The St. Louis Cardinals' Front Office: Five Steps to Critical Thinking
Above: Cardinals chairman of the board Bill DeWitt Jr. (left) and president Mark Lamping address questions about Walt Jocketty's firing.
The Five Steps to Critical Thinking
1. Know the Facts
2. Remember the Principle of Contradiction
3. Define the Terms
4. Be Intellectually Humble
5. Seek Different Perspectives
Good critical thinking skills are vital to any business that needs to make an important decision. The St. Louis Cardinals' front office made an important decision on October 4, 2007, when they fired GM Walt Jocketty. By examining different aspects of the decision, one can deduce whether the Cardinals' front office took the five steps to critical thinking in making its decision.
1. The Cardinals Front Office Knew the Facts.
Owner Bill DeWitt and the Cardinals front office certainly knew the facts - after all, this is the most basic part of their job, and they demonstrated that they knew the facts in their press conference. Here they are, as best as I can tell:
-Walt Jocketty had had a successful 13-year tenure to the point of the decision. After taking over a franchise that had not made the playoffs since 1987 and drew just 24,570 fans per game in 1995, his 1996 team fell just one win short of the World Series. He proceeded to attract national attention for the Cardinals by trading for Mark McGwire in a lopsided deal with the Oakland A's. Armed with a larger payroll, his Cardinals won the NL Central six times from 2000 to 2006, making two World Series and winning one, in 2006. In each year during that span, the Cardinals amassed over 2,900,000 fans, topping 3,400,000 in 2005 and 2006. Jocketty was also selected as Major League Executive of the Year in 2000 and 2004.
-Despite this long-term success, the team has deteriorated since its 100-win 2005 season. The Cardinals' flaws were largely ignored after the team snuck into the 2006 playoffs thanks to a weak NL Central division. However, the Cardinals' critical flaws were exposed in 2007. A season-ending injury to Chris Carpenter and the failure of Mark Mulder to regain his All-Star form exposed a serious lack of starting pitching depth. Just as important was the fact that the Cardinals were getting old. Jim Edmonds and Scott Rolen struggled to stay healthy, leaving the team without legitimate protection for superstar Albert Pujols, who drove in just 103 runs, the lowest total of his career. The Cardinals were forced to try to make do with these flaws, as they lacked minor league prospects to trade for pitching or hitting help.
-In an effort to bolster the organization's thin farm system, DeWitt initiated an overhaul in player scouting and development before the 2007 season. He promoted Jeff Luhnow, whose emphasis on evaluating players using sabermetrics clashed with Jocketty's old-school approach. DeWitt admitted that "To say (Jocketty) was not 100 percent happy would certainly be accurate." Furthermore, Jocketty's unwillingness to shed expensive veterans and rebuild the roster around Pujols caused a rift in the front office.
2. The Cardinals' Front Office Remembered the Principle of Contradiction.
Knowing the above facts, the front office judged that either Jocketty or Luhnow would have to go - they could not coexist. Cardinals President Mark Lamping asserted, "A division within baseball operations continuing without a common purpose just doesn't work." Thus the Cardinals knew that they would have to make a clear decision.
3. The Cardinals' Front Office Defined Their Terms.
In evaluating the team's decline, the front office was faced with a distinction to make: who was to blame for the decline: the people who decide the games on the field (the players, coaches, and manager), the person who assembles the playes (Jocketty), or the group that restricts the GM's spending power (the front office). In firing Jocketty (and not LaRussa or DeWitt/Lamping), the Cardinals' front office is declaring that they feel Jocketty had ample resources to try to improve the team's age and performance on the field. Furthermore, by firing a proven GM, the front office is making a bold statement - that they believe Jocketty's past success will not translate into future triumphs. While the truth of these judgments will never be known, the Cardinals' front office defined the basis for its decision.
4. The Cardinals' Front Office Was Intellectually Humble.
They realized that whatever they decided, they could not be sure right away whether they were correct or not. DeWitt stated, "You never know what the repercussions of making a change are." Also, the front office realizes that ultimately, fans of the team will evaluate their decision in terms of the team's success on the field. As evidenced by the franchise's early 1990's struggles, a losing record causes fans to lose interest in the team, thus lowering the amount of money available to the team.
5. It Is Unclear Whether or Not the Cardinals' Front Office Sought Enough Different Perspectives.
This is the tricky step. Lamping and DeWitt did not make this decision on impulse - if they did, Jocketty would have been fired at least a year ago, when the organization became divided between him and Luhnow. It is also a reasonable assumption that Mark Lamping and Bill DeWitt sought advice from their advisors within the front office. However, the front office did not consult Tony LaRussa before making the decision. "We didn't get into (LaRussa's) opinion about who we should hire or whether we should have kept (Jocketty)," DeWitt said. "Tony knew a decision had been made." The team's negligence in consulting LaRussa hints that they don't consider it essential that he or pitching coach Dave Duncan, both closely tied and loyal to Jocketty, return next season. Furthermore, it is doubtful that the Cardinals' Front Office consulted other franchises' front offices. Jocketty's successful turnaround with the Cardinals makes him an attractive candidate for teams currently floundering and in need of a quality GM. Therefore, teams in need of a GM would likely encourage DeWitt and Lamping to let go of Jocketty. Also, teams not in need of a GM would have distorted opinions - the New York Yankees, for example, would not want the Tampa Bay Devil Rays (a struggling franchise with plenty of talent) to land Jocketty, and would discourage the Cardinals from firing him.
Verdict
The Cardinals' front office took four of the five steps to good critical thinking in deciding to fire Walt Jocketty. Admittedly, taking the fifth step is difficult for any business - consulting competitors would mean trusting that they will give an unbiased opinion, a leap of faith car rental companies and baseball franchises have struggled to make. There are other ways of seeking other perspectives - asking former club presidents, for example - and many teams' front offices are perfectly capable of making good decisions without consulting other sources. However, the club would have been wise to ask for LaRussa and Duncan's opinions. It is certainly possible that the two coaches will follow Jocketty to another organization. If this were to happen, the Cardinals would be left without a proven GM and a Hall of Fame manager/pitching coach duo.
This oversight notwithstanding, it appears that the Cardinals' front office took the necessary steps to make sure they were prepared to make a good decision regarding the club's direction. No matter what the repercussions of this decision turn out to be - even if, for example, Jocketty, LaRussa, and Duncan join the Cubs and win a World Series in their first year - it is clear that the Cardinals' front office has acted for what it thinks is the best interest of the organization. The consequences of the decision depend on the third step - whether or not the terms the front office defined were suitable.
2. The Cardinals' Front Office Remembered the Principle of Contradiction.
