John Gordon IV and Peter A. Wilson
May 27, 1998

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The authors would like to acknowledge the helpful comments and insights from our colleagues at RAND and the Army community while writing this article. Naturally, we take full responsibility for the opinions and accuracy of facts contained therein. Further, the content of this article is not endorsed by RAND and represents the personal views of the authors. John Gordon IV and Peter A. Wilson are members of the senior professional staff at RAND.

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The views expressed in this report are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the Department of the Army, the Department of Defense,or the U.S. Government. This report is cleared for public release; distribution is unlimited.

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ii FOREWORD

Since the end of the Cold War nearly a decade ago,there have been repeated calls for the U.S.Army to make major changes to accommodate to a transformed geo-strategic environment. Specifically, advocates of major change believe the Army should become strategically agile while maintaining a high in-theater combat and mobility capability. Forexample, much of the design work associated with the Army After Next(AAN)exercise series has focused on the development of a next generation of combat forces which have very high strategic/theater mobility and dramatically enhanced combat power. Unfortunately, some of the concepts associated with the AAN are true “leap-ahead” technologies that even in the most favorable budgetary circumstances and development schedules will not likely be available during the 2020 timeframe. At present, the Army appears to have settled on the selective modernization of its current force structure that is a mixture of very light and ultra-heavy combat formations; a “barbell posture.” This approach provides an inadequate strategy for dealing with near-term political military challenges and acting as a transition to a true next generation Army.

The purpose of this monograph, therefore,is to stimulate a debate within the Army as to whether there is a credible transition strategy to modify a portion of its force structure to gain some ANN-like attributes—enhanced strategic responsiveness coupled with enhanced theater agility and combat power. The authors believe there is a mix of extant and near-term combat systems and technologies that will allow the Army to create a number of “aero-motorized” divisions within likely budgetary constraints by the endof the next decade. These medium weight combat units would exploit the large investment the Air Force is making to modernize its strategic and theater airlift fleets during the first decade of the 21st century. The authors believe that forces equipped with light armored vehicles, next generation combat aviation, and enhanced indirectfire

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support will provide the Army with a strategic “fist.” Aero-motorized forces can be used either as part of a leading edge of a large and inherently slower to deploy expeditionary force or as a central combat component of future lesser contingencies including operations other thanwar. Finally,the aero-motorized concept will allow the Army to develop thoroughly the doctrine and concept of land forces operations that have the strategic agility of current light forces and approach the combat power of current heavy forces—major features of a desired next generation Army.

The Strategic Studies Institute strongly encourages readers to participate in a continuing discussion on the future of American landpower and the challenges it holds for the U.S. Army.

LARRY M. WORTZEL Colonel, U.S. Army Director, Strategic Studies Institute

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BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCHES OF THE AUTHORS

JOHN GORDON IV graduated from The Citadel in 1977 with a bachelor’s degree in history.He also holds a masters in international relations from St.Mary’s University in San Antonio,Texas,and a masters in business administration from Marymount University in Arlington, Virginia. Currently,he is a candidate in George Mason University’s Public Policy Ph.D. program. Following graduation from The Citadel,he entered theArmy as a Field Artillery officer. His assignments included the 82d Airborne and 2dInfantry Divisions,the Field Artillery School,and Training and Doctrine Command Headquarters.For the last 4 years of his Army career,he served at Headquarters, Department of the Army where he was the Chief of the Doctrine Team in the Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and Plans(DCSOPS). He was also the leader of the Army’s Deep Attack/Weapons Mix Study(DAWMS)team.[This is an Army version of the AF airstrike mentality except it does it without airplanes] While in DCSOPS, Mr.Gordon was a member of the Army’s Roles and Missions Commission team and represented the Army at several Quadrennial Defense Review(QDR)panels. He is the author of over 30 articles in various publications such as Army, Military Review, Joint Force Quarterly, Naval Institute’s Proceedings,and Georgetown University’s National Security Studies Quarterly. He joined RAND in May 1997.

PETER A.WILSON graduated from Princeton University in 1966 with a B.A. in political science. He then attended the University of Chicago where he earned an M.A. in political science in 1970.Mr. Wilson is a member of the senior staff at RAND. During the last several years, he has been working on a number of interrelated projects including the co-authorship of the “The Day After” policy exercise series which have explored the implications of major challenges(counterproliferation,strategic information warfare,and electronic commerce)to post-Cold War national security planning. Mr.Wilson is co-teaching a course at Georgetown University’s School for Foreign Service that will use the RAND exercise experience to examine the implications of the se new technologies to a significant change of the early 21st century definition of national security. Mr.Wilson’s written works have appeared in Parameters, Naval Institute’s Proceedings, National Defense University Press, the Progressive Policy Institute, Washington Quarterly,and include the co-authorship of several major RAND studies.

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THE CASE FOR ARMY XXI“MEDIUM WEIGHT” AERO-MOTORIZED DIVISIONS: A PATHWAY TO THE ARMY OF 2020

Theabilitytoprojectlethalforces—intheair,onthesea,oron theland—willbeessential.Towardthatend,ourabilityto projectcombatpoweranywhereintheworldwillrequirenew technologies,operationalconcepts,andcapabilitiestomeetnew challenges.Firstamongthesenewchallengesistheneedfor muchsmallerforce“footprint”characterizedbyfewerbutmore capableattackingtroopsandplatformssupportedbyaneven smallerlogisticselement.Prioritychallengeswillalsoinclude anenhancedmilitaryresponsivenessdistinguishedbyits increasedrangeofemploymentandresultinginreduced exposure of our forces. National Defense Panel Report December 1997 Overview. Theauthorscontendthattoday’sArmyisessentiallya “barbell”shapedorganization:verylightorveryheavy forceswithlittleintheformof“middleweight”units.Oneof thefundamentaldecisionsthattheArmymustmakeinthe comingdecadeiswhetheritintendstocontinuethis organizationalstructureormodifyitmodestlyorradically. Ifmajormodificationisappropriate,whataretheoptions? Fortunately,theArmyhasseveralyearstoconsidersuch issues. ProbablyforatleastadecadetheUnitedStatesandits allieswillnotbeconfrontedbyamajormilitarycompetitor oracollectionofmedium-sizedstatesthatarecapableof successfullythreateningourvitalinterestswith“conventional”combinedarmsforces. 1 Thatdoesnotmeanthat someregionaladversarycouldnotachieveashort-term successbyinvadingandseizingterritoryfromitsneighbor. Furthermore,that“smashandgrab”strategycouldbe 1 reinforcedbythedeftthreatoractualuseofnuclear, biological,chemical(NBC)weapons—afeaturedescribedas aplausiblemajortheaterwar(MTW)scenariobyboththe QuadrennialDefenseReview(QDR)andNationalDefense Panel(NDP).Additionally,futureopponentsarelikelyto exploitlong-rangemissilesystems(bothballisticand cruise)armedwithadvancednon-NBCmunitionsto threatenthemilitaryviabilityofanyfutureU.S. expeditionaryforce.Suchavictorycouldcertainlybe reversed;fortheforeseeablefuturetheUnitedStatesand itsfriendscancertainlyturnbackovertaggressionifthey choosetodoso.Thecriticalstrategicquestioniswhetherthe UnitedStatesanditsallieswillbepreparedtoreversethis actofaggression.UndertheshadowofaNBC/missile threat,thecostmightbeperceivedasveryhighespeciallyif theUnitedStateshasnotadapteditsforcestothat plausible contingency. 2 OneoftheclearpremiumsoffutureU.S.combinedarms forceswillbetheirabilitytorapidlydeployintoamenaced theaterandoperateinthefaceofenhancedNBCand long-rangemissilethreats.Theearlydeploymentofahigh performancecombatforcewillhaveaprofoundimpacton theprobability,duration,andoverallcostofamajor campaign. 3 MoreprobablethanMTWsisthepossibilitythatthe UnitedStateswillbeconfrontedbyawholeseriesoflesser crisesorsmall-scalecontingency(SSC)operations.Civil warsthatthreatentospillintoothernations,relatively limitedarmedstrugglesbetweenreligiousand/orethnic groups,andbreakdownsincivilorderwithin“failedstates” areallexamplesofthekindsofoperationswhereU.S.forces couldconceivablybedeployed.Significantly,manyareas wheresuchbreakdownsinordercouldoccurarewherethe UnitedStatesdoesnothaveforcespermanentlystationed ashore.Finally,manyofthesefutureconflictswilltake placeinanurbanenvironment,whichreflectstheglobal migrationfromthecountrysidetothecities.Shouldthe UnitedStateselecttointervenewithgroundforce,deploy- 2 mentsfromdistantlocationswouldhavetotakeplace.This changingrealityhasasignificantimpactonhowthefuture Army should be configured. 4 The “Barbell” Army. TheArmyhasundergoneatleastfourmajororganizationalerassincetheendofWorldWarII.Firstwasthe immediatepost-WorldWarIIforce.ThiswastheArmythat foughttheKoreanWar.Organizationally,doctrinally,and initsequipment,thisforcewasvirtuallyidenticaltothe WorldWarIIArmy.Secondwasthemid-1950s“Pentomic” armythatwasacontroversialattempttoorganizetheland forcefornuclearcombat.The“Pentomic”eraisgenerally regardedasafailure. 5 ThirdcametheVietnam-eraforce. Organizationally,theArmyofthe1960sowedmuchtothe WorldWarIImodelandwasalargeconscriptforcewhose divisionsweremodeledonthearmoreddivisionofWorld WarIIandwhosefundamentaltacticswerebasedon massiveapplicationoffirepowerandarmoredshocktactics. Themostimportantinnovationfor“highintensity”ground warwasthecreationofthemechanizedinfantrydivision witheachinfantrybattalionequippedwithorganicarmored carriers. 6 InVietnam,theArmyfocusedontheexploitation ofhelicoptertechnologytofreeitfromthe“tyrannyof terrain.”Followingourgeo-strategicdefeatinVietnam,the Armyslowlymovedintothesuccessful ArmyofExcellence period, which is still in effect. Duringthe1980ssomeexperimentationincludedthe permanentassignmentofanattackhelicopterbrigadeto thearmoredandmechanizeddivisions,thecreationofthe 9th“hightechnologylightdivision”(motorizedinfantry division)andtheLightInfantryDivision. 7 Theaircombat brigadeconceptbecameinstitutionalizedwhilethe motorizedconceptdiedduringthelate1980sduetoalackof investmentinalightarmoredvehiclefamilyandhostility fromboththeArmorandInfantrybranchesoftheArmy. ThelightinfantrydivisionconceptbecametheArmy’s 3 modelforairtransportableunits.Structurally,today’s ArmyisquitesimilartotheforceattheendoftheVietnam period—amixofverylightandveryheavyunits.Thisisthe forcethatisonthevergeofbeingtransformedintoArmy XXIwithafocusonmajorupgradesincommand,control, communications,andcomputers(C 4 )andimproved intelligence,surveillance,andreconnaissance(ISR) systems.Currently,thisconceptdoesnotcallforanymajor changeinorganizationorconceptofoperationsforeither the light or heavy combat formations. 8 Withthebrief“Pentomic”eraand9thMotorized InfantryDivisionexperimentsbeingtheexceptions,a hallmarkofthepost-WorldWarIIArmyisthatithashada “barbell”characteristic.TheArmyhasbeengenerally configuredintoeitherveryheavyarmoredandmechanized unitsarmedwithlargenumbersofheavyfullytracked vehiclesorverylightinfantry-typeunitsthatareprimarily footmobile.Onedivision,the101stAirAssaultremainsasa positivelegacyoftheVietnamexperience.Ofcourse,both typesofforcesincludeawidevarietyofsub-units,artillery, aviation,allkindsofsupportorganizations.Aglanceat today’s Army is illustrative. TheCurrentArmy MediumForces 82ndAirborne 10thLight 25thLight 101stAirAssault HeavyForcesLightForces 1stArmored1stInf(M) 1stCavalry2ndInf 3rdInf(M) 4thInf(M) The10-divisionArmyof1998hassix“heavy”armoredor mechanizeddivisionsononeendofthespectrumandthree airtransportableorlightdivisionsontheotherend.The singleairmobiledivisionliessomewhatinthemiddle.While 4 the101stAirborne(AirAssault)divisionisnotencumbered withlargenumbersofarmoredvehicles,itisnevertheless logisticallyequivalenttoaheavydivisionanddifficultto movestrategicallyduetothelargenumbersofcurrent generationhelicoptersthataredifficulttoself-deployover long distances. The Need for Medium Forces. WhattheArmyhaslackedsince1945are“medium” forcesthatcombineadegreeofmobility,firepower,and protectiongreaterthanthegenerallyfoot-mobilelight forces,yetarelessstrategicallyandoperationally cumbersomethantheheavyarmoredandmechanized units.Thelatterrequireeitherprepositioning,relatively slowsealift,orwide-scalerail/heavyequipmenttransporter (HET)supportinordertodeployintoareaswhereforcesare not already stationed. DuringtheColdWar,theprimaryandpotentiallymost challengingArmymissionswerethedefenseofWestern EuropeandKorea.InbothlocationstheArmyhad relativelylargeforcesinplace.Thedeploymentpenalty associatedwitharmoredunitsweighedheavilyonmilitary plannersandledtoagreatdependenceuponprepositioned equipmentsets(POMCUS)andsealift.WhentheGulfcrisis tookplaceinAugust1990,theUnitedStateswasfortunate tobeconfrontedbyanincompetentopponentwhoyielded thestrategicinitiativeoncehisinitialobjectiveswere seized.ThisaffordedtheU.S.-ledcoalitionthetime(nearly 5months)thatwasneededtodeploybyseatheheavyforces thatwouldeventuallyleadthecounteroffensivetoretake Kuwait.Theoperationalimmobilityofheavyforceswas furtherrevealedduringOperationJOINTENDEAVOR,the deploymentofArmyforcestoBosniaduringthewinterof 1995-96.Thedeploymentofareinforcedbrigadeofonlyfour armoredandmechanizedinfantrybattalionsfromsouthern Germany via rail and roads took nearly 2 months. 9 5 TheGulfWarexposedseveralfeaturesoftheArmy’s light-heavyforcestructure.First,theLightInfantry Divisions,amajorArmyinitiativein“strategicpower projection,”werenoteworthybytheirabsence.Theirvery lightnesstofacilitatetheirtransoceanicmobilityleadtoa tableoforganizationandequipment(TOE)whichprovided notacticaloroperationalmobilityandverymodest firepowerforsucha“highintensity”theater.Whilethe82d AirborneDivisiondiddeploy,itquicklyassumedthetitleof “speedbump”inthefaceofanenemywithhugenumbersof armoredvehicles.Ironically,the9thMotorizedInfantry Division,specificallydesignedforearlydeployment,had beendisbandedthesummerbeforeOperationDESERT SHIELD. 10 Ifthereisanydoubtofthepotentialfateoffoot-mobile infantrysuchasthe82dAirbornewhenconfrontedbya largeenemyarmoredforceindesertconditions,onehasbut tolookatmanybattlesthattookplaceinthedesertinWorld WarII.The“bagging”oflargenumbersoffoot-mobile infantryunitsbymoremobilearmoredandmotorizedforces duringtheNorthAfricanandEasternFrontcampaigns comes to mind. 11 IttookroughlyamonthbeforetheArmyhaditsfirst division-sizedheavyforcereadyforoperationsinSaudi Arabia.Fortunately,theenemywastotallypassiveduring thestrategicdeploymentofU.S.forces.Unquestionablyall potentialfutureU.S.opponentstooknoteofthefatethat befelltheIraqisduetocedingtotheUnitedStatesalengthy, undisturbed deployment period. Since1991theArmyhastakencertainstepsthathave enhancedthestrategicdeployabilityofitstraditionalheavy forces.Prepositioningafloatandashorehasledtothe capabilitytodeployroughlyadivision-sizeheavyforcein aboutaweek’stime.Anythingmorethanadivision, however,willhavetorelyonmedium-speedshippingto moveunitsfromsomecombinationoftheU.S.andother overseaslocations.Thatwilltakeseveralweeks.Inany 6 areaoutsidetheGulf,Korea,orWesternEurope,thelackof ashoreprepositioningwillalsoconstraintheabilityofthe Army to rapidly deploy heavy forces. What is a “Medium” Aero-Motorized Force? Beforeweelaborateonsomeoptionsformovingthe Armyawayfromthe“barbell”modelintomoreofamedium force,itisnecessarytoaddsomedefinitiontowhatsucha forcemightlooklike.Characteristicsofamediumforce follow. Morerapidlydeployablethanatraditionalheavyunit. Whileitisphysicallypossibletodeploymainbattletanks andtrackedinfantrycombatvehiclesonC-5orC-17aircraft,itisaveryinefficientprocess.Eitheraircraft mentionedabovecanliftonlyonemainbattletank.Tomove evenasinglebattalion-sizedheavyarmorunitwillrequire virtuallytheentireC-5fleetof120aircraft.Amediumforce wouldbeabletodeployplatoonsof(4-12)armoredfighting vehiclesonasingleC-5orC-17,therebyallowingthe deploymentofabrigade-sizedtaskforcewiththeuseof approximately 100 sorties of either wide-body airlifter. 12 Greaterfirepower,survivabilityandmobility.New technologiesassociatedwiththeRevolutioninMilitary Affairs(RMA)—overthehilltargetingsensorscoupledwith stand-offfirepower—canprovidemediumforceswith enhancedcombatpower.Amediumforcebuiltaroundlight andmediumweightarmoredfightingvehicleswillprovide infantryandcavalryunitswithawiderangeofprotected mobility. OperateUnderaHostileLong-Range“ArtilleryFan.” FutureregionalopponentswillbeabletoputU.S. expeditionaryforcesunderlong-rangeballisticandcruise missilefireswithandwithouttheuseofNBC.Light armoredvehicles,especiallywheeled,willallowthe deploymentofcombinedarmsairandgroundforceswitha smallerintra-theaterlogisticsfootprintwiththeirlower 7 demandforPOLthanheavyarmoredforces.Theselighter forcescanrelymoreheavilyonthe“justintime”deliveryof bothlong-rangefiresandlogisticssupport.Thiswillbe especiallyimportantwherecombinedarmsunitshaveto rapidlydeployoverlongintra-theaterdistancessuchasthe Saudi peninsula, Eastern Europe, or the Balkans. Thecharacteristicslistedaboveargueforamedium weightforcethatcandeployquicklytoapotentialtrouble spotviatransoceanicrangeairlift,haveasubstantial amountofmobilityandfirepoweruponarrival,andbemore survivablethanafootmobile,dismountedunit.Suchaforce couldbetheinitialelementofaglobalmaneuverofland poweraspartofajointexpeditionaryforce.Insome circumstancessuchasanSSC,themediumweight aero-motorizedforcemaybesufficienttodealwiththe crisis.InothercircumstancestendingtowardaMTWclass conflict,theaero-motorizedforceswillbethetipofthe Army’sspear,tobefollowedbyheavierArmyarmoredand mechanizedforces.Thebasicpictureofwhatamedium aero-motorized force would look like is as follows: · Brigadesizedcombinedarmsforcesthatareeasily deployableonC-5/C-17typeaircraft.Somebrigades wouldbeoptimizedasmotorizedinfantrywhileother brigades would be organized as cavalry formations. · Groundcombatelementsthatarebuiltaround wheeledarmoredvehiclesthatprovidetransport,fire support,commandandcontrol,anddirect/indirect firecapabilities.Inthelastcase,artillerybrigades wouldbeequippedwithvariantsofthelightweight 155mhowitzerandthewheeledHighMobility Artillery Rocket (HIMAR) launchers. · Attackhelicoptersthatprovidespeedandlongreach to the force. · Highrelianceonindirectfireandair/missileactive defensesupportfromtheUSAFandUSNcombat 8 aircraft,USNmissilearmedwarships,andArmy ATACMs, MLRS and AD units. · Combatengineeringunitsoptimizedforairliftthat canprovideearlydeployerssomefieldexpedient protectedpositionsforkeyunitssuchasairdefense and USAF aircraft. · PalletLoadSystem(PLS)trucks,lifthelicopters, STOLcargoaircraft,andLogisticsOvertheShore (LOTS)toprovideforJustinTime(JIT)intra-theater logistics. · Command,Control,Communications,Computers, Intelligence,SurveillanceandReconnaissance (C 4 ISR)systemsthatarebuiltaroundtheArmyXXI initiatives,canreachbacktootheroutoftheater basesformanyoftheirneeds,andarecapableof operating with coalition forces. Armored Fighting Vehicle Options. Thereareavailableintheworldtodayawidevarietyof wheeledlightandmediumweightarmoredvehiclesinthe 5-25tonweightclass. 13 Therearetwoprincipaltactical disadvantagestothewheeledarmoredvehicles.First,in sometypesofveryadverseterraintheyhavecrosscountry mobilitythatisinferiortotrackedsystems,and,second, whiletheyofferadegreeofprotectionfarbetterthana dismountedsoldierhas,suchvehiclesarestillfarless protected then a main battle tank (MBT). StudiesbytheArmyCorpsofEngineersindicatethat theallterrainmobility“break-point”betweenwheeledand trackedarmoredvehiclesisaround20tons.Thatistosay, wheeledvehicleshavesimilarcross-countrymobility attributesastracklayingvehiclesbelowtheweightof approximately20tons.Evenheavierwheeledvehicleswill havesuperiormobilityonroadsurfaces.Further,there havebeensomeinterestinginnovationsinwheeledarmored 9 vehicledesigns,whichsuggestthatthebreakpointmay move upward. 14 Contemporarywheeledvehiclesrelyuponacombination ofadieselengineandacomplexhydro-mechanical transmission-suspensionsystem.Withinadecade,anext generationofdieselelectricpoweredvehiclesisplausible. Thistechnologyislikelytoflowfromthemassive investment(promptedbyglobalenvironmentalconcerns) thattheglobalautomotivecompanieswillmakeinhybrid vehicles—manyofwhichwillbeamixofinternal combustionengines,highdensityenergystorage/ generationsystems,andelectricdrivemotors.Ifsuccessful, hybridpropulsionmayprovidethenextgenerationof armoredvehicleswithlongercombatoperatingrangeswith important low observability features. 15 Ontheissueofprotection,lighterarmoredvehicleswill beinferiortosuperheavyfightingvehiclesoftheMBTclass withoutbreakthroughsineithermaterialtechnologyand/or activeprotection.Oneoftheclearweaknessesofthe9th MotorizedInfantryDivisionwasthefactthatallofits personnelandweaponcarriersweremodifiedunarmored HMMWVs.Thesevehiclescouldbe“sweptaway”byair burstingartilleryandmortarfireandprovedvery vulnerableincontestedurbanterrainfromSomaliirregular automaticweaponandrocketpropelledgrenade(RPG) fire. 16 Moreusefulistoexaminetheissueofpassive protection from the full spectrum of killing threats. Asnoted,wheeledarmoredpersonnelcarriers(APCs) willprovideameasureofprotectionagainstawiderangeof infantryandindirectfireanti-personnelweapons. Furthermore,thehullofwheeledarmoredvehiclescanbe designedtoberesistanttoanti-vehiclemines.Allofthese threatsarelikelytobeapartofanyfutureSSCoperations. NecessityanddoctrinewouldusetheAPCsonlyas“battle taxis”duringintensecombatoperations.Oneadvantageof thisinfantry/vehicleconfigurationisthatamotorized battalionwillhaveahigherdensityofuseableinfantrythan 10 acomparablemechanizedbattalion—alikelyadvantagein urbanandbrokenterraincombatsituations.Someunits mightbeorganizedaspurecavalrybrigades.Alldirectfire unitswouldbecomplimentedbyvehiclesarmedwitha varietyofstand-offweaponsincludingfiberopticguided missiles(FOGMs)andmortarsarmedwithguidedmunitions. Somepassiveprotectionagainsthigherperformance directfireweaponsispossibleespeciallywithfurther developmentofreactiveandactivearmorarrays.Passive protectionagainstlargecalibermissilesorkineticenergy weaponswilllikelyremainveryproblematic.Thiswill requirethatlightfightingvehiclesinconfrontationswith MBTswilleitherhavetoshootfirstwithahighperformance directfireweaponoroperatefromastand-offdistance.For example,aportionofthewheeledarmoredvehiclescouldbe armedwithindirectfireweaponssuchasFOGMsor mortarsequippedguidedmunitions.Thiswouldallowthe vehiclestoremainbehindcoverandengageheavierenemy armor,thusavoidingexposingthemselvestoadirectfire battlewheretheirinferiorarmorwouldbeadisadvantage. TargetingcouldbeprovidedbyUAVs,helicopters,other vehicles in hide positions, or dismounted elements. 17 Lightervehiclescanbedesignedtohavemuchlower thermal,electromagnetic,magnetic,andacoustic signaturesthanheavytrackedvehicles.Thereisaprospect thatthenextgenerationoflightarmoredvehiclescanuse hybridelectricpropulsionandceramictypearmortoreduce theirsignature,especiallytothermalimagingsensors.The issueoflowobservabilitywillloomlargeringroundwarfare withtheproliferationofawiderangeoftopattack munitions,whichcandestroytheheaviestMBT.Thelatter mayproveverydifficulttomake“stealthy”fromoverhead surveillance and top attack guided munitions. 18 Thedirectfirebattlewillnotbeabandoned.Thereisa widerangeofoptionsofpowerfuldirectfiresystemsthat couldbemountedonmediumweightwheeledarmored 11 vehiclesincludingmissiles,105mmor120mmlowrecoil cannons,andautomaticsmallcalibergunsavailabletoboth cavalryandmotorizedinfantrybrigades.Advancesintop attackmunitionswillallow105mmand120mmcannons highkillingpoweragainstupgradedversionsofcontemporary generation MBTs. 19 Aseriesofairdefense,commandandcontrol,and supportvehicleswouldbeneeded.Manyofthemodelsof wheeledarmoredvehiclesinproductionalreadyhave command and medical versions available. Finally,light-mediumarmoredvehiclescanbedesigned tobeinherentlyamphibious,provideoverpressure protectionfromNBCcontamination,andameasureof flash,blast,andelectromagneticpulseprotectionfrom nucleardetonations. 20 IfNBCweaponsareemployedin futureMTWsorSSCs,thentheprotectedmobilityof mediumweightforceswillbeofvitalnecessitytoallowthe Army to operate in a “dirty” combat environment. The Aero Component. Thesecondmajorcomponentoftheforcewouldbe transportandattackhelicopters.Todayanentirebattalion ofAH-64 Apache attackhelicopters,withappropriate supportvehiclesandabasicloadofammunition,canbe transportedon10C-5or21C-17aircraft.WhenRAH-66 Comanche isfielded,itssmallersizeandreducedsupport requirementswillfacilitatemoving Comanche Scout/attack unitslongdistancesinUSAFtransports.Withgreater range(1200nms.)thanthe Apache, Comanches maybeable toselfdeploytomanytheatersandmeettheirground supportelements,thusreducingtheburdenontheairlift fleet. Beyond2010,itispossibletoforeseetheexploitationof tilt-rotortechnologyderivedfromthedevelopmentand deploymentoftheMV-22assaulttransportandtheBB-609 executiveaircraft.Variantsofbothcouldbeseenas 12 follow-onstotheUH-60 Blackhawk andthe ApacheLongbow.Additionalaeriallogisticsupportcouldbe providedtheArmyCH-47sandUSAFC130Js.Givenan adequatecommitmentofresources,aheavyliftJoint TransportRotorcraft(JTR)orAdvancedTheaterTransport (ATT)mightbedevelopedbythepost-2010time-frame. 21 Fromthestrategicdeploymentperspective,tilt-rotor technologycouldprovideArmymediumforcesgreatbenefit byfacilitatingthetransoceanicdeploymentofairmobile assetswithoutrelyingasheavilyonUSAFstrategicairlift assets.Ontheotherhand,thecostofdevelopingand procuringanynewtheaterairliftaircraftafter2010will likelyleadtoajointprogramoperatedprimarilybythe USAF. RecentstudiesbytheArmyandtheJointStaffhave clearlyshownthepowerofthemodernattackhelicopter. 22 Indeed,theattackhelicoptermaybe the bestanti-armor platformamongthemanytank-killingsystemscurrently availabletoU.S.forces.ArapidlydeployingU.S.forcemay havetoreacttoanenemyadvancealongmanyaxesthatare widelyseparated.Adismountedinfantry-heavyforcehas littleabilitytorapidlyshifttonewlocationstooppose differentenemythrusts.Themobilityoftheattack helicopterinconjunctionwithagilemotorizedinfantryand cavalry units is ideal under such circumstances. Acriticalvariableaffectingrotarywingoperationswill bethedensityandsophisticationofthebattlespaceair defenseenvironment.Animportantsynergisticroleforthe motorizedgroundunitsistodirectfiresagainstlocalair defenses to facilitate air combat operations. 23 ManyofthepotentialcrisesthatamediumArmyforce couldbedeployedtoincludeopponentswhodonotpossess largenumbersofarmoredvehicles.Theopponentcouldbe infantryheavy,relyingondispersionindifficultterrain. Theattackhelicopterinsupportofdismountedmotorized infantryisprobablyabetterplatformthanmediumorhigh 13 altitudefixed-wingaircrafttoseekoutsuchdispersed forces. Attackhelicopterunitsconsumefuelatprodigiousrates. Ifadeploymentwasbeingconductedintoanareawhere therearenoprepositionedsuppliesawaitingtheU.S.force, thenumberofattackhelicopterunitswouldhavetobe carefullyconsideredandbasedonthenatureofthethreat, theamountofstrategictransportaircraftavailable,andthe logisticschallengesassociatedwiththatdeployment. Certainly,theconceptofjustintimePOLlogisticswillhave tobefullydevelopedincludingtheemploymentofSTOL aircraftsuchastheC-130Jasrefuelers.Underappropriate militarycircumstances,theuseofC-17sshouldnotbe excludedfromtheseandothercombatlogisticmissions.A future JTR or ATT could play this role as well. The Exploitation of Sealift. Althoughthefocusoftheargumentinfavorof aero-motorizedforcesistheircapacitytobeairlifted rapidly,theveryimportantroleofsealiftshouldnotbe ignoredinmanycontingencies.TheMilitarySealift Command’scurrentmodernizationandexpansionplanis ontheacquisitionofverylarge(50,000-ton)mediumspeed (25knots)roll-onroll-off(ro-ro)cargoships.Depending uponthespeedwithwhichafuturepoliticalmilitarycrisis develops,itmaybeappropriatetousesealifttodeploysome aero-motorizedunitsalongwithairlift.Wheeledfighting unitswillbeabletomorerapidlyembarkanddebarkfrom ro-roshipsthentheirheaviermechanizedandarmored counterparts.Further,themotorizedunitswillbeableto rapidlymoveoveroperationaldistances(morethan100 miles)withoutrelyinguponheavyequipmenttransporters orrailcars.By2010,theremaybearevolutioninlargecargo shipdesignthatwillallowro-roshipstocruiseat40knotsin adverseseaconditions.Ifrealized,afleetoffastsealift mightbeusedtodeploysubstantialaero-motorizedforcesto a wide range of plausible military contingencies. 24 14 Long-Range Fires and C 4 ISR. Tofurtherfacilitatetheuseofmediumforcesduringan anti-invasionor“haltphase”ofanMTW,theaeromotorizedunitswouldrelyheavilyuponindirectfires deliveredbyArmymissileunits,USAFandUSNaviation, andUSNmissilearmedwarships.Consistentwith philosophyoftheuseofaero-motorizedcombat,Armyunits willbeabletoexploitthelikelydeploymentofShort Take-offandVerticalLanding(STOVL)variantsofthe USAF’sJointStrikeFighter(JSF)inthepost-2010 time-frame.TosurviveinanMTWshadowedbythe NBC/missilethreat,USAFearlydeployerswillhaveto workcloselywithArmyaero-motorizedforcesandbe prepared to operate from dispersed field sites. 25 Thecommandandcontrolofsuchaforceshouldbebased oninformationsystemsflowingfromtheArmyXXI initiatives.Technologiesarealreadywelladvancedthat wouldpermitthemaximumuseof“reachback/information pull.”Thusthesizeoftheheadquarterselementsactually deployedcouldbeminimized;datalinkstodistantsensors andinformationsystemswouldbesubstitutedinlargepart fordeployedcapabilities.Nevertheless,suchanaeromotorizedtaskforcewouldalmostcertainlyneedasuiteof tacticalUAVs,battlefieldradars,andothersystemsthat would contribute to situational awareness. Sinceaero-motorizedforceswouldbeoptimizedfor deploymentsintoareaswheretheUnitedStatesdoesnot haveapermanentpresence,apremiumcouldbeplacedon abilitytoworkwiththeforcesofimpromptu adhoc coalitions.Onecouldenvisionthattheheadquartersofsuch aunitwouldneedpersonnelproficientinvarious languages, for example. 26 Medium Forces as a Transition to the Army of 2020. Apowerfulargumentformovingtotheaero-motorized conceptdescribedaboveisthatitisanorganizationally 15 comprehensible,technologicallyfeasible,andfinancially plausibletransitionfromthecontemporaryArmydesignto anArmyof2020.Already,therehavebeenseveral large-scalestrategicwargamessponsoredbytheArmy AfterNext(AAN)programthatexploredtheimplicationsof veryhighperformanceair-groundunitswhichmightbe procuredanddeployedby2020.Thecurrentdesignconcept beingexploredbytheAANisbasedupon“air-mechanized” unitsthatassumetherapiddevelopmentandprocurement ofapost-2010generationoftechnologiesfarinadvanceof thoserequiredtocreatethemediumweightaero-motorized unitsdescribedinthisessay.Toseesomevariantofthe AANeraforceposturedeployedwithin25years,theArmy willhavetoseriouslyconsidertheintermediatetransition process.ThattransitionprocesspointstoanArmywhich decisivelymovesawayfromitscurrentultralight/ultra heavy force “barbell” posture by 2010. Ataminimum,theArmyof2010mightbeamixoflight, medium,andheavyunits.Theprospectisplausiblethat mostlightunitswillhavebeenconvertedtomediumunits. Moreradicalandcontroversialistheconversionofseveral heavy units to medium weight forces by 2010. Choices Available to the Army. ThisessayhastriedtomakethecasethattheArmy, currentlyofa“barbell”configuration,shouldchangeatleast aportionofitsstructureintoalighter,yetstillpotent, mediumforceby2005withextantornearlydeveloped combatvehiclesandsystems.Theessentialelementsofa mediumforceweredescribedashavingstrategic/ operationalmobilitysuperiortotraditionalheavyforces andbetterfirepower,operational/tacticalmobility,and survivability than present light forces. Severalquestionsmustbeanswered.Firstistheissueof whetherthisisacorrectcourseofactionfortheArmy.The organizationhasbeensuccessfulforthepast50yearsin roughlyitspresentbarbellconfiguration.Anychangeofthis 16 typewouldrequiresomeexistingforces,eitherheavyor light, to be reconfigured. Thesecondmajorquestionconcernsthespeedandscale ofconvertingheavyand/orlightdivisionsintomedium weightunits.InthoseareasoftheworldwheretheArmy hassomecombinationofin-placeheavyunitsand/or prepositionedequipmentavailable,atraditionalheavyunit willplayanimportant,ifnotcentral,roleforthenear future.Lookingoutadecade,evenprepositioningconcepts maybecomeincreasinglyquestionableoncefuture opponentshavepotentlong-rangemissilecapabilities. Prepositionedequipment—ashoreandafloat—couldbe menacedbyaccuratemissileandaircraftstrikeseven withouttheuseofNBCwarheads.Additionally,insome partsoftheworld,suchasheavilyforested,mountainous, andsomeurbanareas,speciallytrained(Rangertype)light unitsthatarecenteredondismountedinfantryarestillvery appropriate. BelowisanoutlineofhowtheArmyshiftto medium-weight forces might occur over the next 20 years. OrganizationalOptions MediumForces HeavyForcesLightForces 82ndABN OneLightDiv TwoArmoredDivs FourMechDivs 101stAirAssault One“medium”Div (ACR) MediumForces HeavyForcesLightForces 82ndABN OneLightDiv TwoArmoredDivs ThreeMechDivs Three“medium”Divs (OneLightDiv) (OneLightDiv)(OneHeavyDiv andACR) 82ndAirborne Seven-Eight MediumDivisions MediumForces HeavyForcesLightForces One-twoHeavyDivs (Moststructure movestomiddle) (Moststructure movestomiddle) “Limited”Optioncirca2001 Onelightdivisionand 3rdACRconverttomedium structureandjointhe101st whichretainsitspresentairassault configuration. “Balanced”Optioncirca2008. Onelightandoneheavy divsion,plustheACR,convert tomediumstructure.101st alsoreconfiguredwithadditional wheeledarmoredvehicles. “AANType”Optioncirca2020. One-twoheavydivisions andthe82ndABNareretained intheirpresentstructure.All otherdivisionsandtheACRmove tomediumforceconfiguration. 17 Thirdisthecostoftheseinitiatives.Thetypeofmedium forcediscussedinthisessaywillrequirerecapitalizationof aportionoftheArmydivision/brigadestructure. 27 While theArmyalreadyhasthebestfleetofattackhelicoptersin theworld,ithasvirtuallynowheeledarmoredvehicles. Severalthousandvehicleswouldhavetobeprocuredfrom U.S.and/oroverseassources.Additionalindirectfire weaponswouldhavetobebought,forexample,addinga vehiclewithanFOGM-typecapability.Thesearedifficult timesfortheArmybudget,andwithoutadditionalfunding duringthenext10years,someotherlessappropriate systemssuchastheheavy Crusader self-propelled gun/howitzerwouldhavetoberadicallyscaledbackifnot eliminatedinordertoinitiateawheeledarmoredvehicle program.AnyoptiontomovetheArmyinthedirectionof becomingamoremiddleweightforce,whetheralongthe linesdescribedinthisarticleortowardamoreradicalAAN typeforcemusttakeintoaccountaffordabilityandrealistic budget assumptions. WhethertheArmywillmovetoanearlypuremedium weight-typeforceby2020remainsuncertain.Severalkey technologicalandoperationalquestionswillhavetobe answered.Thefateoftheultraheavyunitswhichrelyupon land“dreadnought”(50+tons)armoredfightingvehicles willcriticallydependuponwhethertheinvestmentinthe nextgenerationofcombatvehicleandweaponstechnology willleadtoanArmyconsistingofprimarilymediumweight aero-motorizedforces.Severalmajoradvancesifnot breakthroughswillhavetobemadeinactive/passive protectionandpropulsionefficienciesby2010toallow mediumweightgroundforcestofightinallcombat environments.Secondisthequestionabouttherisksand benefitsoflowaltitudecombatandmaneuveraviation.Low altitudeaerialfightingvehiclescanbeneutralizedby dispersedandeffectivebattlefieldairdefenses.Akey questioniswhethertheUnitedStateswillbeabletodevise effectivesuppressionofenemyairdefense(SEAD) capabilitiestofacilitatelowaltitudeaircombatoperations 18 withoutheavyattrition.Thirdisthequestionastowhether reconnaissancestrikecombinationswilldominatethe battlefieldevendowntothecloseengagementregime. Fourth,thereremainsthequestionaboutthesize, configurationandroleoffutureinfantryforcesandhow theyinteractwiththenextgenerationofcombatvehicles (withandwithouthumanoperators)andlong-rangefire systems. Conclusion. AdecisiontotransformaportionoftheArmyinto aero-motorizeddivisionsandbrigadesappearscompelling. Thegeo-strategicenvironmentwilllikelycallfortherapid deploymentofhighperformancecombinedarmsforcesover trans-oceanicdistances.EveninEurope,NATOexpansion easttoPoland,Hungary,andCzechRepublichighlightsthe needforoperationallyagilegroundforcessinceclassic prepositioningoptionsmaybeprecludedforgeo-strategic and cost reasons. Inmanysmall-scalecontingencies,aero-motorizedunits appearmoreversatilethanpurelightinfantryunits, especiallyifthereisanyexpectationofintenselocalcombat. Additionally,therewillbetheneedtohavetheater forcesthathavehighfirepower,operationalagility,anda lowlogistics“footprint.”Thisprovidesthemthecapacityto operateeffectivelyinamilitaryenvironmentunderthe “artilleryfan”oflong-rangeballisticandcruisemissilesand possibly“dirtied”bytheuseofNBCweapons.Finally,a movetowardthemediumweightaero-motorizedconcept wouldputtheArmyfirmlyonthepathtowardamore strategicallyandoperationallyagileforceof2020without calling for either technological or budgetary magic. ENDNOTES 1.Thepossibleexceptiontothis“10-year”ruleistheprospectthat thePRCwillacquireasubstantialairandnavalcapabilitytomenace Taiwanbycirca2005.TobecredibletheChinesewouldhaveto 19 efficientlyexploitawiderangeofcontemporaryairandnavalweapons, largelyacquiredfromtheRussianFederation.TheChinese military—notnotedforhightechnologyinnovation—wouldhaveto selectivelymasterelementsofthecontemporary“revolutioninmilitary affairs.”EvenifaChinese“regionalstrategicthreat”rapidlymatured by2005,itislikelythatthegeo-strategicfocusofpossiblefuture confrontationswiththeUnitedStateswillhaveprimarilyaerospace andnavalfeatureswithU.S.groundforcesplayingasecondarysupportingrole.ThenuclearcapabilityofChinashouldnotbeforgotten. 2.U.S.forcesinKoreafacetheimmediateprospectthatasecond KoreanWarwouldinvolvethesubstantialifnotmassiveuseofchemical andbiologicalweaponsbytheNorthKoreans.During1997,amajor shiftinattitudetowardtheDPRK’sCWandBWcapabilityoccurred bothwithintheregionandtheU.S.JointStaff.Bythewinterof1998, therewaswideconcernabouttheneedtoenhanceboththeU.S.and SouthKoreans’jointcapacitytooperateinatheater“dirtied”bywide scale CW and BW use. 3.InanimportantshiftemphasisfromtheBottom-UpReview (BUR),thestrategicanalysiscontainedintheQuadrennialDefense Review(QDR)acknowledgedthatCWandBWusewas likely infuture MajorTheaterWars(MTWs).Thisshiftinstrategywasstrongly endorsed by the National Defense Panel. 4.Seethe StrategicAssessment1997,FlashpointsandForce Structure,WashingtonDC:InstituteforNationalStrategicStudies, National Defense University. 5.Withhindsight,the“Pentomic”conceptoffiveinfantrybattle groupswithoutorganicarmoredmobilityandprotectionmadelittle operationalsenseinthecontextofabattlefoughtprimarilywith nuclearweapons.SeeA.J.Bacevich, ThePentomicEra ,Washington, DC: National Defense University Press, 1986. 6.Bytheearly1960s,theInfantryBranchhadadoptedtheconcept ofmechanizedwarfareifonlytoprovideitsforceswithprotected mobilityinaEuropeanTheaternuclearwar.Withthe1960sheavy divisionconcept,thedistinctionbetweenanarmoredandmechanized divisionbecametrivial.Bothhadamixofarmoredandmechanized battalionsinthreebrigades.Itwasduringthistimetheconceptofthe armoredself-propelledgun-howitzerfullymaturedaskeysupporting arm to the armored and mechanized brigades with a heavy division. 7.TheLightInfantryDivision’stableoforganizationand equipment(TO&E)wassizedsothattheentiredivisioncouldbe 20 airliftedby500C-141sorties.Thisresultedinaverylightdivision structurewilllittleorganicmobilityandmodestanti-tankandartillery assets. 8.SeeMajorP.H.Herbert,“DecidingWhatHastoBeDone:General W.E.DePuyandthe1976EditionofFM-100-5,”1988;andMajorR.A. Doughty,“TheEvolutionofUSArmyTacticalDoctrine,1946-76,” Command and Staff School, Fort Leavenworth, KS, 1979. 9.BothOperationsDESERTSTORMandOperationsJOINT ENDEAVORrevealedtheverylargeintra-theaterlogisticsupport neededtoprovisionandmoveheavyarmoredandmechanizedforces. Thenowfamous“lefthook”ofthe100-hourDESERTSTORMground campaignrequiredamassiveshiftofsuppliestopre-dumpedsites throughtheuseofthousandsofheavycargotrucksandheavy equipmenttransporters(HETs).OperationJOINTENDEAVOR requiredtheextensiveuseofrailandroadsupporttomove one reinforcedheavyArmybrigadeoutofsouthernGermanytoBosniaover a90-dayperiod.Aero-motorizedunitswouldhavehadfarbetter operationalagilityinasimilarcircumstance,especiallyinamilitary environment with a substantial road net. 10.Onebrigadeofthe9thMotorizedwasoperationalduringthefall of1990duringOperationDESERTSHIELD.Itwasnotdeployed!The 82dwasdeployedwithoutorganictrucks.UnliketheHMMWV equipped9thID,the82dwouldhavebeeneitheroverrunand/or bypassediftheIraqiArmyhadmovedsouthduringthefirstsixweeksof theU.S.build-up.Itisnoteworthythattruckswereprovidedthe82d whenitparticipatedwiththe6thFrenchMotorizedDivisionasthe furthestelementofthelefthookintoIraqduringthe100-hourground war. 11.TheItalian,British,andAmericanArmieshadseveral disastrousexperiencesduringtheNorthAfricancampaignwherefoot mobileinfantryunitswereeitheroverwhelmedorbypassedbyopposing armoredandmotorizedunits.MuchoftheGermaninfantryandtheir alliedforcessufferedsimilarmilitarydisastersalongtheEasternFront especiallyafterthebattleofStalingradin1943.TheMarinesdiscovered thisrealityduringanumberofNATOexercisesinthe1980swhentheir thenfoot-mobileinfantryregimentswereoverrunorbypassedbyWest Germanarmoredandmechanizedunits.This“lesson”promptedthe Marinestousetheiramphibiousassaultvehiclesasarmoredpersonnel carriersduringtheMarineoffensiveintoKuwaitduringOperation DESERT STORM. 21 12.SeevariousRANDstudiesbyJohnLundandothersforanalyses oftheroleofwide-bodyaircrafttocarrylightarmoredfightingvehicles. ForanearlierdiscussionoftheseissuesseePeterA.Wilson,“U.S. ReinforcementOptions”in EuropeanSecurityPolicyAfterThe Revolutionof1989, JeffreySimon,ed.,Washington,DC:National Defense University Press, 1991. 13.See Jane’sArmorandArtillery,1997,foradescriptionofthe widerangeofextantlightandmediumweightwheeledarmored fightingvehiclesandnewdevelopments.AlsoseeR.M.Ogorkiewicz, “ArmoredReconnaissanceVehicles:FindingtheRightCapabilityMix,” International Defense Review Special Report, May 1995. 14.SeeDennisW.Moore, TheInfluenceofSoilSurfaceConditions OnTheTractionofWheeledandTrackedMilitaryVehicles, U.S.Army CorpsofEngineers , ReportGL-89-6,1989.Duringthe1980s,major advancesinoff-roadwheeltechnologyoccurredwiththedeploymentof radial/run flat tires and central tire inflation systems. 15.SeeVictorWouk,“HybridElectricVehicles”andHaroldA. RosenandDeborahR.Castleman,“FlywheelsinHybridVehicles”in ScientificAmerican ,October1997,foradiscussionofinnovationsin landvehiclepropulsionsystems.Fuelcelltechnologyappearstobeon thevergeofmajoradvance,whichshouldfurtherfacilitatethemass deploymentoflowemissions/highfuelefficienthybridpowerplant combinationsforautomobilesandutilityvehiclesby2010.Variantsof thesehybridsarelikelytopresentthenextgenerationofarmored fightingvehicledesignerswithsomeeconomicallyandtechnologically attractivepropulsionoptions.SeeJoeFeese,“RaceonforCleanCars,” ABCNEW.com,October24,1997.Inthefuture,itispossibletoimagine thateachwheelofafightingvehiclewillbepoweredbyanelectric motor.Thiswillallowdynamicbraking(usingthemotorasagenerator) whichwillincreaseoverallfuelefficiency.Ifdamagedincombat,these poweredwheelsmightbejettisonedtoinsuresurvivalmobilityforthe battle-damaged vehicle. 16.Proponentsandparticipantsofthe9thMotorizedDivision experimentfreelyacknowledgedthevulnerabilityoftheforceto artilleryfirewhilebeingequippedonlywithsoftskinnedvehicles,the HMMWV.AttemptsbytheArmytodevelopanddeployanair transportableArmoredGunSystem(AGS)havefailedtwice—oncewith theMarinesduringthe1980sandmostrecentlywiththe1997 cancellation of the XM-8. 17.ForamoredetailedanalysisofRapidForceProtection TechnologiesseeR.Steeb,J.Matsumura, etal., ExploringNew 22 TechnologyConceptsforLightForces, DB-168-A/OSD,RAND1997;and R.Steeb,J.Matsumura, etal., RapidForceProjectionTechnologies: QuickLookAnalysisofAdvancedLightIndirectFireSystems , DB-169-A/OSD,RAND1997.Unliketheaero-motorizedconcept,this RANDconceptcallsforthedeploymentofveryfewcombattroopsand primarilyreliesonairdeployedweapon“pods”whichhavenotactical mobility. 18.Radicallyloweringthesignatureofthenextgenerationof armoredfightingvehiclestodetectionbyoverheadsurveillanceandtop attacksystemswilllikelybeamajordesignrequirement.70-tonclass MBTsmaybecomejust“toobigandtoohot”tohidefromtopattack threats.SeeGeorgeSeffers,“DoDWantsStealthyHybridElectric Vehicles,” Defense News, December 1-7, 1997, p. 4. 19. See R. Steeb, J. Matsumura. 20.AstheUnitedStatesreliesuponsilicon-basedweapons,sensors, computers,andcommunicationstoaffectarevolutioninmilitary affairs,technologicallycompetentmilitaryopponentsmayrelymore heavilyuponweaponswhichgeneratehigh-poweredelectromagnetic effects.Theseincludebothnuclearandnon-nucleardriven electromagneticpulse(EMP)andhigh-poweredmicrowave(HPM) weapons.FutureArmywheeledfightingvehiclesshouldbedesignedto minimizetheseweaponseffectsespeciallyifthenextgenerationof fightingvehiclesreliesuponhybridelectricpropulsionsystems.SeeF. GassmanandEMCBaden,“HighPowerMicrowave:TheSilentThreat” in Armada International, August/September 1997, p. 70. 21.See“JTRtobe‘Chinook’forUSArmyof2025”in Jane’sDefense Weekly, September10,1997.Aninterestingalternativetovarious tilt-rotorandlargehelicopterJTRconceptsistheBoeingSuperSTOL (SSTOL)conceptfortheAdvancedTheaterTransport(ATT)which wouldreplacetheC-130family.SeeBillSweetman,“Arising imperative:moredemandsonairlift”in Jane’sInternationalDefense Review , 2/98, pp. 28-29. 22.RecentcomputerdrivenwargamessuchaTACWARusedduring theQDRhighlightedthekillingpowerofhelicoptergunshipsduringthe Deep Attack Weapons Mix Study (DAWMS). 23.Thethreatofmanportablesurfacetoairmissilestolowaltitude fixedandrotarywingaircraftisveryseriousandwilllikelycontinueto mature.AmajorobjectiveoftheRAH-66 Comanche gunshipisto producealowobservablecombathelicopter.Amajorjointactivityofall fourserviceswillbetoconductsuppressionofenemyairdefenses 23 (SEAD)operations.Well-armedmotorizedunitscanplayanimportant roleinthisregard.Inthosecircumstanceswherethereisasevereair defensethreat,motorizedunitswillhavetorelymoreheavilyupon long-rangestand-offmissilefiresupportfromplatformsoperating outside of the effective envelope of the local air defenses. 24.Foradescriptionofthenextgeneration40-knotcargoship,see DavidL.Giles,“FasterShipsfortheFuture,” ScientificAmerican, October 1997. 25.CurrentUSAFplansfortheAirExpeditionaryForce(AEF) whichcallsfortherapiddeploymentofshort-rangeF-16class fighter-bomberstobare(unprotected)basesmaybeviewedasabit operationallynaïve.Futurelong-rangemissilethreatswilllikely requirethatUSAFunitsequippedwiththeSTOVLversionoftheJSF willoperateoutofdispersedandhiddensites.BoththeRoyalAirForce whileoperatingtheGR-5/7 Harriers andtheUSAFwhileoperatingthe Gryphon GroundLaunchedCruiseMissilediscoveredthatdispersed logisticstosupportairunitsinthefieldwasamajorchore.Eventhe USMCtendstooperateits Harrier fleetfromafixedairfieldorfroma large amphibious ship to minimize the logistics burden. 26. See R. Steeb, J. Matsumura . 27.Implicitintheproposalsmadeinthisarticleisthequestionasto whethertheArmyshouldmovetoanallbrigadestructure,which eliminatesthedivisionasanechelon.Theauthorsaresomewhat agnosticanddonotbelievetheargumentinfavoroftheArmymovingto medium-weightcombatformationsstandsontheoutcomeofthis debate.ForacalltochangetheArmytoabrigadestructurewithforces havingfeaturesdescribedinthisarticle,seeDouglasA.Macgregor, BreakingthePhalanix:ANewDesignforLandpowerinthe21st Century, Westport, CT: Praeger, 1997. 24 U.S. ARMY WAR COLLEGE Major General Robert H. Scales, Jr. Commandant ***** STRATEGIC STUDIES INSTITUTE Director Colonel Larry M. Wortzel Director of Research Dr. Earl H. Tilford, Jr. Authors John Gordon IV Peter A. Wilson Director of Publications and Production&‰T ƒ>Ð