The Dignified Rant

I am amazed when some opponents of the war opine that we can't hold elections in Iraq until the entire country is as quiet as—oh let's be generous and say Washington, D. C. or Detroit. This opinion is just sheer idiocy:

In the long run, the only way to end the terror is to dry up the sea of Sunni resentment. This will require both the stick of military suppression and the carrot of political incentive. If the Sunnis cannot or will not vote, protracted civil war lies ahead.

Creating conditions in which Sunnis will vote may take some time, but it would be time well spent. If this means delaying the election, so be it. The January deadline is just as arbitrary as every other deadline in the transition process, and it would be counterproductive to enforce it if the election was then seen as illegitimate.

Those murdering thugs were thrown out of the neck-stomping business and we need to cater to their resentment? Sure, the January deadline is arbitrary. Although Iraqis let us know they expected elections quickly and January is at the outer end of what they want. But even if we ignore the desires of Iraqis to vote sooner rather than later, once a date is established it is no longer just an arbitrary date that can be moved back at will. No, the election date is now an objective of the war. Baathists and Islamists now see the January elections as a target to be delayed. If we say that the election date is dependent on peace and quiet, we just guarantee that there will be more violence. Why on bloody Earth would we give our enemies a veto over elections?

Elections that can get some Sunnis into the political process despite their bloody history of oppression is enough of an incentive. The train of sovereignty needs to pull out of the station on time and if the Sunnis don't want to get on—screw 'em. The Shias and Kurds with the legitimacy of elections supporting them will be happy to return the violence they've endured tenfold if the Sunnis decide war is the answer to their so-called resentment of not being on top of the heap after four centuries of brutal minority rule. I don't give a rip if the murderers don't think the elections are legitimate. As if they allowed any at all under their rule!

If we don't move on in the process and hold elections, protracted civil war will surely be the result, at best. At worst, the Shias will begin to wonder if we are serious about elections that their numbers will dominate. As I've said before, if we lose the Shias, we can't win in

Iraq

and delays are a sure fire recipe for stoking Shia paranoia and fear of the return of their Sunni overlords. I swear, academia removes all freaking common sense from those who live inside the university cocoon.

I try very hard to remember that we have friends in

France

and that the Paris-based French government is really what I am railing about when I slap "

France

" around (Hey, maybe it is just that 'Gallic Triangle' from Paris to Strasbourg to Vichy?). But Paris does make it difficult:

France

said Monday that it would take part in a proposed international conference on

Iraq

only if the agenda included a possible

U.S.

troop withdrawal. Paris also wants representatives of

Iraq

's insurgent groups (you know, the Ba'athists and Beheaders Brigades) to be invited.

France

must really love

America

if we are to believe they will be eager to send troops to

Iraq

as long as it doesn't help Bush and insist that American forces get out for a deserved rest after a long fight. Their dedication to a traditional ally is touching.

Will one of our friends in new Europe please insist that the Corsican separatists get a seat at the next EU meeting? And that French withdrawal from that poor island be on the agenda?

Repeated assertions by those opposed to destroying Saddam's regime that

Iraq

never had WMD would seem to be false on the face of it considering

Iraq

's extensive use of chemical weapons in the 1980s.

And the fall-back position that possession of chemical weapons was a giant charade believed by all Iraqis in power and the military and carried out by scientists too fearful to admit they had nothing seems ridiculous to me. The massive amounts of raw materials to produce chemical weapons found in Iraq, the ease of using pesticide plants to produce chemical weapons, and Iraq's extensive expertise all argue that at worst, Saddam could have quickly produced chemical weapons for use had he ordered it. At worst, they are out there somewhere.

I believe Saddam had chemical weapons prior to the war but that at some point just prior to the invasion, they were moved into hiding. Where I do not know, but (via Winds of Change) we will find them:

Lt. Gen. Michael DeLong (USMC Ret.), who until last September was the No. 2 in command of the

Iraq

war under Gen. Tommy Franks, revealed Sunday that

U.S.

military intelligence had determined that weapons of mass destruction were being smuggled out of the country as the

U.S.

prepared to invade. "I do know for a fact that some of those weapons went into Syria, Lebanon and Iran," Gen. DeLong told WABC Radio's Steve Malzberg, while discussing his new book, "Inside CENTCOM: The Unvarnished Truth About the Wars in Afghanistan and Iraq."

Right now, we know that Saddam would have built WMD as soon as the world let up the pressure on Saddam's regime (and the French and Russians were hard at work to do just that with the Arab League cheering them on). That was reason enough to destroy Saddam's regime. But I think we will find those chemical weapons. It makes no sense that Saddam would have given up a proven weapon that he eagerly used. They are buried inside

Iraq

or are in a nearby country such as

Iran

Syria

, and

Lebanon

And as long as I'm on the subject of why we had to destroy Saddam's regime, here are some of those nonexistent Saddam-al Qaeda/terrorism links. But I forget what the current standard of proof is. Are we up to needing to prove they shared a cubicle in the same office and all chipped into the same sweet mint tea fund?

Reports over the past 24 - 48 hours via several important information services such as SMCCDI, Peykeiran, Zagros and direct email reports and phone calls from Iranian citizens is beginning to shine light on what at this time looks to be country-wide fighting and quickly escalating into what could potentially become a freedom revolution.

Several independent citizen sources have reported the formation of significant crowds throughout the country, and have heard many loud explosions and gun shots, including in the cities of Tehran, Esfahan, and Shiraz.

SMCCDI and Peykeiran have both reported intense battles between freedom-loving Iranian citizens and the regime's fanatical militias in the village of Meeyan Do Ab. Both sources are reporting many deaths and injuries both to the villagers and regime's forces.

I have no idea about the reliability of this source. It could just be hopeful activists inflating a couple riots that as I understand it are not uncommon. But I have expected something like this for a long time, so if it is happening now, this is no surprise in that sense. But wow if true. Missiles and nukes can’t be allowed to fall into the mullahs’ evil hands.

Brit Hume mentioned something in passing that affects my Insurgent Effectiveness post. One thing I had wondered about in my post was how attacks were defined. Hume noted that from March to April 2004, the military broadened its definition of attacks to include everything. It was implied that before the change, only more serious attacks were counted. Perhaps only attacks that inflicted casualties? According to the statistics, April attacks shot up in April over March. I assumed this was part of the Fallujah battles. I was curious about why March did not have more attacks given the fighting going on that month, but it did not occur to me that the statistics would be incompatible.

Two things flow from this. One, the effectiveness measure is only accurate from April to August. Even in this truncated chart, insurgent effectiveness is going down. Second, the increase in reported attacks which the press is relying on to show a spreading insurgency (despite the obvious fact that geographically it remains quite contained) is a false increase at least in part. The third thing to note, of course, is the difficulty of judging how things are going from a distance.

The killing of Khalil could embarrass Syrian leader Bashar Assad, who appears to have few options. The bombing makes Assad look weak, but at the same time he is under intense

U.S.

pressure to expel the militant groups and has signaled in recent weeks that he is trying to appease Washington.

Assad was not embarrassed by harboring a terrorist. He was embarrassed by his untimely death at the hands of those whom he would kill.

I respect Robert Kaplan but his article on the similarities of the war on terror with the war on Indians in our frontier past just seems silly. I don’t feel like commenting on that but I did notice this in the article:

Much can be learned from our ongoing Horn of Africa experience. From a base in

Djibouti

, small

U.S.

military teams have been quietly scouring an anarchic region that because of an Islamic setting offers al Qaeda cultural access. "Who needs meetings in Washington?" one Army major told me. "Guys in the field will figure out what to do. I took 10 guys to explore eastern

Ethiopia

. In every town people wanted a bigger American presence. They know we're here, they want to see what we can do for them." The new economy-of-force paradigm being pioneered in the horn borrows more from the Lewis and Clark expedition than from the major conflicts of the 20th century.

I had predicted a Horn offensive in the late spring with special forces, air power, and small regular infantry and Marine units. It never happened. Or at least it never happened visibly. It looks like we have been on the offensive in the Horn below the radar of the media. I’ll not say this vindicates me since I predicted a visible offensive based on the need to attack in the region (which we did) but also the need to visibly strike to maintain public support by showing forward momentum in the war on terror. We did not visibly attack. I suppose if our election is a referendum on the war, November 2 will show whether we should have done it visibly.

With Iraqi insurgents in Fallujah and Ramadi, most prominently, establishing no-go zones where US troops or Coalition troops can only enter in strength, I’ve read plenty of commentary that this is actually a clever strategy to “fix” the insurgents into a geographic locality where we can better identify them and fight them. Citing examples from the past in Egypt and Algeria, these commentators assert that far from being sanctuaries, these no-go zones actually help us by making the insurgents less mobile and concentrated and so more vulnerable to being hit. By giving them control, they also alienate the population and make them more willing to accept an eventual offensive to clean them out.

I think this is rot. I struggle with whether I post to put on a happy face on a bad situation in Iraq or whether I am (as I think I am) putting perspective on what is a winning war effort. With casualties going up, this is critical. I do not want to mask problems to interfere with victory. This question of what these sanctuaries really are makes me feel better about my judgment since I cannot bring myself to defending our policy of leaving these sanctuaries alone on anything other than an expediency basis. That is, other issues may stay our hand. But I do not think this situation is ideal, planned, or good to maintain for long. We have given our enemies sanctuaries and from their point of view, the occasional missile strikes that kill some are a small price to pay to have a sanctuary to sally forth from and kill Iraqis, Americans, and other Coalition forces. And it sure is nice to have a secure place to hold hostages.

Look at what it is like in one of these so-called “fixing point” traps that our enemies have fallen into:

A collection of anti-American forces -- former Baath Party loyalists, Islamic extremists and foreign militants -- have been expanding their presence in Fallujah since the Marines withdrew from positions in the city in April and handed over responsibility for security to the Fallujah Brigade. According to U.S. military officials and residents, the insurgents have since taken over the local government, co-opted and cowed Iraqi security forces, and turned the area into a staging ground for terrorist attacks in Baghdad, located about 35 miles to the east.

"If they [he Americans] invade Fallujah now, it will be better," said Khamis Hassnawi, the city's senior tribal leader. "Every day that passes, the resistance increases. Their numbers increase. Their power increases."

Sanctuaries have a great bonus in organizing terrorism and resistance on a scale that is otherwise not possible to maintain for long. See the Belmont Club post that explains how terrorists/insurgents cannot effectively get stronger than 150 or so, and more likely 80, before they lose cohesiveness. Sanctuaries are key to growing more powerful and becoming seriously deadly with the power of size:

His last paragraph is crucial to understanding why the defeat of the Taliban in

Afghanistan

and the toppling of Saddam Hussein may have cripped global terrorism so badly. Without the infrastrastructure of a state sponsor, terrorism is limited to cells of about 100 members in size in order to maintain security. In the context of the current campaign in

Iraq

, the strategic importance of places like Falluja or "holy places" is that their enclave nature allows terrorists to grow out their networks to a larger and more potent size. Without those sanctuaries, they would be small, clandestine hunted bands. The argument that dismantling terrorist enclaves makes "

America

less safe than it should be in a dangerous world" inverts the logic. It is allowing the growth of terrorist enclaves that puts everyone at risk in an otherwise safe world.

Sanctuaries allow groups to grow in size tremendously and maintain effectiveness using traditional hierarchical organizations.

But aside from anecdotal indications, what do sanctuaries provide for insurgents? This RAND analysis sets if forth clearly:

Human	Material
Ability to mobilize local and international support	Safe haven and transport
Capable leadership, including effective command and control	Financial resources
Training	Direct military support
Intelligence concerning the adversary	Arms and materiel, including ammunition, food, and fuel
Inspiration
Organizational aid

So what do the Iraqi insurgents get by having the sanctuary portion of this list?

Safe havens, whether inside the country where the insurgents operate or across international boundaries, are essential to the success of any guerrilla movement. Sanctuaries protect the group's leadership and members; provide a place where insurgents can rest, recuperate, and plan future operations; serve as a staging area from which to mount attacks; and, in some cases, function as an additional base for recruitment, training, dissemination of propaganda, and contact with the outside world. Such sanctuary allows guerrillas and their commanders to organize, train, recruit, plan, recuperate, and otherwise conduct essential operations outside the reach of the targeted state. Without a safe haven, insurgencies are constantly vulnerable to government forces. Iraqi Shi'ites, for example, have been able to organize themselves and receive essential military training in Iran--activities that would have been impossible in Iraq given Saddam Husayn's tight controls. Safe havens also allow insurgents to dictate the pace of operations, prevent target governments from following up tactical victories when they are denied the right of "hot pursuit," and otherwise help rebel movements retain their initiative.

Read that? Sanctuaries are “essential” to success. I don’t see anything in here that speculates that insurgents make a huge mistake by getting fixed in place. No, the analysis lists the many advantages insurgents gain from sanctuaries.

1. They protect the group's leadership and members. Why yes, Zarquawi is still on the loose in Iraq. And Islamists and Baathists sit around inside those safe zones feeling pretty safe. The fact that they stay despite occasional smart bombs surely indicates that the option of running around outside the sanctuaries where US troops and Iraqi security forces will hunt them while they sleep is not being seriously considered. Could we have found Saddam if there had been safe zones instead of holes in the ground?

2. They provide a place where insurgents can rest, recuperate, and plan future operations. We’ve already read that the insurgents build car bombs in these sanctuaries. Those building we bomb weren’t hosting social gatherings. The enemy was planning. They continue to plan as well as rest and recuperate.

3. They serve as a staging area from which to mount attacks. Is the higher number of daily attacks on Coalition forces since the sanctuaries were allowed to stand since spring 2004 a coincidence?

4. In some cases, they function as an additional base for recruitment, training, dissemination of propaganda, and contact with the outside world. These safe zones with al Jazeera reporters spread the lie of brave resistance to the Sunni world in a recruiting campaign. The insurgents can terrorize locals into cooperating and helping. And the local hospitals claim through coercion or sympathy that every strike kills people “including women and children.” It is amazingly consistent.

5. They allow guerrillas and their commanders to organize, train, recruit, plan, recuperate, and otherwise conduct essential operations outside the reach of the targeted state. While not completely out of reach since these safe zones are inside Iraq rather than in an adjoining country, we do have difficulty targeting the enemy. Our reach is limited to the air.

6. Without a safe haven, insurgencies are constantly vulnerable to government forces. This is the issue that angers me the most. Without sanctuaries, the enemy is atomized and on the run, expending more efforts avoiding capture or death than in planning or carrying out attacks on us. With sanctuaries, the enemy is NOT constantly vulnerable to government forces.

7. They allow insurgents to dictate the pace of operations, prevent target governments from following up tactical victories when they are denied the right of "hot pursuit," and otherwise help rebel movements retain their initiative. What did we get from the spring battles that decimated the enemy in Fallujah and Najaf but which were halted before finishing off our enemies? Nothing. Except allowing the enemy to remain alive and work to hurt us. Now we worry about whether the enemy will strike to try and influence our elections or to delay or disrupt the January Iraq elections. How can this be good? They attack us. We defeat them. They retreat. We let them go. They attack us. It is bad enough with a continuous loop but what if they break out of this loop and actually do something that leads to our defeat? We are powerful but never mistake our power with the idea that our victory in war is inevitable. We must win our wars—not collect the victory prize as our natural right.

These insurgents are not “fixed.” They are in safe areas no more dangerous for them than the Green Zone is for us. And to think that this development is good rather than a bad situation that must be ended sooner rather than later is just happy talk. Remember, I concede that other objectives or limitations may have legitimately put off the destruction of these insurgent safe zones for the time being. But it is still bad.

Recall that this argument was actually made on a larger scale for Afghanistan itself. I don’t have a link but I remember clearly the complaints of the anti-war side who said that by overthrowing the Taliban we merely scattered al Qaeda around the world and made them more dangerous to us. These critics said the terrorists were conveniently concentrated in Afghanistan where they would be easier to confront. This was the same idea of “fixing” the terrorists in place but on a national scale. What did “fixing” the terrorists get us? Human rights violations on a massive scale in the sanctuary of Afghanistan. Material support was easier to obtain. Training was made possible. A place safe from attack in order to rest was maintained. And the terrorists could be sent forth around the globe to attack us on their schedule. I don’t think being “fixed” in Afghanistan prevented the African embassy bombings, the Cole bombing, or 9-11. And what of the benefits? Ah yes, because they were conveniently concentrated we were able to destroy some tents in 1998 using cruise missiles. Wow.

The underlying logic of the idea of “fixing” the enemy makes no sense. The theory is we let them concentrate so it is better to attack them. But if we are effective in attacking them they will be killed and the remainder scattered. Which is bad since we’ve ended their “fixing point.” So then I guess we can only attack them enough to kill some but not scatter the rest. The only way to keep that sanctuary intact to make the enemy vulnerable to attack by our forces is to not take advantage of that vulnerability to strike the enemy effectively!

I remain absolutely convinced that to defeat the Iraqi insurgents we must not let them have sanctuaries. We must break them down so that police can deal with the insurgents. If security forces have to go everywhere in platoon strength for their own security, we do not have a secure area. We need to be confident that squads and fire teams can patrol knowing they can withstand an initial attack until backup arrives. In time, foot patrols of one or two cops need to be made possible. Screw the theories. Kill the enemy. Scatter them. Demoralize them. Do this and the enemy will be too worried about being klled or caught to attack us; and our Iraqi friends will be able to smother the lower level of resistance. As long as sanctuaries exist, we need drones and smart bombs and heavy armor to fight the enemy. And who has the monopoly on that? We do. Winning requires us to transfer the responsibility for fighting to the Iraqis. By leaving sanctuaries we require the Iraqi security forces to reach US levels of training and equipment. Or we can atomize the enemy so more lightly armed and less trained Iraqis can handle the threat.

End the sanctuaries. Now. Because our enemies won’t hold off in October in deference to our election schedule. Better to be going after them than to get hit day after day, reacting to their initiatives. And take that one-man sanctuary, the idiot Sadr, off the streets. I worry that he will eventually succeed in engineering the destruction of a holy site and enflame Shias against us. If the Shias turn against us, we can’t win at a price we are willing to pay. And then our enemies will have a national sanctuary again. But that is good, right? The ridiculousness of claiming we are “fixing” our enemies is evident. End the sanctuaries now.

As we continue to fight the Iraqi insurgents and endure casualties, it would be good to have perspective tactically, morally, and strategically. Tactically first:

September 26, 2004: The "war" in

Iraq

is a low key affair. In the last two weeks, there have been about 70 "hostile incidents" a day, resulting in one or two friendly casualties (nearly 90 percent of the them Iraqi) per incident. The

U.S.

Department of Defense still refuses to release any official numbers on enemy casualties (although data on this is carefully compiled), but the enemy losses are believed to be 3-4 times higher. Even Iraqi troops, benefiting from superior training (particularly in marksmanship and tactics) are giving much better than they are getting. Increasingly, the fighting is occurring around the towns and neighborhoods that the anti-government forces call home. Increasing amounts of information from pro-government informers in these areas has led to daily smart bomb and artillery attacks on specific houses or compounds being used by anti-government fighters. Fallujah has been particularly hard hit, and the al Qaeda men operating in that town are taking heavy losses. American and Iraqi troops are also moving closer to Fallujah, with raids being conducted to take prisoners and capture documents and weapons.

First of all, note that 90% of the casualties are Iraqi. The idea that the US is absorbing 90% of the casualties in the war on our side requires you to completely ignore the Iraqis. The Iraqis are the largest component of the coalition. They are fighting—and dying—every day, and we are training more and more every day. The Iraqis may not be as good as ours but they are giving much better than they get. So questions of whether our Iraqis will continue to enlist should be turned around—how long will Sunnis enlist with the Baathists when they die at a rapid rate? I won’t ask about the Islamists. They come ready to die and the best we can do is rapidly give them their wish.

September 24, 2004: Iraqis Sunni Arabs, who were never very popular with the majority of their fellow Iraqis in the first place, are trying really, really hard to become major villains. Not just to the Shia Arab and Kurdish Iraqis they have been tormenting for centuries, but also to the foreigners who have been trying to help repair the damage done to the economy by decades of Sunni Arab mismanagement and theft. The Sunni Arab terrorism is barbaric in the extreme, just as it was when it served to keep Saddam in power. People are kidnapped, body parts cut off and whole towns and neighborhoods terrified by gangs of Sunni Arab thugs reliving the good old days under Saddam. Most parts of

Iraq

are sufficiently armed and organized to keep the Sunni gangs out. But in the Sunni Arab, and mixed areas, the Sunni thugs have places to hide from American troops. Here, the Sunni thugs are often strong enough to defeat, or chase away, Iraqi police To add insult to injury, the Sunni Arabs are considered heroes in most Arab media, as well as by anti-American partisans around the world. The Sunni Arab terror is portrayed as the struggle of valiant Iraqi nationalists against evil foreign aggressors. This portrayal largely ignores the attitudes, or history, of the majority of Iraqi population (the Shia Arabs and Kurds). These people are at peace (except for a few Shia Arabs fighting to establish a Shia religious dictatorship), and suffering from the continued attacks from Sunni Arabs. This willful ignorance of Iraqi history, and of what is actually going on in

Iraq

, is a tragedy that is rarely covered. Inside

Iraq

, most Iraqis, and foreigners (troops, and civilians working on reconstruction), are perplexed at this media coverage, and say so in emails, and face-to-face when they get back. On the plus side, this will give writers plenty of good material when it comes time to do revisionist books on the "War in

Iraq

." But in the meantime, the bad guys are heroes and their victims don't exist.

Personally, I think it is shameful for people in the West to call the Sunni thugs heroes or nationalists. They liked their neck-stomping gig and don’t like four centuries of abusing the Shias and Kurds to end on their watch. How anybody can pretend that opposing the war in Iraq gives them the moral high ground is beyond me.

And it would also be nice to keep in mind who is behind the horrific attacks in Iraq that some like to pretend are representative of Iraqi “freedom fighters” (and damn those people who cheer the enemy on) and the wider stakes involved in Iraq:

September 23, 2004: While al Qaeda manages to set off one or more suicide bombs a day in Iraq, it finds itself losing the war it is waging. The bombs are killing mainly Iraqis, and the Iraqis have noticed this. Iraqis have also noticed that al Qaeda's terror tactics are little different from those of their former, unlamented dictator, Saddam Hussein. But al Qaeda expects the Iraqi Islamic radicals to benefit from the bombing campaign. However, the only Iraqi Islamic radicals that support al Qaeda are the Sunni Arab ones, and these are a minority of the Sunni Arab (20 percent of the population) minority. Moreover, most of the muscle, and money, for anti-government violence comes from Sunni Arab supporters of the Baath Party. Saddam Hussein led the Baath Party for over three decades. While Saddam is locked up, as are most of the senior Baath Party leaders, the thousands of thugs and enforcers that maintained Baath's control over Iraq are still out there. Many of these guys are still doing what they have always done; terrorizing Iraqis into supporting Baath, or at least not opposing it. Baath has cleverly shaped it's message to sound like a patriotic call to "expel foreign invaders." But most Iraqis are not fooled. Opinion polls consistently show that over 80 percent of the population wants nothing to do with Baath. Yet the only alternative to a democratic government is Baath, or a religious dictatorship. Al Qaeda makes itself unpopular by killing hundreds of Iraqis with suicide bombs. Baath makes itself hated with its continued terror campaign, kidnapping and assassinations. The terror tactics of al Qaeda and Baath have succeeded in some other Arab countries, much to the dismay of the locals. Syria is the only other country run by the Baath Party, and it is another Republic of Fear. Iran is dominated by Islamic conservatives, who rule by intimidation and terror. Afghanistan, when ruled by the Islamic conservative Taliban, also suffered under unpopular applications of intimidation and terror.

For centuries, Western democracies have considered the Arabs unable, or incapable of creating a democratic government, or any government that did not depend on terror and intimidation to maintain order. This debate continues, although in a more carefully worded fashion. It's not just the Baath Party and al Qaeda that have a vested interest in seeing democracy fail in

Iraq

. However, if you talk to a lot of people who deal with Iraqis on a regular basis (military civil affairs, reconstruction workers, troops in general) and Iraqis themselves, you find that while Iraqis still fear Baath and al Qaeda, they still want to try democracy. Iraqis know what goes on in the West. Millions of Iraqis have fled to the West (Europe and North America) in the last two decades, and the migrants have made it clear to the folks back home how democracy works. While Iraqi culture puts more emphasis on believing rumors and outrageous conspiracy theories, you still have to eat. Most Iraqis believe that a government "of the people, by the people and for the people," would be better at putting food on the table, and a DVD player on top of the new TV set, than some Baath Party thug or religious leader.

When so many have an interest in keeping an oppressive minority in power, you’d think somebody would ask why. Why do Sunni Arab dictatorships want Iraqi democracy to fail? Why do European governments want Iraqi democracy to fail? Why do so many here in America want Iraq to fail? Are Iraqis so uniquely evil that so many want democracy to fail there? Or is there something wrong with those wishing failure in Iraq? Is a pro-American Arab democracy too uncomfortable for them to contemplate given their own selfish interests?

I know this is a lot of quoting, but Strategypage is indispensable for defense matters as far as I’m concerned. When we are suffering casualties every day, I struggle to be positive in the face of the relentless talk of “a mess” in Iraq (I believe “mess” is the officially sanctioned polite version of “quagmire” since so many opposed to the war use the term) since I believe we can win, we deserve to win, and we must win. And these three postings illustrate perspective on the questions of winning, deserving to win, and the need to win far better than any of the press has managed to work up.

France is upset with the US. This is a recent phenomenon. They won’t help in Iraq:

France, one of the harshest critics of the war that brought down Saddam Hussein, stressed it would not commit troops for

Iraq

despite appeals from the

United States

and United Nations.

So they are telling us that even the highest authority in the land cannot overcome the angst and whatever that France feels for our decision to lead actual allies in a war against the butcher Saddam’s regime? Apparently:

As everyone knows,

France

did not approve of the conditions in which the conflict was unleashed. Neither today nor tomorrow will it commit itself militarily in

Iraq

," French Foreign Minister Michel Barnier said.

American cannon blasts bellowed in the English Channel 140 years ago, and bloodied bodies lined the deck of a sinking Confederate ship. Teary onlookers watched in horror from the Normandy coast.

Five days before its last battle, the Confederate raider [Alabama] stopped for repairs in Cherbourg, where the [Union warship] Kearsarge tracked the ship after a long hunt.

I suppose I should be relieved that the monument just erected to commemorate this battle does not celebrate the Confederates. Or the Baathists.

Although the inability of the press to call terrorists what they are is something that bugs me, the broader point about the war on terror is one I share (I can't remember who to thank for this link):

That’s why I really don’t care about the MSM’s avoidance of the T word. Usage, that is, reality itself, will imprint that meaning on any euphemism they try to hide the facts behind. By the way, that’s also the reason why I don’t mind the branding of our current world war as the War on Terror instead of, say, the War on Radical Islam or the War against Jihad. Whoever takes the war seriously (either for or against it) knows exactly what it is about. Nobody I know of actually thinks the War on Terror is a fight against the Basque ETA, the IRA or the remnants of the Shining Path. We don’t have to define explicitly the enemies: they have defined themselves quite clearly. And anyone with a single working neuron left can see through the official diplo-speak. Let’s not misunderestimate the intelligence of the people.

I find the hand wringing over what to call our war irrelevant. I don't care what we call it. "War on Terror" is just fine for me right now. Let the historians judge in 50 years what we should call it. For now, we seem to be killing the right people just fine thank you, notwithstanding the possible confusion in our terminology.

Iraqi Prime Minister spoke to Congress assuring the American people through his speech to Congress that Iraqis are thankful for our help and that

Iraq

will win the battle against Islamists and Baathists.

Anthony Cordesman, a military analyst with the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington, suggested that the administration should spend less time staging an attractive photo opportunity and more time adopting a realistic view of the challenges ahead.

"As Prime Minister Allawi comes here, we need real accomplishments and real progress and honest measures of capability, not sound bites of rhetoric which are not substantiated by the figures being issued in detail by the

United States

government," he said.

An attractive photo opportunity? That is all Cordesman sees? Good grief. On the battlefield we are smashing our enemy every time we come in contact with them. But the key fight is here at home to support our forces in the field until we can stand up an Iraqi government that can fight the insurgents. If a noted military analyst is blind to the need to maintain public support in the most important country involved in the fight right now, he is nothing but a tactician and hardware specialist. I don't know what the heck happened to the "strategic" part of his center.

I wrote some time ago (and I'm not up to finding it in my non-existent indexing system—boy, wouldn't that have been a good idea two years ago?) that should it come to a fight with China, I would not want to trade places. Once,

China

was an inert lump of proletarian fury and if we wanted to hurt

China

we had to march on Peking—and maybe even that wouldn't be enough.

Now, with global trade and exploding energy needs that cannot be met except for imports from distant regions,

China

is discovering that it is vulnerable:

September 23, 2004: Never before in its history has

China

's well being been so dependant on sea trade. For thousands of years,

China

was a "continental power." That is, a nation that produced all it needed, or obtained it from neighbors via a shared land border. Only luxuries came in by sea. China is now importing nearly six million barrels of oil a day, a figure which is up a third from last year. China's export industries turn out so much stuff that last year,

China

passed the

United States

as the world's largest cargo handler. So

China

's growing fleet of warships and patrol aircraft should come as no surprise. But other nations in the region (

South Korea

Japan

Indonesia

, the

Philippines

), are also very dependant on seaborne trade. Who shall control these sea lanes that are so important to all? Right now it's the

United States

Navy.

China

is not comfortable with that.

And it has to hurt

China

that even if

America

retreated to the central Pacific,

Japan

alone could throttle Chinese trade. Heck,

South Korea

could do a credible job for a little while. Even

Taiwan

, by virtue of geography, could do a decent job for some time—especially if they get some decent subs. Keep going and Singapore's geography gives them a lovely opportunity to stop up a choke point.

Thailand

, with its own carrier, could do some damage. And even if the route all the way through the Straits of Malacca are clear,

India

's navy stands astride

China

's sea line of communication with the oil of the Middle East.

Our Navy could inflict a serious defeat on

China

with minimal help from the other services at this point. That is quite the strategic shift that the Chinese have to deal with. So will

China

decide to be a good neighbor or a powerful hegemon to protect this new vulnerability? When government legitimacy rests almost exclusively on economic growth?

The debate over

Iraq

continues. It is mind boggling enough that we are re-debating Vietnam let alone the decision to go to war in Iraq even as we still fight there, but as long as both sides are eager to debate their side of the issue, this is perhaps an event that both sides of the debate will welcome as the endless Iraq War argument goes on:

In an interview Sunday with ABC's "This Week," [

Iraq

Prime Minister] Allawi said that Saddam and his lieutenants would go on trial soon. "Roughly speaking, I think October," he said, adding that the evidence against Saddam was "overwhelming."

And

Iran

is still out there waiting for us to deal with them. And why would we? Oh, this:

Secretary of State Colin L. Powell and Defense Secretary Donald H. Rumsfeld have raised sharp complaints in recent days that

Iran

is providing support for the insurgency in

Iraq

, expressing concerns over what they say are

Iran

's attempt to shape

Iraq

's future.

Iranian President Mohammad Khatami called on the international community Wednesday to recognize Iran's right to enrich uranium, again insisting Tehran will pursue a nuclear program that some — including the United States — suspect is aimed at developing weapons.

We also have the hardest target to deal with, North Korea, with yet mercifully the most easily contained (via Winds of Change) if we can't regime change them:

"Our stance that we cannot give up nuclear development is definitely justifiable," the newspaper said.

North Korea

says it has a nuclear "deterrent," and international experts suspect it already has several nuclear weapons.

I know a lot of people are upset that

Iraq

did not have nukes when we invaded, but proponents never said Saddam had them—just that we could not know the status of his very clear desire to get them. When

Iran

and

North Korea

are still hoping to have enough nukes to threaten us, I am glad that

Iraq

is out of the business for good. And it is good that Saddam is on trial rather than killing off his own people. Isn't it?

AP goes with the title "spiritual leader" to describe the man who blesses beheadings of captives in

Iraq

The spiritual leader of a militant group that claimed to have beheaded two American hostages in

Iraq

has been killed in a

U.S.

airstrike, and his Jordanian family is preparing a wake, a newspaper and Islamic clerics said Wednesday.

This will become a war between Islam and the West if such thugs continue to be thought of and described as spiritual leaders.

I hope that wake site is tagged with a GPS coordinate. The mourners should join their spiritual leader.

Dave Himrich emailed me to make me aware of his own analysis of American casualty trends in Iraq. The chart breaks down US deaths in one-week blocks. It shows with more statistical sophistication than my ex-math major brain can use that our casualties are trending up and that it is not just normal fluctuations. So far this confirms a trend I noticed in my more primitive chart.

The second thing that I notice is that there are three spikes in casualties that stand above the period averages. The first is not surprisingly the invasion when major combat operations were executed. The second is the November 2003 Ramadan spike. Recall, however, that we lost 22 dead in two helicopter shoot-downs in the first week of November. These unusual deaths (we've lost few helicopters) jumped the casualties for two of the weeks in question by 11 for each week. Still, even then, this would be a spike—just less dramatic. The third spike was the April 2004 Fallujah and Sadr revolts. Casualties here spiked up to levels not seen since the invasion.

Now, what I notice the most in this chart is something that seems to back my effectiveness post. What I notice is the spike that isn't there. Where is the spike in August 2004 while we were fighting the latest Sadr uprising ? The latter part of August does have an uptick but nothing that elevates it above the average for that period. In the invasion, the November 2003 Ramadan "offensive," and the April 2004 uprisings, the enemy visibly hurt us more. In the August 2004 Sadr uprising, the violence (against us anyway—we reportedly decimated the enemy) is barely discernible from the average. That speaks to me of decreased effectiveness by our enemy. This could change when we go into Fallujah where thugs made of sterner stuff are located, I admit. We shall see.

Casualties may be drifting up, but the Sunni triangle is still where the vast majority occur. The fighting is not spreading across

Iraq

. As long as Iraqi security and governmental structures are built, it is not fatal that the Sunnis are attacking more within the Sunni triangle. The Shias, Kurds, and Sunnis tired of Baathism will be able to defeat the Baathist holdouts and Islamists coming to Jihadworld for the all-day pass as long as we use the time our military is buying to build up the Iraqis to stand on their own.

At one level, however, the focus on American casualties is a dangerous route. If we see this as the metric of metrics, we may shape our strategy and tactics in ways that in the short run may reduce our casualties; but which will both increase them in the long run and lead to defeat. By all means, analyze the casualties for clues on how the war is going and how to win, but do not make getting a downward trend the end. The American people will not flinch from the relatively low level of casualties we are enduring in this war if they see progress in winning.

"Oh, Now the UN Gets All Tough With

Iraq

" (Posted September 20, 2004)

After years of treating Saddam Hussein as a real leader and following every rule to bolster his bloody rule, and after years of allowing Saddam to skim money from UN-supervised oil exports and humanitarian goods imports, now the UN will ask tough questions of an

Iraq

leader:

As he makes his debut before the U.N. General Assembly, Iraqi Prime Minister Ayad Allawi will face serious questions about whether worsening violence in his country will allow January elections to take place on schedule.

As is usual, the UN has nothing to offer to make things better in

Iraq

. Instead, they carp:

The assembly's annual ministerial meeting beginning Tuesday is being held in the shadow of a new claim by U.N. Secretary-General Kofi Annan that the U.S.-led war in Iraq was illegal and his warning last week that there could not be "credible elections if the security conditions continue as they are now."

Ah yes, the war was "illegal." Better to have a legal psychopathic ruler in place still killin' and rapin' than having a shot at a democratic

Iraq

. Credible elections couldn't possibly be held in the 80-90% of the neighborhoods and villages where Baathist and Islamist violence isn't present.

And will the dictatorships-with-UN-seats without insurgent violence (often because they are brutal enough to kill any dissenters) want to explain why they aren't holding real "credible" elections? Any takers? I thought not.

If those hypocrites in the UN want to ask Allawi serious questions, Allawi should respond with serious answers and then ask some serious questions of his own. Like where was your concern for the Iraqi people and democracy all these decades while you were chatting up Saddam? And how dare you judge our progress toward democracy? And maybe if Allawi wants to get real serious, he can ask the UN just where the heck

Iraq

's money is from the oil-for-food program.

Ah, the joys of dealing with the international community. Prime Minister Allawi has my sympathy.

Along with silly accusations that mobilizing reservists in the Guard, Reserves, and Individual Ready Reserve constitutes some sort of “backdoor draft” we have more silliness.

First of all, calling up reservists is called “mobilization.” Inducting civilians is called “a draft.” They are different.

As part of a strategy to sharpen his differences with Bush, Kerry told voters here that the president refuses to come clean about the growing problems in

Iraq

and a hidden strategy for a post-election deployment. "He won't tell us what congressional leaders are now saying: that this administration is planning yet another substantial call-up of reservists and Guard units immediately after the election," Kerry said. Bush is trying to "hide it from people through the election, then make the move," he said.

We are not hiding troop rotations into Iraq. Guard and reservists will be going to Iraq along with active component Army and Marine units to replace existing units. If this is hidden from some people it is only because they aren’t paying attention.

Not to fan rumors, but it is possible people have heard of mobilization talk should we choose to intervene in an Iranian revolt or civil war this winter or spring. In that case, no doubt we’d have to mobilize some substantial amount of additional troops to maintain a strategic reserve as active forces face this challenge. It is possible that this is what is floating around. But I’m just speculating here. One might as well claim we are planning a mobilization to fight a North Korean invasion. Or for

Venezuela

. Or for regime change in Saudi Arabia. Or any other number of unknown future contingencies for which our military plans.

North Korea

will never dismantle its nuclear arsenal and will not resume talks on its atomic programs unless the

United States

drops its "hostile" policy, the North's official KCNA news agency said on Saturday.

The U.N. nuclear watchdog called on

Iran

on Saturday to immediately halt activities related to uranium enrichment, a process that can be used to make atomic weapons.

And some on our side think these guys should be entrusted with nuclear weapons. Or if they have enough brain synapse connections to recognize

Iran

and

North Korea

cannot be left to run loose, they think safety lies in bribing them and looking away, hoping for the best.

Qemoy and Matsu are Taiwanese islands close to the Chinese mainland. They have been heavily defended fortresses for decades. That is changing:

An estimated 15,000 soldiers are stationed there -- triple the number of residents. Matsu aims to gradually trim the number of soldiers to 2,000, Chen said, but gave no timeframe.

Good. I’ve long been annoyed that 15,000 sit on Matsu and 40,000 or so sit on Quemoy. They are just five divisions in a sack ready to be closed by China at any time should there be war. This attitude of holding the line at all costs may have made sense in an age when American nukes would rain down if China crossed the trip wire, but today it is obsolete. If China uses its increasingly capable military to invade Taiwan, the Chinese will bypass Qemoy and Matsu and head right for the main target. If Taiwan falls, Quemoy and Matsu will surrender. And five divisions of Taiwanese troops would have played absolutely no role in the war.

Well, Taiwan is still alive and then there will be no delusions about what China wants or what China would do to absorb Taiwan. The Taiwanese will get realistic and might go nuclear. The US will make sure Taiwan gets weapons and might even deploy troops there.

In short, there is no point for China to nibble on Taiwanese territory. When they go, they’ll go for the jugular. And if they do, Taiwan will be glad to have more ground power on Taiwan itself instead of sitting uselessly on off-shore islands watching the war. Taiwan just took a major step toward adjusting to reality.

Those opposed to the war in Iraq have bitterly criticized the pre-war national intelligence estimate in October 2002 on Iraqi weapons of mass destruction. Warnings of Iraq’s intentions and the unknowns that indicated danger should Saddam remain in power have been tagged as politicized and the product of the dreaded groupthink because Iraq did not have chemical weapons stockpiles or obvious and advanced biological or nuclear programs when we went in during March 2003.

The estimate outlines three possibilities for

Iraq

through the end of 2005, with the worst case being developments that could lead to civil war, the officials said. The most favorable outcome described is an

Iraq

whose stability would remain tenuous in political, economic and security terms.

The same critics have been singing as one in agreeing with this pessimism with nary a thought to avoiding groupthink. It proves what they knew all along—or at least since about August 2003. This is a good NIE, they say.

Set aside the common thread of pessimism as a warning to complacency that both NIEs represent. A ghost of Christmas futures, so to speak. And ignore the ability of the war critics to accept that suddenly our intelligence community has been magically de-politicized to issue an accurate NIE in the middle of a political campaign. Had even one scenario been an optimistic one, the critics would have been in a rage. I concede that any of the projected futures is possible. Yes, we can lose the post-war in Iraq. Just because we decide to do something does not make it inevitable. There are no certain victories and no predestined defeats. We make our future. And our enemies have a say in it, too.

So pay attention to this NIE but don’t mistake it for the full range of our possible future or even the likely paths.

And let’s not get carried away in minimizing what Saddam’s Iraq had in store for us and the region. I refer to Duelfer’s forthcoming assessments of Iraq’s intentions and capabilities:

According to people familiar with the 1,500-page report, the head of the Iraq Survey Group, Charles Duelfer, will find that Saddam was importing banned materials, working on unmanned aerial vehicles in violation of U.N. agreements and maintaining a dual-use industrial sector that could produce weapons.

Duelfer also says

Iraq

only had small research and development programs for chemical and biological weapons.

As Duelfer puts the finishing touches on his report, he concludes Saddam had intentions of restarting weapons programs at some point, after suspicion and inspections from the international community waned.

In addition, we still don’t know whether Saddam managed to hide WMD inside Iraq or ship some to Syria or elsewhere for safety.

These are hardly the only options. Heck, maybe Saddam would have died in his bed from a heart ailment and been replaced by a benign dictator who moved Iraq towards improved human rights, international cooperation, and the abandonment of WMD programs. I mean, who knows?

In regard to the real NIE coming out, let me just say that I think the worry that there will be a full blown civil war that breaks up Iraq is unlikely. Iraq has proven to be resilient. And the Sunni-Shia fight right now is a type of civil war but the Shias can win dominance so why would they split the country? The Sunnis won’t be allowed to split up Iraq. So we aren’t going to see a geographic split in Iraq. The fighting will continue as the government gets better at fighting. At some point, the Sunnis will start to lose visibly and once they do, there will be a rush to not be the last Sunni to die for a defeated Baathist regime that won’t be back.

Read V. D. Hanson for a reminder of what we have done and what we can accomplish—must accomplish—in our fight in Iraq. I expect the anti-war side to want to run. But the pro-war waverers who think we must declare victory and leave must take heart:

It is always difficult for those involved to determine the pulse of any ongoing war. The last 90 days in the Pacific theater were among the most costly of World War II, as we incurred 50,000 casualties on Okinawa just weeks before the Japanese collapse. December 1944 and January 1945 were the worst months for the American army in Europe, bled white repelling Hitler's last gasp in the Battle of the Bulge. Contemporaries shuddered, after observing those killing fields, that the war would go on for years more. The summer of 1864 convinced many that Grant and Lincoln were losers, and that McClellan alone could end the conflict by what would amount to a negotiated surrender of Northern war aims.

It is true that parts of

Iraq

are unsafe and that terrorists are flowing into the country; but there is no doubt that the removal of Saddam Hussein is bringing matters to a head. Islamic fascists are now fighting openly and losing battles, and are increasingly desperate as they realize the democratization process slowly grinds ahead leaving them and what they have to offer by the wayside. Iran, Syria, Lebanon, and others must send aid to the terrorists and stealthy warriors into Iraq, for the battle is not just for Baghdad but for their futures as well. The world's attention is turning to

Syria

's occupation of

Lebanon

and

Iran

's nukes, a new scrutiny predicated on American initiatives and persistence, and easily evaporated by a withdrawal from

Iraq

. So by taking the fight to the heart of darkness in Saddam's realm, we have opened the climactic phase of the war, and thereupon can either win or lose far more than

Iraq

There is no substitute for victory. Use NIEs to achieve victory—not predict the future we have yet to shape completely.

I wrote that it seems as if the Iraqi insurgents are getting less effective in their ability to kill American soldiers and Marines. While attacks are way up quite a bit in the last few months, fatal casualties are up only a bit.

Is this the result of their lack of effectiveness (and our effectiveness in killing them in combat)?

September 17, 2004: The anti-government forces feel they are winning with their terror tactics. This is a misleading assessment, but typical of the Arab nationalists and religious zealots who comprise most of the armed opposition. These folks keep score by watching the TV news, which explains why they are so detached from reality. While the terror tactics has had a noticeable effect on reporters, UN staff and other non-participants in Iraqi reconstruction, the Iraqis themselves are undeterred by the violence. Same for coalition troops and most foreign workers. The average Iraqi wants the new government to succeed, because the alternative is a return to the tyranny of the past. The terror tactics are not working against the Iraqis, so the anti-government forces are concentrating more on foreigners. This means more foreigners are being kidnapped. This is a pure desperation play, as it's the resolve of the Iraqi people that will determine this civil war. While Saddam was defeated and captured, the hundreds of thousands of thugs who kept him in power are still out there, and still fighting to get their power, and jobs, back.

Yes, the press and some here are greatly affected by this violence. It is bloody. But it won’t defeat us. If we don’t let it, that is.

With this in mind, this report (via Andrew Sullivan) that the Green Zone in Baghdad is vulnerable is disturbing:

At a briefing earlier this month, a high-ranking

officer in charge of the zone's perimeter said he had insufficient soldiers to prevent intruders penetrating the compound's defences.

With a press corps and a loyal opposition eager to call Iraq a Vietnam at any pretext, should the insurgents stage a noisy attack that penetrates the Green Zone with actual people—even if they are quickly killed—the press will have a Vietnam Experience show (like the Tet attack on our Saigon embassy) that they will cherish forever. Tighten up there, guys. This is a serious lapse if true. Don’t provide the enemy (and the press) with an easy propaganda victory.

Syria

tested chemical weapons on civilians in

Sudan

's troubled western Darfur region in June and killed dozens of people.

The German daily Die Welt newspaper, in an advance release of its Wednesday edition, citing unnamed western security sources, said that injuries apparently caused by chemical arms were found on the bodies of the victims.

This is an interesting story, to say the least, if true. The Sudanese already requested Syria to remove some missiles from Sudan, as I recall. So there is a connection between the two countries. And we did claim in 1998 to be going after a chemical weapons plant in Sudan when we launched cruise missiles there. So the chemical angle exists already. And given Egypt’s use of chemical weapons against insurgents in Yemen in the 1960s, it isn’t as if the region hasn’t seen that example of use before. So, I’m just saying the claim is plausible if not proven. We’ve surely reached CBS standards, eh?

So why would Syria test chemical weapons when they have probably had them for decades, I assume based on their friendship with the former Soviet Union? Damascus knew the Russians could make chemical weapons and they never seem to have tried them out to see if they work. Why test now? Is it because the Syrians have a large batch of chemicals or a recipe from a country that they never acquired them from before? From a source that is not as technically advanced and with a reputation for making gas that breaks down?

Testing chemical weapons does not make sense unless the chemical weapons are newly acquired from a suspect source.

Again, if the report is true, this could be quite important. The CIA can spare someone to look into this, can’t they? It also provides a reason other than compassion to intervene in Darfur.

I remain convinced we will eventually find out what happened to the chemical weapons and WMD programs that existed in Iraq.

Although it seemed to me that the Pankisi Gorge is the most likely place for a Russian military operation in retaliation for the atrocity of Beslan, the US is cautioning Moscow that the Pankisi Gorge is not the hotbed of terror that it once was:

The US State Department said Georgia's Pankisi Gorge was "no longer a haven for terrorists," in what amounted to an implicit correction of a statement made earlier by the US ambassador to the former Soviet republic.

We pointed out that we have worked closely with the Georgians to eliminate this terrorist haven:

"The

United States

reaffirmed its commitment to working with the governments of

Georgia

and

Russia

to combat terrorism in the region," Boucher said.

He reminded listeners that the

United States

had contributed 47 million dollars over the past three years to enhance Georgian border security and law enforcement.

"As a result of programs like these, the Pankisi Gorge is no longer a haven for terrorists," the spokesman said.

We did admit some terrorists are still in there, however. So we will be balancing our friendship with Georgia, our progress in helping Georgia eliminate the haven on Georgian soil, our desire to bring Russia into the war on terror, and our sympathy for the Russian need to strike back.

As for the Pankisi Gorge, I think the Russians will insist on going in. Perhaps a low-key special forces sweep for several weeks with US and Russian forces in the lead and Georgians trailing along for show will be effective in combating the Chechen terrorists, meeting Russia’s need for a military response, and avoiding an open break between Georgia and Russia that might compel us to take sides.

It is always easy to sit in your living room in your pajamas criticizing. Situations like this remind us that there are no easy solutions when there are many competing objectives involved. I’m not amazed that we make mistakes. I’m amazed we succeed at all.

So are we winning against the Iraqi insurgents? This is a big question for us. What are the metrics of success here?

I looked for the attacks per day data that I recently suspected as too high. I found it at the Brookings Institute's Iraq Index project. And indeed, 80 per day as the NPR reporter stated on Dennis Miller is in the ball park. For August, it is actually an understatement, with the average about 90 per day. This is a sharp rise from the prior four months, which are much higher than the previous five months. Without those weekly Central Command briefings, I'd lost track of this metric. I'd be happier if the attacks per day are dwindling or at least holding steady. They are not. Why? How is this data counted? Are Iraqi attacks including any time the Iraqis open fire first when we go on offensive operations? If so, the number would go up when we are on the offense—a little misleading. Are the attacks generally smaller or are they in platoon strength? Are more of them mortar or rocket barrages or roadside bombs? These are all important questions. Or are the insurgents getting either more numerous or more skilled, able to attack more often from either reason or a combination? Still, the metric is not going in our direction.

I also went back to Globalsecurity for the US deaths. I'd prefer KIA data only and I could just reduce these monthly by 25% to get the average better. But I don't know about monthly fluctuations and thought I'd just leave the data as is so as not to be seen as trying to minimize the casualty rate. Again, combat and non-combat deaths are generally going up with spikes in November (from a helicopter downing) and April in the midst of the

counter-attack against Sadr and Fallujah. Absent those months and we have a slow rise but nothing dramatic, with monthly totals fluctuating. It doesn't seem as if the insurgents are more effective with this metric. They haven't been beaten but even with many more attacks on us, they are not killing our forces at a significant rate. These are individual and family tragedies but not nearly capable of weakening the US Army and Marines in

Iraq

I don't know the monthly

Iraq

insurgent casualties but a recent press conference from Secretary Rumsfeld pegged August at anywhere from 1,500 to 2,500 killed. As I've said many times, the insurgent body count is irrelevant. If there are 5,000 active insurgents or 20,000, when we kill off 2,500 they can replace losses just as we do. The ability of the Baathists and their Islamist allies to command insurgents is probably the limiting factor rather than recruiting, so when we kill a bunch, more are available to fill in.

If this was a straight-up military confrontation, the

casualties and attack numbers would worry me. But an insurgency is not primarily a military problem, although the military has a role in busting up and atomizing the insurgents so that police and other lightly-armed government forces can take the insurgents on. Our military can only buy time while the Iraqi government builds up governmental functions and security and intelligence forces. I've consistently written that the key is turning over the fight to Iraqis and not Americanizing the fight permanently. By default the fight is ours for now, but we are in the process of pushing the Iraqis forward to shoulder the burden.

I think we've been able to use the time that a thousand of our soldiers and Marines have purchased.

Iraq

's government is taking shape and elections are coming soon. Iraqi security forces are getting better and performed better in the latest Sadr uprising. Although I cannot rule out that at some point the insurgents will break under the stress of the military fight against us—especially when we reduce the sanctuaries they have developed in places like Fallujah—the rates of casualties and attacks tell me that victory depends on transferring the fight to the new Iraqi government where it properly belongs. Even increasing our strength on the ground inside

Iraq

won't likely reverse the casualty and attack number trends. I never thought it would. I would have liked to turn over a peaceful

Iraq

to the new government but since we are unwilling to slaughter Sunnis as the Baathists slaughtered revolting Shias in 1991, we can't brutalize the Sunnis into submission. This will be done slowly. We have to transfer the responsibility for the fight to people with no place to go if defeated. If, under Saddam, 20% (Sunnis) of the population could terrorize 60% (the Shias), surely today 80% (Shias and Kurds) can subdue 20%--especially when not all of the 20% Sunnis will be insurgent supporters.

So what do the attack and casualty numbers tell us about the ability of the new Iraqi security forces to subdue the insurgents?

Well, how effective are the insurgents? I decided to try an effectiveness measure based on the attacks per day and monthly

deaths. I divided monthly

deaths by monthly attacks on US forces for each month. The resulting numbers were small and didn't show up well on the graph so I set the highest monthly effectiveness number from November 2003 at 100 and adjusted the remainder of the months around this base number. Graphing all these numbers shows the following from November 2003 to August 2004:

What seems apparent is that effectiveness as measured by the ability of a specific attack to inflict lethal casualties on us is going down. I should note that even reducing the deaths to account for non-combat deaths wouldn't affect the Effectiveness numbers since I'd just be doing a wag reduction based on the average of non-combat deaths. I'd have to have actual KIA monthly numbers for it to matter. The key is that the Iraqi insurgents may be able to replace losses, possibly even increasing their numbers, but they are not getting better. Experienced killers are themselves dying and being replaced by new guys who can't take on US forces without suffering heavily. This is where the Iraqi insurgent body count is significant.

Our fight may not have (yet) broken the back of the insurgency. I don't rule that out. An insurgent collapse could be sudden and unexpected just as the Iranians in 1988 suddenly broke after years of enduring heavy casualties in their Khomeini-inspired death worship in the Iran-Iraq War of the 1980s. But if that collapse doesn't happen, or if it doesn't happen for years, our post-war campaign has tilted the playing field toward the good guys as we reduce average insurgent skills by killing the best; and as we train and equip our side to increase the Iraqi security forces' average skill level. With this skill advantage and US troops as the ultimate reserve force for Iraqi security units, the Iraqis will be able to grind down the Baathists and sweep up the Islamists. If we can finally cut the border infiltration of arms and people, as in Tal Afar, we will tilt the weaponry balance even more in our favor.

The death and attack numbers don't point to winning on our own anytime predicatively soon. If this was the only factor, I'd worry. But in light of our correct strategy to transfer responsibility for fighting to the Iraqis themselves, the Effectiveness number is on a good trend down. This is a crude measure and I'm sure our military has better data based on crime scene-style investigations into the types of attacks. Nonetheless, I feel better that we won't be putting Iraqi security forces into a fight beyond their capabilities.

I’m encouraged by this article. While I am in awe of our Air Force, I’ve always been troubled by service parochialism that always seems strongest in the Air Force. Not unique to the Air Force. But over-represented, shall I say. Check it out:

September 13, 2004: The U.S. Air Force did a study of its first two years performance in the war on terror, and came up with six major “lessons learned". That is, important things that must be remembered, and continue as important aspects of air force operations.

1- Joint warfare. Working effectively with the other services is very important. The air force got a dose of this in late 2001, when the invasion of

Afghanistan

was ordered. With no nearby airbases, the navy carriers were the major source of air power early on. U.S. Air Force tankers were needed in order to get the most out of the navy aircraft, who still had to fly long distances to reach distant targets. While the smart bombs played a critical role in Afghanistan, it was the Army Special Forces teams down there that were finding the targets, and seeing to it that the air force teams with their special radios were getting the target information up stairs regularly and accurately. The lesson here was that the air force cannot do it themselves.

2- Air and space superiority. The air force has dominated the air over the battlefield for more than sixty years, and doesn’t take it for granted. Listing this as a “lesson learned” is just another way of making sure this continues to be an area that requires constant effort. Against some potential opponents, like

China

, air supremacy could be lost, at least temporarily. There’s a downside to all this, however, in that the air force spends enormous chunks of its budget on new air superiority aircraft like the F-22. This starves other priorities, and Congress won’t give the air force a blank check

3- Expeditionary operations. In the 1990s, the air force reorganized to better deal with fast breaking overseas situations. New warplane units, designed to quickly move anywhere in the world and quickly set up operations, were assembled. The

Afghanistan

operation was the first real test of the “expeditionary operations” concept, and many valuable lessons were learned. It worked, but many problems were encountered that have to be fixed.

4- Precision and Persistence. The air force has been using smart bombs since World War II, but the new JDAM (GPS guided) models proved to be a spectacular success (because they found their target on their own, without a laser or someone to “guide them in.”) The air force was finally free of the curse, and the cost, of “dumb bombs.” At the same time, the widespread use of UAVs, which could circle a combat zone for 24 hours or more, and bombers, which, with the aid of air refueling, that could stay up there nearly as long, provided a degree of “persistence” that had never before been available. All this made air power more effective than ever. In this category, the air force also pays the usual lip service to improving BDA (Bomb Damage Assessment, finding out if you hit what you thought you hit).

5- Airlift and air refueling. These two items are critical mainly because the air force could not get bombs on the target in

Afghanistan

without the transports and tankers. Less critical, but still essential, in Iraq, both of these non-combat aircraft types are regularly shoved aside when it comes time to get more money. The warplanes take precedence, but there is an ongoing debate over how much air force money should go to the tankers (which are overdue for replacement) and transports (which everyone agrees there are not enough of.)

6- People. Well trained and well led people made it all possible. The air force has continually worked at improving the quality of its personnel. It’s easy to take this for granted, but the air force doesn’t.

The old idea that there could be an independent air campaign separate from the joint war effort always bugged me. Kosovo showed how a clever enemy could spoof our mighty air armada trying to do this. I’ll never forget my issue of Air Force Magazine proudly displaying a photo of a knocked out Serb armored vehicle—which was clearly a 1945-vintage M-36. We killed darned few of the enemy in that war. We got lucky when the enemy blinked. Acknowledging that spotters can make all the difference and that the Air Force can be responsive to ground pounders is a crucial lesson. Cooperation with the Navy was important, too, with the Air Force absolutely critical to getting Navy planes inland.

The lesson of being expeditionary worked well, too. Operating from big established air bases is now a luxury and not assumed.

Persistence, in support of ground guys who can’t predict when they’ll need bombs on target, was great joined to precision.

And of course, high quality people makes the most of what we have whether it is the best technology in the world or a fifty-year-old plane. Training is invisible to bean counters but it is the most important factor in keeping our system of air power—not a bunch of planes—dominant.

Even the “lesson” of air superiority is important to remember. We had it, so it really isn’t a lesson except in the sense that we have assumed it since about 1944. But we can’t assume it if we fight China. I can’t in good conscience support large numbers of F-22 Raptors since short of a China War, we will have absolute air supremacy in any major theater war. But a couple wings would be nice insurance, along with a warm production line if tensions with China increase.

Overall, I like the lessons’ focus on influencing the events on the ground with the guys on the ground full partners. This way, our fly boys are awesome. And we decimate our enemies.

“Well Now It’s a Full-Blown Coincidence” (Posted September 13, 2004)

The US has been conducting air strikes on Fallujah for a while now, going after the thugs who run that city. And while Baghdad Bob is gone, his memory lives on. I started noticing that every time we drop bombs on a bunch of killers, the locals always seem to say that “women and children” were among the victims. Like today:

At least 20 people were killed and 29 wounded in the airstrike, said Dr. Ahmad Taher of the Fallujah General Hospital. Women and children were among the dead.

We don’t target kids. Either the locals are lying—from fear or conviction I do not know—or the thugs like to hang around kids more than Michael Jackson.

I haven’t followed every strike article, but I get the impression that according to them we always nail innocents according to “witness” reports. Mighty suspicious, I’d say. The Baathists and their terror buddies would do well to, on occasion say, “Yeah, it was a good hit. They nailed our fighters.” You know, just to maintain some credibility.

The mushroom cloud over North Korea doesn’t appear to have been a nuclear test:

South Korean and

U.S.

officials have said the explosion at Kimhyungjik county near

North Korea

's border with

China

was unlikely to have been a nuclear weapons test, although no definitive explanation has been put forth.

I’m tremendously relieved. This day will arrive one day, but putting it off is still desirable. Gives us time to develop missile defense for us and our allies; and allows more time for internal problems to blow up politically for North Korea.

Industrial accident? Missile engine accident? Fuel explosion? Nuclear-related test? Chinese covert sabotage? It is odd it took place on a North Korean commemorative day. But coincidences do happen.

A large explosion occurred in the northern part of

North Korea

, sending a huge mushroom cloud into the air on an important anniversary of the communist regime, a South Korean news agency reported Sunday.

Experts have speculated that

North Korea

might use a major anniversary to conduct a nuclear-related test, though there was no immediate indication that Thursday's reported explosion was linked to Pyongyang's efforts to develop nuclear weapons.

The reality-bending analysis then places the burden of difficulties in future talks on South Korea:

The South Korean experiments, conducted in 1982 and 2000, were likely to further complicate the already stalled six-nation talks aimed at dismantling the North's nuclear development.

South Korea

has said the experiments were purely for research and did not reflect a desire to develop weapons.

I know that non-nuclear explosions can create mushroom clouds, but would the North Koreans risk their prestige with just a big conventional bomb? On an important North Korean anniversary? On the 9-11 anniversary for added oomph?

If true, the Chinese will rue the day they decided to play games with this problem and failed to control their mini-me ally. The Japanese and South Koreans will go nuclear. And if China responds by beefing up their nuclear forces in response, Taiwan will go nuclear, too.

The Moslem world is reacting to our efforts to change their culture of death to deprive Islamist terrorists of willing recruits:

The Muslim world is changing. Three years after the atrocity of 9/11, it may be in the early stages of a reformation, albeit with a small "r". From

Morocco

Indonesia

, people are trying to develop a more contemporary and humane interpretation of Islam, and some countries are undergoing major transformations.

Muslims worldwide are acknowledging the need for fundamental change in their perception of Islam. They are making conscious efforts to move away from medieval notions of Islamic law and to implement the vision of justice, equality and beauty that is rooted in the Koran. If such changes continue, the future will not repeat the recent past.

But according to critics of the Iraq War, it would be better to go back to fostering stability. We would be safer exchanging our dead in their terrorist strikes with their dead in cruise missile retaliations, calling us even until the next strike—even though our enemies will never call it even while we live.

Change them. They need it. They deserve it, for God’s sake. And best of all, they are finally seeking it.

It's difficult to measure

Iran

's intentions and test its assertions that it's only interested in the atom to generate electricity. But weapons experts agree that nearly two decades of covert activities have given the Islamic Republic the knowledge and technology to make nuclear bombs — activities that have mostly come to light in the past two years.

I’ll try not to laugh too hard over the first sentence. I don’t find it hard to measure the intentions of a state that has secretly pursued nuclear technology when they burn off natural gas while producing oil and say they will pursue nuclear energy regardless of the economic consequences due to Western opposition to that program. No, I easily judge that electricity is not the primary motive for Iran’s nuclear program.

Our patience in letting the Europeans try for a peaceful solution before our November elections seems to be paying off:

Europe's major powers have agreed to set a November deadline on

Iran

to meet demands meant to resolve concerns that it is secretly trying to make nuclear weapons, in a confidential document made available Saturday to The Associated Press.

I never worried about the process track since I figured we would not intervene in Iran until early 2005. What’s the harm in letting the Europeans try the conference room and wax seal route until then? It could only be an enlightening experience for the Euros when confronted with Iranian determination to build missiles and nuclear warheads for them:

But it is significant because it puts the three European countries the closest they have formally been to the

United States

on what to do about

Iran

and activities that Washington insists show Tehran is trying build the nuclear bomb.

The best part is, we’ve dragged the Europeans closer to us not by lecturing them but by letting them fail their way. Just going a little farther in their thinking and that fledgling European military capability for out-of-NATO operations might be used.

But even as the bright light of reality dawns on our European friends, the rear guards of blind stupidity fight on. Like this gentlemen from the Council on Foreign Relations. We’ve been too hard line with Iran’s mullahs, he thinks. He’d like to get on with the surrendering before Iran gets nukes so it isn’t so humiliating for us:

The

United States

, by relaxing its economic sanctions and granting

Iran

a voice in the postwar Persian Gulf deliberations, could disarm clerical hard-liners who require American belligerence for perpetuation of the nuclear program. In exchange,

Iran

would have to accept verifiable restraints on its nuclear activities. Indeed, an

Iran

whose strategic environment is stabilized and enjoys expanding economic ties with the

United States

is likely to be a more constructive interlocutor on issues ranging from terrorism to human rights.

Truly I am stunned. Give Iran economic advantages. Give them a voice in the region. Deprive them of American belligerence which the author asserts is the reason for Iran’s determination to get nukes. I guess the line that all of our troubles are due to the Jews and our support of Israel can only be jettisoned when one has to ignore the obvious fact that the Iranian mullahs have joyously proclaimed their intention of nuking Israel even if the Israelis kill millions in a nuclear retaliation. To be fair, Takeyh did not argue that part. I’m just taking the talking points of others who want a soft line. And the Europeans, who we are working on convincing. Do this and Iran will be more constructive on issues ranging from terrorism to human rights? And they’ll give up nuclear weapons. Does the fact that this is the range of issues we must deal with Iran over rather than a range from tariffs to intellectual property rights not tell us something about who we deal with?

A senior fellow? Sounds like a senior moment. Or, as I started out, just more sand-pounding stupidity.

The North Koreans are using South Korean revelations about old small-scale nuclear experiments to trash the talks and insist they will not give up nukes:

"Under these circumstances, it is only natural that we should never give up our nuclear program," the North Korean spokesman said.

Some here fall into their ridiculous rantings as if Pyongyang is a reasonable and trustworthy negotiating partner rather than a criminal state with nukes.

"We strongly suspect that the

United States

may have masterminded the experiments that were clearly of military nature," he was quoted as saying. "We cannot but link these developments with the issue of holding six-party talks."

The dear leader is apparently confused. Why would we mastermind South Korean nukes? When we have plenty to use on North Korea? When we could have just quietly slipped some nuclear warheads to Seoul if we really wanted them to have nukes and avoid discovery of nuclear programs?

But the real stupidity will be evident when the Western surrenderniks use North Korea’s bluster as a reason to urge surrender to North Korea’s demands forthwith.

And as I said before, China needs to move quickly to put the Pillsbury Nuke Boy in his place and defang him of his deadliest weapons before the region gets too complicated for China:

Government officials throughout Asia and members of Mr. Bush's national security team have also feared it could change the nuclear politics of Asia, fueling political pressure in

South Korea

and

Japan

to develop a nuclear deterrent independent of the

United States

It has been three years since we were hit in New York and the Pentagon. Nearly three thousand were murdered by Islamist fanatics who looked around them, saw failure in their societies, and then blamed us. And not only blamed us for their own sick society’s failures, but resolved to kill us in the millions to cure their failure. September 11, 2001, was not the first effort to collect our corpses for their bizarre scheme of revenge and world domination, but it was the largest. Nearly 3,000 were vaporized. Some died without knowing we were at war. Some had time to contact loved ones to say goodbye. Some had the time to contemplate and decide on the manner of their death—plunge to the Earth far below or burn to death. Or be pulverized in the collapse of a symbol of our power.

The idea that we are mistaken in going out after these people and reorganizing their society in the face of their failure to do so on their own, astonishes me. The ability of Arabs and Moslems to succeed abroad when they leave the deadening weight of their own diseased society gives me confidence that their society can be reformed for the better. Stability, that supposedly supreme goal that we have abandoned for the Middle East, has led to death and misery around the world. And still does. And death and misery will continue because, as these scum boast, they love death while we love life:

This death cult has no reason and is beyond negotiation. This is what makes it so frightening. This is what causes so many to engage in a sort of mental diversion. They don't want to confront this horror. So they rush off in search of more comprehensible things to hate.

Our enemies continue to kill us. The children of Beslan were only the most recent innocents to earn the label of “enemy of Islam.” And in a way, perhaps they were. Those children lived in a

Russia

that has made more progress in ten years than the Islamic world has made in a century. Those Russian children were part of the West and would have grown up to enjoy success and progress. The children of the hijackers would have known only further failure in the stability of despair. Thinking that killing us will change this basic fact of our two societies demonstrates why we have nothing to talk about with these killers.

After three years, my anger has dissipated a great deal. I have to work at getting enraged at what our Islamist enemies have done to us. But I can. The numbness from reading the names of our military personnel still dying to protect us is more immediate than 3,000 dead from three years ago, reminding me that we fight on. My anger is not gone. Nor is my resolve to fight this war any less than it was three years ago. This day of remembrance does not recall a horrible tragedy. It was not some Hurricane Osama that swept across our land. It was an act of war. Our enemies finally rubbed in our face the fact that they are at war with us. Finally, we could not ignore what they woke up every day thinking about—how to kill millions of us. We finally knew it would be a long war, involving many campaigns and using many tools, three years ago. And today, all we know is that it is three years closer to our victory, whenever that day is.

Today is not about teddy bears and flowers laid at the headstones of our dead and the monuments of that day. It is about remembering why we fight and resolving to finish it on our terms. What I remember most about September 11, 2001, is that in the midst of the most horrifying attack we have ever endured on our shores from a foreign enemy, some of us showed the way. The passengers of United Flight 93 counter-attacked without any of the technology and weapons that our Islamist enemies assert are the only reason we can beat them. Indeed, they assert we cannot fight without them. Those ordinary Americans on that flight used the strength of our society to inflict the first defeat on our enemies in the long war that has followed. Whatever their target, the al Qaeda thugs who controlled that plane in the end knew that they had lost that battle. They crashed the plane into a field in Pennsylvania rather than get captured by determined American civilians and face our justice by living. They chose death again.

So fine, 19 hijackers showed us a big difference between us. We love life. They love death. As far as I’m concerned, we can work with both of our deepest desires—let’s kill them until even they no longer love death. They still wake up thinking about how to kill us. Now, we wake up thinking about how to kill them. They don’t stand a chance.

Some NPR reporter was on Dennis Miller last night. She claimed

Iraq

is worse. She said electricity is worse now than during the war. No. Electricity is worse in Baghdad because the rest of the country is no longer starved to feed the center. She said attacks per day on us are up to 80 per day. This is about twice what I'd read some months ago, so I need to look into it. That might be why casualties are higher this summer. But we've also been attacking so that could be the reason too. I'll have to look around.

But this is what really got me. She said that the

coalition is shrinking. Well, US and British forces have been reduced after major combat operations and have not been compensated for even by allied contributions. That is true. But to say the Coalition is smaller is to ignore 200,000 Iraqis fighting on our side now. We went from several hundred thousand opposing us to a couple hundred thousand helping us in a year and a half.

The Russians have taken enough from the Chechens. The Moscow theater. A couple planes blown out of the air. Assorted low-level mayhem. But 160 murdered children at Beslan and another 160 dead adults went too far for the Russians to ignore it and triangulate with the Germans and French to thwart US policy in the Middle East.

Russia

's top general threatened on Wednesday to attack "terrorist bases" anywhere in the world, as security services put a $10 million bounty on two Chechen rebels they blame for last week's school siege.

"As for launching pre-emptive strikes on terrorist bases, we will carry out all measures to liquidate terrorist bases in any region of the world," said General Yuri Baluevsky, chief of

Russia

's general staff.

In 2002, President Vladimir Putin accused neighboring

Georgia

of harboring Chechen rebel bases and said this gave Moscow the right to strike at suspects beyond

Russia

's borders.

Qatar

court sentenced two Russians to life in prison in June for killing Chechen militant Zelimkhan Yandarbiyev in the Gulf state. The judge said they had acted on orders from Moscow.

Maskhadov's London-based spokesman Akhmed Zakayev, told Reuters that constituted a "threat to Europe.

"I do not exclude that what they did in

Qatar

they could try to do in any European country," he said.

Also, consider that

Russia

is not a global power any more. They have nukes , which I read that

Russia

is ruling out. Thank goodness! But the fact they felt the need to rule it out should show that the Russians are deadly serious. The Russians have lots of lethal conventional hardware but precision and global reach are limited. They have a small number of professional soldiers and I assume they could put together some good special forces types—although without the sophisticated hardware that we have.

For me, this is not the time to carp on

Russia

Chechnya

policy. The Chechens have, much like the Palestinians have done, gone from having a reasonable objective of independence to forfeiting sympathy based on their repulsive tactics of targeting children and innocents. Both have allowed Islamofascists to speak for their cause and when they speak, the murder and mutilate babies with joyous zeal. How can we—or the Russians or Israelis—negotiate with these thugs under the circumstances? What will they talk about with us when they consider some of their own fellow terrorists insufficiently brutal?

Their leader [in Breslan] was brutal in enforcing discipline. When some gunmen asked why they had seized the school, he shot one dead. He killed two more later by detonating their explosive belts.

Their hatred cannot be moderated. How can we reward such methods with statehood? How can we think about allowing such thugs—who will wage war against even against fellow terrorists who want to "just" murder adults as easily as Westerners? Do you think the terrorists would have any restraint in waging war against moderate and nominal Moslems to take over the state that would be created?

Russia

may be wrong to hold

Chechnya

. But they are right to refuse murderers to take control. The debate over the justice of demands for independence needs to wait until after the Islamist murderers are dead or in jail.

And if you think that Beslan can't happen here. If you think that it is irrelevant to us, consider Hanson's words:

Ask yourself: What do a Russian ten-year-old, a poor black farmer in Darfur, an elderly pensioner in

Israel

, a stockbroker in New York, and a U.N. aid worker in

Afghanistan

have in common? In the last three years, they have all died in similar ways: Unarmed and civilian, they were murdered by a common cowardly method fueled by a fascist ideology.

I hope

Russia

will wage war with precision as much as they can and not pulverize for the sake of vengeance. We did not level

Afghanistan

after 9-11, although I do not know if we could have shown such restraint had 3,000 of our children instead of adults been murdered.

Yet some here question our fight. They fret that we have alienated so many in the Moslem world and cite polls showing this. Well let the Moslem world worry about this:

How the Arab-Islamic world managed to unite over 3 billion nuclear Anglo Americans, Indians, Chinese, and Russians in their suspicions of it will be a case-study in imbecility for diplomatic historians for decades to come.

Others in the world may fear our power and worry what we will do with it, but they won't be strip searching Americans looking for bombs.

But I expect

Russia

to fight and I am glad of it. I don't know how long it will take the Russian military to gear up and go, but they will strike. It will be nice to have another nation that is angry enough to fight back instead of run when struck. What will it take for Europeans to rouse themselves to action? I shudder to think about it. Remember. Beslan is in Europe.

A key component of national missile defense, whose development is receiving priority this year, is likely to strategically tie the United States to Iraq, Afghanistan and some of the authoritarian former Soviet republics, requiring permanent US military bases there, according to officials and scientists involved in the project.

The article notes we could deploy mobile missile defense units in those regions. Deployment in these locations would allow missile intercepts when the offending missiles are in their boost phase—slower and lit up for sensors to track.

I sure hope this is Plan B and that Plan A is to overthrow the mullahs. Heck, depending on what we know, I hope it is Plan C with Plan B being an aerial campaign to destroy

Iran

's nuclear facilities. Because just because

Iran

gets nukes doesn't mean they must use missiles to hit us or our friends. I like missile defense since nuclear tipped missiles are one option for killing us, but our enemies would have many options. If the mullahs think their missiles will be shot down, they'll plop them on a merchant ship. Or turn one of their submarines into a nuclear truck bomb to detonate in the target area—whether next to a carrier or a port city or a canal or a naval choke point.

Regime change would be a whole lot more reassuring to me when I contemplate Iranian nukes.

But then my speculations/predictions that we'd go on the offensive in the Horn region by summer and that Summer Pulse might be a cover for aerial strikes around the globe at terrorists were way off. I still think they were good ideas but they obviously did not happen. I comfort myself by noting that at least I didn't inadvertently tip off enemies over plans and instead contributed to that vast noise out there about what we will do next.

I am sure there is a next.

Iran

in early 2005? Sure hope so. We're running out of time:

Britain has set Iran a two month ultimatum to suspend all activities linked to the production of a nuclear bomb or face a demand for United Nations sanctions, the British press said.

It looks like even Europe is moving toward confrontation. I will say that it is dispiriting when modern ultimatums take the form of threats to go to the UN rather than threats to destroy specific bits of their country. The Europeans really have lost that killer instinct so necessary for ultimatums, haven't they?

After

South Korea

nudged

China

to pressure

North Korea

to end its nuclear program lest

South Korea

use its scientific knowledge to build their own nuclear deterrent force against the north,

North Korea

bolsters that argument by reacting to the South Korean nuclear experiment revelation in a manner bound to concern Peking:

"It has become difficult to prevent expansion of a nuclear arms race because of

South Korea

's test," Han said in the North's first response to the South's admission last week that its scientists enriched tiny amounts of uranium in 2000.

Han's sharp comments came as Seoul sought to play down the diplomatic impact of the unsanctioned laser enrichment tests at the state-run Korean Atomic Energy Research Institute and amid efforts to restart six-party nuclear talks with the North.

By emphasizing that their could be a nuclear arms race between North and South Korea—which could drag in Japan and Taiwan, too—China has been reminded that they really do have a good reason to help us reverse and eliminate North Korea’s nuclear arms programs. I could not have hoped

North Korea

would be this cooperative.

And I have no doubt that

North Korea

really doesn’t want an arms race. They want the nuclear track all to themselves.

"And Let's Debate the Afghan Campaign Too…" (Posted September 8, 2004)

I'm not going to comment on the election, but this excerpt from Jonathon Cohn in an ongoing debate at NRO is interesting:

A major reason for our failure [to kill or capture bin Laden and crush al Qaeda and Taliban forces], Spencer goes on to note, has been our refusal to put more troops on the ground — at Tora Bora, when we had Al Qaeda cornered, and in the time since — relying instead on Afghanistan militias to do the work for us. As a

U.S.

counterterrorism official told The Washington Post, "We f**ked up by not getting into Tora Bora sooner and letting the Afghans do all the work. We didn't put

U.S.

forces on the ground, despite all the brave talk."

Wow. Yes, we failed to nail our enemies for good after we routed them out of Kabul (just as we failed at Falaise to nail the Germans after the breakout form Normandy in 1944). But we have no way of knowing if putting American forces on the ground at that moment would have worked. Sure, the odds might have been increased, but there is no guarantee. And we did have reason to believe locals would have better terrain knowledge than our guys. Plus, getting significant troops into

Afghanistan

was no small feat. Given that the Taliban collapsed very rapidly, how realistic is it to expect that the logistically challenging task of projecting American power into

Afghanistan

could have been accelerated and changed on the fly to exploit the sudden collapse?

News flash to Cohn: Shit happens. Errors are made. And good soldiers die in any war.

As for the brave talk hit, did we not overthrow the Taliban in record time at low cost when the other side warned of a quagmire and Afghan winters and the perils of fighting through Moslem holidays that would enrage the street? Good Lord, some people are just ignorant. Or have bad memories.

But what really gets me is the lack of nuance in Cohn's position. I'll go so far as to say it is simplisme. Cohn argues vehemently that we should have had the courage to go into Tora Bora with US troops at full tilt. Is he really arguing that we should have been more vigorous with a military solution? Am I reading that right? Wow. I don't know if Cohn has military experience but I hope so since his ilk is so eager to hurl the Chickenhawk charge when anybody who hasn’t shot up caches of rice gives a pro-war opinion. What a Neanderthal (oh, I'm sorry, that would be Sloped-Forehead Americans. No insult intended).

I didn’t pay too much attention to a recent report that Pakistan might be near capturing bin Laden. But Pakistan’s recent denial that they are closing in makes me wonder. Are we putting pressure on the Pakistanis to succeed by portraying them as close? Failure when they are close to capturing bin Laden would be unforgivable. Clearly, the Pakistanis would rather not appear close to avoid that black eye.

A related question: if this is going to be the October surprise we are constantly being warned about and we can pick up Osama at will (or indeed have him on ice already) as some wackos have alleged, in what meaningful way has the Iraq War distracted us from the “real war” against al Qaeda?

I feel a bit better after posting my worries that we are letting sanctuaries endure inside Iraq. The Iraqis are in fact going after the insurgent sanctuaries:

September 6, 2004: Fighting in the last three days has killed about 300 and wounded over 600. The government appears determined to regain control of towns and neighborhoods held by Sunni Arab gangs and Shia religious militias, before the January elections. Otherwise, elections will not be held in those areas.

Iraqi troops are said to have captured Izzat Ibrahim al Douri, a senior Saddam aide who had a $10 million price on his head. The Iraqis killed 70 of al Douri’s supporters, and captured another 80, in the battle that broke out in Tikrit during the operation. Al Douri was thought to be one of the key leaders in planning and financing the anti-government attacks. He was number six on the

U.S.

list of “55 Most Wanted.” However, members of the government, and

U.S.

commanders, deny that an operation to seize al Douri took place. [NOTE: I read Al Douri was not, in fact, captured.]

At the same time, Iraqi police and troops raided Latifiya, a Sunni Arab stronghold 30 kilometers south of Baghdad. Some 500 people were arrested, while 17 policemen were killed and 17 people were wounded.

Meanwhile, on the Syrian border,

U.S.

and Iraqi troops are into their third day fighting Sunni Arab gunmen in Tall Afar. The town is thought to be an entry point for men and weapons coming across the border from

Syria

Because as long as we give them sanctuaries where they can plan attacks against us, we will get hit like this (from the Al Douri link):

A massive car bomb exploded Monday on the outskirts of Fallujah, killing seven

U.S.

Marines and wounding several others, a

U.S.

military official said, in the deadliest attack on Americans since May.

It is always a mistake to voluntarily cede the initiative to the enemy. I hope we haven’t. If Iraqis are able to take on the burden of reducing these enemy strongholds, our ability to be nicer and reduce the impact of our troop presence will be enhanced. Kill enemies. Treat suspects with care until we know they are guilty so we don’t make it easier for the enemy to recruit. Once the sanctuaries are gone, it will be easier for our troops to pull back and function as a reserve force to help Iraqis if they run into something they can’t handle.

I’d like to see a Canadian government with the fortitude to issue such an ultimatum to Tehran. But Canada has accepted the death of one of their citizens, Mrs. Zahra Kazemi, at the hands of the Iranian mullahs with nary a protest. The Iranians acquitted their agent, Mohammad Reza Aghdam Ahmadi, in a so-called trial.

A great nation that fielded an army in Europe during World War II after storming one of the five Normandy beaches and which had the third largest navy in 1945, now kowtows to Tehran’s mullahs.

That’s the problem for

Canada

: the dawn of this new century is an era of hard power. The Graham/Pettigrew approach – speak softly and carry a very small twig – advertises our impotence - in contrast, say, to the robust utterances of John Howard, Prime Minister of the nation that now fills Canada’s vacated slot as the doughty third warrior of the Anglosphere.

“Without armed forces a state does not exist,” says my eminent colleague at The Daily Telegraph, Sir John Keegan. Hard power does not mean military might alone. But military might is, in the broadest sense, a reliable indicator of how serious a country is.

I too am concerned. Canada is our friend. A valued friend. I was recently in Toronto and was reminded how much I love that city. I don’t even get upset that they ship their trash to Michigan. But Canada has demilitarized to the point where it cannot even say angry words to the mullahs who murdered one of their citizens. Yes, Canada contributed troops to Afghanistan. I thank Canada for this commitment. But a nation with the stature of Canada cannot sit out the great struggle of our day.

In the short run, Canada cannot rebuild its once efficient military. This will take time. But in the short run, Canada could deploy a brigade group, with say the Princess Patricias and the Van Doos that Steyn mentioned as the core battalions. Add a couple recon troops and some helicopters, perhaps a full tank regiment (battalion) before the Canadians disband them forever, special forces, and assorted support troops, and Canada would have a nice brigade-sized ground force to attach to an American division for the intervention in Iran that will surely follow the first revolts inside Iran against the pre-nuclear mullah regime. Canadian F-18s could support as well.

Other than Britain, no American ally can field an expedition on their own and expect to fight a reasonably competent enemy. France could if Paris ever decides to be an American ally again. Heck, even the US Marines had some Army support units attached for the Iraq War. But everyone else needs to plug into a US effort. There is no shame that the Canadians can’t mount their own expedition around the globe. But there is no reason for a country of Canada’s stature to be unable to deploy a small division if Ottawa really had to. Deploying a brigade should be easy. When a prominent military exercise (Narwhal) is designed to bolster your claim to your own northern territory, you’ve got problems. If Canada had the military she should have, the question of whether Canada exists as a nation—in the Arctic or otherwise—would not need to be answered by sending troops north into Canadian territory. Cripes, does anybody wonder if the US is sovereign in Alaska? Why would the mullahs of Iran worry about Canada’s opinion when this is a major Canadian military objective?

"The trial of Saddam and the others on the black list will start within a few weeks ... before the end of this year and before (Iraqi) elections," [Iraqi Minister of State] Qassim Dawoud told reporters during a visit to Kuwait City.

I’m sure some will question the “timing” of such a trial. I hope that it does start in a matter of weeks. Like next month. How can anybody question the timing when they also say invading Iraq was a mistake? Surely, they should welcome an examination of the ruler we defeated and arrested in error.

I think we’re already familiar with the concept of exaggerating a foreign enemy in order to suppress domestic opposition. I imagine the anti-war left in the US would argue this more forcefully if only they didn’t simultaneously claim that fighting in Iraq is “distracting” us from the “real war” on terrorists.

But what do you call it when a group of people exaggerates a domestic foe in order to suppress awareness of a foreign threat? Is there much research on this? I’m not talking about treason here. There are plenty of cases where people supported a foreign enemy in defeating their own country. In this case the traitors are not only aware of the foreign threat, they are counting on that threat to beat their own government.

No, I’m thinking about people who, when confronted with a foreign enemy that has killed many of us and continues to boast it will kill far more, find that domestic political opponents are in fact the real enemy. These people look at those on the other side of the aisle and see the true threat to the health of our nation. Off hand—and I’m no expert on pre-war French politics—it seems that the era of “Better Hitler than Blum” in France before World War II is the only case that I’m aware of where a foreign enemy was discounted in favor of demonizing a domestic opponent. It can’t be the only one, I’m sure, but is there any research on this?

Actually, the US right now might be the second case. This scares me. I can’t ignore Beslan. Or 11-M. Or Bali. Or 9-11. But an awful lot sure seem to ignore them. They seem to think we are already a dictatorship and the true fight is here. If I was a betting man, I’d say the first political assassination we have in this country will be a domestic fool who believes he is striking a blow for freedom, and not an al Qaeda hit squad trying to extend the Osama Caliphate to North America.

We complain that Europe is in denial about the world as it tries to make a violent world conform to its utopia of rules and meetings and brightly colored ribbons affixed to lengthy agreements in multiple languages.

But given Europe’s violent past interrupted with this head-in-the-sand attitude, could we have a future where we look back to today with nostalgia? Will Europe always be a helpless but annoying giant, always complaining about us but never acting?

It could all turn ugly; an unratified European Constitution, stagnating economies, new dark nationalist politics and a fragmenting European Union.

Of course, I disagree strongly with the author’s assumption that the failure of the EU could lead to this:

To imagine that

Britain

will be immune from this is absurd; what happens in mainland Europe will directly impact upon us as it has throughout our history. What is needed is an understanding that if European states don't hang together they will hang separately - and that because the European Union is the best we have, we'd better make it work.

I think that vesting hope in an undemocratic EU bureaucracy is the path to dark nationalist politics and stagnating economies.

Twisting and turning for any kind of electoral advantage, Schröder last week said he was prepared to reverse

Germany

's 54-year-long ban on the referendum, the populist tool used by Hitler to establish the Nazi regime.

Germany

could then hold a referendum on the EU constitution. This is a key plank of the postwar constitution being knocked away. For the paradox of referendums is that they are fundamentally anti-democratic, confusing democracy with populism and placing power in the hands of those who can manipulate public opinion for their own ends.

Germany

's history is testimony to the consequences.

Voting is “fundamentally anti-democratic.” Why yes, we can’t trust the people to vote. The fools might be swayed to vote against the EU, when their betters will move toward the EUtopia that the Brussels mandarins have mapped out—with brightly colored ribbons affixed with wax. In the EU world where up is down and black is white—and where America is the primary threat to world peace—refusing to let the people vote on the EU constitution is defending democracy.

We can’t walk away from Europe in frustration. God knows what they’ll do without adult supervision. Or rather, we do know. We’ve left little white crosses scattered across Europe learning that lesson. We must always support our friends in Europe and never tire of bolstering them in the battle for Europe’s soul. We must oppose the EU. No good will come of it.

If the war against terrorists isn’t to become a civilizational war between the largely Christian West (even the nominally Christian parts) and the Moslem world, Moslem leaders must denounce the slaughter of our children. Ordinary Moslems must refuse to passively support this slaughter.

If Muslim religious leaders around the world will not publicly condemn the taking of children as hostages and their subsequent slaughter — if those "men of faith" will not issue a condemnation without reservations or caveats — then no one need pretend any longer that all religions are equally sound and moral.

Islam has been a great and humane faith in the past. Now far too many of its adherents condone, actively or passively, the mass murder of school kids. Instead of condemnations of the Muslim "Jihadis" responsible for butchering more than 200 women and children in cold blood, we will hear spiteful counter-accusations about imaginary atrocities supposedly committed by Western militaries.

Well, the cold fact is that Western soldiers, whether Americans, Brits, Russians or Israelis, do not take hundreds of children hostage, then shoot them in cold blood while detonating bombs in their midst. The Muslim world can lie to itself, but we need lie no longer.

I don’t want to wage war against Islam. I don’t want to be hardened to the death of their children. And short of annihilating every Moslem and razing every one of their holy places, this path won’t lead to victory. And if it did, we wouldn’t like the victors very much—or shouldn’t.

But this dilemma does not mean that we should delude ourselves into thinking that these terrorist acts inspired by a sick interpretation of Islam are just isolated criminal acts that we can address with some arrests and prison terms. That law enforcement outlook and an over-emphasis on maintaining “stability” contributed to our current situation.

Instead, we must attempt to change the status quo at the risk of the stability that has nurtured Islamist hatred.

When death and misery is the universally recognized outcome for trying to kill us or even passively supporting our enemies, our Islamist enemies will dwindle. When opportunity is the recognized outcome for being our friend, then friends in the Islamic world will multiply.

I know that the reality of the world will require some compromises for tactical gain. Live with it. This is clearly not a perfect world where we can have a pure strategy. We will have to compromise sometimes until we can bend the situation to our advantage and apply our strategy again. As long as we know compromise is temporary and work hard to make that compromise have an end date, even if unknown, we can move forward.

This is our real choice in this war: reform them or annihilate them. And I don’t want to annihilate them! I don’t even want to think of Islam as “them.” But if the choice is living with attacks on our children or annihilating them, I don’t think the West will choose the former. As Caerdroia notes:

Anyone who thinks that the actions of the jihadis are not driving the world closer to genocide is either not paying attention, or has no sense of history and particularly of the brutality of a decent man pushed past his limits.

September 11 and Bali and 11-M horrified us. Beslan scares us to our very core as a threat to our children. I believe that a passive law enforcement approach guarantees that we will see more Beslans. In

Russia

, in Europe, and even here. Especially here. And if the Moslem world continues its Baghdad Bob mentality of denying we aid them and insisting that we are out to get them, one day we will collectively conclude that if our kindness and compassion are not recognized, then we might as well be as terrible as the Moslem world’s media and Imams say we are on a daily basis. We are a decent civilization. But we are slowly being pushed past our limits.

We must stay on the offensive. Or, as I wrote in my essay on the coming war just after 9-11, our generation’s Pearl Harbor will [NOTE: I meant to write "could" instead of "will." I'm not that pessimistic.] end in our generation’s Hiroshima and Nagasaki. And although our enemies might hit us first with a nuclear weapon, our response will shake the Earth. That scares the Hell out of me. I don’t want to meet our Maker and attempt to justify this path. And what scares me more is I don’t think we’d have much choice. The Beslan effect, if repeated enough, will harden us to the slaughter that we will initiate. Unless we think sacrificing our children so that our enemies may live is the right thing to do. Yet there is some hope that the Islamic world will rise to this challenge, so I am not without hope.

Tell me the Bush Doctrine is wrong when this future choice looms. Just try to tell me it is immoral.

Over the past few months, insurgents in Samarra have deposed the U.S.-picked leaders and put to death people suspected of collaborating with them, making the northern Iraqi city the latest no-go zone for Iraqi and American troops.

Samarra has been added to Fallujah as an enemy sanctuary. Ramadi isn’t quite a sanctuary from what I’ve read, but it is a Fort Apache-type situation where Marines hold isolated outposts in the city that maintain a presence without really controlling the situation.

Now, [1^st CAV DIV commander Maj. Gen. Peter] Chiarelli said, his Texas-based division needs to re-establish control over that area before al-Sadr's forces can regroup. The job will take a matter of weeks, Chiarelli said, giving no timetable for the start of an operation.

"Were going to go in and first, make Sadr City safe for the residents. We're going to make it very, very possible for the militia to disarm," Chiarelli said. "As long as there's a militia of any kind working at counter purposes to the government, we have a problem."

Is this overkill given Sadr’s promise to disband his militia and end his fight? Get real. Listen to that thug:

Rebel Shiite cleric Muqtada al-Sadr declared U.S. forces can never defeat his Mahdi militia in a defiant speech read out to 2,000 supporters during the first Friday prayers since the end of a brutal three-week standoff with American troops.

One of his minions drew this bizarre yet firmly held conclusion from the recent battle:

"Many, but not all, think that the American army is invincible. But now it's appeared only truth is invincible," Sheik Jaber al-Khafaji, said in a statement read on al-Sadr's behalf. "America claims to control the world through globalization, but it couldn't do the same with the Mahdi Army."

Failure to utterly defeat and humiliate our enemies will be interpreted by our enemies as a victory. Is this not clear yet? Why is Sadr alive and free?

We can’t let our enemies have sanctuaries to rest and plan and escape our justice. Occasional air strikes do not deny our enemies the sanctuaries we have granted them. I assume we are working to get the Iraqi security forces to do the job, but if they are unable, we must act. We cannot let our enemies even survive battle with us.

I’m sure the administration is wary of doing anything aggressive lest the fragile majority that supports the Iraq War erode prior to the election. But the war is not going away in the next two months. If we cede the initiative to the enemy, they will attack us and then the news will be how we are reacting to their attacks. If we attack, at least the enemy is reacting to our initiatives and we can keep them worrying about what we are doing to them. And we kill them, of course.

Regional emergency officials said 250 hostages were wounded, including 180 children. The head of a children's hospital in the regional capital of Vladikavkaz said five of the 68 wounded children brought there were in grave condition. Interfax reported more than 400 wounded, including hostages and local residents.

How many dead Russian children are there and how many more will there be before this is over?

Yes, we need a more sensitive approach to addressing their just demands. Certainly, maintaining an air base in a Moslem country justifies murdering children in large numbers. We shouldn't over react to this since fighting back will just create more jihadists. No, we must pull back and tighten our domestic security—but repeal the fascist Patriot Act that places us under near-martial law. We can arrest these presumed innocent criminals, provide them with taxpayer-funded lawyers, and spend years proving each of them guilty under stringent civilian standards. That will show them, right? Fighting these "militants" just perpetuates a cycle of violence that we must understand is only based on unjust US and Western policies. That is what I am supposed to believe, right?

You can still believe this after 9-11, Bali, now-familiar beheadings, and now Beslan, right? I mean, your faith in their basic humanity and reasonableness can't be shaken by simple mass murder of our children, can it? Surely, you can't imagine the horror of hearing the news that your child's school—your precious child—is under the control of armed "militants" and that they've rigged the school to blow. That can't happen here, right? And if it did, it would be understandable, right? Right?!!! You can continue to live in that cocoon of ignorance, can't you?!!!

The only thing I want to understand about our enemies is how to kill them faster and in larger numbers. And the Moslem world needs to wake up and condemn these worthless pieces of living garbage who would murder our children before we decide that this is a war between our civilizations. I don't want it to be that way. But I want to see atrocities like this school hostage situation even less.

South Korea has admitted that government scientists enriched uranium four years ago to a level that several Vienna diplomats said was almost pure enough for an atomic bomb, the U.N. nuclear watchdog said on Thursday.

I don't fear South Korean nukes. Any more than I worry about British or even French nukes. It's the regime, stupid.

So is this revelation a prod to the Chinese to get on the ball in pressuring Pyongyang to give up their nukes? Because if North Korea goes/stays nuclear, with US troops pulling back and possibly pulling out of South Korea one day, the South Koreans are not going to want to trust in the Pillsbury Nuke Boy's famous good will for their security.

It is interesting that

North Korea

should accuse South Korea of kidnapping North Koreans since that appears to be the near-universal means of inducing foreigners to relocate to

North Korea

. And that capitalist tool

Vietnam

aided the crimes, says Pyongyang!

Last month's defection [of 460 people] was by far the largest in what has become a steady stream in recent years, as North Koreans flee repression and hunger in their country, which has depended on outside help to feed its 22 million people since 1995.

More than 5,000 North Koreans have defected to

South Korea

since the 1950-53 Korean War that ended in a truce, not a peace treaty. Last year, the number of defectors arriving in the South reached 1,285, up from 1,140 in 2002 and 583 in 2001.

When a totalitarian, isolated state goes from 33 defections to the south per year for 47 years to well over a thousand per year, it cannot bode well for the regime in question. At some point, when defections from East Germany went from a trickle to a small flood in 1989, the deluge was not far behind, sweeping east European communism and then Soviet communism away in a blink of an eye. At some point, the claim that

South Korea

is kidnapping more and more North Koreans will be obviously false to a lot of people.

All Pyongyang has left to maintain control is fear and if the people stop fearing the consequences of fleeing or opposing the regime, this Bamboo Wall will fall, too.

I hope it won't be too much for the world press to call scum who would threaten mass murder of children "terrorists." But there is progress, in addition to describing the terrorists as "armed militants," "attackers," "rebels," and "guerrillas," the article does call them terrorists, too.

My God, these are children! Can the face of the evil the civilized world confronts be any plainer?

Suspected of seeking nuclear weapons and sponsoring terrorism,

Iran

could prove to be the biggest foreign policy challenge for the winner of the presidential election.

Indeed, the UN notes a disturbing use for yellowcake Uranium (so that’s why Iraqi was trying to get it in Niger! Doh!):

In the confidential report, obtained in full by Reuters, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) said

Iran

planned a large-scale test of a uranium conversion facility this month.

"Iran's announcements are further strong evidence of the compelling need to take Iran's nuclear program to the Security Council,"

U.S.

Under Secretary of State John Bolton said in a statement. The Security Council can impose economic sanctions.

Yet will the UN do something if we take them the problem? After all, the UN simultaneously pretends to see nothing:

United Nations inspectors have found no clear evidence of a nuclear arms program in Iran, according to an upcoming report by the International Atomic Energy Agency cited on Wednesday in The Washington Post.

The article says we believe Iran is 3 to 5 years from atomic bombs. I think it might not be that long and we only say this to put the mullahs at ease a bit.

We need to act soon. In early 2005, probably. Regime change in Tehran. The UN will be of no help at all. Can’t see nukes. Can’t see genocide.

Here is a useful timeline for the mullahs in Iran and their relations with the US.

I am eager to hear what the UN considers “encouraging” progress in the Darfur crisis. Perhaps the UN will report on a 7% reduction over the last month in eye gouging by the Sudanese government thugs prior to raping. Whatever it is, it will be enough to put off sanctions. Kill your own people slowly enough and the UN is capable of calling it progress.

Axis of Evil Candidate Country Syria is feeling the traditional pressure of the power controlling Iraq. Iraq fought a proxy war against Syria in Lebanon in retaliation for Syria’s support for Iran during the Iran-Iraq War (scroll down to 1989):

In August, Beirut exploded in another round of violent shelling between Christian Maronites under General Michel Aoun and Muslim militia. General Aoun was supplied and armed by Iraq, which, since the end of its eight year war with Iran in 1988, had sought to punish Syria for supporting Iran and for refusing the Iraqis right of way for an oil pipeline through Syrian territory to the Mediterranean Sea after the Persian Gulf had been blockaded.

Iraq

and

Syria

had long been rivals in the quest to control regional affairs. Lebanese Muslims, on the other hand were being supplied by Syria, and the Shiite Hizbullah faction ("Party of God") was being sponsored by

Iran

Iraq

had been joined by

Jordan

and

Egypt

(in lower levels of support) on the side of the Christians. Iraq and Syria, then, were in a sense using the militia to fight a proxy war.

With Syria still working against Iraq (and in concert with Iran), the US and Israel are applying some pressure on Syria via Lebanon. Syria, of course, has been occupying Lebanon and running puppet governments in Beirut for the last three decades. Their latest move is to pressure the Lebanese to ignore their constitution to keep their puppet in power:

During a 20-minute extraordinary session Saturday,

Lebanon

's Cabinet approved a constitutional amendment extending the term of Syrian ally President Emile Lahoud.

The Cabinet acted even as German Foreign Minister Joschka Fischer was delivering a message in both Beirut and Damascus urging the constitution should be respected. And the decision ignored a White House declaration that

Syria

should back off.

For

Syria

, the greatest risk is with Europe, its biggest trade partner, with total merchandise trade of $6 billion last year, according to EU figures.

The Arab League is unconcerned with this occupation of an Arab country by a foreign country. Syria is propping up their boy and we have complained. Indeed, we are showing a UN resolution around:

The United States decided to press for a resolution — with the support of France, Lebanon's former colonial ruler — after what many saw as a Syrian-engineered move to change the constitution to extend Lahoud's term.

Imagine! The French are with us (for now). With Germany and France upset in the same way we are, does this finally count as a real coalition?

So we have sanctions on Syria. Europe could put sanctions on Syria. And the US has the potential to hammer Syria militarily though it is admittedly unlikely. But not something to totally disregard if you are sitting in power in Damascus.

And Israel, too, is applying pressure, blaming Syria for the recent bus bombings that murdered innocent Israelis:

Israeli leaders warned

Syria

on Wednesday that it bears the blame for a double suicide bombing by Hamas militants because it harbors the group's leadership, and they hinted at possible retaliation.

Israel’s military threat is far more believable even if it isn’t in the same league as the US’s power.

There are different responses to different threats. I continue to believe that the Syrian government is realistic enough to bend to our will if we apply real pressure and if it is applied firmly and consistently. They aren’t Islamists and they don’t have nukes. They are a second tier problem. They are interfering in Iraq and getting Americans, Iraqis, and our allies killed, so we must deal with them. But others are more urgent. I think we can neutralize Syria with enough conventional pressure.

Now if we can only get the Turks to abandon their silly flirtation with Moslem solidarity and return fully to the Western fold to join us. Do the Turks really think the Arabs have forgiven them for their centuries of colonial rule? Not going to happen, folks.