The Reality of Free Will
Jeremy Craigs, For: Watkins, PHL100 TA: Glenn Tiller (11:00 Tutorial) 3/98

freedom: state of being at liberty rather than in confinement or restraint; exemption from external control, interference, regulation etc.; power of determining ones own actions

The longstanding debate over whether or not human actions are 'free acts', or if they are determined continues to intrigue philosophers, as well as the general public. Are human actions voluntary, brought about by the individual, or are they determined by something external to them?

The determinist's view is that all events are completely determined by causes, while the indeterminist would counter that not all events are caused. The determinist argues that an act must either necessarily follow from the state of events preceding it, or is effectively a random, uncaused event. This narrow view leaves little room for alternatives, and many of the difficulties of this debate result from this, or similarly flawed definitions.

If one seeks to prove that human actions are 'free', then a hard deterministic viewpoint must be rejected, because any action that is necessitated by a preceding action cannot be free. Simply rejecting determinism for indeterminism does not, however, lead to the conclusion that free will exists. The individual gains no power or responsibility over the choice in either case, and we must therefore find some middle ground if we are to support free will.

As stated by Campbell, the aspect of human free will with which we should be concerned, is that required for moral responsibility. He points out that the difference between the actions of a robot and a human lies in the fact that human acts are a reflection of inner acts. Free will must therefore also depend on inner acts.

What evidence is their for us to believe this? Campbell's belief is that there is sufficient evidence available to us through introspection to suggest that we have free will. This basic premise allows him to capture somewhat our intuition that we have the ability to choose. It is his belief that this is really the only legitimate perspective for judging an inner act, because of the very nature of that act.

It is Campbell's belief that this evidence comes in the form of what he calls "moral effort". This occurs when the self's strongest desire is in conflict with what they believe they ought to do. Freedom lies in the mental deliberation between the two, which to the individual is the choice between two genuine alternatives. If he then chooses one over the other, it can be rightly said that he could have chosen otherwise. That is to say that the only free acts, are those inner acts of which the self is the sole author and which the self could have done otherwise.

The determinist however, challenges that statement. Holbach for example, believes that all man's actions are a necessary result of his temperament, his self, and further that his temperament is a necessary due to its dependence on the "physical elements which enter into his composition". Essentially, a persons action is determined by his self, which is determined by genetics, experience and the environment. A persons belief that they are free to choose, and deliberation are merely illusions resulting from ignorance as to the true reason he acts the way he does.

This criticism is a telling one, and Campbell does little to address it. If the self and character are determined or shaped by events external to them, how then are they free to act? Can we not simply say that the self was determined to think itself to be free? According to Holback a persons thought is triggered by some cause independent of himself, and largely rejects introspection as a means for providing evidence, suggesting to some extent that the process is inherently biased.

Campbell takes issue with the latter premise, and rightly so. By discarding the evidence of inner experience out of hand, Holbach, like many determinists, is arguing as if determinism is true. He is in effect saying that because determinism exists, introspective evidence is flawed, therefore it is not satisfactory evidence against the existence of determinism.

Campbell asserts that if inner reflection provides a basis for meaning for will, then this is sufficient, and that to expect anything more is unreasonable. The premise being that only through this inner view point can the activity of deliberation be demonstrated. This would seem to be supported by Descartes. Descartes famous "I think therefore I am" is based on the argument that one knows that they think, even if the content of their thoughts are deceived, they still think, and must therefore exist. It is Descartes' belief that this is the one thing that man can know for sure, because of the fallibility of the senses. Any further statement of truth should come from this premise, which provides a strong support of introspective evidence.

The trend of arguing as if determinism has already been shown to be true leads critics to criticisms that only need to be true if you are a determinist. The ideas of causation and sole authorship are two such examples, that are closely related. Can you ever truly be the sole author of your actions? Campbell freely admits that in most cases you cannot.

The requirement that a person must be the 'sole author' of an act to be responsible in order to be morally responsible for it is not only flawed, but is not a logical starting point. Both determinists and indeterminists accept that genetics, and the environment play a large role in shaping a person's self. We have already granted that we can never be the sole author of an act, and as such we are trying to prove what we have already said to be false. This apparent paradox is as result of the way we interpret causation. If we accept causation as meaning that an act was determined to be by preceding events, then we accept that the cause necessitates the act.

The problem of sole authorship can be largely resolved be examining the idea of reasons and causes. Taylor had the basis for this argument, but bungled it in the process of trying to fit into an incompatible framework. He suggests that a free and rational act is one that a person performs for some reason, but this reason is not the cause of the action.

This statement captures the common sense intuition of deliberation. The ultimate cause of the action, is the person's will, they chose do so. Many factors may have influenced the decision one way or another, but they did not dictate the result. For example, if a person faces the option of getting out of bed for class, or sleeping longer, the following factors might influence the decision; if the person enjoys the class, and feels that it is to their benefit to attend the probability that they will attend increases. If the person has not obtained enough sleep recently, or if that is their only class that day the probability that they will not attend is increased. The result is probabilistic, and therefore unpredictable.

The determinist challenges that notion by demonstrating the predictability of nature through science. While Newtonian physics would seem to indicate that with enough information, we can predict the result, modern quantum mechanics is inherently statistical in nature. A more relevant criticism comes from the field of psychology. The determinist would point to psychologist's ability to successfully predict a number of human behaviors. If you have sufficient information about a person is often possible to predict their reaction, that they will become angry, for example. What we cannot predict, however, is how that anger will be expressed, or the intensity of it. This can be countered however, with the argument that as psychology develops, so will its ability to explain more human actions. By its very nature this argument cannot be refuted, as it is based on a potentiality.

Psychology largest failing is in determining the nature of the mind, or consciousness itself. While it can provide predictions and inferences as to how the mind will react, it does not provide an explanation of how the physical components of the brain create a metaphysical consciousness. This is a question that psychologists are really no closer to explaining. The concept that the mind is greater than the sum of its parts, is compatible with the idea that a decision can be more than just a result of the reasons influencing it.

Holbach dismisses the idea that phenomenological evidence has any meaning at all, attributing this belief to ignorance of the true facts. Campbell points out that this, and many other criticisms are a result of a conflict between what one believes as a theoretical being, and that which one believes as a practical being. Even if I can be convinced of the theoretical validity of the determinists position, it does not, and seemingly cannot account for this belief that I am free. When acting I will believe that I have acted freely, despite and theoretical beliefs to the contrary.

It is in this practical sense that determinism is at its weakest. In a number of areas determinism completely fails to provide for the way people are. It is human nature to hold an individual responsible for their actions, be it morally, legally or physically. In fact it is only within the realm of human actions that moral responsibility is an issue.

If a dog attacks a person we do not debate whether it knew if the act was right or wrong. Further, we do not even seek to explain why it acted as it did. The simple facts are that the animal acted in that way, and that we will hold it accountable for that action.

Much of the debate of whether or not we are morally responsible for our actions is centered around our ability to create our own self. It is not realistic, however, to say that we can. We have already acknowledged that external forces do in fact influence who we are, through genetics, our social environment, or otherwise. To deny this is difficult, perhaps even impossible. We are who we are, and we cannot change that fact, regardless of how we got that way. There is a 'self' that exists, and the way in which it was formed is not relevant. We cannot change the basis of who we are, because it is based on past events over which we had no control. (If we wish to challenge this statement, we are forced to explain how one caused one's self - are we a self caused entity?)

We can however change who we will become. Susan Wolf believes that we have the ability to change our self, and this is consistent with our intuitions. This becomes important when dealing with the issue of punishment. Legally the first question in determining responsibility, is did the person in fact perform the act? The difference between a charge of manslaughter, and that of murder lies not in whether or not the act was done, but in the reasons, or motivations for doing it. In the case of manslaughter we hold the person accountable, even if it was not a result of him choosing to act in a way that would lead to the death of the other.

From a practicalist perspective Campell's observation of our intuition, and belief that we are free is the most important. As far as I believe I am free, I am free. I will continue to act as such regardless of the truth or falsity of that belief. I will believe myself to be accountable for my own actions as they are result of who I am. This is a condition that while malleable, is inseparable from me. As such I will hold both myself and others responsible for their own actions, as they too cannot change who they are. In doing so, I provide an avenue through which to influence who we will become. By providing an external motivation for change, through punishment, or otherwise, I can possibly stimulate an internal motivation to become otherwise. I think therefore I am, and I think that I am free.

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