VEHICLES

The HMMWV its radio, and its crew-served weapon make up a system that can move, shoot, and communicate in a variety of modes. The HMMWV enhances MP mobility and sustainment on the battlefield. And it can be used as a command and control vehicle as well as a weapons carrier. The HMMWV provides a stable weapons platform. The vehicle has a ballistic kit that offers limited protection. Its large cargo area holds equipment and ammunition for the weapon, and its assigned infantry fireteam/squad.

The all-road, all-weather HMMWV is especially suitable for rough terrain because of its--

16-inch ground clearance.

Large tires (Primarily Road dependant) or MATTRACKS (off-road capable).

Strong suspension system.

Wide dimensions.

Features promoting operating efficiency and decreasing driver fatigue include--

Automatic transmission.

Full-time four-wheel drive.

Inboard power disc brakes.

Power steering.

1-40 MPH speed X-xountry with wheels or MATTRACKS
1-60 MPH speed on roads (wheels only)

300 mile unrefueled range

SURVIVABILITY-ENHANCING EQUIPMENT

Reduced ability to find targets.

Difficulty in navigating.

Difficulty in controlling men and weapons.

Difficulty in telling enemy from friendly troops.

Attempted neutralization of surveillance, target acquisition, and night observation devices.

Skillful use of your equipment can extend your ability to see and hear, and even to function in an NBC environment.

NIGHT-VISION DEVICES

Conceal troops and their movements.

Achieve surprise.

Reduce the ability of an enemy to aim well.

On any battlefield, darkness and other limiting conditions hamper success. The dust and smoke of combat often obscure parts of the battlefield. So, too, do rain, fog, snow, and natural dust.

At night, with artificial light, you can fight using daylight tactics and techniques. Binoculars aid your vision, both in daytime and at night when moderate light from moonlight, flares, and headlights exists. Night-vision devices can magnify even the smallest amount of light.

They help you--

Locate and observe the enemy.

Fire weapons at the enemy.

Detect enemy use of infrared light.

AIRmotorized units have image-intensifier night-vision sights (AN/PVS-4) that you use like you use a telescope and face-mounted night-vision goggles (AN/PVS-7Bs) that leave your hands free for--

Operating vehicles and equipment.

Dismounted movement.

Firing weapons (especially when AN/PAQ-4 infared aiming lights or M68 reflex sights are attached)

Administering first aid.

Performing maintenance.

Other similar tasks.

Javelin ATGM Command Launch Units (CLUs) use SINCGARS radio batteries to power their forward looking infared (FLIR) or "Thermal" imagers which can detect enemy heat signatures from distances out to 2,000 meters. The older M47 Dragon night site is a heavier FLIR with less range than the Javelin's CLU and requires a special battery, but can be used by AIRmotorized units for surveillance/early warning. For general use, image-intensifier night-vision devices enhance available light. In this passive mode they do not put out a light signal. Their ranges depend on the available light levels. Extremely low light levels, rain, fog, smoke, and dust reduce their usefulness. In clear air you can increase their usefulness with flares or other artificial light. But the devices also have a battery-operated built-in infrared light source you can turn on to enhance their use in close-up viewing.

You must avoid looking directly at a visible light source when using night-vision devices. This causes the device to shut off. And night-vision devices can cause you to develop eye fatigue and lose night vision temporarily. When using the devices you need 5 to 10-minute breaks every 30 minutes to prevent fatigue. It is best to alternate operators every 30 minutes. Operators should not operate night-vision devices for more than six hours.

CAPABILITIES CREATED

On signal, they fly out to block key mobility corridors in advance of the main body traveling overland in Bradleys/Abrams or air-dropped-STOL airlanded Gavins (M113A3s). By being in HMMWVs they have superior mobility than the enemy they oppose and can carry large quantities of 40mm and Javelin units of fire. They are not left in a position where they get decisively engaged. They can ambush and withdraw and/or be repositioned by helicopters.

New equipment that can be maximized

We should exploit the new (1997) improved lift performance of the recently fielded UH-60 "Lima" model Blackhawks and the new FMTV M-1078 2-½ ton trucks to gain an air-motorized capability for the 25th ID (L) and the 172 SIB (L). Re-organize M-998 HMMWVs into light truck companies attached to the Aviation Brigade (Hawaii) or Aviation Battalion (Alaska) that provides a HMMWV per infantry squad. The vehicle would be configured to be quickly sling-loaded with the squad carried internally in the aircraft.

USARPAC ground maneuver forces must break the Vietnam paradigm of foot mobile air assault methodology to advance to an air-motorized force that can move in all three-maneuver modes; dismounted, motorized and air assault.

New Technology Promotes Air-Motorized Mobility

a. New UH-60 Lima Model Blackhawk. This past year two USARPAC units, 2-25 AV (25th ID (L)) and 1-207 AV (Alaska NG), replaced their UH-60 "Alpha" model Blackhawk helicopters with factory new UH-60 "Lima" models. New "Lima" models now make up about 70% of the approximately 90 Blackhawks in USARPAC. The older "Alpha" models could barely sling load a combat equipped HMMWV (6500 lb.) with its typical payload of 6000-6500 lb. with no troops carried internally. However, in 1997, after a great deal of testing, DA authorized an increase to the new UH-60 "Lima" model sling load maximum from 8,000 to 9,000 lb. and an increase to the aircraft’s gross weight of 1,500 lb. This increase allows for the first time the simultaneous sling load of a combat equipped M-998 soft-top HMMWV (6000-6500 lb.) and a full nine man squad internally (250 lb. per Soldier). It is now possible to sling load a combat equipped M-1025A1 Up-Armored HMMWV (8,500-9,000 lb.) from "A" troop 3-4 CAV and its crew of four carried internally. This new improvement in helo-lift technology now available in USARPAC, suggests that “air-motorized” assault capability receive serious consideration.

b. New FMTV 2-½ Ton Truck M-1078. This past year USARPAC began fielding the new FMTV series of trucks. Contrary to the older vehicles, the new M-1078 2-½ ton truck is designed to be easily sling loaded by a CH-47D Chinook helicopter. In fact, the new truck is light enough to allow the Chinook to carry 18 combat equipped troops or two and half tons of cargo as well. Even the heavier FMTV 5-ton M-1083 can be lifted by the Chinook by sacrificing on board fuel (30-50% reduction in aircraft range). The FMTV series of vehicles greatly improves the ground mobility and cargo capacity of an air assaulted force. Ring mounts on FMTVs allow M249 Light Machine Guns, M60/M240B Medium Machine Guns, MK-19 40mm Grenade Machine Guns, and M2 Heavy Machine Guns to be mounted in a ready-to-support-by-fire position.

c. Future USARPAC equipment to-be fielded includes the M197/M6 pedestal machine gun mount that bolts to the rear cargo deck of the M-998 soft-top HMMWV and the Javelin "fire & forget" Anti-tank Guided Missile (ATGM). This mounts a M249 Light Machine Gun, a M60/M240B Medium Machine Gun, or a Mk-19 Grenade Machine Gun or a M2 .50 caliber Heavy Machine Gun to ANY M-998 soft-top HMMWV. The Javelin is the world's first self-seeking anti-tank/assault missile that has no backblast or launch signature. With a range of 2 KM, the Javelin can be volley fired at multiple enemy targets, with initial target detection gained by the Command Launch Unit (CLU)'s forward looking infared sensor through fog, haze, darkness and smoke. To maximize the Javelin's capabilities, a motor vehicle is needed to increase the units of fire available beyond the single missile and CLU that can be carried by a Soldier. Together, a MG on the HMMWV can suppress the enemy as the Javelin gunners engage enemy armor or defended bunkers/buildings, complimenting each other's fires.

6. Contingency Operations. In planning for possible employment of the CRF and or DRB in a contingency operation, one of the greatest challenges facing the deployed commander is to gain sufficient mobility to accomplish the mission. The light force structure of both the 25th ID (L) and the 172nd SIB (L) provides for either limited light truck ground mobility or air assault mobility. In the former, moving the deployed force via truck convoys over hundreds of kilometers of poor roads from the ISB to the objective area poses a significant security risk and time delay. The latter achieves speedy deployment from the ISB to the objective area but requires landing the foot mobile force extremely close to the objective which poses its own security risk and normally has few vehicles outside of specialized carriers for C2 and crew served weapons like TOW Heavy ATGMs or 81mm mortars.

7. Possible Concepts:

a. Air-Motorized Brigade/Division. USARPAC could pool its helicopters to reinforce the 25th ID (L) into an air-motorized division (AMD). The 39 X CH-47s (24 AC & 15 RC), 62 X UH-60Ls (38 AC & 24 RC), 40 X Light Attack Kiowa Warriors with 200 additional HMMWVs would be reorganized into the Divisional Aviation Brigade. This force could perform similar MTW missions envisioned for the 101st AIRBORNE Air Assault Division with the added ability to move motorized on the ground once inserted.

(1) The additional HMMWVs would come from reallocation from internal 25th ID (L) units and additional HMMWVs from FORSCOM. The 200 vehicles would be organized into provisional air-motorized truck companies (AMTCs) of 50 each with drivers coming from USAR/NG IMAs. The AMTCs would be organized under a provisional Aviation Forward Support Battalion, which would also consolidate AVIM, ATS and FARP assets. Sling loading HMMWVs as part of an air assault has long been a sub-task in our air assault doctrine. Using trucks to motor light infantry from rear TAAs to their attack positions has likewise been a doctrinal sub-task since WW II. The key difference in this proposal is the combining of these doctrinal tasks into a cohesive collective task at brigade-division level. The new collective METL of “Conduct Air-Motorized Assault” optimizes these tasks in close concert to maximize their enhancement to maneuver warfare. The proposed air-motorized concept represents no change in doctrinal METL or battle tasks from platoon through battalion level.

(2) The Aviation Brigade commander would be the responsible agent to deliver the maneuver battalions by air assault to within 10-30 kilometers of the objective and then by vehicle to the attack positions via the sling loaded HMMWVs. The AMTCs then would shuttle organizations from the LZ to the objective area.

(3) An air-motorized division could provide an operational reserve that can quickly move from rear TAAs to the decisive sector. A future 25th ID (AMD) could air assault from rear TAAs up to 160 kilometers over ground obstacles and defended choke points to an unexpected, low-risk LZ, then motor forces the remaining 10-30 kilometers to designated attack positions. This movement can be cross-country off roads by fitting HMMWVs with MATTRACK systems instead of tires.

The vehicles also allow this force to arrive better rested and with substantially more fire power (TOW Heavy ATGMs, Dragon/Javelin Medium ATGMs, heavy 120mm mortars or medium/light mortars with large quantities of ammunition, Avenger HMMWVs (can fire 2.75" Hydra-70 rockets), .50 Cal HMGs, 40 mm GMGs, heavy mines etc.) and supplies as opposed to a dismounted air assault force limited to manpack levels of supply. The AMTCs could also convoy additional forces to the objective area while lead forces are being air assaulted.

(4) The AMTCs also allow forces to deploy forward from rear TAAs in the event of bad weather or helicopter commitments elsewhere. During a counter-offensive, an air-motorized force could be used to conduct 250 kilometer one-way air assaults deep in enemy territory to seize airstrips, ports or other key terrain in advance of the main body. These air assaults could be done at night and after most of the effective radar-directed ADA is neutralized, as was the case in Desert Storm. LZs could be displaced from the objective areas and the force could motor to their attack positions. The HMMWVs would also add a significant dimension to the element of surprise by being able to quickly (10-50 mph) disperse forces from the LZ to seize supporting objectives, a marked improvement over traditional dismounted (1-2 mph) air assaulted forces.

(5) In its current configuration, the 25th ID (L) cannot substitute the 101st AA in typical MTW scenarios. The 25th ID (L) has only 38 UH-60 Blackhawks and no Chinooks. In addition, its forces are mainly foot mobile. USARPAC has insufficient helicopters to replicate the full compliment of the 101st ABN AA Division’s 120 plus Blackhawks, 48 Chinooks, 72 Apaches and 32 Kiowa Warriors. However, the pooling of helicopters from USARPAC units and combining them with 200 HMMWVs provides the division with the requisite mobility albeit with OH-58D Kiowa Warriors and no AH-64A Apaches. The net result is a force with about 60-70% of the 101st capability.

8. Summary. The recent addition of the new UH-60 "Lima " Blackhawks with their improved sling load capability and the new light weight FMTV trucks offers USARPAC an opportunity to break the Vietnam-era dismounted air assault methodology and advance Army Pacific forces towards an air-motorized capability for the 21st Century. It is now possible to simultaneously air assault a combat-equipped nine-man light infantry squad with a combat-equipped HMMWV for ground mobility. The air-motorized concept can be realized with only a relatively modest increase in light trucks and no new METL or battle tasks from platoon through battalion. An air-motorized battalion could air assault out to 160 kilometers to the safety of a displaced LZ out of enemy earshot then motor the remaining 10-30 kilometers to an attack position then dismount. The force would arrive better rested; less vulnerable to artillery fire and deliver greater firepower from heavier vehicle-born weapons vice only hand-carried ordnance.

PATHFINDING THE AIRmotorized Rifle Company

Links to FM 57-38 Pathfinder Operations are included here:

U.S. Army ATDL web site

1. SIMULTANEOUS MEN/HMMWVs into the LZ
The standard way of doing an Air Assault would be to first land the entire infantry company to secure the LZ. Then, fly in the sling-load aircraft. We could cram an infantry company into 7 Blackhawks, leaving 13 free to follow with HMMWVs. However this means an extra lift and disorganization on the ground trying to match up men/vehicles.

Instead, if the LZ is not occupied by the enemy and we want to maximize the ground mobility of the AIRmotorized force, we keep the HMMWVs and their infantrymen together with their delivery Blackhawk. We could move an AIRmotorized force of 20 helos/20 HMMWVs and their infantry company in two lifts of 10 (flight of 6 and 4), or 3 lifts, with one Platoon of 34 men landing by 2-3 Blackhawks to establish the Landing Zone, survey/mark and provide security. In the 101st AA, with seats removed the UH-60L can carry 19 Soldiers in one lift! The first 3 helicopters fly back to the Pick up Zone (PZ) to slingload their 3 HMMWVs and rejoin the other 17 Blackhawks/HMMWVs already inbound.

To maximize the "L" model Blackhawk's lift of 9,000 pounds, the M998 HMMWV's 5200 pound baseline weight (6,000 lbs for planning with weapons mount, ammo, food/water etc) means there is 3,000 pounds left in the empty fuselage to carry infantry. Each man weighing at 250-300 pounds with rucksack, LBE, weapon means a maximum of 10 men could be carried per Blackhawk with HMMWV underslung. An average of 7 men per 20 helicopters easily gives a 130-man light infantry company (SH 7-176 Infantry Reference Data Book March 1989) a lift to the battlefield and a livable space inside the HMMWV driving over the ground.

A 9 man infantry squad and driver supplied by the Air Assault unit would be 10 men total in the HMMWV.

Or a 4 man infantry fireteam and driver would be 5 men total in the HMMWV. Benefits are the space to carry more ammo and mount a Mk-19 40mm Grenade Machine Gun or 7.62mm Medium Machine Gun on the recently type classified M197 pedestal mount

If each squad gets a Blackhawk/HMMWV it will require 10 total helicopters to move in one lift. If each fireteam gets a Blackhawk/HMMWV it requires 18 Blackhawk/HMMWVs to be moved in one lift.

The remaining Company Headquarters has 28 men in a HQ Section of 9, Anti-Armor Section of 13 and 60mm mortar section of 6.

The CO HQ should be broken up with the Co, RTO and Mortar Section Leader, Gunner and ammo bearer in one Blackhawk/HMMWV (Command Element "A", and the XO , 1SG, Supply SGT, Tac Commo Chief, Armorer and NBC NCO in another Blackhawk/HMMWV (Command element "B"). This HMMWV would have a trailer and act as AIRmotorized Company resupply vehicle. The remaining men of the mortar section; a Squad Leader, Gunner and ammo bearer and one Anti-Armor Javelin ATGM team would have the 20th Blackhawk/HMMWV.

If the 3 lift model with initial Pathfinder/Security platoon landed first is used, 3 helicopters are free to move the remaining 2 Anti-Armor Section personnel (2 Team Leaders, 2 AA gunners, 2 Asst AA gunners and a Section Leader).

If we want to move the whole force in one or two lifts and If each rifle fireteam is assigned a HMMWV, the remaining 2 Anti-Armor Section personnel (2 Team Leaders, 2 AA gunners, 2 Asst AA gunners and a Section Leader) would need to be attached to 2 of the fireteam chalks, making them 8 men and 9 men respectively compared to 5 for the others. This cross-loads all key weapons and gives the Infantry company 2 headquarters "A" with the CO, "B" with the XO.

2. The first 10 (flight of 6 and 4)or the entire 20 (3 flights of 6 plus a flight of 2) would land in a staggered trail left or right formation requiring a "6-ship" sized LZ: a long flat, clear area 600 meters by 150 meters. If the 3 lift model is used, it would be 10 (6+4) helicopters and 7 (6+1). All 17 could land in one lift if the landing zone is large enough, since 3 helicopters would fly ahead to land the Pathfinder/Security platoon. This creates two rows of helicopters.

3. To hook up sling loads requires 3 Pathfinders-- a Static Probe man, hook up man and signalman. They wear protective equipment and hook up the helo while it hovers.

4. While it is possible to hook up the helo and have it land alongside the load to pick up its passengers its not prefered. So there are two possibilities:

* Land each serial behind the HMMWVs already rigged for sling load. Load the infantry first that will operate the HMMWVs in the helicopters which will carry their HMMWV. Have on signal, two Blackhawks at a time fly forward to the rearmost HMMWVs, get into a hover, and have two sling load teams hook up the HMMWVs simultaneously from staggered sling load landing points. The Blackhawks take off and fly into the traffic pattern awaiting the next pair to fly forward and have their HMMWVs slung up to them. The first lift flies away.

The second lift repeats the same process except for the very last Blackhawk----this aircraft has to pick up the Pathfinders.

There are two ways to do this.

a. The 20th aircraft and the 20th HMMWV are hooked up and they land alongside the HMMWV while slung (not preferred but only one aircraft) and picks up the 6 sling-load Pathfinders. The downside is that its unlikely that the Blackhawk with slingload taking off last could speed to the formation front unless the other 19 stay circling in the traffic pattern until it takes off. Even then, it would be landing in the LZ with a sling load which is tactically risky in event of enemy resistance. This could be overcome by having 2-3 "slick" Blackhawks without HMMWV sling load land in the first serial and land first with troops to Pathfind/secure the LZ. They render a visual signal (infared chemlites etc) to tell the sling load Blackhawks if the LZ is secure, not just radio communications. If they are pre-occupied with a firefight, then they will be unable to render the signal and the sling load aircraft can abort the landing. This would require additional aircraft or a reduction by one of the HMMWVs being taken in the force or if time permits, an additional lift that flies back to pick up the small security element's HMMWV.

b. The last 2-3 Blackhawks are without a HMMWV to sling load and lands to pick up the Sling Load Pathfinders/Security Platoon. Benefits are that it can fly faster than the sling load Blackhawks and fly ahead to the front to land first in the Landing Site, acting again as Pathfinders for this movement. Also, this reduces the number of men that need to be Pathfinder trained to 6 in case they have to be sent to school at Fort Benning, Ga and a Mobile Training Team cannot be sent to Hawaii. The conservative path would be to assign 1st squad in the 1st Platoon the dual task of sling load team and LZ pathfinding/security. The best path would be to teach ALL Soldiers in the infantry unit to be moved how to slingload. The men in this lift whether a full or partial rifle squad would not have a HMMWV to be moved in on the ground and would need to be split up into the remaining 19 HMMWVs.

** Each aircraft's driver is Pathfinder trained and supervises two other Soldiers from the infantry unit being supported, who rig the HMMWV for sling loading and in the actual hook up. After the hovering hook up, their aircraft lands alongside their HMMWV to pick them and the rest of their unit up. The downside is that the pilots may not want to do this and it would require a set of sling load hook up equipment with each HMMWV. Other benefits are the simplicity of this approach and the ability for each lift to take off at the same time and not have to form up in a circling traffic pattern which hooking up 2 at a time would require.

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