FUTURE AIRBORNE WARFARE: MOBILE COLUMNS WITHOUT FIXED SUPPLY BASES

UPDATED 1/14/05

"The supply by air of Airborne forces in the enemy's rear areas is basically a technical problem which can be solved...."

Gen. Franz Halder, German Chief of Staff WWII

War is full of lost opportunities:
Falaise Gap (40,000 Germans escaped)
Anzio (Rome not taken)
Drive over Belgium in 1944 and later
Arnhem; (Rhine crossing bridge lost)

Often these opportunities are not exploited because adequate supplies were not there to support an advance upon the enemy. In WWII, the Allies basically fought every German unit in every battle we met them in a broad-front attrition struggle. Attempts were made to make a breakthrough and focus a spearhead to cut the enemy's "jugular" but either the Germans at the spear point were too good or our forces/supplies were too thin to properly exploit success.

Part of Attrition warfare is the need for hugh amounts of supplies to enable the force to kill every Soldier on every battlefield. Many commanders felt then, and many do today that large logistics bases are needed to conduct this style of warfare. Unfortunately both Amphibious warfare (usmc) and Airborne warfare (XVIIIth Airborne Contingency Corps) forces are now in the mind-set that their mission is to be the specialists "who knock the door down", and let someone else reinforce and finish the job of defeating the enemy. This is Amphibious/Airborne base seizure not warfare, or an "Anzio" mentality. After flanking the Germans at Anzio, the road to Rome was undefended but ignored as supplies were built-up on the beach. By the time the force was ready to move out, the Germans had moved in, almost pushing the entire force off the beach.

Studies/improvements since that time have only led to a larger foothold being desired by these forces; be it force beachhead line, airhead recon/security zone etc.

In 4th Generation Warfare (4GW), openings must be grabbed the "window of opportunity" in an age of mass communications is too small. For example, the PDF knew about the invasion of Panama hours before because off the volume of radio traffic increasing; they couldn't decrypt the messages but they knew.

Opportunities exploited: Operation Just Cause in Panama

But U.S. Army Generals Thurman and Stiner crafted an amazing plan for the invasion of Panama. Did the 82nd Airborne Division after parachuting into Toucomen airport just set up an airhead? A Recon & Security line? Within hours after landing the 82nd Airborne' Paratroopers were on assault helicopters flying to take out key units of the PDF. They were not in a defensive mode, preventing disaster, rather they were in an offensive mode speeding success. So must it be in future warfare in order to collapse an enemy quickly by destroying his center(s) of cohesion. But Panama was "a special case with U.S. logistics bases already in place" some will say....But with precision guided munitions, every battle will be "special", if we are not daring and unpredictable, we'll be dead. The enemy is gaining precision strike capabilities on the ground and in the air--we must not be wed to vulnerable fixed bases! Every battle/campaign must be planned on a case-by-case basis, not by inflexible "cookie-cutter" plans. Even the Russians after seeing Desert Storm concluded that "stereotypical deployment of forces must be avoided at all costs". An example of this was M551 Sheridan light armored fighting vehicles being low-velocity airdropped into Panama from USAF transports for mobile fire support in support of the Paratrooper advance. It is through innovative logistics means that strategic and tactical surprise will be achieved on the modern battlefield.

Fixed or Mobile Supply?

It is painfully obvious that as the war in Vietnam progressed, the U.S. land presence increased, hugh facilities to keep helicopters, men and machines together became vulnerable rear areas for enemy attack. Much combat power was spent protecting these "safe" areas that could have been used elsewhere to destroy the enemy. This was a deliberate tactic on the enemy's part to dilute our efforts; earlier against the French, it diluted the latter's forces throughout the countryside so they couldn't mass to breakthrough to the garrison at Dien Bien Phu.

Airborne operations unfortunately are stigmatized by two operations in WWII, Crete and Arnhem. From Crete, the idea that we must seize a supply base preferably a runway (airhead) to rush in airlanded reinforcements; Arnhem that paratroops must be dropped close to if not on top of the objectives. Both of these conclusions are reactions to the technical problems that existed with the Airborne operation in WWII that do not exist today. The Germans couldn't jump with their actual infantry weapons, so they were 100% reliant upon separate equipment drop containers, when these were landed between them and the Allies, a costly struggle ensued....Not to mention the "Ultra Secret" which allowed the Allies to intercept German messages and be waiting on the exact drop zones, yet they were still pushed into the sea by the German Airborne. The British Airborne's handful of gun-jeeps slated to rush up to the Arhem bridge failed to survive the glider landings or were blocked on roads. The science of airdropping supplies is reliable enough to supply troops in the field without need of a runway so they can drop AWAY FROM ENEMY AIR DEFENSES, and with lightweight airdroppable armored fighting vehicles so EVERY Paratrooper can move at high speed x-country over the battlefield.

So why land Paratroops and have them fixate on defending terrain features to preserve an aircraft line of supplies when they could move out immediately from the drop zone and strike decisively while surprise and opportunity is on their side? What many forget is that after pulling themselves together on Crete, the German Airborne and Mountain troops formed into mobile Kampfguppes using special motorcycle half-tracks and powerful 75mm recoilless guns, both of which the Allies did not believe were air-deliverable, and drove three times as many Allied men into the sea. The is true Airborne warfare and is what the 82nd Airborne did in Panama when it (along with other U.S. forces) collapsed the Panamanian Defense Forces from the inside out through maneuver.

What needs to be done is to develop the means to free the Airborne from having the need to seize airfields, and objectives from close range parachute assault, first by logistically light high mobility devices. This is described in detail in my article from long ago, "The Need for Indirect Parachute Assaults", Tactical Notebook 6/93.

The next step is to have a MOBILE, moving "airhead" to enable Airborne troops--ALL OF THEM to concentrate on decisive victory without having to waste forces (and most importantly time) defending vulnerable field supply bases. The two technological advances that make this possible are reliable world-wide satellite communications and precise navigation systems.

Enhanced Container Deliver Systems (ECDS): Mechanize Airborne Logistics


New ECDS pallets stacked!

Problem 1: USAF 463L pallets are $1500 each and fragile. They are not airdropped as Container Delivery System (CDS) bundles, skid 3/4" plywood is used (see photo at top of this web page of a CDS bundle). Even that's not cheap: $50 per chunk of wood from your local hardware store. The plywood and honeycomb shock absorbers are not cheap and are not recoverable on the drop zone by Paratroopers on foot. Thus, CDS is not aggressively trained on by the 82nd Airborne. We are not training as we would fight.

Problem 2: Since we do not train on hundreds of CDS bundles covering an equipment drop zone, in real life it takes days to clear the DZ of these supplies through laborous break-bulk of the CDS bundles onto FMTV and HMMWV trucks. In a shooting war this is too dangerous. Trucks and MHE cannot pick up and load skid board CDS bundles that rest flat on the ground.

Problem 3: The 463L pallets are pushed off the rear ramp of USAF aircraft after airlanding but break in TRAINING after just two short drops. Even if they do not break, they cannot be picked up by forklift because they are flat and rest flush against the ground/runway etc.

SeaBox has a new "Enhanced Container Delivery System" (ECDS) pallet that has 4-way sleeves for a forklift to pick them up after airdrop or airland. Cost is $4,950 each.

However, after just 2 uses of 463L combat off-load, the 463L is destroyed. After 6 missions 463L losses alone will pay for the ECDS which is durable and indestructible (infinite amount of uses).

To be more durable than the balsa wood core of the 463L the ECDS has a heavy duty extruded aluminum core.

SeaBox's ECDS is 650 pounds vs the 463L's 358 pounds.

The SeaBox ECDS at 250 pounds heavier over 463L is worth it because:

a. Its reusable unlike plywood so we will actually start training as we fight; supplies can be rigged for airdrop for assault echelons on DRB-1 status at all times without fear of deterioration like plywood is susceptible to

b. Is strong enough to be dropped without damage---unlike 463L

c. Will save $ in long run over 463L and lost plywood

d. Can be picked up quickly off the drop zone by rough terrain fork lifts

e. Can be attached to the top of a CROP platform to be picked up by PLS

PLS

www.army.mil/fact_files_site/pls/

Mission

Perform line haul, local haul, unit resupply, and other missions in the tactical environment to support modernized and highly mobile combat units. Rapid movement of combat configured loads of ammunition and all classes of supply, shelters and containers.Entered Army Service 1993

Description and Specifications

The Palletized Load System (PLS) consists of a prime mover truck with an integral self-loading and unloading capability, a payload trailer (M1076), and demountable cargo beds, referred to as flatracks. The PLS prime mover truck carries its payloads on its demountable flatrack cargo beds, or inside 8 x 8 x 20 ft International Standards Organization (ISO) containers, or shelters. The PLS prime mover truck comes in two mission-oriented configurations: the M1074 and the M1075. The M1074 is equipped with a variable reach Material Handling Crane (MHC) to support forward-deployed Artillery units. The M1075, without MHC, is used in conjunction with the M1076 trailer in support of transportation line haul missions. The M1076 trailer, capable of carrying payloads up to 16.5 tons, is equipped with a flatrack that is interchangeable between truck and trailer. The prime mover truck and trailer form a self-contained system that loads and unloads its cargo without the need for forklifts or other material handling equipment. Without leaving the cab, the driver can load or unload the truck in less than one minute, and both truck and trailer in less than five minutes.

Two additional pieces of equipment enhance PLS flexibility. The M3 containerized roll-in/out platform (CROP) is an A-frame type flatrack which fits inside a 20-ft ISO container. A container handling unit (CHU) enables PLS to pick up and transport ISO containers without using a flatrack. Flatracks and CROP are interchangeable between PLS and the HEMTT-LHS.

By converting the XVIII Airborne Corps to ECDS, it can revolutionize the way it sustains itself in battle by in a matter of minutes clearing the DZ of all of its supplies via rough terrain forklifts moving them to a covered and concealed position or loading them onto trucks to become completely mobile. Supplies are not destroyed and men are less likely to be killed fumbling around on the DZ with ECDS. Supplies stay in their palletized form until they reach their users who break bulk them down.

Mechanized Units that are not in the Airborne mode of operation can be resupplied by ECDS airdrop and load their bulk supplies of ammo, food, water and even fuel rapidly onto their cargo trucks from a nearby impromptu drop zone. Smaller FMTV trucks can have PLS capability as the picture above shows, and/or have a winch and a ramp to hoist ECDS pallets onto their cargo beds. Ideally, our resupply should be armored and tracked using air-transportable XM1108 variant Gavins. No wastage and trash need occur---the honeycomb stays under the supplies and the cargo parachutes can be thrown on top and returned eventually to the rigger unit saving vast amounts of Army funds. But right now with our airplane-to-unmechanized resupply system air items are thrown away because the Paratroopers on foot do not have a way in combat to recover large cargo parachutes weighing hundreds of pounds.

www.SeaBox.com

CORPORATE OFFICE & AUXILIARY DEPOT

Sea Box, Inc.
802 Industrial Highway
East Riverton, NJ 08077
Tel. (856) 303-1101
Fax. (856) 303-1501

NORTH JERSEY DEPOT

499 Hollywood Ave.
South Plainfield, NJ 07080
sales@seabox.com

ECDS bundle: SKEDCO "Magic Carpet" for dragging

Theory vs. Practice.

In theory, you can drag the ECDS across the drop zone to first get it out of the line of fire. BUT WILL WE DO IT REGULARLY AT PLACES LIKE SICILY DZ AT FORT BRAGG? Will the Army scratch up and mud-encrust up the bottoms of their expensive ECDS pallets?

No, no, a thousand times no!

We "Know" how these guys think. ECDS has to go on a USAF airplane this means IT HAS TO BE TIDY BOWL CLEAN.

Conclusion: they ain't gonna be dragging ECDS bundles as-is.

However,

Why not have the ECDS bundle DZ clearing vehicle have on its back end a SKEDCO "Magic Carpet"---a large piece of plastic with walls that the ECDS bundle is pulled onto and then......the back wall is closed and then the SKEDCO takes the mud and scratches for the ECDS until it gets to the ECDS bundle collection point. This way the ECDS can stay the way it is...and in fact the "Magic Carpet" could be used to retrieve plywood skid CDS bundles, too.

BREAKTHROUGH! A WAY TO PICK_UP & MOVE ECDS BUNDLES: Amaze-N-Tow (ANT)

Inventive genius, Butch Walker's AMAZE-N-TOW (ANT) could emplace and move ECDS pallet bundles such that Airborne units can do this themselves! All they need is to airdrop the ANT on its own ECDS or on a Type V airdrop platform with even a pathetic Humvee truck as the prime mover. We can do this. ANTs run for about $15K.

www.amaze-n-tow.com
amazentow@earthlink.net
(800) 688-7627

Armored Airdrop Resupply Recovery Vehicle (AA-RRV)

The vehicle shuttling ECDS bundles off the open, danger area DZ must be ARMORED and TRACKED to protect the Paratroopers as they do this, and to have maximum traction in all weather and vegetation and soil conditions. The armored cargo-carrying variant of the parachute-airdroppable, amphibious, helicopter-transportable M113 Gavin 10.5 ton light tracked armored fighting vehicle (TAFV) is called the XM1108. The XM1108 has a stretched hull distinguishable by its 6 road-wheels common to the mobile tactical vehicle light (MTVL) upgrade but behind the armored cab its a cut-down flat bed for cargo. As an Armored Airdrop Resupply Recovery Vehicle (AA-RRV) for Airborne units the XM1108 would be parachute airdropped into the heavy equipment drop zone on a type V airdrop platform for immediate recovery by designated personnel to clear the HDZ of ECDS bundles. The AA-RRV would tow the SKEDCO "magic carpet" or Amaze-N-Tow up to the ECDS bundle as one Paratrooper mans a gunshield-protected .50 caliber heavy machine gun to kill/suppress any enemies trying to interfere, as another Para would get out, hook the ECDS bundle onto the magic carpet or ANT, get back into the armored cab and they'd zoom the ECDS bundle to the designated supply collection point. The AA-RRV would be a hybrid-electric drive, 500 hp vehicle with 600 mile range on one 95 gallon load of internal fuel for many days of ECDS bundle shuttling as well as stealth silent mode if covertness is required. A fold down ramp and winch would be on the rear of the cab to carry ECDS bundles on back as an armored transport means after the shuttling ECDS bundles off the DZ mission is complete. The winch can also help the already powerful AA-RRV's tracked propulsion means get other less-capable wheeled vehicles out of mud/ditches. The Palletized Loading System (PLS) load/offload means could also be on the AA-RRV rear area for resupply using larger PLS flat racks. Fold-down or detachable side walls at the cargo area with a sacrificial face to pre-detonate RPGs would protect the cargo on AA-RRVs from destruction during transport.

ECDS Weight, Complexity & Costs?

The Cost threshold when you no longer train as you would fight

If the "disposable" thing is so costly that it passes the threshold of where you cannot train on it in full quantities and as often as you like, it needs to be a re-usable item so we do not throw money away every time we use it.

CDS bundle skid board plywood is an example. In theory a $100 sheet of plywood per every two CDS bundles should not empty the unit budget if the plywood is recovered on the DZ. But the plywood is NOT recovered on the DZ, and soon the hundreds of dollars of plywood becomes thousands and thousands of dollars of plywood and units stop training as they would fight with many, many CDS bundles with a war time budget that can afford to throw stuff away. So in training we will drop a few token CDS bundles and "guard them" where they drop so the riggers get their stuff back which ruins the training that the users need to get so they can optimize resupply recovery equipment and techniques. Its a sham.

Complexity Bad: trash on the drop zone

Let's say money is not a problem even in training, and you drop multiple CDS bundles with plywood skid boards and you do not care that the troops leave them on the ground or the more industrious ones use them for overhead cover roofs for fighting positions. In a top-down dictatorial, demeaning outfit like the Army we can just order lower ranking Soldiers to clean up the mess for the main body.

First, we are being a "penny wise" and a "pound foolish" here. The plywood skidboards cannot be lifted by forklifts to rapidly clear the DZ or stack to make supply dumps. In the wide open, DZ a danger area---supplies will have to be "break bulked" from their CDS bundles and placed into trucks. There is no guarantee that the men trying to do this will not be killed and the supplies destroyed. Without resupply and only jumping in with a 3-day supply of ammo, water and food the entire Airborne operation could fail. Even if the DZ is secure enough to break bulk CDS bundles into truck or manpack loads, it will leave enormous amounts of plywood, honeycomb, straps trash in addition to expensive cargo parachutes that must be cleared before aircraft can land. If we are airdropping stuff to refugees or independent, "flying columns" of ground troops/vehicles and do not care if any of the airdrop means are returned, sure we can toss away plywood, honeycomb and just eat the loss of expensive parachutes and nylon straps. But THROW-AWAY AIRDROP RESUPPLY should not be the preferred way to airdrop resupply U.S. forces that have a two-way flow of supplies going in and casualties and empty containers going out. U.S. forces need efficient resupply means that limits trash and head ache/time loss for troops who need to be focused on fighting the enemy.

Complexity Good: Dual-Use is the answer to recovering items

ECDS solves this because its a re-usable airdrop platform and at the same time a ground pallet that forklifts can lift on and off trucks and make stacks with to create supply dumps.

Since ECDS has a dual air and ground use, the question is why not have EVERY UNIT IN THE ARMY USE ECDS PALLETS FOR GROUND RESUPPLY NOT JUST AIRBORNE UNITS FOR AIRDROP RESUPPLY?. Then if an Air Delivery Unit (Riggers) drop say 100 x ECDS pallets to the 3rd Infantry Division maneuvering to capture an enemy capital city, all they would need to do to get their 100 x ECDS pallets back would be to get 100 x ECDS pallets from the 3rd ID rear, NOT insist that the exact 100 x ECDS pallets held by the 3rd ID's maneuvering units locked in mortal combat stop what they are doing and return them by dangerous ground movement.

In other words, airdrop resupply items by NOT BEING JUNK; by being items that have a ground purpose that is well thought out and in use by ground units, we insure they are returned by better yet exchange for like items. By being a forklift pallet, ECDS enables units to not have to break bulk on the DZ, but can shuttle supply bundles quickly and intact off the DZ and into covered, guarded supply dumps, where they supplies can then be break-bulked as needed. The entire Airborne force with enough motor transport remains mobile to relocate to an entirely different area or go into the attack with all its supplies. No more will the Airborne be stuck to fixed airheads; airdrop resupply could come to them wherever they are on the battlefield at that moment via the GPS precision we now have.

Weight

The ECDS is a little too heavy at 650 pounds which cuts into aircraft payloads and makes them difficult to man handle on the ground when empty but skeletonizing them should save 100-200 pounds of weight.

Modular Airdrop Ballistic Blankets (MABBS)

So let's proceed with airdrop resupply that is over 100 pounds in bulk ECDS bundles. On the non-linear battlefield where the enemy can attack at any time in any direction, there is no guarantee that supplies on top of unarmored, rubber-tired trucks from the DZ are going to make it to the troops fighting the enemy. In fact, during the 3rd ID's march to Baghdad in 2003, they ran dangerously low on ammunition and fuel and two resupply columns in vulnerable trucks were wiped out by the enemy and did not get through. Fortunately we had just enough ammo to prevail, but next time we might not be so lucky. Luck ran out for the dead resupply Soldiers who tried to make an ill-conceived linear battlefield (NLB) supply system work. The days of a 100 division U.S. Army clearing out all enemies in large geographic areas so "Red Ball Expresses" of trucks can shuttle men/supplies in vulnerable, unarmored trucks is over. The 10 division Army must bypass enemy forces and collapse the enemy's center of governmental and military gravity to collapse the enemy not annihilate him slowly and everywhere he is found. Flying columns that go for the enemy's "jugular" must be resupplied and airdrop that is precise is an important means to this end because it flies over enemy ambushers on the ground. However, once the supplies are on the ground, they are still vulnerable to ambush and confiscation for use by the enemy or destruction.

The current CDS A-22 bag/cover is a flimsy canvass that does little more than keep dirt/dust out of loads. Once on the ground, and a bundle is break-bulked, its yet another pain in the ass to recover along with the cargo parachute (s). It should be replaced with a kevlar or other ballistic protective material "blanket" offering protection from 7.62mm x 39mm AKM bullets and shrapnel/explosions destroying the cargo as its transported from DZ to the troops. Let's now look at the "Modular Airdrop Ballistic Blankets System" (MABBS) in terms of weight, complexity and cost.

MABBS will surely weigh more than thin A-22 canvass, perhaps twice as much. However, this weight will pay for itself because its moot point if the cargo gets destroyed because the thin canvass A-22 bag doesn't protect it from enemy fire effects. MABBS would be more complex because its heavier and slightly harder to rig than an already pain-in-the-ass A-22 container (as hard as that would be), perhaps not on second thought! If MABBS is done right, it would be MODULAR, meaning it could plug into truck beds to act as a protective liner after its no longer used as a cover for the ECDS bundle. Again, the dual-use capability. Every time an ECDS bundle is received by the ground unit and break-bulked, it now has a ballistic liner to line its truck beds to protect cargoes and troops or to do the same to ISO container "Battle Boxes". All the Rigger unit has to do is keep a running tab on how many MABBS they have given to the supported ground units and ask for them back at the end of the war. MABBS is one item that we need to mass produce and give freely to our troops who need every ounce of ballistic protection on the NLB against roadside bombs, RPGs and ambushes. In times of peace, after the training exercise is over the ground unit returns the MABBS to the Rigger unit.

Reuseable ORANGE/TAN plastic "trash" bags for recovering cargo parachutes & air items

With ECDS + MABBS, we have now reduced the throw-away portion of a CDS bundle down to just honeycomb cardboard. ECDS doubles as a forklift pallet, and MABBS as ballistic blankets on the ground. This leaves us with the cargo parachutes themselves and nylon strappings, D rings etc. The MABBS would have a pouche on its side to hold a VERY, VERY LARGE, inexpensive but reusable plastic trash bag TAN on one side and ORANGE on the other. To recover the cargo parachutes and other nylon air items, this plastic trash bag is removed from the MABBS pouch and stuffed inside. If speed of recovery is paramount, the blaze ORANGE side is shown for troops/vehicles to drive by and toss them onto the back of a cargo bed. If tactical covertness or a dangerous situation exists, the TAN side would be shown out.

New Ways to insure airdrops land where they need to: GPS & SATCOM microwave radios

Signals go straight up to a satellite which then bounces the signal back down to be received anywhere on the earth. Today's "General Urqhart" doesn't have to have communications break-down when keeping units coordinated. The Airborne can call for supplies and the request will be heard.

Navstar GPS "Plugger"

Inside the transport aircraft, the Airborne mobile column's grid coordinates can be flown to using navigation satellites that emit signals to give aircrews and Paratroops a precise fix over the earth.

Very Low-Altitude and FREEDROP: cargo lands exactly where its needed!

Another surprising fact is that cargo parachutes can deploy at very low altitudes--under 500 feet for very little wind drift. And many items to include rations and ammo can be FREEDROPPED---no parachutes, no drift! Look at the photos above! Paratroopers can also jump from as low as 250 feet routinely using the British Irvin parachute system.

NEW DEVELOPMENT!!! Disposible Rotary-Wing Airdrop Resupply System: "CopterBox"

Face it: we don't parachute airdrop resupply our Army units in contact. Only for the Airborne/SOF.

This is wrong.

During the they ran perilously low on ammunition. If we had a cheaper and simpler way to airdrop resupply we could have delivered critical 12.7mm (.50 cal) and 7.62mm ammo into a precise location in urban Iraq and made it not needed for ground resupply trucks to try to get through enemy opposition which risks our Soldier's lives. In 4th Generation War, where we seek to bypass enemy rear guards and take out their military and governmental "centers of gravity" we need a way to air resupply our maneuvering forces with precision to reach units in urban areas and at a low-cost to be disposible.

The fact is that conventional parachute resupply costs too much money in parachutes, honeycomb and plywood for small CDS bundles such that even the Airborne doesn't do it as they should in training.

If it is done, we have all sorts of trash on the DZ and no way for foot-grunts to pick it all up! (result: it ain't being done). Its about 300+ pounds of airdrop materials just to make a G-14 CDS bundle work! Who wants to hump out all these materials on their back? A 12-man SF A-Team or 9-man infantry squad cannot afford to divide 300 pounds of supplies and airdrop junk onto their backs.


If you are in an armored vehicle, parachute CDS supplies can be recovered and if the combat situation permits, returned to their air delivery unit. What if you are on foot or in the middle of a firefight? Achmed gets a $1,000 nylon parachute tent for his girlfriend for free courtesy of Uncle Sam. OK if he's a civilian refugee from a natural or man-made disaster, bad if he's the enemy!

If you are in a ground vehicle, parachute CDS makes sense because you can throw the expensive cargo shoot on board and recover it back to the Air Delivery Unit Riggers. But if all you need is ammo and water, and you are on foot you need the minimal amount of airdrop packing for supplies that are in manpack sizes.

In high-altitude regions like Afghanistan, aircraft cannot simply airland to resupply troops. Even if they can find a suitable assault zone to airland on, 463L pallets are notoriously fragile (aluminum covered balsa wood) and when they are pushed off the rear ramp of the USAF or Army ramp equipped aircraft they often break. Now you have a broken 358 pound 463L pallet with netting and more supplies than a small team can handle on foot. We need to push out loads from aircraft overhead so they do not have to land or expose themselves to enemy fire, but not have them drift away under a parachute or crash into rocks and break if free-dropped. Freedrop is great but some fragile items like morphine ampules need a slowed, cushioned descent.

The result of all of this is the potential of small airdrop resupply is NOT being done throughout the Army like we used to do in WWII, Korea and Vietnam. LTC John Paul Vann saved the day in Korea free-dropping ammo from his O-1 Bird Dog observation/attack plane to surrounded U.S. troops.

SMALL AIRDROP RESUPPLY HAS GOT TO BE THROWAWAY AND INEXPENSIVE OR IT AIN'T GOING TO BE DONE!


CopterBox in Flight!

Retired Colonel Chuck Warren, an Army Combat Infantryman and fixed-wing Aviator who has done air resupply by Bird Dog aircraft in Vietnam himself has come up with the definitive solution that enables almost any under 60 pound cargo to be dropped with a slow descent using the cardboard rotors of a helicopter instead of a costly parachute.

www.dropmaster.com/pages/686308/index.htm
http://mywebpages.comcast.net/dropmaster/dropmaster.htm

The CopterBox: A Lightweight, Disposable Air Cargo Delivery System

The CopterBox can deliver up to 100 pounds of emergency supplies from a wide variety of aircraft with drop speeds of up to 130 knots. The corrugated paper box employs three rotor blades that use the principle of autorotative lift to slow it and its payload to a gradual descent prior to ground contact. The CopterBox can delay opening its descent rotors for High Altitude Low Opening (HALO) insertions so the delivery aircraft can stay well above enemy air defense weapons as we did at An Loc in Vietnam.

The CopterBox makes economic sense in applications where a parachute would not be practical or prudent. The CopterBox requires very little time and training to pack and rig prior to launch.

A welded wire rotor hub is used to protect the box prior to launch and to withstand the aerodynamic and centrifugal forces of flight during descent.

Please email us with your questions and comments. Videos of developmental testing and a brochure are available via the link below or via CD-ROM. We need your input.

U.S. Patent 5,947,419

Video & Brochure Download:

To see our video, brochure, pictures, news and our white paper, click HERE.

Call us for pricing information! We are now taking orders for our current configuration.

Contact Information:

DropMaster, Inc.
3600 Abernathy Drive
Fayetteville, NC 28311
(910)630-DBOX (3269)
copterbox@dropmaster.com

Charles V. Warren, President
(910) 630-2997

www.defensetech.org/archives/001059.html

"COPTERBOX" FOR MEDS, SUPPLIES

A few weeks back, we looked at the Army's "medical missile" for shooting supplies to wounded Soldiers in hot zones. Well, apparently, there's more than one flying first aid kit out there.

With funding from the Army, Fayetteville, NC's DropMaster, Inc. has developed a "CopterBox" -- a fast-spinning, cardboard cylinder equipped with rotating blades -- that can be used to airdrop supplies to Soldiers in need.

Chuck it out of a helicopter or a plane, and the CopterBox will slow a 60 lb. payload to 34 feet per second. And "since it spins at about 400 RPM, it cuts through trees and always reaches the ground, unlike parachute-based systems," writes DropMaster's engineering director Chase Warren. Plus, the things are cheap, Chase says: just $300 a pop.

But right now, the Pentagon ain't buying, Chase complains. Despite a small business grant from the Army -- and nine years of work by "my father, 5 other people and me" -- Chase says the answer has been the same from every branch of the U.S. military he's approached: "We don't have a requirement for your concept. No one has come to us asking for this."

THERE'S MORE: The Australian military has been using a similar product for years, notes Defense Tech reader GK.

www.defence.gov.au/news/raafnews/editions/4401/story01.htm

These "heliboxes" have maximum weight of just 7.5 kg, he says, but they're just right for rations, water, and the like.

Posted by noahmax at August 13, 2004 12:32 AM

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Copterbox has this all solved!

And its PRECISE without expensive GPS electronics to steer parachutes.

What are we waiting for?

Mobile Airborne Warfare

In WWII, airdrop had progressed to where a force of Chindits led by visionary British General Orde Wingate, parachuted/glider landed into Burma where they engaged the Japanese supply lines/communication using mobile warfare, continuously resupplied by air. Light planes evacuated casualties off dirt strips, and even gliders were "snatched" by low flying C-47 transports. Outnumbered, the Chindits could not afford a set-piece battle, choosing to say moving which tired the men to exhaustion in the thick jungle. Later, more conventional forces like General Slim's "Admin box" were saved by air resupply drops during the battle of Kohima-Imphal in 1944. The Allies could not have beat the Japanese in the CBI theatre without airdrop. Today, things could be even better.

Airborne Infantry Fighting Vehicles, folding All-Terrain Bicycles, All Terrain All-purpose Carts can be airdropped with Paratroopers and used as mobility means to prevent men from having to carry themselves and their gear on foot all over the battlefield. Paratroopers with organic Survival Evasion Resistance Escape skills, and a lightweight holistic field living/load bearing system could live off the land if need be, allowing air logistics to concentrate on food/ammo since in most areas water could be collected/purified by hand-pump reverse osmosis water purifiers. The 1st TSG's Project Hi-Speed suggestions now an entire web site at www.geocities.com/Pentagon/Quarters/2116 can guide units and individuals towards achieving the capability of the Airborne force to carry 30 plus days of supplies with them into the battle--plenty of time before ship resupply can commence. Who says Airborne forces have to be hamstrung logistically?

The Airborne mobile column would be its own "supply base" taking with it only what it needs for the immediate fight, with resupply coming in on schedule, on call over Satcom and on target via Navstar global positioning satellite. The Israelis did this often in the 1967 and '73 wars to keep armored columns on the move (see picture above). Even the lazy and apathetic marines during Operation Iraqi Freedom would clear a 3,000 foot stretch of highway of all debris and have KC-130 Hercules aircraft airland to deliver 6,000 gallons of fuel bladders per sortie to keep their fusterclucks of rubber tired trucks rolling (See Smith/West's The March Up pages 127 & 142). The amazing FLEX-CELL fuell bladders could be dropped without any pumping equipment as the tracked vehicles run over the FLEX-CELLs to pressurize hoses to refill themselves. The "Blackstar" technique of infrared chemlights on airdropped cargo bundles and then using night vision goggles to spot them can be used to prevent enemy location of the Airborne mobile column from spotting the resupply parachutes. Reinforcements could parachute directly into the mobile column's temporary defensive position via low-altitude parachutes and accurate world-wide mapping on computers, made into color photocopied topographical maps for deploying Paratroopers.

The air defense weapons of maneuvering Airborne units also double as protection for resupply aircraft from enemy fighters, though being on them move is the best defense. Local air supremacy is possible using ground-based missiles coupled to a highly mobile force; with the Afghan freedom fighters robbing the Soviet Air Force from the skies by using hand-held Stinger should-fired surface-to-air missles; the first time this has occurred in modern history. Today's Airborne has even more advanced Stingers; a missile that has knocked aircraft down from the Falklands to the mountains of Southern Asia. A fixed base invites counter-attacks; being small and mobile can be a blessing, especially if your combat power is compact, flexible and resilient.

The re-supply aircraft should infiltrate using terrain masking flight when over enemy controlled areas, using free and high velocity airdrop from high altitudes to evade any enemy air defense weapons whenever possible. These aircraft could sortie out from a nearby allied base outside of the war zone (C-130 Hercules-intra-theater airlift) or even from the Continental U.S. (C-141B, C-5B, C-17 inter-theater airlift) during the initial deployments and in emergencies.

Fixed-wing and Helicopter CopterBox resupply to inland Airborne forces from navy amphib ships needs to be practiced and perfected, in the spirit of the mc's oft-neglected 4th Mission. Better yet would be a handful of SL-7 fast or LMRS Bob Hope class RO-RO medium-speed sealift ships with flight decks for carrying attack/transport helicopters that would speed to the scene to resupply the Airborne force. These ships would be U.S. Army owned and manned efficiently by small civilian sealift command crews. This would insure a seamless transition of supplies to the Airborne force and would maximize the use of current Army LACV-30 and USN LCAC air cushion vehicles for over-the-horizon resupply. LACV-30s and LCACs are light enough to be lifted by 110-ton cranes so they can be carried aboard Army sealift ships and not need expensive, custom-built flooding well-deck amphibious ships. The LMRSs and SL-7s are standard cargo ships in U.S. military use.

Paratroopers can be delivered to ANY spot on the globe

Sources:

Airborne Operations: A German Appraisal, CMH, 1985; Malcom McConnell, Just Cause, 1992, Ian Hogg, Great Land Battle of WWII, 1987.


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