WHAT IS ARMOR BRANCH DOING TO HELP WIN URBAN BATTLES?

A Russian General comments on how the Chechan guerrillas beat his Army:

"First they use smoke screens and then tear gas to drive out the enemy" the General said. "Special equipment is used to take buildings by assault , including assault ladders and hooks that are simply non-existant in our military units. Even elementary smoke bombs are in short supply with us. As for artillery, using it in urban conditions is useless. It is like using cannon to kill sparrows...."

"The world turned upside down: military lessons of the Chechen war" by Anatoi Lieven for Armed Forces Journal International, August 1998 Page 40

While one watches Saving Private Ryan's (SPR) Soldiers struggle to win a desperate city fight in WWII against German Soldiers shielded by following in the path of Panther, Tiger tanks, and assault guns, (try this behind the turbine engine exhaust of today's M1 Abrams tank) you cannot help but wonder how we would do today since we have retired our Sheridan light tanks and cancelled our own M8 Ridgway Assault Gun Systems. After contacting the U.S. Army Advanced Concept Technology Demonstration (ACTD) effort at Fort Benning, you learn that infantry branch is doing NOTHING with armored fighting vehicles (AFVs). The parochial marines are supposedly investigating ladders and vertical assist platforms but its unlikely to see them develope such things for Army AFVs, much less their own since they think we can fight infantry pure in cities "3-blocks at a time". The casualties depicted in SPR and piled up for real in WWII, Korea, Vietnam and Somalia are sure to follow as our world rapidly urbanizes and we fail to adapt to it.

Not much So what is Armor branch doing to win urban fights? I was told they are using the height of the AFVs to enter buildings one floor up. Basically our infantry exposed to enemy fire will have to cross open streets swept by enemy fire carrying makeshift ladders and clamber up buildings with these or ropes and/or hand emplace demolition charges to create mouseholes, and the results will be no different from previous wars: high casualties and lots of awards of bravery. Is this what we want? At the very least Armor branch should buy some commercial ladders, paint them a subdued color, tape sandbags to their legs for urban anchoring, bungee cord them to some M113A3 infantry carrying, and M58 smoke screen laying AFVs and borrowing some infantry develope expedient AFV ladder assault tactics/techniques, so our men have some protection from enemy fire closing on enemy held buildings.

Rude awakening: Abrams without a mission
In Desert Storm, as much as we try to ignore the truth, most of the enemy's AFVs were killed by indirect fire and Anti-Tank Guided Missiles (ATGMs), not direct fire from our own Abrams tank and Bradley main guns. Once the 5-6 kilometer range self-guiding ("fire and forget") Follow On To Tow (FOTT) ATGM replaces the wire-guided TOW that must be tracked from a standstill, the Bradley will be the premier anti-armor killing ground platform if we can get it to the battlefield. Complimenting this inevitable death for enemy AFVs in terrain ambush positions will be shorter-range self-guiding Javelin teams deploying out the back of the Bradley. Both FOTT and Javelin will be able to kill enemy helicopters and buildings/bunkers if the situation requires this expensive use. I guess as soon as HQDA catches wind of this result, they will cancel FOTT like they cancelled the M8 AGS when it was realized the Airborne would become a fully mobile offensive force from the drop zone and in small wars could possibly leave the careers of the heavy force officers with no combat experience?

What will matter in future armor versus armor warfare will be the absolute best mobility to get into ATGM firing position first, not heavy armor to survive cannon fire at the expense of operational mobility.

The vaunted 70-ton Abrams will be left without a mission except for its main gun to provide close in security against enemy AFVs that somehow get by our new generation ATGMs and for use to reduce buildings/obstacles in urban terrain now that the M728 Combat Engineer Vehicle (CEV) was unwisely retired, assuming that a high explosive plastic 120mm main gun round can be actually FIELDED and reach armor units and not remain a "position paper capability".

Its high time Armor branch begins to adapt to the modern battlefield or its vehicles and its operators will be sitting in a motor pool in CONUS during the next conflict as the Airborne/Light troops fight the battles with a less than ideal force structure in a world where politicians need positive results (VICTORY, LOW CASUALTIES) in HOURS by AIR delivered forces. Itsd time for Armor branch to get with the program and HELP us win. We need them. Here is how we can do it.

Urban Armored Assault Battalion
We need an Urban Armored Assault Battalion in either the 2d Armored Cavalry Regiment or the 3d Infantry Division of the XVIII Airborne Corps. This force would have the mission of being the urban war and forced-entry "Sunday punch" lost when the air-droppable 3d Battalion of the 73d Armor was disbanded last year. Key equipment changes would be:

The IRC changed to AIRLAND Fire Support Company (AIRland FSC)
The name of the Immediate Ready Company (IRC) assigned to support the 82d Airborne on 18 hour contingency alert would be changed to reflect the reality of its deployment, and form the first part of the Urban Armored Assault Battalion.

Its M1A1 Abrams tanks would be re-engined with diesels so infantry can follow it as a moving shield and eliminate the POL sortie carrying HEMMET fuel trucks in the to reduce somewhat the operational handicap of having to seize defended runways to airland the heavy 33 ton Bradleys and 70 ton Abrams AFVs by C-17.

2. Field a HEP round for the Abrams, not just have it sit in as an ammo dump queen or mount the 165mm demolition gun from the CEV inside which has a proven HEP round; Command Sergeant Major Timothy Chadwick 4th ID, 299th Engineer Battalion Fort Hood advocates this in U.S. Army Engineer magazine:

http://www.wood.army.mil/ENGRMAG/PB5964/perview.htm

http://www.wood.army.mil/ENGRMAG/PB5973/letters.htm

Who brings up good points that the long barrel on the M1 Abrams tank restricts its use compared to the short barrel CEV in tight city fighting. He also says:

"It is official, the Army has declared that the combat engineer vehicle (CEV) will cease to exist throughout the Army inventory. When I heard the news, many emotions ran through me in a split second. I felt relieved of the burden of trying to maintain a piece of equipment based on a chassis system that the rest of the Army had retired. The second feeling was that of disgust-that the leadership of our Army finally agreed with us engineers about how painful maintenance of this system had become.

Several days passed before the last and probably most important emotion hit me head-on. Evidently it took that long to fully digest the impact of the loss of the CEV, without a replacement identified. I can only call this emotion fear. That's right, fear-that we are getting rid of a piece of equipment based on our inability to maintain it and not on an evaluation of its tactical requirement. My fear centers around engineer Soldiers of the future and their need for a standoff demolition capability that only the CEV or a like vehicle can provide.

I am fully aware of the Army's research into a 120-mm gun round that will replace or closely resemble the capabilities of the 165-mm CEV round. Can that be done? You bet it can, but my concern doesn't center around the round itself. Why did we look at keeping the gun tube of the CEV so short? I believe that we recognized the need of a turret system for use in tight spaces, such as cities. That tactical possibility exists today and will continue to exist in the future. I tried to remember how many times I personally saw tanks in urban areas with their gun tubes restricted or even stuck through building walls. I soon realized there were far too many times to count. So, how do we solve this problem in the future? I say that the solution must center around a turret system that resembles the one on the CEV."

3. Attach a M224 60mm mortar IDF-style bracket to the outside turret of the Abrams so the crew can fire mortar rounds---particularly smoke rounds prior to urban assaults to mask our own infantry. An AFV light mortar capability is vital since its hard for foot marcging infantry to fire mortars from base plates resting on concrete, and to carry adequate amounts of ammo in their rucksack to lay effective and long lasting smoke screens. Using the Omaha Beach carnage depicted in SPR as a visualization tool, its helpful to know that in the real battle a smokescreen created by burning grass fires allowed infantry at one part of the beach to land without casualties.

http://www.army.mil/cmh-pg/100-11.htm

Page 45

"There were fortunate exceptions to this general picture. Several hundred yards of bluff west of les Moulins draw were obscured in heavy smoke from grass fires, apparently started by naval shells or rockets. Blanketed by this smoke, enemy guns and emplacements were unable to deliver effective fire on that end of Dog Beach, and units landing there were comparatively unscathed. At other places, what would seem to be an occasional "blind spot" in the enemy fire pattern let a craft get men ashore with few losses. In the main, the first wave was hard hit.

"To their right and left, Company C and some 2d Battalion elements were crowded against the embankment on a front of a few hundred yards, the main Ranger force was about to come into the same area, and enemy fire from the bluffs just ahead was masked by smoke and ineffective.

An unscheduled gap of more than a thousand yards separated Company A from the next unit of the 116th RCT. Instead of coming in on Dog White, Company G landed in scattered groups eastward from the edges of Dog Red. The three or four boat sections nearest Dog Red, where smoke from grass fires shrouded the bluff, had an easy passage across the tidal flat. Most of the men were halfway up the flat before they became aware of sporadic and inaccurate fire, and only a few losses were suffered. In 10 to 15 minutes after touchdown this part of the company was behind the shingle bank, in good condition. Officers, knowing they were left of their landing area, were uncertain as to their course of action, and this hesitation prevented any chance of immediate assault action. Further east on Easy Green, the other sections of Company G met much heavier fire as they landed, one boat team losing 14 men before it reached the embankment.

Company F came into the beach almost on its scheduled target, touching down in front of the strongly fortified les Moulins draw (D-3). The 3 sections to the east, unprotected by the smoke, came under concentrated fire and took 45 minutes to get across the exposed stretch of sand. By this time half their number were casualties; the remnants reached cover in no state for assault action. The other sections had better fortune, but had lost their officers when they reached the shingle bank and were more or less disorganized.

This completes the story of the first assault wave on half of Omaha Beach, for the fourth company (E) of the 116th, supposed to land on Easy Green, veered a mile eastward from that sector."

4. Attach a dozer blade to push aside obstacles/rubble

M2A2 Bradleys

1. Retrofit FOTT ATGMs as soon as possible
2. Modify side shields so M231 firing port weapons can be fired for vehicle close in defense
3. Practice Javelin ATGM/FOTT anti-armor tactics

AIRdrop Armored Assault Companies in Gavin M113A3 AFVs (AIRdrop AACs)
The initial forced-entry of the XVIII Airborne Corps would be powered by the airdrop of M113A3 type vehicles from multiple drop zones AWAY from the air defenses of the airfield itself. By converging on the airfield with armored mobility and shock, the airfield would be seized for STOL airlandings of Abrams/Bradley AFVs. From here, entire Brigade-sized Airborne Regimental Combat Teams (RCTs) can march on cities from multiple directions, bypassing enemy resistance and 3 block at a time attrition war, seeking instead the center of the enemy's cohesion, which like the Commadancia in Panama was the enemy leaders hiding behind the civilian populace.

After the urban targets are suppressed by the AIRland FSC's M1 Abrams 120mm and Bradley 25mm main gun fire, and 60mm mortar smoke is being laid down, the infantry can assault. They need to be in a LIGHT AFV that can be air-dropped in the beginning, not end of a forced-entry, AND IN LARGE QUANTITIES so entire Airborne/light infantry companies can maneuver mounted protected from the small arms fire sweeping the battlefield (Somalia). The Airborne cannot wait for heavy AFVs to be airlanded a planeload at a time and have the initiative surrendered to the enemy who alerted can barricade and fortify his streets into kill zones. Time is critical. That vehicle is the awesome 11-ton M113A3 with applique armor and gunshields. These M113A3s would be modified into 3 special role vehicles and a 3 companies of "vanilla" M113A3s to mechanize an entire battalion of infantry.

1. Mobile Fire Support Company
2. Vertical Assault ladder Company
3. Fire fighting Company
4. IFV Companies (3)

The M113A3 variant Mobile Fire Support vehicle would have an off-the-shelf, turreted 120mm gun-mortar system (M1064A4) to engage the rooftops of buildings with effective plunging fire to suppress enemy air defenses from hip-shoot positions, not the stop and lay out aiming stakes method that drop-fired 120mm mortars in M1064A3s use. During the initial parachute forced entry, the 120mm gun-mortar would be used for direct fire to destroy enemy bunkers, fortifications and light AFVs, not unlike how the Russian Airborne uses its 8 ton 2S9 Nona BMD 120mm gun-mortar system. Suppressing the roofs facilitate helicopter gunship CAS without risk of shoot downs as experienced in Grenada/Somalia. If we are really cheap, we can fit M40A2 106mm Recoilless Rifles from storage with laser aiming devices to get closely the same effects. Either weapons have short barrels which work easily in tight city spaces.

The urban assault force would be covered by a combination of airlanded OH-58D Kiowa Warrior scout helicopters with Hellfire ATGMS, Avenger, LOSAT, EFOGM HMMWVs and a selected portion of the IFV company's "vanilla" M113A3 Gavins with Javelin ATGMs to counter enemy AFV and attack helicopter reinforcements trying to reach the target city from the outside. If the enemy AFV threat is great, the entire AIRland FSC Company with Abrams and Bradleys can be assigned the security mission without crippling the urban operational maneuver because the M1064A4 120mm gun mortars can lay down smoke and suppress/mousehole buildings for the infantry moving behind in vanilla M113A3s. If the AIRland FSC is not needed for a covering force, the Bradley's 25mm gun with its elevation ability, and the Abrams 120mm main gun, light mortar. Avenger HMMWVs can be fitted wih 2.75 inch Hydra-70 rockets to blast buildings from a stand-off along with LOSAT/EFOGM HMMWVs. Overlapping capabilities create this flexibility.