The 2nd Massachusetts Infantry
at Resaca (May 13-16, 1864):
The Battle

At about 5 a.m. on May 13th, Morse heard a spirited firing [Williams was behind Butterfield's 3rd Division, which had been placed in support of the right flank of the 14th Corps] as "endeavors were made to bring on a general engagement," but throughout the morning "nothing more than skirmishing" resulted against Butterfield's line. Night came and passed without an outbreak of hostilities while both sides rested and strengthened their defenses. The result was a supperless evening for Chaplain Quint, but this was the least of his complaints. He found the inevitable odor of decaying bodies after a battle waged in hot weather in combination with the rank smell of the marsh "indescribable."

For much of the next day (the 14th), the 2nd MA sat idle as skirmishing continued approximately one mile to its front. Things did not get off to a very good start. McPherson had been ordered to move directly on Resaca to reach the railroad, but faulty maps did not reveal that his objective was in fact behind enemy lines. Thomas and Palmer were assigned to form on McPherson's left, and after a difficult march the entire line was facing the valley of Camp Creek. Howard was approximately 1 mile to the north of Schofield.

Palmer crossed Camp Creek under heavy fire but his attack became disorganized and he was driven back. Schofield was thrown against elements of Hood's Corps, but a counter-attack nearly led to disaster. The movement left Howard's left flank in the air and late in the afternoon Hood attacked MG David S. Stanley's vulnerable division. MG Oliver O. Howard appealed to Thomas for help. Williams was dispatched. As Stanley's outflanked line began to crumble before the rebel yell, Williams's division--with Hooker personally leading it forward at the double-quick through thicket and underbrush--arrived just in time to save the 5th Indiana Battery from being overrun. The enemy advance was quickly checked. Then, according to Morse, "we advanced with a cheer, regaining all the lost ground." As it was about 8 p.m., the line was halted and during the night the men strengthened their positions with a strong line of works.

On the right of Sherman's attack, Logan's men, on the principal road to Resaca, carried the height that had been held by Polk. There was no question but that daylight would bring a renewal of the battle.

The morning of the 15th began eventfully for the 2nd 2nd MA when it was selected to make a reconnaissance of the enemy's position to their front. Thomas was given the job of carrying the hill anchoring the enemy's line (which would force Johnston to fall back towards resaca) and needed to know how heavily it was held.

Chaplain Alonzo Quint could not help but admire these veterans of the Army of the Potomac as he watched them quietly lay down their knapsacks, pick up their rifles and disappear into the woods. The regiment proceeded about three-quarters of a mile and ascertained that the rebels were present in force. After drawing the fire of the well-entrenched outposts, Col. Cogswell withdrew his men and reported his findings to Hooker. Morse commended the commander of the 2nd MA for the execution of the maneuver which resulted in the loss of only two men. The regiment, too, performed perfectly, "not firing a shot though under quite a disagreeable fire from skirmishers."

Capt. Crowninshield observed Generals Hooker, Butterfield and Williams engaged in a serious conversation and correctly predicted an attack against the enemy line would be made. Howard, on Hooker's right, would advance with him. Schofield's two divisions were withdrawn from the center to support the attack. Newton, Wood, and Stanley took up positions behind Howard and Hooker. Hovey held the left of the line.

On the other side of the field, Johnston, who did not wish to take Sherman on in a general engagement, was making plans of his own. Hood, reinforced by troops from both Hardee and Polk, was ordered to advance against the Union left.

No doubt to their great disappointment, the men of Williams's division saw the assignment of taking the hill go to Geary and Butterfield, while they were given the less glamorous task of protecting the left flank of the corps. Chaplain Quint's recollection of the division alignment placed the 1st Brigade on the right, the 2nd Brigade in the center, and Ruger's 3rd Brigade on the left. To Ruger's left was some cavalry, soon replaced by Hovey's brigade. McPherson's job was to hold against an anticipated counter-attack.

Ruger's regiments ran from left to right: the 27th Indiana, 2nd Massachusetts, 3rd Wisconsin, 150th New York, and 13th new Jersey. According to Quint, the line was formed "but soon moved on an eighth of a mile to the front edge of a wood, a field with standing wheat before it." The brigade then moved across the field and into another wood that covered the ascending slope of the hill.

It took Hooker all morning to make his dispositions and it wasn't until after noon that Butterfield and Geary got going. They ran headlong into Hood's attack and matters quickly dissolved into a mess. Howard's assault was blasted back by Hindman's division before Hooker had even finished deploying across the Dalton-Resaca road. Soon after stepping off, Hooker's brigades quickly got mixed up and the advance stalled.

During the heavy fighting, of which the 2nd MA took no part, Crowninshield reported that Butterfield (the brigade of William T. Ward) captured a small fort with four guns belonging to Stevenson. The rebels counter-attacked, but the guns were eventually dragged back into Federal lines under heavy fire. The action cost Hooker 600 men.

Morse reckoned that it was about 1 p.m. when the his brigade finally went into the fight. "We moved rapidly forward and became at once engaged. Our regiment was in the front line, supported on the left by the 27th Indiana and on the right by the 3rd Wisconsin." Hardly had they moved into position when Morse observed a large body of the enemy (Alexander P. Stewart) massed in their immediate front whose intention, he surmised, was to turn their left "which had become somewhat exposed."

Stewart's attempt at smashing the Federal left flank and cutting Sherman off from Snake Creek Gap began promisingly enough as Hovey's men went to ground when it came under heavy shell fire and effectively put itself out of the fight. But instead of finding an exposed flank, Stewart encountered the ever-alert "Pap" Williams, who discovered the movement and countered by ordering a change of front while at the same time bringing his batteries up. The assaulting Confederates did not realize until too late that Williams--commanding the same division that had driven Stevenson from the field the previous day--was more than prepared to meet them.

Crowninshield heard the rebels come on with their patented yell, driving their skirmishers before them. They patiently waited for Stewart's men to emerge from the woods on the other side of the Western & Atlantic Railroad. "As soon as the skirmishers uncovered the Batallion, we poured an awful fire into them, which checked their advance." The 2nd MA and 27th IN greeted the attackers with what he referred to as "a style of shooting unknown outside of the armies that have graduated in Virginia." The astonished enemy's return fire was "wild and high." This Army of the Potomac style of shooting involved the front rank firing a volley, then dropping to the ground while the second rank fired another volley, etc.

The fighting raged for about an hour before the rebels finally gave way. Three brigades in succession had attempted to dislodge Williams without success.

Ruger pursued the retreating enemy as far as the edge of the woods to an open field. Here Crowninshield got a look at the rebel works beyond which "they had 6 pieces of artillery concealed, loaded with grape and cannister, all ready to open on us in case we should charge." But Ruger, being far more intelligent than impetuous, went no further, remaining in the safety of the woods. When the situation dictated that Ruger fall back to the top of the hill from whence he started, the enemy mistook the movement for a retreat an opened fire. Said Crowninshield: "The way the bullets and grape hummed was a caution. But fortunately their range was innacurate and few men were hit."

Ruger's men had every reason to be pleased with their day's work. They had captured a fair number of prisoners including the battle flag and colonel of the 38th Alabama. The 3rd WS alone welcomed 40 Georgians into their lines who chose to surrender rather than escape to fight again.

That night the 2nd MA laid down on its arms behind a breastwork of logs. Around 10 p.m. the rebels made one last attack against the flank of the 20th Corps, but this too was repulsed with considerable loss. Then, upon learning that a Federal force under McPherson had crossed the Oostanaula and was moving around his rear, Johnston withdrew.

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