Although imprisonment results in the loss or restriction of many rights and privileges, prisoners do retain certain rights (this basic principle is often repeated by the courts: e.g., Wolff v. McDonnell (1974) 418 U.S. 539, 555). The rights of California state prisoners are created by combination of the federal and state constitutions, state statues, CDC regulations, and court decisions. However, court cases interpreting the U.S. Constitution do not define rights prisoners have under state laws and administrative rules.

Although courts may not casually substitute their judgment for that of prison administrators, the "legitimate penological objective" standard of Turner v. Safley (1987) 482 U.S. 78 is "not toothless", and "deference does not mean abdication" (Thornburgh v. Abbott (1989) 490 U.S. 401, 414; Walker v. Sumner (9th Cir. 1990) 917 F.2d 382, 385), but rather requires courts to evaluate whether the security justifications proffered by prison officials are objectively reasonable in violating a prisoner's rights (see, e.g., Walker v. Sumner, supra, ["prison authorities cannot rely on general or conclusory assertions to support their policies"]; Reed v. Falkner (7th Cir. 1988) 842 F.2d 960, 963 [officials may not pile "conjecture upon conjecture" to justify infringement of constitutional rights]; Crofton v. Roe (9th Cir. 1999) 170 F.3d 957 [unsupported security claims couldn't justify infringement on First Amendment rights]).

In addition to California's statutes and constitution, California's prison authorities have created regulations that set forth more detailed rights for prisoners and rules that must be followed by prison officials. State statutes give the CDC director power to make such rules and regulations for the administration of its prisons (Calif. Penal Code § 5058). Prisoners have several important rights regarding these regulations, including the right to have the CDC follow its rules and to petition the courts for a declaration and order that "underground" rules are invalid and unenforceable.

It is well settled that an administrative regulation has the force of law and is binding on the issuing agency (see, United States v. Nixon (1974) 418 U.S. 683, 695-696; Atkins v. Rivera (1986) 477 U.S. 154; Agricultural Labor Relations Board v. Superior Court (1976) 16 Cal.3d 392, 401). In plain language, this means that the CDC must follow its own rules, which California courts have ordered even when the CDC preferred not to because of the benefits resulting to prisoners (see, In re Reina (1985) 171 Cal.App.3d 638; see also, In re French (1980) 106 Cal.App.3d 74, 85, n. 24 [stating that the CDC director's rules are binding on individual prisons]). In appropriate cases, courts have enforced CDC rules by finding that interpretation by prison officials of certain rules were arbitrary or had no reasonable basis (In re Carter (1988) 199 Cal.App.3d 271, 277).

WHAT I HAVE BEEN INFORMED AND BELIEVE REGARDING MY RIGHTS AND THE LAW IN RELATION TO MY STATUS AS A PRISONER WITH DISABILITY.

California law prohibits in prisons not only willful inhumanity and oppression but also cruel or unusual punishment toward prisoners (Calif. Penal Code H 147 & 673). It is also illegal for CDC employees to not only inflict any treatment or allow any lack of care whatever which would injure or impair a prisoner's health but also modify or cancel a CDC doctor's written order for particular medical treatment required to prevent serious and/or imminent harm to a prisoner's health (Calif. Penal Code §§ 2650, 2652, 2653(a), and 2653(b)).

In 1998, the U.S. Supreme Court held that the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 ("ADA") applies to prisoners (Pennsylvania Dept. of Corrections v. Yeskey (1998) 524 U.S. 206). Specifically, the Court held that Title II of the ADA -prohibiting a "public entity" from discriminating against a "qualified individual with a disability" on account of that individual's disability-- applies to inmates in state prisons (ibid.; ADA of 1990, 42 U.S.C. § 12131 et seq.).

Section Five of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. § 794 ("Section 504"), is the precursor to the ADA and provides identical protections against disability-based discrimination to those who come within its coverage. However, it applies only to public entities which receive federal funding. California state prisoners have successfully sued CDC under both the ADA and the Rehabilitation Act in Armstrong v. Davis (N.D. Cal.) C94-2307 CW (formerly Armstrong v. Wilson) and Clark v. California (N.D. Cal.) C96-1486 FMS.

As a result of a class-action lawsuit, CDC created a remedial plan to bring its prisons into compliance with the ADA (Armstrong v. Wilson, supra, Remedial Plan dated 11/30/98): see reported decisions on summary judgment motion at 942 F.Supp. 1252 (N.D. Cal. 1996) and 124 F.3d 1019 (9th Cir. 1997)). In addressing prisoners such as Petitioner who are protected under the ADA, the Armstrong Remedial Plan states CDC shall provide reasonable accommodations for known mental-health disabilities of prisoners (see, Plan, § II.E), with public safety and the health, safety, and security of all prisoners and staff remaining the overriding consideration (ibid., # 1). 

However, CDC is given provision to not accommodate, but only if it can prove that to do so would create an undue waste of public funds (ibid., # 2). The Armstrong plan further states that health-care needs shall take precedence over all other considerations in determining a prisoner's placement.

WHAT I HAVE BEEN INFORMED AND BELIEVE REGARDING MY RIGHTS AND THE LAW IN RELATION TO MY STATUS AS A PRISONER WITH A SERIOUS MENTAL-HEALTH CONDITION.

Prisoners have a constitutional right to, adequate mental-health care, with inadequate care constituting cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the U.S. Constitution's 8th Amendment (Estelle v. Gamble (1976) 429 U.S. 97; Hutchinson v. United States (9th Cir. 1988) 838 F.2d 390, 394). Although not every failure to provide competent or adequate care will amount to a constitutional violation, courts will find a constitutional violation where a prisoner can show that prison officials acted with "deliberate indifference to a serious medical need" (ibid., deliberate indifference can also occur with regard to mental-health care: see, e.g., Coleman v. Wilson (N.D. Cal. 1995) 912 F.Supp. 1282; Meriwether v. Faulkner (7th Cir. 1987) 821 F.2d 408, 413; Partridge v. Two Unknown Police Officers (5th Cir. 1986) 791 F.2d 1182, 1187).

Whether a particular course of treatment, or refusal to provide treatment, amounts to "deliberate indifference" generally turns upon the particular facts of a case (see, e.g., Sosebee v. Murphy (4th Cir. 1986) 797 F.2d 179; Jackson v. McKintosh (9th Cir. 1996) 90 F.3d 330; Wood v. Housewright (9th Cir. 1990) 900 F.2d 1332). First the prisoner must show the need was serious, including the existence of an injury that a reasonable doctor or patient would find important and worthy of comment or treatment; presence of a medical condition significantly affecting an individual's daily activities; or existence of chronic and substantial pain (McGuckin v. Smith (9th Cir. 1992) 974 F.2d 1050, 1059-1060; WMX Technologies, Inc. v. Miller (9th Cir. 1997) 104 F.3d 1113; Doty v. County of Lassen (9th Cir. 1994) 37 F.3d 540; Buckley v. Gomez (S.D. Cal. 1997) 36 F.Supp. 1216).

A prisoner may be able to prove deliberate indifference to a serious medical need when prison officials deny, delay, or interfere with treatment or where the prisoner receives improper medical care. Thus, to prove deliberate indifference, a prisoner need not necessarily show s/he was completely denied medical care (Ortiz v. City of Imperial (9th Cir. 1989) 884 F.2d 1312, 1314; see also, Lopez v. Smith (9th Cir. 2000) 203 F.3d 1122). One situation where courts generally will find deliberate indifference is when a doctor has made an order of recommendation and prison officials ignore, delay, or otherwise interfere with the order or recommendation (Young v. Harris (S.D. NY 1981) 509 F.Supp. 1111; and Johnson v. Harris (S.D. NY 1979) 479 F.Supp. 333; see also, Payne v. Lynaugh (5th Cir. 1988) 843 F.2d 177; Related is the rule that prison officials may not overrule a doctor's medical judgment regarding treatment [see, Tolbert v. Eyman (9th Cir. 1970) 434 F.2d 625]).

Failure on the part of prison officials or doctors to attend to the medical needs of a prisoner can constitute deliberate indifference (Duncan v. Duckworth (7th Cir. 1981) 644 F.2d 653; Loe v. Armistead (4th Cir. 1978) 582 F.2d 1291). So too do long delays in the face of recognized treatment, with multiple incidents of improper or delayed care increasing the likelihood that a court will find deliberate indifference (Hunt v. Dental Dept. (9th Cir. 1989) 865 F.2d 198; Todaro v. Ward (2nd Cir. 1977) 565 F.2d 48, 52).

In addition to the possibility of a medical malpractice action, California law specifically states that public employees such as prison staff are liable for injuries when an employee knows or has reason to know that the prisoner is in need of immediate medical care and fails to take reasonable action to summon such care (Gov't Code H 844.6(a) and 845.6; Lucas v. County of Los Angeles (1996) 47 Cal.App.4th 277).

Necessary and appropriate mental-health services are to be provided to California state prisoners, and adequate staff and facilities are to be maintained by CDC for the delivery of such services (CCR15 § 3360(a)). All required mental-health treatment for prisoners is to be provided under supervision of a psychiatrist licensed to practice in California or a licensed California psychologist who holds a doctoral degree with at least two years of experience (CCR15 § 3361(a)). Treatment is to be in accord with sound principles of practice and not to serve a punitive purpose (CCR15 § 3361(c)).

In a recent class-action lawsuit, a federal court ordered California prison officials to create a mental-health-care program to provide adequate care to every prisoner who has a serious mental-health condition (Coleman v. Wilson (E.D. Cal. 1995) 912 F.Supp. 1282). A Special Master was appointed to monitor health care at each of CDC's prisons.

Treatment and monitoring is provided to any prisoner who has a current diagnosis for certain serious mental-health conditions, including all major depressive disorders, bipolar disorders (manic depression), schizophrenia, delusional disorders, and all psychotic disorders (see, CDC Mental Health Services Delivery System Program Guides, at 1-3 & 1-4). Treatment is also provided for any other prisoners diagnosed with or suspected of having any mental-health disorder if "necessary to protect life and/or treat significant disability [or] dysfunctionality."

The Correctional Clinical Case Management System (CCCMS) is the level of care for most prisoners with mental-health conditions. CCCMS patients with symptoms able to be moderated or partially in remission are generally able to function in a normal prison environment. Every CCCMS patient is assigned a clinical case manager who must meet with the prisoner at least once every 90 days. Each CCCMS patient mast also have a "treatment plan" which sets treatment goals and objectives and determines appropriate activities and programs for the prisoner. Some CCCMS patients should receive individual or group therapy.

Eric Charles Rodney K'Napp