One of the drawbacks to the rapid deployment of Army helicopters to overseas conflict areas is their slow speed in flight and short range of action, requiring multiple refuelings, pilot fatigue and time loss. This has resulted in the 101st Airborne (Air Assault) division being excluded from short-notice operations like Grenada and Panama because their helicopters would have to be flown by USAF fixed-wing aircraft in a dismantled state and then airlanded at an airstrip and re-assembled. For Desert Storm, we had 6 months and used ships to sail over much of the 101st, and in the future this isn't a likely option against an alert enemy. The recent tribulations of TF Hawk into Albania underscore the need to find a better way to get existing Army helicopters to the battlefield.
The way to do this is to reinstate the "Airborne" part of the 101st's lineage and Low-Velocity AirDrop (LVAD) helicopters from USAF fixed-wing aircraft, so they can rapidly deploy from CONUS to world trouble spots at 500+ mph, yet do not need to be airlanded and re-assembled at an air strip seized from the enemy. One way to expeditite this would be to KEEP the AH-1S HueyCobras and UH-1H Hueys being thrown away and turn them into the first Unmanned Aerial Combat Vehicles (UCAVs) as Congress in the 2001 Budget has directed the military to field UCAVs. There are two ways this can be achieved:
1. Design the rotors of Army helicopters to unfold in flight after airdrop from USAF aircraft, and then fly away under their own power to do the mission
2. Desgn a padded "cacoon" to hold helicopters inside and parachute them to the ground, followed by their aircrew in personnel parachutes where they would meet up on the ground, de-rig and fly missions.
The airdrop/rotors unfold/autorotate concept would be the best because it would require the least amount of material' preparation and result in a helicopter and crew ready to fly missions immediately after air delivery. The ability to unfold rotors in the air is already proven technology.
X-25 DDV program model: http://www.aim72.co.uk/bensen2.htm
The X-25 DDV or "Discretionary Descent Vehicle" program was initiated in 1967 in direct response to the horrendous losses U.S. fixed wing aircrews were suffering over the dangerous skies of Vietnam. Sponsored by the United States Air Force, it was hoped that the DDV program would ultimately result in a disposable vehicle that could be packaged as part of an aircraft’s ejection system and allow the hapless crew member/members the option of landing somewhere other than that offered by a parachute decent.
The Benson Aircraft Corporation were contracted to produce three aircraft designated X-25, X-25A & X-25B. The basic X-25 was un-powered and of very basic construction consisting of little more than an aluminium square cross sectioned structure with a single seat and four post landing gear. Un-powered and designed to operate like a rotorchute, following ejection and a brief period of decent, the DDVs rotor blades automatically self deployed and aerodynamic forces then rotated the blades. As rotational speed increased so the gyroscopic forces in turn spread the blades into a conventional flat plane configuration though no control of the rotor head was provided for the pilot, the only directional control being via the foot pedal controlled rudder. The X-25A & B on the other hand were variations of Bensons McCulloch powered B-8M and un-powered B-8 Gyroglider. Although far more complex than the planned "one use" DDV,/b>, the X-25A and B provided both the data required to prove the feasibility of the DDV concept and also demonstrated the problems likely to be encountered in transitioning fixed wing pilots onto rotor craft -the average instruction time before solo being apparently 20 minutes or so.
The overall DDV program proved an unqualified success. The feasibility of the DDV was proved sound and found to be effective even at supersonic speeds. Unfortunately for the DDV, the winding down of U.S. involvement in South East Asia ultimately killed off any interest in the program as the problem of aircrew losses reduced itself to what were judged to be "acceptable levels".
START SMALL: OH-58D Kiowa Warrior
We propose that we begin with a small OH-58D Kiowa Warrior helicopter.
Place DDV-style rotor blades on.
Replace the Mast Mounted Sight (MMS) with a Recovery Parachute for safety sake in case something should go wrong and the rotors do not unfold.
The pilots would wear slim seat pack or ATPS/T-21 parachutes for even further safety.
The engines and controls would be started in flight just before the drop, with the pilots seated and strapped in. The rotors would be unclutched from the engine to autorotate.
The USAF aircraft's rear ramp and upper hatch would open.
The USAF aircraft would slow to drop speed of 100-150 knots.
The OH-58D would be loaded before take-off strapped to a special airdrop platform to slide out its USAF aircraft, nose-first by gravity from a nose high attitude the pilot would make prior to cutting the platform to slide out the open rear tail gate.
As the helicopter falls away from the USAF aircraft, the rotors would unfold DDV-style and begin to auto-rotate.
After the autorotation has steadied, the engine is clutched back to power the rotors and the helicopter flies its mission.
The airdrop platform attached to the skids of the OH-58D Kiowa Warrior can remain attached for the initial tests. The actual fielded system would have a platform that would be released after powered rotor flight was attained, the only loss connected to this insertion technique, however in peacetime a small recovery parachute could be attached so the platform could be found on the ground and re-used, or in peacetime, the aircrew fly to a recovery point and then release their platform.
Yes, the mid-air launch of Army helicopters will take extreme nerves of steel, but its not as risky as it first may sound. The rotor blades themselves are their "parachute" or deceleration devices, as the USAF realized years ago when they were looking at better ways to eject from stricken jets. If this technique is perfected with the OH-58D it can be applied to the larger AH-64, UH-60 and RAH-66. If the engine(s) fail to power the rotors, the helicopter autorotates to the ground. If the rotors fail to unfold properly during insertion, the mast head recovery parachute brings the entire helicopter/aircrew down. If rotors and RP fail, the pilots can bail out of the helicopter and land safely with their bail-out parachutes.
PARACHUTE LVAD
A less revolutionary approach would be to LVAD helicopters inside a padded cacoon and have aircrew jump afterwards, de-rigging the helicopter on the ground and getting it back into flying order. If they are RoboCobras and RoboHueys then they would be UCAVs and if they get destroyed, the loss would not be lamented. They would be deployable by airdrop and usable without all the hand wringing and risk aversion that goes with manned systems. Airdrop is possible to do since helicopters are not that heavy, its the possible reluctance Aviators might have to fly their fragile craft after being jarred from a parachute landing---even a padded/shock absorbed one. So why not have them as UCAVs?
The key in this approach would be a padded cacoon to fully cushion the helicopter so absolutely no damage is done upon landing, and to jump-qualify the aircrews and keep them on jump status to recover their helicopters after LVAD. If the cargo parachutes fail, the helicopter would "burn in" and even in the cacoon would become at best a source for parts.
SUMMARY/CONCLUSION
These are ideas Bell Textron could pursue/perfect with the OH-58D and could be first exploited by the 160th SOAR "Night stalkers" on its A/MH-6 "Little Birds", then the 101st Airborne (Air Assault) division with its OH-58Ds. As the technology matures, the AH-64 and the UH-60 and the 82d Aviation Brigade of the 82d Airborne division.
An Aviation expert writes:
"I've been thinking about this very problem. One partial alternative to attack helicopters (think outside the box!) is to use Harriers for CAS and anti-armor roles. Very high fuel comsumption, but one can easily imagine a modified C-5 cargo plane spitting out ready-to-fly AV-8Bs. Merely bring the engine up to idle speed, and eject them out the back using bleed air from the C-5's engines. As soon as they clear the C-5, they go full throttle and fly away under full power. The down sides to Harriers are the rather low loiter time, fuel burn rate, and lack of "low and slow" flight. However, they only have to fly continuously for the 1st 24 hours, while the rest of Airborne is getting dropped, organized, and dug in. Then occasional patrol flights while the engineers are building a landing strip. Once the C-130s and C-17s start landing, game over for 95% of the OPFOR out there.
Since two-bladed helicopters such as AH-1s fit into C-5s without derigging (I think; there may be a height problem with many helicopters), they're the obvious place to start. I figure the pilots will demand having engine on and at 100% Nr ASAP, so one scheme would be to attach a "stinger" to the tail boom with a static chute on it. The helicopter is pushed out of the cargo plane, the chute deploys and the helicopter hangs vertically from it. The pilot starts up, and when he gets 100% rpms, cuts away from the chute and flies away under power.
That sure would be one E-ticket ride for the rifle troopers in the 101st!
In-flight blade unfolding is high-risk, and I wouldn't try it in a 1st generation system.
The parachute/cocoon system is pretty workable, though. Heck, the system JPL came up with for the Mars lander worked like a champ!
Now that's what I like to hear!!!!!
Bravo!
The point being that we spit out the back end of the C-5s/C-17s (actually larger rear ramp clearances) an ARMY OWNED aviation asset. The USAF A-10 and in this case Mc Harrier fly boys would just say they would escort the C-5s/C-17s to the target area via air-refueling and then......
Go back to base.
And that is the central problem, that base is in CONUS or on an aircraft carrier that might be fighting for its life and losing against ASMs and diesel electric subs directed by satellite imagery targeting.
The point here would be to merge the arrogant Mc into the Army and stop allowing it to play-in-its-make-believe-world-of-media-exploits while in the real world doing nothing as the Army does the real deeds and dirty work. Then you'd have your Harriers LANDING right after the Paratroops have secured them a FARP and operating thereafter.
Or are you suggesting we have the Army buy Harriers because the Mc are too big of a derrier holes to fight jointly?
Regardless, its high time we take the CAS mission from the USAF and give it to the Army with the A-10s to do it since the AF is not interested in doing CAS. This includes developing a CAS UAV.
Perhaps you are right about something else----why not just use a 2 bladed rotor helicopter and slide it out the back and have it start spinning on its own, no unfolding at all? We have plenty of 2-bladed OH-58Cs sitting around unused...A helicopter flies at 100-150 mph anyway, so if it was pushed into the air at the same speed with rotors in autorotation, what would the differance be? We could start with an unmanned OH-58C and do the entire test to include bringing the engine back into powering the rotors and landing--by radio remote control.
AIRBORNE!
Mike