| http://groups.yahoo.com/group/PhilippineArmyScoutRangers/message/5522 |
| What went wrong in Agusan del Norte |
| SR Clubhouse Forum
September 23, 2004 |
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Flipzi wrote:
2 hours passed and no reinforcements or air support? They never learned. Is it still primitive tactics with expected results? Oh well, that's part of a soldier's life anyway. One more thing here. The rebels aren't trained like these recon teams and their leaders aren't educated in prestigious institutions such as that of the PMA. I'm just wondering how did this thing happen? It seems like there's no difference between a typical rebel group that are composed of "peasants-turned-guerilla fighters" and "highly trained military men" anymore. 2 recon teams repulsed and defeated by less-trained farm workers? Why? It seems like the rebels outsmarted the soldiers again in this particular case. The rebels were able to ambush the soldiers leaving 5 dead instantly. Then the rebels even displayed that they were indeed brave and gutsy enough that they were able to hold their ground and sustained their offensive strikes until the soldiers ran out of ammo and finally captured the bewildered soldiers including their team leader, a PMA graduate. Now the military is using violations of human rights committed by the rebels to cover their folly with it. When a soldier is captured by the enemy, we should expect for the worst because that's part of the risk in performing their job. I am not blaming the brave soldiers here. I was wondering how they (higher authorities) drafted the plan. They lost a lot of men in that encounter. They were given intel reports of the number of hostile elements and they still failed in handling that one. Now, who's fault is it? MART OIROG wrote:
Something is wrong here. Anywhere there are NPA terrorists merong training ground. Kasi alam ng mga NPA na kilangan mag train para successful ang offensives. Sa AFP lang naman perapera lang ang training eh. Sa record may training para ma clear ang fund. Kaya dami jan sundalo minsan lang makapunta sa rifle range, nung nag CS lang. Kaya look at what happen to the DRCs of 4ID, tapos banat ang Division Commander ng Human Rights violations ng terrorists. No go na agad. Dapat nga mahiya ang Commander dun kc kulang sa training ang DRCs kaya nakatay. I had my share in combat operations in Aurora, from Dilasag to Dingalan. Super hirap ang terrain kaya ideal na training ground lalo na Dikapanikain-Dibot complex. Lots of officers do not value training. Madinig mo sa mga nasa operations divisions sa HPA and GHQ last priority ang training including fund allocations. Kaya palpak to the nth power ang performance. Ask guys assigned in SRTS how people in Tecson prioritize training the force. Dapat ang HPA is more concerned in TRAINING the force kasi force provider. Ang problema mas fucos sa G2/G3 e, monitor lang naman. Joint Commands are the ones calling shots in Operations. Kaya dapat dun ang may concern. Minsan di na din natin alam ang tamang trabaho. Gusto lahat sikat. I heard officers discussed what late Spade said: "We should train our troops well so that when we send them to area commands and brigades they would excel in operations." Sam J. Marcelo, CPO, USN The guerillas as a matter of course are even more resourceful and resolute which is the doctrinal center of training itself. You see success in battle is an element of environment, numbers, surprise, mobility, good intel, technology (very minimal), will, determination and LUCK. Lacking one element thereof could spell victory or defeat. ................................ You can argue the guerillas are less trained when it comes to the core competencies of soldiery and that is alright. But you must understand guerilla competency lies in their warfare. Dovetail their guerilla compentency with their competetive advantage (i.e. ideology, stealth, mobility, mass support, intel, etc) then you have an effective enemy to confront. Fighting you in unequal term is their means - the very essence of guerilla warfare. A strategic move is to beat the guerillas in their own warfare by adopting their strengths and combining them with ours, exploiting their weaknesses and eliminating ours, taking advantage of every opportunity and denying them the opportunity to take advantage on us, knowing the threats that confront us and by adopting a doctrine of assymetrical warfare. Another element is to conduct a well-orchestrated psyops before and every after combat operations with its design and objective to weaken the enemy's resolve and winning their mass base hearts and minds. This can be a long and drawn out process that could ensure the upper advantage in a protracted conflict. Always keeping in mind the road to victory is not a short and easy one, it is the long and hard road. Eduardo Davalan Its not his (Division Cmdr) job to look out for the training profile of the DRC, its his responsibility. Ang problema dun yung directly involved to look out for the unit's well-about. Sayang coz we are throwing lots of good soldiers for nothing because of BAD LEADERSHIP. harold cabunoc
I believe it is worth pondering why the line units of the Philippine Army always suffer casualties in almost similar battle-field scenarios like raids and ambushes. There may be lots of reasons. I include LEADERSHIP by the officers/NCO's and the MOTIVATION of the soldiers as great factors for our successes in the battlefield. If a unit has a well dedicated, experienced LEADER who trains and motivates his soldiers well, his unit has a higher chance to outsmart those bunch of "peasant-soldiers". I believe that the guerillas are less trained than the soldiers; however, they enjoy the advantage in the battlefield. They are supported by the local people and even by local government officials in some areas. A soldier who is wearing military uniform, riding on a military truck passing through an identified roadnet IS AN EASY TARGET to guerillas who are disguised as farmers. Kahit sa Mars ka pa nag training kung di mo na plano ng maayos ang movement para maiwasan ang ambush, katay ka pa rin. Tama din lang na pag-aralan ng Army leadership kung paano maiwasan ang mga unfavorable scenarios na ito. Kung tukuyin, NOT LEARNING! ........................ Pag susuriin mo, pulitikahan na lang lahat at dito walang kontrol ang military leaders. How would you defeat the guerillas in a particular province if the local government officials themselves are sympathetic to them? Actually, the problem of defeating the communist guerillas should be dealt by the government as a whole and we all know that. Tingnan mo si Gen Palparan. Dahil effective ang ginagawa nya sa Mindoro, tinanggal sya dahil sa pressure ng pulitika! ........................ I think PMA training is not the real issue here. Its why "illiterate, less trained" farmers achieve combat successes like what happened recently. Tingnan nyo, even the Americans, with all their high tech gears get killed in Iraq almost daily. The enemies are "weaklings" and "crying babies" as they call them pero lagi sila namamatayan. Doon din nila nalaman na marami silang baguhin sa doctrines nila. Ang pagkakaiba sa atin sa kanila ay ang paano nila pinag-aralan ang kanilang past experiences (whether good or bad) para ma-improve ang kanilang doktrina. They always document their various activities. Even Generals who committed failures are mentioned in their historical accounts. Sa atin, puro puri lang mga heneral kahit palpak ang ginagawa. Shall we forget what happened in Lamitan, Cabatangan and Ipil? |