We are certain that the design requirements of a future U.S. Army must start now so that we will have a view and guiding light of our future requirements. During this period of change we can then shape the units of the Army to meet our future force, as well as providing a focus to our future equipment needs.

"The greatest mistake we could make is to take our Army of the 70's and 80's into the 21st century."

GEN John W. Foss, Commander, TRADOC

"What worries me is that instead of the light, mobile, readily deployable high-tech military that we're going to need, we'll just get proportionate cuts in everything . . . . You cut your tanks a third and I'll cut my planes a third, [is) not a recipe at all for defense in the 21st century."

Senator John S. McCain III, Ranking Minority Member, Senate Armed Services Committee, and Vietnam War Navy pilot/POW (2)

This thesis critically analyzes the evolution of U.S. Airborne forces by conducting a comparative analysis of the U.S. and Soviet Airborne forces' development and capabilities. Current U.S. and Soviet aircraft and equipment capabilities and the projected future threat limitations to Airborne forces have also been analyzed. It provides recommendations for the modernization of the U.S. conventional Airborne forces based on the requirement for a successful forced entry capability in a future threat environment. These recommendations are grounded on several essential Airborne concepts derived from a combination of historic "tried and true" Airborne principles. Finally, this thesis provides an option for consideration in the restructuring of the

deviation in the perceived usefulness of the Airborne forces. From the early days of Airborne development, the Soviets have always considered their Airborne forces a critical component of the third dimension of offensive maneuver. As such, they have developed their war fighting concepts and then modernized their forces in a manner that has included their Airborne forces. The resources needed to develop and modernize their forces have been made available because of the importance the Soviet government has put on the military. Their system - whatever the overall inefficiencies - has enabled them to develop and field, modern, effective military equipment. They have also resolved, in ways favorable to the Airborne forces, interservice rivalries. It is often touted that the Soviets have spent significantly more than the U.S. on defense (more than twice as much, as measured in the percentage of the Gross National Product). In fact, using 1984 numbers, some analysts contend that the U.S. spent more than the Soviets on defense in total dollars and double the budget expenditures per man.(6)

Unlike the Soviets, the U.S. has never [yet] embraced the Airborne concept. Caught off guard by Germany's use of Airborne forces in World War II, the U.S. trained their Soldiers to jump out of airplanes but never trained the military leadership to visualize the true potential of the Airborne concept. Even today, the foot mobile, lightly armed Airborne forces are equipped with a 35 year old parachute and supported by a 30 year old light tank. [Not any more thanks to short-sighted Army officials] This would indicate that they are still not part of the Army's main effort. [Even though they have lead the rest of the Army in Grenada, Panama, Haiti, Bosnia].

This comparative analysis of the U.S. and Soviet Airborne forces focused on the current capabilities and limitations of these forces, while comparing their missions, force designs and equipment. It further highlighted the significant difference in the orientation of these

forces (see chapter four). The Soviets are oriented toward offensive, strategic missions against an armored opponent with the possibility of chemical or nuclear weapons use. This orientation has dictated their heavy emphasis on direct fire firepower, tactical mobility and dispersion. The result is an Airborne force that is over SIX Divisions strong, yet compact, deployable lightly-armored, mobile and lethal.

Meanwhile, the U.S. seems to have remained fixed on the defensive, World War II, mission of seizing and securing terrain, like an airhead, against minimal enemy air defense, artillery, aircraft and armor. In fact, the entire concept of the light Divisions, as a strategic force, is tied to this mission. The light fighters are expected to airland into this "seized and secured" airfield, and then conduct whatever type of operation a foot mobile, lightly armed Division can accomplish. As a result of this defensive mentality, the U.S. Airborne forces have remained infantry heavy, foot mobile, armed with mostly man portable weapons and supported heavily by indirect firepower, helicopter support and Air Force aircraft. This remains the case despite a number of studies which indicate that weapons systems are significantly more decisive than a large number of infantryman. (7)

[Disagree: The NVA/Somalis etc. won without lots of high-tech weapon systems using just infantry. But infantry AND armored vehicles is a unbeatable combination]

Finally, the strategic deployability of the light-mechanized Soviet Airborne forces is actually better than the infantry-heavy U.S. Airborne forces. The Soviets have designed their Airborne force to maximize its deployability, by moving more of the supplies with the combat forces and designing their equipment with multiple capabilities.

While the current U.S. Airborne force is capable of conducting combat operations effectively in many parts of the world, as demonstrated in Grenada and Panama, the future threats are likely to significantly restrict their use, and the use of the other five

Light/Air assault Divisions. The militarization of the Third World, fueled by the liberal arms sales of the developed countries, has resulted in a virtual arms race. The proliferation of modern conventional weapons, long-range ballistic missiles and weapons of mass destruction demand the modernization of the Airborne forces if they are to survive in the increasingly lethal Third World environment. While a detailed discussion of the future threats to the Airborne is provided in Chapter Five, an outline of the significant threats and potential corrective actions follow:

THREAT CORRECTIVE ACTION
_________________________________________________

1. Tanks, armored vehicles; Vehicle mounted gun or heavy crew weapons. Mobile, long-range antitank systems.

2. Long-range arty, MLRS; Mobile forces / Light armored vehicles. Mobile artillery.

3. Helicopters, aircraft; Long-range air defense systems. Mobile forces.

4. Sensors, Intelligence; Mobile forces. / Mobile reconnaissance. Airdrop where unexpected.

5. Heavy air defense threat; Mobile ground forces with offensive punch. Airdrop offset from objective.

6. Ballistic missiles; Mobile forces. / Dispersed logistics. Multiple, dispersed drop zones.

7. NBC attack; Mobile forces. / Decon capabilities. NBC overpressured vehicles.

8. Soviet equipment; Modern antitank capability, mobility. Modern air defense capability.

9. Loss of air cover; Air defense systems. / Mobile forces. Mobile, indirect firepower.

10. Loss of AC-130 gun ship; Mobile, indirect firepower. Less dependence on Air Force aircraft.

11. Loss of basing rights; Less dependence on Air Force Support. Less dependence on C-130 aircraft.

12. Loss of airfield; Mobile forces. Airdroppable DRB. Less dependence on helicopters/aircraft. Carry more supplies in initial assault. More Airborne forces for reinforcement.

FUTURE AIRBORNE CONCEPT

>"

Based on the analysis and evidence presented in more detail throughout this thesis, the following recommendations for future Airborne concepts are highlighted below.

1. Airborne forces must be designed, equipped and used for operational or strategic level missions. The tactical use of Airborne forces has been assumed, de facto, by Air Assault forces. The resources and time required to conduct a successful Airborne assault, make tactical missions an inefficient use of valuable assets. Future Airborne forces should be designed and equipped with a focus on strategic requirements and missions.

[Disagree: computer intelligence means and maping makes the Airborne assault faster and easier to do than helicopter Air assaults had the author been more PATHFINDER conscious here. The Airborne drop should be a key OPERATIONAL battlefield tool, not just strategic missions.]

2. Airborne forces must be designed and equipped to conduct offensive operations. While the strategic mission may require the "defense" of national interests, future threats will likely dictate the airdrop be conducted some distance away from the heavily air defended objective. The subsequent attack to the objective, on the ground, without significant Air Force and helicopter support, against modern mechanized forces will require an offensively designed and equipped force.

3. Equipment providing Airborne combat power and tactical mobility must be 100% airdroppable, the trend in the U.S. Airborne forces seems to be just the opposite of this. Future forces must have a true forced-entry capability. As discussed in Chapter Five, the future threat will be capable of neutralizing an airfield or otherwise preventing the airlanding of aircraft. This can be a "show stopper" if forces are not designed to accomplish the mission without airlanded equipment or airlanded reinforcements. This concept has a far reaching impact on the viability of both the use of the Light Divisions and the marines' [and Army] pre-positioning force

4. Airborne forces must have 100% ground tactical mobility. As FM 100-15 says, "Even meticulously constructed field fortifications offer limited protection against modern weapons such as cluster bomb munitions, chemical weapons and fuel air explosives." (8)

Besides survivability, the offensive power of maneuver is essential for the Airborne forces, who are normally the smaller force attacking a larger one. An operational research study conducted in 1987 reveals that of 72 battles examined, covering combat from 1941 to 1982, 83% were won by maneuver alone versus 17% won by firepower. (9) Finally., if the Airborne forces are to ever function as a strategic or operational reserve in the future, they must have ground tactical mobility. BG Christoph-Adolf Fuerus, former Commandant of the German Paratrooper force has said,

"Operational reserves must be superior to the aggressor with regards to speed and mobility . . . if they are to achieve results at the decisive point. " (10)

5. Airborne forces must have significant, organic, vehicle- mounted tank-killing capability. With the future Third World threat consisting of thousands of armored vehicles, many of them modern Soviet tanks, the Airborne force cannot survive with their heavy dependence on

man-portable anti-tank weapons. The low kill probabilities of these systems against tanks invites another "Task Force Smith" encounter in the not so distant future. Additionally, for the reasons stipulated above, the dependence on helicopters, even very small, C-130 air-transportable ones, to shoulder the responsibility for killing tanks, could be a deadly mistake in the future. Finally, if the U.S.' forward deployed forces ever need rapid reinforcement, the reinforcing Airborne forces must be capable of dealing with modern Soviet armored vehicles.

6. Airborne forces must be designed and equipped to be able to conduct offensive operations in an NBC environment. Weapons of mass destruction are very likely to be encountered in future Third World conflicts for the following reasons: these weapons are much cheaper than arming and maintaining a large conventional force; these weapons are easy to acquire (see Chapter Five); delivery of these weapons is becoming possible for many countries, with the proliferation of ballistic missiles and high performance aircraft; and these weapons are very effective against point, stationary targets and can render a port or airfield unusable in a matter of minutes. Of these weapons, the chemical weapons are the most likely to be encountered. Any airlanded, reassembled and resupplied from. While there will be many situations where Air Force

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