So far, this chapter has identified many of the threats that the military forces in the future can expect to encounter. The real question for this thesis is, how will these threats impact on the use of Airborne forces in the future and what can be done to modernize the Airborne force to enable it to deal with these threats? The arms race of the Third World coupled with the reduction of forwarded deployed U.S. forces makes the development of a viable strategic force critical to the defense of the U.S. national interests. Potential ways to deal with these future threats will now be addressed.

The requirement for Airborne forces to deal with armored forces and artillery fires is nothing new. The British 1st Airborne Division at Amheim was blocked by a single mechanized battalion and delayed long enough for the mobile German reserves in the area to assemble and crush the Airborne division. As Soviet Colonel A. F. Bulatov said in his article on combating Airborne assault forces,

"Combat experience showed that an assault even by insignificant forces, usually (a relatively small number of) tanks with artillery support, carried out [against an Airborne assault] could lead to the defeat of numerically superior forces." (27)

As was discussed earlier, the Soviet solution to this threat is to provide lethal antitank capability and mobility to every Airborne squad with the BMD. The BMD was also designed to help the Soviet Airborne deal with another conventional threat, artillery. As Colonel Bulatov explains,

"with limited opportunities for hitting Airborne assault forces [before the airdrop] . . . the basic burden of combating them shifted to the drop areas. The early preparations of artillery fire against such areas proved effective." (28)

As the threat of indirect fire on the Airborne forces increases, the need for mobility and armored

protection also increases. It is interesting to note that even some small Third World countries possess significant indirect fire capabilities. For example, Nicaragua currently has over 600 heavy artillery pieces. Possibly the most significant threat to the use of Airborne forces in the future comes from the proliferation of modern air defense weapons. With the increasing employment of these systems, by even the smallest countries, the U.S.' willingness or ability to airdrop anywhere near a concentrated air defense area is unlikely. The Airborne forces will also lose a significant fire support capability in the AC-130 aircraft (Spectre Gunship). Despite its advanced weaponry and electronic equipment, it is still a slow, vulnerable C-130 aircraft, exposed to sophisticated surface-to-air missiles. Unfortunately, the limited number of airfields available in the less developed countries, enables them to consolidate their air defenses around these airfields.

The defense of these airfields is important to them, primarily for the protection of their high performance aircraft and helicopters which are extremely vulnerable while on the ground. Historically, these heavily defended airfields have always provided a serious problem to Airborne forces. During World War II, under threat of invasion from Germany, the airfield defenses in the area of The Hague were significantly strengthened. "As a result, the Nazi Airborne assault forces, dropped by parachute to capture the airfields of Falconburg, Eipenburg and Okenburg were almost completely destroyed." (29)

The U.S. Airborne mission of seizing and securing an airfield is currently their number one training priority. This dependence upon an airfield is based on the requirement for a large operational airfield to bring in, by airland aircraft, much of the Airborne Brigade's equipment and any follow-on reinforcing light infantry units. The helicopters are a critical part

of the airlanded equipment. Since the Airborne (and light infantry) forces heavily depend on helicopters for tactical mobility and firepower, the Airborne will continue to be tied to airfields until modernized. Airdroppable tactical mobility and firepower are needed to wean the Airborne forces from their absolute dependence on airfields. Still, the resupply of an Airborne force in the future will likely require some smaller airfields, as will the evacuation of U.S. nationals or the withdrawal of the Airborne forces upon completion of their mission. While the new C-17 aircraft will be able to airland oversized cargo into small austere airfields in support of the Airborne forces, the importance of this limited strategic asset will likely limit its use to areas where the enemy threat is low. Therefore, the Airborne forces must have the ability to drop away from the air defense threat, that will be protecting the airfields, and have the mobility and firepower to attack and seize the defended airfields from the ground.

[AMEN! We need to AIRDROP EVERYTHING away from airfields--these are then turned into assault zones for landings and take-offs]

This tactical mobility can be used to seize many small airfields or a series of airfields in an effort to avoid the massing of forces or the positioning of forces at any one place too long. Several authors have postulated the need for small mobile forces on future battlefields. William S. Lind, for example, in his article "The Changing Face of War: Into the Fourth Generation," believes that future warfare will require a greater emphasis on maneuver,

"Small, highly maneuverable, agile forces will tend to dominate." (30)

With the future Third World weapons discussed earlier in this Chapter, it will be especially important to move quickly away from the drop zone after the airdrop. Even with air superiority during the airdrop, the increasing numbers of Third World high performance aircraft and attack helicopters are likely to penetrate the protective air cover if the location of the Airborne force is known and fixed. However, the

most serious threat to fixed locations, as in seizing and securing an airhead or port, is the threat from weapons of mass destruction. With ballistic missiles that can reach over 1,500 miles, fly at over 2,000 miles per hour and carry chemical, nuclear or biological weapons, the more dispersed and mobile a force is, the more survivable it will be. Even with the capability to detect the launch of a ballistic missile, there is currently no system available to defend a force from ballistic missiles once launched. The Strategic Defense Initiative is supposed to destroy the faster more powerful intercontinental ballistic missiles in space. The funding for the development of an anti-tactical ballistic missile system in the U.S. is unlikely until the U.S. mainland becomes threatened by these shorter range ballistic missiles. (31)

[Editor: U.S. is developing Theatre High Altitude Air Defense System (THAAD) to meet this threat for forward deployed forces]

And while preemptive strikes on known missile sites can be used to eliminate some of the ballistic missiles that threaten an operation, the long ranges involved make the neutralization of all the sites unlikely. Political constraints may further restrict preemptive actions, especially where missile sites are located in other countries. As discussed earlier in this thesis, the main reason the Soviets developed the BMD for their Airborne forces was to be able to use their Airborne forces' in a nuclear environment. The Soviets knew that

"the large, static formations of Airborne troops would make a tempting target for enemy nuclear forces. To survive, the desant [Airborne forces] would have to remain dispersed and mobile, concentrating only for the assault." (32)

With the need to move quickly, over all kinds of terrain, and to be able to function in the almost certain chemical environment of the 21st Century, the future Airborne forces would seem to need an amphibious, mechanized vehicle with NBC filters and overpressure capabilities.

[Editor's note: THAT VEHICLE IS ALREADY IN SERVICE!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! ITS CALLED THE M113A3 Gavin!!! ALL THE U.S. AIRBORNE COMMANDERS HAVE TO DO IS ASK FOR SOME OF THE LITERALLY THOUSANDS SITTING UNUSED IN U.S. ARMY POSSESSION TO HAVE THEIR OWN "BMD". ]

A less obvious threat to the Airborne, but still one that must be considered in the modernization of the Airborne forces, is the intelligence and electronic warfare (IEW) threat. The advantage of strategic surprise may no longer be possible with an Airborne assault. Even the relatively short U.S. airlift to Panama last December was detected. The Panamanian Defense Force knew the aircraft were coming at least three hours before the airdrop. With the detection capability of satellites, it only takes a few minutes to identify and project a destination for a large formation of aircraft. Although most Third World countries do not have direct access to satellites, neutral or anti-U.S. countries with satellites may offer the information to the

target country. Additionally, the increasing technological advances by the Third World include use of long-range radars and sensors, night visions devices and electronic direction finding equipment. While tactical surprise may be possible, as long as Airborne forces continue to be tied to major airfields, it will only take the alert of all air defenses on or near the airfields to defeat the U.S. Airborne assaults. Unlike in the past, the Airborne forces of the future must be prepared to conduct an operation knowing that the opposing forces know they are coming.

[Editor: Disagree somewhat; even with a few hours warning, enemies will not be able to fortify for days/weeks prior to a ship based movement--this is also Strategic and Operational surprise, too. But his point is well taken that a lot of those afflicted with "light-itis" use the sneaky-pete-angle to mask tactical inadequacies like no light AFVs and shock action. This sneakiness cannot be counted on to overcome a lack of firepower versus an alert enemy--especially if we are doing him a favor by going to the airfields he is defending. What the author prescribes--a light AFV--we do need and we already have--the M113A3 Gavin--if we can break out of the "seize and hold airfield" mentality and light-itis. True AIRBORNE WARFARE defeats enemies with vertical envelopment and ground leverage, not just seizes a "logistics base" which in high-tempo 24-hour warfare is irrelevent anyway. You win with what you can get to the battlefield in the first 72 hours or you don't win at all.]

Finally, another indirect threat to the Airborne forces, but one that should be considered in the modernization of the forces, is the loss of U.S. basing rights overseas. The stability of the U.S. basing presence will no doubt become more precarious. A number of the most vital facilities in Panama, the Azores, Spain, Turkey, Greece and the Philippines are in doubt. "Most of the major host countries face internal opposition to U.S. bases." (33) With the U.S. budgetary problems increasing, the funds available for the aid packages that have been used to encourage U.S. access to major ports and airfields are decreasing. The impact on the future Airborne forces could be significant. With fewer airfields available to U.S. military aircraft around the world comes: the loss of intra-theater airlift (within a theater of operations) which has been used to augment the strategic airlift and provide aerial resupply; fewer secure intermediate staging bases, which have been used to strategically move helicopters into a theater of operations; and less U.S. Air Force aircraft support, which has provided continuous air cover and close air support. The loss of overseas basing means that in modernizing the Airborne forces: there should be more supplies airdropped in with the initial assault and that the Airborne forces on the ground should be capable of transporting these supplies; there

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