Tank/Infantry Cooperation for Urban Combats

SIRIUS: The Strategic Issues Research Institute
Benjamin C. Works, Executive Director
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--Speak the Truth and Shame the Devil--

Strategic Issues Today

A formatted report may be viewed at: http://www.siri-us.com/issues.html

SIT 04-04-16; Friday, April 16, 2004

Iraq: Damned If You Dont

"You will be damned if you do. -And you will be damned if you don't."

- Lorenzo Dow (1777-1834); Reflections of the Love of God

At the www.siri-us.com website, we have posted some useful files on what our forces should know about serving in Iraq in these anxious days leading up to the restoration of

In war, as in all political undertakings, you face the Calvinist Dilemma and will get damned if you do and damned if you dont. In wartime in particular though, when you do, you are more damned by political rivals and human rights activists, and your campaign tends to turn out well. But its those things that you dont that will cause reversals, casualties and even defeats. In Iraq, we mounted a brilliant campaign with enough heavy and light forces to do the job of toppling Saddam right, but did not retain enough Iraqis in uniform, in order to restore security and clean up the rubble, at wars end. One thing you need after the war is what my drill sergeants called all asses and elbows with shovels, wheelbarrows and also on guard duty, to get things going again.

Let us look at the twin insurrections in the Sunni Triangle north and west of Baghdad, and the companion insurrection mounted, as a putsch, by the narcissistic junior Shia cleric Muktada al-Sadr.

First, why now? Well, the U.S. was rotating troops around Falluja and the marines were taking over the territory from the 82nd Airborne. And it was the first anniversary of the fall of Baghdad. And the marines were coming in with not quite enough fire power which consists of armor, not light infantry.

In the south, the would-be charismatist, al-Sadr, calculated that while our forces were distracted with the Sunni rising, he could pull offa Muslim version of Hitler's Beer Hall Putsch and rouse the masses. And his al-Mahdi militia did achieve success in the opening hours by targeting Shiite towns in the zones of our less experienced allies Ukranians, Poles and the Spanish.

But in Sadr City, a sprawling Shiite suburban borough of Baghdad with two million souls thought to be the seat of Muktadas power, they challenged the U.S. directly and failed spectacularly. A single brigade of the 1st Armored Division, using its Abrams tanks and Bradley armored infantry carriers smashed the uprising before nightfall, the first day and the police never abandoned their stations in the face of the mobs and militiamen. And let us specify that there are almost seven times as many people in Sadr City as are in Falluja.

In contrast, the marines have very few Abrams tanks and no Bradleys. They have some light armor but those vehicles are highly vulnerable to Iraqi rocket propelled grenades (RPGs). Now the Marine light infantry is turning in a fairly spectacular performance against the Sunni insurrectionists in the eleven days of fighting around Falluja and Ramadi, but if they had an armored task force at their disposal, they, too, could have broken the back of the insurrection on Day 1.

The key in both insurrections is that the rebels know the coalition forces are slow to react when police stations come under attack. Our forces as much fear ambushes laid for relief forces as anything. But to Iraqi cops, this slow reaction gives them every reason to be less than aggressive in fulfilling their duties when a crisis is on and a Fallujah police station had been attacked a few weeks ago, leaving about 25 cops dead before U.S. forces reacted.

A Paradox:

It is a paradox of war that if you put on a heavy show of force, you will only have to use that force swiftly and with less collateral damage, as the 1st Armoreds brigade demonstrated in Sadr City. But if you use light forces to try to put on a show of force, the enemy will perceive your vulnerability and force you into using a heavy application of violent force to achieve your aim, where your battlefield advantage in weapons and vehicles is marginal, as at Falluja.

In the Vietnam era, we used to sneer at actors and soldiers when they were John Wayne-ing it and taking risks for the wrong reasons. Light Infantry, such as our Airborne Infantry tend to fantasize about the John Wayne model of infantry combat. But it is the Heavies who can crush an insurrection before it achieves critical mass, while dismounted infantry in the open, immediately has to go on a defensive posture, when it comes up against determined resistance.

So the Heavies turned al-Sadrs ill-conceived putsch into a mere Nine Days Wonder, while the marines still have a serious fight on their hands. As late as today, though, Sadrs militia, around Kufa, were still trying to mix it up with coalition forces.

I have a print entitled A Friendly Power in Egypt showing a red-coated British Army band marching through the soukh of Cairo, putting on a show, about 1895 or so. The finesse of armed power is to put on an appropriate show of force, in order to avoid having to apply that force. Power is as much about finesse as it is about blunt force.

Hearts and Minds:

Jim Bartlett, in a recent note to an internet circle (Milinet) reports from Baghdad, that there is a material disconnect between our ground operations, our public relations/psychological operations efforts on the military side and what the Coalition Provisional Authority is attempting as it seeks to establish an interim government on June 30. He suggests we need a more cohesive program at all levels. A source inside the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) confirms that view.

One way of working the hearts and minds problem is to work closely with the tribal chieftains and others in the social hierarchy. Another facet of Iraqi urban life is that each block has an official representative, a Muqtar, who acts something like a ward boss, mayor and concierge rolled into one. For instance, when the police are tracking a suspect the muqtar is obliged to lead them to the suspect, but then turns around and acts as the suspects official witness to assure that he is not mistreated in the arrest process. The muqtars of Falluja would know exactly where foreign jihadists are hiding in their neighborhoods. Town by town, our people are learning more about how to put these mechanisms more effectively.

But ultimately to keep the hearts and minds of the Iraqis on our side, we need to be very careful and swift in our application of force against the insurrections while communicating more clearly about building a better future. In the longer term, one way to take a lot of fuel away from the fire of insurrection is to rapidly establish and roll out a system of community colleges, based on our model. Community colleges here routinely train the labor force in skills that can be applied in the market in as little as 13 weeks. Then, while already working, the student can continue through a two-year degree or move on to a four year university. One such college has been established in Hungary a roaring success-- with others opening soon. American community colleges are lining up to partner with foreign schools in order to rapidly develop skilled labor forces in other countries. Obviously, the internet allows the course curricula to proliferate in very short order. As Iraq only has 95,000 seats for a population of 25 million and where half that population is under 25, putting community colleges to work in all the major towns would rapidly reduce the potential recruiting pool for terrorists.

Falluja

Now, the marines aren't John Waynes, but they have to adapt to their lack of heavy forces and accommodate that handicap. They have one of the most capable commanders in Major General Mattis, who understands about winning hearts and minds and working with tribal and community leaders.. At the same time, one wonders about the 82nd Airborne brigade that was in Falluja until the marines arrived, just as four contractors were ambushed and butchered some two weeks ago, precipitating this showdown. In April, 2003, the city was initially occupied by a brigade from the 101st Airborne, which got in trouble with the city when it occupied a school that families wanted re-opened for their children. That led to the first civilian deaths.

Ultimately the situation was calmed after an armored force from our 3rd Division took over from the 101st and negotiated an end to the impasse while putting on a show of what the Heavies can do. But when they returned to the US late last year, they were replaced by a brigade of the 82nd Airborne Division, who reverted to John Wayne-like behavior and stirred the town up again, setting the stage for the slaughter of the four contractors and the arrival of the marines.

Do our light forces understand that the successful application of martial power involves more than mannered swagger? Some units do I've met real leaders from the 101st and 82nd-- but some apparently do not.

The British have a legacy from the days of Empire, where they can demonstrate that by perfecting the image of martial power, they have to apply less violent physical power, and Americans can profit from this perception. We do not need to raze Falluja to its foundations and salt its earth in a Roman-like devastation of Carthage, we need to understand how to walk the walk of reassuring, present power on the ground. And, perhaps, we need a more perceptive class of pundits on our cable news channels. Too many teeth-gnashing tough guys advocate overreactions, while our force commanders, who better know the facts on the ground and the community leaders attitudes, are trying to apply a bit of finesse. Sir Charles Gwynns 1934 classic Imperial Policing, (Macmillan) is a useful textbook for how the military can restore order in constabulary situations and is one of several books that can help hone our skills in finesse.

Enough U.S. Troops?

The twin crises in Iraq are both worse than optimists would let us believe, and better than the pessimists assert. But because of the importance of returning Iraq to a resemblance of self-rule and democracy on June 30th, the Army has been forced to require some 20,000 US troops from the 1st Armored Division (Heavies), the 2nd Armored Cavalry Regiment (Lights) and support troops in Kuwait (mostly National Guard) to serve 15 months, rather than the promised 12-months in country. The Soldiers will grumble, as they always do and we soldiers are very creative at grumblingbut theyll perform their duties well, and when they get home, will get back to normal life again.

This raises the question of whether the Army and marines have enough troops in uniform, or should we enlist more? The real answer in April 2003 was we need more Iraqi troops and the real answer in April 2005 will be, though we need more Iraqi troops, for now, yes we need those extra troops to remain into July because there are no Iraqi troops and there is a crisis; while we see whether further reinforcements are needed for the next year and prepare those units.

In the long term, we have too few infantry (Heavy and Light) and too much Artillery and certain other combat and support troops. These imbalances are the result of maintaining a Cold War armed force posture for 15 years after the collapse of the Soviet Union. Why?

As with all bureaucracies, the Armed Forces fear change: Better the Devil you know Yet, the real issue is, are the troops we do have in the right jobs? The answer to that is too many are not in the right slots and if we re-work those allocations, we will be much more efficient. The Army Chief of Staff has directed that 33 surplus artillery battalions, each with about 500 troops, be converted into infantry and military police companies, and additional Civil affairs teams as an initial stopgap measure.

Another early step to increase our combat strength would be to restore a fourth platoon in every company and a fourth company in every battalion. This would raise Army strengths from about 500 men per battalion to 700 and raise marine battalion strengths to about 900-1000 from 750.

The real trick is to move to a balanced force where our basic units of deployment are put on a three year cycle of training-deployment-recovery from deployment so that we can sustain ourselves for the time needed to protect our investments in Afghanistan, Iraq and any future adventures in nation building. The Navy, marines and Air Force run on this cycle of readiness and the Army needs to adopt it, as well.

Late in 2003 Colonel Douglas A. Macgregor published a useful book mapping out a logical way to modernize our Army, Transformation Under Fire (Praeger: 2003). His good advice will probably never be entirely adopted, but he has helped propel our consideration of expeditionary warfare in this new era of low-intensity conflicts in struggling Third World countries.

* * *

In the final essence, we are in a less secure situation in Iraq because of what we have not done or provided for, as much as for what we did in toppling Saddams regime. Our leaders are learning as they go and doing their best to learn how to transform a society while under fire, but even after a year, we still do not know how to mount a consistent public relations/psychological operations message.

© Copyright 2004 by Benjamin C. Works - SIRIUS www.siri-us.com

* Recipients of this report may re-post it, in whole or in part, to Internet web sites and address lists, so long as this copyright notice is included, and "for fair use only."

MY REPLY:

Ben works does a good describing why light forces are not QUALITATIVELY up to the job of urban warfare.

But he fizzled at the end with talk of more quantities of weak light force quality. We need more troops with tracks not troops-in-trucks.

The current U.S. Army plan is to (as you know) expand the Army into more John Wayne cheapo light units in trucks = WWII Italian Army all over again.

The answer (as you know) is to make our light forces HEAVY ENOUGH to be intimidating; ie light tanks, light tank APCs; ie M8 Bufords and M113 Gavins.

We need light forces for closed terrain and 3D maneuver.

However, we cannot create more 2D maneuver heavy forces to do the jobs light forces refuse to adapt to. We do not have the medium and heavy tanks to make more heavy forces.

The answer is to make our light forces heavy enough with the light tanks (we do have large quantities of) to do urban fights without John Wayne firepower compensation for weakness. We do not need any more bad, light infantry BS training. WE need to THINK about what and how we do things and MAKE TANGIBLE CHANGES WHICH MEANS ACTUAL WEAPONS AND EQUIPMENT not chest-beating and posturing about "training". Talk is cheap, and this BS talk about training is just another cheap excuse to send our troops riding to their deaths in trucks in Iraq. I love how lots of lightfighter egotists say the familiar quote: "Don't take a knife to a gunfight" when they do exactly that walking into cities with M16s vs enemies that out-number them with AKMs and RPGs.

REVELATION! U.S. ARMY "DISCOVERS" TANKS FOR URBAN COMBATS

Notice the CYA "spin" for wheeled Srykers/HMMWVs in Bell's BS when they clearly are not up to the job on non-linear combats and should be withdrawn in favor of tracked AFVs.

www.nationaldefensemagazine.org/article.cfm?Id=1485

National Defense Magazine, July 2004

Heavy Armor Gains Clout in Urban Combat

by Roxana Tiron

An ongoing debate within the U.S. Army is whether to revise its tactics and doctrine for the employment of heavy armored vehicles in urban areas.

Operations in Iraq prove that the current doctrine, which specifically dissuades the Army from bringing tanks into cities, should be rewritten, said Gen. B.B. Bell, the commander of the Army’s forces in Europe.

“The utility of tanks in the city, not only from a protective envelope, but also from a capabilities perspective, is something that we relearned,” Bell told National Defense. “I think we knew this in previous wars. So, we have to go re-look at our doctrine and make sure that we write our doctrine correctly for using armored platforms in cities.”

In the current doctrine, crafted 20 years ago, “the fundamental precept was [that] the worst place where you can take a tank is in the city,” Bell said in an interview during the 2004 Armor conference at Fort Knox, Ky.

“The general belief was that you’d be immediately engulfed with rocket-propelled grenades, [the tank] would be caught up in this terrible caldron of fires and, therefore, this was not an appropriate platform to operate in cities,” he explained. “That has obviously proven to be a doctrine of exclusion that was not correct.”

Stability and support operations have turned out more lethal than expected, he said, and therefore, the requirement for armored platforms, ranging from tanks to Stryker light armored vehicles and up-armored Humvees, “is as important as it has ever been and, perhaps, more so,” he said.

Lt. Gen. Thomas Metz, the commander of the U.S. Army’s 3rd Corps and the multi-national Corps in Iraq has required more tanks and Bradleys, according to Chief Master Sgt. William Gainey. “We are all beefing up,” he said after a presentation at Fort Knox. “We had what we thought we needed, but it did not prove enough.”

Officials at Fort Hood, Texas, were preparing last month to send 50 tanks to Iraq.

“One thing is for sure: to gain proximity to the enemy and survive his ambush attacks, having sufficient armor surrounding our forces—physically surrounding them—has proven vital,” Bell said.

“Armored platforms do have a role in cities,” he argued. “They have a role first to protect our infantry formations as they fight house to house. Then, they have a role as a support platform, or firing platform to defeat enemy forces in cities.”

U.S. main battle tanks—the M1A1 Abrams and its updated versions, the M1A2 and the M1A2 System Enhancement Program—carry precise, direct-fire weapons that can cut the risk of civilian casualties, which normally would be high in a city, said Bell.

“An artillery piece, or even certain types of aerial delivered fire, produce a wide range of collateral damage that a direct-fire, tank-like weapon does not produce,” he said.

“I would take this tank in the urban environment any day, because having extra protection would be something that we like,” Staff Sgt. Jared Hamilton said. Hamilton fought with the 3rd Infantry Division in Iraq.

“Tanks not only provide over-watch, they can also blow up a house much better than the firepower from six soldiers,” he told National Defense. “In order to disable a tank, one would have to get pretty close to it.”

But that does not happen often, he said. The shock factor of an Abrams tank is fairly effective. Insurgents are less likely to attack if a tank is present, he explained.

Hamilton’s former unit from the 3rd ID, training at Fort Polk, La., before being re-deployed, is using the tanks in support of the dismounts, he said.

In the past, infantry always entered cities first, with armor following, explained Gainey. Now, “what we are trying to do is put the armor in first, blow the holes and [then] let the infantry come in,” he said. “That is working well.”

Success in the urban environment requires the effective use of the combined arms teams—the mix of scouts, infantry and armored platforms, according to Bell. “What you do not want to do is use any of these capabilities by themselves.”

The Army’s intent to build combined arms brigades-modular units organized as combined arms at the lowest level—will not only bring all those organizations together for the fight, but keep them together for their entire organizational life, said Bell.

The 3rd ID, based at Fort Stewart, Ga., is the first to be reorganized under the modularity concept and will test it when they re-deploy to Iraq. The division’s three brigades are being restructured into four “units of action,” including armored, maneuver and aviation components. The division headquarters will become the “unit of employment X.”

The maneuver units of action are made up of an armed reconnaissance squadron, two combined arms battalions, an artillery battalion, a brigade support battalion and an engineer company, according to Maj. Gen. Terry Tucker, the commander of Fort Knox and the Army’s Armor School.

“We had a tradition in the Army for years of tailoring and task-organizing for a mission right before the mission and it worked kind of well, but we have always been troubled that during training and exercises we did not have these organizations permanently formed,” Bell said.

To provide the combatant commanders with cohesive, combat-ready troops, the Army has to figure out how to bring a unit together “at the right time” and keep it together, Tucker explained.

Under a new proposed plan, a brigade should be “rebuilt” over one to three months, then would spend up to eight months training, culminating with a certification exercise. For about 24 to 29 months, the brigade will stay ready to conduct operations and each of these new units of action can expect to go “somewhere, at least once,” said Tucker.

“That gives you about a three-year cycle to build the team, train it, deploy it and bring it back,” Tucker said in a presentation at the armor conference. To support this plan, however, the Army has to restructure the personnel system.

Meanwhile, Fort Knox is leading the Army’s efforts to change the way the service trains its armor and infantry forces, said Tucker, from “private to brigade commander.”

The Army is revamping unit training, according to Tucker. Soldiers and officers are spending more time in live exercises and less on marches and drills.

“Tankers and scouts are not going to be good marchers for the next year or two, because they are conducting tactical movements and combat drills,” Tucker said. Additionally, troops will learn to fire their individual and collective unit weapons at night and during the day, according to Tucker.

Classroom instruction will be curtailed, said Tucker. “Today, what we turn out is a Soldier [who] is better prepared to arrive at this first unit to contribute to the effort” as opposed to having to be trained by the platoon sergeant in theater, he said.

Non-commissioned officers also will be better trained to lead crews, squads, sections and platoons. “We are getting great sergeants out in the operational force, a lot faster than we did [before],” said Tucker. Out of 368 soldiers who recently graduated from the Armor School, 240 were in theater.

TAGS is the clear gunshield with sexy "new" appeal so its all of the sudden AOK for the Army to buy. Nevermind that solid steel gunshields are more protective, but they are "old". Maybe if we painted pictures of Brittney Spears' cleavage on tracks then Army Generals would suddenly rediscover the need for tracks?

Also notice the Army puts the "icing" enhancements on the BS platforms they favor: Strykers/HMMWVs not M113 Gavins to make them appear to be more capable than they are. They only grudgingly embrace the M1 heavy tank because they had their asses kicked in combat and need them. The preponderance of the Army budget is going to anything but its heavy tanks. As soon as the crisis in Iraq passes they will say the physically emasculated "future" will be soon here and retire all our heavy tanks ASAP. To help kill them they will keep 7 gallon per mile fuel hog turbine engines in them to have the ready made excuse to retire them. This is all about overgrown kids and the toys they want to play Army with (concepts) not what is required to win on the real NLB (threat driven). The IDF is upgrading both its M113 Gavin light and Merkava-3 heavy tanks for urban combat, why not the U.S. Army?

www.nationaldefensemagazine.org/article.cfm?Id=1487

National Defense, July 2004

Units Heading to Iraq Equipped With Upgraded Technology

by Roxana Tiron

The Army’s 3rd Infantry Division is preparing to return to Iraq with a number of new technologies designed for urban fighting.

Among them is an anti-sniper vehicle system that will be operated from a Humvee. It will be ready to deploy in late summer or early fall, according to John Dillon, an Army engineer working on the project.

The Army Aviation and Missile Command has outfitted an older Humvee with an acoustic sensor and a remote weapon station. “These two systems are highly integrated to produce a protective system,” Dillon said.

The original plan, Dillon said, was to equip up-armored Humvees with this anti-sniper kit in the United States, but because all the vehicles are in Iraq, the kit will be shipped there.

Another option, Dillon explained, would be to integrate the acoustic system onto the Stryker light armored vehicle, which already has the remote weapon system. The Stryker brigades have expressed interest in the acoustic sensor, Dillon told National Defense.

“They tested the Strykers with the acoustic sensors and they performed very well,” he said.

At first, only one kit will be sent to Iraq. Its performance in the field will determine the final numbers the troops will receive.

Another technology the 3rd ID will take to Iraq is the long-range advanced scout surveillance system, or LRAS3.

During the initial phase of the war last year, the Army did not have enough time to outfit all tanks with the system, said Maj. Thomas Lippert, from the office of the project manager for night vision and reconnaissance, surveillance and target acquisition. Several LRAS3 systems were issued to the 3rd ID in Kuwait and then handed over to the 1st Armored Division. The Stryker brigades already have the LRAS3, he said.

The Army changed its delivery schedule to outfit the tanks returning to Iraq, said Lippert. The LRAS3 consists of a second-generation forward-looking infrared with long-range optics, eye-safe laser rangefinder, a day video camera and a global positioning system with attitude determination.

“LRAS3 is a phenomenal thermal FLIR, which allows you to see in fog and sand,” said Lippert. “It is basically a far target locator.” LRAS3 also exports far target location coordinates to the Army’s unit-tracking system, the Force XXI Battle Command, Brigade-and-Below.

Meanwhile, the PM NV/RSTA is working on developing a “change-detection technology,” said Lippert, which allows soldiers to survey an area to determine if any changes occurred from previous surveillance.

The Army also is looking into sensors to detect improvised explosive devices and prevent explosions during convoy operations, as well as prevent bridges from blowing up, a source said.

Soldiers from the 3rd ID are asking for a driver’s vision enhancer on their M1A1 tanks. DVE is on the upgraded Abrams tank the M1A2, as well as the M1A2 SEP. The DVE is a thermal system that allows drivers to see through dust, smoke, haze and darkness.

Staff Sgt. Jared Hamilton, who fought in Iraq with the 3rd ID, said he is not very fond of the M1A2, even though it is more technologically advanced than the M1A1. “It has too much stuff that can break,” he said. Because of the 3rd ID’s busy schedule, it has not had the time to upgrade its M1A1 tanks.

The commander’s independent thermal viewer is a key element of the M1A2 SEP model. However, troops have expressed interest in having the viewer installed in the M1A1, even though the Army has no funds budgeted for the upgrade.

Meanwhile, Soldiers are pointing out easy fixes for the battle-tested M1A1 tank. “The external auxiliary power unit needs to be gotten rid off altogether,” said Hamilton. “They were always broken, because of lack of maintenance, plus they take way too much space.”

A bustle-rack extension at the back of the tank would be useful for soldiers to be able to keep more tools and carry them more securely, Hamilton said.

“The enemy is finding out that the rear end of the tank is exposed and vulnerable,” said Hamilton. For that, he suggested that the Army outfit its tanks with bolt-on armor for the back of the tank to protect it from rocket-propelled grenades. The add-on armor “would not affect the mobility of the tank, because the engine of the M1A1 can pull much more that what it pulls now,” he said.

The fire suppression system in the Abrams also needs improvement, said Hamilton. “Now we have three fire extinguishers inside the track and for how much fuel and ammunition this tank holds, something bigger would be better, possibly more fire extinguishing systems,” he suggested.

M1 Abrams crewman exposed behind .50 caliber HMG

In his opinion, a clear ballistic shield would be a useful technology to be installed on the tank’s .50 caliber gun and above the hatch so that the commander can leave it open.

M113 Gavin with TAGS

United Defense builds the transparent armored gun shield system, or TAGS, which offers protection against small arms.

A company representative said the 1st Armored Cavalry Regiment bought 900 systems to test. The system is built mainly for Humvees and tanks, but there is talk of using the shield on the Stryker [deathtrap] as well.

The Clash of Combat Power Factors: we forgot about Cost

Traditionally, when we look at a ground weapon system, we evaluate it it by its firepower, mobility and survivability. These three factors can also be used to look at any force structure as it physically clashes with the enemy's force structure. Certainly this is looking at war just materially and ignoring the human beings who actually operate weapons, but it takes a sound warfighting mentality + good weapons to win against other cunning humans. If we go to war with a "knife" to a "gunfight" we will not just lose physically we will soon see our human morale erode. This is exactly what is happening in the wheeled truck debacle in Iraq; where we have troops riding around in un or thinly armored wheeled trucks while the enemy explodes powerful bombs and shoots rocket propelled grenades and high-velocity assault rifle bullets into these rolling coffins for our men. When these wheeled trucks slow down and stop, the enemy has dropped and thrown firebombs and grenades into the passenger areas, shattering and incinerating our men inside. If our men chose to walk, they are easily picked off by smaller bombs and snipers.

How did we get to this sad state where we clearly are outmatched by a poor third-world country Iraqi enemy in terms of firepower, mobility and protection?

How we forgot about cost and how it now haunts us.

Cost should be the 4th aspect of combat power because all of our weapons and supplies to sustain them and our men "do not grow on trees": some civilian human here in the states has to make this stuff and they want to get paid so they can eat, pay rent and send their kids to college. In WWII, we had leaders who grasped the totality of the war situation we were in and made critical weapons systems decisions that were affordable to get us superiority on the battlefield. In Europe, we realized we needed thousands of tracked tanks and fighter-bomber airplanes to defeat the German Panzers who had a 3-year head start in development. We chose to build thousands of medium tanks rather than hundreds of more costly heavy tanks so we could field superior numbers on our march to Berlin. In the Pacific war against the Japanese infantry, we built escort aircraft carriers so we could out-swarm the Japanese aircraft carrier's aircraft and sank their supply ships with inexpensive submarines so their infantry cut-off starved. Cost as a factor determines how many war machines you can have, and on the still very large planet earth, size still matters as we battle for control of that earth.

However, after WWII, the all-out mass production and development of war machines stopped. We returned to a peacetime economy. With limited funds, whatever the military bought would have to last a long time and maintain its superiority over the enemy. Fortunately, we still had many WWII "Greatest Generation" minds on the job. Early in the Cold War, the U.S. created the world's first all armored, light tracked armored personnel carrier, the M113 at the behest of General James M. Gavin so ALL U.S. troops would be able to move freely over devastated nuclear battlefields. The M113 later earned its spurs in the jungles and rice paddies of Vietnam. The M551 Sheridan 17-ton light tank was also fielded in our very effective light mechanized, armored cavalry units. However, as time went on, without common-sense warfighting leaders like Gavin who wanted affordable functional platforms that could equip the entire force over unaffordable forms, the U.S. Army got caught up in an "arms race" of platform outward appearances. We adopted the late WWII German Army "Tiger Tank" desperation mentality of buying fewer regardless of cost, "super weapons" in terms of firepower, mobility and survivability to out-bluff the Soviets and spend their economic system into oblivion. However, as we did this we, forgot about cost as what determines force size, and how long we could sustain such forces in actual, not imaginary combat. We knew we couldn't out-produce the Soviet's medium tanks so we went in favor of platform quality. The Fulda Gap WWIII struggle against the Soviets was supposed to be decided in a few days at tops. So we built a 72-hours of combat Army with very heavy M1 Abrams defensive tank destroyers that could out-shoot enemy tanks and keep fighting even if hit by their main guns, backed by Bradley medium tanks shooting small caliber autocannons to destroy enemy BMP infantry carriers with a mini-squad of its own infantry security guards to protect from close-range RPG/ATGM attacks. This Cold War defensive force was arrayed linearly against the Soviets to the east in a WWII-style arrangement that allowed the Army to cut costs with the rest of the Army---the underclass of support troops---who would ride around in cheapo wheeled trucks with the expectation they wouldn't have to fight.

The Cold War ended and WWIII didn't happen with the collapse of the Soviet Union in the early 1990s. Tiny failed nation-state wars like Grenada, Panama and Somalia required the Army's 3D air-transportable M113/M551 tracked armored fighting vehicles which are much lighter than our medium M2s and heavy M1s; though large nation-state combat to liberate Kuwait required the latter for 2D overland maneuver. Despite the clear lessons from these small wars, after the Kosovo crisis in 1999, the Army absurdly decided to buy handfuls of 19-21 ton Canadian-made LAV-III re-named "Stryker" wheeled trucks less armored and mobile than the light tracks it already had, touting that they would have computers for situational awareness that would somehow excuse away their physical weakness. Some observers note the real motivation was to cut operating costs over heavy tracks with trucks by an Army expecting to only do humantarian reliefs not fight, but the huge purchase costs were not understood. To try to justify the huge purchase costs of Stryker trucks, the Army bragged about the computers they have inside when this "icing" had already been applied to the more affordable light tracked "cake" vehicles years before under Force 21 in the 4th Infantry Division. The Army tinkered stateside for 3 years trying to make overweight 19-21 ton Stryker trucks fly in 17-ton capable C-130 Hercules aircraft when Army commanders in Germany used 10.5 ton M113 Gavins and had a 3D air contingency, rapid-response NATO light mechanized "cavalry" force operational immediately.

However while the army squandered time & money on expensive handfuls of trucks, a new hot, World War IV against Islamic sub-national groups began on September 11, 2001 with the suicide airliner strikes at the WTC and Pentagon. The Army was forced to invade weak nation-states in Afghanistan and Iraq looking for hidden sub-national terror groups or weapons of mass destruction without the overwhelming size to create safe rear areas for its underclass Soldiers to drive around in wheeled trucks. Today's battlefield is now non-linear (NLB) where the enemy can attack in any direction at any time. But because the Army has neglected cost as a key factor along with firepower, mobility and protection, its failed to provide all of our troops the required physical means to fight.

While the Americans were creating a class-conscious, Army of "haves and have nots" with a blank checkbook, the third world enemy realizing that inexpensive, simple weapons would enable them to have more in the close fight against the first world western armies; all they needed to do is sucker us in to close fights where our more expensive weapons wouldn't have stand-off ranges to work. Our World War IV foes realize that if they hide amongst civilians in urban structures they will have more protection, and better mobility because they can move freely in all directions building-to-building amongst sympathetic populations, and have superior close-range firepower by mass produced RPGs, AKMs and land mines using plentiful explosives/artillery shells.

Weapons Cost = Force Size

After invading Iraq in 2003, the U.S. Army with its long-range, WWIII Cold War stand-off weaponry defeated the weak Iraqi nation-state Army followed by its underclass of support troops in trucks. However, the Army unlike in the small nations of Grenada, Panama and Haiti this time had to stay and secure a still-violent, very large country of 25,000,000 people in all directions with "the clock ticking" of how long the Iraqis would tolerate our presence. While we took over Saddam's palaces and kicked down Iraqi homes daily looking for the hiding former dictator, bypassed enemy pockets of resistance began blowing up our underclass Soldiers in their trucks exploiting the NLB. Now, a year later, we have over 700 dead, 3,000 wounded from the enemy's successful attacks which prove we cannot maintain the peace and the entire Iraqi populace now wants us gone. We still have over 134,000 troops riding around in over 10,000 HMMWV trucks in Iraq, at risk of being pinned down, their road supply lines cut and run out of Iraq. Yet Army leaders back in the safety of the Pentagon want to spend the preponderance of the Army budget on electronic gadgets for 600 thinly-armored Stryker trucks, buy another 300 Stryker trucks and spend $Billions on Future Combat System (FCS) lab work for more trucks to be bought 10 years from now at a likely unaffordable cost. The Army's current leaders think electronic gadgets will allow us to "cherry pick" where/when we will fight, when the enemy on the NLB has already shown repeatedly that our computer network awareness cannot stop him from successfully attacking us whenever he pleases because we cannot physically endure or stop him in wheeled trucks. Wasting money on computers and Canadian-made trucks is not "transformation" to decisively solve problems, this is "re-arranging the deck chairs on the Titanic". The Army's current leaders are criminally negligent for not facing the reality that the ENTIRE ARMY needs to change quickly to an egalitarian, all-teeth and no-tail outfit where everyone works and everybody fights to prevail against our WWIV enemies on the NLB fought primarily at close (under 1000 meters) ranges. The Army is funding its favorites while its troops are killed and maimed in Iraq. This means we must get ALL of our troops out of vulnerable rubber-tired wheeled trucks and into the most protective tracks we can afford to operate across-the-board by everyone in the Army. However, we do not have now---nor will ever likely have--a WWII-style war economy to mass produce brand-new vehicles (even if they were tracks) since President Bush and other civilian leaders refuse to formally declare war. We have to somehow immediately transform our Army within the constraints of a peacetime consumerist economy still in effect.

M113 Gavin light tracked ACAVs to the rescue!

If you examine the close-range NLB fight, the main threats are RPGs, land mines and bullets from assault rifles. To endure automatic weapons fire and not have American bodies pinned down and unable to move, you need an armored vehicle moving by tracks with gunshields when the troops are inside so they can fight out from them, and when our troops are on foot act as a moving shield. HMMWV and Stryker trucks will never be able to do this as close combat vehicles as both are easily knocked out by gasoline bombs setting fire to their 4 and 8 rubber tires, cannot rumble over barricaded cars or obstacles and take dozens of feet that will not be available in narrow streets to turn. Wheeled vehicles by design are 28% less weight/space efficient than tracks---we simply cannot afford to throw away 1/4 of our armor protection from the get-go by trying to make wheeled vehicles combat capable when they are patently unsound.

The miracle and only good news in all of this is that the world's greatest light tracked armored fighting vehicle of all time, ever--the 10.5 ton M113 Gavin was at one time mass-produced during the Cold War and non-linear Vietnam War when real bullets were killing thousands of Americans and armored mobility for everyone was demanded. At $22,000 each to build, we were able to put entire previously light and foot-mobile divisions into M113 Gavins that are 7.62mm AP bullet resistant overnight to prevail against enemy ("AK-47s") AKMs in Vietnam. There are thousands of Soldiers alive today in the 1st Infantry and 25th Light Infantry Divisions because we did this. However, after the Vietnam war, the Army reverted back to the frontal linear orientation for WWIII and began squandering all its monies on expensive medium/heavy tracked tanks to fight thousands of Soviet medium tanks and put its support underclass and rapid-response light infantry back into wheeled trucks. However a small miracle took place amidst all this decay, the Army could simply not afford--even in the Reagen era--to put all its combat units in medium-weight Bradleys, so thousands of M113 Gavins were up-engined into A3 models which are actually faster than Bradleys. This is a very good thing because 33-ton Bradleys do not swim and cannot fly by helicopters and C-130s; sometimes less vehicle is actually more. 50% of an Army heavy division now moves by M113 Gavins and there are still thousands in storage that could rapidly equip the ENTIRE ARMY to prevail on the NLB against automatic weapons fire. This is exactly what the IDF has done for years to win on NLBs with zero or very small casualties.

Furthermore, by the Army finally correctly factoring in COST efficiency into firepower, mobility, protection it can save $BILLIONS of dollars by not buying handfuls of Stryker trucks and instead use these monies to make thousands of baseline 7.62mm AP bullet resistant M113 Gavins, roadside bomb and RPG resistant as well with applique' armor panels. Thousands of up-armored M113 Gavins could re-equip the entire U.S. Army both heavy and light--to prevail against our enemies hiding deep in cities and inhabitable terrains exploiting its C-130 fixed-wing and helicopter rotary-wing 3D air transportability and 2D all-terrain tracked mobility. The monies from just one $1 BILLION dollar purchase of ($3.3 million each) 300 Stryker trucks would up-grade 2,000 M113A4 Gavin tracks to include a 1-man 30mm autocannon turret and a C4ISR package to do the network-centric style of warfare Army Generals want to do. 2,000 M113A4 Gavins would transform all of the Army's light infantry troops who walk now or ride in trucks. Instead of talking about FCS capabilities 10 years from now, we could have them now, today to help in the war on global terrorism today.

Rifle Grenades for everyone and a RPG in every Squad

When our troops fight on foot the current sickening situation where we are out-gunned by enemies with the explosive effects of RPGs must be fixed by our own troops being issued bullet-trap rifle grenades and a RPG launcher in every squad. Our infantry must be able to point and shoot and BLAST the enemy hiding behind urban building cover, not just empty bullets into walls. The lightweight (under 5 pounds), disposable M72 LAW 66mm rocket concept has morphed into 15 pound M136 "AT4" 84mm rockets that are too heavy and 30 inches long to be carried in large numbers to be mass explosive effects firepower for our infantry. Even if we re-introduced lightweight LAW rockets, the fact that they are disposable means no one before the battle is trained and has to shoot them annually to be quick and accurate with them. We need the minimalist re-usable rocket launcher possible in every rifle squad so RPG gunnery skills reach a high level of accuracy and lethality to kill the enemy hiding in buildings before he can send barrages of RPG rockets that are turning our vehicles into flaming coffins. Every Soldier needs rifle grenades, not just a handful of grenadiers who have to be in position to hit the enemy so we can blast fleeting targets as soon as they appear. We must no longer be fighting enemies with bullets and rockets with just bullets.

Gunshields for everyone: on our light tracks and our shoulder weapons

Despite our advances in optics, naked human eyesight is still far superior at detecting what's going on around you during the day time. Dropping down into your vehicle and looking out through any kind of optic is still second choice, and referred to as fighting "buttoned up". When enemy air bursts are encountered, driving under overpasses or being swarmed by enemy infantry buttoning up is a good capability. However, first choice is to fight head-out from an armored vehicle and be able to see the enemy first and hit him with effective fire using a gunshielded perch. We have known this since the 1963 battle of Ap Bac in Vietnam, yet the Army's M1s, M2s have no gunshields at all, and the gunshields available for M113 Gavins have not been fitted to all of them.

Its also time to realize that the men-against-automatic weapons fire paradigm first described by SLA Marshall can and must be solved. For the first time since vietnam, we have the ballistics protection technology to fit a small gunshield to the end of every Soldier's shoulder weapon to give him the minimalist front cover to prevail in a desperate fight against AKMs and RPGs. 7.62mm x 39mm AKM bullet protection can be had at 3 pounds per square foot. All we need is a square foot of gunshield on the end of our shoulder weapons to render our troops a decided advantage. Trying to stop his bullets at our chests with Interceptor body Armor is too late and sacrifices the face, neck, arms and legs which if hit can still immobilize our Soldiers if not kill them by massive arterial blood loss. Details:

www.geocities.com/combatreform.com/gunshield.htm

Summary/Conclusion: Fire + Mobility + Protection + Cost = Weapons Success

The basic reality that if your weapon system is too costly to equip your entire force its not a viable option seems to be lost on current Army leaders. The Stryker truck even if it was a worthwhile vehicle, (which it clearly is not) is not even affordable/feasible as a re-equipping option for even a significant part of the Army force. Furthermore, using up the majority of the Army budget on a handful of favorite toy brigades, 300 vehicles-per-year in an Army of 500,000 men that needs frankly 50,000 but at the very least 2,000 light tracked armored vehicles with important new capabilities NOW in a life or death fight against global terrorists is criminally negligent. There is only one way out of the current Army mess which includes possible strategic defeat in Iraq--is to rapidly upgrade its 13,000 M113 Gavin light tracks and save the day. Monies saved doing this will also get our men rifle grenades, RPGs, and gunshields to actually dominate the close fight instead of fighting the enemy out-numbered and outgunned.

Mike Sparks

Table of Contents Winning Cityfights 3 guidelines for victory Attack/Defend with tanks/infantry at the same time Do the unexpected JRTC Horror story: can't seize the DZ Light/Heavy Commander ignores sound advice PBS films event, reports wrong information Wiesel 1 AFVs and helos ignored MOUT village Soccer LZ undefended Missions of Urban Combat Team Foot assaults unwise Percy Hobart type vehicles needed M113 Gavin MOUT vertical assault vehicle Slide Harden Soldiers and Vehicles Infantry CAN ride on M1 heavy tanks Diagram from FM 7-8 Light Infantry in FMTV truck Better FMTV rear tail gate needed Harden the FMTV truck FMTV truck sandbagging and arming FM 90-5 Jungle Operations is guide Don't get killed in ambush!

Author: 1st Tactical Studies Group (Airborne) Email: itsg@hotmail.com Home Page: www.geocities.com/equipmentshop