Inside The Army
February 16, 2004
Pg. 1

Paratroopers' Needs Rekindles Talk Of Defunct Armored Gun System

The 82nd Airborne Division at Ft. Bragg, NC, still needs a rapidly deployable vehicle with firepower, a requirement some say could be met sooner rather than later if the Army is willing to shake the mothballs from its defunct Armored Gun System, sources say.

"They want an air-droppable platform for forced entry," said a service source, and "they want it now."

As a result, the division recently passed along an "operational needs statement" to Army Forces Command that outlines the unfulfilled requirement, said Maj. Rich Patterson, a spokesman for the 18th Airborne Corps, which oversees the division. The Army's operations and plans office, or "G-3," is reviewing the requirement with Training and Doctrine Command, but no decision has been reached, Patterson said.

While Army leadership may determine AGS is not the solution, the idea of moving the system back into the limelight, at least in a limited way, has caught the attention of a lawmaker who represents the Ft. Bragg area.

The requirement for an air-droppable platform has existed at least since the late 1990s, when the division disbanded one of its battalions -- the 3rd Battalion of the 73rd Armored Regiment, which was equipped with an aging armored reconnaissance vehicle called the Sheridan. At the time, service officials thought other capabilities would become available to the Paratroopers once the M551 Sheridan retired.

When the division deactivated the armored battalion in 1997, however, Army officials had already terminated AGS, which had been regarded as the Sheridan's replacement. Proposed in the 1980s as a lightweight combat vehicle that could fit aboard a C-130, AGS featured a 105 mm cannon, an ammunition autoloader and options for armor protection. United Defense LP had produced a handful of prototypes of the vehicle in 1996, when then-Army Chief of Staff Gen. Dennis Reimer terminated the program. Eliminating AGS freed more than $1 billion over the service's outyear funding plan -- money that was badly needed for other cash-strapped programs, officials said at the time.

What was not eliminated was the need to equip light forces with an air-droppable platform that had enough firepower to hold off opposing forces until heavier forces arrived, sources said.

According to the Army's program executive office for ground combat systems, five AGS prototypes exist today. Four systems reside at UDLP's manufacturing facility in York, PA; one is at a UDLP facility in San Jose, CA.

Herb Muktarian, a spokesman for UDLP's ground systems division in York, said the four M8 AGS vehicles there have been regularly maintained.

"They are in a standard configuration and are in excellent condition," he said. "We are prepared to provide the vehicles and any required support if we were to receive an official request from the Army."

The unmet requirement has caught the attention of Rep. Robin Hayes (R-NC), a member of the House Armed Services Committee whose district includes Ft. Bragg. Hayes contacted the Army's legislative liaison office last December requesting specifics on the ongoing "discussion about getting the AGS" into Army "tactics, techniques and procedures."

"What is your assessment of the immediate operational need for a system to support airfield seizure, forced entry and other missions of the 82nd Airborne Division?" Hayes asked in a Dec. 15, 2003, e-mail. "Can the AGS serve as a near-term solution to an immediate operational need?"

Hayes requested several other details from the Army, including the cost of reviving AGS, spare parts needs and the status of the 82nd Airborne's needs statement. Hayes' spokesman, Jonathan Felts, said Feb. 10 that the congressman has not yet received a response from the Army.

"Congressman Hayes' top priority is that we help our Soldiers in the field as quickly as possible," Felts wrote in a statement.

"Let me be very clear to say that this is not a matter of advocating one system over another," he added. "Rather, the congressman knows that there is an existing technology presently sitting unused, and he is simply inquiring if it is feasible to utilize the capabilities while awaiting future technologies that are in production."

The division's interest in an AGS-like system is nothing new. The division's 17th Cavalry Regiment expressed a desire for such a system several years ago, according to the Army source.

As Inside the Army reported in the fall of 1999, service officials then were looking at all vehicles that could serve as a near-term solution for light forces -- including AGS, the marine corps' Light Armored Vehicle, the Pandur lightweight vehicles used by the Kuwait National Guard and a variant of the M113 armored personnel carrier (ITA, Oct. 4, 1999, p1; Sept. 27, 1999, p1).

The PEO for ground combat systems, which had overseen the AGS program, was directed to conduct a review of the various candidates. For AGS, the office provided Army leaders information on three options: field AGS in the state it was in when the program was terminated; revamp the system with newly developed technologies, then field it; or field AGS in the condition it was in when terminated, but with plans to retrofit the system with new technologies.

Past inquiries into AGS and other systems, however, have failed to "go anywhere," the service source said.

Pulling AGS out of storage might be a more tenable idea today, however, than in 1999 when then-Army Chief of Staff Gen. Eric Shinseki announced plans to invest heavily in a lighter, more lethal future force. After years accepting considerable risk in its current force to fund transformation goals, the Army once again shifted gears last year to focus on ensuring the current force -- stretched thin across the globe -- is adequately equipped. Gen. Peter Schoomaker, who took over Shinseki's job last August, told reporters in October 2003 that he had directed his staff to scrub the force and its transformation plans for existing technologies and equipment that could be used by troops in Iraq or Afghanistan (ITA, Oct. 13, 2003, p1).

-- Anne Plummer

Army Digital Library
www.adtdl.army.mil/cgi-bin/atdl.dll/fm/17-18/f1718.htm

However the Airborne will need infantry to accompany and escort the M8 AGS light tanks and these can moved in conjunction by employing 11-ton M113A3 Gavin light tracked armored personnel carriers which were flown into Northern Iraq by 3D maneuver and were very effective during the 2D maneuver drive into Baghdad:

www.geocities.com/equipmentshop/m113combat.htm

The Army has thousands of M113 Gavins in storage and they are certified for parachute airdrop. The easiest way to employ M8 AGS light tanks and M113 Gavins would be by designating an infantry battalion's "Delta" Weapons company to use M8s/M113s instead of vulnerable HMMWV trucks. Details:

www.geocities.com/equipmentshop/itmaneuversabattalion.htm

Lastly, the reason the Airborne desperately needs light tracked armored vehicles is best shown in the power point show I made for the Airborne Combat Engineers:

www.geocities.com/lightmechsappers

It Takes Infantry

Just three Soldiers man most Delta Company HMMWVs: a driver, a vehicle commander and a gunner for either a Tube-launched, Optically-tracked, Wire command link guided Anti-Tank Guided Missile (TOW ATGM), .50 caliber heavy-barreled machine gun or a 40mm Mk-19 heavy machine gun. This leaves at best just one infantryman who can dismount from the vehicle to conduct such tasks as providing local security, observing down avenues of approach that are blind spots for the driver or gunner, removing wire and other obstacles, and detecting mines. As the reader can quickly assess, this one man is not enough to do this task and it is worth considering that without more dismounted infantry the Delta Companies can barely provide their own security when stopped. In Afghanistan, it became necessary to carry more infantry task organized for route clearing, village sweeps of suspected terrorists, and cordon and searches over suspected terrain. These extra infantrymen were forced to sit cramped, four at a time, in the HMMWV missile hatchback area. An unsafe and less than ideal practice since they lacked seats, belt restraints, clear fields-of-fire and shielding from enemy fires.

In an airfield seizure package (a two battalion mission), there are four to five AT platoons of HMMWVs in a heavy drop. Certainly the AT gun trucks can bring firepower and move out, but they can't move rifle squads to protect themselves from being ambushed. So potentially there is a possible replay of Freddie Gough's jeep squadron’s demise at Arnhem (A Bridge Too Far) during World War Two.

It Takes Full-Cross-Country, Amphibious Armored Mobility

Clearly, for a Delta Company to hunt and kill enemy tanks it must have mobility superior to its prey; road and trail-bound HMMWVs, even unarmored, are simply at a mobility disadvantage against tracked vehicles. Against a combined-arms enemy who skillfully employs suppressive artillery and mortar fires ahead of its main body of tanks, the unarmored Delta Company HMMWVs could be damaged and destroyed by area fires and unable to employ their long-range Improved TOW Acquisition Sight’s (ITAS) observation and missile-firing capabilities. Delta Companies must be as close to one-hundred percent terrain mobile in any terrain anywhere in the world in order to get into observation and firing position first to exploit American advantages in sensors and night vision; this includes lake and river swimming to get into unassailable firing positions since most medium and heavy tanks cannot swim.

The answer to all of the above requirements is to make several 82nd Airborne Delta Companies fully mission dominant by replacing their thirty-five, four-ton HMMWV wheeled trucks with thirty-five, eleven-ton light tracked armored vehicles, initially M113A2 Gavins from Army war stocks. The M113 Gavin is a combat proven air-droppable, amphibious, cross-country mobile armored box that can employ the Delta Company’s current weaponry as well as have space inside for permanent scouts or a task-organized nine man infantry squad from A, B or C Companies. A whole array of appliqué armors to protect against auto-cannon and Rocket Propelled Grenades (RPGs); Command, Control, Communications, Computers, and Information (C4I) situational awareness gear; infrared camouflage ghillie coverings; rubber “band tracks;” gun shields; turrets and mounts are available that can be added on at unit level as experience is gained using the Gavins. Depot-level improvements of larger engines, stretched hulls, hybrid-electric drive trains, and larger engines make the -A3 and later versions the most mobile and stealthy armored vehicles in the world. Currently fifty percent of an Army heavy Division rides in M113s; trained mechanics, Prescribed Load List (PLL), and logistics are already in place to supply and maintain these simple vehicles. The day is coming when the enemy will “own a piece of the night” and we will need stealthy fighting vehicles that are fully camouflaged against enemy electro-optics to include thermals.

The HMMWV is now parachute airdropped on a 16-foot type V platform. The M113 is airdropped on a 20-foot airdrop platform. Although the Gavin is seven tons heavier, the fact that its volume is only a few feet longer than a HMMWV means a Delta Company's thirty-five vehicles can be parachute air-delivered using the same number of heavy drop aircraft. For example, inside a C-130 you can only airdrop one sixteen foot to twenty foot platform with either a HMMWV or a M113 on top; there is not enough width for troops to sit alongside, so space for a second platform must be used instead for troop seats. This is a reason why the 82nd likes to fill aircraft with either all personnel or all equipment and drop them onto separate DZs, even though this means slower assembly and more time exposed on the ground.

A mixed-load of heavy drop vehicles and personnel is easier in the wider C-17 Globemaster III transport jet. Co-author John Miller, in a 2002 airborne operation, had his men sit in the C-17’s fifty-four sidewall seats with two HMMWVs rigged for airdrop in the center single-row aisle. On the first pass, the vehicles were airdropped over the rear ramp. Then on the second pass the ramp was closed and the side paratroop doors opened for his men to jump into the same DZ as their vehicles, resulting in a very quick assembly. Thus, inside a C-17 you can single-row airdrop either two or three M113s, their respective Delta Company Soldiers, and their attached infantry squads sitting alongside their vehicles, then jump immediately on the second pass (preferably using MC1-1D steerable parachutes to land close together into a small heavy DZ adjacent to the main body’s personnel DZ). While this does present the problem of a longer time period for the vehicles on the ground unsecured, it makes more efficient use of available aircraft and is an option war planners may consider.

A smaller DZ makes it easier to find vehicles in the dark; rapidly de-rigging their M113s, the Paratroopers can then launch a horizontal axis attack to unhinge the enemy also trying to cope with the main body’s vertical assault. The Army’s Airborne in training is already routinely launching P +:30 minutes helicopter air assaults onto DZ objectives in conjunction with the main parachute assault; such asymmetric attacks have also been done during actual combat: 1989’s Operation Just Cause in Panama. Why not use Delta Anti-Armor platoons and companies in the same way?

The airborne operation planned for Haiti demonstrated that aircraft de-confliction would be made easier for planners if they had the option to use a separate heavy DZ. It is unrealistic to assume twelve to fifteen UH-60L Blackhawk helicopters are going to be nearby to launch a supporting attack or project forces at P +2 hours since the Airborne might have to project across thousands of miles of oceans; we must have an organic, ground, asymmetric attack capability. The current paratrooper is at least twenty pounds heavier in high-tech equipment than his World War Two predecessor; on foot he is actually slower. This is unacceptable! We must exceed the one- to two- mile per hour walking pace by having organic, armored, tracked mobility.

Since the Delta Company's thirty-five M113 Gavins can move the bulk of an Infantry Battalion over the ground at one to fifty miles per hour, why drop them on heavily defended airfields? Even a platoon drop of a dozen M113s moves an entire infantry company as needed. If it is important for us to take, it is important for them to defend. Much like the air assault airfield seizure Bolger describes in his book during his second stint at JRTC, exploring airfield seizure from the outside in should be considered a serious and viable option. If the main DZ is likely, and obviously, a potential beaten zone for enemy weapons fires, why drop there? Smaller DZs are possible given Global Positioning Systems (GPS) and in-flight navigation systems. A heavy drop of a dozen M113s into nearby heavy DZ, with their crews, would allow a ground-axis horizontal assault onto the main personnel DZ in conjunction with the vertical parachute drop, thus creating a two-directional assault. This means the enemy now has a true asymmetric dilemma. At whom should he shoot?

The Modern Battlefield Requires Advanced Anti-Tank Companies

We recently stumbled upon the new anti-armor platoon and company field manual online. We as an anti-armor community have been waiting for the revisions of FM 7-91, ARTEP 7-91 Drill, and the Mission Training Plan for a long time. Our initial assessment is that it appears to be a marked improvement over the old FM 7-91. It addresses offensive and defensive operations and gives a better chapter on troop leading procedures, especially terrain analysis. Much of the field manual seems a paste of FM 71-1, which is by far, in our opinion, the most useful company level doctrine available to anyone who reads.

Unfortunately, FM 3-21.91 is deficient in several areas: it makes little discussion of the possible employment of the AT platoon and company in closed terrain and urban operations, spends little time on recurring AT missions such as convoy security, or where AT platoons are part of a company team such as route clearance. Most damning of all is a complete failure to even address the M41 ITAS. Fully fielded within the 82nd Airborne Division, 2nd Infantry Division, and partially within the 101st Airborne Division (Air Assault), and 10th Mountain Division, ITAS is a huge leap in capability able to see out to ten kilometers compared to the current five kilometer ranged thermal sights; some classify as a “3rd Generation” advance one or two steps ahead of anything even our allies have now. Unfortunately, the field manual makes no mention of ITAS capabilities, nor does it even mention the acronym ITAS in its glossary.

The impact of “cutting and pasting” another field manual’s contents and “revising” the AT manual in the way it was done is that our Delta Company AT forces will remain “bastard children” of the light infantry and not fully exploited. Even the designation “anti-tank” blinds many to believe that that is its only contribution when it should be realized as also assault firepower suppliers. The anti-armor platoons and companies are misunderstood, frequently neglected, and their real combat potential is too often not actualized. The United States Army infantry does close with and destroy the enemy, but there is a great emphasis on destroying and much less on “closing” to get into positions of advantage, like denying the enemy escape routes into safe havens to fight us again another day. The “send a bullet, not a man” philosophy prevails in most of our technology and how we apply firepower and ignore maneuver. Paradoxically, when push-comes-to-shove, with bullets flying, we are going to employ our anti-tank platoons and companies in many more different ways than we do in our narrowly focused peacetime training, as Afghanistan and Iraq have proven.

In order to get the most out of our anti-tank platoons and companies, the hurdle begins with our doctrine. While doctrine should not dictate the rigid, specific employment of the anti-armor unit, it should address what the platoon is capable of, and its limitations. It is a grave deficiency that other combined-arms doctrinal publications do not adequately discuss capabilities and all of the employment options of the anti-armor platoon and company. In some cases, the units are not discussed or referenced at all! This doctrinal void in anti-armor unit discussion results in poor employment by battalions and brigades of their anti-armor platoons because many see publications as the final manifestation of all that can be done requiring no creative original employment from current leaders.

Lacking suitable discussion in the rifle company and infantry battalion field manuals, we as an infantry branch lead ourselves to ignorance and in some cases irrelevance as others more adaptive to the situation by innovative employment and equipping get the real-world missions. No one outside of an anti-armor unit will likely read FM 3-21.91, Tactical Employment of the Anti-Armor Platoon and Company, because it is not part of larger unit doctrine. It won't be discussed at leader professional development, and it won't be seen as a topic of discussion at those beautiful Fort Polk JRTC task force After-Action Reviews (AARs). What we don't understand as a branch, we will not practice, and so our training reinforces this ignorance.

Many Sensors and Shooters Are Needed To Dominate The Asymmetrical Battlefield

Imagine U.S. forces in a heavy anti-armor fight, in need of maximum AT killing systems as they did during the march to Baghdad. Anyone with professional integrity would admit the fifty-pound Javelin ATGM, despite its amazing fire-and-forget top-attack capabilities, is "collecting dust" in arms rooms across the Army because it is too heavy to manpack. Furthermore, the Javelin is too large and too heavy to jump attached to the individual paratrooper, resulting in XVIII Airborne Corps foot-mobile units not having anti-armor and anti-bunker firepower. By equipping Delta Companies with M113 Gavins, however, we can instead have Javelins stored inside these vehicles for parachute heavy drop, and have their designated platoon gunners and assistant gunners fire their missiles from the top troop hatch (when mounted in .50 caliber and 40mm heavy machine gun equipped vehicles) dismounting for short distances through the rear ramp or troop door to employ their weapon’s thermal sights in concealing terrain. Its sights have already been proven; one could also shoot Javelins from TOW-equipped M113 Gavins. The greatest restriction against longer-range Javelin shots is the limitations of its Command Launch Unit (CLU).

In a non-linear scenario against irregular, asymmetrical enemies hiding in difficult terrain, Army units must be able to fan out and use sensors to cover large areas to deny these foes sanctuary and escape routes. The enemy will most likely escape a thin net of mere unmanned aerial vehicles with narrow fields-of-view if the ground cordon never leaves the DZ or LZ out of fear that its rubber-tired trucks cannot survive in contested lands. This is why it is critical that AT units be mounted in light tracked Armored Fighting Vehicles (AFVs) that can “hold their own” in bad-guy land and yet still be light enough to paradrop by aircraft so to have positional advantage to flank, encircle, pursue and cut-off elusive enemies.

When we go into combat, this ignorance can branch two ways: we can maximize AT capabilities and potential from the beginning, or we can, through less-than-ideal enemy contact and accumulating casualties, decide to use the mobility and firepower of our AT units, leading us back to our historic “American Way of War.” The ideal is we can realize the full mobility, firepower, and surveillance capability of our units and seek every opportunity of massing those effects using existing equipment. One needs look no further than the crucial role of our anti-armor platoons in Panama, Afghanistan and Iraq (though in the latter two situations without light tracked AFVs). More Recently, we have seen the Mk-19s and .50 caliber machine guns hammering enemy positions. We have read of how ITAS equipped units have fired dozens of TOW missiles precisely into opposition in urban areas, however to complete the mobile firepower capability, there must be adequate infantry on the scene to maneuver and hold the ground to deny its use to the enemy. Mounted infantry is hard to achieve with the current HMMWV truck in use by anti-armor companies.

Another advantage to a light tracked armored vehicle: many bad guys adhere to the “if it looks bad and tough, it is bad and tough.” In the third world, many combatants use tanks, artillery and large caliber weapons as status symbols. We saw this in Afghanistan, and Afghanistan Foreign Military Studies Office (FMSO) expert Lester Grau told many deploying Army soldiers about this. The M113 Gavin looks tougher than a HMMWV, no matter how you draw the picture, and it may deter some from the opium- or culturally macho-induced pressure from taking a shot at it. It won't stop the well trained or highly motivated, but it does make someone think more about action and reaction. Clearly, a Chechen rebel was not intimidated by a tracked BMP in Grozni, and a wheeled BRDM or GaZ jeep intimidated him even less, but it is likely that many a thug would say to himself, “Hmmm, maybe I'll wait for a soft-skinned vehicle to come by. Let me go back to my warming campfire,” before shooting at a Delta Company in M113s.

We hope we never have to learn the best way to employ our AT units through blood. At our CTCs, like the open-terrain National Training Center (NTC) and the closed-terrain JRTC, we learn over and over again through simulated death the crucial role of our AT units, but often we do nothing about learning from the training to correct limitations. When the next training cycle begins, our rifle platoons will be off to the shoot house and their maneuver live-fires, and the anti-armor platoons will be off to their multi-purpose ranges, never working together until the bullets are real. This parochialism must change.

We as a branch are kidding ourselves as we are awed by urban operations, and fixate upon room-clearing ignoring the most obvious fact that you first must survive and fight your way into the building before you can even begin to do room clearing. It takes a whole combined-arms team to succeed in urban operations. To limit our anti-armor platoons to blocking positions outside the urban area, or to leading the notoriously frontalist Ground Assault Convoy (GAC) is ridiculous. True, the anti-armor platoon is a standoff supporting base of firepower effort about ninety percent of the time, especially in urban operations. But we need to educate ourselves on better employment options through actual field exercises, and we need to do it immediately. The anti-armor platoon has much to offer in terms of explosive munitions effectiveness and ITAS surveillance capabilities that will require innovative positioning.

Why do we limit the employment of our anti-armor units in training? Our heavy machine gun and Mk-19 manuals openly discuss the munitions effects of these weapons on concrete, brick and wooden logs. The M41 ITAS is generally known as the exceptional thermal sight. It offers superior thermal resolution to the AH-64A Apache, the M1A1 Abrams and M2A2 Bradley. The system can be employed mounted or dismounted, and offers a much lower noise signature than the previous TOW thermal sight. An ITAS can accurately tell if a human is carrying an M4 carbine or an AK47 at ranges under five hundred meters. The system can provide great resolution on humans beyond one kilometer. The ITAS offers vehicle identification beyond three kilometers, and detection out to ten kilometers. The ITAS can bore-sight laser aiming devices to its thermal sight to designate targets for other “killers.” None of this information is hidden, and it is not hard to find more. Why not supply Delta companies with laser target designators co-axial to ITAS, and send designated Soldiers to the joint school for Emergency Close Air Support (ECAS) capabilities with USAF A-10s and pin-point 2.75-inch rockets and Hellfire ATGM support from Army AH-64 Apache gunships?

The truth is we limit much of the employment of our AT units in training because of our training locations. The southeastern United States is heavily wooded, and we have difficulty imagining how the AT unit’s weapons might be employed in a close fight. When training for urban combat, our urban complexes are too small and surrounded by pine trees, so we have a tough time visualizing how our heavy weapons are going to get into the fight. As a result, AT units aren't often employed in the close fight; they guard convoys, command posts, and establish roadblocks when weapon lethality and observation capabilities are most needed to overcome enemies hiding behind urban cover. Perhaps the vulnerability of the HMMWV truck has driven these decisions, but with M113 vehicles we can boldly employ our weapons and troops where they can have maximum effect on the enemy, even if cover and concealment are lacking. The real world is not largely urban areas surrounded by pine trees.

To maximize the full potential of our AT community, we must focus our efforts on three aspects: equipment, education and training. We know that the HMMWV truck is not a combat vehicle and commanders must request war-stock M113 Gavins to replace them as our primary mobility mounts. We know that few will read the AT manual itself, and that even if they did, the AT manual is lacking crucial discussions. But we can ensure that any new infantry publication does adequately discuss anti-armor platoon employment. Discussions of the AT platoon in company and battalion manuals will plant the seeds for reference in discussions and AARs. From education will come the integration in training and full employment of the AT unit weapons and capabilities. Fixing these deficiencies will integrate our anti-armor platoons in ways we have yet to see across the Army. It will lead us to acknowledge what our AT units can offer in terms of mobility, targeting, and firepower. The crucial step for us in the targeting cycle involves detection. If you can label it as a target, your ITAS AT unit stands a good chance of detecting it. If you can detect it, the target can be destroyed.

More Reasons for an Armored Delta Weapons Company

A British Army officer adds the following benefits to our proposal:

1. Protected mobility gives the CO the ability to disperse, concentrate and sustain combat power across his area of responsibility.

2. The unit can enage in limited movement by projecting one element, at a time under armour, then dismounting while the vehicles recover to pick up the next element to move.

3. Using [M113A4 Gavin] MTVL re-supply can be quickly recovered from the DZ and distributed efficently to defensive postions or harbour areas.

4. The ability to use [M113A4 Gavin] MTVL for re-supply means postions that would be un-sustainable on foot can be achieved.

5. [M113A4 Gavin] MTVL allows for the the protection and sustainment of forward ISTAR assetts, and reduces the number and proximity of Soldiers allocated to QRF.

We Can Do This: Airborne, Armored All-Weather Ground Power Projection

An expensive but strategic trump card like the 82nd Airborne Division needs to have organic armored ground mobility starting with the alpha-echelon, not a gradual build-up beginning with the air-landed bravo echelon many hours too late, after the enemy has escaped. What if the enemy mortars your runway starting at P+2 hours and shuts it down for twenty-six hours?

What now colonel?

“That could never happen,” he replies.

Response: Witness the marine Khe Sanh Combat Base in Vietnam. It can happen, it has already happened, and it is time for us to make sure it does not happen again. Fifty percent of an Army heavy division is equipped with M113s. The PLL and the trailed mechanics are all in place to support a relatively small number of these vehicles in the 82nd Airborne Division. We would have guaranteed fifteen kilometers (or more) of power projection from the drop zones by P+2 hours with absolute mobile reserve and follow-on mission capability, despite bad weather or aircraft unavailability. We could have the world's best armored, cross-country mobile, long-range sensor and shooter mechanized infantry assault unit in the world in a few short weeks; all we have to do is ask for the vehicles from war stocks.

Authors’ Biographies

Brigadier General (Retired) David Grange is the Chief Executive Officer of the McCormick Tribune Foundation in Chicago, Illinois, a 30-year Army veteran of the Vietnam War, Operation Urgent Fury in Grenada, Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm in Saudi Arabia and Iraq, and Bosnia. He is a graduate of North Georgia Military College.

Captain John Miller is the former Commanding Officer of Delta Company, 2nd Battalion, 504th Parachute Infantry Regiment, and led his men in combat in Operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan. He is a graduate of Norwich University.

Lieutenant Mike Sparks is a Platoon Leader in an U.S. Army Reserve Airborne unit. He is a former enlisted Non-Commissioned Officer and is a graduate of Liberty University.

Staff Sergeant Brian Heitman was an Anti-Tank Section Leader in Delta Company, 2nd Battalion, 504th Parachute Infantry Regiment. He is a combat veteran of Operations Desert Shield, Desert Storm, Operation Iraqi Freedom in Saudi Arabia and Iraq, and Operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan.

The authors have come together to write two editions of the book, "Air-Mech-Strike: Asymmetric Maneuver Warfare for the 21st Century".

A veteran "Red Leg" Artillery Paratrooper writes:

"Dear Mike,

'I advocate M1064A3s 120mm mortars with an ulterior motive---to ground mount the 120mm mortars and free the carriers to transport infantry. The 120mm mortars can fire guided anti-armor projectiles and do indirect, high angle fire, good for MOUT/trenches etc."

Ah...I see...hehe. Well being of the fire support mind, more steel on target is a good thing.

Like I said....I am totally ignorant to the role of APCs and other 'Mech' type vehicles. I spent all my time in the 82nd so I didn't get to see much.

But, that being said...I did witness guys trying to rig-up 5 tons and 2.5's for air deployment. I always thought they were a little big for that. I know you are right about HQDA, and light divisions. We did a number of field exercises where we never even saw our HMMWVs. A towed artillery unit going 2 weeks with out a truck? We had to coordinate with the UH-60 troops for transpo. I mean it was cool if we did a 3 or 6 gun raid...but we needed them just to move from one firing position to another. And that pretty much would mean we would be dead in a RW engagement...no trucks to evac under fire(a task we had to perform for section evals anyway). We would have to sit under counter fire without being able to leave. So I see if they did assign the M113 or a like vehicle to the 82nd, it would spend more time in the motor pool than in the field. The doctrine would go something like this: "Once you have secured the DZ, your APCs will be brought in with follow on forces when they arrive, but in the mean time move out to your secondary objectives and we will call you when they get here"

If there is a vehicle in the current TO&E that would give Airborne and air-moble light infranty another combat capability, that meets there deployment requirements, it should be assigned. If that vehicle can be air-dropped, air-lifted, or slung under a shit-hook, then it should be used.

Maybe in company sized elements at first. If I remember right, the infantry battalions in the 82nd are cut up into 3 light inf. maneuver companies, and 1 anti-tank (turtle hummer with TOW) company. Make the new battalion line of march to be 2 light inf. maneuver companies, 1 armored/mech company, and 1 anti-tank company (mix platoons of armored and HMMWV). I am not an expert but that would give the battalion task force something to breech strong defensive positions. And with the addition of a platoon or company sized element of light armor, every thing could be done in house, which gives the division more punch in that 72 hour period (which is longer cause it will take more than that to alert and move any division sized heavy elements to the theatre). Once the vehicle has proven its usefulness, then the Divsion command staff can make the final decision on wether or not to implement it through out the battalion task force or not.

Which brings me to another beef. The largest manuever element in the current doctrine is the Division right? If that is so, how can someone on "the hill" make a decision on what the division or brigade needs to accomplish its mission. That is like telling you what kind of things you need in YOUR car.

Oh..I know that DA hates the Airborne. The Officer Corps wants to have the wings...but doesn't want the work. My graduating jump school class was almost 600 strong. Of that 600 less than 100 ended up doing time as a Airborne assignment. The other 500 went back to leg business as usual. And the officers just went back to the career track. I don't think everyone needs to be Airborne. I think between the 1 division, and 2 seperate task forces we have, that the mission is there. The mission is the issue. Not the Airborne. All units have a mission statement. That takes us back to the inferiority issue. There isn't a damn thing we can do to change their minds.

They keep the Airborne/Special community locked up in the kennel and only pull them out when the more conventional elements are either incapable or unwilling to perform the mission. They pat them on the head and say 'good job' but get back in the cage.

Yet, look at the last 3 Chairmen of the Joint Chiefs. 2 were from the Airborne community, the other was a ticket puncher. So, obviously the Airborne community is either what you want for leadership, or something to get a ticket punched on your way up. For someone to hate that community is simply ridiculous. Their very actions tell us that they can't live without them....maybe that is why they don't like them."

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