On the 27th of April, the 2d MA left Stafford Court House and moved with its corps, taking the road to Warrenton, each man carrying 8 days' rations and 60 cartirdges. Howard's 11th Corps followed. It was a pleasant day but the roads were in terrible condition. A 10-12 mile march brought them to within a mile of Hartwood Church, where they bivouacked. At half past 3 the next morning the regiment was awakened. The 11th Corps took the lead. In spite of the falling rain, the column made 17 miles and bivouacked 2 miles from Kelly's Ford. The following day (the 29th) the Rappahannock was crossed and the 2d MA took the lead on the march towards Germanna Ford, where a Rebel force was in the process of constructing a bridge.

Said Francis Crowninshield, "Gen. Slocum accordingly ordered our Regt. and the 3rd Wisconsin to be deployed as skirmishers and clean out, which we did in fine style without losing a man. A part of the enemy were on our side of the river and the remainder on the opposite side. Those on our side tried to cross over, but were prevented by a sharp fire of musketry. Those on the opposite endeavored to run but we gave them such a terrible volley that after trying once or twice to get off they abandoned the attempt. Only one or two escaped, the rest surrendered."

The river was not broad but it was high and swift. The crossing was made by the 1st and 3rd brigades with no mishap, although Crowninshield reported that "several of our men came very near to being carried away by the rapidity of the stream." It was decided to build a bridge to get the rest of the corps across, and before daylight the remaining of the 12th Corps and the 11th Corps were across the river.

On April 30th, it rained again. Geary's division now took the lead. The 2d MA formed the rear guard of the Corps. A 12 mile march on the plank road towards Fredericksburg brought them close to Chancellorsville between 12 noon & 2 p.m. Along the way, said Charles Morse, "the rebels kept attacking us on our flank with cavalry and artillery, and any less bold an officer than Gen. Slocum would have halted his column and delayed the march; but he kept along steadily." The 5th Corps was already there when the 12th Corps arrived at the Chancellor House, located at the intersection of the plank road and the turnpike running from Frederickburg (8 miles to the east) to Orange Court House. In front of the house, looking southward, were open fields, bordered by the forests of the Wilderness. A clearing beyond was bounded by the woods, through which ran the roads to Ely's Ford and U.S. Ford. Chaplain Quint distinctly remembered the birds chirping gaily around the house. "Violets were smiling in vast abundance. The pine-air was fragrant with spring."

A few rods from the house, the 2nd MA turned off the road to the right, into the woods, turned to the right again, in a line parallel to the road, then right a third time and took up a position at Fairview. Facing westward and southward, the right of Knipe's 1st Brigade rested on the road. The Ruger's 3rd Brigade touched its left (with the 2nd MA on the right), then came the 2d Brigade (Ross). Geary's Division formed on Williams's left. Slocum's line thus extended from the Old School House on the Orange Plank Road and ran southeast to a point east of Hazel Grove. The 11th Corps took up position on Slocum's right, making it the right flank of Hooker's army. Meade formed on the left.

With the successful crossings at U.S. Ford of Reynolds (1st Corps), Couch (2nd), and Sickles (3rd), Hooker had accomplished his first objective. Spirits were high for at last the army was in the hands of a fighting general.

1 May

Chaplain Quint remembered the first day of May as a "beautiful" one. As it was Muster Day, the rolls were called, but before the task could be completed, the orders to fall in were received. So confident was Hooker that he had spent the entire morning consolidating his position, so it was not until afternoon that the 12th (with Williams on the left and Geary the right) and 5th Corps began their advance eastward along the Orange Plank Road towards Fredericksburg. Their progress was slowed by deep underbrush and the arrival of elements of Lee's army which had hurried forward to oppose them.

A 2-hour skirmish commenced. "We were in a splendid position," recalled Morse, "and were driving the enemy when an order came to Gen. Slocum to retire his command to its former position. No one could believe that the order was genuine, but almost immediately, another of Gen. Hooker's staff brought the same order again.

Slocum and Meade were infuriated. No one but a lunatic would issue such an order with victory in his sights. Everything was in their favor--numbers, position and momentum. Still, they had no choice but to obey the order.

Morse continued, "Now, perhaps you don't know it, but it is a fact that to retire an army in the face of an enemy when you are engaged, is one of the most difficult operations in war...It was a delicate job; each brigade would successively bear the brunt of the enemy's attack."

The men of the 2d MA were not alone in the belief that the iniative had been lost and a golden opportunity squandered. Their idea of an aggressive campaign did not include the digging of entrenchments and the construction of abbatis. Once again, the man responsible for running the show had let them down.

As the regiment fell back to the vicinity of the Chancellor House, the pursuing enemy attacked, but were repulsed. During the night, the men of the 2nd MA cut logs for barricades and intrenched. By morning Williams's entire front was well protected by a line of breastworks that extended into the woods for a quarter mile north of the Plank Road.

2 MAY

Skirmishing commenced at daylight, but without much result on either side. But Robert E. Lee had a surprise in store for Hooker. He made the bold decision to split his force in two to send Stonewall Jackson on a flanking movement to the west to attack the right flank and rear of Hooker's line. Meanwhile, Lee would threaten the Federals east and south of Chancellorsville with a much reduced force.

As Jackson and his men marched past Catherine Furnace the movement was interpreted by wishful thinkers as a withdrawl. Not believing it, Williams ordered Knipe to send some scouts out to see what the rebels were up to. What he learned alarmed him enough to warn Slocum, who in turn, warned Hooker. A similar conclusion was reached by Sickles, who requested permission to attack the enemy column, but he did not received an affirmative reply until after noon. Critical time was lost.

Sickles sent Birney and Whipple out in pursuit of the Rebels. Said Morse, who was at Corps headquarters: "The order then came to Gen. Slocum that the enemy were in full retreat, and to advance his whole line to capture all he could of prisoners, wagons, etc. Our right, Gen. Williams' Division, advanced without much trouble, driving the enemy before it."

Slocum was ordered to move down through the woods and strike the plank road as far as possible from the Chancellor house, then sweep both sides of the road back towards the mansion, in the hopes of catching the rebels between two fires. The movement only served to stretch a thin line even thinner.

The going was tough in the dense underbrush. Then, on the right, Knipe became sharply engaged. Just as Williams was bringing up Ross's brigade to help out, he received a hurried message to return at once and reoccupy his old line.

It was about 5 p.m. when Morse heard "a tremendous and unceasing musketry fire" in the direction of the 11th Corps. Jackson had rushed out of the woods and smashed into the division of Carl Schurz. Riding ahead of his division, Williams ran headlong into the disorganized mass of panicked infantrymen. It was a sight to behold: men, guns, wagons, horses, all coming down the road in the greatest confusion. Morse called it a "complete Bull Run rout...Everyone was running for his life."

In his position as Provost Morse attempted to rally the "cowardly Dutchmen" and stem the tide racing to the rear. "I pitched into them sword in hand and with the help of one cavalry orderly, I succeeded in forming a good many of them on the left of the new line, but an unusually heavy volley coming, they broke and ran like sheep. I am happy to say that I cut down two or three of them of them I got isn't quite so good as if they'd staid [sic] in the ranks."

Williams ordered up his two lead brigades at the double-quick and faced them in line of battle directly in the path of the oncoming rebels. Henry Scott recalled having to employ "the free use of my sword" to keep the 13th NJ and 107th NY in their places, but the old reliables--the 2nd MA, 3rd WS & 27th IN--held fast. Williams estimated that in less than 15 minutes the enemy advance had been checked. He was furious when head-line grabbing Dan Sickles took credit for the work the 12th Corps did this day, insisting that the Tammany politician was at least two miles away and did not arrive on the scene until after dark when Berry's Division occupied the woods to the right of the 12th Corps. It was Berry who was afterwards credited with driving Jackson's men back.

Crowninshield gave the wily Jackson credit for inducing them to leave their well-built trenches. "As soon as we left our lines in one direction he stepped into them from the other."

And it was the forlorn 11th Corps that would become the whipping boy of the army's failures at Chancellorsville. "You must know that the whole cause of our misfortune was the surprise & bad behavior of Howard's men," Henry Scott wrote afterwards. Most of his comrades shared this view. No one would ever quite trust the 11th Corps again.

By 8 p.m. a second Union line was established and Williams moved to reoccupy his old entrenchments. Fumbling about in the darkness, Crowninshield reported that several regiments "fired into one another and raised the devil. We got mixed up and so did the enemy." A number of Knipe's men blundered into a rebel force and were captured. As the 2nd MA drew near their old defenses they found that the enemy had taken up residence. Unable to dislodge the interlopers, they withdrew to the north and south line of woods in front of Fairveiw, where they first entered. The rebels followed but were stopped dead in their tracks by Capt. Clermont Best, the 12th Corps Chief of Artillery, who, according to Morse, "on his own responsilibity gathered together all the batteries he could get hold of" had placed them in position on Fairview "and had begun firing at the rate of about 100 guns a minute, into the rebels." This, in Morse's opinion, "saved our army from destruction."

Williams formed a new line south of the Plank Road, along the interior edge of the woods on the western rim of the ravine separating Fairview and Hazel Grove. Ross's brigade took its former position on the left of the line, facing south, and Ruger formed on his right, and on a right angle facing west. Two regiments of Knipe's brigade were on Ruger's right, also facing west, and these connected with Berry's Division (3rd Corps) at the Plank Road. Chaplain Quint described the new line to be "infinitely stronger than the original one, and considerably shorter." The 12th Corps hospital, he continued, "having been enveloped in a tornado of missiles" was moved back across the river, "the last surgeon there being killed at the door of the Chancellor house."

About 10 p.m. Williams received a message from Sickles that Whipple and Birney had reached Hazel Grove, about 400 yards across the ravine before Fairview--a position that was outside of Slocum's established line. Sickles then made an attack to regain the Plank Road to the north, as well as recapture some guns taken earlier in the day. His line of attack brought him directly along Williams's front on the right and Lane's Confederate brigade on the left. As a result, the 3rd Corps men came under fire from both sides. The guns were recovered; the road was not.

Artillery fire was scary enough during the day; at night it was terrifying. Then, just before midnight, an eerie silence fell. Col. Sam Quincy was moved to write about the startling contrast that a mere 10 minutes brought to his ears: "...in the midnight battle there would be 10 minutes of flash & thunder of artillery, crash of musketry, scream of shell, yell & cheer of infantry & explosion of caissons shocking the earth & filling the air with fire--and then an interval of silence in which the ripple of the brook, the voices of the crickets & frogs & all the peaceful sounds of a quiet summer night." There was no rest for the men of the 2nd MA as they solidified their defensive positions with new log breastworks. The men were resupplied. They would literally need every round the next day. Young Francis Crowninshield "never passed such a miserable night" in his life, "knowing full well there would be a terrible battle the next day." A battle in which Slocum's corps would be the apex.

3 MAY

Before dawn J.E.B. Stuart, who had taken command of Jackson's corps after the latter had been accidentally shot by his own men the night before, resumed the attack on the right flank. A.P. Hill's division, consisting of the brigades of Lane, McGowan, and Archer, squared off against Williams and elements of Sickles's Corps at Hazel Grove. One of the worst decisions of the battle was made by Hooker when he ordered Sickles to abandon Hazel Grove.

The Confederate attack was made in three lines. "Gen. Birney's Div. of the 3rd Corps was out in front of Gen. Williams," said Morse. McGowan, on Archer's left, hit the 37th NY. Birney's men, "behaved badly, and after a slight resistence, fell back into our line losing a battery."

Henry Comey noted with some satisfaction that a portion of Sickles's line fled right through those of the 2nd MA. "When the last of that 'fighting Division' had run through our single line (a mere hand full of us as it were) the enemy was only a few rods distant." Comey had plenty of sarcasm to spare for one of his brother regiments, the 13th NJ, who, from the safety of a hollow in the rear of the 2nd MA, "kept pelting away at our backs, like 'good brave soldiers' as they were reported to be."

Having driven over the first Federal works, McGowen ran into Ruger's brigade and the 17th NJ of Mott's brigade. The enemy was met, said Morse, "with such a deadly fire that they were almost annihilated. Their second line was then sent in, but met with the same fate." When Archer, who had attacked Ross's brigade, was driven back to Hazel Grove, it exposed McGowan's right flank to a cross-fore from Ruger, compelling him to also fall back. This, in turn, exposed Lane's right flank. Ruger advanced and pressed the enemy back a quarter of a mile.

Noticing a gap opening between the 2nd MA and the 27th IN, Henry Scott, formerly aide to his cousin, Gen. Gordon and now performing the same duty for Ruger, ordered the left wing of the 107th NY into the breach. Not one of the veteran regiments in Ruger's brigade, Scott thought they did well after "they were well formed & a little accustomed to the fire."

The Stonewall Brigade and that of Garnett were sent forward to oppose Ruger, but a heavy response drove them back, leaving Paxton mortally wounded. Closer to home, Lt. Col. Cogswell of the 2nd MA went down with a serious arm wound.

"For 2 hours our brigade fought like devils," Col. Quincy reported. By 7 a.m. the men of the 2d MA, 27th IN and 3rd WS had beaten back three separate attacks and fired their 60 rounds of cartridges. The 2nd MA was finally in its old entrenchments, but all along the line ammunition was begining to run dangerously low. It had been the longest and fiercest sustained fighting the regiment MA had yet experienced. Scott managed to find a box which he sent out to the line then hurried to inform Ruger of the situation. Not finding him, he went to Williams. "He didn't know where his train was, said he had sent down all that was wanted the night before, & cussed & swore." Scott tried begging ammunition from another Division but came away empty.

On the front lines things were becoming desperate. "Our men now had fired more than 40 rounds of cartridges and were getting exhausted," said Morse. Even before the morning's battle, Slocum's corps had so long a line to occupy that there were few reserves and no second line. "Gen. Slocum sent almost every one of his staff officers to Gen. Hooker, stating his position and begging for support; Hooker's answer was, 'I can't make men or ammunition for Gen. Slocum.'" Morse was incredulous. "Everyone who had common sense saw that we were withstanding the attack of the whole rebel army, still no support came."

The officers of the 2nd took all the remaining ammunition from the dead and wounded and distributed it among the men.

Henry Scott made his way back to the 2nd MA and encountered Adj. John Fox "who told me they had not an average of three rounds left, so I took the 13th [NJ] and sent them in to relieve the 2d. "Our last round of ammunition brought down the colors of the 1st South Carolina," said Quincy, who ordered the regiment to fix bayonets. When the 13th NJ came up, Quincy fell back with his exhausted men.

The abandonment of Hazel's Grove was now causing Williams all kinds of problems on his left flank. On the right, Berry was killed and his division began to gave way. And at about 9 a.m., with his pleas for ammunition unfulfilled, Slocum was finally compelled to retire. Col. Quincy, now horseless and "astonished to find myself alive," led the 2d MA to the rear. The rebels, said Morse"seeing us retreating, rushed forward their artillery and began a fearful fire....I have in different fights been under pretty severe fire, but never before did I see anything so terrible magnificent as the attack on that battery; the air was full of missiles, solid shot, shells, and musket balls. I saw one solid shot kill 3 horses and a man, another took a leg off one of the captains of the batteries..."

When the solid masses of the Rebels got to within 300 yards, the Union battery exploded in a hail of fire, driving them back, then it too, was forced to retire...without losing a gun. By now the rebel artillery had occupied the crest of Fairview, which Hooker had ordered abandoned, to the dismay of Dan Sickles, who had recognized its importance. The guns opened upon the Chancellor House. The Union line was crumbling.

The men of the 2d MA got resupplied and lay down to catch their collective breaths. All this time, said Quincy, "the battle thunder rose & fell & the column of yellow smoke rose above the trees & floated up in the clear sunshine while we lay by the roadside & made coffee."

Later that night the 12th Corps was alternately ordered to support the 3rd Corps, the 2nd Corps, then the 11th. "Now noticed this piece of generalship," Morse sneered. "The 11th Corps on Saturday night had run from their trenches almost without firing a gun; yet on Sunday this same dastardly crowd of Dutchmen were put in the most important position on the whole line, the extreme left, and expected to hold it." So when the order came to move to the support this corps, "I believe that Gen. Slocum positively refused to obey this order; he remonstrated with Gen. Hooker so firmly that he finally got permission to put the 12th Corps on the extreme left and to have only one division of the 11th in the trenches on his right."

During the night, Lt. Henry Comey and four companies--one each from the 2nd MA, 3rd WS, 27th IN and 13th NJ--formed a skirmish line, and while "the rebels were in sight all the time" they did not "see fit to advance." This was perfectly okay with Comey. "Three nights I have been without sleep." As he tried to put his thoughts on paper after the battle, it seemed to him as though he could take a week to describe the Battle of Chancelloresville. "I have seen what was called fighting before but I never saw anything equal to the fighting on the third." Not a man in the Second would have voiced disagreement with this statement.

After the battle, Col. Sam Quincy could hardly find the words to describe the day's fight:

"Once more have I by the grace of God come out safely from about as much hell as a man often experiences in this world. I think I could write a fine description of Pandemonium if I tried for if that Kingdom of Satan wouldn't pale its ineffectual fires before the battles of Saturday midnight & Sunday morning at Chancellorsville, the the Devil is a bigger man than I take him to be."

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