There are some things which should be prohibited, such as laundered money and organizations 'taxing' membership to pay for leadership agenda promotion, which at the very least many of the members vehemently oppose. But aside from that, we might do well to lift most restrictions all together and allow 'free' elections on a level playing field -- in terms of rules --(something liberals should favor) instead of trying to enforce an artificial equality of competition onto the system. However, whether by design or not, such reform as drying up soft money would weaken political parties further. We may want to do it anyway, but should consider the consequences and the added power it would give to the less responsible media. X. The Media Effect Another factor of the massive Democrat campaign funding effort which needs to be dealt with involves the level of disinformation that has permeated it. We should place campaign ads under truth-in-advertising restrictions so that distortions and lies can be stopped. Instead of hollow outcries against 'negative ads' such as the Bush campaign was hit with where they criticized opposition records, stands, or character, we need to address the violently negative misrepresentations which have abounded on the other side. After all, Willie Horton was a dispicable thug, but the country was no where close to having the 'worst economy in fifty years' in 1992. Actually, the conditions of 1980 were far worse. Dan Quayle was wracked for his family values message, but when Clinton pirated it rhetorically, there was no complaint. It is via this very mechanism that Newt Gingrich's negatives were sent so high. The integrity of our political process is at stake. And while it is always risky to tamper with the First Amendment, neither should the media be allowed to engage in conscious partisan fabrication anymore than slander and libel are permissible. The entire Democrat ticket benefited from these efforts to subvert our political system, but on one did so more than Bill Clinton. One of the failings of Republicans in this campaign cycle is that they tried to play by the rules -- largely set for them by Democrats -- while the opposition did not. And, it was somewhat astounding to watch Bob Dole's genteel demeanor in the face of their onslaught. One of his weaknesses was his not infrequent cant that Clinton was his adversary and not the enemy, when that is precisely what he was. Such factors contributed immensely to Clinton's success in 1996 (as they had in 1992), and while hefty expenditures did not retake the Congress, they did chip away at the Republican majority, at least temporarily. And, if we believe the network spin doctors, they are at least part of the reason that Dole did not carry Florida. Perot's declining numbers are in part attributable to the sense in the electorate that voting for him was a wasted vote since he was not going to win. Many stayed home, helping contribute to the lower voter turn-out of 1996. Why as many still voted for him as did was in part a decision of 'undecideds' until a few days before the elections, convinced by news coverage for weeks that Dole was not going to win, either -- what proved to be a self-fulfilling prophecy the electorate was 'conditioned' into subscribing to. XI. The Decline in Voter Turn-Out This is another aspect of the 1996 vote which has been overlooked except by the spin put on it by punditry. Across the board, the drop in turn-out was substantial. It has been suggested (repeatedly) that this occurred due to a lack of interest in the campaign, largely attributable to the pronouncement long ago that the race was over. Interestingly, Clinton's numbers remained rather constant as compared to 1992, but the Republican and Perot votes were down, slightly for Dole (though he netted an increased proportion and real vote total, his part of the potential electorate declined from that of Bush), substantially for Perot. Faced with having no impact on a foregone conclusion, large numbers of voters stayed home. Even more to the point, in the west, where the election was 'over' well before the polls closed there, the turn-out was down dramatically. And, just for the record, low turn-out does not have to hurt Democrats more than Republicans, as, for example, recently argued by Nagel and McNulty (1996).
Table X -- Decline in Voter Turn-Out in Western States for 1996 (NYT 11/7/96) Turn-Out Decline Electors Arizona -12 6 California -10 54 Nevada -11 4 New Mexico -10 5 Oregon -10 7 Washington -17 11
Even in western states which Dole won, the turn-out sagged well below that of the rest of the country. These drops in voter turn-out were well above the national average decline of about 7% (NYT 11/7/96). More than eleven million people who voted in 1992 did not do so in 1996. Perhaps seven million of that number 'lost interest' as the country was being programmed to Clinton's 'inevitable' re-election, but more than four million stayed home once the reports of Clinton's 'victory' were flashed across the country. Those votes by themselves would have been sufficient to have given Dole a win in California, if a razor- thin one. In both Nevada and California, turn-out fell below 40%!(NYT 11/7/96) The same is arguable for the other five states, as well, and that impacted on other races besides the Presidency, too. Utah (-15), Colorado (-10), and Alaska (-18) were nevertheless carried by Dole. And, in the midwest, Wisconsin turn-out fell by 12 points, adequate to cost Dole that state, too. Just that factor suggests an alteration downward of the electoral vote from 379 for Clinton to no more than a mere 281 to 257 edge. (Oregon's turn-out drop was mitigated by its adventure with mail-order voting -- which poses other questions of electoral validity). The narrowness of Clinton's margin in Ohio is also erased if turn-out there matches the national average. Then, too, Clinton won Kentucky and Tennessee by a hair, readily attributable to voter acquiescence to the foregone conclusion propagated by the media. In both of these states voter turn-out sagged slightly below the national average. And with these three states, Dole would have had 297 electors and the election. While Clinton appears to run stronger in 1996 than might have been anticipated from the five election average, even this higher vote is beaten by Dole without the Perot and Turnout factors. When these are combined with the increased cost of information for voters out of the campaign of disinformation, it is probably a wonder that Dole did as well as he did. But, despite similar factors in 1992, George Bush nearly won re-election anyway. They were enough to have given Clinton both elections. And, given that Clinton's share of the total vote approximates the Democrat share of the aggregate Congressional vote, the drain of particularly the Perot effect is clear. XII. The Pollster Geist However, we must also consider the 'conditioning' of the electorate by pollsters to the media's premature burial of Bob Dole. Taking these into account, the results of the election are explicable, if not any more acceptable. It would have required only about 1.6 million votes in 13 states to have knotted the electoral vote count at 269 for both candidates. We have been subjected to a subversion of the electoral process in the nation. It is very hard indeed to accept that the level of bias in the mainstream media would or could find its way into polling data itself, but there seems to be increasing suspicion that it does. The day after the election, the Wall Street Journal editorialized about disparities in polling: "The disparities in the final polls were dramatic, ranging from a Clinton lead of 18 points in the New York Times\CBS poll down to a Clinton edge of only 7 points in the Reuters/Zogby poll. In polling on whether Democrats or Republicans would win the House, the variation was even greater. The ABC tracking poll gave Democrats an 11 point edge and the Gallup/CNN poll an 8 point advantage. Reuters/Zogby and the Hotline tracking polls showed the GOP with a slight lead." (WSJ 11/6/96) The Zogby measure has shown more. It had Clinton down below a four point lead going in to the final week of the campaign, but the rise in Perot's numbers widened that slightly over the final few days. As for the others, it does seem somewhat odd that they could be so far off so much of the time. But the accuracy of polls has often been a matter of some concern. They may, in fact, be developing a reputation that approximates Liberty Magazine in 1936. None are probably likely to predict Republican victory, except where it is quite obviously so lopsided as to be unnecessary to do so. The entire exercise, and its lack of reliability does call into question the utility of such measures not only for politics, but for the private sector, as well, as with advertising research, market studies as to offer a new product (such as the Edsel), or whatever. The examples of surveys misfiring have become quite commonplace if not legend. In 1992, most measures had Bush far behind and yet he came closer to winning than even most party leaders thought possible. In Britain, Prime Minister Major won despite quite alternative indications in the polls. And Michigan's John Engler was far behind in even late polls when he unseated the Democrat incumbent governor in 1990. But then, it would be difficult to find any of them, either, that had foreseen anything like the Republican capture of Congress in 1994. Throughout this campaign, pollsters have insisted that Dole was down by double- digits, and perhaps by as much as twenty points. The actual poll -- on election day -- had him trailing by only about seven points -- quite a rally. Actually, however, it was Perot, climbing in late polls, who did even better than had been foreseen. Even if his 1996 numbers were less than half that of 1992, they were double most pollster estimates. It might be suspected that many undecided voters over the final week-end before the election opted to vote for Perot where they had been slipping toward Dole. Convinced by weeks of conditioning that Dole was far behind, it may have seemed to many that it would make little difference whether they 'wasted' their vote on Dole or Perot. And Perot was in a late campaign blitz against Clinton. With that, however, lies the turn in the results. Had Dole picked up those late-comers, he would have shaved Clinton's margin down to nothing. That undoubtedly was part of the reasoning behind the Dole campaign's unsuccessful mission to Perot in the late period of the campaign, urging him to withdraw Continue
