The Break-out

 Early in November, the garrison was informed of the important role it was to play in a major new offensive by the Eighth Army aimed at recapturing the whole of Cyrenaica. The relief of Tobruk was made one of its first objectives in the operation to be known as Crusader. The plan was for the Eighth Army to advance from Egypt to the Sidi Rezegh ridge several miles south east of the fortress. Once there, the Eighth Army (specifically the South Africans) would signal the garrison (TOBFORCE) which would then make a break-out towards El Duda some 7 miles south, where the two forces would hopefully link up. If successful, this link-up would cut off the Axis forces in the area and Tobruk could be used as a supply depot in the continuing battle.

Major-General Scobie, commander of the garrison in Tobruk delegated command of the break-out to Brigadier A. Willison. The break-out itself was to be undertaken by Chappel's 14th Infantry Brigade, supported by tanks. The break-out force was to follow a 5-point plan set out by Scobie and Willison which involved a series of attacks against enemy positions in a corridor on the east side of Tobruk. These positions were each given names to assign the objectives:

Phase I - to capture "Butch"
Phase II - to capture "Tiger"
Phase III - The 1st Royal Tank Regiment (1RTR) were to sweep around the enemy's rear
Phase IV - to capture "Jack"
Phase V - to capture the El Duda ridge and link up with the South Africans
(Harrison, p.191)

All the attacks were to be supported by tanks, and the strongest possible artillery fire, aided for the first time by the British 3.7in guns.

Unbeknownst to the men of the 14th Inf. Bde, Rommel himself was also preparing an attack at the same time, and by a strange coincidence, against the same part of the fortress as the break-out would be made. Rommels orders of 7 Nov. had outlined the secret replacement of the encircling Italian Bologna Division with his own new 90 LT Division under General Sümmermann. 90 LT (formerly zbV Afrika) was an infantry division, composed of Inf Regt. 155 (under Oberst Marks) and Afrika Regt 361 (under Oberst von Barmby). It also had strong support from 3 artillery battalions, with the notoriously deadly 88mm guns, and an attached reconnaissance unit, Recce Bn. 580. The replacement was to be carried out so that "absolutely no impression of preparation for attack" would be given, and it was specified that "The soldiers must wear Italian helmets which will be lent by the Bologna Div." (Harrison, p.190). Thus when TOBFORCE eventually made its break-out, its infantry would not be fighting against the predicted Italian Infantry, but rather against Sümmermann's 90LT, in heavily defended posts, which was, as Harrison concurs, 'a vastly different proposition' (p.191).

 Operation Crusader got underway on the 18th November, the advance overall went well, though not without some alterations to the plan. On 20th November the signal was given to Tobruk, and after dark that night TOBFORCE moved forward to its starting lines with 159 armoured fighting vehicles, an Infantry Brigade, the guns of one and a half artillery regiments and hundreds of trucks. These forces collected to the west of the Bardia Rd, in the sector between defence posts R60 and R80. The infantry gradually assembled as the night went on; the 2nd Bn Black Watch, the 2nd Bn King's Own and others, with the 2nd Battalion York and Lancaster Regt. led in by Lieutenant-Colonel Gilroy. Clearing away mines and creating 'bridges out through the defences, the first waves of infantry crossed out at 04:45 the following morning.

 At "Butch", the King's Own were surprised to find themselves up against a German division whose out attempt to 'break-in' was due for the 23rd. The fighting was heavy, but relatively brief, and by 06:20, with support from the 7th Royal Tank Regt (7RTR) they had secured their first objective. Next, in the attempt to advance and take "Tiger", the 2nd Black Watch had to take out another post called "Jill". After being delayed waiting for tank support, they were hit hard, but by 07:15 the post was theirs, reinforced by the Beds and Herts Regt. The Black Watch now had to advance and take on "Tiger". This element of the attack was to be the hardest so far, with "Tiger" being far more than just a post. Casualties were heavy and tanks were wandering onto mines. An error in the start lines meant that part of the infantry and armour had veered to the left, attacking "Jack" much earlier than planned, but on a day full of surprises for both TOBFORCE and the Eighth Army at large, they had to readjust quickly. Eventually both "Tiger" and "Jack" were overrun and taken. In the early afternoon, Willison in command of the break-out was informed that a new threat had emerged on his right, to the west. This area, known as "Tugun" had a large concentration of guns and could put a premature end to the attempt to reach El Duda. Equally, Willison could scarcely risk diverting many of his forces if the projected link-up were to go ahead. He made the decision to take on "Tugun". His first thought, to secure the 'corridor' of the break-out thus far proved to be the right decision; soon after it was taken, he was told that 'Plum' (the code-word for the El Duda attack) was off.

At the end of the first day the force had advanced 4 miles on a 2 mile front, but at a very heavy cost to the Black Watch. Not to mention Willison's 158 armoured vehicles, of which only 40 remained.  Further afield, the South Africans hadn't made it to the ridge, so the plan had had to be changed. The Regimental history provides a clear and useful overview of the military situation at this time,

The next fortnight witnessed the heaviest fighting which had so far taken place in the Western Desert. The enemy sought strenuously to eliminate the corridor and also drive the Eighth Army back from Sidi Rezegh and elsewhere. The garrison commander was equally determined, not only to hold the corridor he had got, but to strengthen and enlarge it with a view to resuming his advance on El Duda as soon as possible.

On 22nd November (Break-out D+1, in Harrison's terminology) the Yorks and Lancs were brought into the action. "C" Company, led by Captain Hawkins and with tank support from 4RTR, were to attack a newly-discovered enemy post which lay to the south-west of "Tiger". This new position, named "Lion", was attacked after a short delay around 14:30. Little opposition was met as the post had been abandoned shortly before the advance. It was soon consolidated facing the other way. The following day "B" company under Capt. Northover was given the task of capturing "Dalby Square", which was a large enemy post covering 300 x 200 yards, further west than "Lion" beyond the edge of the 'corridor'. Willison's plan for the attack was as follows:

• 1 Royal Tank Regiment were to demonstrate come out and protect the right
• 4 RTR were to go south around the extended tail of Dalby Square's minefield,and then turn north for a rear attack.
• The Yorks and Lancs were to make a frontal attack.
• 1 Royal Horse Artillery were to fire a supporting barrage.
  

The attack was over very flat, open country and the men came under heavy machine-gun and mortar fire, being held up about 400 yards in front of their objective. Captain Jackman of the Northumberland Fusiliers came across to help. 2 Bren carriers with 3 inch mortars were brought forward, and they weakened the enemy fire. "B" company then rushed the position with bayonets fixed and it fell at 11:05. The surrendering defenders greatly outnumbered the depleted ranks of "B" Company which was down to around 50 men. The reserve "C" Company was called forward, "D" Company taking their places in "Lion". The reinforced "B" and "C" companies were in something of a hornets nest, as 2 hours later, the first counter-attack took place. It was repulsed with help from nearby disabled tanks and Jackman's fusiliers.

On the night of the 25th "A" company, under Captain Keymer, with support from A Squadron 4RTR were to attack "Wolf" - a strongly defended and mined post about a 1½ miles wide and ½ mile deep, 2,000 yards south of "Tiger". The attack which went in at 21:00 hours went well at first, with the infantry closing up to "Wolf" as the artillery bombardment lifted. Then the tanks went in, A Squadron (Sqn) 4RTR unfortunately ran into mines, but the Matildas of B Sqn managed to get through, and by 22:30 Keymer's men were inside. Once there they discovered that the enemy was still in great strength all around and so decided to hold their position.The enemy for their part realized the weakness of the attack and subjected the company to insults, threats as well as mortars. Early the following morning the enemy attacked, but C Sqn Lieutenant-Colonel O'Carroll's 4RTR tanks swept forward and the position was taken. The results of the action were considerable, with over 300 prisoners, including the CO of Bologna taken and a haul of 26 Bredas, 12 Fiat light machine-guns, 12 3.7mm anti-tank guns, 4 81mm mortars and 2 88mms and a large number of rifles (NB details corroborated from p.91 Regt. Hist. and p.244, Harrison).

 By 26th Nov. the success of this series of attacks against substantial enemy posts had considerably strengthened and extended the extent of the corridor. Willison had received intimation that friendly forces were nearby and thus 'Plum', the attack on El Duda, was back on. By Dusk El Duda had fallen and at night the first contact was made between TOBFORCE and the Eighth Army. The Axis forces reacted quickly and delivered a series of violent counter-attacks over the next few days. 2nd Bn Yorks & Lancs "B" and "C" companies were still at "Dalby Square" which came under attack from infantry and light tanks on the 27th. The Forward Observing Officer at the post engaged them with 25 pounders and the attack faded out. On 29th November they tried again with long and heavy mortaring covering an assault at the front and at the left-flank. The Yorks and Lancs replied with heavy small arms fire, using many automatic weapons taken from the enemy. Faced with this, and the continuing artillery fire the attack faltered and died out.

 The much vaunted link-up between TOBFORCE and the Eighth Army did not last long. General Rommel delivered an all out attack against the oncoming allied troops, combined with an audacious raid around its flank.

On 30th November command of most of the troops beyond the Tobruk perimeter returned to their respective Brigade commanders, with the 16th Inf. Bde responsible for the area adjacent to the defences and the 14th given the remainder of the corridor on a front that now amounted to 44 miles. The general situation necessitated adjustments in the corridor with the left flank being more vulnerable to attack that the right. As such the order had been given for the exposed post at "Dalby Square" to be evacuated. Leaving behind a standing patrol of a dozen men and an officer (was Eric amongst them?)  the remains of "B" and "C" Companies were withdrawn during the night of 30th Nov./1st Dec. "C" Company then occupied an enemy post called "Cat" a little way back and "B" coy went into reserve near Battalion HQ. Not realizing it had been evacuated, the enemy staged an elaborate attack on "Dalby Square on 3rd December. As the attack started, the patrol came under artillery and mortar fire and it tried to withdraw as previously ordered to do, but the barrage put down cut them off and they were taken prisoner.

 Somewhere amongst all of this confused fighting Eric had also been part of an isolated patrol in a slit trench. On or about the 26th Nov., he'd sent a member of his section to find out what was happening, the moment the soldier did so the top of his head was sheared off by an artillery shell (?is this accurate?).
Apparently cut off, the group nevertheless attempted to hold their position when they came under attack. Such an attack came, and although firing continued, an enemy tank advanced on their position and the defenders were forced to surrender to the German troops.

This sudden static confinement after the 'freedom' of army life is always a most punishing change with which to come to terms, and many have written of the self-loathing and utter desolation that being made a Prisoner Of War can bring about. But such a resigned attitude helps no-one, and it certainly would not help the thousands of British, Australian and New Zealand troops who had to survive years that were to follow.

Soon after Eric was taken prisoner, and in spite of a new round of counter-attacks, the Eighth Army linked up with Tobruk and the 8 month long siege came to an end with Rommel's forces in retreat. After the battles of Operation Crusader had finished, tribute was paid by men such as General Auchinleck in his official despatch, to the vital role Major-General Scobie's 70th Div. had played in the "Battle of the Corridor". Later historians though have always concentrated on the Eighth Army and the Tank Battles, with scant recognition and even glaring neglect of Brigadier A. Willison's sterling efforts. The recognition given to the 70th contrasts sharply with the garlands often layered on the Australians before them, as Harrison reflects,

 One cannot escape the feeling that had this been anything other than an ordinary division the world would have heard much more about its bravery and its accomplishments than has been the case, nor would anyone have dared to propose that it be broken up*. But it was a division without glamour, formed from a variety of county and regional regiments, and therefore dispensable.  (p.325)

* After Tobruk it was sent to India and the Eastern Army, while the 14th Inf. Bde, in a new form, went on to Burma to serve Wingate in the famously forgotten Chindit columns.