 BENTONVILLE, NC
| PRELUDE
|
| THE BATTLE
| REGIMENTAL LOSSES
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| BATTLE REPORTS
| AFTERMATH
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| VIGNETTES
| BACK
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Bentonville was a small town approximately 22 miles southwest of Goldsboro, North Carolina.
The action at Averasboro had widened the gap between Sherman's two wings to 12 miles. At the same time, it gave Johnston the time he needed to concentrate all of his forces, which numbered about 20,000. Hoke had reached Bentonville that night, followed by the Army of Tennessee. Hardee was on the way. This was the opportunity Johnston had been hoping for. If he acted quickly, he could crush Slocum's isolated and vulnerable column, which was stretched out along a single road, with the 20th Corps lagging behind laying roads and reparing bridges.
For his part, Sherman assumed that the danger to his troops had passed, so he moved to the right wing of his army, joining Schofield en route to Goldsboro.
Late on the 18th of March, Slocum halted his column and went into camp. Like Sherman and Slocum, Capt. Francis Crowninshield supposed that "our road to Goldsboro was all clear." After all, Judson Kilpatrick had reported that Hardee was retreating on Smithfield and that Johnston was concentrating his forces near Raleigh. This misinformation led Sherman to believe that the enemy intended to concede Goldsboro. Even after foragers from the 14th Corps ran into stiff opposition the next day, no one thought it was anything more than some residual cavalry. Only MG Jefferson Davis expressed wariness that something was in the air, but after shrugging off a civilian's report that the Confederates were massing at Bentonville, Sherman departed from Slocum's wing.
Johnston set his trap. He placed Hoke's North Carolina division in a defensive position across the road and along the edge of an open field, with its left concealed in a thick oak scrub. On the right was Gen. A.P. Stewart's Army of the Tennessee.
William P. Carlin's division was in the advance at about 7 a.m. on the 19th when it ran into some dismounted cavalry. So slipshod was Kilpatrick's reconnaissance that Slocum still believed only a minor force stood in his front, even after riding forward himself to take a look. As a precaution, however, he pushed Hobart's brigade forward to the edge of the field. As late as 11 a.m., Slocum was sending messages to Sherman not to let the sound of musketry delay Howard's advance.
After pushing the horsmen back, the Federals encountered Hoke's well-entrenched infantry. A sharp exchange commenced, but Slocum proved a hard man to convince, and even after several "Galvanized Yankees" took the opportunity to escape into his lines and warned him of the danger, he was still inclined to discount the reports that he was outnumbered 10,000 to 2,000. Only after one of his officers stepped forward to personally vouch for one of the fugitives did Slocum see the light. At 1:30 p.m. he dashed off a message to Sherman calling for assistance. Slow to grasp, he was now quick to act, assuming a defensive position while ordering up the 20th Corps at the double-quick.
From his position with the 2nd Massachusetts, Francis Crowninshield heard the sound of artillery at the front and thought little of it until the entire corps was summoned. "We then began to think something was up." Gen. Alpheus Williams, once again in temporary command of the 20th Corps, quickly dispatched his advance--Hawley and Robinson--forward. At 2 p.m., Hawley reached Morris Farm and deployed, along with 2 of Robinson's regiments, the 82nd IL and 143rd NY, in reserve north of the Goldsboro road, about 1 mile in the rear of Carlin and Morgan. Robinson continued to the front with his remaining regiments and tried to fill the gap between Hobart and Miles, but with his reduced brigade, he simply did not have the manpower to be an effective plug.
When Williams learned that Taliferro's division was marching around Carlin's left flank and was within 1 mile of his position, he ordered the 3rd brigade, inlcuding the 2nd MA, about a quarter mile north of the road to meet the threat.
For Joseph Johnston, things had gone wrong from the start. His hope had been to deliver a crushing blow to Carlin early in the morning, but although Hardee had arrived at 9 a.m., he could not reach the field until noon. (Johnston's map apparently underestimated the distance Hardee had to travel). Then, what proved to be a truly fatal delay occured when Johnston had to dispatch the division of Mclaws to reinforce Bragg, who had gotten nervous after repulsing Carlin's attack and sent to Johnston for help. Not only did McLaws arrived too late to be of any assistance to Bragg, it seriously weakened Johnston's right flank for his proposed attack.
Johnston's woes continued when his attack got off at 2:45. For reasons unknown, Hoke and Mclaws failed to join the assualt. By this time, Morgan's division and elements of the 20th Corps (including the 2nd MA) were coming to Carlin's aid.
Haley's brigade took up a position behind Carlin's division in a small, wooded ravine than ran roughly east to west along the northern edge of the Morris farm. The brigade was deployed in 2 ranks along the southern lip, with its right resting on a second ravine that ran northwest from the Goldsboro Plank Road and connected with the first ravine about 100 yards north of Hawley's line. The 2nd Massachusetts held the right flank in the front line, with the 13th NJ behind them along the edge of a cornfield.
The 2nd MA was busy fortifying its position when, at about 3:15 p.m., a heavy firing, which grew increasingly closer, was heard in the woods along the right flank. The New Jersians were ordered across the wooded ravine, where it extended beyond the right of the 2nd MA. Capt. Francis Crowninshield now observed Carlin's men streaming back "in the wildest confusion." Hardee had burst through the gap in Carlin's line while Stewart drove back the left flank upon the 20th Corps, leaving Webb's battery uncovered.
At this critical moment, said Capt. Henry Comey, the oft-malinged "Eastern" corps demonstrated its discipline and training. "It was worth something to see the air of determination with which the men went in. Officers called upon the men to fight and the men answered with a will, 'Aye! Aye!,' and they did fight and would have fought & held the ground had they been pressed 10 times as hard."
Ward's brigade came up and moved into line on Hawley's left. On the right, 5-7 assaults were made against Robinson's thin line without success.
He had fought at Antietem, at Chancellorsville, and at Gettysburg. He had been wounded 4 times, But Crowninshield now found himself as scared as he had ever been in battle. "I had made up my mind that my turn had come," he wrote to his mother. "But made up my mind to fight till the last. It would have been no use to run to the rear, for me had no rear; the only thing to do was to stop the enemy, be captured, or die." He waited nervously for one of the three. "We could hear them in the woods in our front, yelling like demons. The shots grew nearer and nearer but never reached us, for their charge was stopped by the admirable handling of our artillery, which fired the grape into them. We could see them waver when the artillery opened--halt and fire, and then turn back." It was, he confided, "the happiest moment of my life."
But the battle was by no means over. A second attack was made and repulsed. After nearly four years of fighting without a scratch, the luck of Lt. Col. Charles Morse finally ran out and was felled by a Rebel bullet through his shoulder. Capt. Robert Brown (who would serve the entire war without a single wound) took command of the 2nd MA.
Hardee found his rear threatened by Morgan's 2nd division (14th C), which had been bypassed during the inital attack. At 4:30, Bragg belatedly charged Morgan's front while 3 brigades from Hill's Corps assaulted Morgan's breastworks from the rear. Only the timely arrival of BG William Cogswell (late of the 2nd MA) and his brigade saved the day. Plugging the gap between Davis and Williams, Cogswell then pushed the enemy a mile and a half, out of 2 lines of breastworks and into a third. The effort cost Cogswell the most losses of any brigade in the corps.
Hawley's work was done for the day. His brigade was moved to the left of the line, where it remained until after the battle. Crowninshield supposed that the Rebels "considered our part of the line too strong to assault." The fight continued until darkness forced the Confederates to withdraw to the position they had occupied before the battle.
Crowninshield believed that Johnston had lost his chance when his men were driven back in the first assault. "Had they followed up their advantage more promptly they would have crushed us. As it was, they got within gun shot of the 14th Corps trains."
The next day (the 20th), Slocum held his defensive position. Skirmishing broke out along the line, but the battle was not resumed. Shortly after dawn, Howard arrived. By noon, all of the 15th Corps was on the scene. Johnston remained in his trenches, hoping that Sherman might grow impatient and attack, but the Union commander's objective was not a major battle, but to reunite all of his forces at Goldsboro.
Skirmishing continued on the 21st, until MG Joe Mower, commanding the 1st division of the 17th Corps, became fed up with the stalemate and, without orders, made a bold attack on Johnston's flank. His intention was to cross Mill Creek in order to cut off Johnston's only escape route. Mower's surprise movement came tantalizingly close to accomplishing this goal, but when he called for reinforcements, Sherman ordered him to fall back lest his command be trapped. Thus did the Federals squander its own golden opportunity. During the night, Johnston retired.
The battle of Bentonville would be the last action of the 2nd Massachusetts Infantry.
Remarkably, there were no reported losses for the 2nd Massachusetts Infantry at the Battle of Bentonville.
None available from the 2nd MA INF.
Capt. Daniel Oakey accurately summed up the battle of Bentonville as "a combination of mistakes, miscarriages, and hard fighting on both sides." Although Johnston would claim for himself a moral victory, for having surprised and nearly bested Slocum, the action can not be considered anything but a defeat, for in the end, he failed to wreck one of Sherman's wings and he failed to prevent the consolidation of Sherman's forces at Goldsboro, while at the same time losing over 2,600 men to Sherman's 1,527. Sherman could absorb his losses; Johnston could not.
Johnston was ultimately defeated by a number of factors, from the dense terrain which hindered the deployment of his troops, to Bragg's skittishness, which caused a fatal delay in his attack.
On the Union side, both Sherman and Slocum can be faulted for over-confidence and for ignoring the obvious signs of an impending trap. But once convinced of his dire situation, Slocum responded quickly, and wisely decided upon a defensive battle. Sherman later came under criticism for not finishing Johnston off, or at least pursuing his damaged army after he slipped away on the night of the 21st.
Crowninshield declared the campaign in the Carolinas "one of the hardest, if not the hardest that I ever went through." Since leaving Savannah, the regiment had marched steadily through mud, swamp and quagmire, fought 2 battles, and had subsisted on a very poor diet. "We have lived on meal and ham and I am sick of the sight of both."
Still mourning the loss of Capt. James Grafton at Averasboro, the officers of the 2nd MA learned of the death of Lt. James Storrow at Bentonville. Storrow had not been with the regiment very long before accepting a position on Cogswell's brigade staff. During the battle, he received 2 flesh wounds, one in the arm and the other in the led. Neither appeared to be serious, yet within 20 minutes, he was dead. Capt. Francis Crowninshield, whose frail frame had withstood 4 Rebel bullets, could only attribute Storrow's death to "extreme shock." He requested and was granted permission to accompany Cogswell's staff officers in burying his friend. "It was a sad burial but the best we could do under the circumstances....Grafton is buried beside him."
The men of the 2nd Massachusetts dubbed the battle of Bentonville "Acorn Run," in honor of the 14th Corps, whose Corps badge was the acorn. For a long time, the former Army of the Potomac men had suffered the scorn of the Westerners. Now the "Stars" of the 20th Corps had saved the "Acorns" from a sound drubbing, which, quipped Henry Comey, "is a hard nut for them to crack."
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