The Army Leadership Cult = blind obedience lemming like behavior or how a senior leadership cult led to a flawed light armored vehicle selection process.
By a Concerned U.S. Army Officer
GEN George S. Patton Jr. once said:
"No one is thinking if everyone is thinking alike. In too many organizations, toadyism is buried like a cancer. It must be removed with the sharpest bayonet available. All sorts of suggestions, ideas, concepts, and opinions must be allowed to promote an environment of learning and imagination. A fault of many potentially fine commanders is a lack of the ability to admit that other people have good ideas. If younger Soldiers are not allowed to use and cultivate their imaginations and their abilities for abstract thought, where will we get the next generations of qualified, motivated, and confident commanders? Commanders who never ask for an opinion, never listen to suggestions, and think they have the only correct idea find that their Soldiers will stop communicating altogether. They'll begin to sit on their asses and wait for orders before doing anything. No matter how high in the ranks a man goes, he can't know everything. We can always learn from each other. Juniors must learn not only to be allowed to use their imaginations, but they must be encouraged to do so.
Moral courage is the most valuable and usually the most absent characteristic in men. I cannot count the times I've seen men who should know better than to keep quiet when unjust decisions are being made, decisions that literally affect the lives of tens of thousands of Soldiers. These decisions are made, not on the basis of sound military policy, but purely to further the political and personal ambition of officers in high command. Cowardice on the battlefield is disgusting enough. Cowardice in the military planning room is repugnant. It ultimately means the unnecessary death, mutilation, and disfigurement of Soldiers for the sake of the commanders. It takes courage to stand up for what is believed to be right and just. Most men seem to lack such courage. Sycophancy for the sake of career is just as deadly as incompetence."
The decision by the Army leadership to use the LAV-III as its platform of choice for the new Interim Brigade Combat Teams - IBCTs - says much about the culture of Army leadership, and little of it is positive. This is especially true in light of the recent Army Times newspaper piece, which noted that the LAV-III, lauded as the best IBCT candidate by Army management, actually violates or pushes the envelope of acceptability in each of the three best-known requirements for the vehicle. According to the report, certain variants of the LAV are too tall, while all types are too wide and the system weight requires a waiver for it to be transported by the C-130 cargo aircraft in some cases. In each of three important criteria, -height, weight, and width - the LAV-III either clearly fails to meet the requirement or requires waivers to meet the Air Force transport standards.
None of the revelations in the Army Times piece should be news to anyone in the defense industry. An IBCT study published last year in National Guard Review actually screened out the LAV series vehicles due to their excess height. Furthermore, even if the LAV had passed the height-screening test, it would have lost in the relative value arena, where its weight made it less attractive than other, lighter vehicles. Ironically, what the Army Times report didn't mention was that the LAV-III's tracked competitors, in addition to weighing thousands of pounds less, offered far superior protection as compared to the LAV-III's anemic 14mm of armor. Finally, common sense suggested that a tracked vehicle like United Defense's M113 would be at least competitive in most other evaluated areas and superior in many to the LAV.
So how did we arrive at the point where the Army chose the wrong platform?
Surely the fault cannot lie with the Chief of Staff, who initially indicated a preference for a wheeled platform, but later testified before Congress that he was "open" to a tracked system. The rational observer, accepting the Chief's statement at face value, could conclude that the choice for the LAV over the M113 was made without command influence and based on reasonably objective criteria.
Unfortunately, neither of these statements is strictly true, though there was almost certainly no illegal action taken and no official command influence exerted.
Confused?
The short answer is that the Army has elevated its leadership to almost "god-like" status, and the decisions made by the organization have come to reflect this strange, almost obsessive fascination with those who are referred to as "the stars."
Generals in today's Army are in many ways an aristocracy of sorts, with many of the trappings one would normally associate with royalty. Their every whim is assiduously attended to. They live and travel in style, waited upon by a personal staff that grows as the General achieves higher and higher rank. The most senior of these officials routinely grant themselves privileges, such as the use of government vehicles, aircraft, chauffeurs and pilots, for transportation to and from their offices that would result in the conviction and imprisonment of more junior personnel.
Most importantly, however, the junior officers who attend to The Stars specialize in divining what is known throughout the military as the "Commander's Intent" and bringing that intent to reality. An aside often told in the Army illustrates the point. In it, a General arriving at his new command notes that he prefers the rocks on post be painted white, in the best Army tradition. The following day, the General is pleased to note that virtually every rock on post is painted a dazzling, glossy shade of white. The general never ordered that this be done, mind you; his staff simply accepted the General's off-hand comment as gospel and took action.
In the case of the IBCT platform decision, the Commander's intent was well known. His later protestations aside, General Shinseki had early on made it known that he preferred a wheeled APC for the IBCTs. That was all that the rest of the organization needed to hear. The result, predictably, were tests that showed the LAV-III was every bit as good as its tracked competitors, despite all evidence to the contrary. To those within the organization, the issue was never in doubt - the Commander's intent was clear.
The sad point here is that an organization, which fails to support its leadership with objective, sometimes unpleasant, analysis and support will ultimately fail. In this case, the unwillingness of those supporting The Stars to seriously debate the merits of the IBCT platform will materially affect the ability of the nation to meet emerging 21st century threats in the most effective way possible. Worst of all, the cult of leadership that pervades the Army today virtually guarantees that such missteps will prove the norm, not the exception, in the future.
E-mail received:
Its funny that while the Russian Army moves away from its wheeled vehicles (the BTR series), learning lessons from the brutal combat in Chechnya, the U.S. Army is moving towards them.OUR RESPONSE: IRONIC. The compass that is most important is a MORAL COMPASS. You have none if you are so cowardly that you cannot speak the truth for the good of the service, America, her Army and the men. Funny how U.S. Army Armor branch worships Patton yet when a LAV-III and FCS road-bound rubber-tired death car is proposed by higher ranking officers, these same fans of Patton shrink from their responsibility as men, Soldiers and human beings to vigorously oppose such non-sense. Don't praise Patton and other heroes (Gavin, Ridgway, Lee, Moore) if you are not trying to live up to their example.Below is a picture of the MT-LB6MB, a dedicated APC variant of the MT-LB, acknowledged as the Soviet/Russian equivalent of the M113 APC, which your site gives well deserved praise to.
The MT-LB is usually referred to as a tracked multipurpose armored vehicle and has probably been used for more roles than any other vehicle in the Russian army inventory, including artillery prime mover, command vehicle, armored ambulance, transporter-erector-launcher for ATGMs and SAMs, armored recovery vehicle, combat engineer vehicle, repair vehicle, chemical/ radiological reconnaissance vehicle and battlefield surveillance radar platform. It has also been used as a self-propelled mortar (mountng the 82mm Vasilyek automatic mortar) and as a purely ad hoc air defense and fire support vehicle with the ZU-23 AA gun. Last, but not least, it has been used as an APC, and can carry 11 men. In Chechnya Russian BTR-80 equipped Motorized Rifle units have often exchanged their BTRs for MT-LBs and the recently the Russian Army has been so impressed with the performance of the MT-LB that the construction of a dedicated APC variant with improved armament and armor has gone ahead. Its impressive performance obviously comes (like the M113) from its excellent cross-country performance (due to its very low ground pressure, lower than the ground pressure of the M113 even) robustness, ease of maintenance etc.
Like the M113, the MT-LB is an 'old' vehicle, being introduced in the late 1960's I believe. In 1995 however the vehicle was modernized with a new engine and improved steering by Muromsk Diesel Locomotive Works. The vehicles (approximately 5000 in the CIS total) were stripped down then overhauled and at the same time the steering system was replaced by a new hydrodynamic steering mechanism, which improved the ride of the vehicle and also made it easier to handle.
I could not find a larger picture of the MT-LB6MB, I apologize, but this vehicle has had the single PKT 7.62x54R machine gun removed and replaced with a drop-in turret called the Modular Weapon Station, which is mounted on the roof near the rear of the vehicle. This turret was first seen on the new BTR-80A and is equipped with the 2A42 30mm autocannon first seen on the BMP-2, a PKTM coaxial machine gun, and six 81mm smoke grenade launchers. The turret also has a much improved day sight.
The MT-LB6MB has a 290hp engine (more powerful than the engine on the M113A3 even). Like the M113, in its original form the MT-LB weighs a little over 11 mt. The addition of the MWS and the strengthening of the armor probably has increases the weight of the MT-LB6MB by an extra mt or so (the BTR-80A weighs 14.6 tons compared to the 13.6 tons of the original BTR-80).
Russian infantry preferred to ride in a tracked MT-LB with a 7.62mm machine gun rather than a wheeled, supposedly better protected BTR-80 APC with a 14.5mm heavy machine gun. While the BTR-80 choked on the debris strewn streets of Grozny and rocky roads up in the mountains the tracked MT-LB didn't break a sweat. Now that the same superb tracked APC has been equipped with the firepower of an infantry fighting vehicle and has had its armor improved, its ridiculous that the US Army is ignoring their own excellent M113A3 and instead going for the wheeled LAV-III deathtrap option.
While I was writing this email I thought I'd tell you about the latest Russian BMD development. The BMD-3M has been identified. The main difference between the BMD-3 and BMD-3M is that it is fitted with a new turret based on the BMP-3 design. The Russian airborne now has not only the 30mm autocannon at their disposal but the 100mm main gun of the BMP-3 for direct fire, shock action. I have also attached a picture.
Regards,
Dorian
PS There is also an MT-LB6MA version with the same features of the 6MB except instead of the MWS there is a BTR-80 style turret with the 14.5mm heavy machine gun, coaxial PKT machine gun, etc.
A veteran officer writes:"Reminds me of the 'Compass' incident that took place at Fort Hood back in the mid-80s. An off-hand comment by the post commander (a 3-star) about leaders needing to know at all times 'which way they're going' and 'what their objectives are' was construed by the staffers to mean that every leader (squad leader to brigade commander) must have a compass with them at all times. This was immediately followed by a frenzy of hi-priority requisitions for thousands of wrist compasses for the leaders to wear. What the general meant was that each leader should know what the objective of their training was; what skills or information needed to be passed on to Soldiers to accomplish the objective. The point the general was trying to make was totally missed by his minions and resulted in the spending of thousands of dollars for cheap wrist compasses for the leaders; I still have mine."
An Army Colonel writes:
All of the current ARMY leadership fancies that they are masters of tactical and strategic decision making. They have reached their positions by being careful to maneuver politically and have as few bad decisions as
possible on their record at promotion and command selection time. They have carefully selected workers whom they can trust to support them in their endeavors, and they usually have a mentor about two slots above
them pulling for their success.
All of the nug-work, and I mean all of it.... that which you all are beating yourselves up for time and again, even at the Army Staff level, is done by 05/06 'worker bees' who have the current doctrine sort of in their grasp. Having worked at a four star command for six years, I know whereof I speak.
Workerbees (WBs) put together COAs based on input they glean from their experiences, Army Manuals, contemporary testing, contacts in the field, CALL, CARL, anyplace they can find the info. Then they compare what they have
discovered with the "Command Guidance" they have received, and co-check their 67-9-1 (OER Support form) for "significant performance objectives" given them by their rater (who got them from the senior rater).
WBs put together presentations recommending COAs based on these goals and their guidance. Their boss, because he is MR/MS WIZZARD, knowing all, sensing all, telling all, will chose the COA that most closely supports his/her guidance, not necessarily the most clearly suited plan for success. If this sounds s little cynical, it is actually a lot cynical based on experience and observation at the EOR (echelons above reality) level of operation.
SO, where am I going with this?
You guys are all doing what you are supposed to be doing. If you were in an
operational cell group, cranking out all the information which was going to be used to build a brand new TOE for a deploying Air-Mech-Strike force, you would still have to sell it one-point-at-a-time to many decision makers whose feet are firmly anchored in their professional career goals. Some of them may have career goals which include improving the U.S. fighting systems for the combat
commander on the ground, but not all do. (read "Once an Eagle")
Don't get so sold on what you are building that you cannot take a step backward occasionally to look at what may or may not be practical to accomplish. I would be happy just to get the M113A3 v LAV-III test accomplished, but even that has so many political repercussions that it will still be being fought when I breath my last.
Our best hope now is to pray that both Abrams and Shinseki get ousted and people with no "67-9-1" goals of making the Stryker "happen" comes in in their places.
Don't take it out on the true believers. I think we are all in this because we believe in better ways to fight and win with fewer losses of life. The trooper has only us to trust. I made that my goal: to save my boys' lives. I'll certainly fight for that."
"After reading all the reactions and comments involved with the processes you are fighting I see one thing that really needs addressing.
OUR REPLY: AMEN! THE SPIRIT OF SAM DAMON LIVES!
1st Tactical Studies Group (Airborne)
E-mail: itsg@hotmail.com
Home Page: www.geocities.com/equipmentshop
See important links on the impending LAV-III wheeled armored car disaster:
Tracked M113A3s already in use by USAEUR as C-130 air-deliverable force
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