required to move a unit and indirectly reduce the combat power this nation can project. Finally, by designing equipment with dual capabilities, such as the 2S9, howitzer/anti-tank gun, [M113A3 Gavin with 120mm mortar turret] more combat power can be projected in fewer aircraft.

9. Sufficient combat power must be available in the future Airborne forces to deal with the increasing requirements and threats.

One Division Ready Brigade (DRB), which is the current airlift capability of the Air Force, is not enough combat power to deal with the future threats. The requirement should be for at least two full strength DRBs to be airdropped in one lift. The Airborne forces must be redesigned to be smaller, more mobile, more lethal and more deployable. A reduction in the size of a Brigade and an increase in the requirement for airdrop qualified crews, the limiting factor in the one DRB airdrop requirement, would enable the U.S. to strategically project significantly more combat power in the future.

The Department of Defense Biennial Planning, Programming and Budgeting System (BPPBS) manages the resources that are needed for the modernizing of the military. The planning phase of the BPPBS requires both an evaluation of the future threats and an update of the national military strategy. The resource requirements, submitted to the DOD by the Army, are based on these future threats and the missions assigned to the Army are in accordance with the updated national military strategy.

Now is the time to reevaluate the missions assigned to the Airborne forces, in light of the future threat, and confirm the Army's and the Nation's needs for a versatile, lethal and rapidly deployable force, with a forced-entry capability. As detailed in Chapter Four, the current missions assigned to the Airborne forces are essentially the

1. To quickly respond by airdrop, with sufficient combat power to safeguard vital national interests worldwide.

2. To provide military support, peacekeeping or security to allied governments worldwide.

3. To project significant military power worldwide in a show of force or demonstration.

4. To seize major political, administrative and economic centers worldwide in support of national policy.

5. To conduct or support the quarantine or blockade of other nations in support of national policy.

6. To seize and secure or destroy, operational or strategic chokepoints (straits, canals, bridges, beaches, peninsulas and other key terrain), islands, airfields, naval bases, ports or other military or civilian targets in support of national aims.

7. To respond worldwide as the Nation's strategic reserve, to include reinforcement of forward deployed forces.

8. To counter or interdict the enemy's use of operational or strategic reserves.

9. To open a new front by attack of an enemy flank or rear.

10. To attack and destroy key enemy weapons, command posts, lines of supply or installations in the enemy's rear.

11. To assist in the encirclement and destruction of large enemy groupings.

12. To conduct noncombatant evacuation operations. [NEOs]

13. To support U.S. civil authorities as directed.

FUTURE AIRBORNE EQUIPMENT

M113 Gavin tracked AFVs are available, what's the U.S. Army Airborne's excuse?

The equipment required by the Airborne forces of the future is radically different from the equipment currently available in the U.S. Airborne units. The Soviets have demonstrated, in the fielding of the BMD, the 2S9 howitzer and other specialized Airborne equipment, that the technology is currently available to produce the future U.S. Airborne equipment, now. In equipping the Airborne force of the future, the Airborne concepts and future missions (detailed above), as well as the future threats must be addressed. Some of the general characteristics that must apply to this equipment include airdrop ability, a common chassis, amphibious capability, NBC filtration and overpressure and light armor. Some of the specific equipment requirements follow-.

1. An Airborne Amphibious Infantry Fighting Vehicle (AAIFV) This vehicle will be the backbone of the Airborne and should be sized to allow the airdropLAV-105, which the marines are working on, must be resisted.

[Editor: HOLD IT MISTER!!! What you want is going to take a decade and is re-inventing the wheel. We have the AAIFV, its called the M113A3 Gavin. If it looks like an AAIFV, has the performance of an AAIFV, guess what? ITS AN AAIFV!!!!. This is where the author loses the entire thrust of his 180 page plus thesis--we correct this. There is no excuse why the 82d Airborne Divisuion does not have surplus M113A3 Gavins supplied to it. NONE.]

The move to replace the obsolete M-551A1 Sheridan with the LAV-105 does not address the need for tactical mobility by the Airborne forces. Additionally, there are some potentially serious problems with the LAV-105. The high profile of the LAV-105 (over eight feet) may restrict the firing of the gun over the sides of the vehicle, and there is serious doubt that the LAV-105 will be able to make the tip-off curve limit of the C-130 or C-141. Also, the rigged weight of the LAV-105 (over 30,000 lbs) limits the number of LAV-105s transportable by C-141 to two. (11) More importantly, if the Airborne division is outfitted with the LAV-105, it may be another (30) years before the funding is available for a real Airborne light tank.

[Editor: Don't sweat it, Maj Kazmierski, we have the light tank you call for: the M8 Ridgway Armored Gun System. All we have to do is NOT buy a few $3.3 million dollar junky LAV-III/Stryker trucks or $40 million dollar Super Hornets and we could have 50 in the 2d ACR.]

generation; reconnaissance; support, especially one with a platform moving capability; and fuel and water transporters.

There are several areas that require additional study to assist in the modernization of the Airborne forces. I will identify a few of the areas that should be addressed in an open-minded and unbiased manner. The decisions rendered in the next five years will determine the ability of the Airborne forces to respond to the strategic needs of the Nation for many years to come.

1. Should the LAV-105 be used by the Airborne forces as the replacement for the M-551A1 Sheridan light tank? The Army seems more than willing to continue to take what ever is available and make do.

The LAV-105 is not what the Airborne division needs, but may ultimately be acquired only because it is cheap and available. What other light tanks (as is, or modified) are available worldwide, that could replace the M-551A1 Sheridan?

[Editor: Hello, Kazmierski??? Read Jane's. There is the Stingray. The United Defense CCV-L chosen to be the M8 AGS, GD has an external gun light tank, the British Scorpion, Stormer series light tanks...all available "off the shelf"]

Could a true Airborne tank be developed if given sufficient funding in the next few years?

[Editor: Man, is this guy obsessed with R & D funding or what? We don't need R & D funding we need money to BUY the light tanks selected. Does he want something fielded or fantasy? Its 20 years after he wrote this report and the U.S. Airborne doesn't have a single tracked armored fighting vehicle. Maybe he should have stopped being so picky and advocated M113 Gavins and we would have then had 20 years of upgrades and experience with them to include combats in Panama, Desert Storm, Somalia, Afghanistan and Iraq, saving many Paratrooper lives.]

If an Airborne infantry fighting vehicle were developed with a tank killing capability, would an Airborne light tank even be needed?

[Editor: Developed? We have it. Its called a M113A3 Gavin. And the answer is yes, we still need a light tank with a big gun even if the AAIFV can kill tanks with ATGMs.

2. Is it time to do away with the Airborne, light infantry and Air Assault divisions and task organize a contingency division? Why do we still have pure Airborne, Light and Air Assault Divisions while all our other forces are task organized, combined arms team? For example, an Armored division has not only tanks, but also mechanized infantry, and attack helicopter forces? Why not develop contingency divisions with light mechanized Airborne forces, Light infantry forces and Air assault forces - essentially a contingency force task organization? By reorganizing the seven Light, Airborne, Air assault, or motorized

[Editor: The Army's Airborne, Air Assault and Light Infantry Divisions are already deployed in "task forces". They have attack and transport helicopters. What they don't have is light AFVs. Get them this and the re-arranging of deck chairs on the patio will be less important.]

3. When will we give the Light Divisions the forced entry, tactical mobility and firepower they will need to deal with the same future Third World threats as the Airborne forces face?

[Editor: when I suspect the Anti-Airborne, heavy-mech 'mafia' stops its deliberate sabotaging of the Airborne. Much of the Army and other services are jealous of the Airborne and are actively seeking its demise instead of seeing it as an American institution and strength shared by us all. They'd rather torpedo it by not buying it light tanks etc. than to be a part of it. Regardless, the world we live in moves by the speed of the AIR. Either we harness this "tiger" or we be eaten by it.]

Dozens of studies have been already been done on this subject and the same shortcomings identified with the current Airborne forces, exist with the light forces. By modernizing the Light Divisions along with the Airborne, Air assault and motorized forces, as a package, the greater the quantities of equipment required and the lower the overall costs for the development and acquisition of this light and strategically deployable equipment.

4. Are tracked or wheeled vehicles better for the armored tactical vehicles of the future Airborne forces? If a requirement is established for three of these future vehicles (rigged for airdrop) to fit on a C-141 aircraft, then these vehicles will weigh less than 12 tons.

[Editor: the tracked M113A3 Gavin weighs 10.5 tons]

A 1985 TRADOC study concluded that, "tracked vehicles are more compact and offer a superior gun platform while wheeled vehicles are quieter, have lower fuel consumption, are self-deployable within a theater, and have superior reliability and maintainability." Its goes on to say,

"Because of the reduced off-road mobility, reduced maneuverability, reduced weight growth potential, inferior large caliber gun platform and larger overall size, we do not see the 10 to 20 ton wheeled armored vehicle as a viable combat platform." (12)

Perhaps, this is the reason why the 14-ton, wheeled LAV-105 is having problems.

field forces capable of deterring or fighting wars in regions in which the local protagonists themselves possess the means for escalation well beyond the low-intensity level." (15) We must modernize the Airborne forces before it is too late!

"Where is the prince who can afford so to cover his country with troops for its defense, as that ten thousand men descending from the clouds, might not, in most places, do an infinite deal of mischief before a force could be brought to repel them?"

Benjamin Franklin, 1784

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