differences in the forces in an effort to identify the concepts upon which the modernization of the U.S. Airborne forces can be based.

The first area to be addressed, in the comparison of the U.S. and Soviet Airborne forces, is the missions of these Airborne forces as detailed in doctrinal literature. The Soviet Airborne missions have significantly changed since World War II. During World War II, the Airborne units had limited tasks: to capture objectives and hold them for follow-on forces or until ground forces could linkup. The depth of these objectives did not exceed 100 kilometers and the duration of the combat was short. The main form of combat was defensive, as tactical mobility was extremely low, and there were insufficient means to deal with enemy tanks. (2)

As discussed earlier, to be able to overcome these shortcomings and to be able to accomplish the operational and strategic missions the Soviets believed the Airborne forces needed to accomplish, they designed and produced the airlift aircraft and Airborne equipment needed to realize their concepts. At the operational level, airborne forces are assigned the mission of conducting Airborne assaults to a depth of several hundred kilometers (150 - 400) in support of Army or Front missions. These operations will normally be Regimental size or larger, include airland elements and may be conducted jointly with the naval infantry. More specifically, these missions are:

1. To destroy operational-tactical nuclear weapons, important command posts and installations in the enemy's rear.

2. To interdict the approach of operational reserves.

3. To assist in the advance of ground troops.

4. To capture and put airfields and air bases out of operation.

5. To capture islands, straits, ports, naval bases and beaches to further facilitate combat operations.

6. To assist in encircling and destroying large enemy groupings.

The ability of the Soviet Airborne to accomplish these missions has been demonstrated on numerous large-scale exercises. (3) On the strategic level, Airborne forces are controlled at the highest levels. It seems likely that a strategic Airborne operation, that is a component of a theater strategic offensive, would be controlled by the High Command of Forces in the Theater of Military Operations (TVD). Independent strategic airborne operations would be controlled by the General Staff / Supreme High Command. These operations can be composed of one or more Airborne Divisions and executed at distances hundreds of kilometers beyond the forward edge of the battle area. The Airborne divisions may be reinforced by airlanding motorized rifle troops. (4) The missions identified for the Airborne forces at the strategic level are:

1. Seizure of major political, administrative and economic centers.

2. Destruction of military and civil control.

3. Seizure of vital islands, straits and peninsulas.

4. Opening of a new front by invasion of enemy territory.

5. Forcing individual states to withdraw from enemy coalition.

The invasions of Czechoslovakia in 1968 and Afghanistan in 1979 were initiated by Airborne forces and demonstrate the Soviet's willingness to employ their Airborne forces to accomplish strategic missions. (5)

Like the Soviets' World War II Airborne missions, the U.S. Airborne missions were focused on tactical objectives in support of ground operations.

"The Airborne force was conceived . . . to assault or envelop the enemy from the air and seize and hold limited objectives to assist in the advance of the main forces." (6)

In fact, the War

Department Training Circular Number 113, dated 9 October 1943, clearly oriented the use of Airborne forces to tactical roles with its insistence that,

"Airborne troops should not be employed unless they can be supported by other ground or naval forces within three days." (7)

Although there were some proponents for the operational use of the Airborne forces, the conservative, immediate tactical missions were the only ones assigned. A review of the current specific U.S. Airborne missions shows the U.S. still thinks of the Airborne as a supporting force to be used in a tactical role.

The general mission of the 82nd Airborne Division is:

"to deploy anywhere in the world and be prepared to conduct combat operations to protect U.S. national interests." (8) This is an ambitious mission statement, especially when the capabilities of the threat (to be discussed in Chapter Five) are matched up against the current Airborne Division's combat power. The specific missions assigned to the Airborne Division will be analyzed in three categories, tactical missions, strategic missions and other missions. The first group of specific missions to be discussed will be the tactical missions. (9)

1. "Seize and hold via vertical envelopment vital objectives behind enemy lines until linkup with supporting forces." This mission is essentially the same mission assigned to the Division in 1943. The need for a linkup with ground forces "behind enemy lines" implies a fairly shallow depth for the assault, probably less than 100 miles. The effectiveness of the helicopter has made this mission unlikely or even obsolete.

[Editor: IF helicopter-mobile forces can be delivered by fixed-wing aircraft airland to the battlefield in a no-notice contingency, which is doubtful]

2. "Conduct large scale raids." By definition a raid is a limited objective attack. This type of attack is typical of the World War II supporting attack role for the Airborne. The development of the Ranger Regiment and the significant growth in the Special Operations Forces

have all but eliminated the need for the Airborne division to accomplish this mission. The three separate Airborne battalions (in Panama [Now Fort Polk, LA], Alaska and Italy), would still be expected to accomplish this mission, in their respective theaters.

3. "Occupy areas or reinforce friendly or allied units beyond the immediate reach of ground forces." This mission is another limited holding or reinforcing mission to be conducted until the ground forces can linkup. Again, the efficiency of the helicopter makes this mission unlikely. Additionally, the intent of the phrase "beyond the immediate reach" is nebulous and subject to significant variation in interpretation.

The second group of specific missions to be discussed includes those missions assigned that can be considered strategic in nature.

1. "Rescue of U.S. nationals besieged overseas." This can be considered a strategic mission and a mission that the Airborne forces are capable of performing, as demonstrated by Operation Urgent Fury in Grenada. However, unless the threat is very light, the non-surgical nature of an Airborne assault may not be the best choice for this mission. Special Operations Forces reinforced by Light Infantry Division forces could accomplish this mission in a low threat environment. While in a high threat environment, like Iran, the current Airborne Division may be too light to accomplish the mission.

[Editor: Totally wrong. When hostages are held you need overwhelming fixed-wing aircraft AIRDROP capable forces: Los Banos, Stanleyville, Kolwezi, Grenada, Entebbe, Panama = successes. Smaller Helicopter rescues = Son Tay, Koh Tang, Desert One = failures. We need to re-think the entire helicopter rescue mission profile in the light of historical successes and failures--when we parachute in we gain surprise and shock action, when we tinker with helicopters we fall short. Whatever Firepower "muscle" a Light Infantry Division can provide the Airborne Division can do better--as well as getting there faster by parachute. We need an AIRDROP DIVISION for rescue missions not just a tiny SOF. If the 82d Airborne Division is too foot-mobile to fight off an Iran for a rescue to proceed then get it the light AFVs it needs]

2. "Capture one or more intermediate bases or forward operating bases for protracted ground/air operations." This mission is a good strategic Airborne mission, provided the countries involved are not defending their airfields. And if undefended, the Light Infantry Division units could be used to secure these bases.

The third group of specific U.S. Airborne missions to be addressed will be the missions that do not clearly fall into the tactical or strategic categories.

1. "Exploit the effects of nuclear or chemical weapons." This mission was a key mission for the Soviet Airborne in the 1950s and 1960s and led to their design of vehicles with NBC (nuclear, biological and chemical) filtration and overpressure systems. With the growing Soviet focus on war without nuclear weapons, this specific mission for their Airborne has lost its earlier importance. Since we have not equipped our Airborne forces to operate freely in a NBC environment, it may be time we also dropped this mission.

[Editor: negative, get NBC protective AFVs..world doesn't change to suit our whims]

2. "Reinforce forward deployed forces." and

3. "Serve as a strategic or theater reserve."

These are the same missions the Airborne divisions were assigned in World War II. Of course, the units they were reinforcing were also non-mechanized infantry units.

[Editor: They were? You sure? XXX Corps the "Market" in "Operation Market-Garden" was completely mechanized. Remember the Airborne seized a 60 mile corridor for them?? Or Bostogne? The Airborne Divisions held the Germans off while the Mechanized and Armored forces got their acts together??]

Now the forward deployed forces are primarily mechanized and pposed by mechanized threat forces. The success of the light Airborne infantry against these mechanized forces is reflected in an after-action report on a recent REFORGER exercise. The Brigades were good for a "one night stand . . . the enemy overwhelms the dismounted U.S. forces in tactical mobility and firepower. Foot mobility is simply not adequate to cope with the mechanized mobility of the Soviets."

The problem with the missions currently assigned to the U.S. Airborne, is that they are still based on the World War II mentality of the Airborne - a novel "gimmick" force to be used tactically, to seize and hold limited objectives in support of the main attack. A quick comparison with the Soviets' Airborne missions reflects a striking difference in the way each country plans to project their combat power on the strategic level. The Soviets have clear, achievable strategic and operational missions for their airborne forces, while the U.S. has limited, defensive and tactically oriented, missions. Even the early draft of FM 90-26, Airborne Operations, has detailed for the Airborne forces these same types of limited, defensive, tactically oriented

missions, or missions based on the seizure of an airhead. Additionally, the Airborne Division now competes with the Special Operations Forces, the Light Infantry Divisions, an Air Assault Division and the marines for use as America's strategic force. Just what is the mission of the U.S.'s Airborne forces? In light of the significant changes in the world, now is the time to clearly establish the 21st Century missions upon which the modernization of the Airborne forces can be built.

A modernized Airborne force must consider the other strategically deployable forces already a part of the U.S. military structure and evolve in a manner that will provide the Nation a unique strategically oriented offensive capability that complements these other forces. This modernized force must be able to respond anywhere in the world and to conduct combat operations to protect U.S. national interests. As Lieutenant General James M. Gavin has said,

"[The Airborne forces] must be employed where their action would be decisive, and not scattered about for local gains." (11)

In an effort to draw out the significant differences in the U.S. and Soviet Airborne forces, the combat power of the Airborne squads and companies will be compared initially. The remainder of this section will then focus on a comparison of the firepower, mobility and survivability of a U.S. "task organized" Airborne Brigade versus a Soviet Airborne Regiment. A discussion of the deployability and Divisional assets available to augment these forces will be included.

The Airborne infantry squad is the base upon which the entire Airborne force is built The Soviet BMD is the main difference between the Soviet and the U.S. Airborne squads. By being mounted on the BMDS, the Soviet squad is capable of carrying tremendous firepower into

battle, maneuvering great distances through NBC contaminated areas or across water obstacles and surviving small arms and artillery or mortar fires. More important, on the modern battlefield, each squad can kill tanks at great distances. The breakdown of each squad's combat power follows:

SOVIET AIRBORNE DM SQUAD - 7 personnel

1 ea BMD Airborne Amphibious Infantry Combat Vehicle (AAICV)

1 ea 73-mm or 2A42 30-mm cannon (maximum effective range 1,000 m)

3 ea 7.62-mm Medium Machine Guns (one coaxial, two bow mounted)

1ea RPG-16D ATGL (antitank grenade launcher, range 800 m)

1 ea RPKS-74 LMG (5.45-mm light machine gun)

6 ea AKMS-74 5.45mm Assault Rifles

Other: NBC filtration system, firing ports, infrared capability Armor protection, crusing range of 320 miles, amphibious.

U.S. AIRBORNE SQUAD - 9 Personnel

No vehicles

2 ea M-249 Squad Automatic Weapon (5.56-mm light machine gun)

2 ea M-203 Grenade Launcher (on M-16 rifle/M4 carbine, range 400 m)

7 ea M-16/M4 5.56mm Assault Rifle/Carbine

Other: M136 AT-4 Light Antitank Weapon (84-mm, range 300 m, issued as required), squad is 100% night vision equipped.

The combat power comparison of firepower, mobility and survivability, strongly favors the Soviet squad. This squad is clearly more capable of offensive action and of dealing with a modern mechanized threat. There is also no requirement to support or augment this squad with any combat power other than indirect fire. The U.S. squad, on the other hand is easily deployable has excellent night capability and is transportable in light-lift helicopters. However, even if reinforced with one-half of the weapons in the weapons squad (one Dragon/[Javelin] antitank weapon, range 1,000 meters [2,000 meters], and one M-60-[M-240B] medium machine gun) the squad still falls far short of the Soviet squad's capability when it comes to conducting combat operations "anywhere in the world".

In further comparing the U.S. and Soviet Airborne force structure, I will now skip over the platoons and briefly address the Airborne companies. At the company level, the Soviets are organized

with three BMD platoons of three BMD squads and a company headquarters with one BMD. The U.S. Airborne company also has three rifle platoons (each with three rifle squads and a weapons squad) and one 60-mm mortar section, with two mortars. For the sake of this comparison, we will assume the U.S. Airborne battalion has reinforced the company with a platoon from the battalion's antiarmor company. This platoon consists two antiarmor sections of two TOWs (tube launched, optically tracked, wire command link guided missiles) each. The TOWS, are HMMWV wheeled vehicle mounted, antiarmor systems with a range of 3,750 meters. A breakdown of each company's combat power is provided in Table 4-1.

TABLE 4-1

COMPANY LEVEL COMBAT POWER COMPARISON

SOVIET ABN COMPANY U.S. ABN COMPANY (Reinforced)

MANNING: (Soviet/U.S.) 75 personnel / 152 personnel

MOBILITY: (Soviet/U.S.)

BMD (AAICV) 10 ea / 6 ea extremely limited in mobility and heavy firepower (only 6 medium machine guns). It appears that the U.S. force is designed for the defensive,

2S9 120-mm How (SP) (Rg 10 km) 6 ea / 4 ea M551A1 Sheridan (152-mm)

[Editor: make that ZERO NOW for U.S.]

73-mm or 2A42 30-mm cannon 90 ea/ 34 ea .50 cal Heavy Machine Guns

7.62-mm Medium Machine Guns 278 ea/ 61 ea 7.62-mm Medium Machine Guns

RPKS-74 5.45-mm LMG 83 ea/162 ea SAW 5.56-mm LMG

ASG-17 Automatic Grenade Launcher 18 ea/No Equivalent Weapon

BG-15 120/350 ea M-203 Grenade Launcher

No Equivalent Weapon/ 27 ea M-202 66-mm Flash

[Editor: Not true: Russians have twin shot Shmel Flame rocket in service, 4-shot M-202 is unsafe and not in service in U.S.]

INDIRECT AND AIR DEFENSE - FIREPOWER: (Soviet / U.S.)

No Equivalent Weapon / 18 ea 60-mm mortar (Rg 3.4 km)

No Equivalent Weapon / 12 ea 81-mm mortar (Rg 5.6 km)

2S9 120-mm How (SP) (Rg 10 km) 6 ea / 18 ea M-119 How 105-mm (19.5 km)

ZU-23 ADA gun (Rg 2.5 km) 6 ea / 3 ea Vulcan ADA Gun (Rg 1.2 km)

[Editor: Not true. Vulcan retired. Avenger ADA HMMWVs with .50 cal can fire 2.75" Hydra-70 rockets, otherwise U.S. firepower here is ZERO.]

SA-14/16 missile (Rg 5.5 km) 36 ea / 40 ea Stinger missile (Rg 4 km)

Note 1: Division Ready Brigade (Medium) is a generic force package used by the 82nd Airborne Division as a point of departure for rapidly tailoring forces for specific contingencies. It has a medium mix of firepower and some helicopter mobility as it incorporates the Division's medium slice of combat, combat support and combat service support

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