The U.S. Airborne regiment does have an advantage in numbers of rifleman and small-arms fire (1.8 to 1 overall and 1.3 to 1 at squad level). The question then is, is it better to have more troops and less heavy firepower or to have less troops and more heavy firepower? This question was answered by J.F.C. Fuller when he said, "the machine gun was the concentrated essence of infantry, its invention put into the hands of one man the fire-power formerly wielded by forty." (23) It is also interesting to note that the evolution of the U.S. regular infantry forces appears to subscribe to the "more firepower - less troops" theory. With the recent modernization of the mechanized infantry, the mechanized infantry squad went from 11 men and a M-113 armored personnel carrier with a M-2 .50 caliber heavy machine gun, to 9 men and the M-2 Bradley Infantry Fighting Vehicle with a TOW ATGM, a 25-mm automatic gun and a coaxial 7.62-mm medium machine gun. The Airborne squad also went from 11 men to 9 men but without an offsetting increase in firepower.

The survivability of the Soviet Regimental forces is significantly enhanced by the armor, the mobility and the NBC overpressure of the BMD. The armor provides protection from indirect

fire which becomes especially important when a regiment is forced to defend an area that is easily targeted, like an airfield. The effects of indirect fire can be devastating to a light infantry force, even in prepared positions which will not be readily available following an airdrop. Lessons learned at the National Training Center indicate that,

"A light infantry company in well prepared survivability positions lost 58% of its combat strength during a major maneuver exercise when opposing forces concentrated indirect fires on the unit for three to 24 hours. Armor also provides protection from small-arms fire and grenades."

The mobility of the BMD will also improve the survivability of the Soviet forces. The BMD provides the Airborne forces with armored mobility to quickly move away from the drop zone, an area that will draw any fires the enemy can muster. Also, by having the ability to quickly maneuver, a force can avoid an enemy strength or exploit an enemy weakness. The mobility and armor protection of the 2S9 120-mm howitzer (SP) will greatly enhance its survivability against counterbattery fires. Finally, the worldwide proliferation of chemical weapons and the likely targeting of airfields makes the N13C overpressure of the BMD important to the survivability of the Soviet Airborne regiment. Still, some U.S. light infantrymen would argue that the lightness of the light infantry, in and of itself, enhances survivability. While this may have been, or is now, true in a low intensity conflict, this environment is likely to be the exception rather than the rule by the 21st Century.

The development of the U.S. and Soviet Airborne forces has resulted in two significantly different forces. This chapter has identified the need for a re-evaluation of what the U.S. wants the

Airborne forces of the future to accomplish. The missions of the Soviet Airborne forces, while not perfect, provide some indication of what a strategically deployable Airborne force can be expected to accomplish if properly equipped. The needs of the Nation in the 21st Century will help focus the development of these missions. Another concern is, just what should the orientation of the U.S. Airborne forces be toward combat? If the needs of the Nation require an offensive capability, then much can be learned from the modernization effort of the Soviets.

A focus on direct fire capability and tactical mobility, with a reduction in their indirect fire capability and numbers of light infantry troops is the Soviets' solution to the failures of their Airborne operations during World War II.

Another critical issue identified in this comparison concerns the U.S. Airborne's requirement to secure an airfield for follow-on airland forces. Although not specifically stated, the required airlanding of over 40% of a DRB's aircraft is a clear indication that airfield seizures will continue to be an essential requirement for the U.S. Airborne forces. The future threat may make this requirement difficult if not deadly. Finally, the Soviet's ability to project up to SIX Airborne Divisions to the U.S.' one, indicates the relative importance each nation has put on their respective Airborne forces. If the Army is going to be a deployable, versatile and lethal strategic force in the future, the Airborne forces must be modernized to meet the 21st Century threat. The nature of this threat will be discussed in the next chapter.

CHAPTER FOUR ENDNOTES

Edward N. Luttwak, Historical Analysis and Pro.iection for Army 2000, Volume 1, Part 17, Soviet Airborne Forces 1930-1983, (DTIC B085085, March 1983), pp. 156-157.

Dr Graham H. Turbiville Jr., "Soviet Airborne Operations in Theater War," Foreign Policy, Vol XIII, 1986, pp. 173-174.

Voroshilov General Staff Academy, "Employment of Military Transport Aviation to Assault Land an Airborne Division in the Rear of the Enemy," Lecture Notes, mid-1970s (Fort Leavenworth, KS: Soviet Army Studies Office, Dec. 1989), pp. 8-9.

Turbiville, pp. 176-177.

General Board Report # 17, Types of Divisions Post-War Arnw, U.S. Forces, European Theater of Operations, 1945, para. 19.

War Department Training Circular Number 113, Employment of Airborne and Troop Carrier Forces (Washington DC: Government Printing Office, 9 Oct. 1943), para. 4d.

Headquarters, 82nd Airborne Division, The 82nd Airborne Division Capabilities Book 1988 (Fort Bragg, NC: ACofS, Force Integration, April 1988), P. 2-5.

Ibid.

LTG James F. Hollingsworth and MG Allan T. Wood, "The Light Armored Corps - A Strategic Necessity," Armed Forces Journal International, Jan. 1980, P. 20.

LTG James M. Gavin, Airborne Warfare (Washington, DC: Infantry Journal Press, 1947), P. 35.

Field Manual 100-2-3, The Soviet Army Troops, Organization and Equipment (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, Nov. 1988) P. 4-134. While some of the systems have a reload capability, this thesis will compare the units based on the number of launchers and not the numbers of missiles or rounds carried in the basic load.

The 82nd Airborne Division Capabilities Book 1988, P. 5-11. While some of the systems have a reload capability, this thesis will compare the units based on the number of launchers and not the numbers of missiles or rounds carried in the basic load.

FM 100-2-3, P. 4-134. Also, The 82nd Airborne Division Capabilities Book 1988, P. 5-7.

COL Peter Kolecko, "Soviet Airborne Forces Part II," Truppendienst, Vol 25, No. 6, 1986, P. 12.

LTC Lou Matz, "Airdrop Is It Still a Viable Tactic," Airlift Magazine, Spring 1988, P. 8.

FM 100-2-3, pp. 4-135/138. Also, The 82nd Airborne Division Capabilities Book 1988, pp. 5-3/7 and 24-1/25-5.

Headquarters, 82nd Airborne Division, Memorandum For, Subject: "82nd Airborne Division Generic Force Packages," dated 21 Jan. 1988, pp. 16-D-1/16-D-7 and 16-H-2.

FM 100-2-3, P. 4-143.

MAJ James F. Holcomb, "Soviet Airborne Forces and the Central Region: Problems and Perceptions," Military Review, Nov. 1987, P. 10.

Field Manual 100-5, Operations (Washington D.C.: Government Printing Office, May 1986), P. 12.

Ibid.

John Keegan, The Face of Battle (New York: Viking Press, 1976), P. 228.

Center for Army Lessons Learned 89-2, "Heavy-Light Lessons Learned," (Fort Leavenworth, KS: CALL, June 1989), P. 12.

CHAPTER FIVE

"You look at other parts of the world. Every place there is a degree of sophistication, every place there are some armored vehicles, there's helicopters. Nobody is sitting there with spears and clubs."

GEN John W. Foss, Commander, TRADOC (1)

"Three trends, already underway, are beginning to undermine the superpower order: the rise of assertive regional powers or power blocks, the proliferation of military technologies across the spectrum of capabilities, and the globalized competition with the closest allies . . . for economic and political influence. . . . With the gradual ebb of superpower predominance will emerge a panoply of contenders for power who are better equipped than before - psychologically, militarily and economically. . . . They will inevitably pose new risks to U.S. national security."

The Center for Strategic and International Studies (2)

INTRODUCTION

The changes that are occurring in the Soviet Union and Eastern Bloc nations have clearly reduced the threat of a superpower confrontation in Europe. But change, in and of itself, induces instability and the world environment is changing significantly. The world is becoming increasingly multi-polar as regional power centers become stronger and grow in number. Conflicts between these new power centers can pose clear threats to U.S. security interests. And as these developing countries continue to gain significant military capabilities, they are more likely to resort to force in settling their disputes. (3)

While the U.S. is now, and will likely remain, prepared to deal with the change that is occurring in Europe, the changes occurring in the Third

World are likely to present the U.S. with a more formidable challenge than the U.S. is prepared to deal with. This chapter will identify and address this future threat with a focus on the impact this threat will have on the ability of the U.S. to project power. Since the mission of the U.S. Airborne forces is likely to remain, "to deploy rapidly anywhere in the world and be prepared to conduct combat operations to protect U.S. national interests," the understanding of this future threat is essential to the design of a versatile, deployable and lethal Airborne force.

21st CENTURY THREATS - GENERAL

Overall, 21st Century threats to U.S. national interests can be addressed in three main areas: the growing instability of the Third World as a result of unchecked population growth, weak economies, terrorism, religious fanaticism and drug trafficking; an accelerating Third World arms race; and the potential of a reinvigorated Soviet military establishment that has undergone significant modernization efforts. The long list of hostilities in the developing world, since World War II, is testimony to the continuing existence of pre-colonial tensions and hatreds as well as the emergence of many new and equally powerful seeds of conflict. Today no region in the Third World is free of civil or national conflict. The armed conflicts in El Salvador, Cambodia, Angola, Mozambique, Afghanistan, and the Spanish Sahara are only the most visible. Other conflicts, like the Arab - Israeli, Iraq-Iran, and India - Pakistan, are only quiet for the time being. These tensions are propelling the Third World into the same type of arms race that the U.S. and the Soviet Union felt compelled to undergo following World War II. As with the postwar East - West tensions, imbalances in military capabilities inevitably spur the attainment of a "balancing

RETURN TO AES HOME