NOTES
1 In the regional hierarchy of the Soviet Union, the highest units were the 15 Republics of the Union, which had the theoretical right to withdraw from the union. Immediately under these were the Autonomous Republics, with a higher degree of autonomy than the autonomous Oblasts, or regions.
2 This policy of Stalin’s is clear if one observes the national delimitations in the Caucasus. An example is the regions of Karachay-Cherkessia and Kabardino-Balkaria. It seems, indeed, as the delimitation is designed purely to cause dissent in the regions that would enable Russia to control the regions. Karachays and Balkars are in fact in most respects one people speaking the same Turkic language; similarly Kabardins and Cherkess are both Circassian peoples. Thus the result of the national delimitation is that both regions include two titular nationalities without ethno-linguistic affinities, which have mutual prejudices and historical antagonisms against each other. For an overview of the subject, see Pustilnik, Marina, "Caucasian Stresses", in Transition, 15 March 1995, pp. 16-18, or Smeets, Rieks, "Circassia", in Central Asian Survey, nr. 1, 1995.
3 See Suzanne Goldenberg, Pride of Small Nations, p. 159, or Cullen, Robert, "A Reporter at Large", in The New Yorker, 15 April 1991.
4 For an overview of the population distribution of Nagorno Karabakh and Nakhichevan between 1959 and 1979, see Alexandre Bennigsen and S. Enders Wimbush, Muslims of the Soviet Empire. London: Hurst & Co., 1985.
5 See Stéphane Yérasimos’ excellent article "Caucase: Le Retour de la Russie", in Politique Internationale, nr. 1, 1994.
6 Certain analysts have tried to prove that the Azeri-Armenian conflict was initiated by the authorities in Moscow in as a part of a policy of ‘divide and rule’ in the Transcaucasus, as they felt that the region was getting out of their control. Moscow’s support for the Abkhazian separatists in Georgia is well documented. For an overview of the subject, see Igor Nolyain, "Moscow’s Initiation of the Azeri-Armenian Conflict", in Central Asian Survey, v.4 n.13, 1994.
7 Quoted in Stéphane Yérasimos, "Caucase: Le Retour de la Russie".
8 See Robert Cullen, "A Reporter at Large", in The New Yorker (Magazine), 15 April 1991.1/1994.
9 For an account of the outbreak of the conflict, see Mark Saroyan, ‘The "Karabakh Syndrome" and Azerbaijani Politics’, in Problems of Communism, September/October 1990. For a more recent assessment, see also Arie Vaserman and Rami Ginat, "National, Territorial or Religious Conflict? The Case of Nagorno-Karabakh", in Studies in Conflict and Terrorism, 4/1994.
10 The claim of the Karabakh Soviet was based upon Article 70 of the Soviet Constitution, which affirms the right of peoples to self-determination. However, the claim was rejected on the basis of Article 78, which states that ‘territory may be altered only by mutual agreement of the concerned republics, and subject to the ratification by the USSR. The legal aspect of the issue is further discussed in the second part of the article.
11 See Cullen, "A Reporter at Large".
12 Armenian National Committee of America press release, March 31, 1994, as quoted in Human Rights Watch / Helsinki, Azerbaijan: Seven Years of Conflict in Nagorno-Karabakh, New York: Human rights Watch, 1994.
13 For further information and a complete and impartial assessment of the conflict, see Human Rights Watch/ Helsinki, Azerbaijan: Seven Years of Conflict in Nagorno-Karabakh.
14 Ibid., p. 77
15 For Abkhazia, see John Colarusso, "Abkhazia", in Central Asian Survey, nr. 1, 1995; for South Ossetia, see Birch, Julian, "Ossetia: A Caucasian Bosnia in Microcosm", in Central Asian Survey, nr. 1, 1995. For a general overview of Russia’s divide and rule policy in the Caucasus, see Svante E. Cornell, Small Nations and Great Powers - A Study of Ethnopolitical Conflict in the Caucasus, to be published in 1997.
16 See the magazine Neft Rossii (oil of Russia), 1(4), 1995; and Salih Aliev, Oil and Independence, paper presented at the international conference on the Caucasus and Central Asia, Bilkent University, Ankara, May 1995.
17 Few works have been written on Iran’s policy; nevertheless, see Ahmed Hashim, The Crisis of the Iranian State, Adelphi paper no. 296, p. 41-43.
18 See Dilip Hiro, Between Marx and Muhammad - The Changing Face of Central Asia, London: Harper-Collins, 1994, p. 293.
19 See Dilip Hiro, "The Azerbaijan Question", in The Nation, 14 September 1992.
20 See Foreign Broadcast Information Service, Western Europe series (Hereafter FBIS-WE), 5 March 1992, p. 43, quoting news agency Anatolia.
21 FBIS-WE, 16 March p. 2, quoting Ankara TRT television network.
22 FBIS-WE, 13 March 1992, p. 14, quoting Türkiye Radyolarï.
23 FBIS-WE, 3 March 1992 p. 39, quoting Ankara TRT television network.
24 See U.N. General Assembly Resolution on "Emergency International Assistance to Refugees and Displaced Persons in Azerbaijan" , November 19, 1993.
25 U.N. Security Council, Resolution 884 of November 11th, 1993.
26 Conference held by Papazyan at the Foreign Policy institute in Stockholm, in February 1996. The question was asked by the author, following Papazyan’s claim that Armenia considers Nagorno Karabakh a separate territorial entity.
27 See International Herald Tribune, 20 September 1996, "Enclave Builds a Lifeline Out of Azerbaijan".
28 U.N. General Assembly, resolution 2625 adopted on October 24, 1970.
29 Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, Charter of Paris for a New Europe: Paris, 1990.
30 See Human Rights Watch / Helsinki, Azerbaijan: Seven Years of Conflict in Nagorno-Karabakh.