Airborne division from the 1950 TO&E through to the 1986 TO&E, so I will just highlight some of the more significant changes: (68)

The figures clearly indicate a trend downward in the numbers of personnel and systems assigned to the Airborne division. However, an argument in favor of the 1986 TO&E is that the systems have significantly more lethality and range and, therefore, the trend is toward a smaller, more lethal force. This argument would be more plausible if the non-Airborne forces of the Army also trended downward in the numbers of personnel and systems. However, the mechanization and modernization of the standard Infantry Division has resulted in significant increases, not only in the lethality and range of the weapons systems assigned, but also in the quantity and the mobility of the systems. This mechanization and modernization of the Infantry units have also occurred in most of the developed countries of the world and in many of the Third World countries

The modernization of the U.S. Airborne forces has suffered for many reasons, but the fact is, that the funding has not been made available for the development and fielding (especially in such small quantities) of Airborne fighting systems. This has required the

[Editor: Kazmierski is wrong here: the Avenger HMMWV system and the 5 ton truck old (M925) and new (FMTV) ARE air-droppable]

Despite the second-class status of the Airborne forces when it comes to research and development funding, they have demonstrated an excellent ability to adapt to the limitations imposed on them and when called upon in the 1980s have responded very successfully.

The use of the Airborne forces in Grenada, Operation Urgent Fury on 25 October 1983, is another example of the need for a viable strategic force. Preceded by a 700-man U.S. Army Ranger airdrop, the assault echelon of the 82nd Airborne Division (two Battalions) airlanded with a total of 19 C-141 AirLifter aircraft (one at a time), into Point Salines Airfield. In conjunction with a U.S. marine amphibious task force, which was departing the U.S. for Lebanon and just happened to be available, the 82nd Airborne Division (two battalions) airlanded with a total of 19 C-141 AirLifter aircraft (one at a time), into Point Salines Airfield. The 82nd Airborne Division rescued 662 U.S. citizens and 82 foreign nationals. Additionally, the threat of a Cuban/Soviet takeover of Grenada was neutralized and a democratic government was restored. (71) Two key lessons to be learned from the operation are: First, had the 22nd marine amphibious unit not been available, the urgency of the situation would have required the Airborne forces to accomplish the mission alone, before a marine force could have been assembled and shipped to the area. And second, had the initial airdrop force at Point Salines been met with properly sited and effectively manned ZU-23s (23mm anti-aircraft fire), then the loss of aircraft (possibly full of Paratroopers) would have been devastating to the operation. (72)

[Editor: Kazmierski overlooks the Combat Talon Commander who knew to fly under the guns and the AC-130s that pulverized them: in either event the drop would have went unhindered--you don't need to paint a picture of disaster to effectively make a point for improving the Airborne's mobility so it can use indirect vertical assault capabilities]

In the future, airdropping on a large airfield without having to deal with deadly anti-aircraft fire is unlikely, even in tiny countries like Grenada.

Operation Just Cause, the contingency operation in Panama, also provides another example of the requirement for a viable strategic force. With 13,000 troops permanently stationed or predeployed in Panama, with Airborne requirement for forced-entry may not have been critical to the overall success of the operation. However, the shock provided by the 5,000 conventional and Special Forces Paratroopers assaulting multiple objectives in conjunction with the ground forces, provided the overwhelming combat power necessary to secure the major military objectives and put down most organized resistance in less than a day. (73) There are two key points to be learned from this operation. First, the firepower and mobility of the mechanized forces [THATS M113 FORCES, KAZMIERSKI] contributed significantly to the overall success of the operation. A mechanized infantry battalion, a light armored vehicle company of marines and a company of M-551A1 Sheridan armored reconnaissance vehicles greatly assisted in delivering the impact of overwhelming U.S. combat power. The sight and sound of a tracked vehicle is unmistakable to a Light Infantry Soldier, armed only with a rifle, and can provide the impact needed to encourage the surrender of these lightly armed enemy troops, avoiding the need for costly fighting. Additionally, the mechanized vehicles provided the direct fire accuracy and surgical destruction needed in peacekeeping operations. Such was the case when the M-551A1 Sheridans were used on the Commandancia early in the operation. Finally, the use of mechanized vehicles in MOUT (military operations on urban terrain) provides the firepower, mobility and survivability needed to support the difficult house-to-house fighting associated with these operation. It is for this reason that the bulk of the mechanized forces committed in this operation were used in support of the clearing of Panama City. (74) The second key lesson to be taken from this operation is that the potential for complete surprise Airborne assaults is extremely limited. By 2200 hours, three hours before the 0100 hours airdrop, U.S. intelligence intercepted Panamanian Defense Force (PDF) radio transmissions that were saying such things as;

"They're coming. The ball game is at one o'clock in the morning. Report to your units immediately and draw your weapons and prepare to fight."

and

"Draw your weapons and get out on the airfield and start shooting at them when they come over. And block the runway." (75)

The success of the operation would have been in doubt if the PDF was shooting at the U.S. transport aircraft with air defense missiles and radar guided guns instead of rifles and machine guns.

[Editor: Author ignores the fact that there were ADA guns that were cleared by U.S. Army Apache attack helicopters prior to the Airborne assaults. If the threats was larger it would have been USAF TacAir clearing out the enemy. There is a big differance between having a few hours of warning before an Airborne assault and days, weeks and months (It took us 57 days to launch Inchon in 1950) as a seaborne assault would give the enemy time to re-deploy, fortify and ambush seaborne attacks.

The U.S. and the Soviet Union have taken strikingly different paths in their development of Airborne doctrine, organization and equipment. This is strange when one considers the parallel evolution of almost every other U.S. and Soviet military system, from the massive array of nuclear weapons and delivery systems, armored vehicles, and helicopters to the more recent exploration of space and the space shuttles. The reason for the differences in the Airborne evolution seems to start with the deviation in the perceived usefulness of the Airborne forces. From the days of Marshal Tukhachevsky, the Soviets have always considered their Airborne forces a critical component of the third dimension of offensive maneuver. As such, they have integrated concepts for combined arms operations and modernized all components of the force to include the Airborne. Unlike the Soviets, the U.S. has never [yet] embraced the Airborne concept. Caught off guard by the Germans'

use of Airborne forces in World War II, the U.S. trained their Soldiers to jump out of airplanes but could never train the Generals to visualize the true potential of the Airborne. Therefore, the U.S.' use of Airborne forces has been mentally restricted to the tactical level, in a supporting role to the main attack. Even the recent strategic use of Airborne forces by the U.S., in Grenada and Panama, has really been in a supporting role to the main effort in Central Europe.

[Editor:??? The author is really stretching it here to call Grenada and Panama supporting operations to the main effort in unit. Winning the Cold War was a global engagement of U.S. Grand Strategy--a level of war not included in Maj Kazmierski's definition...The Airborne in the last decade has been used as an instrument to GRAND STRATEGY not a supporting role to a heavy mechanized effort. Or was this mental subordination just to avoid the reality that the Airborne is finally being used as a strategic asset? What then of Desert Shield and Haiti a few years later? Maj Kazmierski's case is strong enough without listing a lack of strategic appreciation as proof, we just need to fully enable this strategic force...The strategic value of the U.S. Airborne IS being realized, now its time to fully equip it with M113A3s and M8 AGS light AFVs, ATBs, ATACS to give it the secondary mobility Maj Kazmierski speaks of]

As long as the Airborne forces are not considered a part of the main effort, there will not be enough resources left to modernize them.

[Editor: Defeatist whining here. The point is that Airborne forces as part of the main effort needs the tools to have secondary mobility as the current "seize and hold" mentality is handicapped by our own creation. The M113A3 re-assignment would cost nothing. Building 50 M8 AGS light tanks at $5 million each for the 2d ACR would cost less than 3 F/A-18E/F Super Hornet jets (useless in a city fight) that do not fly right and would crash eventually anyway.]

A modernized Airborne force could provide the U.S. military with the flexibility it needs to be successful in future combat operations. As Secretary of Defense, Richard B. Cheney has said,

"The European-oriented, modernized Army force is unsuitable for the flexibility demands of the 21st-century missions. . . By the year 2000, the nation will need a . . . highly flexible force that can be more creatively employed . . . anywhere in the world." (76)

A careful consideration and assessment of the Soviets' extensive study, experimentation and testing of Airborne concepts, doctrine and equipment over the past 60 years, would clearly contribute to our own search for a strategically mobile and flexible 21st Century force.

1. COL David M. Glantz, The Soviet Airborne Experience (Fort Leavenworth, KS: Combat Studies Institute, Research Survey No. 4, Nov.1984), P. 135.

2. Jonathan M. House, Toward Combined Arms Warfare: A Survey of 20th-Century Tactics, Doctrine and Organization (Fort Leavenworth, KS: Combat Studies Institute, Research Survey NO. 2[20], Aug. 1984) P. 142.

3. Harrier F. and William F. Scott, The Soviet Art of War: Doctrine, Strategy and Tactics (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1982), P. 201.

4. Glantz, p. 136.

5. Dr. Graham H. Turbiville Jr., "Soviet Airborne Operations in Theater War," Forei@M Policy, Vol XIII, 1986, P. 163.

6. Glantz, P. 130. 7. COL David M. Glantz, Soviet Force Structure in an Era of Reform (Fort Leavenworth, KS: Soviet Army Studies Office, U.S. Army Combined Arms Center, March 1989), P. 3.

8 Turbiville, p. 165.

9. United States Army Command and General Staff College (CGSC) Student Text 100-2[20], U.S. Air Force Basic Data (Fort Leavenworth, KS: CGSC, May 1989), pp. D-8 and D-9.

10. Dr. Graham H. Turbiville and MAJ James F. Holcomb, "Soviet Desant Forces," International Defense Review, Vol 21, Sep.-Oct. 1988, P. 3.

11. Scott, P. 201.

12. Turbiville and Holcomb, P. 3.

13 Ibid.

14 Turbiville, pp. 166-167.

15. Glantz, The Soviet Airborne Experience, P. 148.

16. Edward N. Luttwak, Historical Analysis and Pro.iection for Army 2000, Volume 1[20], Part 17, Soviet Airborne Forces 1930-1983 (DTIC B085085), March 1983, p. 70.

17. Glantz, Soviet Force Structure in an Era of Reform, p. 6.

18. Glantz, The Soviet Airborne Experience, P. 149.

19. Luttwak, P. 70.

20. Field Manual 100-2-3, The Soviet Army Troops, Org@ Equipment (Washington D.C.: Government Printing Office, Nov. 1988), pp. 5-32/33 and 5-42/44. Also, Turbiville, pp. 168-169.

CHAPTER THREE ENDNOTES

COL David M. Glantz, The Soviet Airborne Experience (Fort Leavenworth, KS: Combat Studies Institute, Research Survey No. 4, Nov.1984), P. 135.

2[20] Jonathan M. House, Toward Combined Arms Warfare: A Survey of 20th-Century Tactics, Doctrine and Organization (Fort Leavenworth, KS: Combat Studies Institute, Research Survey NO. 2[20], Aug. 1984) P. 142.

3 Harrier F. and William F. Scott, The Soviet Art of War: Doctrine, Strategy and Tactics (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1982), P. 201.

4 Glantz, p. 136.

5 Dr. Graham H. Turbiville Jr., "Soviet Airborne Operations in Theater War," Forei@M Policy, Vol XIII, 1986, P. 163.

6 Glantz, P. 130.

7 COL David M. Glantz, Soviet Force Structure in an Era of Reform (Fort Leavenworth, KS: Soviet Army Studies Office, U.S. Army Combined Arms Center, March 1989), P. 3.

8 Turbiville, p. 165.

9 United States Army Command and General Staff College (CGSC) Student Teyt 100-2[20], U.S. Air Force Basic Data (Fort Leavenworth, KS: CGSC, May 1989), pp. D-8 and D-9.

10 Dr. Graham H. Turbiville and MAJ James F. Holcomb, "Soviet Desant Forces," International Defense Review, Vol 21, Sep.-Oct. 1988, P. 3.

11 Scott, P. 201.

12 Turbiville and Holcomb, P. 3.

13 Ibid.

14 Turbiville, pp. 166-167.

15 Glantz, The Soviet Airborne Experience, P. 148.

16 Edward N. Luttwak, Historical Analysis and Pro.iection for Army

2000, Volume 1[20], Part 17, Soviet Airborne Forces 1930-1983 (DTIC B085085), March 1983, p. 70.

17 Glantz, Soviet Force Structure in an Era of Reform, p. 6.

18 Glantz, The Soviet Airborne Experience, P. 149.

19 Luttwak, P. 70.

20 Field Manual 100-2-3, The Soviet Army Troops, Org and Equipment (Washington D.C.: Government Printing Office, Nov. 1988), pp. 5-32/33 and 5-42/44. Also, Turbiville, pp. 168-169.

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