UNITED STATES ARMY POWER PROJECTION IN THE 21st CENTURY: THE CONVENTIONAL AIRBORNE FORCES MUST BE MODERNIZED TO MEET THE ARMY CHIEF OF STAFF'S STRATEGIC FORCE REQUIREMENTS AND THE NATION'S FUTURE THREATS.
projection capability of the Nation. His conclusion is that the U.S. needs a light armored corps that is equipped with a family of combat vehicles which includes infantry fighting vehicles and self-propelled artillery. [Hello: M113A3 family can do this for us]
SOVIET AIRBORNE (DESANT) FORCES - EVOLUTION AND CURRENT STATUS
Government Documents:
The Soviet Airborne Experience is a excellent study of the Soviet Airborne forces from their inception in the 1930s to the 1970s. Authored by Lieutenant Colonel David M. Glantz and prepared for the Combat Studies Institute of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, this document examines the Soviet Airborne evolution and provides essential historical information for this thesis.
Another government document that contains a great deal of historical information on the Soviet Airborne forces is Dr. Edward N. Luttwak's Historical Analysis and Projections for Army 2000: A Study of the Soviet Airborne Forces 1930-1983. This document provides an excellent review of the Soviets' Airborne forces evolution. Dr. Luttwak discussed the transition from the light infantry of World War II to the light mechanized force of today in some detail. Dr. Luttwak says,
"the Airborne desants (forces) have become more determined, dynamic, mobile and rapid." (1)
There is also a very good discussion of the 1970 Dvina exercise in which the Soviets airdropped an entire Division, with vehicles, on three closely placed drop zones within 22 minutes. (2)
Austrian Army Colonel Peter Kolecko has written two articles, both titled "Soviet Airborne Forces," that have been translated and published by the U.S. Army Intelligence Agency. These articles, dated 1986 and 1988, provide an excellent source of information on the current capabilities of the Soviet Airborne forces. Some of the specific
information presented includes: the tactics and techniques used by the Soviets on Airborne operations; and a review of the Soviets' modernization of their Airborne forces.
Periodicals:
There are dozens of articles available that address the Soviets' Airborne forces. Dr. Graham Turbiville, Jr., from the Soviet Army Studies Office at Fort Leavenworth, has authored several of these articles for a variety of publications. Some of the most current unclassified information available on the Soviet Army and the development of its Airborne forces can be found in these articles. A few of Dr. Turbiville's articles used in this thesis are: "Soviet Airborne Troops" (1987), "Soviet Desant Forces" (Oct. 88), "Soviet Airborne Assault" (Oct 87), and "Soviet Airborne Operations in Theater War" (1986).
MAJ Richard N. Armstrong provides some good insights into the Soviets' Airborne forces modernization in his Infantry Magazine article titled, "Soviet Mechanized Airborne Forces," May-June 1985. In the article, Armstrong discusses the Soviets' realization that World War II experiences identified some major weaknesses with their Airborne forces. As Colonel General D. Sukhorukov, Commander-in-Mief of Airborne Forces put it:
"Although these Airborne forces had great strategic mobility, once on the ground they had the tactical mobility of regular infantry - two or three miles per hour on foot. Consequently, to avoid wasting the swiftness of the strategic deployment itself, and to achieve tactical surprise, Airborne forces had to be dropped on or very near their objectives. As a result, the landing party's engagements usually began under conditions in which the enemy had both fire superiority and greater mobility". (3)
C. N. Donnelly provides a good discussion of the Soviets' investments in the military application of technology in his article for the International Defense Review, titled, "The Development of Soviet Military Doctrine." Donnelly says that many Western Armies design their equipment based on peacetime requirements. He goes on to say that in the Soviet Union, the principles of war are taught, not only to the Soldiers, but also to the weapons designers and the research staffs.
FUTURE THREATS AND FORCE DESIGN
AirLand Battle Future Forces Briefings:
The Combined Arms Center at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas has proponency for the force design of the Army of the future. The AirLand Battle Future Forces Division (ALBF-F) office is the agency within the Current Forces Directorate of the Combined Arms Center that is working to redesign the Army to be able to fight 15 years from now. The ALBF-F office has been given guidance to relook the current design focus from Heavy-Light to a Heavy-Medium-Light Army. One of the objectives they received in their guidance is, "To ensure that our combat forces are strategically deployable, operationally flexible, maneuver-oriented, firepower-intensive, highly mobile and tactically effective." (4)
Additional guidance includes increasing the strategic deployability of Army units through improvements in force design. The information from the ALBF-F office was used in this thesis to ensure that the recommendations developed offer viable solutions to the modernization of the U.S.' Airborne forces.
The Current Forces Directorate of the Combined Arms Center has developed projections of the threat forces in the year 2004. Rather than developing recommendations to modernize our Airborne forces which are based on historic or even current threats, this thesis will orient on the future threats to the use of Airborne forces.
Periodicals:
An excellent article discussing the future national military strategy and the military role in determining that strategy was written by Secretary of Defense Richard B. Cheney, as a Congressman in 1981. The article, titled "Strategic Underpinnings of a Future Force" and written for the Military Review, states that the "logistically heavy, European-oriented, modernized Army force is unsuitable for the flexibility demands of the 21st-century missions." (5) The article goes on to say that the Army must be able to generate dominating force in remote regions faster than their adversary. And given the remote inland location of many of these areas of vital interest, the requirement for speedy strategic deployability can only be accomplished by aerial delivery. This article will be used to support the argument that a modernization of the U.S. Airborne forces is necessary.
Another good article written by William S. Lind and Colonel Keith M. Nightengale et al, is titled, "The Changing Face of War: Into the Fourth Generation," October 1989, Military Review. This article takes a look at the makeup of war in recent generations and predicts the look of war in the next generation. The authors believe that maneuver will be a key element in the next generation of war and that small, highly maneuverable, agile forces will tend to dominate. Massed forces will be easily targeted. They warn that the military and the Nation must adapt to the changing face of war.
heavy field artillery limits support for maneuver battalions and reduces the ability to deliver counterfire and to suppress enemy air defenses."
The manual also keys on the Division's "limited ground and air mobility once delivered into the objective area." Finally, the manual states, "Special staff consideration must be given to attack by enemy armored or motorized formations." The Airborne division's deficiencies in mobility and firepower seem to present a dilemma as FM 100-5 (above) detailed the need for mobility and offensive capability in the contingency forces.
DA PAM 20-232, Airborne Operations: A German Appraisal, was published in 1951 and provides a unique look at the Germans' use of Airborne forces during World War II. This pamphlet provides an appraisal of the German successes and failures, the reasons for their abandonment of large-scale Airborne operations after the Crete operation, the German experience in opposing Allied and Russian Airborne forces and an appraisal of the effectiveness of these operations.
The Germans, during World War II, did things that U.S. Airborne forces even now would not consider doing, such as airdropping at an altitude of 330 feet with test jumps at 200 feet (the U.S. standard for airdrop altitude is 500 feet in combat); airdropping in winds of 31 knots during the operation in the Ardennes (the U.S. standard for airdrop is 13 knots); and airdropping intentionally in wooded terrain or on towns or villages (U.S. Airborne operations are planned almost exclusively for clear flat drop zones or airfields). Although historical in nature, this document provides many observations and recommendations that still apply to the force design, equipment and doctrine of the Airborne forces.
The intent of this review of literature is to group the many areas of study together into like topics. There is significantly more information available, on the subject of Airborne forces, than has been identified in this literature review. However, a comparative analysis of the Soviet Airborne forces and the U.S. Airborne forces, or a projection of future threats against current airborne forces capabilities has not been found.
REVIEW OF LITERATURE ENDNOTES
Edward N. Luttwak, Historical Analysis and Pro.iection for Army 2000, Volume
1. part 17, Soviet Airborne Forces 1930-1983, (lyrIC B085085, March 1983), p. 159.
2 Ibid., p. 77.
3 MAJ Richard N. Armstrong, "Soviet Mechanized Airborne Forces," Infantry, May-June 1985, p. 25.
4. AirLand Battle Future Forces Division of the Combined Arms Center, unpublished briefing notes, 27 Sep. 1989.
5 Congressman Richard B. Cheney and Major (P) Thomas N. Harvey, "Strategic Underpinnings of a Future Force," Military Review, Oct. 86, P. 10.
CONCLUSION
The intent of this review of literature is to group the many areas of study together into like topics. There is significantly more information available, on the subject of Airborne forces, than has been identified in this literature review. However, a comparative analysis of the Soviet Airborne forces and the U.S. Airborne forces, or a projection of future threats against current Airborne forces capabilities has not been found.
REVIEW OF LITERATURE ENDNOTES
Edward N. Luttwak, Historical Analysis and Pro.iection for Army 2000, Volume 1. part 17, Soviet Airborne Forces 1930-1983, (lyrIC B085085, March 1983), p. 159.
2 Ibid., p. 77.
3 MAJ Richard N. Armstrong, "Soviet Mechanized Airborne Forces," Infantry, May-June 1985, p. 25.
4 AirLand Battle Future Forces Division of the Combined Arms Center, unpublished briefing notes, 27 Sep. 1989.
5 Congressman Richard B. Cheney and Major (P) Thomas N. Harvey, "Strategic Underpinnings of a Future Force," Military Review, Oct. 86, P. 10.
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