Epilogue
Signing up
Originally intending to join the Royal Navy, the 18 year-old Eric Crosswaite was told was somewhat dismayed to be told that he would have to have some teeth out before he could join. But, undeterred from joining one of the Armed Forces, he walked next door to enlist in the Army at Surrey Street in Sheffield on 26th October 1938. He joined the York & Lancaster Regiment and received the princely some of £1 5s for his services. Also trying to join up that day was the young Cyril Loosemoore, who was to become a friend and comrade-in-arms in the 2nd Battalion three years later on Crete. But that was yet to be; for the moment the new recruits were to report to the Regimental depot at Pontefract. There, the 1st Battalion recruit though unimpressed by his surroundings, nevertheless underwent the 3 months/12 weeks of initial training, following which he was sent to Fulford barracks in York for further training .
In late February-March 1939, when he was out on manoeuvres under canvas in North Yorkshire he was drafted into the 2nd Battalion. The 2nd Bn. who had just completed a tour of duty in India were to be stationed in the Sudan. Given roughly 10 days leave, Eric had to report back to York before going to Southampton where he was to make his first journey abroad, boarding the troop ship, HMS Lancaster, for a 3-week voyage to Port Sudan via the Suez canal, calling at Gibraltar, Malta and Port Suez on the way.
When they arrived at Port Sudan, the new draft was taken to Khartoum by train. There it was sorted out into regular formations. Eric joined Cs company ("C" coy) which seemed to him to be the best. Assigned to the Khartoum Southern sector, the 2nd Battalion was to spend much time improving infra-structure. From September onwards they helped in the construction of defence works for the town and vicinity, and also worked on the important road and rail bridge over the Blue Nile which was completed at the start of November. Also during their stay, known as a 'one year, no family' assignment, they went on tours of the interior carrying out perfunctory 'good will visits' when they would share a coffee and a chat with the local chieftains, a reminder of the British Imperial presence in North Africa and the Middle East. Nevertheless, his duties still left him time to enjoy the hot climate and beautiful vistas of Sudan. As Eric commented, it was certainly better than the wet days in England. To keep fit and cool off in the stifling heat Eric went for the odd swim, equally he always enjoyed the odd game of football, something which would keep him active in the later years of captivity. He played many matches in his favourite "inside-left" position, even undertaking a 2-day journey northwards to play a match at Wadi Halfa which they won. Just before the War began he was picked for another match, but hostilities cancelled what would no doubt have been a good match.
In September 1939, at the time of the declaration of war and the commencement of the so-called 'phoney war', the 2nd Bn Yorks & Lancs were at Kazanil barracks, by the Nile in Khartoum. Though far from Europe, everyone had the idea that war was on its way as 1939 gave way to 1940. Anxious to mobilise and revitalise its forces, the 2nd Battalion among with many other regular battalions was called up into Egypt, spending a few days in Cairo in January where the regimental plate and Colours were stored away, before leaving for Jenin in North Palestine (now to be found in the West Bank area of Israel) on 16th January.
At Jenin, the troops recuperated from the harsh conditions of the Sudan. Whilst there they were twice visited by the Colonel of the Regiment Lt-Gn. M.G.H. Barker CB DSO (GOC-in-C Palestine), and also by Brigadier H.E. Wetherall OBE MC who went on to serve with distinction in Ethiopia. By Mid-March their recuperation was complete and the commanders of the battalion felt their troops could well manage the 100 mile journey down to Gedera in South Palestine. This journey, completed as a route march certainly lives long in the memory, though the strictly ordered lines that appear in the photograph probably don't do justice to the long hot days and dry hard earth which caused many bleeding feet. Certainly Eric was unimpressed, commenting that it "bloody nigh killed me!". On the march itself he attempted to make the odd sideline for a Jaffa orange, but this met with little sympathy from the NCOs.
At Gedera the 2nd Battalion was grouped together with others to form the 14th Infantry Brigade, a formation which continued to train together over the next 2 months of intensive training.
One evening during this period Eric was being driven back to camp in a 15 cwt army truck. The driver was somewhat adventurous and the heavy truck bombed through the dry countryside until it suddenly collided with an anti-tank trap. The sudden stop propelled Eric forwards, over the front of the vehicle where he unfortunately impaled his hand on a bolt; an injury which allowed him a couple of weeks of welcome rest before the Battalion left for the Cairo area at the end of May.
At the camp at Helwan, near Cairo, the Battalion's advanced party found that the facilities had been prepared by the 19th Battalion New Zealanders, with members of the Wellington Regt. - the Allied Regiment of the Yorks and Lancs, the New Zealanders did their best to make sure the Battalion was well looked after.
On the 10th June, when Mussolini's Italy declared war on Britain, the forces ranged against the Allies in a new theatre of war: the desert.
The declaration proved to be a disappointment for the 14th Infantry Brigade. After all their weeks of preparation the brigade was broken-up, and the Yorks & Lancs sent to look after the defences at Alexandria. On 23rd July they arrived at Alexandria, and the 2nd Battalion took over a sector near Mex. There they passed away the next few months on very tedious defence duties, before being relieved by a unit from the Polish Brigade on 4th October. Interestingly, on 24th October, when attending a ceremonial parade of the Polish Brigade, the commanding officer (CO) of the Yorks and Lancs, Lieutenant-Colonel N.E.H. Sim, was told by Mr. Anthony Eden, Secretary of State for War that it had been decided to send the battalion to Malta, but nothing more came of the projected move.
Since the declaration of war, the Battalion had been called upon to re-post many from its ranks to provide staffs elsewhere. To compensate it had received two drafts from England, but even these did not bring it up to its full war establishment. Of the 24 officers serving with the battalion on Sept. 3rd 1939, 15 had now left, amongst them:
Major J.M. Edye, DSO,MC -to command 2nd Royal Sussex
Major A.W. Edwards, MC }Returned to UK to be given-
Major C.E. Blad } -command of newly-formed battalions
After being relieved at Mex, the Battalion went to Sidi Bishr, a great camp of tents (see photos), with a large NAAFI. They were not there long before they were sent on their next mission. With the launching of the Italian all-out attack on Greece on the morning of 28th October, Vice-Admiral Sir Andrew Cunningham's desire to create a naval base on the strategically useful island of Crete was given the go ahead. The Commander of the British Eastern Mediterranean sent for Lieutenant-Colonel Sim, who was told that the 2nd Battalion were being lent to the Royal Navy and were to go ASAP to Crete on board HMS Ajax. Early on the following morning, a joint Services reconnaissance party flew to Crete and that afternoon a convoy left Alexandria for Suda Bay. It comprised 2 Royal Navy Auxiliaries, 2 armed boarding vessels and the netlayer Protector, and it arrived at the same time as the Ajax.
The 2nd Battalion had received their warning order to move within 48 hours of the Italian invasion. A small military mission flew to Heraklion to prepare the way for the battalion which was put on six hours notice to follow by sea in the operation known as ACTION. According to the Regimental history, the Battalion began loading the Ajax in the afternoon of 31st October. Eric Crosswaite was one of the men charged with carrying out the embarkation. By midnight all were aboard. As it had not been possible to take all of the Battalion's transport in HMS Ajax, the remainder, together with the rear party, were embarked at Port Said in SS Brisbane Star.
Late in the afternoon on 1st November 1940, an Italian reconnaissance aeroplane flew past high up above the Ajax. The Anti-Aircraft guns opened up, but without any visible result, and it disappeared. The Captain of the ship, Capt. McCarthy, DSORN, informed the commanding officer (CO) that he now expected the ship would be attacked in Suda Bay the next day when disembarking.
At sunrise on the 2nd November HMS Ajax was off the entrance to Suda bay. Soon after entering harbour, 2 AA cruisers appeared and anchored. Plans were made for rapid disembarking - and went according to plan. At around noon "considerable numbers" of Italian aircraft came over, but HMS Ajax was not hit. However, a number of bombs fell around Suda village, causing the first 2 casualties for the Battalion:
(Lance-Corporal?) Cyril Loosemoore, and Private Lister.
When HMS Ajax was completely unloaded, all three cruisers left. The advance party, the first British troops on Crete, found that morale was good and that the inhabitants were largely pro-British.
On 7th November, the SS Brisbane Star arrived earlier than expected bringing the transport and the rear party. Around the same time HMS York arrived, bringing:
A Brigadier and HQ
2nd Battalion Black Watch
1 heavy and 1 light battery of Anti-Aircraft (AA) artillery
1 field company of engineers
(All in all, the British forces represented a total of around 2,500 men.)
The Brigadier, O.H. Tidbury approved the dispositions of the 2nd Battalion guarding the high ground on the approaches to Suda Bay, and sent the 2nd Battalion Black Watch on to Canea. He also instructed the AA batteries to guard the anchorage.
1941
All change
On 31st December 1940, Lieutenant-Colonel Sim left for Egypt to take up another appointment. The new CO was Major A. Gilroy of the Black Watch. Early in the new year another change of personnel took place. Captain C.K. Marriott MM, the Quartermaster and a long and popular servant of the Regiment, took over the Commando Base, Egypt. He was succeeded by Lieutenant W. Armstrong. Similar personnel changes were also continuing at the highest level, and Brigadier Tidbury was replaced by Major-General M.D. Gambier-Perry, though he soon made way for Brigadier A. Galloway in February, by which time the 14th Brigade had been brought up to full strength with the arrival of 1st Welsh Bn.
Since the first British troops had arrived on the isand the Greek military presence had been gradually reducing as the forces were sent over to the mainland. By February 1941 only 1,000 troops remained from the 7,000 men and 8,000 reservists that were originally available, although even this residue was by no means a fully armed force. When Wavell visited the island on 13th Nov. 1940 there were only 659 serviceable rifles.
Despite the changes, the first 3 months of the new year were relatively quiet, "except for occasional mild bombing attacks, nothing was seen of the enemy." ('The York and Lancaster Regiment, 1919-53' Major O.F. Sheffield, p.78). Given the task of building defences and garrisoning the small port at Suda, the Battalion had time to enjoy the beauty of the ancient isle. During his time there he got to know some members of the Fleet Air Arm, visiting the carrier HMS Eagle, and even getting a ride in an old Valencian bomber. Coincidentally, the brother of the commander of "A" coy was also the head man on the "Eagle". Another friend, known as "Snakey" Inger was a Squadron leader who led attacks in the Dodecanese. Eric recalls that he once commented 'If I get winged, I'll come back and drop it on you buggers'. The life of a soldier is apt for moments of such light-hearted sentiment, but events in Greece would soon bring this 'Cretan Summer' to an abrupt end.
Although initially panicked by the Italian campaign, the Greeks had coped well with Mussolini's attacks. Nevertheless caution was the best defence, and on the night of 27-28th March, when the Italian Fleet made a rare appearance at sea, all troops on Crete 'stood to' in battle positions whilst the Battle of Cape Matapan was fought. Despite this, the Italian campaign in general had been farcical, with the Greeks winning spectacular victories against their Adriatic neighbours. Once again it fell to Hitler's German units to salvage the campaign. During April the Germans made a series of heavy and highly successful attacks against the Allies. The Allies were forced to withdraw, rushing south abandoning arms and supplies and many artillery pieces, and not least the country which months before they'd promised to defend. The sudden evacuation of Greece meant that around 23,000 troops were landed in Crete; unorganised and without equipment.
With the Germans pushing ever further east, the question of pro-German sympathies amongst the Arabs and the uncertain Vichy leanings of the French in Syria, Crete suddenly took on a more imperative significance. The capture of Crete could seriously challenge the supremacy of Admiral Cunningham's Royal Navy in the Mediterranean. To combat this possibility it was decided that a stand would be made: a battle for Crete.
German plans for an attack on Crete had long been anticipated by strategic planners. On 25th October 1940, General Franz Halder had suggested that "mastery of the Eastern Mediterranean was dependent on the capture of Crete, and that this could best be achieved by an air landing" (Beevor, Anthony "Crete: The Battle and the Resistance" p.98). British strategic awareness was no less clear. Six and a half months before the attack, the energetic Brigadier Tidbury, appointed commander of British forces on Crete on 3rd Nov. had correctly predicted all of the German objectives and the four main dropping zones for an airborne attack.
Whilst the evacuation of Greece was still in progress, the Black Watch, and later the 2nd Battalion Yorks and Lancs, were moved by sea to Heraklion. (The Battalion had left Suda Bay minus its carrier platoon which months earlier had been sent to Greece, it suddenly turned up at Heraklion under Capt. Rhodes.)
The man of the moment was to be a New Zealander, Major General Bernard Freyberg VC. He arrived on HMS Ajax on 29th April, and the next day was placed in command of the island with orders to defend it to the utmost. His flight from the Greek mainland and sudden appointment came only weeks before the battle began. Though uninspired by his selection for the post by General Archibald Wavell, he nevertheless set about his duty of the defence of Crete with the utmost urgency. With German forces supreme in mainland Greece, a large scale attack on Crete could not be far behind. At a time when the Rommels Afrika Korps were pressing the Australian 9th Division hard at Tobruk, the Allies sorely needed to hold back the tide if they wished to avoid a manifestation of General Jodl's 'peripheral strategy' from strangling the British via the Mediterranean. Against this threat must be stressed the actual German view of things. Though impressed by the speed of the successes, Hitler himself was not convinced by the 'stepping stone' theory whereby the Germans could take the islands in the Mediterranean and then proceed to take over the Middle East, linking with Rommel's Afrika Korps. Already the Führer's attentions were far more concentrated on the planning of Operation Barbarossa, the campaign against Russia which was part of his grandiose Lebensraum plan anticipated in the 1920s in his work, Meine Kampf. Nevertheless, Goering's repeated calls for a chance to prove the effectiveness of the Luftwaffe were finally given the go-ahead on 25th April in Führer Directive 28.
The operation would be known as Operation Merkur (Mercury) under the direction of General Student, but approval came with a reservation that "The transport movements must not lead to any delay in the Strategic concentration for Barbarossa." (C:TB&TR, p.74)
In the meantime, as February drew to a close it was a wet and somewhat miserable, though by no means joyless day that marked the coming of age of Eric Crosswaite. Repairing to a good local hostelry with friends to celebrate his 21st, the festivities turned somewhat sour for one soldier, a certain Mr. Deaton who, having drunk more than he ought, fell down a hill and was injured. Even in the midst of impending danger, life was very much to be lived.
Given the background to Operation Merkur, the Allies had several things in their favour. Foremost amongst which was the remarkable extent of their intelligence on the Axis forces' future planning. Stemming from the euphemistically termed "most secret sources", we now know this vital stream of intelligence to be the famous ULTRA decodes of secret transmissions which the Germans thought indecipherable. Today we are free to talk about such sources, their contents and origins. We are privileged retrospective commentators on the situation Major General B. Freyberg found himself in during the few weeks he had on Crete. However, we must always be wary of analeptic simplifications, nor must we neglect the fundamental importance attached to, and the effort required in maintaining the secrecy of these 'most reliable sources' in what was to be their first real test - The attack on Colorado, as Crete was referred to. The importance of ULTRA transmissions is hard to underestimate, it has been claimed that the work of the decoders in Hut 3 at Bletchley Park shortened the struggle by as much as 2 years.
Given the accuracy and detail of the decodes forwarded from Bletchley Park to Freyberg's command, Creforce in the OL (Orange Leonard) 2XXX series of messages, (cf. C:TB&TR) it seems strange that Gen. Freyberg chose to dispose his forces in the way he did. Despite Brigadier Tidbury and others' assertions, he seems to have been convinced that a seaborne invasion would play a large role in the coming battle. As a result, he decided to keep large numbers of troops in reserve and paid scant attention to the key unprotected area west of the airfield at Maleme which was to prove vital to the Germans in reinforcing their attack. Instead of assembling fast-reacting mobile units to deal with the paratroops of the Air Corps, the western sectors at Canea and Maleme had a thin static defence prepared for the repulsion of a seaborne landing.
To this apparent misunderstanding must be added several other important, if not crucial factors which affected the situation on Crete in the days up to 20th May. Though long occupied as a 'Naval base', there were still many deficiencies in the island's facilities. The lines of communication in particular were abysmally lacking. At vital moments, radio communication which might have made the difference failed, or was simply non-existent. This same problem also effectively meant that the different commands were isolated. A further communicative obstacle was found in the roads and byways of Crete. Though having a number of armoured formations, including tanks, the forces on the island found it very difficult to move and transport men and materials at speed on the 'romantically dilapidated' roads. Similarly, the situation of the air forces on the island were particularly acute. Though officially under the command of the RAF, the equipment was mainly that of the Fleet Air Arm and was largely unserviceable. In any case, the day before the battle began, most of the working aircraft had been sent back to Egypt, and Allied aircraft were to play no major role in the great Airborne attack to come. In light of this, and the accepted vulnerability of the island to airborne attack, it seemed peculiar to some amongst the command that the decision to destroy or mine the airfields was not taken. Amidst all of these problems, Freyberg may have been concerned that any preventative action would have alerted the enemy to the existence of ULTRA intelligence. Thus he erred rather on the side of inaction. Despite this, and in contrast to his earlier pessimistic messages about a combined sea and air attack, Freyberg's mood seemed generally positive as the invasion that ULTRA had forewarned him about drew near. Perhaps, given the fundamental failure of German intelligence in preparing for the invasion, he had some justification.
On the eve of the battle, on the 19th May, General Student's intelligence staff led by Major Reinhardt, insisted in a summary that:
'the British garrison on Crete was no more than 5,000 strong, with only 400 men at Heraklion, and none at Rethymno. All the New Zealanders and Australians from Greece had been evacuated directly to Egypt and there were no Greek troops on the island.' (C:TB&TR, p.79)
The astounding inaccuracy of this estimate was only realised as the Battle of Crete got underway.
The German plan for Operation Merkur
Against this apparently poorly defended island were to be ranged over 22,000 German troops. Many of them would be playing a direct part in the unparalleled airborne assault which was to consist of around 570 aircraft from VIII Air Corps (8th Fliegerkorps), under General Freiherr Wolfram von Richthofen (a cousin of the WW1 Red Baron). The force included: Stukas, Junkers 88s, Dorniers, Heinkels, Messerschmitt 109s and 110s. Additionally, there was of course the enormous concentration of troop transport planes, the Junkers 52s, over 500 of them - the largest number ever seen. This force, the main part of the XI Air Corps (11th Fliegerkorps), was assembled on 7 airfields in Attica and Boetia, ready for its 300km ferry service to land troops in Crete. Originally planned to commence on the 17th May, the plans had to be delayed for the arrival of Rondine a tanker with 5,000 tonnes of aviation fuel. The new date of the attack was to be Tuesday 20th May.
The plan was not revealed to the German troops themselves until the night before the assault. General Student plan was to divide his forces and attack all three of the airfields along the northern coast of Crete.:
a) At Maleme the Storm Regiment was to attack. It was Student's largest formation, composed of 4 Battalions, each 600 strong, as opposed to the usual division of 3 Battalions of 550 men;
b) At Rethymno, 50km to the east, most of the 2nd Parachute Regiment would attack;
and at Heraklion, a further 65 km eastwards, the 1st Parachute Regiment would take the town and its airfield.
First of all would come the glider troops, with approximately 70 gliders to Maleme and Canea in the west. When the airfields were secured on Day 1 or 2, the 5th Mountain Division under General Ringel would be flown in, followed by motorcycle, artillery and engineer units.
On the 2nd day 2 flotillas of light ships, or Leichten Schiffsstafeln would send in reinforcements consisting of two battalions, together with anti-aircraft batteries. Further back up would be sent when a good sea corridor had been established. This 'back-up' flotilla was the less-than-overwhelming reality to the seaborne invasion so feared by Major General Freyberg. It was only added as assurance to satisfy Hitler who had never been convinced of the operation's merit.
Intelligence mistakes on both sides seemed to have contributed directly to the outcome of the battle itself. For their part, the Germans' estimate of a garrison of only 5,000 British troops was woefully inaccurate. In fact the total number of Allied troops present, including New Zealanders, Australians and many Greeks, was around 42,460, although only perhaps half of these were properly formed infantrymen. The huge difference between the estimate and the reality seems almost unbelievable in the circumstances, yet at this early stage in the war the arts of intelligence and not least of intelligibility had not yet been perfected, and in many cases hypothesis quickly became categorical assertion.
Major General Freyberg's failing, amongst other things was to be found in the steadfast belief that the seaborne troops would represent a major invasion force. As he later conceded "We for our part were mostly preoccupied by seaborne landings, not by the threat of air landings." (C:TB&TR, p.91) This idea was reinforced by the incorrect figures sent in the OL 2302 ULTRA message received on 13th May, which stated:
'the invading force...will consist of some thirty to thirty-five thousand men, of which some twelve thousand will be the parachute landing contingent, and ten thousand will be transported by sea.'(C:TB&TR, p.90)
The die, as it were of the Allies dispositions was already cast. In April and May the Allied troops were spread out throughout the island which was divided into sectors: Maleme & Galatas; Suda and Heraklion. This division of forces left the 22nd New Zealand Battalion at the weakest point in the west of the Maleme and Galatas sector.
The 2nd Bn. Yorks & Lancs which once again formed part of the 14th Infantry Brigade, under Brigadier Chappel, was assigned to the Heraklion (also referred to as Candia) sector. A sudden and quite unwelcome move from Suda Bay, where they'd spent the past few months. The forces in this sector were:
HQ 14th Infantry Brigade Brigadier B.H. Chappel
Infantry:
2nd Battalion The Black Watch
2nd Battalion The York and Lancaster Regt.
2nd Battalion The Leicester Regiment (from Egypt)
2/4th Australian Infantry Battalion (approx. 300 riflemen)
and 250 artillerymen from the 64th Medium Regiment armed as Infantry
Additionally, there were 3 Greek Battalions from the 3rd and 7th Greek Regiments.
Artillery:
7th Medium Regiment Royal Artillery
12 Bofors guns
2 troops of heavy AA guns
5 captured Italian guns
Armour:
7th Royal Tank Regiment (with 2 Matilda tanks)
3rd Hussars (with 6 light tanks)
These troops formed a horseshoe 'U' around the harbour at Heraklion. West-to-East, they were set out as follows:
Nearest the town on the western side of this defence perimeter line were the Greek Regiments, covering the town itself, with its stone ramparts, and also the roads west to Rethymno, and south to Knossos, where there was a hospital. Next to them, to the east of the road to Knossos was the 2nd Battalion Yorks & Lancs. They were away from the town itself, but just south of the 14th Infantry Brigade's HQ which was supported by 7th Medium RA. Next, the Leicesters filled the gap between the Y & Ls and the Australian Infantry which had taken up positions on the two hills known for obvious as the 'Charlies', about 3 km east of the town. Finally, completing the defences around the airfield were the Black Watch, together with the Bofors guns well camouflaged around the runways themselves.
All in all, Freyberg seemed quite optimistic on the eve of the battle. This was certainly the impression he'd given in a secret signal to Wavell on 16th May,
