Friday afternoon. I added line numbers that correctly reflect the original page. I've added a few more paragraphs, and corrected some errors noted by Dracsmith.

On this page I set the prologue from S. Bonaventura's second book on Peter Lombard's sentences, published in 1493 by Kilian Fischer, in jpg form, against the Latin text of the Quarrachi edition. This was comparatively easy because I had access to the Latin text.

On this page there is the incomparably harder task of working out the Latin from the 1493 text alone (as I do not have the Quarrachi text to hand). This is the better and nobler thing to do. The context is the interesting and philosophically challenging argument about infinite traversal. On which there are some interesting discussions going on at Brandon's place here and Alan Rhoda's place here.

You can also follow the discussion here.

I'll add some English shortly (I just found out how to get columns which are wider than the whole screen. But not all the Latin makes sense, partly because I can't remember how to decline tempus and instantas, and there is work I need to do which is so urgent and important that I don't have time to go downstairs to the large Latin dictionary in the living room. The argument looks interesting though.

I've omitted the marginalia, but there was a sweet little hand used to draw attention to a passage, which I reproduce here:

Line	1493 Edition	Interpretation	English
1.45 1.46 1.47 1.48 1.49 1.50 1.51 1.52 1.53 1.54 1.55		Questio II Utrum mundus productus fuerit ex tempore aut ab eterno. Et quod non ex tempore ostenditur duabus rationibus sumptis a mo tu. Prima est ostensiva sic. Ante omnem motum et mutationem est motus primi mobilis, sed omne quod incipit, incipit per motum vel mutationem. Ergo ante omne illud quod incipit est motus ille. Sed ille motus non potuit esse ante se nec ante suum mobile. Ergo impossibile est incipere. Prima proposi tio supponitur, et eius probatio patet sic, quia suppositio est in philosophicis, quod in omni genere perfectum est ante imperfectum. Sed inter omnia genera motuum localium motus ad ad situm est perfe	Question II Whether the world was produced at a time, or whether from eternity? And that it was not produced in time is shown by two reasons drawn from motion. The first is a demonstration thus. Before all motion and change, is the motion of the prime mover; but all that begins, begins through motion or change. Therefore before all that which begins, there is that motion. But that motion could not be before itself, or before its moving. Therefore it is impossible for it to begin. The first proposition is supposed, and its demonstration is clear as follows, because there is a supposition in philosophicis, that in every genus, perfection is before imperfection. But among all genera of local motion, motion ad situm is the more perfect,
1.56 1.57 1.58 1.59 1.60 1.61 1.62 1.63 1.64 1.65		ctior, quia est entis completi, et inter omnia genera motuum localium, motus circularis et velocior est et perfectior. Sed talis est motus caeli, ergo perfectissimus, ergo primus, ergo &c Item ostenditur per impossibile. Omne quod erit in esse, erit per motum vel mutationem, ergo si motus erit in esse, erit per motum vel mutationem, et similiter de illo quaeritur, ergo vel est abire in infinitum, vel est ponere aliquem motum sine principio. Si motum, ergo non mobile, ergo et mundum. Similiter ra tio ostensiva sumitur a tempore sic. Omne quod incipit, aut incipit in instanti, aut tempore. Si ergo mundus incipit, aut in	because it is a complete entity, and among all genera of local motion, circular motion is swifter and more perfect. But such is the heavenly motion, therefore the most perfect, therefore the first, therefore &c. Moreover, it is shown per impossibile. All that will be in existence, will be through motion or by change, therefore if motion will be in existence, it will be through motion or change, and similarly it is asked concerning that, therefore either it is to come about in infinitum, or one is to suppose a motion without a beginning. If a motion, therefore not a mover, and therefore the world. Similarly a demonstrative reason is taken from time, as follows. All that begins, begins in an instant, or in a time. If therefore the world begins, this happens either
1.66 1.67 1.68 1.69 1.70 1.71 1.72 1.73 1.74 1.75		instanti, aut in tempore. Sed ante omne tempus et ante omne instans est tempus, ergo tempus est ante omnia quae inceperuntur. Sed non potuit esse ante mun dum et motum, ergo mundus non incepit. Prima propositio ne cessaria vel nota est per se. Secunda, scilicet, quod ante omne tempus sit tem pus, patet ex hoc. Si currit, currebat prius de necessita te. Similiter quod ante omne instans sit tempus patet sic. Tempus est mensura circularis, conveniens motui et mobili, sed omnis pun ctus quod est in circulo ita est principium quod finis, ergo instans tem poris ita est principium futuri quod terminus praeteriti. Ergo ante omne nunc, fuit praeteritum, patet ergo &c. Item, probo per impossibile. Si	in an instant, or in a time. But before every time and every instant, there is a time. Therefore there is a time before all things which would have begun. But it could not be before the world and before motion, therefore the world did not begin. The first objection is necessary or self evident. The second, namely that before every time, there is a time, is clear from this. If a thing runs, of necessity it was running before. Similarly that before every instant there is a time is clear thus: time is a cyclical measure, appropriate to motion and a mover, but every point which is in a circle is thus a beginning that is an end, therefore an instant of time is thus a beginning of the future that is the terminus of the past. Therefore before everything now, there was the past, therefore it is clear &c. Likewise, I prove per impossibile. If
1.76 1.77 1.78 1.79 1.80 1.81 1.82 1.83 1.84 1.85		tempus producitur, aut in tempore, aut in instanti. Non in instanti cum no n sit in instanti, ergo in tempore, sed in omni tempore est ponere prius et posterius, et praeteritum et futurum, ergo si tempus in tempore, ante omne tempus fuit tempus, et hoc impossibile, ergo &c. Et hae sunt rationes philosophi quae sunt sumptae a parte ipsius mundi. Item aliae rationes philosophorum quae sumuntur ex parte causae producentis, et generaliter ad duas possunt reduci, quarum prima est ostensiva, sed a verbo per impossibi le. Prima est haec. Posita causa sufficienti et actuali, po nitur effectus, sed deus ab eterno fuit causa sufficiens et ac tualis ipsius mundi, ergo &c. Maior propositio per se nota est	time is produced, either in a time, or in an instant. Not in an instant, since it may not be in an instant, therefore in a time, but in every time is to suppose before and after, and past and future, therefore if time [is produced] in time, before every time there was a time, and this is impossible &c. And these are the reasons of the philosopher which are taken on the side of the world itself. Likewise, other reasons of philosophers which are taken on the side of a producing cause, and generally can be brought back to two, of which the first is demonstrative, but a verbo per impossibile. The first is this. Having supposed a cause that is sufficient and actual, an effect is supposed. But God was from eternity the sufficient and actual cause of the world itself, therefore &c. The major premiss is self-evident.
1.86 1.87 1.88 1.89 1.90 1.91 1.92 1.93 1.94 1.95		Minor patet, scilicet, quod deus sit causa sufficiens, quia cum nullo extrins seco indigeat ad mundi creationem, sed solum potentia sapi entia, et bonitate, et haec in deo fuerunt perfectissima ab eterno, probatur quod ab eterno fuit sufficiens. Quod etiam actualis patet. Deus enim est actus purus, et suum velle ut dicit philosophus et sancti dicunt est suum agere, restat ergo &c. Item per impos sibile, omne illud quod incipit agere prius ut (?) producere, cum pri us non produceret, exit ab ocio in actum, si ergo deus incipit mundum producere, exit ab ocio in actum, sed in omni tali cadit ociositas, et mutatio sive mutabilitas. Ergo circa deum est	The minor is clear (namely that God is a sufficient cause), because since He needs nothing extrinsic for the creation of the world, but only a power that is wise, and good, and these in God were the most perfect from eternity, it is proved that He was sufficient from eternity. That also actual, is clear. For God is pure actuality, and his willing, as the philosopher and the saints say, is his acting, therefore it remains &c. Likewise per impossibile: all that which begins to act before (?) producing, since it was not producing before, comes from idleness into actuality; if therefore God begins to produce the world, He comes from idleness in actuality, but in every such thing falls idleness, and change or changeability. Therefore around God there is
1.96 1.97 1.98 1.99 1.100 1.101 1.102 1.103 1.104 1.105		ociositas et mutabilitas. Hoc autem est contra summam bo nitatem et contra summam simplicitatem, ergo hoc est impossibile et blasphemum dicere de deo, et ita quod ceperit. Hae sunt rationes quas commentatores et moderniores superaddit rationibus Aristotelis, sive ad has possunt reduci. Sed ad op positum sunt rationes ex propositionibus per se notis secundum rationem et philosophiam, quarum prima est haec. Impossibile est infinito addi. Haec est manifesta per se, quia omne illud recipit additionem fit maius, infinito autem nihil maius. Si mundus est sine prin cipio, duravit in infinitum, ergo durationi eius non posset addi	idleness or changeability. But this is against the highest goodness and against the highest simplicity [of God], therefore this is impossible, both a blasphemous thing to say about God, and that the world may have begun in this way. These are the reasons which the commentators and the more modern [writers] have added to the reasons of Aristotle, or can be reduced to these. But in opposition are reasons or propositions known through themselves according to reason and philosophy, of which the first is this. It is impossible for the infinite to be added to. This is manifest through itself, because everything that receives addition becomes greater, but to the infinite there is nothing greater. If the world is without a beginning, it has lasted in infinitum, therefore to its duration there could not be an addition.
1.106 1.107 1.108 1.109 1.110 1.111 1.112 1.113 1.114 1.115		sed constat hoc esse falsum, quia revolutio additur revolutioni omni die, ergo &c. Si tu dicas quod infinitum est quantum ad praeterita, tunc quantum ad praesens quod nunc est, est finitum actu, et ideo ex ea parte qua finitum est, est reperire maius, contra ostenditur quod in praeterito est reperire maius. Haec est veritas infallibilis, quod si mundus est eternus, revolutiones in orbe suo sunt infinitae. Rur sus pro una revolutione solis necesse est fuisse xii ipsius lune ergo plus est revoluta luna quantum sol, et sol infinitus, ergo infinito. Rursus ex ea parte qua infinita sunt est reperire excessum. Hoc autem est impossibile, ergo &c. Secunda propositio est ista. Impossibile est	But it is established that this is false, because a revolution is added to a revolution every day, therefore &c. If you say that the infinity is as far as the past, then as far as the present which exists now, is finite in actuality, and by the same reason, on the side by which it is finite, is to be found more, against this it is shown that in the past is to be found more. It is an infallible truth, that if the world is eternal, the revolutions in its orbit are infinite. Again, for one revolution of the sun it is necessary to have been 12 of the moon itself, therefore the moon has revolved more than the sun, and the sun an infinite [number], therefore infinite. Again, on the side they are infinite, there is to be found an excess, but this is impossible, therefore &c. The second proposition is this. It is impossible for
1.116 1.117 1.118 1.119 1.120 1.121 1.122 1.123 1.124 1.125		infinita ordinari, omnis enim ordo fluit a prius in medium. Si ergo non est primum non est ordo, sed duratio mundi sive revoluti iones caeli si sunt infinitae non habent primam, ergo non habent ordinem, ergo una non est ante aliam, sed hoc est falsum. Restat ergo quod habent primam. Si dicas quod statum ordinis non est necesse ponere nisi in his quae ordinantur secundum ordinem causalitatis, quia in causa necessario est status, quaero quare non in aliis, tu ex hoc non evades, nunquam enim fuit revolutio caeli ergo non fuisset generatio animalis ex animali, sed con stat quod animal ordinatur ad animal ex quo generatur secundum ordinem causae. Ergo si secundum philosophum et rationem necesse est ponere statum in his quae ordinantur	an infinity to be ordered, for all order flows from a first thing via an intermediate. If therefore there is no first, there is no order, but the duration of the world or revolutions of the sky, if they are infinite, do not have a first, therefore do not have order, therefore one is not before another, but this is false. It remains therefore that they have a first. If you say that it is not necessary suppose a order of position except in those which are ordered according to causality, since in causation there is necessarily a position, I ask why not in other things, and you will not escape this way. For there was never a revolution of the the sky, [???] generation of animal from animal, but it remains that an animal is ordered to the animal from which it is generated according to the order of cause. Therefore if according to the philosopher and reason it is necessary to suppose a state in things which are ordered,
1.126 1.127 1.128 1.129 1.130		secundum ordinem causae, ergo in generationem animalium necesse est ponere primum animal, et mundus non fuit sine animalibus, ergo &c. Tertia propositio est ista. Impossibile est infinita pertransire sed si mundus non cepit, infinitae re volutiones fuerit, ergo impossibile est illas pertransire, ergo impossibi le fuit ducire usque ad hanc. Si tu dicas quod non sunt pertransita	according to the order of cause, then in the generation of animals it is necessary to suppose a first animal, and the world was not without animals, therefore &c. The third proposition is this. It is impossible for an infinity to be crossed through but if the world did not begin, there will have been infinitely many revolutions, therefore it is impossible to cross through them, therefore impossible to reach up to here. If you say that they are not crossed through,
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2.1 2.2 2.3 2.4 2.5 2.6 2.7 2.8 2.9 2.10		quod nulla fuit prima, aut quod etiam bene possit pertransire in tempore infinito, per hoc non evades. Quaero enim a te utrum ali qua revolutione praecessit hodiernam in infinitum, an nulla. Si nulla, ergo omnes finitae distant ab hac, ergo sunt omnes finitae, ergo habent primum. Si aliqua in infinitum distat, quaero de re volutione quae immediate sequitur illam utrum distet in infinitum. Si non, ergo nec illa distat, quoniam finita distantia est inter utramque Si vero distat in infinitum, similiter quaero de tertia et quarta, et sic in infinitum, ergo non magis distat ab una quam ab alia. Ergo una non est ante alia, ergo omnes sunt similiter. Quarta propositio est ista. Impos	because none was the first, or that also it could well be crossed in an infinite time, you will not escape through this. For I ask from you whether some revolution preceded today in infinitum, or none. If none, therefore all lie a finite distance from here, therefore all are finite, therefore they have a first. If one lies distant in infinitum, I ask of the revolution which immediately follows that, whether it lies in infinitum. If not, therefore it is not in that way [?] distant, since a finite distance is between them both. But if it it lies infinitely distant, similarly I ask of the third and the fourth, and thus in infinitum, therefore it is not more distant from one than from the other. Therefore one is not before the other, therefore all are similar. The fourth proposition is this.
2.11 2.12 2.13 2.14 2.15 2.16 2.17 2.18 2.19 2.20		sibile est infinita a virtute finita comprehendi, sed si mundus non ce pit, infinita comprehenduntur a virtute finita, ergo &c. Probatio maioris per se patet. Minor ostenditur sic. Supponendo deum solum esse virtutis actu infinitae, omnia alia habere finitatem. Rursus supponendo quod motus caeli nunquam fuit sine subiecta spirituali crea ta quae vel ipsum faceret vel saltem cognosceret. Sed hoc supposito quod subiecta spiritualis nihil obliviscitur, si ergo aliquae spiritualis subiecta virtu tis finitae simul fuit cum caelo, nulla fuit revolutio caeli quam non cognosceret, et non est oblita, ergo omnes actu cognoscit, et fuerunt in finitae, ergo aliquae spiritualis subiecta virtutis finitae similiter comprehendit infi	It is impossible for an infinite to be comprehended by a finite power, but if the world did not begin, an infinite is comprehended by a finite power, therefore &c. The proof of the major premiss is clear in itself. The minor is shown thus. In supposing God alone to be of infinite power in actuality, all other things have finitude. Again, in supposing that the motion of the sky never was without a created spiritual subject which either would have made it or at least would have known it. But having supposed this, that the spiritual subject forgets nothing, if thereofre some spiritual subject of finite power was together with the sky, there was no revolution of the sky which it would not have known, and none is forgotten, therefore it knows all in actuality, and there were infinitely many, therefore some spiritual subject of finite power similarly comprehends
2.21 2.22 2.23 2.24 2.25 2.26 2.27 2.28 2.29 2.30		nita. Si dicas quod non est inconveniens quod unica similitudine co gnoscit omnes revolutiones quae sunt eiusdem speciei et omnino consimiles, obiicitur quod non tam cognoverit circulationes sed earum effectus, et effectus varii et diversi sunt infiniti patet ergo &c Quinta est ista. Impossibile est infinita simul esse, sed si mun dus est eternus sine principio, cum non sit sine homine, propter ho minem enim sunt quoddamodo omnia, et homo duret finito tempore, igitur infi niti homines fuerunt. Sed quod fuerunt homines tot animae rationales, er go infinitae fuerunt animae sed quot animae fuerunt tot sunt, quia sunt for mae incorruptibiles, ergo infinitae sunt animae. Si tu dicas ad	Infinitely many things. If you say that it is not unfitting that by a unique similitude it knows all the revolutions which are of the same species and altogether consimilar, it is objected that it would not have known the circulations so much as their effect, and the various different effects are infinite, there it is clear &c The fifth is this. It is impossible for infinitely many to exist at the same time, but if the world is eternal without a beginning, since it is not without men, for on account of man in a certain way all things exist, and man lives a finite time, then infinitely many men have existed. But there were as many men as rational souls, therefore there were infinitely many souls, but there exist as many souls as there used to be, as they are incorruptible forms, therefore there are infinitely many souls. If you say to
2.31 2.32 2.33 2.34 2.35 2.36 2.37 2.38 2.39 2.40		hoc quod circulatio est in animabus, vel quod una anima est in omnibus hominibus primus est error in philosophia, quia ut vult philosophus primus actus est in prima materia, ergo non potest anima quae fuit perfectio unius, esse perfectio alte rius etiam secundum probatum. Secundam etiam magis est erroneum, quia multo minus una anima olim. Ultima ratio hoc est. Impossibile est quod habet esse post non esse, habere esse eternum quoniam haec est implicatio contradi ctionis, sed mundus habet esse post non esse, ergo impossibile est esse eter num. Quod autem habeat esse post non esse probat sic. Omne illud quod tota liter habet esse ab aliquo, producitur ab illo ex nihilo. Sed mundus to taliter habet esse a deo, ergo mundus ex nihilo. Sed non ex nihilo ma	this that there is circulation in souls, or that one soul is in all men, the first is in error in philosophy, because as the philosopher wishes (?) the first act is in prime material, therefore the soul which was the perfection of one, cannot be the perfection of a lower one as was also proved. The second is also more an error, because much less one soul for all time. The final reason is this. It is impossible that what has being after non being has eternal being, since this implies a contradiction, but the world has being after non being, therefore it is impossible to be eternal. But that it has being after non being is proved thus. All that which entirely has being from another, is produced from that other from nothing. But the world entirely has being from God, therefore the world is from nothing. But not from nothing
2.41 2.42 2.43 2.44 2.45 2.46 2.47 2.48 2.49 2.50		terialiter, ergo originaliter. Quod autem omne quod totaliter producitur ab aliquo differente per essentiam habeat esse ex nihilo patens est, nam quod to taliter producitur, producitur secundum materiam et formam, sed materia non habet ex quo, producatur quia non ex deo, manifestum est igitur quod ex nihilo Minor autem scilicet quod mundus totaliter producatur, patet ex alio pro blemate. Respondeo dicendum quod ponere mundum eternum esse sive et ernaliter productum, ponendo res omnes ex nihilo productas, omni no est contra veritatem et rationem sicut ultima ratio probat. Et adeo contra rationem ut nullum philosophorum quantumcumque parvi intellectus credide rim hoc posuisse. Hoc enim implicat in se manifestam contradi	materially, therefore originally. But that all which is produced entirely from something different through essence has being from nothing, it is clear, for what is entirely produced, is produced according to material and form, but material does not exist by itself, for it is not produced by God, therefore it is manifest that out of nothing. Now the minor, namely that the world is entirely produced, is clear from another problem. I respond, saying that to suppose that the world is eternal or produced from eternity, while supposing that all things have been produced out of nothing, is altogether against truth and reason, just as the last reason showed. And it is so much against reason that I do not believe that any philosopher, however small in intellect, can have believed this. For this involves, in itself, a manifest contradiction.
2.51 2.52 2.53 2.54 2.55 2.56 2.57 2.58 2.59 2.60		ctionem. Ponere autem mundum eternum presupposita eternita te materiae rationabile videtur intelligible, et hoc duplici exem plo. Egressus enim rerum mundanarum a deo est per modum vesti gii, unde si pes esset eternum, et pulvis in quo formatur vestigium esset aeternus, nihil prohiberet intelligere vestigium pedis esse coaeternum, et tunc a pede esse vestigium. Per hunc modum si ma teria sive principium potentiale esset coaeternum autori, quod prohi bet ipsum vestigium esse eternum, immo videtur congruum. Rursus aliud exempli, rationalis enim creatura procedit a deo ut umb bra, filius procedit ut splendor, sed quamcito est lux statim est splen	But to suppose that the world is eternal by presupposing the eternity of its material seems reasonable and intelligible, and this by a twofold example. For the coming out of worldly things from God is by the manner of a footprint, wherefore if the foot were eternal, and the dust in which it the print is formed were eternal, nothing would stop us understanding the print to be coeternal, and so to be a print from the foot. Through this way if the material or beginning principle were coeternal to the author, what prevents the footprint itself from being eternal? Indeed it seems agreeable. Again another example, for a rational creature proceeds from God as a shadow, the son proceeds as splendour, but whenever there is light, immediately there is
2.61 2.62 2.63 2.64 2.65 2.66 2.67 2.68 2.69 2.70		dor, et statim est umbra si sit corpus opacum obiectum. Si er go materia coaeterna est autori tanquam opacum luci, sicut rationa bile est ponere filium (qui est splendor primis) coaeternum, ita ratio nabile videtur creaturas sive mundum qui est umbra summae lu cis esse aeternum, et magis rationabile est quam suum oppositum, scilicet, quod ma teria aeternaliter fuerint imperfecta sine forma vel in fluentia. Sicut posuerunt quidam philosophorum, et adeo rationabilius ut etiam ille excellentior inter philosophos, Aristotelis, sicut sancti imponunt et commentatores exponunt, et verba eius praetendunt in hunc er rorem dilapsus fuerit. Quidam tunc moderni dicunt philosophum	splendour, and immediately there is a shadow if there is an opaque object. If therefore the coeternal material is to the author as the opaque object is to the light, just as it is reasonable to suppose the son (who is the first splendour) coeternal, so it seems reasonable that created things, or the world (which is the highest shadow of the light) is eternal, and more reasonable than its opposite, namely that material things existed eternally, imperfect without form or inflow, as certain of the philosophers supposed - so much more reasonable that that more excellent among philosophers, Aristotle, just as the saints lay down, and the commentators set down, and his words continually show, fell into this error. Accordingly, certain modern writers say that the Philosopher
2.71 2.72 2.73 2.74 2.75 2.76 2.77 2.78 2.79 2.80		nequaquam illud sensisse nec intendisse probare quod mundus omnino non ceperit, sed quod non ceperit naturali motu. Quod horum magis sit verum ego nescio. Hoc unum scio quod si hic posuit mundum non incepisse secundum naturam verum posuit, et rationes eius sumptae a motu et tempore sunt efficaces. Si autem hoc sensit quod nullo modo ceperit, manifeste erravit, sicut pluribus rationibus ostensum est supra, et ne cesse fuit ad vitandum contradictionem ponere aut mundum non esse factum aut non esse factum ex nihilo. Ad vitandum autem infi nitatem actualem necesse fuit ponere, aut animae rationalis cor uptionem, aut unitatem aut circulationem, et ita auferre be	in no way felt or meant to prove that the world altogether did not begin, but rather that it did not begin in natural motion. Which of these may be more true I do not know. This one thing I do know, that if he supposed that the world did not begin according to nature, he supposed the truth, and the reasons taken by him from motion and time are effectual. But if he felt here that it in no way began, he manifestly was in error, just by many reasons is shown above, and to escape the contradiction it was necessary to suppose either that the world was not made or that it was not made out of nothing. But to escape, it was necessary to suppose an actual infinity, or the destruction of the rational soul, or unity or circulation (of souls), and thus to take away
2.81 2.82 2.83 2.84 2.85 2.86 2.87 2.88 2.89 2.80		atitudinem, unde iste error et malum habet initium et pessimum finem. Quod ergo obiicitur primo de motu primo mobilis qui est primus inter omnes motus et mutationes quia perfectissimus, dicendum, quod loquendo de motibus et mutationibus naturalibus verum di cit, et non habet instantiam loquendo aut de mutatione supernatu ali per quam ipsam mobile praecessit in esse non habet veritatem, nam illa praecessit omne creatum, et ita mobile primum, ac per hoc et eius motum. Quod obiicitur omnis motus exit in esse per motum, dicendum quod mo tus non exit in esse per se nec in se, sed cum alio in alio, et quia deus in eodem instanti mobile fecit, et ut motor super mobile in	happiness, wherefore that error both has an bad beginning and most bad end. To the first objection about the movement of the prime mover who is first among all movements and changes because most perfect, it is to be said that in speaking of natural movements and changes it states the truth, and non habet instantiam in speaking either of supernatural change through which itself it precedes the mover in being does not have truth, for that preceded every created thing, and thus the prime mover, and through this also its motion. To the objection that all motion comes out into being through motion, it is to be said that motion does not come into being through itself or in itself, but with another in another, and since God made the mover in the same instant, and as motor over the mover in
2.91 2.92 2.93 2.94 2.95 2.96 2.97 2.98 2.99 2.100		fluxit, ideo motum mobilem concreavit. Si autem quaeras de illa creatione, dicendum quod ibi stare est sicut in primis, et hoc melius in fra patebit. Quod tertio obiicitur de nunc temporis &c, dicendum, quod sicut in circulo est dupliciter assignare punctum, aut cum fit, aut postquam factus est, et sicut dum fit est ponere et assignare primum punctum, dum vero iam est non est ponere primum, sic est accipere in tempore nunc dupliciter et in ipsa productione temporis fuit nunc primum, ante quod non fuit aliud quod fuit primum principium temporis id quo omnia dicunt esse producta. Si autem de tempore postquam factum est, verum est quod est terminus praeteriti, et se habet per modum circuli, sed hoc modo non fuerunt res productae in	fluxit, by the same reason he co-created the moving motion. But if you as about that creation, it is to be said that to stand there is just as being before all else, and this will be clear below. To the third objection about the now of time &c, it is to be said, that just as in a circle a point is assigned in two ways to - either when it happens, or after it is made - and just as while it comes about is to posit and to assign the first point, but while it now exists is not to posit the first point, thus it is to take now in time in two senses and in the very production of time there was the first now, before which there was not another which was the first principle of time, that from which they say all things are produced. But if concerning time after it is made, it is true that it is the terminus of the present, and exists in the manner of a circle, but in this manner things were not produced in
2.101 2.102 2.103 2.104 2.105 2.106 2.107 2.108 2.109 2.110		tempore iam perfecto, et ita patet quod rationes philosophi nihil valet omnino ad haec conclusionem. Et quod dicit quod ante omne tempus est tempus, verum est accipiendo in tempus dividendo, non extra anterius procedendo. Quod obiicitur de tempore quantum cepit, dicendum quod cepit in suo princi pio, principium autem temporis est instans vel nunc, et ita cepit in instanti, et non valet illatio, non fuit in instanti, ergo non cepit in instanti, quarum successiva non sunt in sui initio. Potest tunc aliter dici quod dupliciter est loqui de tempore, aut secundum essentiam, aut secundum esse. Si secundum essentiam, sic nunc est tota essentia temporis, et il lud nunc cepit cum re mobili, non in alio nunc sed in seipso	time now perfected, and thus it is clear that the reasons of the philosopher are not altogether valid for this conclusion. And that ? he says before every time there is a time, it is true that in accepting division in time ? nothing To the objection about time as far as it begins, it is to be said that it begins in its principle, but that the principle of time is an instant or now, and thus it begins in an instant, and the inference is not valid, that it was not in an instant, therefore it did not begin in an instant, of which successive ones are not in its beginning. Accordingly it can be said in another way that one can speak of time in two ways, either according to its essence, or according to its being. If according to essence, if now is the whole essence of time, and that now begins with the moving thing, not in another now but in itself
2.111 2.112 2.113 2.114 2.115 2.116 2.117 2.118 2.119 2.120		quia status est in primis, unde non habuit aliam mensuram. Si secundum esse, sic cepit cum motu variationis, nec cepit per creationem, sed potius per temporum mutabilium mutationem, et maxime primi mobilis. Quod obiicitur de causae suffici entia et actualitate, dicendum quod causa sufficiens ad aliquid est duobus modis, aut operans per naturam aut per voluntatem et rationem. Si operans per naturam, sic statim cum est producit. Si autem operans per voluntatem, et quamvis sit sufficiens, non oportuit quod statim cum est operetur, operatur enim secundum sapientiam et discretionem, et ita considerat congruitatem. Quoniam igitur non	because its position is before all else, wherefore it did not have another measure. If according to being, thus it begins with the motion of variation, and does not begin through creation, but rather through the change of changeable times, and particularly of the first mover. To the objection about the sufficiency and actuality of the cause, it is to be said that a cause is sufficient for something in two ways: either operating through nature or through the will and the reason. If operating through nature, then immediately it exists, it produces. But if operating through the will, then although it may be sufficient, it was not necessary that as soon as it works, it works according to wisdom and discretionem, and thus it considers congruity. Since therefore eternity does not
2.121 2.122 2.123 2.124 2.125 2.126 2.127 2.128 2.129 2.130		conveniabat naturae ipsi creaturae aeternitas, nec decebat deum alicui hanc nobilissimam conditionem donare, ideo di vina voluntas quae operatur secundum divinam sapientiam produ xit non ab aeterno sed in tempore, quia et sicut produxit, sic et dispo suit et sic voluit. Ab aeterno enim voluit producere tunc qn produxit, sicut ego *** ***** ****issam, et ita patet quod sufficientia non cogit. Similiter de actualitate dicendum, quod *** duobus modis potest esse in actu. Aut in se ut si dicam sol lucet. Aut in ef fectu, ut si dicam sol illuminat. Primo modo deus semper fuit in actu, quidem ipse est actus purus nihil habens admixtum de possibili.	belong to the nature of the created thing itself, nor was it fitting for God to give this most noble condition to something, for which reason the divine will, which works according to divine wisdom, produced not from eternity but in time, because thus it produced, thus it disposed, and thus it willed. For from eternity it wished to produce accordingly *** it produced, thus ** ** **, and thus it is clear that [the objection from] sufficiency is not compelling. Similarly concerning actuality it is to be said that in two ways something can exist in actuality: either in itself, as when I say the sun shines, or in effect, as when I say the sun illuminates. In the first way God always existed in actuality, for he himself is pure actuality not having an admixture of the possible.
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3.1 3.2 3.3 3.4 3.5 3.6 3.7 3.8 3.9 3.10		Alio modo non semper in actu, non enim semper fuit producens. Quod obiicitur secunda, si de non producente factus est producens mu tatus est ab ocio in actum, dicendum quod quoddam est agens in quo actio et pro ductio addit aliquid super agentem et producentem, tale cum de non agente sit agens, variatur aliquo modo, et in tali ante operationem ca dit ociosum, et in operationem additur complementum. Aliud est agens quod est sua actio, et in tali nihil omnino advenit cum producit, nec etiam in eo fit aliquid quod non prius, et tale nec recipit complemen tum, nec in non operando est ociosum, nec cum de non producente fit producens mutatur ab ocio in actu, tale autem est deus, etiam secundum philosophos	In another way He was not always in actuality, for he was not always producing. To the second objection (that if from not producing, a thing is made producing, it is changed from being idle to having acted) it is to be said there is one kind of agent in which action and production adds something over acting and producing, [and] such a thing, when from not acting it acts, is changed in some way, and to such a thing before working befalls idleness, and in working is added a complement. There is another kind of agent which is its own action, and nothing at all happens in such a thing when it produces, nor even happens within it that [was] not [there] before, and such a thing does not receive a complement, nor, in not working, is it idle, nor when from not producing it becomes a producing thing is it changed from idleness into action. For such a thing is God, even according to the philosophers
3.11 3.12 3.13 3.14 3.15 3.16 3.17 3.18 3.19 3.20		qui posuerunt deum simplicissimum, patet ergo quod stulta est eorum ratio. Si enim propter ocium vitandum rationes ab eterno produxisset, sine re bus perfectum bonum non esset, ac per hoc nec cum rebus, quia perfectissimum seipso perfectum est. Rursus si oppositur immutationem oporteret res ab aeterno esse, nihil posset nunc de novo producere, qualis igitur deus esset quod nunc nihil per se posset. Haec omnia dementiam indicant magis quam philosophiam vel rationem aliquam. Si tu quaeras qualiter possit capi quod deus agat seipso et tunc non incipiat agere, dicendum, quod si hoc non possit plene capi propter imaginationem coniunctam, potest tunc necessaria ratione convinci, et si quis a sensibus se trahat ad intelli	who supposed that God is the most simple being. It is clear then that their reasoning is foolish. For if to escape [the objection from] idleness one produced reasons from eternity, without things the perfect good would not have existed, and through this neither with the things, because the most perfect thing is perfect in itself. Again if it is objected form unchangeablity that things would have to exist from eternity, nothing could accordingly be produced anew, of what nature then God would be that now he could be nothing in himself. All these things indicate madness more than philosophy or reason. If you ask in what way could it be grasped that could works by himself and accordingly does not begin to work, it is said, that if this cannot fully be grasped because connected to the imagination, then it can be shown clearly by necessary reason, and if someone draws himself from the senses to
3.21 3.22 3.23 3.24 3.25 3.26 3.27 3.28 3.29 3.30		gibilia aspicienda, aliquo modo perciperet. Si cum quis quaerat utrum angelus possit facere pottum figuli cum non habeat manus ut pro iicere lapidem, respondebitur quod potest, quia homo potest solo virtute sui absque organo, quod potest anima cum corpore et membro suo. Si igitur an gelus propter suam simplicitatem et perfectionem tantum excedit ho minem ut possit facere sine organo medio illud ad quod homo necessario indiget organo, posset etiam facere per unum quod hoc potest per plura, quantomagis deus qui est in fine totius simplicitatis et perfe/ ctionis absque omni medio, suae voluntatis imperio (quae non est aliud quam ipse) potest omnia producere, ac per hoc in producendo immuta	things looked on intelligibly, he would comprehend in some way. If when someone asks whether an angel could make the potter's pot, when he does not have a hand to throw a stone, it will be replied that he can, because a man can by his power alone without a tool, what the soul can do with the body and its limb. If then an angel on account of his simplicity and perfection only can exceed a man by making, without using a tool, that for which a man necessarily needs a tool, he could also make through one thing what [the man] can make through many, by how much more God, who is in the end of complete simplicity and perfection without any medium, by the power of his will (which is no other than himself) can make all things, and through this in producing
3.31 3.32 3.33 3.34 3.35 3.36 3.37 3.38 3.39 3.40		bilis permanere. Et sic potest homo manu duci ad hoc intelligen dum. Hoc autem perfectius capiet, si quis ista duo potest in suo opifice contemplari, scilicet quod est perfectissimus, et simplicissimus. Quia perfectissimus, omnia quae sunt perfectionis ei attribuunt. Quia simplicissimus, nullam diversitatem in eo ponitur, ac per hoc nec ponunt ullam varietatem nec mutabilitatem, ideo stabilis manens dat cuncta moveri.	remain unchanged. And thus can a man be led by the hand to this understanding. Moreover this can be more perfectly grasped, if one can contemplate these two things in one's maker, namely that he is the most perfect, and the most simple. Because most perfect, all things which exist attribute perfection to him. Because most simple, no diversity is supposed in him, and through this neither do they suppose any variety or change, for that reason, remaining steady, he grants that all else is moved.

THE LOGIC MUSEUM