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The U.S./Mexican Border Has Become a Sieve of Death - and needs U.S. Soldiers

US Army Off Course (pdf) - Colonel Macgregor's remarks to Congress

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Prisoners of War and War Crimes - official U.S. Army history in Vietnam 

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The Politics of Contracting - legal kickbacks and

Osprey or Albatross - the V-22 scandal

How to Lose the War on Terrorism - expert thoughts

Unlearned lessons from Waziristan - unrest in Pakistan

South Asia Terrorism Review - a good source

Saddam's people are winning the war - by Scott Ritter

Ten Mistakes History will Record About the War in Iraq (pdf)  - General Zinni's scorecard

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Transforming National Defense

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2005 Base Closures- likely closures

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NY Times: Army tracks prevail in Najaf, marines on foot and wheels fail

www.nytimes.com/2004/08/29/weekinreview/29bere.html

Fighting the Old-Fashioned Way in Najaf

On the streets of Najaf, the lightly armored marines proved more vulnerable and less effective than the Army, which overwhelmed the enemy with tanks and other armor.

By ALEX BERENSON

Published: August 29, 2004

AJAF, Iraq — The marines fought hard in the battle of Najaf, but the Army's role proved decisive. At stake is more than bragging rights. The success of the Army's tanks on the city's narrow streets in the last three weeks casts a new light on efforts to transform the Army by weaning it from the heavy armored vehicles that are a traditional mainstay.

The proponents of this transformation have pushed the Army to become more flexible and fleeter. They argue that lightly armed Soldiers, provided with real-time information about enemy movements and supported by precision air power, can replace heavy armor, especially against enemies who lack their own.

"We can use precision weapons, in the form of bombs dropped by aircraft, in the form of snipers," said Andrew Krepinevich, executive director of the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, which studies defense issues. "Precision allows you to do more with less."

But the Najaf battle, which involved some of the heaviest urban combat the American military has seen since Vietnam, may offer a different lesson, according to some experts. Commanders and front-line Soldiers say that the Army's tanks and Bradley fighting vehicles reduced American casualties while demoralizing the insurgents, who could not stop the heavy armor. A cease-fire Thursday ended the fight, but by then tanks and Bradleys had closed to within 100 yards of the Imam Ali shrine, where the insurgents were based.

The Pentagon should heed Najaf's lessons, said Douglas Macgregor, a former colonel and the most outspoken of a small band of military veterans who believe replacing tanks with lighter forces is misguided.

Col. Macgregor, a former Army Ranger and Gulf War commander who retired in June from the National Defense University, acknowledges that he is not well liked at senior levels of the Pentagon. He said his critics overestimate air power in a rapidly changing battle and underestimate the lives saved by armor.

"The easiest thing to harm or kill is a human being with a rifle," he said.

In fact, in April the Army and marines rushed dozens of tanks and armored personnel carriers to Iraq because they were needed to fight the insurgency, which killed well over 100 American troops that month.

But Carl Conetta, director of the Project on Defense Alternatives, a Boston-based research group, said that he and most other supporters of transformation, who include Defense Secretary Donald H. Rumsfeld, have never argued that the Army should eliminate tanks. The question, he said, is how to build a more balanced force.

"You need the tanks - you just might not need that many," he said, noting that they are heavy, hard to maintain and consume huge amounts of fuel.

Moreover, the urban warfare in Najaf is only one kind of combat, Mr. Krepinevich said. The advantages tanks have shown here do not "mean that transformation isn't valuable," he said.

The battle for Najaf began on Aug. 5, with American forces fighting guerrillas loyal to the Shiite cleric Moktada al-Sadr. Najaf's old city, with narrow, easily mined streets and buildings that allow guerrillas to fire down on tanks, is in theory dangerous terrain for armored vehicles and better suited to fighting on foot.

Yet in Najaf, two battalions of the Army's tanks did what a lighter marine battalion could not, inflicting huge casualties on Mr. Sadr's insurgents while taking almost none of their own. The 70-ton tanks and 25-ton Bradleys pushed to the gates of the Imam Ali shrine at the center of the old city. Meanwhile, the marines spent most of the fight raiding buildings far from the old city. Even so, seven marines died, and at least 30 were seriously wounded, according to commanders here, while only two Soldiers died and a handful were injured.

The difference the armor made was obvious to Soldiers on the ground. "You spot an enemy in a building, you don't want to send guys in, you use Bradleys and tanks," said Specialist Marquis Harrell of the Second Battalion, Seventh Cavalry. "We're glad to have 'em."

Military commanders here say they were somewhat surprised by the tanks' success.

"They myth that we've proven false is that heavy forces can't operate in an urban environment that in the past has been considered a light-fighter environment," said Lt. Col. Myles Miyamasu, commander of the First Battalion, Fifth Cavalry, which fought north of the shrine. Colonel Miyamasu emphasized that he was not trying to play down the contribution of the marines.

The marines have barred their commanders here from talking on the record. But some officers admit privately that armor made the difference in the fight. When the marines finally entered the old city Tuesday night, they took four tanks, their only heavy armor, and borrowed several Bradleys from the Army.

The marines traditionally try to integrate overwhelming air power with light infantry, the same doctrine that the advocates of the military's transformation say the Army should adopt. In theory, airstrikes can be carried out very quickly, once approved at headquarters. But aircraft are not always available, and concerns about civilian casualties can slow the approval process. In Najaf, the approval often took hours, and in that time American forces faced mortars and snipers.

The transformation idea is relatively new, and its biggest proponents are often civilian experts. But commanders and Soldiers also like the idea of light infantry and fighting the enemy face to face. As a Soldier in the armored First Battalion, Fifth Cavalry, said on Friday, the gung-ho aggressiveness of the marines and the Army's light infantry "is a lot more fun than this."

But the Army should always be ready to use armor, even against lightly armed guerrillas, Colonel Macgregor said. "The idea in war is to crush your enemy," he said. "If you're in a fight with a fly, use a baseball bat."

WINNING BATTLES, NOT HEARTS

By Edward Bernard Glick

Jerusalem Post

www.washingtontimes.com/op-ed/20040826-084258-5644r.htm

-----------------------------------------------------------

Events in both Israel and Iraq prove that the winning-hearts-and-minds approach to ending wars and insurrections has the same success rate as getting rain by praying for it. If it were indeed the key to victory, armies would have exchanged their weapons for public-relations kits ages ago.

The ancient Persians conquered the Babylonians, and the Greeks the Persians, and the Romans the Greeks, and the Turks the Byzantines, and the British the Turks not by capturing their hearts and minds, but by overwhelming them with so much might that they lost their will to fight and surrendered.

Swords, not sermons, swept Islam quickly from the Middle East to Africa and the Far East. Swords, not sermons, enabled King Ferdinand and Queen Isabella to rid Spain of 700 years of Moorish rule. And it was swords, not sermons, that stopped the Muslims at the gates of Vienna.

During the Revolutionary War, Great Britain's King George III did not relinquish his American colonies because Gen. George Washington had somehow won his mind and heart. Similarly, England's Duke of Wellington didn't prevail at the Battle of Waterloo because he won the heart and mind of France's Napoleon Bonaparte.

And the South didn't surrender and end the American Civil War because Union General Ulysses S. Grant won the hearts and minds of General Robert E. Lee and his Confederate troops.

Nor did the Allied powers vanquish the Axis powers in 1945 because their brilliant propaganda and psychological warfare tactics captured the latter's hearts and minds. Germany and Italy surrendered because they knew in their brains and their bowels that they had been beaten by slow, sustained and superior force, applied over a number of very bloody years.

And the Empire of Japan surrendered not because U.S. Navy Capt. (later admiral) Ellis Zacharias, a specialist in intelligence and psychological operations, was able to broadcast our surrender terms in fluent Japanese, but because Japan already had taken the measure of America's atom bomb.

In 1970, Canada presented an excellent, if forgotten, example of force prevailing over hearts and minds.

French Canadian terrorist separatists had kidnapped James Cross, the British trade commissioner, and Pierre Laporte, Quebec's minister of labor. They later murdered Laporte. Instead of trying to win their hearts and minds, Prime Minister Pierre Elliott Trudeau, himself a French Canadian, got parliament to proclaim a War Measures Act and suspend Canadian civil liberties.

Then he ordered Canadian troops and mounties to search the streets of Quebec house by house. They arrested 500 people and crushed the terrorists.

The Cold War did not end in the 1980s because Voice of America broadcasts or State Department exchange programs eventually got to the hearts and minds of the Soviet people. It ended because the Kremlin leadership finally realized that President Ronald Reagan, with the backing of most of the American people, was ready to use all means, including economic strangulation and military prowess, to end Communist domination of Eastern and Central Europe.

On the other hand, since the Korean War was at best a draw, and the United States did not win in Vietnam, many Americans no longer accept war as part of the human condition. So they seek to appease with nonmilitary approaches enemies who cannot be appeased.

Neither can these Americans fathom that when a nation does go to war, it is entirely proper, as U.S. President Franklin Delano Roosevelt and British Prime Minister Winston Churchill knew so well, for it to sacrifice one in order to save 10, 10 to save hundreds, hundreds to save thousands, and thousands to save millions.

Islam does not look kindly upon infidels who lose. So the issue confronting Israel and the United States is not whether one is pro-Bush or anti-Bush, pro-Sharon or anti-Sharon, for or against the invasion of Iraq, or for or against Israel's leaving the Gaza Strip unilaterally. The issue is how can the United States and Israel defeat their foes?

The Ba'athists and the jihadists will not stop fighting the Great Satan because they have been made to like, respect or fear the United States. They will stop fighting only when they are convinced that America's Vietnam trauma is over and that America is once again willing and able to use crushing force.

And Israel, the Little Satan, will prevail over its existential enemies only when it realizes that in order to survive it must fight by the rules of the neighborhood in which it lives.

In short, America's and Israel's struggles will end favorably only if they follow Churchill's dictum: "Victory at all costs, victory in spite of all terror, victory however long and hard the road may be; for without victory there is no survival."

-- Edward Bernard Glick is professor emeritus of political science at Temple University and author of "Peaceful Conflict and Soldiers, Scholars, and Society." This article is reprinted from the Jerusalem Post.

www.usatoday.com/printedition/news/20040823/1a_cover23.art.htm

Page 1A

Insurgents showing no sign of letting up U.S. officers say attacks may continue for years

By Jim Michaels and Charles Crain
USA TODAY

BAGHDAD — Nearly two months after the establishment of a sovereign Iraqi government, the violent attacks on U.S. and Iraqi forces show no sign of flagging.

A USA TODAY database and analysis of unclassified U.S. government security reports, show attacks against U.S. and allied forces have averaged 49 a day since the hand-over of sovereignty June 28, compared with 52 a day in the four weeks leading up to the transfer.

Iraqi guerrillas are relying heavily on weapons that allow them to attack and then slip away, such as roadside bombs and mortars. In June and July, U.S. and Iraqi forces were attacked with 759 roadside bombs and uncovered at least 400 others before they exploded.

U.S. officials had said they expected the attacks to drop as Iraqis re-established control over their country. Their thinking: Iraqi security forces would be better at gathering intelligence, and support for militants would erode because insurgents would be attacking Iraqis rather than U.S. occupation forces.

The officials still hold that view. But U.S. officers say the continuing attacks suggest that it will take time, possibly years, to crush the insurgency. President Bush and Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld have said U.S. forces will stay in Iraq as long as they are needed to assist Iraqi security forces. Iraqi forces are not yet trained and equipped to the point where they can assume responsibility for the country's security.

And insurgents — be they former members of Saddam Hussein's regime, criminals or Islamic fundamentalists — remain entrenched. While most attention has been focused on the showdown in Najaf between followers of radical cleric Muqtada al-Sadr and the new Iraqi government, data show the insurgency is a stubborn and continuing phenomenon throughout the country.

“If we have the political will and stamina to stay, I could see this going on for 10 years,” says Randolph Gangle, a retired officer who heads the Marine Corps' Center for Emerging Threats and Opportunities in Quantico, Va.

Guerrilla war

The USA TODAY database shows a guerrilla war in which insurgents have kept up relentless hit-and-run attacks on U.S. forces:

•Roadside bombs, which the military calls “improvised explosive devices,” remain the insurgents' weapon of choice. Mostly rigged from artillery shells, these bombs can be triggered from a distance by militants who can then quickly escape. The bombs are deadly. Half of the Army's 24 deaths from hostile action in July were attributed to roadside bombs. The marines generally do not describe the specific cause of hostile-fire deaths.

Militants have become more innovative in devising the bombs. They are using cellphones and wireless garage-door openers to detonate the explosives. A military task force is investigating technology, training and tactics to counter the increasingly ubiquitous roadside bombs.

•Though generally not very accurate, mortars and rocket attacks are common. Mortars, some of them homemade, can be carried in the trunk of a car, set up quickly and aimed at U.S. positions. Militants often can drive off before their positions can be pinpointed. In July, there were 468 mortar and rocket attacks. Of the Army's 24 combat deaths in July, seven were from rocket or mortar fire.

•Attacks are concentrated in the “Sunni Triangle” area north and west of Baghdad and in Shiite Muslim strongholds in Najaf and other southern cities. But violence is common in almost every part of the country, with the exception of Kurdish-controlled areas in the north. There were 880 attacks reported in Baghdad, a city of about 5 million, in June and July. They represented about 30% of the total attacks. In Mosul, Iraq's third-largest city, 244 attacks were reported during the same period.

•Militants regularly fire on U.S. airplanes and helicopters. In July, there were 15 such attacks, mostly with rifle fire and rocket-propelled grenades. But militants also have access to more dangerous surface-to-air missiles and anti-aircraft guns.

“No one is underestimating our opponents,” says marine Brig. Gen. Robert Neller, director of the operations division at marine corps headquarters. “These guys are adaptive. They learn. They are creative.”

Hit-and-run tactics

Insurgent violence peaked in April, when 126 American troops were killed in action in Iraq. The month was chaotic: marines launched an offensive in the Sunni Muslim stronghold of Fallujah, west of Baghdad, and the Army battled followers of al-Sadr in the southern city of Najaf and other predominantly Shiite areas.

The pace of attacks since April is lower but has remained mostly steady.

U.S. officers say the insurgents generally use classic guerrilla hit-and-run tactics and avoid direct confrontation with American troops and firepower.

When insurgents have taken on U.S. forces directly, such as the al-Sadr rebellion in Najaf this month and earlier insurgent attacks in Fallujah and Ramadi, the battles have been costly to the guerrillas.

“Every time they stand and fight, they die,” says marine Col. Larry Brown, who recently returned from Iraq, where he served as operations officer for the 1st marine expeditionary force, based outside Fallujah. “Their survival tactic is sniping around the edges.”

Insurgents have settled on roadside bombs, mortars and rockets because they can attack and run.

The nearly limitless availability of weapons in Iraq has made these tactics deadlier than in previous guerrilla wars. Militants raid military ammunition dumps or use weapons looted from bases abandoned by Iraqi forces after the collapse of the regime in April 2003.

The forces fighting the insurgents find these pinprick attacks frustrating. “We can't see the enemy,” Iraqi National Guard Brig. Gen. Mudhir Mawla Abbood says. “They see us, but we can't see them.”

No ‘pressure point' to hit

The fight against the Iraqi insurgency differs from other guerrilla wars. There is no single cause driving the fighters, nor is there a unified leadership. Making the situation even more complex, the insurgency includes multiple groups with differing goals and motives. Sometimes they fight together; other times they fight among themselves.

Insurgents include former members of Saddam's Baath Party and ex-military officers who want to return to power, religious extremists who want Islamic rule, foreign fighters who want to hurt the United States and criminals motivated by money.

“Here you have a whole hodgepodge of differing groups,” Gangle says. He recently returned from Iraq, where he conducted research to update the Small Wars Manual, the marine corps' counterinsurgency bible.

That diversity makes quashing the violence difficult. There is no way to attack the nerve center of Iraq's multifaceted insurgency.

Saddam's capture in December was followed by a temporary drop in attacks. That led U.S. officers to believe that the ousted dictator had been inspiring, if not controlling, the fighters. His capture sparked hopes that the insurgency was in permanent decline.

Now U.S. officials are focusing on Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, a Jordanian-born militant suspected of having ties to al-Qaeda.

Zarqawi is believed to be behind many of the more spectacular attacks, assassinations and kidnappings in Iraq. But even his capture might not have a dramatic effect on the violence because there are so many guerrilla cells with different leaders and different motives.

“It is not classical guerrilla warfare in the sense there is no one in charge of it,” Brown says. “There is no pressure point. … There is no rebel leader that you would find in a Central American guerrilla war.”

Building Iraqi capability

One key to U.S. strategy remains rebuilding Iraq's security forces and turning over responsibility for security to the Iraqi army, National Guard, police and other security forces.

But until that happens, American troops remain in the line of fire. U.S. forces in Iraq, which number about 140,000, are conducting 12,000 patrols per week, though many now are joint operations with Iraqi troops.

In July, 43 U.S. troops were killed by hostile fire, up from 37 in June. In the first weeks of August, about 34 U.S. forces were killed in action, bringing the total to at least 599 combat deaths since May 1, 2003, when President Bush declared major combat operations over.

Rumsfeld said recently that the number of properly trained and equipped Iraqi troops is about 100,000, not 206,000 as had been widely reported. Rumsfeld said the larger number that had been cited included individuals who are poorly equipped or trained, have left the force or died.

In April, an Iraqi army battalion balked when told it would be sent to quell violence in Fallujah. And civil-defense forces in Fallujah melted away when the fighting started there.

U.S. officers say the problem at the time was that security forces were hastily put together. Quality was sacrificed in the interest of building the size of the forces quickly. Many recruits had no formal military training before donning a uniform.

Soldiers and police are now receiving more training, and many of the poorly disciplined troops who were recruited earlier have left.

“There's been a turnover,” says Army Col. Gerald Simmons, an adviser to the Iraqi National Guard's 40th Brigade. “After the March-April incident (in Fallujah), we found out who wanted to be an ING (Iraqi National Guard) soldier and who didn't.”

In recent weeks Iraqi police have stood up to militants in fighting in Najaf, Mosul and elsewhere. U.S. officials say there are signs that Iraqi forces have taken on more responsibility since the June 28 hand-over. And increasingly, Iraqi forces are coming under attack. More than 700 Iraqi police have been killed since the fall of Saddam's regime.

Progress evident in Iraqi forces

Before the hand-over, Army 2nd Lt. Fernando Medina, a platoon leader with the 2nd Battalion, 8th Cavalry Regiment, patrolled Baghdad streets with four Humvees and 16 U.S. soldiers. On a patrol early this month, half his patrol consisted of newly minted Iraqi National Guardsmen.

Medina, of Austin, says he has seen progress in the Iraqi forces since the hand-over. Before the transition, he says, “sometimes they didn't even show up for work.” Now they mostly do.

As they prepare to leave for Baghdad's predominantly Shiite Amin neighborhood, the armed Iraqi soldiers crowd into the open back of a pickup. The Americans leave in armored Humvees. The patrol's mission: to provide a show of force around a date palm grove where insurgents have hidden and fired mortars at U.S. positions.

The strategy behind the patrols is to put an Iraqi face on security. But sometimes the reaction from Baghdad residents is as hostile to the Iraqi troops as it is to the Americans. The Iraqi translator who accompanies the Americans on the patrol wears a red bandanna over his face and mirrored sunglasses to hide his identity. Iraqis working for Americans have been killed by insurgents.

At times, locals will spit at the National Guardsmen, throw things at them and call them spies and traitors, Medina says. The Iraqi soldiers sometimes respond with their fists when the locals swear at them. “Their rules of engagement are a little different from ours,” the lieutenant explains.

Patience is the key to winning in a guerrilla war, tacticians say.

“If we can stay the course over here for another year or so, the insurgency will wear itself out,” says Col. Dusty Rhoades, a marine intelligence officer in Iraq. “The U.S. military is currently in a position where it is militarily impossible for us to lose, but only an Iraqi government can totally win.”

But how much time will it take? The Army is hiring a research group, The Dupuy Institute, to help answer that question. The group will study guerrilla conflicts in Indonesia, Southeast Asia, Greece, Malaysia and elsewhere to see whether they hold lessons for Iraq.

But even a lengthy war doesn't have to be a quagmire, military experts say.

“We're not doing badly at all,” says Ralph Peters, a retired Army officer and strategist. “It's just everyone underestimated the intensity and complexity of this.”

Crain reported from Baghdad, Michaels from McLean, Va. Contributing: Paul Overberg, James Cox, William Risser, Tom Squitieri

TIME Magazine Archive Preview -- How Long A War? Let's Ask -- Aug. 23, 2004

Aug. 23, 2004

How Long A War? Let's Ask
The Pentagon asks for an estimated time for the U.S. occupation in Iraq

By MARK THOMPSON

With U.S. combat deaths approaching 600 since major combat operations ended in Iraq nearly 16 months ago (in contrast to only 109 before the fall of Baghdad), the Pentagon has decided it's time to get some help in figuring out how long the postwar fighting might last. The Army quietly released a contract announcement last week that it was seeking to calculate " the possible intensity and duration of a guerrilla war in Iraq." The Army wants to award a contract to the Dupuy Institute, a Washington-area think tank, by the end of the month. The institute will be asked to study " casualties from...

www.middle-east-online.com/english/?id=11043

First Published 2004-08-23, Last Updated 2004-08-23 17:09:07

U.S. forces will stay in Iraq as long as necessary: Bush

Crushing Iraq's insurgency may take up to 10 years

U.S. Army officials say it could take one to 10 years to quash insurgency if they have political will, stamina to stay in Iraq.

WASHINGTON - U.S. Army officials say it could take one to 10 years to crush the insurgency in Iraq, which has shown little sign of letting up in the two months since the transfer of sovereignty to an interim Iraqi government, USA Today reported Monday.

U.S. officials expected the violence to drop after Iraqis regained control of their government on June 28, but attacks against US and Iraqi forces have averaged 49 a day since then, compared to 52 a day in the month before the transfer, the paper said.

President George W. Bush has said US forces will stay in the country to assist Iraqi security forces as long as necessary.

"If we have the political will and stamina to stay, I could see this going on for 10 years," Randolph Gangle, head of the marine corps' Center for Emerging Threats and Opportunities, was quoted as saying.

A more optimistic view came from Colonel Dusty Rhoades, a marine intelligence officer in Iraq.

"If we can stay the course over here for another year or so, the insurgency will wear itself out. The US military is currently in a position where it is militarily impossible for us to lose, but only an Iraqi government can totally win."

The marine corps is updating its manual on counterinsurgency, the "Small Wars Manual," based on its experience in Iraq, where the conflict stands out for the array of different groups involved.

"Here you have a whole hodgepodge of differing groups," Gangle said.

And the U.S. Army is hiring a research group, The Dupuy Institute, to try to figure out how long the fighting may last. The group will study guerrilla conflicts in Greece, Indonesia, Malaysia and elsewhere to see how they pertain to the war in Iraq, the report said.

www.khaleejtimes.com/DisplayArticle.asp?xfile=data/focusoniraq/2004/August/focusoniraq_August251.xml§ion=focusoniraq&col=

Khaleej Times Online >> News >> FOCUS ON IRAQ Quashing Iraq’s insurgency could take up to 10 years: report (AFP)

23 August 2004

WASHINGTON - U.S. Army officials say it could take one to 10 years to crush the insurgency in Iraq, which has shown little sign of letting up in the two months since the transfer of sovereignty to an interim Iraqi government, USA Today reported Monday.

US officials expected the violence to drop after Iraqis regained control of their government on June 28, but attacks against US and Iraqi forces have averaged 49 a day since then, compared to 52 a day in the month before the transfer, the paper said.

President George W. Bush has said US forces will stay in the country to assist Iraqi security forces as long as necessary.

“If we have the political will and stamina to stay, I could see this going on for 10 years,” Randolph Gangle, head of the Marine Corps’ Center for Emerging Threats and Opportunities, was quoted as saying.

A more optimistic view came from Colonel Dusty Rhoades, a Marine intelligence officer in Iraq.

“If we can stay the course over here for another year or so, the insurgency will wear itself out. The US military is currently in a position where it is militarily impossible for us to lose, but only an Iraqi government can totally win.”

The marine corps is updating its manual on counterinsurgency, the “Small Wars Manual,” based on its experience in Iraq, where the conflict stands out for the array of different groups involved.

“Here you have a whole hodgepodge of differing groups,” Gangle said.

And the U.S. Army is hiring a research group, The Dupuy Institute, to try to figure out how long the fighting may last. The group will study guerrilla conflicts in Greece, Indonesia, Malaysia and elsewhere to see how they pertain to the war in Iraq, the report said.

www.turkishpress.com/turkishpress/news.asp?ID=25170

Quashing Iraq's Insurgency Could Take Up To 10 Years: Report AFP: 8/23/2004

WASHINGTON, Aug 23 (AFP) - US army officials say it could take one to 10 years to crush the insurgency in Iraq, which has shown little sign of letting up in the two months since the transfer of sovereignty to an interim Iraqi government, USA Today reported Monday.

U.S. officials expected the violence to drop after Iraqis regained control of their government on June 28, but attacks against U.S. and Iraqi forces have averaged 49 a day since then, compared to 52 a day in the month before the transfer, the paper said.

President George W. Bush has said US forces will stay in the country to assist Iraqi security forces as long as necessary.

"If we have the political will and stamina to stay, I could see this going on for 10 years," Randolph Gangle, head of the marine corps' Center for Emerging Threats and Opportunities, was quoted as saying.

A more optimistic view came from Colonel Dusty Rhoades, a marine intelligence officer in Iraq.

"If we can stay the course over here for another year or so, the insurgency will wear itself out. The US military is currently in a position where it is militarily impossible for us to lose, but only an Iraqi government can totally win."

The marine corps is updating its manual on counterinsurgency, the "Small Wars Manual," based on its experience in Iraq, where the conflict stands out for the array of different groups involved.

"Here you have a whole hodgepodge of differing groups," Gangle said.

And the U.S. Army is hiring a research group, The Dupuy Institute, to try to figure out how long the fighting may last. The group will study guerrilla conflicts in Greece, Indonesia, Malaysia and elsewhere to see how they pertain to the war in Iraq, the report said.

www.fbodaily.com/archive/2004/08-August/12-Aug-2004/FBO-00640770.htm

FBO DAILY ISSUE OF AUGUST 12, 2004 FBO #0990 SPECIAL NOTICE

B -- Intent to Sole Source with The Dupuy Institute for Casualty Estimate in the Iraq War Notice Date

8/10/2004

Notice Type
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Contracting Office Minerals Management Service GovWorks (Franchise) 381 Elden Street, MS 2510 Herndon VA 20170

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Archive Date
8/10/2005

Description

GovWorks on behalf on the Center for Army Analysis intends on awarding a sole source contract to The Dupuy Institute (TDI) for the below listed requirement. CAA is acquiring services to produce an estimate of the possible intensity and duration of a guerilla war In Iraq. Intensity will be measured in terms of "blue side" (intervening forces) losses. As such, it will serve to provide a casualty estimate for such a war. Since this estimate will also address duration of the conflict, this effort may serve as a basis for doing cost estimation. This project will also attempt to address projected force sizes for such a war. The focus of the research is to examine casualties from various guerilla conflicts in the 20th century, including but not limited to Indonesian War of independence, Greek Civil War, Indochina War, Malaysian Insurrection, Mau Mau Revolt, Cypriot EOKA Insurgency. The award will have four tasks and a final report. The focus of the research is to examine casualties from various guerilla conflicts in the 20th century. TASK 1, Conduct a survey of strengths, losses, and duration of a number of guerilla wars in the past. TASK 2, Collect statistical data about force strengths and losses, assembled on a monthly or more detailed basis. Determine the patterns of losses in the various wars examined, including the degree of variation in casualties from month to month. TASK 3, Determine if casualties tend to peak at certain points during the course of the operations; and whether one can determine by comparisons of Iraq data to some or all of the other operations, if the casualties in Iraq will decline over time, increase over time, or remain at a steady state. TASK 4, Assemble basic narratives of each of the guerilla wars in an attempt to identify those major events or turning points in each of the wars that resulted in a downturn or upturn in the casualty patterns. This project will provide unique insights to the Army leadership and to the analytical community casualty estimation in guerilla conflicts, and specifically the Iraq war. TDI will provide a final report at the end of this effort. It will consist of seven major sections: Introduction and background, General Description of various guerilla conflicts, Statistical data and analysis of casualties in guerilla conflicts, Detailed description of casualties in guerilla conflicts, Brief Description of the Iraq war; Detailed description of casualties in the Iraq guerilla war, and Conclusions. TDI is a Non-Profit institution and the only known provider of scholarly research and objective analysis of historical data related to armed conflict and the resolution of armed conflict. The use of TDI in a sole source contract is in accordance with FAR 6.302-1. TDI has been chosen because of previous efforts that have been completed by TDI, their expertise in the field, and their availability to complete the project in the short time period necessary for the analysis project. The anticipated award date is August 23, 2004 and the total project length is estimated at 141 days. This notice of intent is not a request for competitive proposals. Any questions regarding this effort should be directed to Sarah Roper at (703) 787-1808, or by email at sarah.roper@mms.gov.

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OPERATIONAL

Retired General Slams Army For Failure To Release Armored Gun System

BY NATHAN HODGE, DEFENSE TODAY August 27, 2004

In an interview with Defense Today, retired Brig. Gen. David Grange said the Army needs to deliver the M8 Armored Gun System (AGS) to the 82nd Airborne, which wants an air-droppable light tank for "forced entry" operations such as airfield seizure and other missions."If they're not going to do this for the 82nd, it's a big mistake," Grange said. "The 82nd needs it." The 82nd Airborne, which is likely to rotate back to Iraq next year, wants the extra combat punch a lightweight armored gun would provide, and earlier this year, the division asked the Army to approve an operational requirement for AGS, which is made by United Defense, L.P. (UDLP) Equipped with an automatically loaded 105-mm cannon, the tracked AGS is designed for low-velocity airdrop, and can roll on and off of a C-130 Hercules tactical airlifter.

AGS was cancelled in 1997, but four complete vehicles were delivered. Delivery of those vehicles to the 82nd Airborne has remained on hold while the Army studies the feasibility of airdropping the Stryker Mobile Gun System (MGS), a wheeled vehicle made by UDLP rival General Dynamics. Grange, who now is executive vice president and chief operating officer of the Robert R. McCormick Tribune Foundation, a non-profit organization, said, "Airborne units and air-assault units need some type of a light tank, some type of a gun system. We should have had the Armored Gun System. We should have done that, [but] we never did-that program was cancelled."

During Operation Iraqi Freedom, elements of the 3rd Infantry Division, a heavy mechanized unit, captured Baghdad International Airport. According to Grange, airborne and air assault (helicopter-borne) units need extra firepower and protection for such critical operations. "I've been in airborne, air assault and Ranger units most of my life, and once you go in and secure an airhead, you're just keeping your fingers crossed as you're waiting for an armored link-up," said Grange.

As part of its effort to transition to a more rapidly deployable future force, the Army is investing heavily in the Stryker family of wheeled armored vehicles. Grange, who stressed that he has "zero relations" with defense contractors, suggested that those funds might be better spent upgrading light armored vehicles like the tracked M113, which has been in service since the 1960s.

"They're air-droppable, there's a version you can put a gun system on as well as a troop carrier, and we could have taken a lot of the light units and given them some mobility and protection," he said. "Not whole divisions-like the whole 10th Mountain and the 101st Airborne-but enough of them to give them some maneuverability and some punch."

The Stryker, Grange added, "I personally think was a waste of money because we had already so much stuff in the inventory we could have modified."

Stryker has been touted as a major success by Army leadership, which points to the deployment of the first Stryker Brigade Combat Team to northern Iraq as evidence of their capability. Proponents of the Stryker say the vehicles, which run fast and quiet, offer superb situational awareness and stealth, traits especially critical in urban combat.

However, Stryker has come in for criticism recently, particularly after a Government Accountability Office report suggested that the vehicles were too heavy for effective transport by C-130 aircraft. Sen. John Warner (R-Va.), the chairman of the powerful Senate Armed Services Committee, has pledged to hold a hearing on the issue.

The Stryker MGS, part of the Stryker family of wheeled armored vehicles, has not been airdrop certified, although the service recently airdrop tested a surrogate vehicle that was weighted down to simulate the MGS. The surrogate, a Stryker Engineer Support Vehicle, was dropped from a C-17 Globemaster III, a larger, more powerful airlifter than the C-130.

Grange suggested that Stryker variants are not practical for airdrop and rapid deployment missions if they can only be delivered by C-17. "The [C-]130 is intra-theater," he said. "C-17s are great, if you have enough of them. But as you know, there's a finite number of them. And they are more inter-theater instead of intratheater."

One member of Congress, Rep. Robin Hayes (R-N.C.) been lobbying the Army for the delivery of AGS to the 82nd Airborne, which is based in his home district. "He's trying to do everything he can for the 82nd Airborne in a timely manner," said a press aide to Hayes. "They'll probably be going back to Iraq. And he wants to make sure that they have the systems they need."

Master Sgt. Pam Smith, a spokeswoman for the 82nd Airborne, said the division still has a need for the AGS. "We do have [a requirement] but we have not been told a date that we're supposed to receive it," she said. "We'd love to have that system." The four AGS vehicles currently are warehoused in Pennsylvania. A UDLP source said a full complement of AGS parts and a "combat spare" also are available.

TECHNOTACTICAL

The Killer Ride

www.military.com/NewContent/0,13190,SOF_0804_Stryker,00.html

Soldier of Fortune Magazine August 2004

This article is courtesy of Soldier of Fortune, a military/adventure publication. The magazine specializes in first-person reporting from armed conflicts around the globe, with emphasis on current military activities, developments, special units, weapons, tactics, politics and history. Its writers include experienced professionals, including former military and frequent Soldier of Fortune readers.

Tracks or Treads on the Mean Streets of Iraq?

By John Higgs Soldier of Fortune Magazine

March 2nd 2004, Baghdad. A U.S. Soldier was killed and another wounded when Islamist terrorists attacked a convoy and threw an incendiary device into their armored M1114 High-Mobility Multipurpose Wheeled Vehicle (HMMWV- pronounced "Humvee").

March 25th 2004, Fallujah. A Humvee was burned and destroyed by a rioting mob after a shootout between Islamist terrorists and a U.S. Army convoy.

March 28th 2004, Mosul. Islamist terrorists fired two Rocket Propelled Grenades (RPG) at a U.S. Army Stryker armored vehicle as it patrolled a side street. Despite the Stryker's additional anti-RPG slat-armor, one RPG ignited the external 5-gallon fuel cans. The resulting fire and ammunition cook-off destroyed the vehicle, without injury to the occupants.

March 31st 2004, North of Fallujah. An armored Humvee was up-ended by a powerful explosion, killing the five U.S. soldiers inside.

Is the Army's newest armored vehicle -- STRYKER -- sufficiently well protected for duty in the dangerous neighborhoods of Iraq's cities? Or should U.S. troops be riding in Vietnam-era Armored Personnel Carriers (APC)? Our troops are being killed and wounded as they patrol the streets of Baghdad, Mosul, and Fallujah, in soft-skinned unarmored or under-armored Humvees, trucks, and up-armored M1114 Humvees.

Terrorists in Iraq have adopted the tactic of throwing grenades through the windows of cars, SUVs and Humvees to kill the occupants before dousing them with fuel and setting them on fire. In an attempt to mitigate such a serious problem, the Army is beginning to up-armor Humvees, and medium and heavy trucks, by bolting or welding on armor plate and bullet resistant glass kits, at costs of up to $150,000 per vehicle (The Humvee itself costs around $62,000).

But the program will not be complete until 2005 at the earliest. In the spring of 2004, another part of the Army's solution was to deploy to Iraq the first of six Stryker Brigade Combat Teams (SBCT). The Stryker, a version of the General Motors Canada manufactured LAV III 8x8 Light Armored Vehicle (LAV) is an eight-wheeled armored vehicle designed to carry nine troopers in addition to a crew of two.

It certainly sounds like an improvement over the four-wheeled Humvee, so why is it mired in controversy, and why do the Stryker's opponents - who range from Vietnam vets to some members of Congress - champion the forty-something-year-old M113 "Gavin" APC instead? First, we have to understand the Army's plan to revamp our forces to fight a three-dimensional war instead of the traditional two- dimensional format.

Shock and Maneuver

This requires rapid aerial deployment of mechanized armor to support ground troops. This Rapid Deployment concept of combining Infantry, Aviation, and Armor for shock and maneuver originated in Russia before WWII and was later championed by US General James M. Gavin.

Jump forward thirty-four years and we come to [then] U.S. Army Chief of Staff (CSA) General Eric K. Shinseki's 1999 vision: "The Army will develop the capability to put combat forces in Brigade Combat Teams anywhere in the world ninety-six hours after liftoff for both stability and support operations, and for warfighting. We will build that capability into a momentum that generates a warfighting Division on the ground in 120 hours and five Divisions in thirty days."

For the Shinseki Initiative to become a reality the Army must be able to transport a large number of armored vehicles and their troops and support infrastructure rapidly by air to almost any location in the world. This requires a fleet of U.S. Air Force C-130 tactical airlift aircraft. It also requires fighting vehicles that are armored heavily enough to survive on the battlefields of the world, be it jungle, desert, temperate forests, or urban settings, and that the vehicle must be able to roll into combat directly from the aircraft. This last requirement means that the vehicle has to fit into a C-130 without having to be partially disassembled.

Back to Iraq. Who is our enemy and how do they fight? In places like Fallujah, our enemy seems to be largely a mix of Iraqi and non-Iraqi, anti-coalition Islamist militants, former regime holdouts, and common criminals. Followers of Shiite Muslim Cleric Muqtada al-Sadr have attacked occupying troops in Baghdad and Najaf. Other enemies include politically motivated insurgents from countries like Syria and Iran.

As Mao said: "A terrorist is a fish in a sea of humanity." In Iraq, Islamist terrorists organize crowds of supporters to surround an army or civilian vehicle, and then attack it with grenades or incendiary devices, sometimes turning it over. The ubiquitous RPG-7 is often used to fire on Army and coalition patrols as they drive through narrow streets and similar choke points.

Since it first appeared in 1962, the Soviet designed hand held RPG-7V (Ruchnoi Protivotankovy Granatomyot) Rocket-propelled Anti-Tank Grenade Launcher has appeared in almost every war zone in the world from Vietnam in the 1960's, to Afghanistan in the 1980's, to Iraq in 2004. The launcher is simplicity itself, comprising a tube with forward mounted pistol grip and trigger assembly, second handgrip, and a stadiametric optical sight.

The rocket or booster motor section of the Rocket Propelled Grenade (RPG) fits inside the launcher tube while the warhead protrudes from the muzzle of the weapon. This feature allows warheads with various diameters greater than the bore size of the launcher to be used.

To load and fire the RPG typically takes a two-man team comprising the operator and his Assistant Gunner (AG). After firing, the team will quickly relocate to another firing position before the heavy cloud of smoke from the launch gives away their position. Teams who fail to shoot 'n scoot often don't live long enough to regret it. The RPG is simple enough for almost anyone to use, and for its size and portability packs a huge wallop. And thanks to Saddam there are lots of them in Iraq.

The "Gavin"

Unofficially known as the "Gavin" after WWII General James M. Gavin, a longtime proponent of Airborne Warfare, the M113 Armored Personnel Carrier (APC) is a tracked vehicle designed in the late '50s to carry troops and supplies cross-country over rough terrain, along highways at higher speeds, and on amphibious operations in lakes and rivers. The latest version of the M113 Family Of Vehicles (FOV) is the A3, equipped with the RISE (Reliability Improvements for Selected Equipment) package.

This features an improved drive train with 275 HP turbocharged Detroit Diesel 6V53T, upgraded electrics, new power brakes, and conventional steering controls which allow the vehicle to turn in its own length by making one track turn forward while the other track turns in reverse (neutral steer).

The M113A3's fuel tanks have been relocated externally to the rear of the vehicle giving an additional sixteen cubic feet of space inside while also reducing the risk of fire in the crew compartment. Composite Spall suppression liners for additional crew protection are fitted inside the lightweight aircraft aluminum armored hull.

An additional (14.5mm thick) bolt-on armor kit is available.

This is not your father's M113. The M113 cannot be driven if it breaks a track. Emerging Band Track technology would replace the segmented metal tracks with a continuous steel reinforced rubber band - think of it as a single steel belted radial tire stretched over the sprockets.

The Band track is only 50% the weight of a traditional steel segmented track, which translates to better acceleration and braking, lasts about 4000 miles, reduces noise and vibration, and creates less wear and tear on roads. There is little or no maintenance, although changing the band in the field takes longer than the standard track. One drawback to rubber, however, is that it burns just like tires. The Gavin's original manufacturer, United Defense Corp (formally United Defense Limited Partnership), has prototypes of modernized hybrid (electro-mechanical) M113A4 Gavins that are even more capable than the A3.

The current Gavin is small and light enough to be transported in a Hercules C-130 transport aircraft; it is also amphibious, and can be air-dropped onto the battlefield. The Army's Modernization Plan requires computerized communications and data transfer systems to enable battle command on the move. The current M113A3 digitization program will apply installation kits for hardware and software into the A3's by 2006 to bring them in line with other vehicles.

There are approximately 13,000 Gavins in the Army's Operational Inventory, of which about 3-4000 are A3s. The M113 is much cheaper than the Stryker, which means the Army can put more of them in country quickly. Some strategists advocate more technologically complex vehicles like the Stryker, with advanced electronic communications packages even if the high cost dictates that fewer of these vehicles will be available to go into battle.

But in the Normandy campaign of WWII, the technically superior German Panzer V Panther and Tiger tanks were overwhelmed by the large numbers of less capable U.S. Sherman tanks. On the other hand, Operation Desert Storm demonstrated how well a technically superior tank, the M1 Abrams, could do against massed groups of Iraqi T62 and T72 tanks.

Stryker

The U.S. Army defines the Stryker's mission as: "[To] fulfill an immediate requirement in the Army's current transformation process to equip a strategically deployable (C-17/C-5) and operationally deployable (C-130) brigade capable of rapid movement anywhere on the globe in a combat ready configuration. The armored wheeled vehicle is designed to enable the Stryker Brigade Combat Team (SBCT) to maneuver more easily in close and urban terrain while providing protection in open terrain."

Modeled after the Light Armored Vehicle-3 (LAV), the Stryker comes in two main variants: Infantry Carrier Vehicle (ICV) and Mobile Gun System (MGS). All vehicles are equipped with a central tire inflation system. The ICV has a Kongsberg Remote Weapon Station with four M6 smoke grenade launchers and a universal soft mount cradle for either a MK240 7.62mm belt-fed machine gun, .50 caliber Browning M2 heavy machine gun, or a MK19 40mm Grenade Launcher.

A digital communications system - the FBCB2 (Force XXI Battle Command Brigade and Below) allows vehicle commanders to communicate with each other and with the Battalion using text messaging and a video map system where commanders can mark enemy positions on the map for the other commanders to see. This "tactical internet" utilizes a Raytheon AN/TSQ-158 Enhanced Position Location Reporting System (EPLRS).

The commander can also access seven M45 periscopes and a combination video camera and thermal imaging display screen. The driver has access to a Raytheon AN/VAS-5 Driver's Vision Enhancer (DVE) and three M17 periscopes. In Iraq the Strykers are being fitted with add- on slat-armor for protection against RPG attack.

The slats are designed to detonate an incoming warhead before it contacts the vehicle's half-inch thick steel hull. But there is a limit to how much weight (armor) can be added to a wheeled vehicle before it begins to sink into soft terrain such as sand or mud. At 38,000LBS the Stryker is 11,000LBS heavier than the M113A3. This is due in part to the basic design of the armored vehicle, which requires wheels, axles, suspension, and a transmission.

The hull is fabricated from steel instead of aircraft aluminum - as used in the M113 - and this also adds to the weight. Space must be provided for the front wheels to turn in order to steer, and for all the wheels to travel up and down on the independent suspension. This prevents the use of armored skirts to protect the wheels from incoming ordnance, which means that the areas of the hull behind the wheels are vulnerable.

Oddly enough, while the South Africans fielded various armored vehicles in the '70s and '80s such as the Casspir and Wolf, both of which had a v-shaped armored hull to deflect the blast from driving over a land mine, the floor of the Stryker's hull is flat. Critics charge that the Stryker's additional weight also prevents it from meeting the Army's requirement of being transportable by C-130 where it can be immediately driven off the aircraft in a battle-ready condition, including its full complement of crew and troops.

Lightly Armored

Although faster than the M113 APC, the Stryker has been criticized by some as being too lightly armored, unable to cope with tough terrain, and too expensive. Contrast that opinion with the vehicle's performance in Summer of 2002 at The National Training Center, Ft. Irwin, California, during the Millennium Challenge. Four Strykers with their infantry detachments deployed to Ft. Irwin by C-130. Each vehicle was unloaded and prepared for action in less than twenty minutes.

In this exercise, and others like it at the National Training Center, various army units are pitted against other army units known as Opposing Force (OPFOR) that have been specially trained and equipped to simulate the battle tactics of some of our potential enemies. This is what the OPFOR force had to say about the Strykers: "The Stryker went places at greater speeds, quieter, with more agility than any vehicle the OPFOR has ever encountered. We had to adjust our tactics."

Speed and Stealth are two of the Stryker's strengths. It is best suited to fast travel on open highways and unrestricted terrain. In restricted terrain and the urban setting of buildings, narrow streets and alleys it loses its advantage. It's overall length and turning radius can often require many forwards and backwards movements in order to negotiate a ninety-degree turn in a narrow street.

Even the M1 Abrams Main battle tank is somewhat vulnerable to attack in such an environment. Unlike the M113, the Stryker's remote weapons station and camera system does allow the gunner to fire from within the vehicle rather than having to expose himself to incoming rounds. But the remote weapon station is handicapped by its narrow field of view and slow slew rate (the camera takes up to 60 seconds to rotate through 360 degrees) to scope the area in all directions. Multiple RPG shooters in a concerted attack from different directions could get off several rounds before the camera can pick up the first attacker. In its APC configuration, the Stryker is really a lightly armored bus or taxi to take troops to the front line. But on a non- linear battlefield like Iraq there is no front line and every building or alley may be hiding a tango with an RPG. Is the Stryker better than an up armored Humvee? Probably. It doesn't have open windows through which grenades or Molotov Cocktails can be thrown or dropped. It may be equipped with slat armor for some level of protection against RPGs.

It has twice the number of wheels that a Humvee has, and it is less likely to be tipped over by a crowd. In order to provide some safety in numbers, Humvees typically patrol in groups of four or more, a wise precaution for any lightly armored vehicle in an Iraqi city.

Is the M113 APC the answer? Not entirely. An Improvised Explosive Device (IED) can, if it is big enough, and placed appropriately (particularly directly underneath) blow off a wheel or a track, leaving the crew immobilized in their vehicle. However, in at least one instance in Iraq, a Stryker has continued to maneuver on the remaining seven wheels. We are talking here about increasing the odds of surviving, not eliminating the risk altogether. So where should the Army spend $3.3 million? Buy one Stryker, convert eight M113A2 Gavins to M113A3, or up armor twenty-two Humvees?

The Stryker does have an obvious reconnaissance or support role on hard roads and trails, and where the terrain is fairly open and not too extreme. In fact, the marine corps limits its LAVs to a reconnaissance role. Incidentally, due to unforeseen transmission problems, Strykers will eventually undergo a planned $111 million refurbishment.

With its sophisticated communications systems and high speed, the Stryker can transmit battlefield intel rapidly and haul ass out of hotspots. But its armor has been criticized as being too thin, and any additions will just add to the problem of trying to deploy it by C-130, which was the original requirement stipulated by General Shinseki.

So is the Stryker better than the M113 in Iraq? Or has it been deployed to a theater of operations that may become increasingly unforgiving, in a peacekeeping role to which it may be unsuited?

John Higgs is a graduate of Gunsite, DTI and Yavapai firarms schools and is an NRA firearms instructor.

U.S. Army UAV debacle: Its AOK in DoD's mind to have UAVs and UCAVs "in-a-box", why not manned aircraft, too? Who are the ones here not "thinking out of the box"?

http://ebird.afis.osd.mil/ebfiles/s20040816312489.html

Pilotless Plane Guides 82nd

Fayetteville (NC) Observer
August 13, 2004

By Kevin Maurer, Staff writer

A plane that is too small to carry a pilot and does not have any weapons is expected to make the 82nd Airborne Division more deadly.

The Shadow 200 is the latest in unmanned reconnaissance planes. It will allow the 82nd to scout targets, call in artillery fire and track the enemy without placing paratroopers in danger. Adding the unmanned planes to the 82nd's arsenal is part of the Army's efforts to streamline and update its fighting force.

The 82nd, like the rest of the Army, is incorporating the lessons it learned in Iraq as it prepares for its next deployment. Part of what it learned is the usefulness of the unmanned reconnaissance planes.

''It makes the division much more lethal than it has been in the past. It doesn't allow the enemy to know we are coming. They can not hide," said Capt. Matt Gill. He worked with the vehicles in Iraq.

"It can provide on-time, real-time target description. We can put intelligence that is only seven minutes old in the hands of a battalion commander," he said.

Gill said a unit from Fort Hood, Texas, that operated the planes was attached to the 82nd while it was deployed in Iraq. They gave the division the ability to track insurgents who attacked the division and get intelligence about them before Soldiers attempted to capture them.

Next time, the 82nd will have its own planes.

Two platoons from the 313th Military Intelligence Battalion are training with the aircraft. Each platoon has two planes. By 2006, the division will have five platoons operating the reconnaissance planes.

Gill says having the planes as part of the division instead of attached to it makes a big difference.

"We can support more customers and spread our coverage," Gill said.

Smaller than Predator

The Shadow 200 is smaller than the more widely known Predator.

Unlike the larger versions, the Shadow can not be armed.

The plane resembles a high-speed radio controlled plane. The propeller-driven aircraft is powered by what is essentially a souped-up lawn mower engine and sounds like a gas weed trimmer when it is airborne.

The plane is flown and landed by remote control. The system can be deployed anywhere using three C-130 aircraft.

The Shadow takes off and lands like a fighter on an aircraft carrier. It is shot from a ramp and lands by catching one of four wires stretched across a runway. A net at the end of the runway acts as a failsafe.

The whole operating system - which includes two planes - costs about $36 million. The aircraft costs about $275,000.

Most of the Shadow pilots are volunteers.

"It is more of a rush that you are in control of something in the sky," Pfc. Ryan Evans said.

The Shadow is flown mostly by choosing commands on various menus. For security reasons, the paratroopers would not say exactly how the vehicle is flown. They did say that being good at video games is not necessary. ''I am sure it wouldn't hurt if you can read instruments," Pfc. Josh Reed said.

One of the hardest parts of flying the unmanned planes is being aware of what is around you. "You are limited because of the camera," Sgt. Zeke Jaramillo said.

Chief Warrant Officer Darren Strock has worked with unmanned planes for more than nine years and has seen the technology and capabilities improve.

Strock said that in the end the vehicles make Soldiers safer. "Any time I can see what is behind the door for the guy kicking in the door, that is saving a life," he said.

A PICTURE OF ALL THAT'S WRONG WITH THE U.S. ARMY IN 2004

1. Operating from a fixed, static air base that the enemy can easily attack

2. Army helicopters in Fulda Gap green in tan desert Iraq

3. Tent city! Army still living in fabric tents that offer ZERO protection from enemy arty, mortars, CMs, TBMs, WMD

This Army pecking-order "rear area" pogue unit has not dug itself in or is prepared to fight off an enemy attack, one mortar landing here will kill everyone and their $36M UAV system. THERE ARE NO "SAFE" "REAR" areas on the non-linear battlefield.

4. Shadow 200 UAV, sky gray color good (why can't Army helos be in this color?), everything else is BAD, narrow field of view sensors relays info 10 minutes late back to base, $36M cost

5. Uses MOGAS! Unsafe! Where will this MOGAS come from when the rest of DoD is using safer JP8?

Engine is LOUD; enemy will hear UAV, hide and go back to business. Enemy has 10 minute data relay delay head start anyway

6. The pogue Army Soldier is sleeping exposed on a cot!

7. Unit that thinks its a non-combatant, drives around in TAN HMMWV trucks; does the enemy buy into this fantasy?...the color is good, rest is bad. No armament on truck top. No armor protection...

8. Rubber tires easily shred and burn, all carrying $36M UAV system

9. Soldier has to buy his own baby-wipes because Army log system can't supply him one in his MRE or with every hot meal

10. Note that the Shadow 200 TM manuals are on top to show superiors that everyone is following procedures like good little, weak co-dependants and if one of these Shadow 200s crashes, we can CYA

11. Notice UAV is fixed-wing, now WHY is that? Why not a helicopter? Is it because rotary wings are inefficient and hard to maintain and are failures? Nahh, we can't admit to that. So we hide this by having UAVs instead of pilots flying in effective fixed-wing observation/attack aircraft.

Chuck Myers writes:

"My observation: Here we go again; a significant batch of 82nd troops are destined to become non-combatants thus further aggravating the 'tooth-to-tail' problem (less trigger pullers). The pilotless support crews eat/drink water/are targets, etc. The logisics burden just increased. Need more C-130s which are already overbooked; need special fuel, parts, technicians, etc. The cost of operating the 82nd just increased a significant amount. Where is the analysis that portrays the benefit vs burden for such operations or is that 'old think' to even ask such a question?"

My observation:

So here we have two narrow field-of-view model planes that cannot attack the enemy for $36,000,000.

When for the same money we could have 18 x AY-65 Vigilante armored and armed crop dusters with human observation powers of two people, a pilot and an observer, PLUS infared, image intensifier optical sensors.

Do the math.

18 aircraft beats two.

18 armed aircraft beats two that cannot attack (0).

18 sensor platforms beats 2.

18 platforms with 36 humans with sensors beats two without human sensors (0).

18 platforms with 36 humans with a vested interest in returning to base intact beats 2 platforms with no survival instinct that will soon crash.

I guess we are stupid and just don't want to do what it takes to win the war in Iraq. We want to play with technotoys as our men get clobbered on the ground below because the enemy without any air surveillance is free to ambush with RPGs, roadside bombs and AK47s. Man! What a waste of money.

When will the USAF admit that we need GROUND MANEUVER to win wars?

Or that slower-flying MANNED, armored observation/attack aircraft are needed to do CAS and effective battlefield COIN?

The X-45 UCAV will be unmanned "fall guy" to do dirty work of making enemy Air Defenses reveal themselves to clear way for manned fighter-bombers to strategic bomb with some token USAF FACs and SOF on the ground shining laser beams so USAF can get the glory.

However, X-45 UCAV will neither be agile or observant enough to do CAS to enable ground MANEUVER. It will have problems like most UAVs have of simply not flying themselves into the ground.

The answer is:

CAS/MAS Air-Ground Team

A-10s in a "Cactus Air Force" guided by USAF FACs for CAS

Army helos and U/MCAV "Killer Bees" flying Maneuver Air Support (MAS) guided by Army Attack Pathfinders

FEEDBACK!

itsg@hotmail.com

An Army analyst writes about the army's $36 million UAV "bargain":

"And it's data is SEVEN minutes old (best case), what a waste. Maybe we can convince the bad guys to stay put for 10 minute blocks of time, maybe offer them coffee as their setting up their IEDs."

A Navy officer writes:

"My sentiments exactly. Stay on target!"

NEW DEVELOPMENT!!! Disposible Rotary-Wing Airdrop Resupply System: "CopterBox"

By Mike Sparks

One day as I was walking to my BOQ room at the Quantico's Officers The Basic School I saw the spectacle of a CH-46 SeaKnight helicopter flying overhead. Suddenly a tan object came flying out headed for the inner courtyard formed by the H shape of the BOQ buildings. KAWUMK!!! A bundle of 5 gallon tan plastic water jugs taped together landed right on top of the hood of a fellow Lieutenant's black Camaro---with him and his girlfriend watching it from a few feet away. The CH-46 circled back and we could see the crew chief from the rear ramp showing remorse for the misdrop as the LT waved angrily at him. He shrugged and flew off!

That was my first experience with freedrop--the most accurate of air delivery methods--and it had landed in the wrong place! While Army manuals show that small amounts of non-fragile supplies can be freedropped and others using just a "poncho parachute", its considered too "high-speed" for the mainstream U.S. military.

Face it: we don't parachute airdrop resupply our Army units in contact. Only for the Airborne/SOF.

This is wrong.

During the they ran perilously low on ammunition. If we had a cheaper and simpler way to airdrop resupply we could have delivered critical 12.7mm (.50 cal) and 7.62mm ammo into a precise location in urban Iraq and made it not needed for ground resupply trucks to try to get through enemy opposition which risks our Soldier's lives. In 4th Generation War, where we seek to bypass enemy rear guards and take out their military and governmental "centers of gravity" we need a way to air resupply our maneuvering forces with precision to reach units in urban areas and at a low-cost to be disposible.

The fact is that conventional parachute resupply costs too much money in parachutes, honeycomb and plywood for small CDS bundles such that even the Airborne doesn't do it as they should in training.

If it is done, we have all sorts of trash on the DZ and no way for foot-grunts to pick it all up! (result: it ain't being done). Its about 300+ pounds of airdrop materials just to make a G-14 CDS bundle work! Who wants to hump out all these materials on their back? A 12-man SF A-Team or 9-man infantry squad cannot afford to divide 300 pounds of supplies and airdrop junk onto their backs.

If you are in an armored vehicle, parachute CDS supplies can be recovered and if the combat situation permits, returned to their air delivery unit. What if you are on foot or in the middle of a firefight? Achmed gets a $1,000 nylon parachute tent for his girlfriend for free courtesy of Uncle Sam. OK if he's a civilian refugee from a natural or man-made disaster, bad if he's the enemy!

If you are in a ground vehicle, parachute CDS makes sense because you can throw the expensive cargo shoot on board and recover it back to the Air Delivery Unit Riggers. But if all you need is ammo and water, and you are on foot you need the minimal amount of airdrop packing for supplies that are in manpack sizes.

In high-altitude regions like Afghanistan, aircraft cannot simply airland to resupply troops. Even if they can find a suitable assault zone to airland on, 463L pallets are notoriously fragile (aluminum covered balsa wood) and when they are pushed off the rear ramp of the USAF or Army ramp equipped aircraft they often break. Now you have a broken 358 pound 463L pallet with netting and more supplies than a small team can handle on foot. We need to push out loads from aircraft overhead so they do not have to land or expose themselves to enemy fire, but not have them drift away under a parachute or crash into rocks and break if free-dropped. Freedrop is great but some fragile items like morphine ampules need a slowed, cushioned descent.

The result of all of this is the potential of small airdrop resupply is NOT being done throughout the Army like we used to do in WWII, Korea and Vietnam. LTC John Paul Vann saved the day in Korea free-dropping ammo from his O-1 Bird Dog observation/attack plane to surrounded U.S. troops.

SMALL AIRDROP RESUPPLY HAS GOT TO BE THROWAWAY AND INEXPENSIVE OR IT AIN"T GOING TO BE DONE!

CopterBox in Flight!

Retired Colonel Chuck Warren, an Army Combat Infantryman and fixed-wing Aviator who has done air resupply by Bird Dog aircraft himself has come up with the definitive solution that enables almost any under 60 pound cargo to be dropped with a slow descent using the cardboard rotors of a helicopter instead of a costly parachute.

www.dropmaster.com/pages/686308/index.htm
http://mywebpages.comcast.net/dropmaster/dropmaster.htm

The CopterBox: A Lightweight, Disposable Air Cargo Delivery System

The CopterBox can deliver up to 100 pounds of emergency supplies from a wide variety of aircraft with drop speeds of up to 130 knots. The corrugated paper box employs three rotor blades that use the principle of autorotative lift to slow it and its payload to a gradual descent prior to ground contact. The CopterBox can delay opening its descent rotors for High Altitude Low Opening (HALO) insertions so the delivery aircraft can stay well above enemy air defense weapons as we did at An Loc in Vietnam.

The CopterBox makes economic sense in applications where a parachute would not be practical or prudent. The CopterBox requires very little time and training to pack and rig prior to launch.

A welded wire rotor hub is used to protect the box prior to launch and to withstand the aerodynamic and centrifugal forces of flight during descent.

Please email us with your questions and comments. Videos of developmental testing and a brochure are available via the link below or via CD-ROM. We need your input.

U.S. Patent 5,947,419

Video & Brochure Download:

To see our video, brochure, pictures, news and our white paper, click HERE.

Call us for pricing information! We are now taking orders for our current configuration.

Contact Information:

DropMaster, Inc.
3600 Abernathy Drive
Fayetteville, NC 28311
(910)630-DBOX (3269)
copterbox@dropmaster.com

Charles V. Warren, President
(910) 630-2997

www.defensetech.org/archives/001059.html

"COPTERBOX" FOR MEDS, SUPPLIES

A few weeks back, we looked at the Army's "medical missile" for shooting supplies to wounded Soldiers in hot zones. Well, apparently, there's more than one flying first aid kit out there.

With funding from the Army, Fayetteville, NC's DropMaster, Inc. has developed a "CopterBox" -- a fast-spinning, cardboard cylinder equipped with rotating blades -- that can be used to airdrop supplies to Soldiers in need.

Chuck it out of a helicopter or a plane, and the CopterBox will slow a 60 lb. payload to 34 feet per second. And "since it spins at about 400 RPM, it cuts through trees and always reaches the ground, unlike parachute-based systems," writes DropMaster's engineering director Chase Warren. Plus, the things are cheap, Chase says: just $300 a pop.

But right now, the Pentagon ain't buying, Chase complains. Despite a small business grant from the Army -- and nine years of work by "my father, 5 other people and me" -- Chase says the answer has been the same from every branch of the U.S. military he's approached: "We don't have a requirement for your concept. No one has come to us asking for this."

THERE'S MORE: The Australian military has been using a similar product for years, notes Defense Tech reader GK.

www.defence.gov.au/news/raafnews/editions/4401/story01.htm

These "heliboxes" have maximum weight of just 7.5 kg, he says, but they're just right for rations, water, and the like.

Posted by noahmax at August 13, 2004 12:32 AM

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Copterbox has this all solved!

And its PRECISE without expensive GPS electronics to steer parachutes.

What are we waiting for?

LAPTOP COMPUTERS: AIR COOLED = DIGITAL SUCCESS

Upper surface of the TALC on which the laptop sits.

Iraq.

Everything Army units need come by computers. Laptop computers are everywhere. They handle everything from beans to bombs.

Until they go down.

Usually they go down HARD----burned out motherboards.

No laptops, no supplies.

Why are we in this mess?

Because we are operating laptop computers on our desks, on vehicle dashboards and on our laps WITHOUT COOLING THEM. They get hot in addition to the Iraqi 100+ degree heat and they burn out. Cause = Effect.

Chase Warren of DropMaster INC. in NC has a solution: a laptop cooling device.

TActical Laptop Cooler (TALC).

Features:

- Good for large laptops - 15" X 11" like this one:

www.m-techlaptops.com/specifications/mtechd870.htm

- USB cable plugs into DC Jack and PC USB port.

- DC jack can be moved to suit customer preference. The DC jack uses a 2.5 mm coax pin, so a power inverter you use needs to have this pin available. The laptop can plug directly into the power inverter, negating any concerns about the TALC killing the laptop battery via the USB port. Using a power inverter on tactical ground vehicles along with Laptop and TALC preserves battery power.

- Excess USB cable can be wrapped between larger holes in the back.

- 80mm fans are only 15mm thick vs. standard 25mm and provide quieter operation than 60mm fans.

- Open space between front vertical stops allows front CD drives to open.

- Rubber feet on the bottom prevent scuffing of finished surfaces and feet on top allow an air passage for cooling air.

- Bottom return flange prevents fan blockage, allowing cool air to circulate regardless of surface type - tables, laps or cushions.

- Lashing holes and slots allow fastening of laptop via paracord or straps.

- Ample lightening/circulation holes and slots render this cooler lightweight.

- Black and gray powder coating or other finishes are possible.

- Body is constructed from .040 6061-T4 aluminum sheet.

TALC with IBM ThinkPad. TALC is designed for laptops this size and larger, particularly the hot-running Pentium 4 systems with 17" LCD screens.

Rear view of the bottom side of the TALC. Note that the DC jack can be moved to suit the customer. Larger rear holes are used to wrap excess USB cable.

Bottom side of the TALC to show detail.

Projected price: $125 each

Price to replace overheated large laptop: $3,000-$4,000.

Price to keep your Laptop running in the middle of nowhere: PRICELESS.

DropMaster, Inc.
3600 Abernathy Drive
Fayetteville, NC 28311
(910)630-DBOX (3269)
copterbox@dropmaster.com

Charles V. Warren, President
(910) 630-2997

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Professional Military Education HOT LINK:

GAO report on overweight/overpriced Stryker truck

Military Transformation: Fielding of Army's Stryker Vehicle Is Well Underway, but Expectations for Their Transportability by C-130 Aircraft Need to Be Clarified. GAO-04-925, August 12.

Full Report

Highlights - www.gao.gov/highlights/d04925high.pdf

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