We continue to use wheeled HMMWV trucks, we will continue to get easily killed by molotov cocktails, grenades, RPGs and roadside bombs entering the doors, windows and windshields and setting fire to their 4 rubber tires. Above is a picture of a M113A3 Gavin armored personnel carrier with Soldiers inter-acting with local Iraqi boys. So much for the non-sense that you cannot do this while mounted. I guess Sattler never thought you could gulp, GET OUT OF THE M113 Gavin and WALK with the APC in the background ready to provide overwatching fires/surveillance, or move ahead as a moving shield? No, he doesn't know these things because he's criminally INCOMPETENT and has his own hubristic infantry-on-foot-solves-everything anti-tracked armored vehicle agenda that is killing our troops in Iraq. He should be fired at once for gross incompetence.

Another marine General Hoar was instrumental in 1993 insuring Rangers didn't get tracked armored vehicles which resulted in the October 3, 1993 "Black Hawk Down!" debacle. There are serious issues and false ideas of military malpractice that emanate from the USMC mind and Army foot-infantry egotists that if not corrected will bring this nation to continued ruin and military defeat.

We have made a grave force structure error with the latest troop rotation, the majority of our 134,000 troops in Iraq now ride around in 10,000 vulnerable unarmored and quasi-armored 3-6 ton HMMWV "Humvee" rubber-tired trucks that fail to protect them from roadside bombs (IEDs), RPGs or mob violence. This is the same error we made in Somalia; emasculating our forces into wheeled trucks when we were getting ready to pull out. The Iraqis have recently discovered they can throw bombs through the shoulder-high doors and windows of HMMWVs and then crowd around them to set fire to them with containers of fuel. Details: www.geocities.com/paratroop2000/armoredhmmwvsstrykersfail.htm

There's been lots of half-informed media criticism of the Army for not supplying enough "up-armored" HMMWVs that's caused Congress to increase their production. The Army proclaims these Sport Utility Vehicles (SUVs) are the answer to our troop protection problems. Tragically, many American Soldiers have been killed in so-called "up-armored HMMWV" trucks only slightly better protected than the gasoline-powered SUVs the 4 civilian Blackwater Security contractors (former Special Forces and SEALs) were killed in, burned and then dragged through the streets. This is a sober reminder that being in superb physical condition to fight on foot is not a panacea and cannot protect you from RPGs and bombs going off. Since you cannot walk everywhere and carry everything you need to fight in a foreign country, our basic motor-driven transportation means must be as COMBAT capable as possible. Tracked armored vehicles that can be 28% more armored by inherent design parameters than wheeled vehicles are what we must do. These are the results of numerous Army studies and decades of combat experience but ignored by current Army officials. CBS anchorman Dan Rather weeks before, showed one of the so-called "armored HMMWVs" with its windshield blown out by a roadside bomb that killed another two Soldiers. Before that, another Soldier died in an armored HMMWV after a bomb was easily thrown through one of its 4 windows and 4 doors. Waiting for inadequate armored HMMWV SUVs to be built is not the answer for our military and civilian men in danger in Iraq and gives the enemy easy propaganda video footage of burning trucks. The Army plan to eventually supply 40% of our troops heavier HMMWV trucks ignores that thousands of thicker armored, M113 Gavin light tracked vehicles--without windows/doors and rubber tires that burn--are sitting in depots around the country that could and should replace the thousands of vulnerable HMMWVs in use in Iraq to protect nearly 100% of our troops. Civilian contractors "are on their own" to supply themselves armored vehicles, when we are all in this war together.

Researching this issue since 1994, we've discovered that 50% of an Army heavy division already moves by 10.5 ton M113 Gavin light tracks and in fact, 1,300 are in Iraq now protecting their men though the Army has not supplied the extra armor they are supposed to have fitted to their undersides, belly and gunshields on top. Even worse, Army officials wanted the majority of the current troop rotation in Iraq to ride in vulnerable HMMWV wheeled trucks when they ALL should be riding in adequately protected M113 Gavin tracks, except for heavy trucks carrying cargoes that won't fit into the back of a M113. This bad decision in favor of HMMWV trucks is killing our men and offering weakness that our enemies are exploiting to throw Iraq into chaos.

Casualties in Iraq were temporarily down because troops have been ordered to patrol less to reduce bad PR for Bush re-election. Type "B" personality National Guard troops are also less inclined to patrol and launch raids against the resistance. We thought we would "lay low and ride out" the situation until the June 30th hand-over. Then the enemy refused to abide by our policies. MSNBC's Chris Matthews on Hardball recently asked former presidential national security advisor, Sandy Berger about this. He is worried chaos will break out with the U.S. exerting less control. The many, de-centralized Iraqi opposition groups increasingly sense that Americans cannot even defend themselves much less keep order. The relatively few tracked armored fighting vehicles we have now in Iraq are not enough to be everywhere they are needed if there is a general uprising or "intifada". Most troops will have to fight from HMMWV trucks until they are overwhelmed, and after they are abandoned, try to move on foot. Every Iraqi household is allowed an AK-47-type automatic weapon (AKM); stripped of our vehicular mobility, our troops on foot would be easily pinned down by automatic rifle fire from many directions; their only shield would be firing back into crowds---and there is a finite limit to how much ammo you can carry on your body. If the Iraqis sense they have the Americans pinned down, they could "pile on" with women and children pointing and shooting AKMs into the general direction of huddled American troops, just like what happened in Somalia.

Army pinching pennies and killing troops in Iraq to pay for Canadian-made Stryker trucks

What little nation-state stability there is in Iraq is falling apart via increasing 4th Generation War (4GW) Islamic religious discontent not understood by DoD which prescribes to Alvin and Heidi Toffler's gadget-centric, technowiz world-view described in their book, War and Anti-War. The Tofflers preach that mental information from computers is being embraced by the world to live more at peace, a "3rd Wave" of human achievement that has replaced the "2d wave" of physical machines and "1st wave" of manual labor farming. However, no one has told the Iraqis this, or most of the Islamic world. The disciples of the Tofflers in DoD think a U.S. military with computers can now replace physical mobility and armor protection of tracked armored vehicles while hopefully cutting costs by moving troops in trucks rolling on air-filled rubber tires, boasting this is "transformation" and a "revolution in military affairs" (RMA). Details: www.geocities.com/transformationunderfire

Accordingly, the Bush Pentagon Tofflerians think all you need to win wars is to steer aircraft firepower by mental "mouse clicks" and then "mop up" inexpensively with troops-in-trucks. The monies they think they will save by not having a capable Army moving in armored, tracked tanks can be used to buy more expensive precision guided bombs for aircraft. On the ground, the Bush DoD thinks it can "cherry pick" where and when it will fight using computers and icons to create a mythical linear battlefield even though we lack the physical troops to clear out areas of actual enemies to make "safe" rear areas for trucks to operate. In the physical world, the enemy with lots of explosives, unused 155mm artillery shells, RPGs and AKMs has refused to co-operate with our Tofflerian rules. This mentality that we don't need physical maneuver, presence and armor protected control but can drive around in vulnerable trucks has failed miserably in Non-Linear Battlefield (NLB) in Iraq where the enemy can physically attack at any time in any direction; so far over 739 dead, 5, 162 serious and 18,000 total evacuated wounded Americans--some maimed for life.

Disturbingly, the Army's Tofflerians now want to cover up their mistakes with a 2-year program to slap armor onto wheeled trucks rather than honestly adapt to NLB reality and fully employ tracks. Why? Why not use tracks that physically work best, and put a computer in them if you insist and take care of our Soldiers? Because tracks are "old fashioned" to them since they are physical and "2d wave" in the Toffler's timeline of human ego. Someone else created them when they were in charge, the current generation of Army officers can't claim they created tracked vehicles on their Officer's Evaluation Report (OER) to get promoted or spend billions of tax dollars on new wheeled vehicles that expands Army power/prestige in Washington D.C. and creates employment opportunities after they leave the service. Never mind, that computers can and have been placed in the Army's 3rd and 4th Infantry Division's light, medium and heavy tracks which did well when they were in Iraq because they were physically protected and dominant and not just relied on information as a crutch. Even though wheeled vehicles are inferior to tracks, they look different so Army officials can spin press releases/photo opportunities to the uninformed how they are "transforming" the Army. Thus, the Army wastes $250 million per year just for contractor support to keep 2 brigades of problem-prone, Stryker wheeled lemons operating; one is in Washington State and another is hiding out in a quiet part of Iraq to claim combat successes while this money could have up-armored all of the 1,300 M113 Gavins actually in combat in Iraq and supplied our troops under fire another 1,150 up-armored Gavin tracks to get them out of dangerous HMMWV trucks. While 134,000 troops are getting burned in Iraq on foot and in 10,000 cheapo HMMWV trucks, the Army "fiddles" with buying handfuls of $3.3 million each Stryker trucks in a 300 vehicle brigade that costs over $1 BILLION dollars, then marvels why it doesn't have money for body armor, so troops have to buy their own? Strykers are so expensive even their brigade troops have to ride around in unarmored HMMWV/5-ton trucks resulting in several easily preventable deaths in Iraq. If the Army cannot afford Strykers to move a brigade of troops its simply not economically feasible to outfit/operate significant parts much less the entire Army in such costly vehicles Each year the Army wastes another $1 BILLION on the "Future Combat System" (FCS) research program that delivers no vehicles at all to the fight we are in now. Like the RAH-66 Comanche, 10 years and $10 BILLION later we will "discover" we cannot afford over-priced FCS vehicles and NOTHING will actually get put into our troops hands. If you doubt that current Army Generals see computers as a panacea read Yakovac's Tofflerian hubristic remarks in the recent Inside the Army article by Jen DiMasci, "Transformation vs. modernization: LAWMAKERS FEAR FUTURE COMBAT SYSTEM FACES MAMMOTH PRICE TAG, DELAYS reports:

The Army's Future Combat System faced a wave of criticism last week by members of the House Armed Services Committee after the General Accounting Office released a report questioning the service's acquisition strategy. Panel members said FCS was fraught with the risk of missed deadlines and budget overruns that could over-whelm the service and limit its ability to protect Soldiers.

Rep. Curt Weldon (R-PA), chairman of the tactical air and land forces subcommittee, said that in addition to the system of system's price tag -- estimated at $92 billion for procurement and up to $40 billion for research and development -- the Army has never managed a program of such size or complexity. The 18 systems and communications network that will comprise FCS will rely on 32 critical technology areas, 34 million lines of code, 129 studies and 157 programs, Weldon said. "If FCS experiences the technical difficulties that every major development program seems to experience, the cost overruns will consume this budget," he said during the April 1hearing. Weldon said his worries go deeper than FCS. The Army is trying to balance its thirst for adding technology while meeting current needs for force protection and equipment repairs, he said. "Maintaining current equipment is a major challenge," Weldon said. "It is our responsibility to ensure that we do not sacrifice today the capabilities and equipment provided to our Soldiers to field a capability two decades from now. Our past experience indicates that the current force is constantly shortchanged by ever escalating cost over-runs...We are in the midst of a massive train wreck. . . . As members of Congress, we have to ask where is the money [for Army transformation] going to come from," Weldon said.

Rep. Neil Abercrombie (D-HI) said he supported Weldon's proposal to move cautiously on FCS but had an additional concern. Will the Army's "razzle dazzle" technology respond well in asymmetric warfare? The Iraqi insurgency is exhibiting surprisingly "good military doctrine" because it exploits the assets they have on hand -- such as launching mortars from donkey carts, Abercrombie said.

Lt. Gen. Joseph Yakovac, the military deputy to the Army's civilian acquisition director, said FCS technology is critical when fighting an asymmetric battle because armor eventually has limitations. The key to force survivability is in information and networking, which the FCS communications system will provide. Superior situational awareness will prevent troops from constantly reacting to threats, Yakovac said.

The congressional inquiry was based in part on a GAO report released April 1. According to the report, 75 percent of the technologies needed to equip the system of systems were "still immature" when the program started. And, because the first prototypes will not be ready until just before the initial production decision in 2008, the program is at a high risk for not delivering what it has promised on time.

Is it a wonder why we have over 739 dead and 18,000 wounded American Soldiers so far in Iraq with Generals so out-of-touch-with-physical-reality like Yakovac? The Army's senior leaders don't understand the non-linear fight in Iraq cannot be won fighting the enemy at a physical disadvantage outnumbered AK47 versus M16 with troops on foot and in wheeled trucks-- regardless if we have computers or not. We already have computer information networks in vehicles in Iraq and they are NOT providing the battle-winning panacea that Yakovac and others brag about. We publicly accuse them of not giving a crap about our troops in Iraq by having them die under-equipped without enough tracked armored vehicles so they can pay for handfuls of their pet technowiz projects. While our brave, young Soldiers die and are maimed, senior Army leaders like General Heebner and Keane retire and become high-paid executives of the companies building pet technowiz projects they instigated while in uniform.

Furthermore, weighing down trucks trying to make them durable enough for combat when they are not combat vehicles--will make the entire Army too road-bound to fight in mud/rice paddies/jungles of the far east and much of the world. To save our troops, maintain control in Iraq and win future 4GW non-linear battles against terrorists as well as enemy nation-state armies, we must value physical, ground MANEUVER using go-anywhere, adequately protected tracked armored vehicles not wheeled trucks. Whether American forces could survive an imminent Tet-type offensive all over Iraq hinges on our troops not being properly equipped with enough M113 Gavin light tracked AFVs which are sitting back here in the U.S. when they should be there in Iraq. 700 are sitting unused in Kuwait! The troops cannot wait 2 years for an inadequate HMMWV armor cover-up; they need light tracks NOW to meet the imminent Iraqi melt-down. Congressman Davis from Tennessee in February sent a full report of these facts to Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld, yet it remains unanswered.

The entire country could collapse into civil war in June when we turn over control to the new but impotent Iraqi government. A Tet-type offensive would pit thousands of angry unarmed Iraqi mobs swarming around HMMWV trucks forcing American troops to either fire on them or flee their flimsy mounts lest they be incinerated in them when the mobs surround them, toss fire bombs inside and/or turn them over. American troops could be forced to flee for their lives back to their barricaded city areas and a dozen fortified camps and then be frankly surrounded and trapped. How long their ammunition/food/water could last since they wouldn't be able to move in their wheeled trucks for resupply? is a big question mark. Think what happened in Mogadishu during the "Blackhawk Down!" incident except this time its 100,000 troops trapped not 100. If this happens, U.S. forces will have to flee Iraq like it was Saigon in 1975, fighting their way south to Baghdad airport to set up a defensive perimeter and then fleeing by aircraft to Kuwait, leaving behind all of their impotent wheeled trucks, or trying to take the few tracked AFVs they have to lead the way through Iraqi opposition for the wheeled trucks to flee back to Kuwait.

WE ARE IN DIRE DANGER OF A TACTICAL, OPERATIONAL AND STRATEGIC DEFEAT IN IRAQ THE LIKES OF WHICH WE HAVE NOT SEEN SINCE THE RED CHINESE ALMOST THREW US OUT OF KOREA IN 1951.

Solution

The American Congress needs to order the U.S. Army to have its current heavy units in Iraq (1st Infantry Division, 1st Cavalry Division, National Guard 30th and 81st Brigades) that left behind literally hundreds of modernized 11-ton (same weight as a FMTV truck) M113A3 Gavin-type light steel-tracked AFVs, send for these life-saving and war-winning vehicles IMMEDIATELY to Iraq by land, sea and air as fast as humanly possible and reverse the current deteriorating security situation to get our troops out of HMMWV trucks before the Iraqis can overwhelm them in a general uprising. Extra peel 'n stick armor that the troops themselves can apply, made by Armor Systems International of Vancouver, WA called Aztik validated by Army Aberdeen Proving Ground tests to stop .50 caliber, half-inch projectiles moving at 3,000 feet per second needs to be supplied to all Gavins. Also ACAV Gunshields for the TC and troops on guard out the top troop hatch as soon as possible. Troops in M113 ACAV Gavins saved the day during the 1968 Tet offensive in Vietnam by their tracked, armored mobility enabling them to fan out quickly despite enemy opposition all around and restore order. If Iraq falls apart in the coming months, we need the same everyone-in-a-light-tracked AFV capability to rapidly put down the uprising and secure key governmental and religious centers, roads, power plants, shops and stores. We need to find/destroy all of the Iraqi arsenals and weapons installations where all these 155mm artillery shells, RPG rounds and explosives are stored.

It would be cheaper for us to give the new Iraqi Army/Security forces new American weapons so we know who is legit and who is not, than get run out of the country where both friend and foe brandishes an AKM and/or RPG. We propose force structures formed with M113 Gavin light tracked AFVs be sent to cover the border to cut off supplies and al Queda terrorists coming from the outside. Surplus M113 Gavins should be supplied at no charge to civilian contractors in Irag so their funds can buy extra armor and gunshields.

All of our troops need clear ballistic riot control face shields fitted to their helmets and riot control OC pepper spray hand grenades and paint ball guns to withstand rock attacks and disburse angry mobs without killing people and started a cycle of revenge violence. If we do not do this, we could have a blood bath and be thrown out of Iraq; a strategic defeat for the U.S. that could destroy our perception as a super power and thrust the entire world into chaos as our many enemies "pile on" be it terrorist attacks" or land grabs ie; North Korea vs. South Korea, Serbs vs. Kosovo, Red China vs. Taiwan etc.

If we survive Iraq...

The non-linear 4GW battlefield requires that EVERY ounce of vehicular protection is provided to our troops; we cannot squander this away by using wheeled trucks with window, doors, windshields or $3 million Strykers which are 28% less space/weight efficient than tracks, all of which run on easily destroyed, air-filled rubber tires. Recently a $3.3 million dollar Stryker armored truck was incinerated by just $30 dollars of RPGs in Mosul, at this exchange rate the terrorists will win by bankrupting us. On the NLB, the enemy can attack at any time in any direction and American Soldiers must have the ability to shrug off such attacks by being in a light tracked AFV with applique' armor and gunshields that resists against RPGs, roadside bombs, mobs, barricades and firebombs. The minimum non-linear battlefield transportation standard for the U.S. Army must be an upgraded M113 Gavin light tracked AFV not a pair of flimsy quasi-armored HMMWV or Stryker trucks that offer the enemy obvious physical weaknesses for the enemy to exploit with asymmetric tactics. The U.S. Army must be able to fight anywhere in the world to include rice paddies, swamps, and mud; if we squander tax dollars slapping armor onto HMMWV and buying expensive handfuls of Stryker trucks we will become road-bound and run the risk of being encircled by more numerous enemies swarming all around us on foot.

The design of the tracked M113 Gavin represents the wisdom of years of combat experience so troops can fight from the top with situational awareness behind gunshields yet can still talk with people from the vehicle or dismount through the rear ramp, troop door inside the ramp or jump out from on top. We lose all of this going to even "armored" HMMWVs; its an unsafe step backwards to essentially a civilian car that with shoulder-high, 4 doors, 4 windows, a windshield rolls on air-filled rubber tires offering little protection from someone tossing a grenade or molotov cocktail inside. Troops sitting in HMMWV bucket seats if they are protected have their doors and windows closed and are not situationally aware or able to fire back. Remove the doors and they are exposed to instant death if a bomb goes off. Its a lose-lose situation. It takes two HMMWVs to move a 9-man rifle squad at 5 mpg fuel rate and 4 men are taken out of the fight because they have to stay with their vehicles. The M113 Gavin at 3.5 mpg fuel rate is easy to supply, maintain, operate and can go cross-country at will to include swimming across lakes, rivers and even oceans (with waterjet kits), is gentle on pavement, and takes only a driver and Track Commander/Gunner away from the other 7 dismounts but can provide stubborn suppressive fires behind gunshields. The marines could swim "Amphigavins" from ship-to-shore or sling-load them under CH-53E/X Sea Stallion helicopters; they could get surplus M113s FREE from the Army and make them into world-class amphibious infantry fighting for pennies on the dollar. Marines are dying now in Iraq needlessly in HMMWV trucks when the M113 Gavins that could save them are sitting here in the U.S. and Kuwait in storage. Details: www.geocities.com/armysappersforward/amphigavins.htm

FCS-NOW: M113A4 Gavin MTVL Non-Linear Combat Vehicle

Furthermore, just $500,000 of tax dollars per M113 Gavin would provide each squad increased capabilities like hybrid-electric drive stealth, band tracks, 30mm 1-man AV30 autocannon turrets shooting the same lethal ammo as the AH-64 Apaches shoot to dominate the battlefield to enable dominant mounted/dismounted maneuver. A C4ISR package would give "FCS-like" capabilities right now for the war on terror not 10 years from now at an unaffordable $10 million per vehicle. Army light infantry battalion "Delta" companies should switch their impotent HMMWV trucks for M113 Gavin light tracks and then could give Alpha, Bravo and Charlie companies armored mobility as needed without bogging them down with new vehicles to maintain/operate. While M113 Gavins can be externally sling-loaded by CH-47D/F Chinook helicopters at 80-100 mph, armored versions of the Bv206 tracked over-snow vehicle with armored louvers over their windows and driver's station modified to work head out from the roof are smaller and can roll on/off from inside Chinooks for the 101st Air Assault Division to fly at 100-150 mph. Army CH-47D pilots flew Bv206s into combat in Afghanistan (See SOF December 2002 "Riding in harms way on wide tracks" by Major Chuck Jarnot) .The 25th Infantry Division learned to use light tracks to win in Vietnam and so can America's expanding Army light units as we go from 30 to 48 brigade "units of action". .

We ask you, the reader to write his/her Congressman/Senator to pass the following legislation:

Upgrade of Light Tracked Combat Vehicles, Army

For construction, procurement, production, and modification of 2,000 M113 Gavin tracked combat vehicles, equipment, including peel 'n stick applique' armor panels, track commander and troop hatch gunshields, belly armor plates, ordnance, spare parts, and accessories therefore; and transport expenses necessary for 700 of the foregoing vehicles and 1,300 sets of armor to be sent rapidly by sea/air to Iraq, $840,000,000, to remain available for obligation until September 30, 2006: Provided, that of these funds made available under this heading, $400,000,000 shall be available for upgrade of surplus M113A2s for the Army's 4 light infantry division's 6 brigades (not being equipped Stryker armored trucks) to replace vulnerable HMMWV trucks in their infantry battalion "Delta" companies with 800 parachute-airdroppable, C-130 air-transportable "M113A4" Gavins with hybrid-electric drives, band tracks, up-armor and C4ISR packages to compliment their existing TOW ITAS weapons systems and long-range thermal sights. $240,000,000 of these funds are for the 101st Air Assault Division's 3 brigades to procure new 400 armored versions of M973 small unit support vehicles (SUSVs or Bv206S in NATO terminology) that are CH-47D Chinook helicopter internal air-transportable for their Delta weapons companies in lieu of HMMWV trucks. Replacing HMMWV trucks in Army light units' Delta companies with squad-carrying light tracked armored vehicles will render immediate armor protected mobility for the other rifle companies as needed and provide network-centric warfare capabilities for the war on terrorism. That the M113 family of vehicles be officially referred to as the "Gavin" in honor of Army war hero and combat commander General James Gavin who conceived and oversaw the development of these air-transportable, amphibious all-terrain armored fighting vehicles, and the M973 family of all-terrain vehicles be named "Ridgways" in honor of General Matthew B. Ridgway who during the Korean war made U.S. troops fight away from roads to defeat the enemy threat. Many troops already refer to these vehicles by these nicknames.

The tragedy is Army leaders now admit privately that up-armoring HMMWVs is a mistake; FORSCOM General Ellis has distributed a memo realizing the mistake but absurdly calls for more wheeled trucks, this time Strykers made in slow handfuls in Canada at $3.3 million each when our troops need better protected M113 Gavin tracks that are available NOW to be shipped/flown into Iraq to reverse the crumbling situation there.

BREAKING NEWS!!!

GOOD NEWS: Senate Panel to Review Use of Humvees in Iraq After Warning

By Tony Capaccio

April 27 (Bloomberg) -- The Senate Armed Services Committee will review the deployment of AM General Corp.'s Humvee vehicles in Iraq after a top Army general warned that they are not as effective as General Dynamics Corp.'s Stryker transports, panel head Senator John Warner said.

General Larry Ellis of U.S. Army Forces Command in Atlanta, told Chief of Staff Gen. Peter Schoomaker in a March 30 memo that U.S Iraq field commanders were reporting the Humvee ``is not providing the solution the Army hoped for'' in terms of protection. He urged that the service consider asking General Dynamics to double Stryker production.

"I'm going to have a hearing on this armored Humvee situation right away,'' Warner told Bloomberg News in Washington today. Warner said he was concerned money shortfalls might be affecting the type of equipment reaching Iraq. ``We are going to turn to it immediately,'' he said.

The Stryker is a 19-ton, eight-wheeled vehicle that will come in 10 models. It can carry a nine-member infantry or engineer squad at speeds of up to 62 miles an hour on highways --much faster than traditional tracked armor. The Army has spent $3.1 billion to date on what's to be an $8.6 billion program for about 2,000 vehicles.

"The Stryker vehicle is needed to support continuing overseas operations,'' wrote Ellis, who is responsible for the overall organization, training and equipping of the Army but does not have authority to boost production rates.

Kerry Claims

Democratic presidential challenger John Kerry's campaign headquarters yesterday touted the memo as an indication the Bush White House was shortchanging U.S. troops in Iraq.

The Ellis memo should not be construed as highlighting a critical problem because both vehicles provide similar protection, Joint Chiefs of Staff Chairman Gen. Richard Myers said.

"Stryker is a good vehicle,'' Myers said today at a press conference. ``How fast they're going to be brought in the inventory is an interesting point. But it's not a shortage that was brought up by the field commanders, and it's not one that's been brought to us by General Schoomaker up to this point.''

The Army last year accelerated the purchase and fielding of more heavily armored Humvees from AM General, which builds the basic vehicle, and Armor Holdings Co.'s O'Gara-Hess & Eisenhardt subsidiary, which applies the armor.

The Army's requirement grew to 4,402 so-called Up-Armored Humvees today from 235 in August 2003 as Iraq's insurgency has intensified and road-side attacks using improvised explosives have increased. There are 2,750 of the fortified Humvees in Iraq with a goal to reach the 4,402 mark in October, Army officials have told Congress.

The program since last year has received more than $400 million in emergency defense spending.

Strykers

One Stryker brigade is serving in Iraq today. A second is being retrofitted at Fort Lewis, Washington, with specialized wire armor used in all Strykers in Iraq, to blunt the impact of rocket-propelled grenades after undergoing a recent rigorous training exercise. It has not yet received any Iraq deployment orders, said Capt. Tim Beninato, a Fort Lewis spokesman.

The Pentagon has committed to buying six Stryker brigades of about 310 vehicles each.

General Dynamics is producing 24 Strykers a month for a third brigade at its London, Ontario, and Anniston, Alabama, facilities for final deliveries around March 2005, company spokesman Karl Oskoian said.

Production has fallen from 30 vehicles a month last year but the plants are capable of building 50 a month, he said.

Ellis in his memo said it wasn't his intention to accelerate purchases and deployments of entire brigades, just individual vehicles.

"Based on current information, production could double for a total of 650 vehicles a year for only the cost of the additional vehicles,'' Ellis wrote. ``Thus, it is imperative that either funding from congressional supplementals be reauthorized or that funding be diverted from the Bradley Refurbishment Program to fund this operational need immediately,'' he wrote.

Ellis, through a spokesman Maj. James Crabtree, declined to elaborate on his memo.

BAD NEWS: Amidst Criticism, Army Sticks To Armor Buying Plan

BY NATHAN HODGE

The Army has not changed plans for armored vehicle procurement, despite warnings from the field that reinforced Humvees are not providing adequate protection for troops in Iraq and Afghanistan.

In a recently publicized memorandum, a four-star Army general urged Army Chief of Staff Gen. Peter Schoomaker to speed acquisition of the Stryker, an eight-wheeled armored vehicle manufactured by General Dynamics.

"Commanders in the field are reporting to me that the up-armored High-Mobility Multipurpose Wheeled Vehicle is not providing the solution the Army hoped to achieve," wrote Gen. Larry Ellis, the head of Army Forces Command. "It is imperative that the Army accelerates the production of Stryker vehicles to support current operations in Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) and Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF)."

With Iraqi insurgents regularly targeting U.S. vehicle convoys, the Army has been rushing up-armored Humvees to the field. The vehicles-modified by Ohio-based O'Gara-Hess & Eisenhardt, a subsidiary of Armor Holdings Co.-feature armor plating and bullet-resistant glass that provide improved protection against small-arms fire, shell fragments and mine detonations. In addition, the service also has been buying ready-made armor kits that can be bolted on to the Humvees already in theater.

Up-armored Humvees are not indestructible. A standard up-armored model can stop armor-piercing 7.62-mm rounds, but not heavier-caliber bullets; its front axle can withstand a 12-pound contact-mine detonation, while the rear axle can absorb the blast from a four-pound mine; its rubber tires can burn. Recent media reports have focused on cases where armored Humvees have been disabled by gunfire or roadside bombs.

As an alternative, Ellis recommended doubling production of Stryker vehicles, which made their combat debut late last year in Iraq. And he suggested that the service either seek supplemental funds from Congress to buy more of the nineteen-ton, rubber-wheeled vehicles, or divert money from the Bradley Fighting Vehicle Refurbishment Program to pay for it.

The general's memorandum sparked a small media furor, with commentators suggesting the Pentagon is keeping troops in Iraq without adequate protection.

An Army spokesperson downplayed the Ellis memorandum, saying it was "an individual general expressing his opinion" to the Army chief of staff.

"Based on that memorandum, no decision has been made to change requirements," the spokesperson said.

Bob Mecredy, the president of the Aerospace & Defense Group of Armor Holdings, said he thought the uproar over up-armored Humvees was misplaced.

"Vehicles like Stryker are designed for combat roles versus [vehicles for] combat service/support roles like the Humvee," he said. "Unfortunately, I think Gen. Ellis' comments have caused people to worry about what the vehicle's capability is, and we [failed to note] some tremendous work done by the Army ... to put some level of moderate force protection in the hands of our Soldiers and marines." But now, having incorporated that work into Army planning, "we know we're saving lives today."

In major combat, Mecredy added, Humvees cannot substitute for heavy armor: "Now, if the operation transitions back into combat actions, then, you know, I'm a former Soldier, I want to be in an M1A1 [Abrams tank] or a Bradley or a Stryker."

Critics of the Stryker program, however, think the Ellis memorandum missed the point. They say that the Stryker is better suited for peacekeeping-style operations, not the kind of combat now going on in Iraq; some suggest the delivery of tracked M113s from existing stocks would make a better substitute for up-armored Humvees.

According to a senior Army officer with experience in the region, wheeled vehicles-whether they are armored Humvees or the Stryker-fall short of the mark.

"You had the previous [Army] chief of staff who became enamored of light, wheeled armor during his tenure in Bosnia ... and decided that the Army would do one of two things: we would fight another war on the scale of World War II, which is the cultural predisposition of the senior officers, or we would go someplace and be peacekeepers, and nothing in between," he said. "Not a very broad-minded or thoughtful approach. The result of that was the Stryker brigade, which was originally designed for peacekeeping-it was never designed as a warfighting platform."

Schoomaker, a special operations veteran, is also "enamored of light infantry," the officer said. "He's got thirty years of experience falling out of airplanes, and feels a great deal of disdain for the armored force. And I think that his experience in places like Panama ... where the enemy was worse than incompetent, almost irrelevant, led him to a large number of fallacious assumptions. He decided that the first thing that we needed to do once we were in Iraq was to get as much of the armor out as possible and convert the Army into a light, infantry-centric constabulary force."

The Stryker Brigade Combat Team of the 3rd Brigade, 2nd Infantry Division is currently based in Mosul, northern Iraq. The major fighting this month in Iraq has been in central and southern Iraq.

Asked if his company could boost Stryker production if Army leaders changed their mind, a General Dynamics official said: "Should the Army wish to increase production, we could accommodate."

Tanks Sought To Protect Soldiers
Associated Press
April 28, 2004

WASHINGTON - Changing gears in the face of an emboldened insurgency in Iraq, the Army is asking for additional tanks or other heavy armored vehicles to improve protection for Soldiers.

The request reflects a recognition by military commanders that they must adapt as the insurgency evolves. With at least 115 deaths, this has been the deadliest month for U.S. forces since they invaded 13 months ago; troops are killed and maimed daily by improvised bombs and rocket-propelled grenades that can penetrate the relatively thin skin of the jeep-like Humvee.

When the Army rotated fresh units into Iraq this spring, the newly arrived forces left some of their tanks, Bradley infantry vehicles and armored personnel carriers at home, figuring they needed a higher proportion of Humvees to be light and more agile to deal with insurgents.

But as the anti-occupation violence has grown, Army leaders have concluded that the lighter force should be stiffened with more armor. Initially the response was to add armor plates to the Humvees, giving them a measure of extra protection. Now, even that seems too little.

Gen. Larry Ellis, commander of Army Forces Command, recently told his superiors at Army headquarters that Humvees equipped with extra armor are inadequate in the face of insurgent attacks, a senior defense official said.

The matter has become an issue in the presidential race. Democratic candidate John Kerry's campaign said Tuesday the Army's call for more armored vehicles is an example of the Bush administration's "disregard for the men and women who put their lives on the line every day in Iraq."

At the Pentagon, Gen. Richard Myers, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, said that the request has not reached his office, but he understands U.S. commanders want a "modest" increase in armor for troop protection. He did not specify the type of vehicles that would be added, but presumably it would be a mix of tanks, Bradleys and armored personnel carriers.

"It's not a major change in philosophy" about how to defeat the insurgency, Myers said.

Myers argued that Humvees with extra armor tacked on have been proven lifesavers in Iraq. He also stressed that even the most heavily armored vehicle - the M1A1 Abrams tank - cannot fully protect the Soldiers inside when hit with an improvised explosive armed with a 105mm shell.

Gen. Paul Kern, commander of Army Material Command, which supplies the Humvees and the rest of the equipment used in Iraq, said in an Associated Press interview Tuesday that U.S. commanders in Iraq have made "adjustments" that include requesting more heavily armored vehicles.

Kern said he could not discuss the details because it would reveal too much about the military's operations in Iraq, but he said the change has had a ripple effect on the supply of spare parts.

Speaking at his office at Fort Belvoir, Va., Kern also said he disagrees with those who say the heavy strain on the Army since Sept. 11, 2001, is a temporary "spike," and not a longer-term pattern. He sees no reason to expect a dropoff anytime soon in the Iraq or Afghanistan missions.

"We believe that the tempo of current operations is one which we need to continue to plan for," he said. "There were some suggestions in the past that we were at a peak. We think that this war on terrorism is going to be more of a norm for some period of time."

Kern did not discuss U.S. troop levels in Iraq, but Defense Secretary Donald H. Rumsfeld said Tuesday that he was studying options for maintaining the 135,000-strong U.S. force in Iraq beyond this summer. The force was to have been cut to 115,000. Rumsfeld recently scratched that plan, extending the tours of about 20,000 Soldiers who otherwise would have left Iraq this month.

Rumsfeld said he also was looking at possibilities for increasing the force beyond 135,000 at some point.

"I should add that we have no requests along that line, either for replacement troops or for troops above the replacement level," he said.

The defense secretary left open the possibility that the administration would have to ask Congress sooner than it had planned for additional billions of dollars to run the Iraq war. So far the administration has said it did not intend to ask for more money until early 2005.

Rumsfeld said his budget specialists are reviewing figures to see if they can make ends meet on the existing budget.

"Is it conceivable that they're not going to be able to manage the additional costs?" he asked without answering, referring to the cost of keeping more troops in Iraq than previously planned and the cost of intensified up fighting.

MORE BAD NEWS: M8 Buford AGS Back-Stab all over again! Blame General Yakovac

82nd Airborne through Congressman Robin Hayes got the Army to field the 4 x M8 Buford AGS light tanks that are sitting in storage in York, PA to render immediate parachute-deliverable shock action/firepower lost when the M551 Sheridan light tank battalion was retired in 1997. Gen Schoomaker said he liked the M8 Thunderbolt seen at AUSA. LTG Cody, Army G3 had set it all in motion and ready to go.

Details:

www.geocities.com/equipmentshop/lighttanks.htm

All was fine until LTG Yakovic twisted Schoomaker's arm that M8 Buford AGS would "threaten" the Stryker-MGS which is frankly not working, a piece of junk and not parachute airdrop certified. Its unlikely the Stryker-MGS can even take-off in a C-130 much less roll off the rear ramp on an airdrop platform and not impact the rear tail with only 104" of height available. Schoomaker knuckled under to the wheeled armored truck/GDLS mafia and reversed the OK for the M8 Buford AGS.

Below is a link to the 2001 M8 rejection letter by VCSA Gen John Keane to show the historical corruption within our Army towards tracks even when its a pet project of the "Airborne Mafia". We were hoping clique-ishness would finally work in the troops' favor for a change. The troops-in-wheeled-trucks-with-computers RMA/Tofflerian clique in our Army is killing and maiming our troops and setting the stage for the destruction of the fighting capabilities of our Army.

After being in uniform supporting the Stryker deathtrap and blocking the M8 Buford AGS light tank in 2001 (see letter link below), General Keane retired and joined the Board of Directors of GDLS the makers of the Stryker wheeled deathtrap.

www.combatreform.com/m8rejectionletter2001.gif

WARNING: U.S. IN DANGER OF BEING THROWN OUT OF IRAQ: CARLTON MEYER

A careful reader of the limited news coming out of Iraq will discover the U.S. military situation is perilous and a few more bad moves could send the U.S. Army and marines retreating back to Kuwait in the same manner they fled southward 54 years ago in Korea. That was when a million Chinese foot soldiers suddenly appeared and attacked as overextended U.S. forces approached the Chinese border. American firepower, airpower, and technology was unable to compensate for the confusion and lack of supplies for American ground troops.

The main problem in Iraq today is the massive logistics effort required to sustain U.S. Forces at a over a hundred dispersed camps. Over 95% of supplies arrive by ship, and the closest major seaport is in Kuwait. This means everything must be hauled hundreds of miles over war torn roads among hostile natives. This is far more difficult than Vietnam, which had a long coastline where supplies could be dropped off. A recent article by Tom Ricks of the Washington Post noted that most convoys are attacked, and that Soldiers must to stop to check each bridge for explosives because there is not enough manpower to guard them. Other reporters tell of recently destroyed bridges, forcing convoys to travel on secondary roads which doubles their travel time. In addition, many civilian truck drivers have refused to drive and many foreign logistics contractors have left Iraq.

Many reports tell of ammunition rationing. The U.S. military was not expecting a prolonged conflict, and drawing and transporting dangerous ammo from limited worldwide stockpiles is a challenge. Senior Army officials told the House Armed Services Committee last month that nearly all the wartime stockpiles in Southwest Asia and on the island of Diego Garcia have been issued, as well as equipment stashed in Europe—a total of 10,000 tanks, personnel carriers, trucks, and other vehicles. Only the Army's equipment for one brigade in Korea and the marines' brigade stock in Guam remain untouched. In addition, the desert sand and heavy use of helicopters and equipment is wearing them out many times faster than usual. This demands many more spare parts and shortages have developed. Ammunition and most military spare parts cannot be purchased on the commercial market. Assuming the military supply and contracting bureaucracy can quickly identify needs and place orders, it takes months to boost production. Meanwhile, Generals must juggle budget allocations with semi-legal account shifts since the Bush administration has announced that it will not ask Congress for supplemental funding until January, after the presidential election.

Back in Iraq, U.S. commanders need more troops to guard supply lines and provide security, but more troops require more supplies. Moreover, the Army is stretched to the limit and has no forces ready to deploy. There are several National Guard divisions available since most Guard combat units have not been mobilized since 9-11. However, that would cause an election year embarrassment for the Bush administration, and there is no money allocated to pay them anyway. While President Bush often proclaims the nation is at war, he has failed to request a tax increase to pay for it and has become hesitant to mobilize more reservists to provide the manpower Army Generals say they need. Meanwhile, combat units have been diverted for an election year offensive into the rugged Afghanistan mountains in hope of capturing Osama bin Laden, while the Spanish and other allies pull their troops from Iraq. Finally, hundreds of heavy M1 tanks were shipped back to the USA last year as the Army expected only light peacekeeping duty. Only 70 are left in Iraq, while 28 are inbound from Germany in an emergency airlift personally ordered by Secretary Rumsfeld. The 1st marine Division brought none of its 58 tanks and was forced to borrow some from the Army to support recent fighting.

Americans forget the Bush administration had promised democracy in Iraq. Eventually, they realized that since the Shiite represent 60% of Iraq, the country would come under the control of fundamentalist religious leaders who are likely to demand the U.S. military leave. The U.S. is building four large, modern "enduring" bases in Iraq, and apparently wants to shift forces now based in Germany to permanent bases in Iraq, which is to become America's military bastion in the Middle East. Iraqis are not fooled by statements that "sovereignty" will be granted on June 30th. All this means is that some new English speaking Iraqi puppets will be appointed to represent U.S. interests. While the U.S. military attempts to win their hearts and minds with billions of dollars in aid, Iraqis show little gratitude since the U.S. caused most of the damage with bombings and a ten year trade embargo.

Sensational reporting by Arab television networks has aroused anti-American hatred throughout the Arab world. The religious co-leaders of unstable Saudi Arabia issued a fatwa (a law) urging Muslims to use "all means" to stop what it called "the fierce onslaught" on Muslims by "occupation forces" in Iraq. It "urges every fair person among Muslims and others in the world to denounce this fierce onslaught and strive by all means to stop it and punish those responsible for it", said the fatwa, carried by the Saudi state SPA news agency. This was not reported by American media, and the effect is difficult to measure, but worrisome enough that the U.S. government immediately ordered all non-essential U.S. citizens to leave Saudi Arabia. President Bush further infuriated Arabs by announcing that he would not seek an agreement to end the Israeli occupation of Arab land, but will support whatever Israel wants to do.

As a result, Iraq has become a magnet for young, adventurous jihadist from Syria, Saudi Arabia, and Iran whose leaders have begun to openly voice disapproval of the situation. Iran has a population of 70 million, compared to 25 million in Iraq. If one million armed Iranians slip across the border and attack American infidels, the U.S. may have to retreat. Anyone who thinks this is implausible should read about the U.S. Army's embarrassing retreat from North Korea in 1950. Army Generals were extremely optimistic, dismissive of their enemy, and thought airpower could always protect them. This historical document: Staff Operations: The X Corps in Korea, December 1950 includes these comments:

"It seemed as if the war was winding to a successful close. So sure were Almond and his staff of the enemy's weakness that they thinned forces across the entire front. Almond told officers of one regiment: "We're still attacking and we're going all the way to the Yalu. Don't let a bunch of Chinese laundrymen stop you." That regiment was overrun a few days later, by Chinese laundrymen.

"General Willoughby-asserted that a Chinese intervention was highly unlikely but that if it occurred the Chinese would suffer massive casualties to UN air power. This optimism colored the plans and ideas of all subordinate commands."

"At the start of the massive Chinese intervention, the X Corps staff at first tried to ignore it or downplay its effect on the corps' offensive plans. In response to the new guidance and in an attempt to react to the rapidly changing situation for which they had no contingency plans, the X Corps staff prepared a succession of orders, each outlining vastly different types of operations." X Corps and the 1st marine division managed a semi-organized bloody retreat from all of North Korea, but it was embarrassing and costly.

American forces in Iraq cannot be defeated in standard military engagements. However, insurgents know the weak spot; the long main supply routes. If camps run short of ammo and spare parts, they must retreat toward Kuwait and hope that the Army's cash strapped logistics bureaucracy can meet the surging demand to save them from a catastrophe. The Army must take five steps to prevent an embarrassing retreat: 1) Secure the main supply routes and establish emergency supply caches inside Iraq; 2) Develop plans to quickly abandon vulnerable camps in a crisis; 3) Avoid alienating the Arab world with offensive operations until the first two steps are accomplished; 4) Stop calling Iraqi insurgents thugs, terrorists, and criminals. That encourages poor treatment of all Iraqis by American Soldiers and makes negotiations to end violence impossible; 5) Americans must not destroy Iraqi cities in order to save them, lest they find themselves overrun by irate Muslim laundrymen.

Carlton Meyer editor@G2mil.com

G2mil editorials may be freely distributed without permission

We agree with Carlton 1000%.

Carol Murphy
Editor

FEEDBACK!

Legendary Colonel Carl Bernard writes:

"You all,

The book described below by two distinct reviews is by one of the most interesting persons I have ever known, Chalmers Johnson. His earlier book, BLOWBACK, is an "introduction" to this one. You should find all the reviews of his new book at least, although the book itself is well worth all of us knowing and understanding. I am half-way through it and will send you my final conclusions about it later.

Johnson was on the University of California's Political Science faculty at Berkeley when I was posted there in 1972 after the ROTC had been cancelled. We were brought back on campus three years later, due in part to the remarkable support of the faculty, and the cancellation of the draft.

John Paul Vann and I had been company commanders in Colonel Bruce Palmer's 16th Infantry Regiment. I took over John's Heavy Mortar Company when he left, and worked for John in Vietnam several years later. Palmer was a UC Berkeley graduate, one of the reasons for my posting there later.

I have distress with how easily our nature is captured, converted, and misled by our various chiefs. My distress with many of our journalists is as bad as my feelings for the intellectual paucity of many of our senior soldiers and political administrators thinking about critical issues. In effect our declaring war on the Muslim people is of the same ilk as our instituting and then perpetuating that folly in Vietnam.

My youth in the marine corps, exposure to its Japanese language school and subsequent posting to North China (!) prepared me well for my early days in Korea. I knew far too little of that culture despite some exposure from the Japanese who had been posted there. One of my later subsequent postings in the Special Force was with the Hmong mountain people overlooking the Plaine des Jarres in 1961. My time with the French Army-their language and my primitive knowledge of Laotian-let me appreciate the cultures of that particular part of the world. I knew very early how ill-prepared our so-called Special Force was to be effective there.

We have made enormous progress since, but our intelligence services need to know the cultures of the persons in the parts of the world from which they are reporting. This combination of Iraq and the rest of the Muslim world keep me unsettled.

Best regards,

Carl Bernard

THE GLOBAL RACKET

In The Sorrows of Empire, Chalmers Johnson advances the disturbing claim that the United States' Cold War-era military power and far-flung base system have, in the last decade, been consolidated in a new form of global imperial rule. The United States, according to Johnson, has become "a military juggernaut intent on world domination."

Driven by a triumphalist ideology, an exaggerated sense of threats, and a self-serving military-industrial complex, this juggernaut is tightening its grip on much of the world. The Pentagon has replaced the State Department as the primary shaper of foreign policy. Military commanders in regional headquarters are modern-day proconsuls, warrior- diplomats who direct the United States' imperial reach. Johnson fears that this military empire will corrode democracy, bankrupt the nation, spark opposition, and ultimately end in a Soviet-style collapse.

In this rendering, the American military empire is a novel form of domination. Johnson describes it as an "international protection racket: mutual defense treaties, military advisory groups, and military forces stationed in foreign countries to 'defend' against often poorly defined, overblown, or nonexistent threats." These arrangements create "satellites" -- ostensibly independent countries whose foreign relations revolve around the imperial state. Johnson argues that this variety of empire was pioneered during the Cold War by the Soviet Union in Eastern Europe and the United States in East Asia. Great empires of the past -- the Romans and the Han Dynasty Chinese -- ruled their domains with permanent military encampments that garrisoned conquered territory. The American empire is innovative because it is not based on the acquisition of territory; it is an empire of bases.

Johnson's previous polemic, Blowback, asserted that post-1945 U.S. spheres of influence in East Asia and Latin America were as coercive and exploitative as their Soviet counterparts. The Sorrows of Empire continues this dubious line. Echoing 1960s revisionism, Johnson asserts that the United States' Cold War security system of alliances and bases was built on manufactured threats and driven by expansionary impulses. The United States was not acting in its own defense; it was exploiting opportunities to build an empire. The Soviet Union and the United States, according to this argument, were more alike than different: both militarized their societies and foreign policies and expanded outward, establishing imperial rule through "hub and spoke" systems of client states and political dependencies.

In Johnson's view, the end of the Cold War represented both an opportunity and a crisis for U.S. global rule -- an opportunity because the Soviet sphere of influence was now open for imperial expansion, a crisis because the fall of the Soviet Union ended the justification for the global system of naval bases, airfields, army garrisons, espionage listening posts, and strategic enclaves. Only with the terrorist attacks of September 11 was this crisis resolved. Bush suddenly had an excuse to expand U.S. military domination. September 11 also allowed the United States to remove the fig leaf of alliance partnership. Washington could now disentangle itself from international commitments, treaties, and law and launch direct imperial rule.

Unfortunately, Johnson offers no coherent theory of why the United States seeks empire. At one point, he suggests that the American military empire is founded on "a vast complex of interests, commitments, and projects." The empire of bases has become institutionalized in the military establishment and has taken on a life of its own. There is no discussion, however, of the forces within U.S. politics that resist or reject empire. As a result, Johnson finds imperialism everywhere and in everything the United States does, in its embrace of open markets and global economic integration as much as in its pursuit of narrow economic gains.

Johnson also offers little beyond passing mention about the societies presumed to be under Washington's thumb. Domination and exploitation are, of course, not always self-evident. Military pacts and security partnerships are clearly part of the structure of U.S. global power, and they often reinforce fragile and corrupt governments in order to project U.S. influence. But countries can also use security ties with the United States to their own advantage. Japan may be a subordinate security partner, but the U.S.-Japan alliance also allows Tokyo to forgo a costly buildup of military capacity that would destabilize East Asia. Moreover, countries do have other options: they can, and often do, escape U.S. domination simply by asking the United States to leave. The Philippines did so, and South Korea may be next. The variety and complexity of U.S. security ties with other states makes Johnson's simplistic view of military hegemony misleading.

In fact, the U.S. alliance system -- remarkably intact after half a century -- has helped create a stable, open political space. Cooperative security is not just an instrument of U.S. domination; it is also a tool of political architecture. But Johnson neglects the broader complex of U.S.-supported multilateral rules and institutions that give depth and complexity to the international order. Ultimately, it is not clear what the United States could do -- short of retreating into its borders or ceasing to exist -- that would save it from Johnson's condemnation.

Johnson's jeremiad against what he sees as American imperialism and militarism exhaustively catalogs decades of U.S. military misdeeds, from rapes committed by marines in Okinawa to the deaths of Afghan civilians from errant bombs. He says the Bush Administration, emboldened by September 11, has taken trends that began with the Monroe Doctrine and Spanish-American War to new heights, viewing America as "the greatest colossus in history, no longer bound by international law, the concerns of allies, or any constraints on its use of military force." Johnson's conclusion: The cost of supporting troops deployed to hundreds of bases abroad will bankrupt the American empire and republic.

Johnson is an emeritus Asia expert at the University of California at San Diego and president of the Japan Policy Research Institute. But his book lacks the academic rigor one might have expected. He fails to distinguish between a nation that is imperious, which the U.S. is, and one that is imperialist, which America isn't. Johnson maintains that the more than 700 U.S. military bases around the globe have replaced traditional colonization. But if those bases, which include several in Germany, really translated to political control, Washington wouldn't have faced much resistance in the U.N. Security Council from Bonn, Ankara, and others. Diplomatically, America seems more of a hyped power than a hyperpower.

Johnson also worries about the domestic political muscle of the military-industrial complex. But if it wields so much clout, why is aerospace/defense-industry employment down to 1953 levels and the Pentagon's inflation-adjusted procurement budget half the Reagan-era high? Johnson may be right that the U.S. doesn't always use its power wisely, but he fails to say what the U.S. role should be. Al Qaeda, North Korea, and Iran are all out there. How should the U.S. handle them?"

John Cutonilli provides us some extremely important good news!

"I recently read the April Edition of your Landpowertransformation newsletter. In it you talked about repealing the 17th Amendment. I do not understand why the 17th Amendment needs to be repealed. Under the constitution there is currently two methods for electing Senators. The first method is by the State Legislature (Article I Section 3 Clause 1) The second method is by popular election (17th Amendment). The popular misconception is that the 17th Amendment overrules the first method. The problem with this argument is two fold. First nothing in the 17th Amendment states that the first method cannot be used. In fact it would be unconstitutional for it to say that. This is due to Article V of the constitution, which is the article that allows the constitution to be amended. There are two restriction on amendments. The first restriction is not applicable anymore and has nothing to to with the election of senators. The second restriction is that "no State, without its Consent, shall be deprived of its equal Suffrage in the Senate". As can plainly be read by Article V, no change in the 17th Amendment is necessary.

Currently every state is consenting to the 17th Amendment. If the legislature of any state wanted to choose its state senators all it has to do is withdrawl its consent to the 17th Amendment. That state would then be allowed to choose its senators in accordance with Articles I based on what is written in Article V. As you can read from the above information, no change to the constitution is necessary. All that is needed is for States to choose their own senators."

John Cutonilli

---

GEOSTRATEGIC

Neocon Madmen with World Conquest-on-the-cheap: Iraq looks like 1920 all over again!

www.telegraph.co.uk/opinion/main.jhtml?xml=/opinion/2004/04/10/do1003.xml&sShe et=/opinion/2004/04/10/ixop.html

This Vietnam generation of Americans has not learnt the lessons of history

By Niall Ferguson (Filed: 10/04/2004)

Around this time last year I had a conversation in Washington that summed up what was bound to go wrong for America in Iraq. I was talking to a mid-ranking official in the U.S. Treasury about American plans for the post-war reconstruction of the Iraqi economy. She had just attended a meeting on precisely that subject. "So what kind of historical precedents have you been considering?" I asked. "The post-Communist economies of Eastern Europe," she replied. "We have quite a bit of experience we can draw on from the 1990s."

When I suggested that the problems of privatisation in Poland might not prove relevant on the banks of the Euphrates, she seemed surprised. And when I suggested that she and her colleagues ought at least to take a look at the last Anglophone occupation of Iraq, her surprise turned to incredulity. Not for the first time since crossing the Atlantic, I was confronted with the disturbing reality about the way Americans make policy. Theory looms surprisingly large. Neoconservative theory, for instance, stated that the Americans would be welcomed as liberators, just as economic theory put privatisation on my interlocutor's agenda. The lessons of history come a poor second, and only recent history - preferably recent American history - gets considered.

That's why there hasn't been a month since the invasion of Iraq last year without some clapped-out commentator warning that Iraq could become "another Vietnam". For many Americans - including the Democratic contender for the presidency, John Kerry - the only history relevant to American foreign policy is the history of the Vietnam War. True, the Department of Defence has commissioned some ambitious historical studies. In August 2001, Donald Rumsfeld's office produced "Strategies for Maintaining U.S. Predominance", which compared America's bid to establish "full spectrum dominance" with the attempts of previous empires. Most of it, however, consisted of pretty superficial economics and the conclusion was that technological change has put the U.S. in a league of its own, so more detailed comparative study would be superfluous. [Editor: this is RMA/Tofflerian hubris: www.geocities.com/transformationunderfire]

There was amazement last year when I pointed out in the journal Foreign Affairs that in 1917 a British general had occupied Baghdad and proclaimed: "Our armies do not come into your cities and lands as conquerors or enemies, but as liberators." By the same token, scarcely any American outside university history departments is aware that within just a few months of the formal British takeover of Iraq, there was a full-scale anti-British revolt.

What happened in Iraq last week so closely resembles the events of 1920 that only a historical ignoramus could be surprised. It began in May, just after the announcement that Iraq would henceforth be a League of Nations "mandate" under British trusteeship. (Nota bene, if you think a handover to the UN would solve everything.) Anti-British demonstrations began in Baghdad mosques, spread to the Shi'ite holy centre of Karbala, swept on through Rumaytha and Samawa - where British forces were besieged - and reached as far as Kirkuk.

Contrary to British expectations, Sunnis, Shi'ites and even Kurds acted together. Stories abounded of mutilated British bodies. By August the situation was so desperate that the British commander appealed to London for poison gas bombs or shells (though these turned out not to be available). By the time order had been restored in December - with a combination of aerial bombardment and punitive village-burning expeditions - British forces had sustained over 2,000 casualties and the financial cost of the operation was being denounced in Parliament. In the aftermath of the revolt, the British were forced to accelerate the transfer of power to a nominally independent Iraqi government, albeit one modelled on their own form of constitutional monarchy.

I am willing to bet that not one senior military commander in Iraq today knows the slightest thing about these events. The only consolation is that maybe some younger Americans are realising that the U.S. has lessons to learn from something other than its own supposedly exceptional history. The best discussion of the 1920 revolt that I have come across this year was presented by a young Chicago-based graduate named Daniel Barnard at a Harvard University history conference. This week at New York University it was the economics undergraduates who organised a question and answer session for three senior UN diplomats, including the current (German) president of the Security Council. Their questions - particularly about the likely consequences of a premature American withdrawal - seemed a great deal better informed about the realities of modern imperialism than the anodyne stuff routinely trotted out by the White House.

The high quality of political debate in the American universities suggests that the delusion of American "exceptionalism" may be waning. But for the time being US policy in Iraq is in the hands of a generation who have learnt nothing from history except how to repeat other people's mistakes.

• Niall Ferguson's book Colossus: The Rise and Fall of the American Empire will be published next month by Penguin. His television documentary American Colossus will be broadcast on Channel 4 in June. Adam Nicolson is away

Madmen-with-nukes: Is Pakistan at risk of militant Islamic take-over?

By STRATFOR

SPECIAL REPORT!

Please feel free to send the Stratfor Weekly to a friend or colleague.

THE STRATFOR WEEKLY 13 February 2004

Pakistan Braces for the American Storm

Summary

Pakistani President Gen. Pervez Musharraf has begun warning his country that if it does not root out al Qaeda, the United States will.

Analysis

As part of its self-declared "war on terrorism," the United States has been involved in the Afghan theater of operations for more than two years, since it succeeded in overthrowing the Taliban government in late 2001 by employing a strategy heavily dependent upon local allies. Since then, U.S. efforts have followed a bifurcated path: maintaining some semblance of order in Kabul -- where the "national" government resides -- and bombing any concentrated pockets of resistance.

The strategy makes sense. Unlike the Soviet occupation of 1979- 1989, the United States is not attempting to control the entire territory of Afghanistan. Split as it is by the Hindu Kush mountains -- and a plethora of ethnic groups with little to no sense of a shared history -- the country probably is not capable of forming a unified state in the traditional sense. The least violent existence that Afghanistan can hope for is probably to have a very weak central government in which the various regional capitals -- Kandahar, Herat, Mazar-i-Sharif -- exercise de facto sovereign control.

The U.S. strategy, then, is geared toward maintaining the fiction of a "united" Afghanistan, without providing any troops to enforce central rule. The NATO-led International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) patrols only Kabul and the immediate surrounding area, while various regional militias rule their respective territories.

The strategy is not exactly brilliant, but -- considering Afghanistan's history and geography -- it is probably one of the few that could work. As a side effect, it leaves al Qaeda and its sympathizers free to prowl largely where they will and conduct hit-and-run nuisance attacks.

For al Qaeda, this is far from a happy state of affairs. Afghanistan can no longer be used as a major training facility, and the network has been funneling most of its fighters into Iraq. A smaller presence in Afghanistan is a more vulnerable one, so al Qaeda has done what any business would do under similar circumstances: move.

The mountainous border region of the Afghan-Pakistani border region is porous, relatively unguarded and home to the Pushtun ethnic group that straddles national boundaries. Al Qaeda, unhobbled by state loyalties, has most likely moved its core personnel into this region, where it is more complicated for U.S. forces to operate.

But more complicated does not mean impossible.

The Bush administration is looking for the end game. Al Qaeda has proven unable to mount a major strike on U.S. targets since Sept. 11, 2001. The attacks that have occurred -- Casablanca, Bali, An Najaf, Riyadh, etc. -- have been far less ambitious in scope, carried out by affiliate groups and, most importantly, have not touched the U.S. mainland. The next major push from the United States will be an attempt to roll up al Qaeda's prime senior members themselves.

As with all other major policy pushes in 2004, the White House has its eye on domestic politics as well. Melting down al Qaeda into a commemorative coin set to present to the American voter just in time for Nov. 4 would, of course, be a nice touch from a White House perspective. Doing that, however, means rolling into Pakistan with a lot more than a disposable State Department officer with snazzy shoes and a sharply worded demarche. Unlike Afghanistan, Pakistan is a real country with a real army -- and real nuclear weapons. Hence, at the highest levels, Washington has been tightening the screws on Islamabad -- most recently regarding the indiscretions of its nuclear development team.

Musharraf has received the none-too-subtle message, and this week began preparing his country for the inevitable onslaught -- and spurring it into action so that the United States might not need to come calling with a whole division of troops when it comes.

In a Feb. 10 interview with the New York Times, Musharraf made it clear that the onus of responsibility for the nuclear technology leaks was on the CIA, which he said had not provided any proof about the nuclear proliferation until quite recently. While the primary message of "don't blame me or push me around" came through loud and clear, there was also a secondary, more subtle, message: "Show me proof and I'll act."

The buzz in Pakistan this week, at least according to the Daily Times, is that CIA Director George Tenet paid Islamabad a secret visit on Feb. 11. In short, Musharraf was preparing the public for what sort of terms would be necessary for him to cater to Washington's wishes, and Washington just might have provided the appropriate information about al Qaeda's new digs in Pakistan.

That brings us to a more recent statement by Musharraf concerning militant activity. Speaking at Pakistan's National Defense College in Rawalpindi on Feb. 12, Musharraf said, "Certainly everything [within Afghanistan] is not happening from Pakistan, but certainly something is happening from Pakistan. Let us not bluff ourselves. Now, whatever is happening from Pakistan must be stopped and that is what we are trying to do."

On Feb. 10, Musharraf outlined what Washington would need to do to get him to move. On Feb. 12, he made it clear to other power brokers within Pakistan what needed to be done. Stratfor expects a third, more direct, statement to tumble from Musharraf's lips in the near future.

The issue now is simply one of timing. The Afghan-Pakistani border currently is difficult to navigate: Mountains plus winter equals no tanks. Once spring arrives, however, the United States can roll in and -- in theory -- nab all the appropriate personalities, just in time for the Democratic National Convention in July. If the Bush administration can pull it off, more Democrats than Howard Dean will be screaming.

The plan is not quite as neat as it seems. Northern Pakistan is rugged territory, but people actually live there and like it. Most are none too pleased with what the United States has been doing across the border in Afghanistan of late. This region, dubbed the Northwest Frontier Territories, is heavily Pushtun and is rife with al Qaeda supporters. Rolling into it would not be pretty.

In the hopes of heading off what would likely be a bloody U.S. intervention in Pakistan, Musharraf is trying to make the case for a major Pakistani military offensive against al Qaeda and its supporters in these tribal areas.

The Pakistani president is in quite an uncomfortable position, attempting to balance his role as a trusted U.S. ally in the war against militant Islamism, while leading a country where anti- Americanism is at a fever pitch. Despite Musharraf's attempts to proceed with caution, decisions resulting from the U.S. pressure are critically injuring his domestic image.

Musharraf has long stressed that his government furnished the United States with only minimal assistance in terms of logistical support, intelligence-sharing and so forth, and that Pakistani troops are not committed to campaigns outside the country. Both Interior Minister Syed Faisal Saleh Hayat and Information Minister Sheikh Rashid Ahmed routinely deny that U.S. intelligence and military forces are engaged in any operations in Pakistan against al Qaeda/Taliban suspects, particularly when arrests are made or suspected militants are killed in shoot-outs. Hayat and Ahmed have gone to lengths to underscore that Pakistani forces are doing the actual work, while the United States is merely providing intelligence and logistical support in the background.

U.S. troops conducting a large-scale operation inside Pakistan would take away the Pakistanis' we're-doing-it-ourselves factor and could well fracture the Pakistani military, not to mention prompt a backlash from the public.

But Musharraf has no illusions about where he falls on the U.S. priority list. If destroying al Qaeda once and for all means losing the Pakistani president, well, the United States has survived Pakistani regime changes before. Therefore, Musharraf issued an oblique warning to his country that it needs to do a housecleaning -- before the rat-a-tat of U.S. M16s is heard across the Northwest Frontier.

It is unclear just how Musharraf will be able to muster the support necessary for this latest step his government has had to make in the wake of Sept. 11. Initial signs are promising. So far jirgas (councils) of the Utmanzai and North Waziristani tribes have decided to set up militias to hunt down foreign militants. It is far too early to evaluate the tribes' seriousness -- much less their success -- in the matter, but it is obvious that the political dialogue has been sparked.

Islamabad does not have much time to get results. Warmer weather soon will set in, and the ISAF already is taking over policing duties in Afghanistan from U.S. forces, which will free up even more U.S. forces for a counterinsurgency offensive, should Islamabad fail to get the job done.

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OPERATIONAL

The Battle for Algiers: learn from the Casbah Battles

By A Coward

Well, as usual, De Graffenreid has stolen my ideas and given it to his superior Feith in the DoD. In 2000, I advocated to De Graffenreid's class using the Battle of Algiers as a required movie for members of the (Special Operations/Low Intensity Conflict Command) SO/LIC. At the time I mentioned that the movie was a test case on how insurgency would spread to the U.S. urban areas with their large foreign settlements and how probable warfare would arise in an occupation of Iraq or other Middle Eastern Moslem nation. I reasoned that based on past "national liberation" revolutionary methodology that the U.S. was being manipulated into a politico-warfare situation making it ripe for insurgency. I also estimated that some day we would invade Iraq, and that since the Ba'athist were ideological twins of their Barbary kindred in Algeria, and had used similar tactics in the 1950's and 1960's, that they would resort to it again after our occupation.

Of course, I was laughed at by many members of my class who said there never would be a catastrophic attack on American infastructure by Moslems or the beginning of some insurgency cum terror campaign in our cities---undoubtedly today, these same people are in high position of authority, there being an inverse relationship between actual knowledge and oatmeal within the cranium of our leadership. De Graffenreid although loath to agree that insurgency would occurr here in the U.S., undoubtedly did believe we would some day occupy Iraq---See Bene Geserite Azerbaijan.

It now appears De Graffenreid agreed enough with my assessment of probable urban terrorism to issue the movie for viewership (nearly four years later and four airliners manned by Muslems---"who are just like us you know"-yuck). According to this article Feith's and De Graffenreid's office of special plans has made watching the Battle of Algiers a mandatory requirement for members of the OSP and SO/LIC.

BTW, I told a number of people as late as 2002 to buy up as many copies of the Battle of Algiers as possible reasoning that someday it would be watched by the morons at egg-central and their assorted oatmeal heads guiding our illustrious nation. What better way than to make them come talk to you.............

French Lesson: City: Battle of Algiers

By Steve Sailer

The Pentagon’s special-operations chiefs screened the once-famous 1965 film “The Battle of Algiers” last August, inspiring its timely re-release in selected theatres this month. Produced by arch-terrorist Saadi Yacef (who played himself) and directed by the Italian Communist Gillo Pontecorvo, this favorite of the old New Left recounts with remarkably dispassionate (if selective) accuracy one of France’s many military victories on its road to losing the 1954-1962 Algerian war of independence. Ultimately, the 132-year-old settlement of one million “pied noir” Europeans was driven into the sea.

The Pentagon commandos’ flier advertised, “How to win a battle against terrorism and lose the war of ideas … Children shoot Soldiers at point blank range. Women plant bombs in cafes. Soon the entire Arab population builds to a mad fervor. Sound familiar? The French have a plan. It succeeds tactically, but fails strategically.” The Paratroopers’ plan was to track down Yacef’s top killers using intensive interrogation (i.e., torture).

Perhaps, though, our Soldiers should have shown their civilian overlords “The Battle of Algiers” before the latter blithely decided to occupy an Arab country. For extra verisimilitude, the special-ops boys could have strapped Douglas Feith’s Office of Special Plans ideologue-warriors to their armchairs, pinned their eyelids open, attached electrodes, and applied little jolts of juice to help them remember the movie better.

Even without such stimulation, “The Battle of Algiers” is hard to forget but also hard to enjoy. It’s excellent filmmaking and frank history, yet distasteful entertainment because there are no heroes.

The central figure is the illiterate hoodlum Ali la Pointe, portrayed by the illiterate farmer Brahim Haggiag, a North African James Dean in his only movie. Why this superannuated juvenile delinquent became Yacef’s best murderer is of obvious relevance today. Apparently, Ali la Pointe, like many Arabs, was outraged by the French guillotining of a terrorist who had murdered eight civilians, including a seven-year-old girl. Considering how many thousands of innocents both sides slaughtered, it’s puzzling why the Muslims objected even more to a handful of the guilty being executed, but such are the snares Westerners blunder into when they rule an alien culture.

More generally, the sullen ex-pimp, like so many high-testosterone young men in Palestine City, and everywhere, just couldn’t stand wealthy and powerful outsiders giving orders instead of him.

“The Battle of Algiers” ignores France’s expensive efforts to buy the hearts and minds of the Arabs and Berbers. Nor does it stress how the insurgents, to prevent peaceful compromise, mutilated and decapitated moderate Muslims and assassinated liberal Europeans. But what it does show of Yacef’s 1956 terror bombings of bistros and discos is horrifying enough. Alistair Horne’s exhaustive 1978 history, A Savage War of Peace, confirms many of the film’s details. (Paul Johnson’s tour de force summary of Horne’s book—furiously illustrating how a few extremists can launch a vicious cycle of provocation, reprisal, and outrage—climaxes his famous Modern Times.)

Algiers’ civil authorities hand policing over to the paratroopers under Colonel Mathieu. This glamorous character was modeled partly on the redoubtable Jacques Massu, partly on the intellectual colonels like Marcel Bigeard, who had recently parachuted gallantly into the doomed fortress of Dien Bien Phu. While an involuntary guest of General Giap, Bigeard studied Mao’s theories and then used them in his sophisticated counter-guerilla strategy in Algeria.

The anti-French filmmakers give Mathieu most of the best lines. When challenged at a press conference about torture, he answers with Descartes’ logic and Cyrano’s panache:

The problem is: the FLN wants us to leave Algeria and we want to remain … Despite varying shades of opinion, you all agree that we must remain … Therefore, to be precise, I would now like to ask you a question: Should France remain in Algeria? If you answer “yes,” then you must accept all the necessary consequences.

The paras liquidated the Casbah rebels’ leadership in 1957. In Algeria, torture worked. What the film doesn’t show is that in France, though, the public started to lose the stomach for the “necessary consequences.” Alarmed that the politicians might throw away their fallen comrades’ sacrifices, the Paratroopers threatened to drop on Paris in May 1958 unless Gen. Charles de Gaulle became France’s strong man.

Once in power, however, that great patriot resolved to cut and run. He had to weather two coup attempts and countless assassination plots, but, minus the Algerian tumor, long-suffering France emerged peaceful, prosperous, and democratic.

TECHNOTACTICAL

Air-Mech-Strike, anyone? Army lusts for vehicles & helicopters it doesn't have when it already has the platforms it needs for 3D maneuver warfare!

Stop trying to fit 20 tons of FCS to into 15 ton helicopters...If you can't raise the Bridge.....

Maybe you use light tracked tanks under 12 tons that fit inside CH-47F/CH-53Xs instead of the 20-30 ton FCS cash cow?

A 11-ton M113A4 Gavin can be made roadside bomb and RPG resistant with a C4ISR network-centric warfare package, hybrid-electric drive, band tracks etc. for under $500,000. It can even be narrowed to fit inside a CH-47F/CH-53X. Beats wheeled FCS trucks at $10 million each in 2012, doesn't it?

Piasecki can make the CH-47F/CH-53X fly 200 mph for 2,000 faster with their ring-tail compound helicopter technology to effect the "vertical maneuver" we desire.

We call this "Air-Mech-Strike" and its all in our book. Maybe more Generals should read it?

Vertical Envelopment

New heavy-lift helicopters could give the U.S. military unprecedented rapid-deployment capability, but first the Pentagon must attack budgetary problems and inter-service rivalries.

By John R. Guardiano

Army generals dont always speak well about the marine corps. The two services have long enjoyed a healthy, and sometimes not-so-healthy, rivalry. The competition has intensified now that the marines are returning to Iraq to replace Army units.

So it was newsworthy when, three months ago, the Army's Chief of Staff, Gen. Peter J. Schoomaker, went out of his way to praise the marines procurement of the V-22 Osprey.

The reality is that that kind of capability allows you to move at C-130 speeds and C-130 distances, Schoomaker said. Its huge in terms of what it means for battlefield mobility and agility. And I think the marine corps, when it gets the V-22, is going to find itself able to operate further out over the horizon.

This is something that the Army is going to get informed about, Schoomaker added. Part of what were looking at is transformation of Army aviation, and were going to have to look at those kinds of speeds and distances.

Schoomaker, a former head of the Special Operations Command, was brought out of retirement last August by Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld to shake up an Army many observers think has become too bureaucratized and inflexible.

Its not that the Army intends to procure the V-22. Schoomaker clearly stated the service will not. There is nobody right now thats thinking about buying a V-22 for the Army, he said.

However, the capability that the Osprey brings to the battlefield twice the speed, three times the payload, and six times the range of a conventional helicopter, with the ability to self-deploy clearly does interest Schoomaker. Such capability could address the Army's increasingly stringent heavy-lift requirements.

I want to see what's beyond the V-22, he said. There's a dimension beyond that. Its like V-22 capability with a CH-47-size box or a C-130-size box the advanced tactical transport tilt-rotor.

Schoomaker was referring to Bell Helicopter Textron's proposed quad tilt-rotor, one of many ideas now being floated to address the Army's need for more capable heavy-lift, intra-theater logistical supply aircraft.

All of the services require enhanced heavy-lift capability. However, the requirement is most pressing for the Army and Marine Corps, the two services tasked with landing troops on the ground, typically in distant and austere environments with no nearby landing bases.

Schoomaker, in fact, referred to the militarys experience in Afghanistan, where marines and Special Operations Forces were inserted on the ground from ships 900 mi. offshore via helicopters, mostly CH-53E Super Stallions. The mission was successful, but it clearly strained the logistical capabilities of the U.S. military.

Indeed, these helicopters had to be refueled four times en route to Afghanistan. The Osprey would have required just one or two refuelings and it could have performed the mission twice as fast, Schoomaker noted. This speed advantage would make the V-22 considerably less vulnerable to rocket-propelled grenades. Moreover, unlike the CH-53E, the Special Forces CV-22 (and perhaps the marine corps MV-22) will employ Defensive Infrared Counter Measures (DIRCM) to defend against shoulder-fired missiles.

The problem for the Army and the marine corps is that these types of difficult and challenging missions are now the rule, not the exceptionand the rule surely will grow more exacting on the U.S. military. The Super Stallions, after all, made the trek to Afghanistan over friendly, non-hostile airspace. But what happens when thats not the case, as it was not in Iraq?

For the U.S. military, Iraq and Afghanistan are the future, said Tom Donnelly, a military analyst with the American Enterprise Institute in Washington, D.C. The problems were encountering there are going to repeat themselves in future conflicts.

I think Turkey got everyones attention and its become a real catalyst for change, said Mark Gibson, a retired marine corps aviator who now analyzes future concepts for Bell. People realize that even our allies may not allow us to stage operations from their territory, so we need to rethink how we do things.

Turkey did not permit the United States to launch an invasion of Iraq from its territory. This denied the U.S. military a northern front in the war, thus permitting thousands of anti-American armed insurgents to escape the Army and marine forces to their south. These insurgents have since launched a powerful guerilla operation that has bedeviled the U.S military and killed more American troops than were killed during major combat operations last spring.

The Army has heeded this lesson, which is why the service seeks greater heavy-lift capability, said Col. Ellis Golson, director of the Combat Development Directorate at Ft. Rucker. It took a good bit of time to get the 101st [Airborne Division] up to Mosul, he said. And when we do airlift them in, they're limited by how far they can walk, because we can't put a mounted maneuver force on the ground.

But if that were possible through a more capable heavy-lift aircraft, then the Army would have great asymmetric capability. For example, an enemy might know where U.S. airplanes are being staged, but that location could be entirely separate from where American infantry forces are coalescing.

If you're going to execute operational maneuver, then you're going to need the capability to put a force down in a position of advantage whenever and wherever you want, Golson explained. Otherwise youre limited to linear [military] effects.

Golson said that it is too early to speculate on the performance specifications that the U.S. military wants in a new heavy-lift aircraft. However, it is well known within the industry that the Army requires an aircraft that can transport its 20-ton Future Combat System (FCS), and that the service seeks to extend its heavy-lift range to around 500 km. roundtrip. Cruising speeds in excess of 200 kt. also are desired.

The use of heavy-lift rotorcraft to vertically envelop the adversary with the FCS force package has shown significant promise in war games and simulation models, reported the Rand Corp. in a 2003 study.

The Pentagon, consequently, has commissioned a Joint Vertical Aircraft Task Force to focus the military's acquisition and technology efforts on manned, vertical aviation. As Michael W. Wynne, the acting under secretary of defense for acquisition, technology, and logistics, explained in a July 25 memorandum:

Planning and funding for vertical aircraft science and technology investment, infrastructure, research and development, and procurement do not adequately reflect the warfighters reliance on these important assets. Task force recommendations, he wrote, will affect the Fiscal 2005 and 2006 budgets.

The task force is focusing on vertical heavy-lift aircraft because that is the U.S. militarys most pressing, unfulfilled aviation requirement, task force members said.

The Army's only cargo helicopter, the CH-47 Chinook, has performed well in Iraq and Afghanistan and thus been utilized for troop assault missions as well as logistical supply efforts. However, the Chinooks performance underscores the increasing importance of vertical heavy-lift aircraft to the U.S. military, analysts said.

I think that among the Army aviation modernization requirements, the need for modernizing heavy lift is probably more pressing than the need for new attack or utility helicopters, said Loren Thompson, an analyst for the Lexington Institute in Arlington, Virginia.

Given the threats that we face, the Apache is more than adequate and the Black Hawk is doing fine. Where we have a problem is in an increasingly decrepit cargo helicopter that cant really do the type of logistical support that rapid deployment requires. Its getting a little worrisome, Thompson said.

Added Richard Aboulafia, an aviation analyst with The Teal Group in Fairfax, Virginia: Theres no question that vertical mobility and heavy-lift capability are of huge importance to an Army that is trying to reinvent itself for this century.

Emerging Technologies

The Pentagon's director of transformation, Vice Adm. Arthur K. Cebrowski (Ret.), has dubbed the military's requirement for more capable rotary-wing aircraft an area of potential regret. These are areas that are not funded at the kind of level that is likely to produce a result which is consistent with the actual available technology, Cebrowski said in a recent speech.

Were moving to the non-continuous battle space, which is profoundly enabled by advances in information technology. Those advances will come to naught if there are not corresponding advances in battlefield mobility, particularly vertical mobility. Heavy-lift capability also is essential to supporting operational maneuverability, Cebrowski noted.

Yet, NASA closed down its National Full-Scale Aerodynamics Complex in May because of a lack of funding. The Ames Research Center in Sunnyvale, California, houses two full-scale wind tunnels40x80 ft. and 80x100 ft., respectively that are instrumental to developing new rotorcraft technologies, industry officials said.

Moreover, NASA zeroed out rotorcraft research funding in Fiscal 02 and 03. Some of that money was later restored, and the agency has since agreed to fund aeronautics research with at least $15 million annually. But $15 million represents just 2530 percent of what this funding stream used to be, said Rhett Flater, executive director of the American Helicopter Society International in Alexandria, Virginia.

Funding is especially important now because seed money spent today will go a long way toward identifying what is technologically feasible and cost-efficient, industry officials said.

We can build anything, said retired Army Col. Waldo Carmona, who now leads Boeings advanced rotorcraft research efforts. We just need to know what the military wants

Boeing manufacturers the Chinook and is co-producing the Osprey with Bell.

The company insists, though, that it is not wedded to any particular aircraft type or technology, but instead is investing in basic modeling and simulation research to illustrate the tradeoffs involved in any potential solution.

Every configuration has pros and cons, whether its cost, speed, or lift efficiency, Carmona said. However, he added, these are technologically exciting times.

We can do things with rotor blades that were unthinkable 10 years ago. We have fuel-efficient engines that can reduce fuel consumption by 35 percent and still extend the aircraft's range. Weve made great advances in transmission design. Our manufacturing processes are better. We now use smarter, composite materials, Carmona said.

Sikorsky officials agreed that if the financial commitment is there, great technological progress can be made; however, theyre skeptical about whether enhanced vertical lift capability is a true Pentagon priority. Even within the rotorcraft world, there are a lot of bills to pay, cautioned Kit McKeon, Sikorsky's director of Army business development.

McKeon said Sikorsky has a number of new technologies that it could develop to address the militarys need for a more capable heavy-lift aircraft, but he declined to identify these technologies because they are proprietary.

Sikorsky has publicly proposed a coaxial-design, three-engine helicopter that could lift upwards of 25 tons. This aircraft would not provide the dramatic increases in speed and range promised by the Bell quad tilt-rotor. Nor would it match that aircrafts promise of vast internal cabin space for heavy-lift transport. Cargo instead would have to be transported by hook beneath the aircraft.

Sikorskys coaxial-design heavy-lift helicopter, though, would cost substantially less than the quad tilt-rotoran estimated $50 million a copy versus $100 million a copy, respectively, industry analysts said.

Wanted: Leap Ahead

The problem is that the joint U.S. military doesnt really know what it wants in the way of a future heavy-lift aircraft, when exactly it wants it and at what cost. But without leadership from the Pentagon, the various services go their separate ways.

The marine corps, for instance, has committed to a remanufacture of the CH-53E. The new CH-53X should be flying in 2012 and the marines expect to take delivery of the last such helicopter in 2022, said Maj. David Dowling, the Corps' CH-53X requirements officer.

The horrible truth is that CH-53X funding ramps up right around the time that CH-47 funding ramps down, Aboulafia said. The Army is scheduled to take delivery of its last new F-model Chinook in 2018. The aircraft then has a useful service life of at least 20 years.

The CH-53X and CH-47F would give the services significant improvements in range and payload. However, they are still old airframes that do not provide the technological leap-ahead capability that is necessary for 21st century conflicts, analysts said. Indeed, neither the CH-53X and CH-47F can ferry the Army's Future Combat System, which is scheduled to enter service in 2012.

The Office of the Secretary of Defense needs to knock heads together between the Army and marine corps for integrated requirements and give this mission the priority it deserves, Thompson said. Our weapon systems are becoming more and more precise, but our logistical capabilities aren't keeping pace with these improvements.

www.militaryinfo.com/news_story.cfm?textnewsid=692

SAD NEWS OF FALLEN AMERICAN HEROES

General Hal Moore's beloved wife, Julie Moore

By Joseph L. Galloway
Knight Ridder Newspapers

WASHINGTON---There is mourning in a number of small corners of the country this week. With a dozen new American Soldier and marine deaths in Iraq over the weekend there are shattered lives in a dozen new towns. And at Fort Benning, Georgia, this week we are laying to rest one of the finest Army wives who ever walked.

Julia Compton (Julie) Moore, 75, was an Army daughter, an Army wife and an Army mother. In the dark days of November, 1965, she did the hardest duty of all: She visited the small bungalows and trailer houses around Columbus, Georgia, to offer her sympathy and support to new widows whose husbands had died in action in the Ia Drang Valley of South Vietnam.

In those early days of the war the Army was overwhelmed by hundreds of death notices for unsuspecting families. It had forgotten how to do this right, so the Western Union telegrams were handed over to taxi drivers.

Julie Moore was horrified when one taxi driver pulled up to the small house where she and the five young children of Lt. Col. Hal Moore, commander of the 1st Battalion 7th Cavalry in Vietnam, were living. It took her a long, long time to answer the doorbell, a lifetime really, and then the driver apologized, said he was lost and asked her where he could find this address.

Mrs. Moore followed in the wake of that taxi and others to comfort the new widows and orphans of a war that would, itself, ultimately be orphaned and abandoned. She also raised unshirted Hell with the Pentagon about so callous a method of notifying the families. Within two weeks the policy was changed and a new one instituted, requiring that an officer and a chaplain personally deliver the sad news. It was also a small beginning of a concern for Army families that has grown into a major program throughout the Army.

Mrs. Moore was a true hero in the book her husband and I wrote about that time in Vietnam and in America, We Were Soldiers Once…and Young and the movie based on that book, We Were Soldiers. Madeline Stowe played the role of Julie Moore on the silver screen, and Mel Gibson portrayed Hal Moore.

The love story on film couldn’t hold a candle to the real love story behind this story. How the dashing West Point graduate swept the lovely college coed off her feet, and married her beneath an archway of drawn sabers.

How she brought forth five children, and raised them largely without a husband who was away following wars or rumors of wars. He fought in Korea; commanded two Infantry companies on places like Pork Chop Hill and Old Baldy. He fought in Vietnam, commanding first a battalion in the Ia Drang Valley, then a Cavalry brigade all over the central part of South Vietnam.

Julie Moore was an Army brat herself, born at Fort Sill, Okla., only child of Col. And Mrs. Louis J. Compton. She would see two of her three sons follow their father to West Point and the Army, and one of them fight in Panama and the Persian Gulf War with the 82nd Airborne.

In January of 1991 I phoned the Moore home to give Hal Moore the news that I was leaving early the next morning on a military flight to Saudi Arabia to get in place for the coming ground war. Miss Julie said, “Joe, I am so very upset and worried about this thing. My son Davy is over there now.”

I expressed surprise that the normally unflappable Mrs. Moore was upset. “Julie, you sent your husband off to two wars, so why worry now?” She responded: “Joe Galloway, you don’t understand a thing. You can replace a husband. You can never replace a son.”

Julia Compton Moore died last Sunday, in the early afternoon, surrounded by her grieving husband and her two daughters and three sons. I said my goodbyes at her bedside the day before. Her eyes lit up and she whispered: “Oh, Joe, we have come so very far together, and we still have so far to go…”

This week we are burying Julie Moore in the Fort Benning Cemetery, near her mother and father, and in the middle of the 7th Cavalry troopers whose wives she comforted and whose funerals she attended in 1965. Her grave is beside that of Sgt. Jack E. Gell of Alpha Company 1st Battalion 7th Cavalry. She will rest in the arms of the Army she loved so long and served so well.

GarryOwen, Miss Julie. Godspeed.

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Military icon Aaron Bank, 'father' of Green Berets, dies at 101

Associated Press

LOS ANGELES - Retired Army Col. Aaron Bank, a military icon called "the father of the Green Berets" for his role as the first commander of the Army's elite Special Forces, has died. He was 101.

Bank died Thursday of natural causes at his home in an assisted-living facility in Dana Point, said his son-in-law, Bruce Ballantine.

In 1952, the Army approved 2,300 spaces for men in a Special Forces unit, the 10th Special Forces Group (Airborne), at Ft. Bragg, N.C. Bank was a key figure in pushing for its creation.

He also is credited with writing a memorandum suggesting that Special Forces Soldiers be allowed to wear berets as a mark of distinction.

The Army initially turned the idea down. But in 1962, four years after Bank retired from the military, President John F. Kennedy authorized Army Special Forces to wear berets.

"Col. Aaron Bank is a legend within the Special Forces community," said Maj. Robert Gowan, spokesman for the U.S. Army Special Forces Command. "His commitment and service to our country is unsurpassed. He was a man far ahead of his time. His vision and initiative allowed the Army to create Special Forces as we know them today."

In December 1944, Bank was assigned to recruit and train 170 anti-Nazi German POWs and defectors. Their mission: parachute into the Austrian Alps and capture high-ranking Nazi leaders, including Adolf Hitler.

The mission was scrubbed, but Bank later co-authored a novel, "Knights Cross," that fantasized about a successful mission where the hero succeeds in capturing Hitler.

Bank is survived by his wife, Catherine; their two daughters, Linda Ballantine of Dana Point and Alexandra Elliott of Anaheim; and a granddaughter.

A funeral service, with full military and Special Forces honors, will be held Monday at Riverside National Cemetery.

In lieu of flowers, the family asks that donations be sent to the Special Operations Warrior Foundation, P.O. Box 14385, Tampa, FL 33690.

SOMETHING TO MAKE YOU SMILE (OR WINCE)!

FW: Government invents the space pen

SOMETHING FROM THE "IN" BASKET

Organization: WILLIAM CLEWES TECHNICAL SVS, INC.

Subject: Zero Gravity Solution

When NASA first started sending up astronauts, they quickly discovered that ball--point pens would not work in zero gravity. To combat this problem, NASA scientist spent a decade and $12 million developing a pen that writes in zero gravity, upside down, on almost any surface including glass and temperatures ranging from below freezing to over 300 degrees Centigrade.

The Russians used a pencil.

Enjoy paying your taxes--they're due again.

THE FUTURE COMBAT SYSTEM: LAV-4

When the Army discovers it can't afford $10 million each FCS vehicles it will attempt to splice gadgets onto wheeled trucks resulting in the abominations below:

FCS-Stryker 4: Mobile, Line-of-Sight Gun System

FCS-Stryker 4: Infantry Carrier Vehicle

Professional Military Education Hot Link

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Stryker or any wheeled vehicle cannot travel in the face of enemy area fire shredding their tires or in soft terrains and mud. We already learned this lesson before...must we learn it again?

Please read Dimarco's Mechanized Cavalry:

www.geocities.com/dimarcola/mecz_cavalry_doctrine.htm

Got bad Soldier gear? U.S. bureaucracy not listening?

Post your gear requests/ideas to Brigade Quartermasters, they will get good gear to the good guys (YOU)

www.actiongear.com

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