Criminal law “ the role of judge and
jury"
the decision of the House of Lords in Wang [2005] UKHL 9; 10th
February 2005
At the end
of the defence case the judge ruled that there was no defence
arising on the appellant's evidence and (the
judge ) directed the jury to
convict on both counts.
The
appellant appealed to the House of Lords, the Court of Appeal
certifying the following question of law of general public
importance:
" In what circumstances, if any,
is a judge entitled to direct a jury to return a verdict of
guilty?"
The decision of the House of Lords
The
House allowed the appeal holding that there are no
circumstances in which a judge is entitled to direct a jury to
return a verdict of guilty.
In their Report their
Lordships considered earlier decisions of the House in
Director of Public Prosecutions v Stonehouse [1978] AC 55 and
Chandler v Director of Public Prosecutions [1964] AC 763 and
pointed out that the:
-
role of judge and jury is clearly
defined;
-
the judge directs, or instructs, the jury in respect
of the relevant law and makes clear that the jury must accept
and follow his legal rulings. The decision of all factual
questions, including the application of the law to the facts
as they find them to be, is a matter exclusively for the jury
-
and the judge should make it clear that whatever views he may
express or be thought to express,
- it is for them (the
jury) and not for
him (the judge) to decide whether the defendant is guilty
or not guilty.
If a judge is satisfied that there is no evidence
which could justify the jury in convicting the defendant and
that it would be perverse for them to do so, it is the judge's
duty to direct them to acquit Director of Public Prosecutions
v Stonehouse [1978] AC 55 at 70, 79-80 and 94.
-
This rule
serves to protect the accused from a wrongful conviction. But
there is no converse rule and so where, on applying the law to
facts which have been agreed or not disputed, an acquittal
would be perverse, the judge may not direct the jury to
convict.
-
He may however express his opinion in strong terms
provided he gives it as advice and not as a direction and
-
tells them in clear terms that the question is for them to
answer.
- The judge has no power to pre-empt the jury's verdict
by directing a conviction. This rule was of fundamental
importance and there was no reason to doubt that juries
approached their task other than
conscientiously.
Although a judge should withdraw a
defence from the consideration of the jury if there is no
evidence whatever to support it,
- if there is evidence, no
matter how weak, the judge should direct the jury to consider
it.
The House commented that,
as there was not a total lack of evidence,
the question should
have been left to the jury, "irrespective of how predictable
the outcome might reasonably be thought to be."
In the
instant case D had given evidence that he had religious
motives for carrying the weapons with him. He had also stated
that he had not wanted to leave the weapons at home unguarded.
It was for the jury to evaluate the motives of the D and
decide whether either of the defences in the section were made
out.
The House concluded:
" Had the
learned judge left the present case to the jury and directed
them in the ordinary way, it seems very likely that they would
have convicted. There could then have been no effective
appeal.
- As it is, the Court of Appeal's judgment highlights
the dangers of judicial intervention.
- It may well have been
"very far from clear" what the appellant's intentions were.
The nature and extent of the appellant's religious motivation
had been the subject of evidence. The appellant's evidence of
not wanting to leave the weapons at home with no one to look
after them may well have given rise to nuances not recognized by the judicial mind. These were pre-eminently matters for
evaluation by the jury.
- Belief that the jury would probably,
and rightly, have convicted does not in our judgment entitle
us to consider this conviction to be other than unsafe when
there were matters which could and should have been the
subject of their (the jury) consideration."