There is fallacy of any kind in accepting the world as real.
Such of the Advaitins who accept the theory of many Jivas and say that the difference among these Jivas is caused by unreal adjuncts, also will have the fallacies that were shown in respect of “Theory of One Soul”. The propagandists of One soul do hold that the difference among the Jivas is due to unreal adjuncts. But it is never found that the differences are caused by the unreal adjuncts.
The very tenet of unreal adgunct and the difference caused by it is untenable. It is already shown that the superimposition of Atman over Atman is not possible. Even the magical projection of an object is observed only when a similar object exists and a locus i.e., adhistana to project such an object exists.
Without a real Adhistana i.e, locus and a real Pradhana i.e, a similar object no illusiory projection is possible even in a dream or a magical projection.
In the case of dream the objects seen are the manifestations of the VasanA stored in the mind but these are wrongly comprehended as if these are outside objects. In the case of magical projections the body of the magician, the pieces of cloth etc., help by him are projected as the army, tiger etc.
In the absence of Adhistana and Pradana the world is not an illusory projection. It is real. This is stated in Brahmavaivarta.
It is also stated that the magician is not able to see his magical projection. But the God sees the world all the time. Therefore, the world is not an illusory projection.
One who sees the things directly will never see the illusion. Lord Vishnu sees everything directly. He sees the world. Therefore, the world is not an illusion.
In case it is stated that one and the same Brahman undergoes the transmigration and the liberation on account of real adjuncts, then, this Brahman has to undergo the transmigration all the time since the transmigrating Jivas are always present. Therefore, attainment of such Brahman is not a liberation at all. He is always associated with the adjuncts.
It cannot be contended that the Suddha Brahman is not associated with the adjuncts. If these adjuncts are to be associated with such Brahman who is already associated with an adjunct, then, for the association of that adjunct another adjunct already associated has to be envisaged and so on. Thus, it leads to infinite regress. It also cannot be contended that the same adjuncts cause the difference and condition the Brahman because, this will lead to the fallacy of Atmasraya.
The concept of unreal adjunct is not tenable for the following reasons: The concept of unreal adjunct could be maintained only if the presence of Ajnana is maintained. Because, without the presence of Ajanana unreality of the adjunct cannot be maintained. Now, the presence of Ajana cannot be maintained without an unreal adjunct. This is because, the Jiva when differentiated by Brahman by means of unreal adjunct only can be the locus of Ajnana.
It will not help to say that it is Suddha Brahman who is the locus of Ajnana. In that case, even liberated will continue to have Ajnana as it is found in Brahman himself. Further, since this Ajnana present in Brahman has to be treated as natural and real there will be contingencies of the presence of two reals viz. Brahman and Ajnana. According to Advaitin a real entity never ceases to exist. Hence, Ajnana will remain for ever. Therefore, interdependency of Ajnanasiddhi and Mithyopsiddhi as stated above is unavoidable.
Further, there will be the fallacy of circular arguments also as follows: the presence of Mithyopadhi depends upon the presence of Ajnana, the presence of Jiva depends in the presence of MithyopAdhi, the presence of Ajnana depends on the presence of Jiva. This is a circular dependence.
It is also not correct to hold that it is Suddha Brahman who is the locus of Ajnana due to Bhrama i.e., illusion. Because, the presence of illusion depends upon the presence of Ajnana, and the presence of Ajnana depends upon the presence of illusion. Thus it leads to the fallacy of anyonyAsraya i.e., interdependence.
Vatsasruti states that there are innumerable groups of Jivas countlessly more that the past and future Paramanus (atoms) and past and future moments of time. Therefore, the transmigrating Jivas are never exhausted.
Skanda Purana states that in the thousand yojana long hall constructed by Vishvakarma there are innumerable groups of Jivas. Even in the place of a Paramanu there are innumerable Jivas. They are subtle in their nature and gross in their bodies. These remain as stated above by the power of the Supreme God.
The Advaitin’s claim that the inexplicability of falseness is more a compliment than a drawback is not correct. To brand a perceived object as Mithya a superior Pramana and a superior argument than the perception is needed. In the absence of such a superior Pramana to prove the contrary, the truth of what is seen is established by the very fact of its perceiving.
To eat the food that is actually seen requires no further evidence to prove it . On the other hand, if some body says that it is not food, then, to check up as to why it is not food a proof is necessary.
What is observed by perception, that cannot be denied without a superior Pratyaksha, Agama or Anumana. A tree that is at a distance is seen as short. This is known. Therefore, by reasoning it is comprehended to be tall. The fact of perception being slow and distorted in respect of distant objects is also established by superior perception.
The claim that the world is Mithya is not established by any Pramana. Particularly, the Mithyatva of knowledge, ignorance, joy, sorrow, difference from the God and other Jivas etc., is never observed. Therefore, the transmigration is true. According to advaitin, whatever is true that never vanishes. Therefore, Advaitin can never have liberation.
In case that which is proved by Pratyaksha is considered as Mithya merely by argument without the support of a superior Pratyaksa, then, let Atman also be false. The fact of all other things being considered as false itself is an argument that can support this contention. To posit in two different ways viz., Atman as Satya and all others as Mithya is an excess of assumption.
To consider Atman as Adhistana for superimposition is not justified since an illusion involving the superimposition on Atman is not established. If stating something that is not explicable is a compliment, then, let the acceptance of Atmamithyatva also be a compliment which is inexplicable.
Since the experience itself is a result of Avidya and the inexplicable nature of this Avidya is a compliment and something to be real needs the support of arguments, let the Jar etc., be the knower, Atman be the non-sentient, experience without experiencer, illusion without Adhistana and such other self contradictory things be acceptable.
It is contended that the Jivas are not different but it is only due to the adjuncts that the differences arise, then, there would not have been differences arise, then there would not have been differences in the experiences of joy, sorrow etc., of different persons. Just as the person who undergoes joy, sorrow etc., in the different parts of his bodu is one, the Jiva who undergoes joy, sorrow etc., in different bodies would have to be one. Further, one and the same person would have to experience the joy, sorrow etc., occurring in all bodies.
Further, just as by the removal of one finger no liberation could be attained by the removal of one adjunct i.e,, one body, no liberation is possible, since, innumerable adjuncts i.e., bodies would be still persisting.
The adjuncts being disjunct does not make any difference in the light of the statement in Mahabharatha viz., even the headless bodies were killing their enemies raising their arms with the weapons seeing the enemies with the eyes in their fallen heads.
Further, whether the adjunct conditions a part of Atman or the whole of it. In case it is stated to condition only a part, then the Atman will be an entity with parts. The entities with parts are considered as perishable by Advaitins. If it is stated that the adjunct conditions the whole of Atman, then it cannot cause any difference among the Jivas. In case, parts are conceived as arising from the adjunct itself, then, the question arises whether by the same or by another adjunct. If it is by the same adjunct, then, it leads to the fallacy of Atmasraya i.e, self dependency; if it is by another adjunct, then, that adjunct also needs another to cause the part and so on. This leads to infinite regress.
Since God i.e, Saguna Brahman is everywhere there can be no difference caused by the adjunct between Isvara and Brahman. Those that are unlimited in respect of space and time cannot have any difference caused by the adjuncts.
Further, since one and the same Isvara is associated with all adjuncts and since the difference caused by these is illusory, this one Isvara will have to undergo the experiences of Joy and sorrow of all just as one and the same person experiences the pleasure and pains occurring in different parts of the body.
Since both Isvara and Suddha Brahman are unlimited in respect of space and time, there can be no difference between then caused by the adjunct. Therefore, no Suddha Brahman different from Isvara who undergoes suffering could be conceived. Consequently, the transmigration will be a natural course and there can be no end to it.
Now, is the transmigration to Visista i.e., Jiva or Suddha Brahman? If it is stated that Suddha under goes transmigration, then, it will be a self contradictory statement. To avoid this, if it is stated that Visista i.e., Jiva undergoes transmigration , then there arises the further question whether this Jiva is different from Brahman or the same one. If it is the same one, then, the fallacy of self-contradiction is already pointed out. If it is different, then, whether it is eternal or pershible? If perishable, then, it has to perish. There is no hope of liberation.
If it is eternal, then the difference will be real, and will persist even after liberation. If it is contended that its basic nature is one but it assumes difference by the adjuncts, then , as its very naure is contaminated by the adjunct it is no longer Suddha. Something that is of impure nature can never become pure even according to Advaitin. As against the contention that the adjunct is superimposed , the fallacies of Anyonyasraya etc. are already pointed out.
It is also not correct to say that the difference is due to the difference in Anadhikarma. Because, the difference of Anadhikarma can be posited only on the ground of the difference due to adjuncts and the latter is posited only on the former. This again leads to Anyonyasraya.
Thus, there are innumerable fallacies in Advaitaposition. However, the discussion will be closed here to avoid the lengthening of the text. To conclude, we declare that abheda (non-difference) is not the purport of Sruti as it is against all evidence.
Brahman of Advaita cannot be conveyed by the Sruti since he is not conveyed by any word by Vachyavrtti. Nor he can be conveyed by Laksanavrtti, since, that which is not conveyed by any word by Vachyavrtti cannot be conveyed by Lakshana also. Thus, being non-comminicable and unknowable, it is good as Sunya (of Buddhist).
Advaitins do not also say that it can know itself, since, one and the same cannot be both the agent and the object.
Neither the very Brahman could be known nor anything else. There is no knower. There can be no knowledge without a knower. Therefore, in the absence of a knower and a known, the so called knowledge is as good as void. Therefore, there is no difference between void theory of Buddhists and Advaita. Knowledge without a knower and a known is never found.
Further, since the difference between Isvara and Jiva is not known by any other Pramana the denial of it i.e., Abheda cannot be the purport of Sruti.
The Mahopanishat states that the entire scriptures chiefly convey the Supreme God who possesses unlimited number of attributes, who is absolutely free from defects, who is unique and distinct from all others. The scriptures does not convey anything else.
Therefore, it is established that Lord Narayana is conveyed by the entire scriptures as unique and distinct from all others.
