Americans are still being held hostage after incompetent marine corps pilots in navy RH-53D helicopters fail in the desert. A collision with a parked EC-130 Hercules modified to be an expedient tanker craft for the MC-130E Combat Talon Is and helicopters leaves 8 dead.
After the marine-created debacle (planners wanted qualified USAF SOF pilots but had marine pilots forced on them due to politics), helicopters are not an option. We can parachute IN a rescue force like we did in the 1945 Los Banos prison raid and helped the Belgian Para-Commandos rescue hostages from the Congo for Operation Dragon Rouge/Noir, but cannot afford to seize an airport in the middle of downtown Teheran to fly everyone out. So rescue planners turn to the dependable, legendary C-130 Hercules fixed-wing Short Take-Off and Landing (STOL) aircraft for answers.
They realize they need an EXTREMELY short take-off and landing or ESTOL capability. So they add a host of rockets to a C-130 so it can not only land literally on a "dime" inside the soccer stadium bearby the seized U.S. embassy in Teheran, but also lift off from there with the rescuers and hostages together! Actual flight tests proved the technique, code-named "Credible Sport" can work.
However, the election of no-non-sense, take-no-guff Ronald Reagen and the imminent threat of war yields a return of our hostages and this type of ESTOL technique is not put into operation. There are other ESTOL techniques which we will discuss later, ranging from landing gear modifications to new design Burnelli-type aircraft.
HELICOPTER & TILT-ROTOR MYTHS AND TRUTHS
When most people think of what helicopters (powered rotary-wing aircraft) can do, they imagine a single helicopter, basically able to land in any opening large enough to accept it and its rotor blades. At Son Tay POW camp in North Vietnam, the creative mission planners took advantage of this and crash-landed a HH-3 "Jolly Green Giant" helicopter into the center of the compound to take down the prison guards suddenly; basically using it as a defactor rotary-wing "glider". However it was a one-way use, the helicopter was too large and damaged to take off after the raid and was destroyed by demolitions charges as the Special Forces raiders exfiltrated through wall breech holes and into USAF HH-53Ds waiting a short distance outside the camp.
In other situations, if the enemy resistance is small, a single helicopter like a MH-6 "Little Bird" can land with 4-6 "shooters" onto a rooftop or small area and rescue a person like Kurt Muse in Panama. The single-ship NIGHT helicopter rescue gives maximum space for the pilot to land his helicopter and should have been used to rescue downed USAF pilot CPT Scott O'Grady in 1995 Bosnia, instead of packing two CH-53E Super Stallions full of low-grade ad hoc rescue skill mortar marines and trying to land both in an unsurveyed zone, where a farm fence trapped an entire chopper load of men inside. Later, when two French pilots were downed, AFSOC Pave Low IVs went into Bosnia to search with Pararescuemen or "PJs" aboard (not packed full of potential victims) and armed-to-the-teeth but, the pilots were already captured before they could get to them. On two other occasions years later during the civilian infrastructure bombing of Kosovo in 1999, AFSOC single-ship rescues saved a F-117 Nighthawk pilot and a F-16C pilot from at best imprisonment and at worse summary execution by irate Serbs. However, you cannot rescue hostages and fight wars with a large enemy opposing you with just a single helicopter's worth of men. These are bigger missions requiring more troops, weaponry and combat vehicles.
A big disappointment studying helicopter PATHFINDING is that to get multiple airlanded helicopters into a zone requires a lot of space that needs to be surveyed beforehand, and time to offload and fly away. This slow, piecemeal build-up of combat power by noisy helicopters flying into and out of the Landing Zone (LZ) gives the enemy time to react to our insertion, in a hostage rescue, it would mean the loss of surprise, in a major war, the enemy could "melt away" and be long gone before we assemble ourselves into fighting units and begin to foot-slog (Vietnam).
We have tried to overcome this by the direct delivery of assault troops onto the target by helicopters by airlanding or if there is nowhere to land hovering and having troops slide down ropes. Both techniques have resulted in diasaster: the 1975 usmc-led debacle on Koh Tang island and the 1993 raid to capture Somali warlord leaders in Mogadishu; in both cases helicopters were literally shot out of the sky trying to deliver troops directly to the objective. The survivors later hanging on and fighting for their lives until THEY could be rescued. Even when direct helicopter air assaults work, during the Kurt Muse rescue, their helicopters got shot down. Part of a real solution would be to actually have better foot mobility than our enemies by a holistic field living/load bearing system and to use human powered vehicles (HPVs) like folding All/Extreme Terrain Bikes and All-Terrain, All-Purpose Carts so we can insert away from enemy detection range and close by SPEED MARCH as the Israeli paratroops are fond of doing, and have been successful many times. At the very least helicopters used in direct assaults need max armor and smoke grenades/generators to protect them from aimed enemy fire while inserting/extracting troops. Another technique would be to use light tracked armored fighting vehicles like the German Wiesel, Swedish BV-206S or American M113A3 Gavin to insert into an offset LZ or by parachute DZ and then close on the objective with superior armored protection and firepower. Stealth provided by band-tracks, infared camouflage and hybrid-electic drives. This capability to "Air-Mech-Strike is described in detail by former SOF General David Grange's AMS-Study Group's book, "Air-Mech-Strike: Asymmetric Maneuver Warfare for the 21st Century".
The advent of the marine-contrived V-22 Osprey tilt-rotor helicopter with the ability to fly fixed wing flight does not solve these basic short comings in the zone, and actually increases our problems because it cannot carry the common HMMWV 4X4 vehicle inside. Marine corps pathetic attempts to adopt an unarmed "sports truck" or "dune buggy" that can be turned into a flaming wreck by a mere burst of enemy small arms fire as depicted below do not fix this handicap.
This assumes the V-22 can even be made to work safely which is questionable. Its a deathtrap that will eventually be cancelled as a troop transport. The question is how many dead and burned-up American bodies will have to be lost before DoD bureaucracy acts?
Frankly, the V-22 is finished.
If AFSOC pursues the CV-22, ITS FINISHED.
Read why and you will see test program or no test program the V-22 as a troop transport is finished.
Col Dunn USAF (R) rebukes lying USMC V-22 Program manager
The Dunn Report's Main Revelations:
V-22s Cannot:
*Fly above 10,000 feet, so much for turboprop flight range/speed
* Are not pressurized--cannot fly in NBC environment
* Cannot hover in mountains with more than 5 troops
* Cannot fly into storms (no de-icing) without icing and crashing
* Cannot crash land with any chance of survival in airplane mode unless engines/rotors rotated up 60 degrees
* Cannot autorotate in event of engine failures
* Doesn't have crash worthy fuel cells
* Cannot make abrupt maneuvers when landing in helicopter mode or could flip over on its back from Vortex Ring State asymmetric lift loss
* Cannot be armed with multiple defense weapons to suppress enemy in LZ
* Cannot hover insert troops by rappel/fast rope: too much downwash, limited to predictable open-area LZs
* Huge radar target bigger than helicopters akin to two 747s
* Cannot carry ANY armored vehicles inside, my God its only 5.45 feet high! Its too small for us humans!!!!!!!
Its toast.
Its only going to get worse if we try to field this deathtrap to our men.
Its a bad turboprop and a very bad helicopter, the very worst of both worlds.
If I were Bell I'd stop before its too late, save the company and pitch a slimmer V-22 as a two-seat attack/observation aircraft with EJECTION SEATS and call it a decade. Then you are not asking it to act like a hovering and landing helicopter in an enemy-held combat zone with men packed inside like sardines surrounded by fuel, just to take-off and land from forward operating bases to support ground units with observation/fires manned by just 2 humans not two dozen.
Even if V-22s worked, it would take more time and more men to get effective combat power using the CV-22 than to use a slightly slower C/MH-47D/E/F Chinook, which can deliver 3 times the men in a lift AND carry armored HMMWVs and Wiesel or BV-206S (armored SUSV) light tracked Armored Fighting Vehicles with battle dominating auto-cannon, rockets, recoilless rifles and missile to the fight. What matters is the END RESULT ON THE GROUND, not the means. As Sun Tzu said:
"what matters in war is VICTORY, not prolonged operations, however brilliantly executed".
Even with a potent mobile fighting vehicle force packed into Chinooks, or MH-47Es such an option would still have the time/distance and fuel factors to contend with to get to the target area and return to safety.
While we can and must address the weak areas of helicopter Air Assault techniques, the fact remains YOU CAN GET MORE COMBAT POWER INTO A GIVEN AREA FASTER BY PARACHUTING---AND AT LOWER RISK TO THE HIGH PERFORMANCE AIRCRAFT THAT DELIVER THEM THAN BY SLOWER, AIRLANDING HELICOPTERS.
The only problem is getting the AIRBORNE force OUT once it is there. General James. M. Gavin wrote in his book, Airborne Warfare that we need grassy field STOL transport aircraft.
In WWII, small fighter aircraft and transports could land on grassy fields.
Another reason why we need tracked and air cushion landing gear...is that the C-130 is simply a very heavy, 4-engined aircraft. While it may be able to land on a sufficiently long, flat and wide area ASSAULT ZONE (3,000 feet long, 90 feet wide) the ground UNDERNEATH it might not be able to support its 150K weight! This is what Combbat Control Teams do when surveying a possible AZ---test the ground surface to see if it will support the Mighty Herk's weight concentrated into narrow rubber tires. The following caption was sent in with these pictures, describing how corrupt VIPs in love with the deathtrap V-22 tried to land C-130s onto lightly asphalted Bell Textron runways and ramp space.
"If you are top brass, you don't have to listen to facts...
You think people would listen to reason....
Four C-130 transports, full of dignitaries and other stuff, were flown to Textron's airfield outside Dallas, for the roll out of the CV-22 aircraft. The people arranging the ceremonies were warned that the runway could not handle an aircraft as heavy as the C-130. These warnings were ignored.
See what happened...."
RETURN OF TRACKED LANDING GEAR!
"The ideal troop-carrier combat transport would appear to be a large transport of the twin-boom type for which personnel, artillery, and vehicles could be dropped. It should have a range of two thousand miles and should be equipped with self-sealing tanks, pilot armor, and a retractable track-laying undercarriage. This last feature would permit its landing and take-off in pastures and cultivated areas. It would thus be able to enter the airhead early in an operation, landing and taking off from areas normally suitable only for gliders".
A Retired USAF C-130 pilot writes about the C-82 with tractor gear experiment shown above:
"Mike...the C-82 with tractor gear. Only one was produced, but the idea was to reduce the pressure exerted from 60 psi to 20 psi and give it the capability to land anywhere."
THE STORCH
During WWII both the Germans and the British experimented with tracked landing gear to further improve their already capable Fieseler Fi-156 "Storch" and Lysander STOL aircraft. Ping's Storch page notes on the "E-O" model:
www.piteraq.dk/flight/storch.html
E-0 1941/42 As.10P Like C-1, but with special tracked landing gear. 10 made
F-0 or P 1942 As.10P Counter insurgency ("Polizei") C-3 with machine guns in side windows and bomb-racks/smoke laying
Since the Storch could take-off within twice its own length (165 feet) and land withing 50 feet, tracked landing gear was not vitally necessary. The Germans and the Army had small airplanes that could meet Gavin's cow pasture STOL goal, but not large transports.
WWII Tech Pubs reports on the Lysander:
This Lysander carried out experiments with unusual undercarriage installations. One trial featured castoring wheels for crosswind landings. Another test used tracked landing gear for rough landing grounds.
Post-WWII Developments
EB-50 Bomber with tracked landing gear
The first production B-50B (S/N 47-118) was retained for special test projects and given the (Exempt) designation: EB-50B. One EB-50B test project involved the modification of the landing gear. The wheels and tires were replaced by a caterpillar-type track system. Tracked landing gear systems were installed on a wide variety of aircraft during the 1940s and early 1950s including the Curtiss P-40 & Convair XB-36. These systems were designed to reduce the overall pressure exerted on the ground by spreading the aircraft weight over a larger ground contact 'foot print.' The reduced ground pressure would, in theory, allow the aircraft to operate from more airfields and even unimproved strips. The problem was particularly evident in the XB-36. With its initial single-wheel main landing gear, the XB-36 could land at only 3 airfields in the entire United States!
P-40 with tracked landing gear!
B-36 with tracked landing gear!
37597 AC - TEST TAKEOFF OF BOMBER EQUIPPED WITH CATERPILLER-TYPE LANDING GEAR.
The first takeoff and landing of the Air Force's experimental XB-36 bomber equipped with a caterpillar-type track landing gear was made on March 29, 1950, at the Fort Worth Division of Consolidated Vultee (Convair) Aircraft Corporation. With the track-type gear, the weight of the XB-36 rests on Bogie Wheels rolling on two endless belts on each main landing gear strut. Two smaller endless belts are installed on the nose gear strut. The gear, which is retractable, is the latest step in the Air Force's program of track-type gear development. The track on the main landing gear is designed for a maximum average of 57 pounds pressure per square inch on the landing strip, as compared to a pressure of 156 pounds per square inch exerted by the conventional wheel-type gear on a B-36 at the same gross weight. The Bogie Wheels around which the track travels are made of a new magnesium alloy containing zirconium, giving the wheels an especially high impact resistance. Friction is reduced to a minimum by the use of 185 tapered roller bearings weighing approximately 500 pounds.
Released Washington, D.C. April 12, 1950.
The caterpillar-type landing gear was fitted primarily to gather test data when fitted to a very heavy aircraft. The original main landing gear design with a single large wheel and tire was redesigned in the late 1940s and fitted to all production B-36s and retrofitted to the XB-36 and YB-36. The new landing gear arrangement had a two wheel nose gear and 4 wheel mains.
BOTTOM LINE: tracks can reduce ground pressure over wheels by 2/3ds!
According to: 1 June 1997 AFPAM 10-1403 AIR MOBILITY PLANNING FACTORS
ACN2,3 (Rigid Pavement Subgrades)
Runway L (ft) W (ft) High Med Low Ult Low High
C-130J CTIII 1000/30 2.8 3 3.5 4 2
Wouldn't this be such a significant reduction that C-130Js could practically land like Piper Cubs almost anywhere there is enough room irrespective of surface firmness?
Here is another solution. No, its not about using rockets, or tracks instead of wheels, which is still a GREAT IDEA that should be pursued... but it is about being able to like General Gavin said LAND anywhere where it is relatively flat. We are talking about not needing a runway. Zero (0) psi ground pressure.
AIR-CUSHION LANDING SYSTEM HERCULES
During the '60s, Bell Helicopter perfected air cushion landing systems onto first a Lake single engine amphibian and then a twin-engine DeHavilland Buffalo STOL aircraft. Basically this is a rubber skirt that traps directed air to form an "air cushion" so the craft doesn't touch the ground, but "hovers" instead. The Russians already have a seaplane in production with air cushion landing gear:
Aeroric Research and Production Enterprise: DINGO
2 Sibirskaya St, 86
603089
Nizhny Novgorod
Telephone: 8 (8312) 44 1965
Jane's All the World's Aircraft 1995-96 says:
"Basically conventional low-wing twin-boom pusher engined configuration: unique air cushion landing systems, permitting operation from any kind of ground surface, water, snow and ice; able to overcome hummocks and tussocks up to 30 cm (1ft) high, edges or projections up to 50cm (1ft 8in) high, ditches up to 1.0m (3ft 3in) wide and slopes of up to 7 degrees
This principle is in use worldwide on hoovercraft like the U.S. Navy Landing Craft Air Cushion (LCAC) pictured below offloading a U.S. Army FMTV 5-ton truck (this is its cargo carrying capacity---truck actually weighs 22,000 pounds--the same as a M113A3 AFV) towing a M198 155mm howitzer. So why do we need an entire seperate service bureaucracy for a marine corps that should be part of the U.S. Army?
What is not commonly known is that the LCAC can travel a good distance inland on its air cushion, even clearing obstacles up to 8 feet high.
The beauty of the Air Cushion Landing System (ACLS) on an aircraft is that it would no longer have to worry about the ground soil being flat and able to accept the weight of the vehicle. The wheels being down on in even the air cushion should momentarily lose lift and so it can bounce back on cushion, and long-term parking of course. For the first Iran Rescue mission, a light UV-18 Twin Otter aircraft had to be flown into "Desert One" so the soil there could be tested for its ability to accept the 167,000 pound weight of C-130 Hercules aircraft that would fly in and refuel the helicopters that would fly the assault force and rescued hostages from the Teheran soccer field.
With an Air Cushion Landing System fitted to Lockheed-Martin MC-130J Combat Talon IIIs
( "J" model Propfans with Combat Talon II infiltration electronics, Combat Talon I FULTON STAR II systems and improved seating configuration to fit the same number of Paratroopers as airlanded Soldiers=92, not 64), the rescue force could be parachuted in quickly to include mobility devices like HPVs and AFVs like the M113A3 so it can rapidly converge on the enemy from an unexpected direction and if necessary fight its way out to the Extraction Zone using vehicle level firepower to avoid being trapped like SEAL TEAM 6 was in Grenada at the Governor's house or the Rangers and Delta operators in Mogadishu. Or, the rescue force could parachute and link up with buses/trucks as the latter was the infiltration means for the first Iran Rescue. No loitering in the zone with helicopters or tilt-rotors. No parachute jump injuries via parachute ankle braces, elbow/knee padding, and better descent rate T-21 static-line or MC-4/5 Ram-Air parachutes that can be flown into the wind and flared for a standing up landing.
At the EZ, USAF Combat Controllers would have readied a suitably flat but not necessarily firm area at least 3,000 feet long and 100 feet wide for the Combat Talon IIIs to land and be there waiting to pick up the AIRBORNE rescue force. A deployed drogue parachute and/or braking rockets could cut down the landing roll further. The C-130 Hercules STOL test bed was supposed to have been able to land in under 600 feet. These devices should come standard on Combat Talon IIIs. The entire force arrives by AFV, HPVs and/or armored HMMWVs and rolls up into the rear ramp of the Combat Talon IIIs for take-off and exfiltration back to safe areas.
With space-based intelligence means, it is possible to plan with great precision AIRBORNE operations to include extraction by air cushion equipped Combat Talon IIIs to such a degree that the difficulty of conducting an AIRBORNE versus an AIR ASSAULT become equivalent. The formation of helicopters needs an open area just about as large as could accept a Combat Talon III, though the latter has benefits of faster ingress/egress, ability to deliver/recover greater combat power coupled with minimal loss of surprise.
"Space Command and the NRO (National Reconnaissance Office) have made significant strides in blending the control of black (classified) and white (unclassified) systems; and more importantly splitting and routing the right information to the right users,""Although the hardware in space, at ground stations and in the hands of warfighters driving planes, tanks and ships has improved; the most significant gains have been made in getting the right information to the right people at the right time."
"The key to winning a conflict now and in the future, is moving information to people who can do something with it,"
--GEN Howell Estes, Commander of Air Force Space Command."Although space is critical to winning any battle today, many times that fact is forgotten"
--MG Gerald Perryman, Commander 14th Air Force.
COMBAT TALONS IN THE WATER? YES!
DETAILS: Seaplane Transports
Floats
Another plus is the Combat Talon III if its engines are inverted to avoid sea spray it could land on water to launch/recover U.S. Army Special Forces and Navy SEALs in small boats inserting from over-the-horizon. Not only can the Combat Talon III skim the water and deliver the boat teams closer to the shore before the earth curves and enemy radar can detect them, it can land and recover SEALs if after a parachute "rubber duck" things go wrong as they did during Operation Urgent Fury off the shore in Grenada. An Air Cushion Combat Talon III would have less drag then a pontoon equipped C-130, thus being able to fly faster and farther.
If water pontoons are used the engines don't have to be inverted to stop sea spray but flight performance would be degarded...but still worth doing! The Stroukoff Pantobase ski system would work without flight performance loss but would probably need the engines inverted since the Combat Talon III would sit lower in the water.
Imagine if a MC-130J Combat Talon III with ACLS, water floats or Pantobase skis landed and off-loaded a SF team in an ocean-swim capable M113A3 Amphigavin! None of the pitfalls of playing around with air-inflated rubber boats and fickle gas-powered outboard motors that beset the Grenada invasion in 1983!
Details of the M113A3 Amphigavin:
M113A3 Amphigavin: triple threat by air, land or sea!
If, for some reason the Combat Talon IIIs cannot land even if their adverse weather optics cannot see through dust/fog/darkness they would have improved Fulton Surface-to-Air (STAR) II recovery systems that could be dropped to a TEAM below. The author contacted its legendary inventor, Mr. Robert Fulton and he reported that his system able to recover up to 6 men at a time by balloon "snatch" by the Combat Talon-type aircraft and then reel in, is "ready to go". During the Cold War, successful missions were run by use of the Fulton STAR to recover agents in inhospitable areas where "helicopters couldn't land". The inability for helicopters to land takes place far more often than the public realizes as the recent food drops to Afghan earthquake survivors prove.
HELICOPTERS ARE STILL IMPORTANT!
Combat Talons and C-17 Globemaster IIIs can and should deliver primarily Army attack/transport helicopters to the fight whenever they cannot self-deploy. Little Birds or OH-58D Kiowa Warriors a pair at a time from C-130 type aircraft or in droves in the C-17 are possible ways to get "hip-pocket" close air support for missions. The leading outfit would be the Army's elite 160th Special Operations Aviation Regiment "Night Stalkers". U.S. Army Air Defense Artillery Avenger HMMWVs can be fitted with 2.75" Hydra-70 rockets like SOF attack helicopters to act as a "ground spectre" for the Airborne/SOF force to do its mission, overcoming any ground resistance even in buildings. The plentiful M113A3 Gavin family of vehicles offer armored tracked vehicle fire support and shock action mobility. Then of course, there is the AC-130 "Spectre" itself, but in a close fight a ground fire support platform is the way to win.
We need the maximum amount of options to win, not just rely on tired formulas that are predictable.
CONCLUSION: BUILD THE COMBAT TALON III NOW!
Its clear the V-22 in AFSOC guise as the CV-22 is an "albatross" putting the entire future of Air Force Special Operations at risk. The proven C-130J should be upgraded into an Extremely Short Take-Off and Landing (ESTOL) platform for a Combat Talon III and possibly an AC-130V Spectre III. Another option would be an AC-17 gunship.
Armed escort should could from a small force of AFSOC owned and operated OA-10B Nimrod IIs.
A penetration compound helicopter with Piasecki Vectored Thrust Ducted Propeller (VTDP) "Ring-Tails" should be purchased to be a MH-type "Pave Low V" using a CH-53X, S-92 or EH101 as the baseline helicopter to do CSAR and extraction missions in concert with Combat Talon IIIs.
The above aircraft fleet will provide a bright future for AFSOC for many years to come.
In contrast, trying to make a single inferior V-22 aircraft type do the job of two optimized aircraft is a recipe for another set of Desert One-type fireballs in the desert from post-crash fire explosions.
UPDATE 2003: Air bases and fixed runways: invitation to disaster
So far we have made a compelling case for AFSOC to develop an ESTOL capable MC-130J Combat Talon III with special land anywhere gear. However, the entire USAF transport force is addicted to airlanding on smooth runways and air bases for their their air-filled rubber tires to roll. This means the Army Airborne will have to parachute in, fight and die seizing an airfield to subsidize their laziness. Deja Maleme airfield on Crete in 1941 over again! An Army Aviator writes:
USAF is not willing to go into Indian country with these precious commodities either. Strat air is always a critical asset and they are reluctant to use it for "high adventure." They are getting better though. They are now talking about landing C-17 at unimproved fields, although they won't define what this means (no O'Club). In fairness it is not all USAF. TRANSCOM really owns the aircraft and they are worse than the USAF."
"To be honest the biggest concern I have is that the enemy will realize what the OPFOR team has been doing for the last year to the air landing efforts. 'Cause the NTC OPFOR guys realize that the most likely place to score success against the U.S. is at the single weak point (airfield). A single bread truck with a 23mm x 2 triple A hidden in the back, in urban shanty town on the approach end of the runway, smeared a C-130 across the poor folks town. Got a triple benny: killed Americans, shot down Americans, burned the poor people out of their homes at the Americans expense. Next day they shot a BM-21 MRL in the hills at the fuel farm. They never fight us for the airfield directly, but they made it tough to use it. Bottom-line is that the bad guys can make it real hard to get onto the runway
If AFSOC can develop ESTOL capabilities, then these devices could be fitted to the rest of the USAF's C-130s and C-17s to enable them to land on places OTHER THAN PREDICTABLE RUNWAYS. This would enable Army Airborne planners to select many potential, unpredictable locations to seize an assault landing zone, avoiding enemy air and ground defenses. Then---if commanders want they can take an airfield by ground assault using the assembled Airborne Air-Mechanized forces. Legendary war historian and combat veteran Ralph Zumbro writes:
Back in 1944, the Japanese in New Guinea were
building a remote airstrip and as soon as it was
aircraft capable, the engineers, who had NO infantry
security saw several dozen transport aircraft coming
in and put out the welcome mat. The aircraft were
DC-3s full of American infantry.
We can simply be creative, use any level piece of
land to bring in an AirMech TF to seize the larger
airfield with a quick overland march. Where is the
problem."
"A couple of years ago, at the NTC, I had a short
conversation with Donn Starry, on the subject of
Air-Mech. The general said. 'Offset your airhead, it's
vulnerable.' SO, we have C-130s that can put upgraded
M-113 combat systems on country roads...Airhead offset
done, no problem.
Clearly, the time has come for the USAF to start landing and operating from paved runways and comfy air bases.
Will they accept this challenge, or will a lot of brave Americans have to die to force them?
UPDATE 2004: NON-LINEAR MANEUVER BRIGADE PROPOSAL
www.geocities.com/airbornemuseum/nlmb.htm
1st TSG (A) proposal to USSOCOM to get special air/ground maneuver capabilities to prevail on 4GW non-linear battlefields.
MC-130 Combat Talon III GyroCopter for V/TOL SeaBasing & Air-Mech-Strike
LINKS
Groen Brothers Aviation
www.groenbros.com/tech/crnt_tech.htm
Giant Heavy-Lifting Gyroplanes: June 2004 Cover Story...
www.popularmechanics.com/science/ aviation/2004/6/giant_gyros/print.phtml
DoD's SeaBasing and the 1st TSG's NLMB concepts need a 10-20 ton cargo transport that can operate from ships and deliver troops to operate ground combat vehicles to the cargo ships that carry them. One way to fully develop the C-130 would be to give it good-enough V/TOL capabilities without the mechanical headaches of being a powered helicopter using the gyrocopter technologies proven by the Fairey RotoDyne. V/TOL would simplify landing in water alongside cargo ships to watertighting the fuselage and having wing pontoons for stability perhaps with Pantobase skis. SpecOps, C/SAR and ASW missions also become new possibilities for a C-130 Gyrodyne seaplane.
EXCLUSIVE!
1st TSG (A) scale model C-130GD pictures!
Scott Miller writes:
I'd like to expand on that a little on the C-130 Gyrodyne (GD) concept to demonstrate just how good this system would be to have. The C-130 gyrodyne would use all the fundamental systems of the existing C-130 but would also possess a large rotor above the wing to provide for V/TOL as well as limited hovering capability. The tail would also be modified to accomodate for the large rotor. In terms of fuselage dimensions, the C-130 offers greater internal capacity in a package similar in overall length to the current CH-53E but with a much larger rotor and wingspan.
The C-130J flies at 400 mph...critics of the C-130GD might say adding rotors for V/TOL would cut that speed in half.
Says who?
There is nothing stopping us from REMOVING THE ROTORS from the C-130GD with the only drag penalty being the rotor mast and extra tails and flying the C-130 as a regular fixed-wing airplane when crossing great distances like oceans at a 350+ mph speeds and 2,000 mile ranges. The rotors themselves can be stowed on top of the fuselage during fixed-wing flight. Add in-flight refueling capability and your range is indefinite. Once the C-130GD (- rotors) lands, it can then be refitted with its rotors for V/TOL tactical operations to be a C-130GD+ again.
Should we decide to fully develop this aircraft, we will be able to define a true Air Assault Company and Airborne Artillery Battery that will reside in each battalion of up to four BCTs or Airborne/Air Assault Groups depending on your force structure preference.
The Air Assault Company would feature 14 x C-130GDs in total. Three aircraft will each carry one platoon of leg infantry trained in both airborne and air assault roles. These will be conventionally armed infantrymen with the C-130GD serving as primary transport and support system. The heavy weapons platoon will consist of 6 x C-130GDs with four carrying IFVLs with 25mm autocannon turrets and/or Buford AGS light tanks with 105-120mm main guns and two carrying M113 Gavin MTVL armed with 106mm RR and infantry dismount squads. Two C-130GD will carry XM1108 Tracked Support Vehicles (TSVs) to meet tactical resupply needs. One C-130GD carries the HQ element while two additional GD provide logistics support. The Airborne Artillery Battalion replaces a conventional FA battalion with 18 AC-130GDs formed in 6-ship batteries. With this structure, each BCT/AAAG would require 74 x C-130GDs. With a proposed fleet of 400 of these versatile aircraft, an additional 104 aircraft will be available to support training, Special Operations, and logistics missions for the remainder of the Army.
The use of gyrodynes makes these units both strategically and tactically mobile. No airfields or runways are required - these units can pick-up and go anywhere at any time. A limited hovering capability gives the unit a traditional air assault capability in addition to being able to parachute in. These units also form a complete combined arms team, featuring a large quantity of conventional infantry, high-powered direct-fire systems, and airborne indirect fire systems. This unit can be fought in a variety of manners.
In a conventional force on force conflict, this unit can be used in two roles. First it would serve as the lead element of deployment. When the conflict originates, these units can be deployed very rapidly in advance of the larger force that will ultimately be deployed. With Air Force expeditionary units clearing the skies, these elements can operate effectively against most types of potential enemies due to its very high level of tactical speed and mobility. As the main force enters the theater, these units can transition to heading off enemy incursions, encircling the enemy with its V/TOL mobility, or providing security for the larger force including conducting search and rescue operations.
This force is also quite capable in a forced-entry role in that it can insert either through parachute drop or a combination of air assault and LVAD to rapidly get a light tracked armored force on the ground with effective weaponry and fire support. Against more capable adversaries, this approach can be used to seize airheads or seaports for insertion of follow-on forces. Against lesser opponents, this unit along with it's respective ABN-AASLTG or BCT would likely be sufficient for completion of the operation.
In Low-Intensity Conflicts, these airborne units can truely take advantage of the capabilities of the gyrodynes. In particular, the capabilities of the GDs allow for keeping some elements of the unit in a constant loitering position while the armored vehicles remain prepared to fly out when needed. In the proposed configuration of four battalions per BCT/ABN-AASLTG with one AAC per battalion and three 6-gunship Airborne Artillery Batteries, two platoons of infantry and two gunships can remain in constant loiter just about indefinitely as elements would rotate every four hours with the remaining 20 hours of the day as downtime. The armored elements would remain on stand-by. With this approach, units can physically engage the enemy in under an hour, anywhere within 200 miles of their base of operations with full combined arms force. The remaining units of the BCT/ABN-AASLTG can engage in traditional operations such as patrolling and security freeing the AACs and AABs to engage targets of opportunity and to respond to any actionable intelligence.
In peacekeeping and humanitarian operations, the AAC/AAB serves as a heavy security element protecting the remainder of the BCT/ABN-AASLTG that is free to use its substantial manpower resources to carry out the primary mission on the ground. The available C-130GDs can deliver large quantities of aid over very long range using its V/TOL capabilities to avoid the need for an available airport. The aircraft can also pick up materials from ships at sea and deliver the supplies hundreds of miles without refueling.
Currently, there are over 1000 x C-130s in service or storage that are available to support this effort. In addition, there are 1000s of M113 Gavins available for outfitting the ground elements. These assets and units should be used as an interim capability until better alternatives become available in the future. Obviously, a C-130GD is not an ideal long-term solution to meeting these needs as it is quite large and very heavy, in addition to being expensive, for serving in this role. The GD models should be built as remanufactured C-130s (all aircraft rebuilt to a common format) while the MTVL and TSV variants are constructed from existing M113 Gavins. This allows for the units to become reality at the lowest possible costs and in the fastest timeframe. With the amount of money we spend on defense every year, there is no reason whatsoever that we couldn't have this project completed in under two years. If the powers that be view this as violating the KWA, fine - turn these into joint units with the Air Force manning the aircraft. This unit isn't going to beat China in a conventional conflict but if we are serious about taking out the Bin Ladens and Zarqawis of the world, this is the level of capability that is going to be required to get the job done.
HURLBURT FIELD, Fla. (AFNS) -- An Air Force Special Operations Command
A MC-130H Combat Talon II crew will receive the Mackay Trophy for rescuing 56 people from destruction and civil war in the Republic of the Congo last year.
The crew, assigned to the 352nd Special Operations Group at Royal Air Force Base Mildenhall, England, also delivered 12 Army and Navy special forces personnel to survey and assess the situation in the capital city of Brazzaville after fighting broke out between rival political factions.
The National Aeronautic Association presents the Mackay Trophy annually to the Air Force member, crew or organization that made the most meritorious flight of the year. This is the sixth time that a special operations crew has earned the Mackay Trophy, established by Clarence H. Mackay, a former industrialist, philanthropist and aviation enthusiast.
The Talon II crew's June 1997 mission took more than 21 hours and three in-flight refuelings to retrieve the 30 Americans, 26 foreign nationals and a dog, held by an adolescent boy. The violence eventually destroyed both Brazzaville and the infrastructure of the Congo, said Pentagon officials.
Crew members included Lt. Col. Frank J. Kisner, mission commander; Maj. (Dr.) Robert S. Michaelson, flight surgeon; Capt. John C. Baker, pilot; Capt. Reed Foster, aircraft commander; Capt. Mark J. Ramsey, electronic warfare officer; Capt. Robert P. Toth, navigator; Master Sgt. Gordon H. Scott and Tech. Sgt. Tom L. Baker, loadmasters; Staff Sgt. John H. Hensdill, direct support operator; and Staff Sgt. Jeffrey A. Hoyt, flight engineer. Since the mission, Ramsey has been reassigned to AFSOC headquarters at Hurlburt Field and Hensdill is now at Davis-Monthan Air Force Base, Ariz.
Also aboard the MC-130, but not part of the Talon II crew, were: Capt. Bill Collins, and Senior Airmen Eric Nielsen and Dave Risnear, special tactics team; Capt. Ben Jones, logistics planner; Staff Sgt. John McAlister, dedicated crew chief; Senior Airman Bryan Zdancewicz, turbo-prop specialist; and Airmen 1st Class Ernest Burghardt and Mark Evans, security forces. These individuals contributed much to the mission's success, said Kisner during a telephone interview from Mildenhall.
"Without the professionalism of all involved, this mission would not have succeeded. This was truly a team effort," Kisner said.
"If there's a down side to getting this award, it's the fact that the (nonaircrew members) were left out," said Scott, who is also still at Mildenhall. "The STS guys did as much as we did. They also helped the European survey and assessment team get set up and then made sure we were cleared to depart Brazzaville."
The security forces airmen also did an outstanding job, said Kisner. "They were recalled in the middle of the night and deployed with us to Germany, Brazzaville and Libreville, Gabon. The mission was their introduction to AFSOC and their first ride on an Air Force aircraft."
Kisner said besides their normal duties, the airmen helped man the ADHOC command post at Libreville.
Ramsey, the electronic warfare officer on the mission, also had high praise for the 100th Air Refueling Wing at Mildenhall. "Getting refueled was a long, slow process and those guys stayed with us all the way," he said. Ramsey explained that because the MC-130 was carrying 116 percent of its gross maximum weight, each refueling took more than two hours of precise formation flying.
The mission began June 9 when two MC-130H aircraft from the 7th Special Operations Squadron flew from Mildenhall to Stuttgart Army Airfield in Germany.
As the situation in Brazzaville deteriorated, Special Operations Command Europe prepared to send additional forces to augment the small marine security detachment already at the American Embassy. By June 10, the plan changed. Only one MC-130H would travel to Brazzaville.
The aircraft departed with 30 people, two heavy, high-mobility multiwheel vehicles, fuel and other equipment. The extra weight and slow speed of the Talon II meant refueling had to be done at a descending angle so the MC-130 could keep pace with the KC-135 tankers, said Toth. As navigator, it was Toth's job to calculate how much fuel was needed as well as map out the route.
By the time the MC-130 reached the airport at Brazzaville, the crew had about 20 minutes to off-load the vehicles, ESAT team and their equipment, board the evacuees and depart the area. Hostile gunfire near the control tower delayed the first attempt to land. As time passed, officials in Germany left it up to the crew to decide if they wanted to risk another try. "There was no question in anyone's mind," said Foster, the aircraft commander who performed the actual landing. "There were people down there, some of them Americans, who needed our help. It took maybe a second to make up our minds."
As the MC-130 came around the mountains north of the airfield, French ground forces in charge of securing the control tower diverted the aircraft toward a concrete building at the opposite end of the airfield. As it turned out, the evacuees were laying face down in the building for safety.
One of the female evacuees later told Ramsey, "When I saw you coming around the mountain, I just knew you had to be Americans. It was just everything I could do not to jump up and cheer, 'We're saved!'"
"It really meant a lot to the Americans to be rescued by Americans," said Ramsey.
The MC-130 was only on the ground about 23 minutes. While the ESAT team off-loaded, every available person helped to reconfigure the aircraft to take on passengers. The crew had been told to expect 40 people.
Meanwhile, the French forces formed a human wall around the evacuees and walked them to the Talon II. Toth, who was in the rear helping evacuees get on the aircraft, noticed that about 16 other evacuees were headed back to the building. "I asked where they were going and the guy in charge said, 'You can only take 40 people, there's 40 on the airplane,' Toth recalled.
Toth remembers saying, "'No. We're taking everyone. We're not leaving anyone behind.' No one argued."
The crew laid bulletproof mats on the floor for the second group of passengers and made sure they had something to hold on to. "Then we got out as soon as we were cleared," said Toth. Though they had already flown about 15 hours, the crew departed on the two-hour flight to Libreville where State Department officials took charge of the passengers. The Talon II crew spent the next eight days on alert at Libreville. "The hardest part of the mission was waiting," said Foster. The crew set up a 24-hour command post in case they had to go back to Brazzaville to evacuate the ambassador and the rest of his staff. They were also standing by to re-supply the ESAT team with food and water, if needed.
When the aircraft, whose call sign was Whiskey 05, returned to Brazzaville June 18 to pick up the ESAT team, most of the fighting had been confined to the city. The ambassador and his staff had left by other means, but there was an extra passenger, a woman."She had been working in the jungle when we picked up the first group," said Toth. "Everyone knew she was missing, but no one knew where to look."
Toth said the woman made her way back to the embassy and stayed with the ESAT team.
For one woman, said Foster, the mission changed the way she viewed the U.S. military. The woman told Foster she and some of her friends had never liked the military.
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