CAS failings in Afghanistan

Robert's Ridge 0700 hours

Pinned down by enemy mortar fire with longer reach than the rifles and machine guns in their hands, the rescuers for Navy SEAL Neil Roberts are themselves in need of rescue. Rallying around a downed MH-47E Chinook helicopter they have dead and some men who will be dead if they cannot secure the area for an evacuation helicopter to land.

Finally after over an hour's wait, F-15Es appear and have to be talked into doing gun strafing runs on the enemy's positions since they've never trained to do this Close Air Support (CAS) task.

Hours later, the area is secure for extraction helicopters to land but not in time to save some men who died from their wounds and exposure.

The USAF in a recent interview with Stars 'n Stripes has tried to put a "happy face" on all this (see below), but the fact remains that after building over 700+ heavily armored A-10 attack planes built specifically for CAS for helping Army maneuver units; only a small fraction are on active flying status and when the troops needed the air strikes, the Army had to wait and men died needlessly.

In the September 30, 2002, Army Times, "Officers: Air Force Policy Left Ground Troops High And Dry: General, senior officer say units need more personnel to call in munitions" Sean D. Naylor reports:

"The Army general who ran Operation Anaconda and one of his senior fire-support officers are taking issue with Air Force practices they say allowed enemy targets to escape destruction and deprived Soldiers under fire of badly needed close air support.

In particular, they say, the Air Force's reliance on precision-guided bombs created several problems for troops on the ground in Anaconda, the March battle in Afghanistan's Shah-e-Kot Valley. The comments come at a time when Army leaders are fighting a rear-guard action in Washington against what they see as the Defense Department's trend toward over-reliance on precision-guided munitions in shaping the future U.S. military.

Their arguments are laid out in two articles in the September-October issue of Field Artillery magazine, the official journal of the Field Artillery Center and School at Fort Sill, Okla. The first article is an interview with Maj. Gen. Franklin 'Buster' Hagenbeck, the 10th Mountain Division commander who was in charge during Anaconda. The second article, 'Afghanistan: Joint and Coalition Fire Support in Operation Anaconda,' was written by Lt. Col. Christopher Bentley, Hagenbeck's fire support coordinator during the operation.

It sometimes took 'hours' for the Air Force to deliver close air support to Soldiers on the ground, Hagenbeck told Field Artillery. Once a request for close air support had been passed to a jet by an Airborne Warning and Control System aircraft, it took the Air Force 26 minutes to calculate the desired mean point of impact, which is required to ensure the bomb hits the target, Hagenbeck said.

After that, the aircraft had to get into a busy airspace management scheme before it could attack the target and deliver the bomb. 'Aircraft were stacked up to the ceiling' and could only be flown in a few at a time, he told Field Artillery. 'It took anywhere from 26 minutes to hours [on occasion] for the precision munitions to hit the targets.'

'That's okay if you're not being shot at or the targets aren't fleeting,' Hagenbeck told Field Artillery. But often U.S. troops were under fire, and the targets were 'fleeting.'

When al-Qaida forces on resupply missions stopped their sport- utility vehicles in one place long enough, 'the fixed-wing aircraft would slam them,' Hagenbeck told the magazine. But, he said, that didn't happen often enough.

'We really worked to find ways to kill fleeting targets the first three or so days,' he told Field Artillery. 'Honestly, we weren't that successful.' But getting the jets on station quickly enough was only part of the problem. All too often, according to Hagenbeck and Bentley, even when a jet was available, Air Force rules prevented it from coming to the aid of Soldiers who needed its support.

'We have a huge procedural and training issue we've got to work through with our Air Force friends,' Hagenbeck told Field Artillery.

The problem, as he explained it, is that the Air Force refuses to drop precision-guided munitions unless the strike has been called in by an Air Force ground forward air controller or an Air Force enlisted terminal attack controller. But there are not enough of these personnel for one to be placed in every Army unit that might require close air support. This particularly was the case in Anaconda, Hagenbeck told Field Artillery.

'This war became platoon fights separated by distances in very rugged terrain with too few ETACs to go around,' he said.

Even infantry units with an airman to call in strikes, he said, can easily lose that critical capability during combat.

'What happens if the ETAC is injured and has to be medevaced [medically evacuated] or is killed?'

'We needed as many ETACs and GFACs as we could [get] on the ground, and the Air Force doesn't have them now, and they probably won't have them in the foreseeable future,' he told Army Times.

The solution, according to Hagenbeck and Bentley, is to train and certify the Army's forward observers - who call in artillery and mortar fire - as 'universal observers,' able to call in any Army or Air Force munitions. 'Our FOs must be certified as ground forward air controllers,' Bentley said in the article. 'This may be a sore spot with the Air Force, but I believe it to be nonnegotiable.'

For his part, Hagenbeck said while it may be a 'sore spot' among Bentley's counterparts in the Air Force, it was not a point of discord between Army and Air Force generals. 'Conceptually, we're all in agreement that it needs to happen,' Hagenbeck told Army Times.

'Fight As A Team'

In the meantime, the Army must do a better job of integrating Air Force tactical air control party personnel - the EFACs and GFACs - into ground maneuver units' training and operations, according to Bentley.

'We cannot continue to operate with an add-on conglomerate of Air Force personnel, especially during combat operations,' he writes. 'We must train and fight as a team.'

The Air Force did not provide an official to discuss the issues raised by Hagenbeck and Bentley before Army Times' deadline.

Hagenbeck and Bentley also touched on other procedural problems that surfaced with the Air Force during Anaconda.

Bentley criticized the need to coordinate what strike aircraft would be needed over the battlefield 36 hours ahead of time, as part of the air tasking order process.

The ATO is 'the best mechanism available to coordinate the hundreds of human and mechanical pieces involved in getting air on station, but it is conversely inflexible and not well-suited to support a nonlinear, asymmetrical battlefield,' he wrote. 'The ATO must be flexible enough to change aircraft and munitions packages as the intelligence picture changes by the minute. Increasing the flexibility of the ATO cycle is imperative to responsiveness in today's' operational environment.

In his article, Bentley suggests that perhaps the Air Force was reluctant to take steps that would lead to better close air support.

'In some cases, the inabilities of aircraft to break self-imposed [Air Force] altitude restrictions, slow their strike speed down or strafe the battlefield (the latter in the case of bombers) restricted these aircrafts' abilities to deliver timely munitions in close support of troops on the ground,' he wrote.

Hagenbeck also warned against being too impressed by the numbers that get thrown around whenever air campaigns are discussed.

'A ground force commander does not care about the number of sorties being flown or the number and types of bombs being dropped and their tonnage,' he told Field Artillery. 'Those statistics mean nothing to ground forces in combat. All that matters is whether or not the munitions are time-on-target and provide the right effects.'

Hagenbeck told Army Times that he was not 'pointing a finger at the Air Force' with these comments.

'It's easy to understand numbers, and I think we all often fall into those kinds of traps,' he said.

Nevertheless, the general said, 'To tell me that we flew this many sorties and dropped this many bombs, in and of itself, doesn't tell me that it's been effective in the war fight. It doesn't tell me where the bombs landed.'

A Few Praises, Too

Hagenbeck and Bentley were not completely dismissive of precision-guided bombs, the best known of which is the Joint Direct Attack Munition, or JDAM. 'The JDAMs were terribly effective against fixed targets,' Hagenbeck told Army Times. 'If we were receiving fire from a cave, if we knew there was going to be a delay [before the close air support arrived], we could continue suppressive fires with our mortars and machine guns, and then they could put a bomb inside the cave. What was more difficult for us is if there were fleeting targets on the ridgeline. ... Then the JDAMs were not effective."

In those instances, it was better for the jets to strafe the target area with cannons. The best close air support aircraft for these missions were the Army's AH-64 Apache attack helicopters and the Air Force's A-10 "Warthog" ground attack aircraft during the day, and the Air Force Special Operations AC-130 Spectre gunship at night, according to Hagenbeck and Bentley.

'The most effective close air support asset we had was the Apache, hands down,' Hagenbeck told Field Artillery. 'The detainees later said the Apaches were the most feared weapons on the battlefield - the helicopters were on top of them before they knew what was happening. The Apaches came as close to 'one shot, one kill' as you can get.'

Both officers also had high praise for the Spectre gunship. 'Its effectiveness was amazing,' Bentley writes. 'The enemy began referring to it as the 'Spitting Witch.'' He advocated giving each of the Army's four light infantry divisions a squadron of AC-130s, or at least making the aircraft available for 'all light infantry training and military operations around the world.'

Hagenbeck also made the following points in Field Artillery:

**He didn't consider bringing in 105 mm howitzers 'because I knew we could accomplish the mission without them.' The 10th Mountain and 101st Airborne (Air Assault) divisions, each of which contributed troops to Anaconda, are armed with 105mm towed howitzers, but none was deployed to Afghanistan. Hagenbeck told Army Times he did not know who made the decision not to deploy them, but he acknowledged in Field Artillery that even if he'd had them available in Afghanistan, he wouldn't have taken them into the battle on the first day, because he had too few CH-47 Chinook helicopters to carry them and his infantry force.

However, he also told the magazine that an organic ground-based indirect fire capability is 'indispensable' for the close fight.

**The U.S. troops might not have had artillery, but al-Qaida certainly did. U.S. forces destroyed five Soviet-made D-30 122 mm towed howitzers that the enemy used to fire on a joint attack by Special Forces troops with Afghan allies in the early hours of the battle's first day, and also on the infantry force's helicopter landing zones, Hagenbeck told Field Artillery. U.S. forces found several others in caves, Hagenbeck said. He told Army Times he did not know whether the enemy guns inflicted any casualties.

**American surveillance and reconnaissance aircraft found it very difficult to identify al-Qaida troops and their cave complexes around the valley. 'It took 'boots on the ground' to find the caves,' Hagenbeck told Field Artillery. 'The shadows alone precluded our discovering a cave until our Soldiers were almost on top of it.'

The enemy moved in small groups of three to five fighters, making them hard to spot. "During the daylight, we watched them on the Predator,' Hagenbeck told Field Artillery. 'At night, when these groups heard a Predator or AC-130 coming, they pulled a blanket over themselves to disappear from the night-vision screen. They used low-tech to beat high-tech.'

2002 Ranger Association Banquet Remarks

The following message from Bill Schwartz '59 is reposted with his permission.

George Lawton

On Close Air Support issues, Bill Schwartz, after listening to comments and discussions from various 10th Mountain Division officers who fought in Afghanistan and participated in the Senior Leaders Panel, came to the following conclusions:

"CAS in Afghanistan was abysmal until the arrival of the A-10s, months into the operations. As I listened to the informal tales told by 10th Mountain Division people about the lack of support, my stomach turned. This was not the Air Force that supported us in Vietnam. Air Force shooters would not fly below 10,000 feet in daylight per Air Force dictates, not for political reasons. Hence no strafing runs. No AC-130 support was permitted by the Air Force during daylight hours. For example, when the Rangers were going back into Roberts Ridge to find the SEAL who was killed and support the operators in the area, AC-130 support was withdrawn by the AF Cmd Center in Saudi Arabia five minutes before Chinook touchdown at the LZ because it was daylight. The result as we know contributed to dead and wounded Rangers.

CAS as we knew it was only provided by Navy and marine aircraft when they were in the AO. Only they would come in low for strafing and bombing runs. Unless a unit had an ETAC or FAC they weren't permitted to call in AF close air support. Small units lacked this support. Precision munitions often weren't and could require hours to get on target. At one point it took five hours to bring in close air support for 10th Mountain troops that were in a tough fight. After the Rangers were evacuated from Roberts Ridge, the Air Force pounded the hell out of it for hours with precision munitions prior to a reinsertion by the 1-87 Inf. When the 1-87 hit the LZ the same Al Queda who fought the Rangers were still on the ground. None had been killed. It took troops on the ground to kill the 12 Al Queda that continued to fight from their fortified positions.

One of the reasons for poor CAS was that the Air Tasking Order was laid out 72 hours in advance, and the Air Force staffers were so bureaucratic that they wouldnt adjust weapons loads or missions. By the time the 10th left, they were able to reduce this to 18 hours. This approach to air support means that hitting fleeting or moving targets is very unlikely.

The ASOC in Afghanistan was often overruled by Blue Suit staffers at the Command Center in Saudi Arabia who didnt have a clue as to the real situation on the ground.

For a long period the Air Force would not allow heavy lifters to land in Afghanistan in daylight. Because of poor weather conditions at night this stifled resupply operations. God forbid a round should hit a resupply bird. I contrast this with Vietnam when C-123s and C-130s landed under fire in daylight to support troops on the ground.

In effect there is a significant cultural difference between the views of the Army and the Air Force when it comes down to close air support. These problems must be ironed out before any further operations, such as in Iraq, are undertaken.

Former Commander of the OPFOR at NTC, Colonel John D. Rosenberger, U.S. Army presented the following report; The Inherent Vulnerabilities of Technology: Insights from the National Training Center's Opposing Force:

"To the 2,500 troopers of the 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment, the Opposing Force (OPFOR) at the U.S. Army's National Training Center (NTC), it came as no surprise to watch the 3rd Serbian Army march back into Serbia virtually unscathed by the relentless attacks of NATO air power during the Kosovo conflict this past year. Moreover, it came as no surprise to see the Serbian Army employ a wide variety of physical and electronic deception techniques, remain tactically well-dispersed, and hide their combat systems in the infrastructure of cities and villages to preserve their combat power.

This is old news to the combined-arms team of the NTC's Opposing Force. These same Serbian adaptations have been learned and employed successfully by the OPFOR at the NTC since 1994-adaptive countermeasures critical to preserving combat capability at the tactical level of war against the impressive array of intelligence collection and attack technologies employed by America's joint team. Moreover, this is only one of several insights the OPFOR can provide into the limitations and vulnerabilities of the current warfighting technology that underpins America's style of warfare in the 21st Century.

In the past six years, the NTC OPFOR has exposed many limitations and vulnerabilities inherent to the warfighting technologies our joint services are currently pursuing. Moreover, they've learned to defeat them just like any adaptive and savvy opponent will do-just as the Serbian Army did this past year. In my view, these vulnerabilities that we have exposed are compelling, not simply to make smarter technological investments in the years ahead, but equally important, ensure we do not forfeit combat effectiveness, the ability to deter, or the ability to quickly defeat our enemies at both the operational and tactical levels of war in the years ahead.

To begin with, we have learned that active and passive force protection measures are vital to preserving combat power against asymmetric technologies, asymmetric in this case meaning some technological capability that provides a decisive advantage over an opponent in combat. For example, cruise missiles, laser-guided bombs, satellite reconnaissance systems, high altitude reconnaissance aircraft, and unmanned aerial vehicles have provided us an asymmetric combat advantage over all our opponents this past decade.

In response to these capabilities, we have learned that thermal deception, vehicle and unit dispersion, decoys of all types, camouflage, concealment, and electronic deception are vital means and ways to protect and preserve our ground combat power. Furthermore, the OPFOR has learned that air power and overhead intelligence acquisition systems have significant limitations and are inherently vulnerable to deception-even in desert and mountainous terrain. And by extension, even more so in densely forested areas and jungles, not to mention complex and urban terrain.

Take fixed-wing attack aircraft. It is not difficult to survive against the existing suite of joint close air support aircraft (F-16, F-18, A-10, and equivalents), attacking at altitudes above 15,000 feet, even in the desert. Given the target acquisition capability and the speed in which these aircraft fly, target acquisition and target recognition at these altitudes is difficult at best. We have learned that if we limit our movement, don't create dust clouds, remain tactically dispersed, use camouflage, and employ decoy equipment, we will absorb few losses to fixed wing attack above 15,000 feet-the same methodology of force protection the Serbian Army and para-military forces employed in the dense forests, cities, and villages in Kosovo.

By using a combination of these force protection techniques, the effectiveness of high-altitude, fixed-wing attack against ground forces can be limited and thereby endured. Moreover, this ability to eliminate the effectiveness of high-altitude fixed-wing attack, in turn, places an even higher value on overhead target acquisition platforms like satellites, JSTARS, and unmanned aerial vehicles. And as we have learned, these overhead intelligence collection systems-the operators and analysts-are inherently easy to deceive.

Take reconnaissance satellites in low earth orbit. Given our experience, it takes about 18 hours to complete the targeting process using these sensors-from acquisition, to imagery analysis, to integration into the ATO, to effective attack. Consequently, we've learned to move critical combat systems every 10-12 hours to protect them and keep them in the fight. Frequent survivability moves, in small packets of vehicles are an essential technique to employ to preserve combat power."

Even more troubling is that the AF has hundreds of A-10s in mothballs and at least 1 or as many as 30 were two-seat types that could be used to house an aerial observer to render the kind of alert air support ground combat units need, freeing the pilot to fly the aircraft.

This state of affairs is not satisfactory with the new geopolitical situation where asymmetric, primarily light infantry enemies will seek to attack the U.S. while hiding behind difficult terrain, vegetation and civilian populations. The U.S. military must regain "air observational superiority" by fielding a two-seat observation/attack aircraft to win the war on sub-national terrorism or else the bad guys will continue to get away. In future nation-state combats, alert, agile CAS guided by Forward Air Controllers (FACs) in the air and on the ground will insure that friendly troops are not killed by "friendly" fires since over-relying on precision guided munitions to get accuracy without FAC help to get aircraft line-of-sight (LOS) means at least 10% of this ordnance will go out of control and could kill our men.

Therefore we propose:

1. All OA-10As be made into 2-seat OA-10B models for observer in back to spot targets

2. More powerful engines fitted to ALL A-10As and OA-10Bs

3. A Night Observation sensor package be fitted to the OA-10Bs

4. SLEP ALL A-10s so the aircraft can fly to 2030

5. Unused A-10A/Bs taken out of storage returned to flight status for AFSOC

6. Rebuild OA-10Bs "Nimrod IIs" supplied to to AFSOC for deep-penetration helo/V-22 escort

7. The synergism between Army attack helicopters and USAF A-10As/OA-10Bs exploit both aircraft's inherent STOL capabilities: "Cactus Air Force" Joint Air Attack Team (JAAT) to be forward-deployed with Army ground units to render better CAS and to evade asymmetric enemy attacks on fixed airfields

8. Comm/C4I Package- everybody talk to everybody else (UHF/VHF/FM/HFSSB) plus secure system. Data link. Secure nav system. Color TISEO synched with laser designator and the night observation system.

9. Air-to-air IFF. UHF/GPS/DF (find troops/CSAR survivors/other aircraft). Both IFR sustems

10. Both "probe and drogue" and receptacle mid-air refuelling.

11. Selectable ejection system.

12. Autopilot (long ferry flights, orbiting and looking out).

13. Wingtip AIM-9X air-to-air self-protection missiles or tiptanks - saves 2 stations for air-to-ground ordnance plus tip tanks increase ferry range over standard underwing drops. Rear quarter missile detection system.

14. Also needs a modular ECM/IRCM system capability to accept upgrades as they develop.

15. General Dynamics GAU-19/A .50 caliber heavy machine gun pods fitted to all A-10s to increase their gun strafing capability: this is the safest and most responsive fires for CAS. Their 2.75" Hydra 70mm rockets must up upgraded to laser guidance, also.

GENERAL DYNAMICS ARMAMENT SYSTEMS
Lakeside Avenue Burlington, VT 05401
Tel: 802/657-6841
Fax: 802/657-7493
nblancha@gdarm.com
Contact: Mr. Norman Blanchard

General Dynamics Armament Systems (GDAS) is a world-class defense company with a range of armament and munitions capabilities from 12.7mm Gatling guns to 155mm artillery projectiles. Its weapon systems are in production for aircraft, helicopters, vehicles and ships across all branches of the U.S. armed forces and more than 20 allied nations. GDAS has design, systems management and production expertise in all aspects of armament system development, including high rate of fire guns, gun barrels, ammunition handling systems, turrets, fire control computers, drive mechanisms, munitions demilaritization, ammunition and sensor integration. GDAS is a leading systems management company with the capability to integrate weapon systems on a full range of aircraft, naval and land-based platforms. Its products featured Eurosatory included HYDRA-70 rockets, reactive armor tiles, 120-mm mortar rounds, munitions demilitarization, GAU-19/A 12.7mm pintle systems and 40mm grenades.

16. A FAC Career field for non-rated officers instead of the grounded flyers who are now called Air Liaison Officers (ALOs) but frankly, unhappily filling a position in an ad hoc manner. FAC officers would also be OA-10B observers for a 20+ year USAF career and see to it that their enlisted FACs are taken care of and that their service area is vibrant and improved constantly with officer clout so the Army doesn't have to suffer from a lack of CAS as it has had to in recent years.

17. Decide on a single name for FAC/ROMAD/ETAC/TACs etc. and stick to it

We suggest the Army name-recognition term of "FAC" be used in two forms;

"AFAC" means an Airborne Forward Air Controller in the rear seat of an aircraft like an OA-10B

"GFAC" means a Ground Forward Air Controller on foot or in an armored fighting vehicle with laser ranging and target designation, and secure commo with all players in the air and on the ground.

It should be a JOINT term used by all the services in DoD. In fact, DoD should come up with standardized criteria for ALL AFACs and GFACs in use by ALL of the services.

Collectively, all the A-10 pilots, ground crews and observers would be termed "Air Commandos" in AFSOC, reviving a tradition lost when the A-1 "Sandy" SkyRaider fixed-wing prop attack aircraft were retired.

18. Enlistedmen would also be OA-10B observers so they have a perspective from the air, too. In fact, they should rotate tours of duty from inside the rear cockpit of the OA-10Bs and on the ground throughout their careers. This will also make this career field challenging and rewarding for all involved.

We recently discovered we have counterparts in Australia!! Their Army Aviation Association has been fighting a battle to get their wannabe-lawn darts Air Force to provide CAS. In their excellent report, "The Tactical Air Support Group" they make some observations about the highly successful German Air Force/Army cooperation in WWII where ground troops served as air observers:

The Tactical Air Support Group

By O.M. Eather MBA.

www.fourays.org/archives/closeair.htm

"Examining the Luftwaffe's development reveals sound principles of tactical air support that were later reflected by other air forces as they sought to emulate the effectiveness of the Luftwaffe's 'Blitzkrieg' techniques. From the outset and in spite of the pervasive influence of classical air theorists, the German High Command realised that technical limitations would always constrain air power from being the decisive arm. Rather, the Luftwaffe would always act in concert with the Wehrmacht, and to a lesser extent, the Kreigsmarine. Great attention was paid to cross training army officers and non-commissioned officers as observers in reconnaissance squadrons and, both in basic flying training and at the Air Command and Staff School, to train young flyers in ' the science of Army Tactics.' (Ref 15) This had the very real benefit of giving Air Force officers, particularly air crew, a proper military education grounded in an appreciation of those elements of their defence forces that were actually decisive.

Mobility, short flight times and immediate reaction were required from the Luftwaffe to match this new style of fluid warfare. This necessitated minimal reliance on fixed bases by operational squadrons and co-location of Luftwaffe and Army headquarters to maximise effectiveness by minimising chain-of-command decision time. Squadrons followed their Army units or the unfolding battle, 'lodging' with independent airfield companies who operated and prepared tactical airfields. Difficulties arose when 'Luftwaffe command units were not based forward' but improved when forward command and control elements moved with the ground combat units.

Ultimately, in Greece and Russia, liaison teams and forward observers were in the frontline, directing aircraft to targets nominated by the immediate infantry or artillery regimental commanders. Also, in Russia, the value of smaller units, two to three bomb carrying aircraft, was recognised in their greater flexibility, and manoeuvrability and that they could attend to targets too small for larger units.(Ref 17) The combined air and land forces of Germany were: 'Self contained. Stukas, tanks, recovery vehicles, petrol wagons, anti-tank gunners, all went forward together and their senior officers were often in the van.' (Ref 18)

The German General Staff calculated that, between 1939 and 1942, aircraft were employed in the ratio of 5:4 for Strategic as to Direct Support roles. This would include fighter and suitable bomber aircraft detached after the air superiority battle was won. However, the actual number of aircraft used for direct Army support was more modest and could not, at any time, have been considered an imbalance against the Luftwaffe's other missions. At the beginning of the French campaign, of 3,824 operational aircraft, there were 342 dive bombers, 42 ground attack and 501 reconnaissance. Similarly, in Russia, with 3,701 operational aircraft, 302 were dive bombers and 593 reconnaissance. However, close tactical support is always accompanied by high attrition in aircraft; if not in crews, due to aircraft being downed from low-level and mostly in reach of friendly forces. By the battle of Kursk, both the Germans and the Soviets had come to expect destruction to be almost equal amongst aircraft and tanks. The Red Army fielded 3,600 tanks and 2,400 aircraft, the Germans, 2,700 tanks and 2,000 aircraft. So, whilst purpose designed close air support types have always been a small proportion of total air resources, in an intense surface battle, high levels of attrition of air assets, as well as armour and artillery, came to be expected and allowed for.(Ref 19)

The Luftwaffe was not merely an adjunct of the Wehrmacht. From the outset its doctrines were meshed to the theories of Douhet. Indeed, whilst those theories were seen as fundamental in defining the singularity of the service, the Luftwaffe contrived to be an effective mariner to reconcile the unique properties of airpower without ignoring the needs of the land battle or indulging in naive dismissal of surface forces as obsolete. The German Air Ministry field manual, 'The Conduct of Air Operations', which lay down doctrine, stated the overriding mission was to 'secure and maintain air superiority' and only then to provide 'combat and other air action supporting army forces on the ground'. The 'Air Field Manual No. 16' went further, stating the prime missions as 'strategic operations against sources of hostile military power' and 'attacks against targets in large cities.' (Ref 20) The Luftwaffe always figured about forty per cent of its strength would be bombers, twenty five to thirty per cent fighters, and the rest for the support of ground forces, including transport. Its first two phases of operations were to attack and destroy enemy air forces and aircraft factories and then ' vital centres'. But always included was the intention to aid the Army in its decisive engagements. For this reason, purpose built aircraft, such as the Junkers 87 divebomber,", were permanently under command of the Army to 'concentrate all striking power' with the service best able to judge its effective application in the land battle. (Ref 21)

Control of the Luftwaffe was always at the highest level with the Commander in Chief of the German High Command and, whilst there was general agreement that Air Superiority forces stayed under the command of the Luftwaffe, fighter units were assigned to Army control when circumstances justified such a change. In effect, they became specialist Army units and both services planned and trained for this as a normal part of operations. The Army local commander directed Luftwaffe units as he was best qualified to direct their activities, whilst in no way interfering with the technical command of Air units.(Ref 22) It is a common fallacy that the Luftwaffe was only ever the air arm of the German Army. Examination of its own doctrine refutes this. Its performance in gaining air superiority in Europe, from 1939 to at least 1943, and in the Western Desert up to the First Battle of El Alamein, and then its consistently determined defence of Germany against the Allied bomber offensive, gives the lie to such criticisms. But it never lost sight of the inescapable reality that, if ever it was to be credible, it must be part of the land battle. It took the Air Forces of its opponents several galling years to reach the same conclusion and to begin to copy the principles that the Luftwaffe had established for effective support of the Army.

The principles that the Luftwaffe experience showed to be successful in the Air Arm's support of the land battle can he now drawn. Those principles, for the use of air assets for Close Air Support, are:

a. Operational command by Ground Force Commander.

b. Forward location, preferably within. short flight time of in action combat elements.

c. Control by Air Arm personnel or fire support control specialists with leading combat elements.

d. Maximum and early use to assist in either breakup of aggressive enemy ground concentrations or, in assault, breakthrough with disabling concentration and surprise.

e. An irreducible proportion of specialist Close Air Support aircraft, organic to the Ground Force and commanded by it and not available (or suitable) for Control of the Air tasks.

f. Side-by-side location and direct command links between Ground and Air

19. GFACs must have not only SOFLAM laser rangefinders and target designators but M224 60mm mortars which can trigger-fire colored smoke bombs (prevent spoofing) to in a "low-tech" way mark targets for CAS aircraft to strike. If we had Army M8 Buford AGS light tanks and M1064A4 Gavin 120mm mortar vehicles with turrets shooting White Phosphorous (WP) rounds this would be another clear mark for CAS aircraft to aim in on.

A multi-war CAS attack pilot writes about GFAC to AFAC radio "talk-ons":

"Been thinking over troubles I experienced with green ALOs and here's a technique.

Presupposing the guy on the ground has a laser ranger (available even from Cabela's, etc) and a field compass he can give both magnetic azimuth and a good range to the target for the CAS pilots. I know the ones I've seen advertised only go out to 800 yards but surely that is pretty good for field use. And who knows? Maybe the manufacturer can tweak the thing to go out further or we can buy an expensive binocular with laser rangefinder like the Leica VECTOR used by Canadian snipers in Afghanistan.

On another track, the big problems was that green guys on the ground saw landmarks with a different idea as what stood out than the guy in the air saw. Quote from a ROMAD in Korea - 'we're up the little canyon off the big one' Hell, Korea is full of canyons of all sizes and from the air they look like roots from a tree . . .we did get it straightened out but it took a while. Also - 100 meters on the ground and eyeballed from the air can be wildly different. I once had a USAF FAC (new guy) almost run me out of bombs before we got on the target, dropping one at a time and moving "50 meters" (?) each time. (He wasn't very good with his smoke rockets either).

A good mark is a great start.

Another super technique is sort of a 'delayed TOT'.

If the fighters know where the GFAC is, they can give him an ETA - the GFAC can give the CAS a target azimuth and range or a vector off a prominent landmark, mark the target (laser or pyro) when the fighters are 4-5 miles out (30 seconds) and give the bad guys a real surprise. At an attack speed of 550 or better the airplane gets there at about the same time as the sound of an exploding smoke bomb/rocket. Only works for ordnance that is cleared for release that fast (unless the CAS has balls) - doesn't work for high drags cause the fins can fail above 450 mph. But slick bombs, rockets, strafing, cluster bombs [CBUs] all work just fine when released supersonic."

http://www.aerospaceweb.org/aircraft/attack/a10/index.shtml

Once we have the "Air Commandos" in place with upgraded OA-10Bs with AFAC in the rear seat and GFACs on the ground designating and ranging with lasers, we would normally have an OA-10B flying continuously overhead of friendly ground maneuver troops. The RAND enemy Air Defense-is-doomsday crowd should take note that the A-10s would be primarily BEHIND friendly lines and not subject to all the nasty missile and gun weapons systems they read about in jane's and work into expensive DoD-funded computer simulations of worse-case "boogie man" nation-state threats.

If targets appear and are requested to be struck, the OA-10B can immediately take care of small targets with its 30mm cannon and twin underwing GAU-19/A .50 caliber gatling gun pods and laser-guided Hydra-70mm rockets. If the target needs more firepower to be suppressed/destroyed, the OA-10B can shoot smoke rockets to assist other fighter-bombers like F-15E Strike Eagles or other single-seat A-10s to hit the target with guns, rockets and with controlled bombs.

Click to enlarge image of the mighty OA-10B!

Details:

Maneuver Air Support

The Precision Firepower Myth is a recipe for disaster

The current media feeding frenzy over expensive guided munitions hasn't factored in the many friendly deaths these bombs have inflicted on our men and WHY.

1. JDAMs are not terminally guided with only internal GPS and INS guidance and can go astray killing our own troops. Terminally guided means a FAC on the air or ground designates the target shining a laser beam and the ordnance flies directly to this spot and/or the FAC radio-directs the attack aircraft to a SAFE LOS attack path parrallel not perpindicular to the friendly troops. A First Sergeant in the 101st Air Assault Division writes:

"Equipment wise, our greatest shortcomings were optics and organic or direct support long-range weapons. After the initial fight all our targets were at a minimum of 1500m all the way out to as far as you could see. Our 60[mm] and 81[mm]'s accounted for most of the kills. Next was a Canadian Sniper team with a MacMillian .50 cal [sniper rifle]. They got kills all the way out to 2500m.

The problem with our mortars was there as a 24 hour [Close Air Support] cas cap. And they wouldn't fly near us if we were firing indirect. Even though our max ord[nant: how high mortar rounds arc into the sky] was far beneath their patterns. Something for you and your alo [Air Liaison Officer] to work out. The other problem was the Air Force could never fly in small groups of personnel, I watched and called corrections on numerous sorties and they could never hit the targets. My verdict is if you want it killed use your mortars. Pay close attention to ti-hz direction of attack your ALO is bringing in the CAS. Every time it was perpendicular to us we were hit with shrapnel. Not to mention the time they dropped a 2,000 lbs [bomb] in the middle of our company, it didn't go off by a sheer miracle I'm sure. [Marine] Cobras and 2.75" [rockets] shot at us. Also, once again, they were shooting perpendicular to our trace. Aviation provided the most near misses of all the things we did".

Below is a story on how a JDAM killed some of our men recently...

Three Special Forces killed, 19 wounded by friendly fire

Fort Drum Soldier dead

by Staff Sgt. Marcia Triggs

WASHINGTON (Army News Service, Dec. 5, 2001) - Three Special Forces Soldiers were killed and 19 were wounded north of Kandahar, Afghanistan, when a 2,000-pound U.S. bomb missed it's target and hit in close proximity to friendly forces Dec. 4.

The names are being withheld until next-of-kin notifications have been completed.

A B-52 that was called in to provide fire support to ground forces who were under fire, reportedly dropped it's ordnance about a football field away from two Special Forces teams and Afghan opposition fighters, officials said.

Two Soldiers were pronounced dead at the scene, and the third Soldier died while being transported to a medical facility in the region, officials said. Five Afghan opposition fighters were also killed and an unknown amount wounded, officials said.

"A close air-support strike is one of the most potentially hazardous types of missions used," officials said. "Simultaneously calling in air strikes on your own position and the enemy's position that you're engaged with takes very fine control, coordination and precision. Unfortunately, it doesn't always happen without causing our own casualties."

Officials said they would not speculate on the reason the precision-guided bomb missed its target, whether the wrong coordinates were given, wrong coordinates were entered on the plane or the system malfunctioned.

A second bomb was also dropped and it did hit the intended target, but officials said they did not know how much damage the bomb inflicted on enemy forces.

Since the war began this is the second U.S. bomb that has missed its target and hit in the proximity of U.S. troops. A stray bomb hit four Soldiers and an airman while they were helping Northern Alliance forces fighting armed Taliban captives in a fort near Mazar-e Sharif.

In an unrelated incident, an infantryman from the 10th Mountain Division, Fort Drum, N.Y. died Nov. 29 in Uzbekistan. Pvt. 2 Giovanny Maria, 19, was a native of Camden, N.J., and had enlisted in the Army in May.

Although the incident in under investigation, Maria's death was not the result of enemy action, officials said.

Link to original news item:

http://www.dtic.mil/armylink/news/Aug2002/a2002080282ndided.html

2. Trying to STEER bombs and missiles from a distant, offset location is problem-prone and gets worse the farther away you try to do it. Alleged "Precision" guidance on munitions has led to a lack of appreciation for the CAS strikes being guided by a FAC on the ground be it radio verbal directions and/or a laser spot for terminal guidance so the PHYSICAL aircraft delivery platform is lined up on the target so there is less physical "murphy" things that can go wrong. Munitions still bump into each other on release from the rack and fins get bent for example.

Carlton Meyers writes:

"G2 gem: GPS Guided Munitions and Fratricide

The May 2002 issue of the Marine Corps Gazette has an interesting article by LtCol John T. Rahm entitled: 'Bombing Accuracy for Idiots'. He points out the circular error probable (CEP) is commonly used to measure the accuracy of a weapon. However, he points out that "probable" means the circle, often very elliptical, where 50% a projectile or bomb is likely to hit. While that was good for ballistic weaponry, it is very misleading for GPS guided munitions. While they have great CEPs, many of their guidance systems malfunction and the bomb goes miles off target. LtCol Rahm states that testers disregard such failures when measuring CEPs anyway, and he worked at China Lake were the testing occurred. He writes this makes them too dangerous for close air support.

This explains the frequent 'mistakes' in Afghanistan where bombs landed far from any real target. The complexity of GPS guided bombs like JDAM, or the Navy 5-inch ERGM still under development, or the proposed 155mm Excalibur will often lead to friendly fire casualties which may be caused by any of these factors: a defective guidance system; a guidance system damaged during transport or installation; an incorrect GPS coordinate sent by the targeting system; and incorrect GPS coordinate entered into the bomb; GPS signal interference from nearby mountains, buildings, or solar flares; or GPS signal jamming. So if an aircraft drops a GPS guided bomb from several miles away, any guidance problem may prove disastrous. Even if 90% work great, that loose 10% may prove too dangerous".

Even the USAF is grudgingly admitting that it needs men on the ground to call in strikes:

European Stars and Stripes
August 15, 2002

Afghanistan War Showing Air Force The Importance Of 'Eyes On The Ground'

By Lisa Burgess, Stars and Stripes

ARLINGTON, Va. - Afghanistan has added a "new wrinkle"; to the Air Force's basic doctrine, according to the service's top analyst for the war on terrorism: Wars aren't won by air alone.

The rugged and unforgiving mountains of Central Asia have revealed many hard truths to each of the services. But for the Air Force, perhaps no single lesson resonates more clearly, Col. Fred Weiners said Tuesday: "Eyes on the ground" are essential to round out the advanced space- and air-based sensors, weapons and platforms that make up the service's inventory.

"You can have all the high technology you want, but it's these 25-year-old staff sergeants on the ground making strike decisions" that, according to Weiners, have in the past been made by high-level planning officers located nowhere near the battlefield.

Weiners is acting director of the Air Force's Task Force Enduring Look, and spoke with Stripes in an interview in his office in Arlington, Va.

Air campaigns traditionally have been planned in advance. Coordinates have been known, and target sets could be chosen from data gathered weeks or months in advance.

To hear an Air Force official emphasizing the need for "boots on the ground" is a significant shift in conventional U.S. military thinking.

The Army and Marine Corps both are founded on the principle that war is never won until "boots hit the ground" - when military personnel actually occupy the turf. The Air Force has tended to be dominated by officers who believe air operations alone can conquer an enemy.

In Afghanistan, however, forward air controllers and special operations forces -not planners sitting in Washington with maps and satellite photographs - have been responsible for almost all critical targeting calls, Weiners said.

"They are our most versatile and highly sophisticated sensor, and they are proving highly effective," Weiners said. "They dramatically enhance overall air power and bombing effectiveness."

Thanks to ground controllers, "We've enjoyed an accuracy like we've never enjoyed," Weiners said - and not only due to more sophisticated "smart" bombs, such as the Joint Direct Attack Munition.

Sensor-To-Shooter Loop

But Afghanistan also revealed a critical break in this "sensor-to-shooter" loop: Air Force pilots had not had enough practice working with the ground operators, particularly the special operations forces.

The service has moved with extraordinary speed to remedy that deficiency, Weiners said.

His task force first identified the need for more pilot training with ground forces in January, and by June, pilots at the Air Force Weapons School at Nellis Air Force Base, Nev., were "engaging special operations forces on the ground, including full mission profiles and simulations, to replicate what we were doing [in Afghanistan]."

Not every lesson coming out of Afghanistan is revolutionary. Much of what the Air Force is gleaning validates tactics and technologies that have worked well in exercises, but never have been proven in combat, Weiners said.

One especially critical validation to come out of the Central Asian campaign is proof that the Air Force's Air and Space Expeditionary Forces, which were designed for peacetime, also work in war, Weiners said.

As the Defense Department continued to pull back from its overseas bases throughout the 1990s, Air Force leaders decided they needed a way to keep the increasingly home-based service ready for action.

C-17 Proves Itself

One example: Afghanistan is the first major conflict for the Pentagon that has required "everything to come in and out by air," Weiners noted.

The Air Force's newest transport, the C-17, was key, Weiners said.

"The C-17 really proved itself, given the austere nature of our bases" in Central Asia, he said.

Creative aircrews also have found ways for the C-17 to perform that its designers never anticipated, Weiners said, citing in particular its function as a "mobile filling station."

Afghanistan has no fuel supply infrastructure, and roads there are so treacherous that trucking large amounts of fuel in is out of the question.

That means every drop of aviation gas and jet fuel needed by the U.S. forces is supplied by the Pentagon's fleet of KC-10 and KC-135 tanker aircraft.

Meanwhile, Army and Marine helicopters and the assorted special operations aircraft stationed at the rough airfields that dot Afghanistan "need a lot of gas," Weiners said.

During Operation Anaconda in March, when fuel was at an absolute premium, an unknown airman came up with a novel idea to get fuel to the fighters quickly: Combine the C-17's ability to land almost anywhere with its large fuel tanks.

"We would park a tanker in an orbit, and the C-17 would go up, tap the tanker, land and off-load the fuel - and now you have avgas [aviation gas]" where tankers can't land, Weiners said.

Bombers With Eyes

Another much-discussed evolution was the decision to use of Cold-war era strategic bombers in tactical combat.

The Air Force's B-1, B-2 and B-52 bombers all were originally designed to deliver nuclear munitions in end-of-the-world scenarios.

In Afghanistan, however, Air Force officials took advantage of the bombers' extensive payloads, range and high-altitude capability to deliver lethal strikes on enemy forces - all while being directed by ground-based forces.

The bombers proved very effective, Weiners said.

"The B-1s and B-52s flew approximately 10 percent of the sorties and delivered close to 60 percent of the weapons," Weiners said.

During the Gulf War, B-52s dropped some 30 percent of all U.S. bombs. Neither the B-1 nor the B-2 was deployed.

One reason for that is the versatility of the bombers: They can carry traditional "dumb" bombs, but thanks to modifications, they also can deliver a range of smart weapons.

Secondly, all this can be done with greater standoff. The bombers fly much higher than fighter craft with no need for a visual, using coordinates from forward air controllers - the eyes on the ground.

Change comes with difficulty for the military; it's a "risk-averse group," Weiners said.

But, he said, "this is a great time to question the old way of doing things."

F/A-22: Deja Me-262 all over again?

The new tailspin of calling the F-22 Raptor a "F/A-22" to imply an unarmored, compromised-flight-performance-for-low-radar signature (F-15s have faster top seeds than F-22s) medium-high altitude air-to-air combat aircraft can perform Close Air Support (CAS) ground attack is a dangerous lie. The F-22 has an internal weapons bay to not have sharp-sided bombs sticking out which reflect radar signals; these small internal spaces are designed to carry slim air-to-air missiles, not large, fat bombs--in order to shoot down enemy aircraft because its an air-superiority FIGHTER not a ground attack aircraft. Giving the AF the benefit of the doubt, with the space available, how many bombs can a "F/A-22" carry internally?

Two.

That's right, 1, 2.

A recent Defense News article by Vago Muradian, Gail Kaufman and Bruce Rolfsen reports (see below):

"The aircraft's initial striking ability will come from a pair of 1,000-pound Joint Direct Attack Munitions in its weapons bays, then get beefed up over time through fleetwide upgrades, Air Force spokesman William Bodie said".

AF spokesman Willian Bodie elaborates further in the article:

"Given the size of the 1,000-pound weapon, the aircraft can carry only two of the bombs internally. That will change, however, with the arrival of the Small Diameter Bomb in 2006. The F/A-22 will be able to carry eight of the 250-pound, high-yield precision munitions internally, and additional ones on the underwing weapons stations. Upgrades will eventually allow the Raptor to hit moving ground targets in all-weather conditions, Bodie said.

Bodie then boasts that the F/A-22 will render CAS for Army Brigade Combat Teams:

"Air Force planners are teaming with their Army counterparts to support the ground service's new Brigade Combat Teams, he said.

'The Raptor can support mobility forces deep in enemy territory while at the same time penetrating any defenses to come to the aid of Soldiers on the ground, 24 hours a day and in any weather,' Bodie said."

Troops on the ground require ordnance that is directed by both human observers on the ground and in the air that is released by aircraft on physical, low-altitude flight paths that are safe in event the bomb tailfins are bent on release, the guidance goes awry and any other myriad problems occur. The hypocrisy of using the enemy ADA threat as a convenient "strawman" to say armored, highly agile A-10s cannot do low-level CAS is made evident when you strap bombs under the wings of "F/A-22s" because this is said to be justified because the ADA threat has subsided so its stealth features---now negated by the externally hung bombs---are not needed. Either the enemy ADA threat has been taken out or it has not; if it has, then what's good for F/A-22s to carry bombs externally is also good for A-10s; except the A-10 can fly low with armor protection and agility to fly beneath overcast weather conditions to render effective

F/A-22s trying to fly CAS missions under 15K if hit by enemy ground fire will be shot down and could crash into steep terrain if boxed in by low cloud ceilings. Knowing this limitation, on "bad weather days" the F/A-22s will not fly and our ground troops will again be without CAS as they were in the dark days of the 1945 Battle of the Bulge in WWII. Dropping bombs blind through clouds by F/A-22s even with allegedy "precision guided" bombs to do CAS is a recipe for killing our own ground troops. JDAMS have already killed American Soldiers in Afghanistan when used in such a fool-hardy manner. In fact, large bombs are not what's needed to do CAS well; guns and rockets aimed by aircraft line-of-sight aircraft under 15,000 feet talked onto target by FACs and terminally guided by their laser designators is what's required.

Cautionary examples of trying to make fighters into quasi-fighter-bombers are the German Me-262 fighter jet which could have as an air superiority fighter swept the prop-driven U.S. Army Air Force from the skies over Europe in WWII. However, instead Hitler insisted it be laden with bombs negating its speed advantage over prop planes. Strapping bombs onto F/A-22s will eliminate any stealth it has to enemy radar detection. Another bad compromised design example is the overweight, under-performing F/A-18 and F/A Super Hornets used by the Navy/marines which cannot even fly Mach 2 but are stuffed with attack avionics. Hornets are unarmored and fly too fast in relation to the ground to provide CAS let alone under operate under low overcast conditions. The ability to be "multi-role" and carry bombs was the design intent of the Joint Strike Fighter (JSF), which would also have STOVL variants that could operate without needing vulnerable, fixed air bases easily ground attacked by asymmetric enemies. Renaming the F-22 a quasi-attack aircraft is likely an opening shot to abandon funding of the JSF and upgrades to actual A-10 CAS aircraft by the USAF in favor of their sexier F-22s operated from comfortable, air-conditioned bases. While our men on the ground that are actually finding, locating and encircling our elusive enemies---and not blowing up decoys, civilians and clumps of rocks from 15,000 feet---who need attack aircraft continuously overhead as far forward as possible operating from dirt strips to render effective CAS---will once more go without.

Warthog-in-a-box?

+

= Warthog Ground Mobility!

The tiny A/T-37 Dragonfly series of aircraft would be easily made sea/air/land container, trailer-mobile as this picture showing a T-37 being moved by a small trailer demonstrates. This same technique can be applied to the Warthog with new wings that fold.

Today's fluid battlefields are revealing the need for aircraft to be more available and flexible in order to strike at increasingly fleeting targets. Army helicopters should be ground mobile through trailers to better covertly operate from Forward Arming And Refuelling Points (FAARPs); so should Air Force fighter-bombers with missions to support ground maneuver troops. Details:

www.geocities.com/equipmentshop/helicoptergroundmobility.htm

Armored Sea-Air-Land MILVAN containers should be used to transport fighter-bomber fixed-wing aircraft via trailers/prime movers with an outer sacrificial wall to predetonate any RPGs and defeat heavy machine gun bullets. When operating from a FAARP or even a fixed-base the armored box would protect the aircraft from enemy air base rocket, mortar, artillery and small arms fire attacks. The box in essence becomes a mobile hardened shelter so we do not have to work around aircraft by supplying them large, fixed bases to hop into and out of. Mechanics can do maintenance on the aircraft not only out of the sun and cold but free from dust and dirt. Inside the armored box, the aircraft is not visible as an aircraft to the enemy to key on to attack it. Since aircraft in general are weak and vulnerable on the ground, its obvious that they need an armored caccoon and some mobility on the ground.

We have long used ships to move aircraft across oceans to eliminate the risks of losing pilots and planes while ferrying them. Its problematic that air refuelling tankers, bases to land and refuel may not be available. However, the fragile nature of aircraft has led to them being gingerly carried on the flat decks of aircraft carriers used as a transport ship, placing both ship and aircraft at risk from enemy attack. By placing aircraft in armored boxes that stack we can avoid having to work around their weakness and can transport them in common container ships. Also, we do not have today extra unused aircraft carriers hanging around like the USNS Card which ferried Army helicopters to Vietnam in 1965. Shipping aircraft across oceans saves wear and tear on them so we have more capability when we really need it: in combat not just moving from point A to B. The same applies to conserving fighting powers moving by trailers and prime movers on the ground using armored boxes.

Where do we start?

Army helicopters can detach their rotors so all we need is armored boxes large enough for them. For the AF, we should start with the A-10 "Warthog" which needs a second seat in back for an Airborne FAC enlisted observer, new engines and new wings. Details:

www.geocities.com/equipmentshop/aircommandos.htm

The new wings should FOLD like the old Grumman Hellcats of WWII so the Warthog could fit inside an armored transport box.

Sadly, the A-10's maker, Fairchild Republic has long been out of business and over the years no company has been fighting to upgrade the A-10, and look at new employment concepts like "Warthog-in-a-box". The A-10 is orphaned. Thus, the greatest armored jet CAS in history is in danger of retiring out of neglect because it has no military industrial congressional complex (MICC) advocate. We must not let this happen! Armored box capabilities in conjunction with 2-seat OA-10Bs with folding wings more powerful engines and improved less than 3,000 foot runway STOL capabilities would revolutionize and improve USAF/Army air-ground cooperation and bring back the "Cactus Air Force" capabilities we lost when jets required long fixed runways.

Today's Non-Linear Battlefield (NLB) demands that aircraft support ground maneuver by being as close to the troops as possibly while not becoming inviting targets for the enemy when not in the air. Armored mobility boxes for aircraft can effect this transformation which will only get better with the advent of STOVL F-35 Joint Strike Fighters for interdiction missions on top of A-10s for Close/Maneuver Air Support. By not offering the enemy easy targets, and only striking hawks from the sky, perhaps he will seek more constructive lines of work.

Summary/Conclusion

The return of two-seat observation/attack aircraft, Air Commandos and enhanced AFACs and GFACs to the USAF is an urgent requirement that can be filled quickly at low cost to the tax payers.

itsg@hotmail.com

An Army Major from Afghanistan writes:

"ALCON

Excellent article and very accurate.

I served as an LNO in the 10th Mountain TOC during Anaconda and I can attest to the unusually long delays in getting CAS to hit targets spotted by ground forces. Instead of seconds to a minute or so it was more like 10s of minutes to the better part of an hour. Many targets subsequently disappeared within that time frame.

Sincerely"

Major XXXXXXX XXXXXXXXXX

A F4 fighter-bomber pilot with extensive experience writes:

"I had no idea they ever made 2-seat A10s.

One of the big hassles in the USAF is the total resistance of HHQ to restricted duty pilots - that is, dedicated career pilots. I was at Nellis AFB on a reunion and we got to talk to a one-star on this matter about 6 years ago. It takes about 8 years for a pilot to go from nugget to expert - and can then go anywhere and do anything. The problem is gaining total situational awareness - thus not being surprised but anything that pops up and also be able to act correctly no matter what.

Then the way HHQ does things now - via D/Personnel - the pilot has about 4 years as an expert and he is shunted to a desk somewhere, or passed over because someone wrote him an 8 OER or he didn't get an MA degree. I was sort of unique - I was 40 when I went to DaNang in '71 and had been in the cockpit since 1954. As I mentioned above, nothing ever surprised me while flying at DaNang. My squadron (390th TFS) was short of 'old heads'. We had 4 pilots, including myself, that had enough experience to lead flight up North. All the rest of my pilots were training command, B52 and C141 types right out of F4 RTU and had never, repeat never, flown fighters before. The Army version of this would be to arm cooks and bakers and form an infantry platoon out of them for front-line duty. By luck, the grace of God, and the skill we 4 old heads possessed we never lost a man. Meanwhile I personnally knew of 6 old heads who were sitting at desks in SEA and we could not pry them loose to help us out. The other two squadrons were in the same shape. It still gripes me that D/Pers will insist on 'career progression' as a reason to keep on shipping good pilots out of the cockpit. Why a brand new second lieutenant who hasn't yet proved he can really fly has to be stuck in a fifty million dollar fighter (F15E) is beyond me. I'd say put him in a second rate ship for two years and see if he survives. If he does, he obviously can fly adequately and we can then entrust him with a first-line machine.

NOTE: I am astounded that fighters made attack runs perpendicular to our own lines. That was absolutely forbidden in Nam. The only times I ever made very close attacks was a) in dire need as stated by the ground FAC and b) he gave me his initials. I have dropped hi-drags from 300 AGL within 100 yards of the wire, napalm (100 AGL) and strafe (same) in the wire, but always repeat always parallel to our lines.

I DO NOT understand what is so hard about strafe - one either makes a point attack with the fire concentrated on one spot or gently but quickly move the stick to lay down a pattern. I suspect the F15E troops were not really with the program.

CAS orbiting on-call say a couple klicks behind the front lines should be pretty immune to enemy reaction. As long as the ECM gear works, the crews keep eyes out, a quick drop down between the trees shoud suffice to dodge any incoming missile.

NOTE 2: Have any infantry types been over to talk to the CAS pilots? I know in my career I didn't get much cross-info. One class at Nellis in 1954, B/S swapping with Nike types, some X-training in Berlin FRG in '72 with Redeye crews, and that was it!

Let me know what I can do for you-all - your effort is extremely worthwhile. I found the most rewarding missions in Nam were 1) CAS and 2) knocking out SAM sites."

A noted Air Power experts writes in:

"I don't have time for a lengthy response, but some thoughts are pertinent.

1. The A-10 can remain viable in airspace without a radar guided SAM threat and fighter threat, but only if it carries a proper MAWS and IR jammer ie DIRCM/laser suite. Bad guys with plenty of cash might have some very modern MANPADS to shoot and flares will not cut it. Without an IR defensive package you will end up losing aircraft, not an if but a when question.

2. No problems putting in a new engine, plenty of choices, and no problems with an NVG compatible glass cockpit, there is plenty of stuff out there. No problems also with putting a big 14" diagonal AMCLD panel in the middle of the cokpit for heads down FLIR targeting.

3. You will need a FLIR/laser pod, probably the PANTERA/ATP would be the best off-the-shelf choice. That means a Bold Stroke PPC 604/VME processor box to drive it and do the weps delivery and digital datalink work. You would probably be reinforcing the Pave Penny pylon - the ATP has an internal LST facility.

4. JDAMs are more reliable than Paveways - they have GPS plus inertial and that provides defacto dual redundancy - a Paveway loses the laser signal and it goes ballistic. The problem with JDAM is fat fingers by folk on the ground and their peers in the cockpit - punching keypads in a hurry is a recipe for trouble. A digital datalink is what is needed here.

5. The two-seat F-16 CAS trials showed the value of a head steered FLIR slaved the the pilot's helmet, using a HMD with visor FLIR projection. There are HMD helmet packages out there (eg GEC and Pilkington) which combine visor projection with embedded NVG tubes.

6.Another option might be the Virtual HUD (VHUD) which would permit synthetic terrain coutour projection on the visor.

7.Direct low-level attack vs medium altitude drops:

a) if you drop a JDAM or an Paveway as if it was a dumb bomb to achieve best ballistic accuracy you won;t get into trouble with broken guidance. That problems happens mostly when people drop guided bombs at the edge of the guidance envelope.

b) people punching in wrong coordinates or pointing lasers in the wrong place is no different a problem to a poorly aimed arty barrage. Bad targeting is bad targeting regardless of weapon.

c) Going in low to acquire the target exposes the aircraft to all manner of fire but also shorten's the pilot's acquisition time and limits his warning time for reacting to SAM shots or AAA. If he goes in at 500 AGL he has this problem. If he goes in at 2,000 AGL the problem does not get much better. If he is up at FL 150 he has time to acquire and react if fired upon.

8. I don't know where the guy gets his 30 A-10Bs from, AFAIK only two protos were built:

www.wpafb.af.mil/museum/research/attack/a6/a6-19.htm

If you are aiming to use the A-10 then it has to be a `COIN' environment without radar guided threats, and you will need proper DIRCM which are absent in the current aircraft config. Not sure I'd be bothering with the two seater conversion, a decent avionic fit and glass cockpit solves that problem.

In principal I am not opposed to the A-10 but I would insist that it gets proper night/adverse weather avionics, a DIRCM package and be operated only in viable environments. Afghanistan was such since the radar guided threat got killed off on day one. Other theatres might be very different.

The strategic issue is whether you want to support a specialised CAS bird while all of this money is being invested into JSF to do only that job well.

Personally I'd be investing into datalinks and ground targeting gear to support such so that any asset which carries bombs can go plinking CAS targets on call. Solve the problem properly at last."

NOTES

1. Washington POST article Ambush at Takur-Gar

2. "Going in"; Close Air Support in Afghanistan parts 1 and 2; by Lance M. Bacon, Soldier of Fortune magazine, September and October 2002' part 3 in due in November

3. Virtual Aerospace Web

www.aerospaceweb.org/aircraft/attack/a10/index.shtml

KNOWN A-10 VARIANTS:

YA-10 Prototype, competed with Northrop YA-9 for Air Force A-X attack plane contract and won on 18 January 1973

A-10A Production attack plane; 721 built, about 90 upgraded with radar altimeter, GPWS, autopilot, new bomb sight, and capability for 30 mm cannon to be used against air units

A-10T or A-10B Two-seat combat-capable trainer with enlarged nose and taller fins; 30 built

A-10NAW or YA-10B Two-seat Night Adverse Weather prototype developed by Fairchild for consideration by USAF, second seat for weapons officer responsible for ECM, navigation, and target acquisition; not put into production but many features later incorporated into A-10 fleet OA-10A

Small number of A-10As converted to observation and forward air control (FAC) role

4. USAF A-10 Fact Sheet

www.af.mil/news/factsheets/A_10_OA_10_Thunderbolt_II.html

Mission

The A/OA-10 Thunderbolt II is the first Air Force aircraft specially designed for close air support of ground forces. They are simple, effective and survivable twin-engine jet aircraft that can be used against all ground targets, including tanks and other armored vehicles.

Features

The A-10/OA-10 have excellent maneuverability at low air speeds and altitude, and are highly accurate weapons-delivery platforms. They can loiter near battle areas for extended periods of time and operate under 1,000-foot ceilings (303.3 meters) with 1.5-mile (2.4 kilometers) visibility. Their wide combat radius and short takeoff and landing capability permit operations in and out of locations near front lines. Using night vision goggles, A-10/ OA-10 pilots can conduct their missions during darkness.

Thunderbolt IIs have Night Vision Imaging Systems (NVIS), goggle compatible single-seat cockpits forward of their wings and a large bubble canopy which provides pilots all-around vision. The pilots are protected by titanium armor that also protects parts of the flight-control system. The redundant primary structural sections allow the aircraft to enjoy better survivability during close air support than did previous aircraft.

The aircraft can survive direct hits from armor-piercing and high explosive projectiles up to 23mm. Their self-sealing fuel cells are protected by internal and external foam. Manual systems back up their redundant hydraulic flight-control systems. This permits pilots to fly and land when hydraulic power is lost.

The Thunderbolt II can be serviced and operated from bases with limited facilities near battle areas. Many of the aircraft's parts are interchangeable left and right, including the engines, main landing gear and vertical stabilizers.

Avionics equipment includes communications, inertial navigation systems, fire control and weapons delivery systems, target penetration aids and night vision goggles. Their weapons delivery systems include heads-up displays that indicate airspeed, altitude, dive angle, navigation information and weapons aiming references; a low altitude safety and targeting enhancement system (LASTE) which provides constantly computing impact point freefall ordnance delivery; and Pave Penny laser-tracking pods under the fuselage. The aircraft also have armament control panels, and infrared and electronic countermeasures to handle surface-to-air-missile threats. Installation of the Global Positioning System is currently underway for all aircraft.

The Thunderbolt II's 30mm GAU-8/A Gatling gun can fire 3,900 rounds a minute and can defeat an array of ground targets to include tanks. Some of their other equipment includes an inertial navigation system, electronic countermeasures, target penetration aids, self-protection systems, and AGM-65 Maverick and AIM-9 Sidewinder missiles.

Background

The first production A-10A was delivered to Davis-Monthan Air Force Base, Ariz., in October 1975. It was designed specially for the close air support mission and had the ability to combine large military loads, long loiter and wide combat radius, which proved to be vital assets to the United States and its allies during Operation Desert Storm and Operation Noble Anvil. In the Gulf War, A-10s had a mission capable rate of 95.7 percent, flew 8,100 sorties and launched 90 percent of the AGM-65 Maverick missiles.

General Characteristics

Primary Function: A-10 -- close air support, OA-10 - airborne forward air control
Contractor: Fairchild Republic Co.
Power Plant: Two General Electric TF34-GE-100 turbofans
Thrust: 9,065 pounds each engine
Length: 53 feet, 4 inches (16.16 meters)
Height: 14 feet, 8 inches (4.42 meters)
Wingspan: 57 feet, 6 inches (17.42 meters)
Speed: 420 miles per hour (Mach 0.56)
Ceiling: 45,000 feet (13,636 meters)
Maximum Takeoff Weight: 51,000 pounds (22,950 kilograms)
Range: 800 miles (695 nautical miles)
Armament: One 30 mm GAU-8/A seven-barrel Gatling gun; up to 16,000 pounds (7,200 kilograms) of mixed ordnance on eight under-wing and three under-fuselage pylon stations, including 500 pounds (225 kilograms) of Mk-82 and 2,000 pounds (900 kilograms) of Mk-84 series low/high drag bombs, incendiary cluster bombs, combined effects munitions, mine dispensing munitions, AGM-65 Maverick missiles and laser-guided/electro-optically guided bombs; infrared countermeasure flares; electronic countermeasure chaff; jammer pods; 2.75-inch (6.99 centimeters) rockets; illumination flares and AIM-9 Sidewinder missiles. Crew: One or two
Date Deployed: March 1976
Unit Cost: $9.8 million (fiscal 98 constant dollars)
Inventory: Active force, A-10, 143 and OA-10, 70; Reserve, A-10, 46 and OA-10, 6; ANG, A-10, 84 and OA-10, 18

Point Of Contact

Air Combat Command, Public Affairs Office; 115 Thompson Street, Suite 211; Langley AFB, VA 23665-1987; DSN 574-5007 or (757) 764-5007. June 2000

5. FM 17-18 Light Armor Operations states:

Tactical Air Control Parties. The USAF provides one TACP to each maneuver battalion. Each TACP includes an ALO, who performs FAC duties, and two TACAIR C2 specialists. One of the specialists is trained in terminal air control techniques and can perform TACP duties. The ALO supervises the activities of the TACP personnel; he advises the commander, FSO, and S3-Air on capabilities and limitations of TACAIR and other technical or tactical aspects of TACAIR missions as required. The ALO uses USAF TACAIR requests to maintain radio contact with all other TACPs in the division and with the air support operations center (ASOC). When possible, he provides final coordination of CAS missions in the battalion area. The TACP transmits to the ASOC all requests for immediate CAS. He advises the S3-Air and FSO of other units' immediate air requests. As changes in the TACAIR situation are transmitted over the TACAIR request net, the ALO relays them to the S3-Air and FSO.

TACP procedures in this manual conform to US Army and USAF standards. TACPs participating in allied operations should be familiar with the characteristics and attack profiles of all aircraft that may support ground operations.

Preplanned Missions. Preplanned missions are those for which a requirement can be foreseen. They permit detailed planning, integration, and coordination with the ground tactical plan. In the defense, CAS can be used to thicken fires in a decisive EA. In the offense, CAS can be planned to strike an anticipated enemy counterattack in the vicinity of an objective. Inherent in such preplanned CAS missions is the possibility that the target will not appear at the place and time that was expected. Such missions would then be released and used to fill requests for immediate CAS elsewhere on the battlefield. Preplanned CAS missions are most desirable because munitions can be tailored to the target and complete mission planning can be accomplished. Categories of planned CAS are--

Scheduled mission. This is a CAS strike on a planned time on target (TOT), and will be included in the daily air tasking order (ATO).

Alert mission. This is a CAS strike on a preplanned target area executed when re quested by a supported unit. It is usually launched from a ground alert but may be flown from an airborne alert status. Alert (on-call) CAS allows the ground commander to designate a general target area within which targets may need to be attacked. The ground commander designates a conditional period within which he will later determine specific times for attacking the targets. Requests for planned CAS missions originating at the light armor battalion level are forwarded to the brigade FSE over the OI net or by any other means available. When the request is received by the FSE, it is reviewed by the G3-Air, the FSO, and the ALO. They determine the suitability of the targets for air attack and consider potential airspace conflicts. The FSO may decide that it would be better to use another weapon system against that target. As a minimum, he will integrate CAS into his FS plan. The G3-Air will then add the request to the file for planned CAS missions, eliminate duplications, and assign target priorities. He then forwards the consolidated request to an assistant G3. Consolidated requests are coordinated with the division FSCOORD and ALO. The requests are then forwarded to the corps G3-Air. Figure 7-6 depicts the planned CAS request net.

Figure 7-6. Planned close air support request channels.

Immediate Missions. Immediate missions are executed in response to requests from supported ground maneuver commanders to fulfill urgent requirements that could not be foreseen. Details of such missions are normally coordinated while the aircraft are in the air. Immediate mission requests are normally processed through USAF channels. Before requesting immediate CAS, the following points should be considered:

Target type. CAS is most effective when attacking exposed and/or moving enemy forces and air defense assets.

Enemy air defenses. Both antiaircraft artillery (AAA) and surface-to-air missiles (SAM) are systems that may require suppression before CAS can be effective.

Target acquisition. Well-camouflaged or small, stationary targets are difficult for pilots to acquire. These kinds of targets will require some kind of marking for identification. The use of an FSE or COLT to laser-designate a target can help target acquisition.

Day or night observation. For night missions, the FSO should give special attention to target identification and the use of artillery to illuminate the target.

Time available. Response and station time for CAS aircraft can vary from a few minutes to more than an hour. The TACP will normally have the most up-to-date information.

Figure 7-7. Immediate close air support request channels.

Requests for immediate CAS missions that originate at maneuver company level are forwarded to the battalion FSE and to the ALO (see Figure 7-7). Based on direction from the S3 and FSO, the ALO can make the request through the TACAIR request net from the TACP directly to the ASOC. The TACP at each level monitors the request and acknowledges receipt. Silence by an intermediate TACP indicates approval of the request by the associated Army echelon. If any echelon above the requesting echelon disapproves the request, the TACP at that echelon notifies the ASOC and the initiating TACP, giving the reason for disapproval. When the request is approved, the ASOC orders the mission flown. Immediate missions involve launching general alert aircraft using air alert sorties and/or diverting aircraft from other missions. Figure 7-8 depicts a typical immediate CAS request flow.

Before CAS aircraft release ordnance on the target, the TACP and FSO must accomplish several tasks. Radio frequencies and laser designation settings used by the FSOs, COLTs, and tactical aircraft should be predetermined and forwarded to all parties. Since most aircraft do not have FM radios, the ALO will use the ultrahigh frequency (UHF) tactical air direction net to communicate with CAS aircraft. Most USAF FM capability is nonsecure; therefore, it is critical that proper authentication procedures be used when FM radios are employed.

Following approval of the CAS request, the TACP and tactical air controller (TAC-A) receive aircraft mission data from the ASOC. These data include mission number, aircraft call sign, number and type of aircraft, ordnance carried, and TOT. The TACP determines any additional essential information, such as updated enemy locations and identification means, availability of fires for suppression of enemy air defense (SEAD), friendly ADA considerations, and time factors for the attack. If CAS aircraft are fitted with LSTs, the laser setting must be passed to the attack aircraft. When aircraft arrive at the target area, the TACP provides the pilots with updated information. They must be given enough information to positively identify the target. The TACP is also prepared to abort the attack if the safety of friendly troops is threatened. During the entire attack, the ALO watches for enemy surface-to-air fires and warns the aircraft accordingly.

If the CAS aircraft are fitted with LSTs, the TACP coordinates with the FSO or COLT to ensure that the targets are accurately marked for the aircraft. The LST-equipped aircraft detects the reflected laser, locks onto it, and illuminates an aiming cue in the pilot's head-up display. Even with laser designators, the use of marking smoke should be considered to help the pilot aim his LST accurately. Caution should be used to avoid laser-to-target visibility and attenuation problems caused by the smoke.

CAS Planning Considerations. CAS mission success is directly related to thorough mission planning based on the factors discussed in the following paragraphs.

Weather. Does the weather favor the use of aircraft? What is the forecast for the immediate future? Weather is one of the most important considerations when visually employing weapons; it can hinder target identification and degrade weapon accuracy.

Target Acquisition. Targets that are well camouflaged, small and stationary, or masked by hills or other natural terrain are difficult to identify from fast-moving aircraft. The use of marking rounds can enhance target identification and help ensure first-pass success. Moving targets will usually highlight themselves.

Target Identification. This is critical if CAS aircraft are to avoid attacking friendly forces by mistake. It can be accomplished by providing a precise description of the target in relation to terrain features easily visible from the air. Smoke, laser target marking, or other means can also be used.

Identification of Friendly Forces. Safe means of friendly position identification include mirror flashes, marker panels, and direction and distance from prominent land features or target marks.

Figure 7-8. Typical immediate CAS request flow.

General Ordnance Characteristics. What types of targets are to be engaged, and what are the desired weapon effects?

Final Attack Heading. Choice of the final attack heading depends upon considerations of troop safety, aircraft survivability, and optimum weapon effects. Missiles and bombs are effective from any angle. Cannons, however, are more effective against the sides and rears of armored vehicles.

Troop Safety. This is a key consideration in using CAS. The primary cause of fratricide is misidentification of friendly troops as enemy forces.

SEAD. SEAD will be required based on the capabilities of the aircraft and presence of enemy air defense systems in the target area.

CAS and Artillery Integration. Army artillery and tactical airpower are complementary. Because artillery support is more continuous and responds faster than CAS, CAS missions must be integrated with artillery so that limited firing restrictions are imposed. The ACA is the FS coordination measure used to accomplish this integration. There are four standard ACAs: lateral, altitude, timed, and altitude and lateral separation.

Other planning factors that must be considered are time available for planning, C3 and terrain. Refer to FM 6-20-50 for these additional planning factors.

Strike Execution. As the CAS aircraft reach the general vicinity of the target, they fly to a contact point that is normally given to the pilots through USAF channels. At the contact point, the pilots change radio frequencies and come up on the supported ground unit's TACP frequency. The pilots are then given a situation update by either a TAC-A or the ALO as they continue flying in the direction of the target. The CAS aircraft then fly to a reference point on the ground that the pilots can identify from the air, called the initial point (IP). When the CAS flight leader is cleared to attack, he switches to the attack frequency, contacts the TACP, and reports when his flight departs the IP and is en route to the target. This radio call is used to coordinate any required SEAD and/or target marking rounds.

It is important to remember that this entire procedure, in a high-intensity, high-threat environment, would have to be done as smoothly and quickly as possible. If the attack aircraft are not aligned with the correct target or if friendly troops may be endangered, the TACP must abort the attack. The CAS abort procedure uses a challenge and reply response. The CAS flight leader gives the TACP the two-letter challenge code; the reply "letter" from the TACP is the abort-call "code word." The reply letter should be transmitted after the words "ABORT, ABORT, ABORT." This procedure is possible only if the TACP or ALO has the same authentication system as the aircraft.

An effective daytime technique of marking target areas is to fire a mortar smoke round into the target area. Pilots can easily verify the target area prior to releasing ordnance. During limited visibility, the same technique can be used only using illumination rounds set for ground burst.

Night Planning and Operation Considerations. In a high-intensity, high-threat environment, the capabilities of CAS aircraft employed at night are very limited. To improve the capabilities of night CAS, the USAF is acquiring additional night-capable systems such as the low-altitude navigation and targeting infrared for night (LANTIRN) system. Despite the limitations, CAS aircraft still have a few advantages while attacking at night. The most important advantage is the limitation darkness imposes on enemy optically-sighted and infrared (IR) antiaircraft systems. This is particularly true if they do not have NVD. Airborne or ground-based illumination can also degrade enemy night-vision capabilities.

The two most important requirements of a night CAS operation are identification of the enemy or target and positive marking of friendly unit locations. The ground maneuver commander should rely on his own Army assets to accomplish the marking and illumination requirement. Although flares released from airborne FACs, other CAS aircraft, or "flare ships" can effectively illuminate target areas, illumination fired by ground artillery and heavy mortars are normally preferred due to the continuous capabilities of sustained indirect fire. Fixed-wing aircraft that can conduct night CAS missions with battlefield illumination are the AV-8B, A-10, A-7, F-16, F-4, F-111, and F/A-18.

Laser designation capabilities of the A-10, A-7, AV-8B, and F/A-18 enable these aircraft to acquire targets without use of conventional illumination. The LSTs carried by these aircraft detect the reflected laser, lock onto it, and provide the data directly to the pilot. The F-4, F-16, F/A-18 and A-7 can also use radar to provide reference information for night operations. In addition, small radar reflectors, optimized for particular airborne radars, can create spotting cues for CAS aircraft.

Marking friendly unit locations improves joint air attack team (JAAT) and CAS safety and also provides target area references. Tracers and radar beacons can serve both purposes. If safe separation is a factor, friendly unit marking is critical. Fired into the air, 40-mm illumination grenades and flares are effective, but they may be useful to the enemy as well. Flares used during limited visibility operations can create the "milk-bowl" effect, making it more difficult for a CAS aircraft to find its target. When used under a low cloud ceiling, flares can also highlight the aircraft against the cloud cover. Strobe lights are very good night markers. They are commonly used with blue or IR filters and can be made directional by the use of any opaque tube. In overcast conditions, strobe lights can be especially useful. Aside from the obvious security considerations, almost any light that can be filtered or covered and uncovered can be used for signaling aircraft.

USAF Aircraft Characteristics. CAS missions never consist of less than two aircraft sorties. These aircraft may make more than one pass over the target area except in high-intensity, high-threat situations, where the capabilities of modern air defense systems present added dangers. The following paragraphs provide examples of two types of aircraft, the A-10 and the A-7, that will normally be given CAS missions. Table 7-5 is a summary of reference data for aircraft that perform CAS missions; Table 7-6 is a summary of ordnance available for CAS.

Table 7-5. Aircraft reference data.

Table 7-5a. Aircraft reference data (Cont).

Table 7-6. Aircraft ordnance reference data.

The A-10 (Thunderbolt) is designed specifically for the CAS role. In a typical CAS mission, the A-10 could fly 150 miles and remain on station for an hour. It can carry up to 16,000 pounds of mixed ordnance with partial fuel, or 12,086 pounds with full internal fuel. The 30-mm GAU-8A gun carried by the A-10 can fire 2,100 or 4,200 rounds per minute and defeat the whole range of ground targets encountered in the CAS role, including tanks. In addition to the GAU-8A, the A-10 can also carry free-fall or guided bombs, gun pods, six AGM-65 Maverick missiles, jammer pods, and the Pave Penny laser spot tracker. A typical standard ordnance load for the A-10 is two to four Maverick missiles and over 1,100 rounds of 30-mm ammunition, consisting of an armor-piercing incendiary (API) and high-explosive incendiary (HEI) mix. The API has a depleted uranium penetrator. The Maverick used by USAF aircraft uses TV or IR seekers with fire-and-forget and day-night capabilities. The warhead is a 165-pound shaped charge for use against tanks or a 300-pound penetrating high explosive. Time required to acquire and lock the weapon onto a target usually restricts the A-10 to one missile per pass. In a target-rich environment, there may be time for further engagements with the 30-mm gun before breaking off the attack. The 30-mm gun is normally aimed at a point target and fired for a one-second burst of 30 rounds. The on-board load of 1,170 30-mm rounds, fired at 2,100 rounds per minute, could be expended in just 30 seconds.

[Editor: A-7s are retired from U.S. service]

The A-7 (Corsair) is a subsonic tactical fighter that was delivered to the USAF and Navy between 1968 and 1976. The A-7 has on-station time of 30 to 50 minutes with a maximum speed of 663 mph. The aircraft's outstanding target kill capability, first demonstrated in Southeast Asia, is achieved with the aid of continuous-solution navigation and weapon-delivery systems, including all-weather radar bomb delivery. Additionally, a large number of A-7s were modified to carry the same Pave Penny laser target designation pod as the A-10. The A-7 can carry up to 15,000 pounds of air-to-air or air-to-ground missiles, bombs, rockets, and gun pods. In addition, it has the standard M-61A1 20-mm Vulcan gun, which is effective against lightly armored vehicles.

The F-16 (Fighting Falcon) is a single-engine, single-seat, lightweight, high-performance, multirole aircraft. This highly maneuverable fighter excels in air-to-air and air-to-surface roles. In the air-to-surface role, using a 20-mm Gatling gun, it is the most accurate aircraft in the inventory and can be used for both CAS and AI.

U.S. NAVY/MARINE CORPS TACTICAL AIR SUPPORT

U.S. Navy (USN) and/or U.S. Marine Corps (USMC) air requests are forwarded by the respective SALTs to the aviation unit in support of the unit. The brigade FSO submits all air requests, including those for USMC attack helicopters (AH-1W Cobra), through the Marine air officer or ANGLICO. The actual terminal control of the air assets is done by the firepower controller of the FCT. In the absence of an observer, USN and/or USMC air may be controlled by the company FSO, the ALO, or the USAF FAC.

Like USAF support, USN/USMC TACAIR never consists of less than two aircraft sorties. These aircraft may make more than one pass over the target area, but loiter time is contingent on transit distance. Refer to Figure 7-4 and Table 7-1 for additional information. The following are the two most common USN/USMC aircraft that provide CAS to light armor operations.

The F/A-18/D (Hornet) is an extremely versatile aircraft that can provide excellent CAS with its 20-mm rotary cannon and a basic load of either 515 or 580 rounds. Loiter time is 30 to 45 minutes, depending on external fuel tanks and ordnance load. The F/A-18 can carry 13,700 pounds of conventional ordnance consisting of 2.75-mm and 5-mm rockets, Walleye, HELLFIRE, TOW missiles, fuel-air explosive (FAE) and flares. It is equipped with a laser designator, radar, and FLIR/NVG. The maximum speed is 1,190 mph (without ordnance or external fuel tanks).

The AV-8B (Harrier) can also provide CAS with its 25-mm rotary cannon, however, its basic load is only 300 rounds and can only remain on station for up to 30 minutes. The AV-8B can carry 8,000 pounds of the same type of external ordnance as the F/A-18. For target acquisition, it has LST and FLIR/NVG. The maximum speed is 685 mph (without ordnance or external fuel tanks). Section III. Army Aviation Support

Army aviation assets will deploy with light infantry contingency TFs. Light armor units may operate with attack and/or reconnaissance aviation assets to perform reconnaissance and security operations.

ORGANIZATION

The organization of the light division aviation brigade and reconnaissance squadron is dependent upon whether the division is light, airborne, or air assault. The ACT in each type of division, however, has the same organization.

CHARACTERISTICS

The capabilities of the AH-1, AH-64, and OH-58D attack helicopters include--

The AH-1 Cobra can carry multiple loads, dependent on the mission, enemy situation, and atmospheric conditions. Weapon systems include 2.75-inch rockets, 7.62-mm minigun, 40-mm grenade launcher, 20-mm cannon, and TOW.

The AH-64 Apache is equipped with the pilot night vision sensor to enhance flight during periods of reduced visibility. It also has a target acquisition sight/designator to lase targets for laser energy-seeking munitions. Its weapon systems include 2.75-inch rockets, 30-mm cannon, and the HELLFIRE missile.

The OH-58D (Kiowa Warrior) is the armed version of the OH-58 (AHIP) with HELL FIRE, Stinger, 2.75" rockets, and .50 caliber [heavy] machine guns. The helicopter is equipped with a thermal imaging system (TIS) and a low-light camera system. The helicopter is capable of operating on a digital TACFIRE network. The Kiowa Warrior will eventually replace all Cobras and Kiowas in the cavalry squadrons and attack battalions of the light and airborne divisions. EMPLOYMENT

The aviation brigade provides divisional Army aviation support. This support can be for attack, air movement, air assault, reconnaissance, intelligence, security, and/or logistical operations. Cargo helicopters (CH-47s) are available only in the aviation brigade of the air assault division or at corps level.

Light armor leaders at all levels must be aware of the integration of Army aviation assets into the maneuver plan so that light armor and rotary aircraft can work efficiently as a team.

Light armor units will normally work with Army aviation assets in reconnaissance, security, or logistical roles.

An ACT may operate with a light armor battalion during a reconnaissance or screen mission. Planning and guidance for future operations are conducted by the light armor battalion. The light armor unit commander assigns missions to the ACT commander. The light armor battalion staff provides essential intelligence, logistical, and FS information. The ACT commander can respond quickly to support a ground commander's scheme of maneuver. The minimum information he must know is--

Enemy situation.

Availability of FS.

FS coordination measures in effect.

Current battlefield graphics.

Attack helicopter assets in the area.

Disposition of friendly ground elements.

Commander's relationship to the new unit.

Person to whom spot reports are to be reported.

Location of supporting Classes III and V aviation assets.

An ACT may also work with light armor companies or platoons as a reconnaissance team. For example, during the early stages of a CONOPS, air reconnaissance aircraft can provide early warning for the mobile light armor ground force tasked to provide security for the airhead. Available light armor and ACT assets can be task organized by the commander to provide a highly mobile screening force in a predominantly dismounted brigade AO.

Attack Helicopter Mission. The primary mission of attack helicopters is to destroy massed enemy forces with aerial firepower, mobility, and shock effect. Light armor with attack helicopter augmentation significantly gain, maintain, and exploit the initiative to defeat the enemy. They operate in offensive, defensive, or special purpose operations. The attack helicopter can be committed early in battle. It can reinforce ground combat units and can attack, delay, or defend by engaging the enemy with direct and indirect fires. Attack helicopter battalions cannot seize or retain terrain without cross-attached ground maneuver forces. However, to deny terrain to the enemy for a time, they can dominate the terrain by fire. Also, attack helicopters are limited by a combination of fuel capacity and flight time, weather and visibility restrictions, and the air defense environment. They are most effective when employed as a battalion. Attack helicopters can also be assigned to do the following:

Conduct rear operations.

Coordinate and adjust indirect fires.

Suppress or destroy enemy air defense assets.

Reinforce ground maneuver forces by fire.

Conduct JAAT operations with CAS and FA assets.

Destroy enemy communication and logistical assets.

Disrupt and destroy enemy second echelon and follow-on forces.

Protect air assault forces during all phases of air assault operations.

Destroy enemy helicopters that pose an immediate threat to mission accomplishment.

Considerations. The commander must consider the following factors before employing attack helicopters and air cavalry/reconnaissance troops.

Offense. Attack helicopters conduct combat operations against enemy force alone or along with friendly ground forces. In the offense, attack helicopters are most effective against a moving or counterattacking enemy force. They are least effective against a dug-in enemy force. With proper planning, attack helicopter battalions can provide antiarmor firepower against an enemy armored force. Rather than being used as a reaction force, attack helicopter battalions should be integrated into the maneuver battalion's scheme of maneuver. This is normally done at division or brigade level and must include coordination for terrain to support attack helicopter operations.

Defense. Attack helicopters, due to their mobility are shifted on the battlefield as needed. They are used to stop enemy penetration into the main battle area, to attack enemy in the covering force area, or to reinforce or thicken the defense on parts of the battlefield. They can also perform effectively in an economy-of-force defensive role. Planners must coordinate BPs for attack helicopters.

The light armor battalion may, on rare occasions have attack helicopter assets OPCON to assist in an antiarmor battle. An army aviation LO may be provided to the battalion to coordinate aviation support when this type of mission is planned. He will advise the commander and assist in planning the use of aviation assets to support the maneuver plan.

6. Defense News, September 16, 2002

Not your father's fighter jet
Faster than an enemy cruise missile, more complex than the space shuttle, able to carry out both air and ground attacks - (re)introducing the F-22

By Vago Muradian
Special to the Times

The Air Force is creating a new name, new missions and a new pitch for the jet formerly known as the F-22 Raptor air superiority fighter.

Air Force officials intend to redesignate it the F/A-22, reflecting a year of changes intended to give the stealthy, supersonic aircraft a potent ground-attack and electronic warfare punch. Behind closed doors, they also are arguing that the F/A-22 could play a large role in shooting down cruise missiles heading for U.S. soil, potentially a critical new mission for Air Force fighters.

Service leaders said the moves are driven by the changing nature of warfare. They also hope the broadened mission of the Raptor will help persuade Pentagon leaders that the military should purchase at least 381 of the aircraft, which Air Force Secretary James G. Roche and service chief Gen. John P. Jumper have called a top priority and key to service transformation. The Department of Defense has suggested as few as 180 of the airplanes.

"This isn't your father's F-22," Roche said in a recent interview, echoing a 1990s advertising campaign by carmaker Oldsmobile. "Is it the world's best air superiority fighter? Yes. But it's also going to be one of the world's most lethal strike aircraft, and that's the case that we are making."

Jumper plans to unveil the new moniker on Sept. 17 at the Air Force Association's annual symposium in Washington, D.C.

Armament to fit the mission

Air Force planners had long envisioned a ground-attack variant of the F-22, whose development is spearheaded by Lockheed Martin of Bethesda, Md. A fully equipped strike version was to enter service around 2012, about eight years after the air superiority variant hit squadrons.

But after the Sept. 11 terror attacks, Roche stepped up efforts to outfit air-to-air F-22s with strike avionics and equipment. The secretary has ordered that when the first planes enter service with the 1st Fighter Wing at Langley Air Force Base, Va., they will be F/A-22s with limited air-to-ground capability to go along with their air-to-air abilities.

The Air Force sees the fighter playing out its attack role in two ways.

When attack plans call for stealth, the F/A-22 will carry strike weapons in its two internal weapons bays in its lower fuselage. When stealth is not a priority, the aircraft can externally heft bombs, missiles or 600-gallon fuel tanks on four underwing weapons stations. Each wing will have a pair of stations capable of supporting 5,000 pounds apiece.

The aircraft's initial striking ability will come from a pair of 1,000-pound Joint Direct Attack Munitions in its weapons bays, then get beefed up over time through fleetwide upgrades, Air Force spokesman William Bodie said.

Given the size of the 1,000-pound weapon, the aircraft can carry only two of the bombs internally. That will change, however, with the arrival of the Small Diameter Bomb in 2006. The F/A-22 will be able to carry eight of the 250-pound, high-yield precision munitions internally, and additional ones on the underwing weapons stations. Upgrades will eventually allow the Raptor to hit moving ground targets in all weather conditions, Bodie said.

The name change also highlights the Raptor's new radar, which will be much more advanced and suited to multiple purposes than the one originally planned, he said. Some research and development work on the Joint Strike Fighter will be incorporated into the F/A-22's multimode radar. The blend of advanced capabilities, Air Force officials said, make the F/A-22 an air dominance fighter.

Air Force officials also continue to discuss whether to press ahead with a larger, radically modified version of the F/A-22. Dreamed up last year and dubbed the F/B-22, this medium bomber would carry nearly 30 Small Diameter Bombs at supersonic speeds 2,000 miles without refueling.

Bodie called the aircraft "a concept that has focused our minds in creative and constructive ways" but said Air Force officials are focusing on the much less expensive F/A-22 effort.

Air Force will ask for 381 jets

Conceived during the Cold War, the Raptor program has been scaled back as costs rose along with doubts about its relevance. The 2001 Quadrennial Defense Review recommended shrinking the planned purchase from 339 jets to 295 unless the Air Force could keep the program under its $43 billion cost cap. The 2002 Defense Planning Guidance - a Pentagon document that shapes long-term budgeting - recommended that the program be capped at 180 aircraft.

Now Air Force officials say that the aircraft's revolutionary capabilities - grounded in its stealth, speed and range - make the plane well-suited for strike and counter-missile roles, and thereby support increasing the planned buy to 381. That total would allow the service to keep 240 of the jets available for combat at all times, enough to outfit each of its 10 Air Expeditionary Forces with a 24-plane squadron.

Cut that number below 339, and the Air Force has to start treating the Raptor the same way it does reconnaissance and special-operations aircraft, former Air Combat Command boss retired Gen. Richard Hawley told Air Force Times in May. Pilots and maintainers will face a high operations and deployment tempo as field commanders demand the planes be available on short notice.

Those who support the cuts see the Raptor as a "silver-bullet' force. The fighter jet would be sent abroad only when a war threatened and its stealth air-combat and ground-attack capabilities were needed.

But the idea of anything fewer than 339 Raptors doesn't make sense to Hawley.

To be effective warplanes, some Raptors will have to be stationed outside the continental United States, the same way F-15 Eagles are now forward-based in Japan, England and Alaska, he said.

Having jets close to potential war zones is what the four-star generals in charge of the European, Pacific and Central commands expect, Hawley said.

To back up those squadrons, the Air Force will need Raptors in the continental United States. These stateside bases will allow pilots and maintainers to be rotated home and train on the ranges here.

So far, Langley Air Force Base, Va., is the only base slated for a combat Raptor wing. Tyndall Air Force Base, Fla., will be home to training squadrons. A few jets will be scattered at other bases for test and evaluation missions.

Everything but the kitchen sink

The Air Force's highly classified F/A-22 proposal - demanded by the Defense Planning Guidance - was discussed at a series of Sept. 6 meetings and calls between Air Force and Pentagon officials. The meetings laid the groundwork for Roche and Jumper to make their case to Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld later this year.

"We're doing our best to define the Raptor in the transformational context of this era, emphasizing its qualities of combined stealth and supercruise to penetrate not only the next two generations of surface-to-air missile threats, but also handle anything regarding next-generation fighters," Bodie said.

The Raptor's all-aspect stealth will make it virtually invisible to radar, he said. Other stealthy attack aircraft, such as the Air Force's F-117 Nighthawk attack plane, reflect radar energy at certain angles, forcing pilots to approach targets with carefully choreographed flight plans based on careful analysis of enemy defenses. All-aspect stealth has also been deemed too expensive for the new F-35 Joint Strike Fighter, which is under development by Lockheed for deployment in 2008, sources said.

The Raptor's range at great speed offers a solution to the need to destroy mobile targets. Part of the problem is getting a strike aircraft on station fast enough. The F-15 Strike Eagle can fly at twice the speed of sound, but for relatively few minutes, especially when loaded with bombs.

The Raptor, on the other hand, can cruise about Mach 1.5 for hundreds of miles. Dispersed around a military theater, F/A-22s could give military commanders a way to attack targets on short notice, officials said.

And there's more to the F/A-22 than speed and stealth, Bodie said.

"Its capabilities also let us use it as a very sophisticated intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance tool that can data-link critical information directly into our command networks, a capability that we don't have now," he said.

Defense against cruise missiles

These abilities, Bodie said, make the F/A-22 key to many of Rumsfeld's most cherished ideals: jointness, transformation, missile defense.

"Taken in total, these capabilities blend well with the new doctrinal emphasis in our Global Strike Task Force, which includes working closely with the Army, Navy and Marines to leverage our stealth, standoff and precision to better support joint operations," he said.

Air Force planners are teaming with their Army counterparts to support the ground service's new Brigade Combat Teams, he said.

"The Raptor can support mobility forces deep in enemy territory while at the same time penetrating any defenses to come to the aid of soldiers on the ground, 24 hours a day and in any weather," Bodie said.

At the high-level meeting, officials also discussed the idea that the F/A-22 might be able to fill near-term gaps in the military's ability to defend the nation against cruise missiles, sources said. The proposal is part of the highly classified F/A-22 briefing submitted earlier this month to the Pentagon leadership.

Roche, Bodie and other Air Force officials declined to comment on this potential use for the F/A-22, why the new aircraft would be suitable for the mission, how the jets would be employed or where they would be based.

But Roche confirmed that Rumsfeld has asked the Air Force to rapidly field a limited cruise missile defense capability.

"That is something we are thinking about in earnest to see how quickly we can put together at least a modest defense against such weapons," Roche said.

Raptor has had some bugs

Raptor tests, which have fallen behind schedule in recent months, are expected to speed up in coming months as test airplanes receive the latest offensive and defensive avionics.

Key electronics have shut down during flight tests, Air Force Brig. Gen. William Jabour, the service's program executive officer for fighters and bombers, said in an interview. The problem forces pilots to wait three to five minutes to reboot their systems in flight, an industry official working on the program said.

The problematic package includes the radar, electronic warfare system, communications and navigation equipment. The software that controls the plane's flight is working fine, Jabour said.

The major components of the offensive and defensive avionics suite are working well on their own, but the challenge has been "getting them to talk together," Jabour said.

"This is the single most complex avionics system we ever built. . More complex than the [avionics aboard] the space shuttle and the B-2," the general said. "The outside experts said, 'You're experiencing problems you should anticipate.'."

Vago Muradian is editor of Defense News. Staff writers Gail Kaufman and Bruce Rolfsen contributed to this report.

7. An EXCELLENT web page showing the best pictures of the two-seat A-10 are here:

Night/All-Weather Attack (N/AWA): two-seat A-10 walk-around

8. Pentagon lying about its failed "precision warfare" fantasy turned nightmare

www.newhousenews.com/archive/wood020703.html

In the three years since her son, Jason, was killed by bombs from a U.S. Navy strike fighter, Sue Faley has tried to find out how such an accident could happen. (Photo by Tyrone Turner)

NATIONAL SECURITY

Grisly Accidents Call `Precision Warfare' Into Question

BY DAVID WOOD

c.2003 Newhouse News Service

It is well after dark in Kuwait but still warm out on the desert floor. In the constellations of stars overhead on March 12, 2001, are the faint, winking navigation lights of three jets, circling high.

One is piloted by squadron commander David O. Zimmerman, among the most experienced aviators in the Navy. On the ground below is a cluster of men including Jason Faley, an Air Force special operations forward air controller. Together they are practicing close air support, the most difficult and dangerous mission in today's military: dropping bombs in the vicinity of friendly troops, on small targets, at night.

Zimmerman pushes his F-18 over into a power dive, 26 tons of high technology plummeting the equivalent of a 30-story building every second. All systems go. Three 500-pound bombs on the racks. Airspeed 533 mph. Zimmerman searching for his target, thumb poised above the bomb-release button.

Then a terrible moment in which it becomes clear the pilot is in the wrong place. Someone on the ground screams into his radio, "Abort! Abort! Abort!" But Zimmerman's thumb has already depressed the bomb release.

As the explosions blossom below, there are words of shock in another cockpit: "He just killed every single one of them."

Six were dead, in fact. And 11 wounded.

***

The United States military heads toward war in Iraq boasting of its ability to wage "precision warfare" -- not only to hit any target at any time, but to accomplish "the surgical destruction of specific aim points within a target," as Navy Vice Adm. John Nathman, a senior naval air commander, once said.

Indeed, the notion that Americans have mastered technology to produce a "revolution" in warfare is gospel to today's military, a bedrock belief that brooks no challenge.

Out in the real world, though, things look different: a long and continuing history of accidents including, notoriously, last year's deadly bombing by an Air Force F-16 of Canadian troops on maneuvers in Afghanistan.

The mounting death toll -- of U.S. Soldiers, allied troops, innocent civilians and simply "unknowns" -- is bloody evidence that despite the best pilots, the best forward air controllers and indeed the best technology, "The system is out of control," as a strike fighter pilot phrases it.

Despite a rising chorus of critics, the high command maintains there is no problem -- or at least, that any problem can be fixed with some tweaks and patches.

"In the history of warfare, there's always been friendly fire; it's always heartbreaking," Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld said last fall.

But, Rumsfeld added: "I've not heard nor seen anybody who has seen a pattern that's correctable. ... It's just the way life is, I suppose, and when you're dealing with bombs ... people get hurt. It's a shame."

***

In her immaculate bedroom, by the curtained window that looks across a suburban cul-de-sac outside Richmond, Va., Sue Faley bends her head over her Gateway computer and begins once again to type. The keys clack into the emptiness of the new white frame house. The room smells of furniture polish and despair.

"Dear Mr. President, we are writing to you today, asking for your help -- on March 12, 2001, our beloved son, Staff Sgt. Jason Faley, was taken from us."

She got the news from a relative who heard it on the radio. Six killed, 11 wounded in Kuwait by bombs mistakenly dropped on their position. Without hearing his name, she knew, in the terrible and final way that mothers, with sons at war, know.

***

In the old days, pilots flew low and slow over the battlefield, craning out the cockpit window, jawing by radio with the grunts below who talked them onto the target. World War II pilots lived with the Army -- indeed, they were the Army Air Corps. They had a gut feel for the flow of battle and became murderously adept at finding and killing pockets of German forces.

In 1947 the Air Corps was wrenched away from the Army and made an independent Air Force, and some say the trouble started then.

With exceptions -- notably during Vietnam when some fighter jocks would come in under 500 feet to strike enemy that were in direct contact with U.S. troops -- pilots have been flying faster and higher ever since, relying on instructions from elsewhere to distinguish their targets.

In recent years, the wildfire spread of lethal shoulder-fired missiles, common to armies and terrorists alike, has forced pilots still farther from the ground -- to heights of three miles and more. Dizzying advances in such precision bombs as the satellite-guided JDAM, for Joint Direct Attack Munition, give air crews confidence that from any altitude, in any weather, they can "hit the `dimpi,"' the Desired Mean Point of Impact.

To compensate for the pilot's loss of direct awareness of the situation on the ground, the military has devised a network of remote sensors, intelligence fusion centers, targeting cells and high-speed data streams linking airborne and ground control nodes that may be hundreds of miles or even continents apart.

Airborne platforms such as the Predator spyplane and AWACS and JSTARS aircraft, which use sophisticated radar and other sensors to track air and ground traffic, transmit data back toward an air operation center. There, analysts assign targets and coordinate air traffic hours or days in advance.

In the process, critics say, the exercise of judgment has left the cockpit and gone inside this complex "command and control" system.

Deviations from the plan are bucked to higher-ranking officers, who hold authority over requests from pilots to respond to unanticipated targets or threats.

Forward air controllers on the ground -- like Jason Faley -- provide final guidance to inbound strike aircraft.

The weaknesses of this rigid, bureaucratic structure in swiftly and accurately handling today's swirling, unpredictable battles are evident. But there are other problems as well.

One is that Navy, Air Force and marine Corps jets don't all use the same communications equipment, complicating efforts to get everyone the same data. Different models of the same airplane can carry different and incompatible communications gear.

And so, persistently, the "dimpi" turns out to be something other than the target, sometimes with tragic consequences.

"We can put a munition on that three-dimensional spot," says Mark Mandeles, an independent systems analyst who has studied the problem for the Pentagon. "But we have not put even a fraction of that effort into figuring out what it is we are killing."

In December, five of the nation's most experienced retired warriors -- two infantrymen and three strike fighter pilots -- launched a fusillade against the Pentagon, warning of "severe deficiencies" in the strike aircraft, tactics, equipment and training involved in close air support.

"Our armed forces' ability to provide and employ effective CAS (close air support) is waning," wrote these experts, including Chuck Myers, who flew close air support missions in two wars and was director of air warfare for the Pentagon.

The Navy, Air Force and Army all declined to talk about close air support for this article and referred questions to the Defense Department's joint staff, which designated Army Col. Peter T. Hayward, an air defense officer, to respond.

"The system is way too complex for a (single) `fix,"' Hayward says. "We're looking at a series of fixes that will evolve over time."

But with senior officers acknowledging that they are "years away" from a solution, the unfolding of grisly accidents is expected to continue.

Among them:

-- In 1983 in Grenada, Navy fighter-bombers mistakenly attacked a mental institution, killing 21 patients, and four Navy strike jets strafed a U.S. Army command post, wounding 17 Soldiers.

-- During Desert Storm eight years later, seven U.S. marines were killed and two wounded when an Air Force A-10 fired a Maverick missile into the marines' Light Armored Vehicle.

-- In Serbia four years ago, U.S. fighter-bombers put precision-guided bombs directly on a target in Belgrade -- which turned out to be the Chinese embassy.

-- In Kosovo, a "misfire" caused bombs to hit a civilian convoy, incinerating several dozen men, women and children.

-- In December 2001, a B-52 bomber dropped a satellite-guided bomb that went "errant," according to a Defense Department press statement. The 2,000-pound bomb killed three U.S. Soldiers and five allied Afghans and narrowly missed killing the just-appointed president of Afghanistan, Hamid Karzai.

-- Three months later, a Special Forces Soldier was killed in Afghanistan by precision-fire from an AC-130 gunship.

-- Last April, four Canadian Soldiers were killed and eight wounded by a bomb dropped by an F-16.

In dozens of exhaustive investigations of these and other incidents runs a common thread. The equipment worked perfectly. The pilot was well trained and experienced. The system worked. Conclusion: human error.

***

In a small house outside Fort Campbell, Ky., where Jason Faley was stationed, his wife Shannon and their son Andrew, now 3, go on with their lives. Shannon is pursuing a doctorate in biomedical engineering and works fulltime as a single mom.

Sometimes, she says, she and Andrew will be strolling down the street and Andrew, spying a distant figure, will shout, "There he is! That's my Dad!" Andrew, she says, "is just beginning his own struggle" with what happened.

Doggedly, with her grandson in mind, Sue Faley writes on.

June 10: "Dear Sen. Warner, I am writing to you today to ask for your help in getting answers to what really happened on March 12, 2001."

June 17: "Dear Sen. Clinton, I am writing to you today to appeal to you as a woman and a mother to please help me."

E-mail, July 17: "Dear Sen. Lott, This is not my first letter or e-mail, nor will it be the last."

When she receives a copy of Jason Faley's death certificate, it is dated 12 March 1945. "Hell, I wasn't even born then," she says.

"Dear Mr. President, On May 17th I wrote to you in regard to the `military accident' in Kuwait. It seems you must be too busy to reply."

***

Hours after Jason Faley was killed, the military convened an investigations board. Its findings became known as the Udairi Range report, after the training area where the incident took place.

Among those testifying was Air Force Staff Sgt. Timothy B. Crusing, a forward air controller who was in charge on the ground that night, working at Observation Post 10 with Faley and the others.

"Incidents like this have happened before," Crusing said, according to a transcript that has not been made public. "It's just -- it's never killed anybody and we as staff sergeants rant and rave -- but it's not -- it doesn't seem to be heard higher up -- nothing was said or done about it."

Three weeks before Faley's death, in fact, an inbound strike fighter had mistakenly bombed the observation post -- in broad daylight. No one was hurt. Authorities ordered the roof on the observation tower painted white with a red cross, to distinguish it from the target, a cluster of vehicles 1.2 miles away.

Somehow, the Udairi Range board decided, Zimmerman mistook the observation tower for the target and dropped his bombs, without being cleared by the ground controllers as required. Besides Faley, the blast and shrapnel killed four American Soldiers and a New Zealand officer. The 11 wounded included Crusing.

The carnage was the result of "human error," the board concluded. And closed the books.

Zimmerman exercised his right not to testify, but did give a voluntary verbal statement "indicating he was deeply saddened." The board amassed hundreds of documents and statements in its effort to understand how one of the nation's most senior pilots could make such a blunder.

But that material is locked away, as Sue Faley found when she pleaded repeatedly with the Navy to help her understand how and why her son was killed.

Eighteen months after Jason's death, she received a letter from the U.S. Central Command rejecting her plea for more information about the incident.

"Dear Ms. Faley," the letter read. "After a thorough review of the requested information, we have determined ... (it) is properly classified in accordance with executive order 12958, section 1.5(a) and (g) and therefore exempt from release under the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA), 50 U.S.C.552(b) and DoD 5400.7-r, paragraph C3.2.1.1.

"Release of this information could damage the national security and pose a danger to the safety of forces involved in future operations. ...

"Please accept my condolences regarding the death of your son."

(Signed) Michael P. DeLong, Lieutenant General, United States marine corps and Deputy Commander in Chief, United States Central Command.

DeLong did not respond to requests for comment for this article. Zimmerman was relieved of squadron command and retired last August. He could not be located for comment.

"They're not going to give me any answers, I am resigned to that," Sue Faley says in a flat voice. "I have lost a lot of respect for our government."

***

What the classified documents reveal, according to an internal Navy assessment by a frustrated Navy captain, a veteran F-18 pilot, are "systemic close air support failures."

The Defense Department denied permission for the officer to speak on the record.

"To my knowledge," the officer wrote 17 months after the Udairi Range accident, "the changes necessary to fundamentally improve these deficiencies were never taken -- another missed opportunity.

"The pattern is, we go kill a bunch of people, we have an investigation, nothing happens. Then we kill another bunch of people, and usually, they shoot the lowest possible person in the career head and nothing is addressed in the fundamental underlying problem."

The military has a documented propensity to blame pilots for "human error," or what pilots call the "fat finger" problem of hitting the wrong switch.

Others, however, blame the command-and-control system, the enormously complex means of gathering, analyzing and distributing information on targets. Moreover, there is evidence that all the data streaming into strike aircraft are testing the crews' ability to focus.

In Bosnia a few years ago a Navy F-18 mistakenly dropped a 500-pound guided bomb just outside a military barracks packed with U.S. troops. Investigators said the pilot was "an experienced and highly trained aviator," a test pilot and combat veteran. But he was too busy ("task-saturated," the investigators concluded) and inadvertently hit the wrong switch.

Beyond these concerns, critics such as Army Lt. Col. Chris Bentley, the 10th Mountain Division's fire control officer during Operation Anaconda in Afghanistan last March, say the command-and-control system is too rigid to be much use.

"When there's a bad decision," says systems analyst Mandeles, "it cascades through the whole system -- and bad things happen."

Air Force Gen. Richard B. Myers, an F-15 pilot and chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, acknowledges that adjustments are needed in "organization, some doctrine, some tactics, techniques and procedures, some technological changes, training, I mean, across that whole gamut of things."

He insists the basic system is sound.

"We are going to have to continue to work that, because war is not a science, it is an art," Myers says. "I think we will be much better in the next potential conflict than we were in Afghanistan."

But critics reject mere polishing.

"We need to stop and do a full accounting of the system and the failures," says the Pentagon-based pilot who was not allowed to speak for attribution. "Because unless we correct this, we open ourselves up to legitimate charges that we are cooking the books, just like Enron did.

"And we're going to kill more people."

***

That thought also visits Shannon Faley, especially as she thinks fondly of the military's young enlisted people -- those enthusiastic, proud, underpaid and under-recognized kids Jason worked with. She ponders the implicit moral contract among warriors, and the concepts of military command and accountability.

"By failing to uncover every detail of the accident, those responsible are essentially signing the future death certificates of unsuspecting Soldiers," she says.

"As the old saying goes, `If we do not learn from our mistakes, then we are destined to repeat them."'

(David Wood can be contacted at david.wood@newhouse.com)

Iraq 'Friendly Fire' Tragedy Blamed on U.S. marine

Sun Mar 28, 2004 04:28 PM ET

http://www.reuters.com/newsArticle.jhtml;jsessionid=FFYIIFWCKFDQACRBAELCFEY?type=topNews&storyID=4679780

By Charles Aldinger WASHINGTON (Reuters) -

The worst U.S. "friendly fire" incident of the Iraq war has been blamed on a marine captain who called fighter jets to strike suspected Iraqi positions last March, unaware that dozens of marines were fighting in the area, defense officials said on Sunday.

Ten marines were killed and three wounded in the incident near the southern Iraqi city of Nassiriya and an investigation report, to be released on Monday by the U.S. Central Command, said the dead were so shot up by both Iraqis and A-10 Air Force jets that it was almost impossible to determine exactly how they died. But the year-long probe by an 11-member U.S. military team concluded that actions by the unidentified marine captain, a ground-based air controller, directly resulted in the confused incident during the firefight on March 23, 2003.

It recommended that the officer receive some type of administrative discipline, but stipulated that "he didn't act with any negligence or reckless disregard," one of the defense officials, who asked not to be identified, told Reuters.

"It was a very ugly scene on the ground -- just a terrible thing in the heat of battle," said another defense official. marine corps officials, who spent the weekend discussing the report with the families of marines involved, declined to comment except to say that no action had been taken against the ground controller because the report had not yet been released. Investigators found that the captain was in the city of Nassiriya at the time, could not see the action in a barren area near a canal and should have consulted his battalion commander, who would have known that U.S. troops were in the strike area. But the report said he had been cleared by his immediate commander to call in air power.

ON DRIVE TO BAGHDAD

Eighteen marines were killed and 17 wounded in the area as Charlie Company of the 1st Battalion 2nd marines from Camp Lejeune, North Carolina, sought to seize bridges and a canal near Nassiriya. But the investigation concluded that apparently only 13 marines were involved in the friendly fire strikes. The air controller was from Bravo Company of the 1st Battalion and was being used because Charlie Company had no air controller.

The investigation, headed by U.S. Air Force Brig. Gen. William Hodgkins, found that two unnamed Air Force pilots from the 103rd Fighter Squadron of the Pennsylvania Air National Guard did not act with negligence and should not be held liable. The A-10s, designed to fly low and use heavy cannon and rockets, are capable of destroying tanks and armored vehicles. The incident occurred on one of the most tragic days of the major-combat phase of the Iraq war for U.S.-led forces. In a news conference on the day of the incident, Gen. John Abizaid, current head of the Central Command, said U.S. marines "defeated an enemy attack" in Nassiriya staged by a combination of Iraqi troops and irregular forces "in the sharpest engagement of the war thus far." That initial public account did not mention the role of the A-10s, but days later Central Command announced that it was investigating whether the marines were killed by friendly fire.

On the same day, in another friendly fire incident, a U.S. Patriot missile battery shot down a British RAF GR4 Tornado close to the Kuwaiti border. Also, a U.S. Army 507th Ordnance Maintenance Company convoy carrying U.S. Soldiers including PFC. Jessica Lynch, was ambushed by Iraqis after making a wrong turn. Several were killed and others captured and later rescued, including Lynch.

APPENDIX

In "The Fighter Force How many seats?" Major William A. Flanagan USAF writes:

www.airpower.maxwell.af.mil/airchronicles/aureview/1981/may-jun/flanagan.htm

"The most obvious advantage of a two-man crew is the division of labor in the cockpit. A two-man crew is less easily saturated as the workload increases due to enemy threats or malfunctioning equipment. A 1975 Hughes Aircraft Company study13 evaluated single-seat and two-seat cockpits in simulated air-to-ground strike missions. The simulated missions were unique in the sense that the crew had to react to threats displayed on the cockpit radar warning receiver (RWR) as well as threats that appeared outside the cockpit. Some of the latter threats also appeared on the RWR display, but others did not, which reflected the real-world situation of a visual attack by an enemy with his radar turned off. Crews in the simulator had to focus their attention inside and outside the cockpit in a situation similar to air-to-air combat. The results showed no significant difference in performance between one- and two-man crews when they were presented with threats only displayed on the RWR. When outside-the-cockpit threats were introduced, the two-man crew was significantly superior (40 to 95 percent) in performing the mission tasks and simultaneously detecting the threat. The second crewman was a decided advantage for visual surveillance outside the cockpit because he could share the work inside the cockpit and allow more time for important visual scanning.

The increased lookout capability of the two-man crew demonstrated in the simulator is especially important for an air superiority fighter. Throughout the history of aerial combat, one fact has never changed: most pilots were shot down without being aware of the presence of the attacker. The VIII Fighter Command included the following underlined sentence in its tactics manual dated 29 May 1944. "Remember few pilots are shot down by enemies they see." In Vietnam unseen MiGs accounted for an estimated 80 percent of all air-to-air losses. Since the two-man crew is better able to search outside the cockpit in situations that impose high workloads, the second crew member minimizes the risk of an unseen attack and maximizes the probability of survival.

The division of workload possible with a two-man crew provides more benefits than survivability. As described earlier, the F-15 must contend with numerically superior— perhaps several—enemy fighter formations in Central Europe. When the F-15 fire control system "locks on" to a single target and provides attack steering, it may remove other targets from the screen and deny the operator information on other enemy aircraft. A delay in "lock on" until the aircraft is near firing range allows monitoring of the overall situation, but that advantage must be balanced against the increased workload of monitoring the cockpit radar display and mentally calculating the intercept solution. A skilled radar intercept officer in the backseat could provide invaluable assistance during the intercept portion of the attack because he could devote most of his attention to the radar display and free the pilot for visual lookout and operation of the airplane. This expertise would also be useful when a system malfunction or electronic countermeasures degraded the performance of the fire control system. Most veteran air defense pilots agree that the radar intercept officer in the F-101 significantly enhanced the intercept capability of the F-101. A radar intercept officer would enhance the F-15 task of attacking numerically superior formations of maneuverable fighter-type targets.

Consideration of a two-seat aircraft raises the fundamental questions: How much larger would the airplane be, and how much performance would be lost? One can estimate the weight penalties of the second seat by examining previous two-seat conversions of single-seat jet fighters (e.g., TF-86/F-86A, F-100F/ F-100D, F-106B/F-106A). Weight differences vary from the 1000 pounds of the two-gun F-100F versus the four-gun F-100D to 900 pounds for the F-106B, which also carries 500 pounds less fuel than the F-106A while retaining the full fire control system. A weight penalty of 1000 to 1300 pounds is considerably less significant on a modern 30,000-poundjet fighter than on a 9200-pound Mustang or an 18,000-pound F-86 (actually, the two-seat TF-86, since it had no guns weighed less than the F-86A and carried 300 pounds more fuel).17 The present two-seat F-15B weighs only 800 pounds more than the F-15A, and performance figures in flight manuals are identical for the two aircraft. The two-seat F-16B loses 1200 pounds of fuel for installation of the second seat; the F-15B retains all the fuel of the F-15A and loses only the compartment for the tactical electronic warfare support (TEWS), which could be placed elsewhere in the aircraft. One can conclude that the relative performance/weight penalty of the second crew member is less for the contemporary jet fighter than for earlier fighters and that the F-15 would suffer no appreciable loss in performance.

A possible disadvantage of the two-seat fighter is the increased life-cycle cost of the aircraft. If a single backseater in a "unit" of live two-seat F-15s sights an enemy fighter about to attack or identifies an unsafe flight condition and saves his airplane, he would in effect "pay" for the life-cycle cost of converting the entire unit. Marine Corps studies show that the backseater visually sighted most aerial threats in Southeast Asia.18 Navy studies further indicate that the two-seat fighter enjoys a better flight safety record than the singleseater. Thus, it seems that the backseater is cost-effective in increased survivability alone.

Another objection to the two-seat fighter that is difficult to assess quantitatively is best described in the words of an F-16 pilot: "Communication from ear-to-ear is much better than from cockpit to cockpit. Of course, crew coordination is a factor that cannot be ignored. The Hughes simulator study noted that as threat density increased, the performance of the two-man crew was consistently better than the single-pilot performance. In the maximum threat density, however, the single crew member became more effective. In other words, the two-man crew was superior until their crew coordination broke down because of too many things happening too quickly for successful relay of information. Part of this breakdown occurred because the test called for a deliberately poorly designed two-man cockpit to force extensive intercockpit coordination.21 But the results definitely show the need for crew coordination procedures designed for a high-threat, fast-moving situation to prevent one member of a two-man crew from hindering another member.

Experiences in Southeast Asia demonstrate the effect of proper crew coordination. For example, the U.S. Navy initiated the TOP GUN program in 1969 because it was dissatisfied with its aerial combat performance from 1966 to 1968. This program emphasized coordination between leader and wingman and between pilot and backseater. Fighter crews flew against airplanes similar to enemy aircraft in size and performance and, in the process, learned to function routinely as teams in the fast-moving aerial combat arena. The U.S. Air Force had no such program at the time. (I was a back-seater in an F-4 air defense squadron and can attest to the lack of emphasis on aerial combat maneuvering and the necessary crew coordination.) When the air war over North Vietnam resumed in 1972, the Navy’s kill ratio jumped from 3.7 to 1 to 13 to 1, but the Air Force’s ratio changed very little—from 3 to 1 to 2 to 1.22 Although such factors as different patrol area and force ratios prevent any simple quantitative comparisons of Navy and Air Force experience, improvements after TOP GUN were sufficiently dramatic to confirm the value of an aggressive training program. That is, crew coordination necessary to operate effectively in aerial combat can be developed, but it must be developed in training.

A second crew member can enhance the capability of the airplane only if he works as a member of a team. Training programs must focus on procedures that ensure automatic crew coordination in matters other than checklist challenge and response. The Navy experience indicates that the absence of training in the past does not infer an impossible task. One of the pilots who took part in the original design of the F-15 admitted that the poor skill levels of the F-4 pilot/navigator backseaters in 1968 exerted a considerable influence on the single-seat choice. The same officer observed that since that time he had become convinced of the value of the backseater in offensive and defensive combat, once the proper doctrine and training program had finally been developed. In "two-versus-many" exercise engagements, the two-seat F-4 was extremely successful due to the pilot’s ability to concentrate on the offensive phase as long as possible while the backseater directed the disengagement when it became necessary to "get out of Dodge."

The arguments point in one direction: a well-trained second man in the fighter aircraft can optimize its offensive and defensive potential without significantly degrading its performance. Especially in this decade the added increment of fighter capability could be critical since the Air Force will be fighting out-numbered. Attrition rates in contemporary high-intensity conflicts such as the Yom Kippur War have been significantly higher than World War II rates, and a war in Central Europe could produce astronomical losses. In view of the projected total of only 729 F-15s, the Air Force must be sure that it can achieve the maximum possible benefits from its fighters in terms of enemy airplanes destroyed. The human factor in aerial combat is often overlooked in favor of simply evaluating airplanes and armament. Historically, the consistently successful fighter pilot has been a rare breed. Of 40,000 airplanes destroyed by the Luftwaffe on the Eastern Front in World War II, 30,000 were destroyed by only 300 German pilots. An average 4 percent of the pilots have accounted for 40 percent of the kills in every war since World War I.

In a study of successful fighter pilots, the McDonnell-Douglas Corporation developed a list of 45 common traits ranging from mechanical skills to personality traits and decision-making ability. Since every fighter pilot cannot be a Hartmann or Bong or Tuck and since the United States has fighter planes that are qualitatively superior but numerically inferior to enemy planes, one can conclude that it makes sense to maximize the efficiency of the average fighter pilot with an optimum crew of two in the cockpit.

The Air Force cannot allow itself to be swayed by the common knowledge of the past regarding the inviolability of the single-seat fighter concept. The improved performance of fighter aircraft and their armament makes today’s aerial combat task much more complex and demanding. The unseen attacker must be regarded as a threat, not at a range of 200 yards but at many miles. The F-15 is not an overgrown P-51 Mustang nor will it be engaging Focke-Wulfe FW-190s. Military decision-makers must give serious consideration to converting the F-15s to two-seat aircraft. They should not permit preconceived notions based on outmoded ideas to color their judgment. Design studies that concentrate on performance and avionics capabilities alone and ignore the operator and his workload in actual combat cannot be allowed to dictate future fighter design. Buck Rogers’s television spacecraft has a second seat, but it is usually empty. If the villains continue to get more and better ships, perhaps even Hollywood will give in and fill that seat."

FEEDBACK!

itsg@hotmail.com

"Airborne Equipment Shop,

My name is Tonio DeSorrento. I really love your site and I appreciate what your organization is doing to try to persuade our nation's senior leadership to make the best decisions for our military.I have just started a company that is trying to improve fire support procedures and products in the Army, marines and Air Force. We're based near Ft.Sill, OK. We're very small (two people) and probably won't ever make a profit-but we've already begun making a difference for company- and platoon-level fire supporters. We've rewritten a key handbook, made a better version of a product called the OF fan, and INVENTED a new close air support template (not yet for sale) that allows fire supporters to determine lat/long coordinates off of a UTM/MGRS map at any latitude. (Because those lasers and GPSs don't always work!)Would you consider posting a small link to my website in the corner of one of your pages? Please visit it and decide whether it is compatible with your message:

www.universalobserver.com

Thank you for your time, and I hope that we can agree to posting mutual links.

Very respectfully,

Tonio DeSorrento
Partner/Founder, The Universal Observer Company

A perceptive defense reader offers the following:

"I saw articles on 'Killer Bees', 'Spads', and 'Cactus Airforce' and I agree completely. Our ground forces are suffering from a dearth of fire support, both in the form of air support all the way down to ground rocket and tube artillery (from heavy howitzers to light mortars/recoilless rifles). We should increase air support but not at the expense of ground based fire support (or wind up like the Israelis in the first part of the Yom Kippur war where they were interested in 'pit crew' aircraft turnaround time, ignoring tube artillery and getting their tube artillery mauled by counter-battery fire). I got the idea for an integrated multi-tiered system from a diagram illustrating levels of air defense coverage with a large hemisphere representing THAAD, smaller hemispheres inside it PAC3 patriot, and smaller hemispheres still representing HAWK or a medium range air defense system replacing it. 'Killer Bees' are a way of combating platform centricity in Army Aviation. Its role, like it or not is to support the troops on the ground who are the final means of implementing a nations policy (Patton's comment on how with all the new methods of fire support, it still was the infantryman who forced the enemy to sign the peace treaty.)

The "Killer Bees" article wanted to have the U.S. First Cavalry Division reequip as a true air cavalry force. My idea takes that concept and gives each division a brigade (group of four squadrons, AF unit designations) modeled on this, three squadrons of which will be killer bee style light helicopters, and a fourth consisting either of AH-64's, OV-1's or OV-10's to provide heavier fire power on demand. For this, an armed version of the XV-15 (smaller V-22 test bed) would be ideal, but I have herd of mechanical problems with the V-22 and how its complexity makes it vulnerable, so it probably is not ideal. They also should be able to scout, spot for artillery, and give forward air control to higher tiers. I have always loved the AH-64 as a platform, it can take allot of punishment, but it can not get close in and commanders do not want to risk such an expensive platform.

The second tier borrows from an old Soviet idea of stationing an air force frontal aviation command in each military district subordinated to the local army commander to provide air support. In a humorous parody piece entitled '219 Reasons to Love Your CORPSe' (1st TSG website), one of the original statement said 'when you look up you see marines, not zoomies' upon which the original author is rightly upbraided for lack of respect for his fellow servicemen. Nonetheless, there needs to be greater coordination between air and ground (ie simply saying pilots and ground troops are of the same service would have been a more polite way of making the same point), and as such the dedicated ground attack squadrons should be manned by army pilots. This level is a wing (division in army terms) of three ground attack groups, one fighter group, one medium bomb group (medium bombers, eg Su-34 type aircraft or transports converted into gunships), one air refueling group, and 1 electronic surveillance squadron (AWACS, JSTARS). Fighters are provided to provide top cover and protection to the ground attack aircraft. The three ground attack group will consist of three squadrons of dedicated ground attack aircraft (eg A-10's, Su-25's) and a fighter bomber squadron (eg F-18's, F-16's, F-35's MiG-29's). The fighter group would have three squadrons of fighter bombers and one squadron of air superiority fighters (eg F-15's, F-14's, F-22's, Su-37's). With this configuration it would probably be more appropriate to have an Air Force officer in command this unit, but nonetheless support of ground troops needs to be the primary mission, and should be subordinated to an army corps.

The final level is a numbered air force (corps in army terms) to provide top cover for an army (large combat unit, not a service), would consist of three wings of fighter bombers, one wing of air superiority fighters, one heavy bomber wing (eg B-52's, B-1's, B-2's to provide heavier air support/ARCLIGHT capabilities, preferably an EB-52 as written about in author Dale Brown's novels, perhaps even a squadron of airborne lasers for protection form theater missiles), an air refueling wing, and a electronic surveillance group.

I have been a bit long winded here, but thank you for your forbearance. I realize I have ignored transport duties, costs, inter-service politics, and a general trend towards smaller unit actions less likely to involve corps and army level units. But what is your opinion on the idea of multi tiered air support more integrated with the ground units they are to support."

Phil West makes the first reply:

"The V-22 seems to be to aircraft what the SA-80 is to firearms -this has been extensively documented on the www.g2mil.com pages.

Placing certain platforms/units under direct army control would help alot -notably A-10s and AC-130s. It is possible an exchange scheme between attack airforce and army aviation pilots may be possible"

Phil