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Preface
1. The CIABG and Dunkirk
2. A meeting at 21 Army Group Main HQ
3. Back at the CIABG
4. Final Composition
5. Departure and the route
6. Crossing the border and Cheb
7. To Plzeň
8. Delay in Plzeň
9. Situation in the American zone
10. To Prague against orders
11. In and around Prague
12. The American zone again

Preface

No.22 Liaison (Czech) HQ, also known as just 22 LHQ, was formed on 22nd August 1940 at Cholmondeley Camp, the reception centre for Czechoslovak soldiers evacuated to Britain with the fall of France. Its job was to ease relations between the Czechoslovak Brigade being formed and the British higher command and other units. It remained in close association with the Brigade throughout the war, up to and including its transfer to Czechoslovakia in May 1945.

It must be appreciated that much of the information below comes from original British military documents, and is therefore recorded from the British perspective. At certain times this was with more knowledge of what was happening than the Czechoslovaks had, at some times less. I am aware that events related here conflict with 'facts' and dates in some of the Czech material published in the 1990's, but they do agree with some of the latest Czech research, which uses original Czechoslovak military documents of the time rather than personal memories recorded much later.

1. The CIABG and Dunkirk

The Czechoslovak Independent Armoured Brigade Group (CIABG) was formed on 1st September 1943 from the original Czechoslovak Brigade with a strength of 194 Officers (with 207 unposted Officers surplus to requirements) and 2,365 Other Ranks, plus the men of the Czechoslovak units newly arrived from service in the Middle East and North Africa (including the siege of Tobruk), consisting of 48 Officers and 1,274 Other Ranks. The average strength of the new CIABG in September 1943 was 245 Officers, 129 unposted Officers, and 3,659 Other Ranks. They re-equipped and trained extensively in Britain before being sent to mainland Europe in September 1944. Here they were not used on the main front, but instead took over the siege of the isolated German garrison in Dunkirk from October 1944 as part of Montgomery's 21 Army Group.

With the end of the war quickly approaching in the spring of 1945, Czechoslovak politicians and senior Officers were very keen for the CIABG to be released from their duties at Dunkirk to take part in the fighting in Germany before their return to their homeland, and many representations were made through various channels to try and achieve this aim.

On 4th April 1945 the AA&QMG, LAC, HQ 21 Army Group visited 22 LHQ near Dunkirk and lunched there. In the afternoon he had a brief meeting with the GOC CIABG (General Officer Commanding - General Liška). The object of the visit was to explain that everything possible had been done to obtain the CIABG's release from Dunkirk, but that operational requirements did not make it feasible at that time. While the GOC CIABG appreciated this, he left the AA&QMG in no doubt as to the contingent's eagerness to get on the move towards their own country and to have the opportunity of participating in the war inside Germany.

The 'operational requirements' referred to involved the concerns of the British about finding troops to replace the CIABG at Dunkirk, along with American concerns about supply and maintenance of units with British equipment while attached to American forces.

2. A meeting at 21 Army Group Main HQ

In the morning of 18th April 1944 American troops crossed the line of the pre-war border from Germany into Czechoslovakia, taking the village of Hranice north of Aš. At 11.30hrs on the 19th there was a telephone call from 21 Army Group to 22 LHQ with an urgent requirement for the CO (Commanding Officer - Colonel H. Bleecker) to fly immediately to the main 21 Army Group HQ. At that moment the CO was visiting various units with the GOC Dunkirk Force (General Liška), so there was a short delay in reaching him and in his returning to his HQ. Meanwhile, arrangements were made for him to fly by Mosquito aircraft from the Coxyde airfield to Eindhoven, and then onwards by Auster. He left at 14.00hrs and returned from his trip the next day at 18.45hrs.

Although there were a number of minor things mentioned during the CO's meetings spread over the two days, the first and principle matter under discussion with the BGS (Ops) was the suggestion by the Supreme Allied Commander that a token force be sent from the CIABG to join American forces on their entry into Czechoslovakia. The first question was the size of the force. Although it was originally suggested it be of regimental strength, after discussions which showed the difficulty in obtaining the required number of tank transporters it was considered more appropriate that the Motor Battalion be released.

Colonel Bleecker was asked to consider the matter overnight and report the next morning as to the effect of the release on the Brigade, what troops might be needed as replacements, and the composition of the token force. He was also advised that the matter should be kept completely secret and not be mentioned to anyone.

Having considered it carefully, the next morning he reported to BGS (Ops) that he had the following two observations to make. First, that although he was not supposed to be interested in political affairs, he had heard several times from senior Czechoslovak officers that it was considered imperative from the political point of view that the entire Brigade be released from Dunkirk and take part in the main fighting in Germany before its return to Czechoslovakia. Second, that the Brigade as a whole should return to Czechoslovakia as soon as possible after the end of hostilities. Both these points were considered necessary to balance the prevailing Russian influence with British trained and equipped Czechoslovak forces. Under those circumstances the reason for sending the token force was not clear to him.

In answer to this, Colonel Bleecker was told that it was the wish of the Supreme Allied Commander and that he was only required to agree the composition of the force, now limited to 150 men. In return, Bleecker suggested that this was a matter for the GOC CIABG to decide, but that sending part of the armour and part of the Motorised Infantry might be considered.

The matter was then referred to SHAEF (Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Force) and any further discussions with Bleecker were to take place by telephone. He then returned to 22 LHQ near Dunkirk.

3. Back at the CIABG

At 09.00hrs on 21st April 1945, the day after Bleecker's return, Main HQ 21 Army Group telephoned him and requested that the GOC CIABG be informed and that the token force under discussion should be ready to leave as soon as possible. The date of departure was to be 24th April.

When told of what was proposed, the GOC also did not understand why this force was being sent. However he agreed to provide one, but not as Bleecker had suggested to 21 Army Group the day before. He did not want his units to be split, so therefore suggested that the force should be made up of the entire Light Anti-Aircraft Troop (LAA Tp) consisting of 3 Officers and 81 Other Ranks. Additions to this were suggested, probably to consist of one platoon of the Motor Battalion, one scout section, service units, and extra motor transport for the required petrol and rations.

It was also decided that a more senior officer than the commander of the LAA Tp should be in charge of the force, and Lt.Colonel Alois Sítek, commander of the Anti-Tank Battery, was nominated. Instructions required 22 LHQ to send one officer with the force, and this was to be the staff captain, Capt. Geoffrey H. Stephenson, along with his car and batman-driver.

On 22nd April at 10.15hrs a message was sent from HQ 21 Army Group, received at 13.55hrs, officially confirming the order for the movement of the Token Force.

Click below to view Bleecker's report on the meeting at 21 Army Group and subsequent dicussions by telephone
Page 1 (134KB)    Page2 (155KB)   Page 3 (99KB)

4. Final Composition

Shortly after receipt of the order from HQ 21 Army Group, a message was sent back to Q(Maint) there at 14.57hrs stating that the Token Force being sent to Czechoslovakia would comprise a total strength of 9 Officers, 132 Other Ranks, 7 motorcycles and 27 vehicles, with 6 Bofors guns, and that the "Party includes staff captain this HQ" (Capt. Stephenson, presumably also his batman-driver).

According to the war establishment of the LAA Tp it should have had 1 Captain, 1 Lieutenant, 1 2nd Lieutenant, and 81 Other Ranks. A summary report for the week ending 22nd April 1944 shows the unit to be slightly over-establishment, with an actual strength of 5 Officers and 82 Other Ranks (of which 2 were Warrant Officers). The British Army 'Field Return' for the week ending 21st April of officers in the unit identifies them as follows.

The War Diary of the Motor Battalion ('Motoprapor') contains a list of men from the battalion who were sent with the Token Force.

The title translates as "Name list of people destined for the group of Lt.Col. Sítek for the Czechoslovak Republic". The column after the list number indicates the rank of the person. The higher in the list, the higher the rank. Entry number 33 for Jiří Färber has a line through it with at the end the words "vratil se" (he returned). The last column indicates the sub-unit of the Motor Battalion that the person comes from. "1.MR.", "2.MR.", and "3.MR." mean the 1st, 2nd, and 3rd Companies ('Motorota') of the battalion, "VR" means the HQ Company, and "RDZ" the Support Company. At the bottom is noted the total, 2 Officers and 40 men.

CLICK HERE TO SEE A COPY OF THE ORIGINAL LIST OF MOTOR BATTALION PERSONNEL (147KB)

The 5 Officers and 82 Other Ranks from the LAA Tp, plus the 2 Officers and 40 Other Ranks from the Motor Battalion, plus Capt. Stephenson and his batman-driver, plus Lt.Col. Sitek, account for all of the 9 Officers and 123 of the 132 Other Ranks mentioned in the message to Q(Maint) at 21 Army Group HQ, with 9 more unidentified Other Ranks providing the additional services and transport required by the expedition.

5. Departure and the route

On 23rd April arrangements were made for members of the Token Force travelling to Czechoslovakia to exchange money. At 11.00hrs the OC Token Force (Lt.Col. Sítek) visited 22 LHQ, and at 15.00hrs Col. Bleecker and Capt. Stephenson went with the GOC and C of S (Chief of Staff) of the CIABG to inspect the Token Force and to hear the GOC's farewell.

The final day before departure had not been without difficulty. A probable route to the borders of Czechoslovakia had been 'extracted' from Q (M) 21 Army Group, but the combined efforts of 'G' and 'Q' at 22 LHQ had failed to make satisfactory arrangements for the well being of the Token Force in other respects - even in the matter of replenishment points en-route. In the end the CO telephoned BGS Q(AE) HQ 21 Army Group, who promised to make all necessary arrangements.

At 06.30hrs on 24th April Capt. Stephenson left 22 LHQ to join the Token Force which was starting for Czechoslovakia at 07.00hrs. The only mention in the CIABG War Diaries about this is a brief entry in the HQ diary which reads as follows.

The first day took them to Bastogne, about half way through the Ardennes, the next day contacting a General Moses in Wiesbaden and being told to get in touch with the 3rd Army at Erlangen. This they did on 27th April, and were sent on to 97th Infantry Division at Wunsiedel. A short message sent back to 22 LHQ at 13.52hrs that day gave details of their progress. The text was "Arrived 3rd US Army today. Attached to 97 Inf Div. All well. Please inform General Liska. Please address mail care of 97 Inf Div." The sender is shown as "Stephenson and Sitek".

Each night of the journey billets had been found in the towns or villages being passed through. Usually there was a German barracks in the towns that served the purpose well, but there were some problems during the journey too. Bridges were down and long and difficult detours had to be made. It was found necessary to do a reconnaissance for each days journey, even with such a small column, and the route was particularly difficult between Trier and Aschaffenburg.

Petrol was also a problem. Although it existed, it was difficult to locate as the Americans were moving all the time and nobody knew where anything was to be found. The same applied to Workshop and Recovery facilities, with the added complication that they had no spares for British vehicles. The surfaces and conditions were so bad that Stephenson later recommended the use of Jeeps rather than Utility cars when the time came for the main body of the Brigade to make the same journey.

However, it wasn't all bad news. Except for one motor car written off in an accident on  28th April, all the other vehicles that set out from Dunkirk later reached Czechoslovakia, even though the petrol lorry 'ran a bearing' on the first day and had to be towed for more than 500 miles. In a later message to 22 LHQ Stephenson remarks on this and comments that "even the carrier" (Bren gun carrier vehicle) had made the trip successfully, and asks one of the men back at Dunkirk to pay up on a bet about it!

The 97th Infantry Division moved out from Wunsiedel on 29th April, replaced by the 1st Infantry Division, 1st US Army, to whom the Token Force was then transferred. During this time they rested and did maintenance.

6. Crossing the border and Cheb

On 1st May the unit moved the 25km to the town of Cheb (Eger) in what had been Czechoslovakia, becoming attached to the 18th Infantry Regiment of the 1st US Division. They crossed the border at 11.00hrs and had a brief ceremony. Lt Col. Sítek made a speech, the Czechoslovak flag was hoisted and the national anthem sung. Stephenson had managed to find numerous press photographers, reporters, and public relations officers, so the event was suitably recorded.

He had also arranged for them to be present when they entered Cheb, making a "triumphant" spectacle. Copies of Lt.Col. Sítek's speech were distributed to the press in both Czech and English, and sound recordings were made in both Czech and English, with promises that they would be played on the Czechoslovak and American networks. He had also put in a considerable amount of 'selling talk' with all levels from Patton's Chief of Staff downwards at all the HQs they had visited (12th Army, 3rd Army, 97th Division, 1st Division) to try and get the main body of the CIABG released from Dunkirk and back to Czechoslovakia.

Stephenson described Cheb as being "not much of a place and is 100% German and pretty hostile ones at that". During the next few days the men of the Token force took over responsibility for security in the town. Patrols were made by the half-tracks and carriers of the unit out to the surrounding villages, but without any serious fighting. Czechoslovaks were enlisted to help the new local administration and armed with captured German rifles, with a view to keeping this area of the Sudetenland functioning as part of Czechoslovakia and maintaining order and discipline in the rear areas after the frontline troops had moved on.

They had their hands full not just with taking prisoner the small detachments of German forces throughout the area, but also with the thousands of released and escaped allied nationals who had been prisoners of the Germans. There were at least 5,000 Russians in the town, with almost the same number of Poles plus many French, Belgians, Dutch, Hungarians, and other nationalities.

7. To Plzeň

As the American advance in front of Cheb seemed to have come to a halt, on 6th May Stephenson and Sítek went to the HQ of 1st US Division to ask that the Token Force be transferred to the spearhead most likely to reach Prague first. They were ordered to report to 2nd US Infantry Division the next day, and arrangements were made to leave in the morning. Lt Sommr was sent on to Plzeň as Liaison Officer on orders from 1st US Division. Sections that had been stationed at Františkovy Lázňe and other outlying points were called in and replaced with the recently recruited local Czechoslovaks.

In the morning of the 7th May, Stephenson and Sítek went on ahead of the main column and found the HQ of 2nd US Division in Plzeň, the day after it was liberated. They immediately requested permission to proceed to Prague, but this was refused. The road was still occupied by the enemy in too much strength strength for them to proceed alone, although the HQ promised to try and obtain permission as soon as it was clear. The two Officers then went to see the 'Burgomaster' and Czechoslovak Military Commander of the town to arrange the official entry of the Token Force into the city. The welcome from these officials was warm, but all were extremely worried about news coming in of heavy street fighting in Prague.

The main body of the Token Force entered Plzeň at 18.00hrs and were welcomed by an enormous crowd, excited at seeing Czechoslovak troops after such a long time. There were bands, processions and girls in national costumes all the way along the route around the city, the first 'real' Czechoslovak town the troops had arrived at. The troops were billeted for the night in the outskirts of the town.

8. Delay in Plzeň

Late in the evening Stephenson went with Sítek to the house of the 'Burgomaster'. From here Sítek telephoned to the GOC in Prague who requested immediate assistance, saying that the situation was critical and the SS were using civilians to screen their tanks and to remove barricades. After discussions with the Czechoslovak Military Commander they went to the HQ of 2nd US Division, informing the Chief of Staff about the situation in the capital and stressing the need for immediate assistance to be sent. They explained that as well as the men of the Token Force there were 1,000 armed 'partisans' with their own transport, waiting at that moment in the main square ready to leave. They asked to be released immediately and be permitted to proceed to Prague. They already had an Officer who had come out from Prague and knew a clear route into the city.

The Chief of Staff saw the commanding Officer of 2nd Division, General Richardson [should be General Robertson?], on their behalf and returned with a refusal. The General had said that he agreed with their desire to assist in Prague and would have gone himself with his own men if he had not had direct orders not to. He had been ordered to hold his present line and not to take any offensive action beyond it. He considered that to permit a body of armed men to go beyond this line would be breaking those orders and therefore he could not give his consent. However, a message was sent to US V.Corps (although they were not able to be contacted by telephone) asking for permission to go to Prague.

The next day, 8th May, the Token Force moved to the village of Kyšice, just outside Plzeň on the road to Prague. Reports of heavy fighting continued to come in from Prague, and the local population could not understand why the troops did not go to the assistance of the people there. Stephenson was busy back at 2nd Division HQ, but they were unable to release the unit as they had still not received a reply to their request from V.Corps HQ, who were expected to arrive in Plzeň later that day and finally did so at 18.00hrs. Having immediately explained the situation to them, the G3 (Operations) Officer of V.Corps telephoned their Army command, who in turn telephoned SHAEF. The order came back to remain where they were.

On May 9th they were still trying to get permission to proceed at V.Corps HQ and were assured that representations had been made through Army command on their behalf, but that nothing could be done until a reply was received. It was suggested that things might be held up until after the armistice period. In the evening Stephenson met some journalists he had previously had contact with. They had just returned from Prague and confirmed that the Russians had entered the city. As a result of the uprising and the fighting that followed, the damage to buildings had been light but civilian casualties quite heavy. Lt.Col. Sítek became increasingly impatient with the continuing delay.

On May 10th Sítek and Stephenson were again at V.Corps HQ asking to be released. They were told to return the next day as there had still been no reply from Army command, but all at the HQ were extremely confident that now, after the armistice, there would be no further difficulties in being released. An appointment was made for 09.00hrs the next morning.

On the basis of this hopeful news the Officer commanding the Light Anti-Aircraft Battery was sent to Prague to make arrangements with the GOC there for the arrival of the Token Force, and also to get Russian approval. Concerning the latter, the Russian general commanding the troops in Prague was visited, and although he himself had no objections to their arrival, he needed confirmation from his marshal before he could give his final approval. All arrangements to depart the next morning were made, and Lt.Col. Sítek ordered that the column should leave Kyšice at 10.00hrs so that there would be plenty of time to catch up with it after leaving V.Corps HQ with the release.

9. Situation in the American zone

On the 9th May thousands of prisoners had started to arrive in Plzeň from all directions, along with long columns of civilian refugees. The men of the Token Force were employed in controlling them and helping with the language problems. Some indication of the conditions may be understood from a telephone call made on the 10th by a General Allen to Major-General H.R. Bull (AC of S, G-3) at SHAEF, and the resulting message from Major-General Bull to D/AC of S the same day. It refers to the severe problems with personnel infiltrating the American lines from East to West, and the intention of General Bradley (commander of 12th Army Group) to ask for permission to withdraw to the line of the Czechoslovak border, in more mountainous terrain, allowing better control and prevention of this movement.

CLICK HERE TO SEE A COPY OF THE ORIGINAL MESSAGE ABOUT THE BULL-ALLEN TELEPHONE CALL (60KB)
From PRO - WO 219/2147 (Crown Copyright Reserved)

It would seem that General Bradley went ahead and made his request for permission to withdraw and that it caused quite a stir, the news even reaching as far as the British Prime Minister,Winston Churchill. In British Foreign Office records there is a message from Orme Sargent to the Prime Minister dated 10th May 1945. Part of the text is as follows.

The response from the Allied Command was swift. In a message timed at 19.10hrs on the 10th from SHAEF (Forward), signed SCAEF (Supreme Commander Allied Expeditionary Force - General Eisenhower) to 12th Army Group (General Bradley), clear instructions are given to maintain the present line, establish a secondary barrier in the mountains, and return all personnel trying to infiltrate towards the West to the Russians after contact had been made with them.

CLICK HERE TO SEE A COPY OF THE ORIGINAL MESSAGE FROM EISENHOWER TO BRADLEY (65KB)
From PRO - WO 219/2147 (Crown Copyright Reserved)

Much later, on 16th June, General Bull sent a message to the Chief of Staff concerning the eventual withdrawal of American forces from Czechoslovakia. Attached to it was a map which was stated as showing the area of Czechoslovakia occupied by the US. However, close inspection of the front line drawn on the map indicates that it is not contemporary with the message, but in fact shows the approximate front line just before the end of hostilities. The position shown is possibly that on the 7th or 8th of May (with some areas using information a day or two older), the time when the Token Force had arrived in Plzeň and were seeking permission to continue to Prague.

CLICK HERE TO SEE A LARGER VERSION OF THE MAP (93KB)
or CLICK HERE TO SEE A COPY OF THE JUNE MESSAGE (95KB)
From PRO - WO 219/2147 (Crown Copyright Reserved)

Although the map is for high level post-hostilities 'political' information and certainly not for operational use at any level, it seems strange that in the middle of June such a senior officer is using such an outdated map. A number of areas clearly show that the map indicates the front line just before the end of hostilities, rather than the demarcation line that was agreed after contact was made with the Russians.

1. The fact that the line is indicated as being the "Present Front Line", and not the fixed, post-hostilities, demarcation line.
2. Český Krumlov and a large area to the west of České Budějovice is shown as being beyond the American lines. In fact this area fell within the American zone of occupation .
3. Písek and an area on the right bank of the river Vltava to the north-east of the town is shown as being within the American lines. Although American reconnaissance units did move this far, this area, just including the town of Písek, was occupied by Soviet forces.
4. Between Blatná and Blovice the line is more advanced than that of the later established demarcation line.
5. Karlovy Vary is shown as being within the American lines. Although the Americans did enter the town, it later came within the Soviet zone of occupation.
6. The area to the north of Sokolov is shown as being beyond the American lines. This area was captured by them before the end of hostilities and formed part of their zone of occupation.

Overall the map gives the impression of showing the position of maximum American advance between Písek and Karlovy Vary , corresponding to the 7th or 8th May, from which they later withdrew in places to the demarcation line agreed with the Soviets. However, the information shown for the areas to the west and south-west of České Budějovice, and for north of Sokolov, is several days older and does not show the 'up to date' position of the American front line as it was at the end of hostilities on the 8th/9th May..

10. To Prague against orders

On May 11th Stephenson and Sítek were at V.Corps HQ by 09.00hrs, but found that there was still no reply from Army command. They immediately phoned through to Army only to be told that no satisfactory answer was likely to come through their channels. It was suggested that they contact SHAEF direct. The G3 (Operations) Officer of V.Corps HQ was able to get through to SHAEF only with difficulty and after a delay. This officer then explained the situation, requesting that the Token Force be released to go to Prague, with Stephenson listening on another phone. The reply was 'No', they were to stay on the American side of the line and not to cross it. This was quite definite and a great disappointment.

Records from "SHAEF G-3 Ops 'A'" have a message sent later the same day from an "A.S. Nevins, Brigadier General, GSC, Chief, Ops Section" at "SHAEF G-3 Division (Forward)", to the "AC of S, G-3 (thru DAC of S, G-3)". This seems to be as a direct result of the telephone call from V.Corps. It confirms that the Token Force was ordered NOT to go to Prague and mentions the need for the ban on troop movements crossing the demarcation line agreed with the Russians to be emphasised to the Czechoslovak Brigade on the arrival of the main body in Czechoslovakia. The first paragraph reads as follows.

CLICK HERE TO VIEW A COPY OF THE ORIGINAL MESSAGE FROM NEVINS (75KB)
From PRO - WO 219/2147 (Crown Copyright Reserved)

The only thing for Sítek and Stephenson to do was to catch up with the column and turn it back - it was 10.45hrs and the column had already left Kyšice. At first Sítek wanted to ignore the instructions and continue to Prague anyway, considering himself to be now under the command of the Czechoslovak Military Command in Prague who had asked for him to go there. However, after Stephenson pointed out to him that he had received a direct order, that the consequences of ignoring that order may be very serious, and that they may not be aware of all the facts and could therefore not judge the reason for the order, Sítek agreed and tried to catch up with the column as quickly as possible.

Going in the opposite direction was a dense flow of Russian traffic, sometimes three vehicles abreast. Tanks, guns, lorries and horse drawn vehicles all mixed up with long columns of POWs and refugees in a great confusion. This delayed them considerably, and to make things worse one of the tyres of their vehicle had a puncture, and the spare tyre was found to be flat.

The result was that the two officers did not catch up with the column until they found it waiting for them on the outskirts of Prague. Also waiting were several cars with officials from the National Council and Military, along with girls in national costume, who had come out to welcome the troops. Under these circumstances Sítek felt it was impossible to withdraw his men and return to Kyšice, so he decided to continue with the planned parade and to go and see General Svoboda, Minister of National Defence and Commander in Chief, immediately afterwards for instructions.

11. In and around Prague

The Token Force was led for many miles around the streets of Prague, often stopping for speeches of welcome from local officials, until finally the column was halted in Wenceslas square with the head facing the museum. Here it remained for some time with people cheering and milling around. Stephenson comments in his report "I unfortunately did not enjoy it as much as I should have liked to as there were of course thousands of Russians everywhere and I was very worried about the outcome of the whole affair". Fortunately there were no incidents and the procession finished in the outskirts of the city where the men were billeted for the night.

Sítek and Stephenson went to the Hotel Alcron, the location of the Czechoslovak Commander's HQ. Here they met Col. Ondraček, previously CIABG Chief of Staff. After explaining the situation to him, he informed them that they should leave the city the next day, but that there would be no problems. They also met General Boček (known as Col. Chodský when previously Second in Command of the CIABG) and several other Czechoslovak officers who had been with the CIABG in England and come through with the Russians, arriving in Prague that morning. Sítek and Stephenson stayed at the Hotel Alcron for the night.

The next morning, 12th May, Sítek went to see General Svoboda while Stephenson went to the Hotel Ambassador which was being used as an HQ by British POWs. He found about 3,000 men based there, and promised to send whatever transport he could arrange.

12. The American zone again

The column of the Token Force had moved off at 09.00hrs on the way back to the American zone, going to Horní Bříza about 10km north of Plzeň. This is where Sítek and Stephenson caught up with them in the middle of a tremendous reception. Later there was a difficult moment when the two Officers were stopped by a Russian patrol while returning from 2nd Division HQ. They got through, but decided that another route must be found due to the large number of Russians everywhere.

On 13th May the men did maintenance work and were free in the afternoon for an official reception in the village. While at V.Corps HQ the next day Stephenson met several senior officers from the CIABG who had travelled on ahead of the main body with the GOC. He also found Col. Bleecker there, the CO of his own unit 22 LHQ, and reported to him. He arranged to return the next morning with Lt.Col. Sítek who was in Horní Bříza, unaware of the arrival of the senior officers.

On 16th May it was decided that the CIABG would be located on the demarcation line between the American and Russian armies to the south and east of Klatovy (Klattau), and all officers of the advance party were sent to reconnoitre the area. The next day the first units of the CIABG passed through Plzeň, and on the day after that the HQ of 22 LHQ was established at Zámek Nalžovy, Stříbrné Hory (now called Nalžovské Hory), with that of the CIABG temporarily at Hradešice, later moving to Zámek Nalžovy on the 23rd May.

On 19th May the Token Force was ordered to re-join the CIABG at it's new location on the 22nd May. This was looked on as a good thing. The Russians had been moving into Horní Bříza in large numbers claiming that the village was in their area. The next day it was found that there had been changes made to the demarcation line and the Token Force had been billeted in the Russian zone, but by the time Sítek and Stephenson returned to Horní Bříza the Russians had moved out.

In the days since their arrival at Horní Bříza, lorries of the Token Force had been used to transport POWs from Prague into the American zone, making their last journey on 20th May. They had managed to start on their way home 450 British POWs and 30 to 40 Americans, with civilian drivers bringing out another 150 British.

On 21st May the Token Force left Horní Bříza to re-join the CIABG, except for the Light Anti-Aircraft Battery which left the next day. Also on the 22nd May Capt. Stephenson reported to the new HQ of 22 LHQ at Stříbrné Hory.