Military-Industrial Complex out of control: refuses to upgrade existing vehicles to transform entire force in favor of a few expensive gadget-laden "new" platforms

Inside The Army
December 15, 2003 Pg. 1

Rumsfeld Couples Future Stryker Brigade With Comanche

Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld last week approved an Army plan to equip its fifth Stryker Brigade Combat Team with the service’s RAH-66 Comanche helicopter.

The new plan details “enhancements” the Army will make to two of the six Stryker brigades it plans to build by 2010. The final two brigades -- known as the fifth and six SBCTs -- will sport improved capability in the realm of aviation, fires, networking and sensors, according to an Army source familiar with the plan.

More specifically, the source said, the fifth SBCT will be equipped with an aviation squadron and the Lightweight 155[mm] Howitzer to increase its combat power.

The fifth SBCT will be the 2nd Brigade of the 25th Infantry Division (Light) at Schofield Barracks, HI. It is expected to reach initial operating capability in 2007 -- two years before Comanche is scheduled for fielding. The Army source said the service likely will equip the brigade with other aviation assets until Comanche is ready.

The Army plans to field the Lightweight 155 howitzer by 2006.

The source was unable to say whether the sixth SBCT -- a National Guard brigade -- would also be packaged with Comanche. The sixth SBCT is the 56th Brigade of the 28th Infantry Division (mechanized) in Pennsylvania.

The Army’s first SBCT is in Iraq. The brigade was packaged with an “aviation battalion task force” that comprised two companies of OH-58 Kiowa Warriors and a company of UH-60 Black Hawks, Army officials said before the unit was deployed (Inside the Army, Aug. 11, p3).

Last year, the Office of the Secretary of Defense asked the Army whether the fifth and sixth SBCTs could be equipped with more combat power. It also asked whether the brigades, as planned, would be able to work in concert with air expeditionary forces to deploy rapidly.

The Army source said the plan presented last week to Rumsfeld stated that the service does feel the SBCTs are properly aligned with the Air Force’s AEF assets.

OSD’s second look at the Army’s Stryker plans was considered a compromise after OSD initially suggested that fewer than six brigades be built and the remaining cash be used to create new brigade-sized units that would pack much more combat power. The Army insisted the plan all along was to insert new networking and sensing technologies into the SBCTs as they became available to improve their capabilities.

Now, a year later, the Army has been given Rumsfeld’s blessing to move ahead with all six Stryker brigades, but with the planned enhancements to the last two, including Comanche.

Before retiring in June, Army Chief of Staff Gen. Eric Shinseki completed a study on potential design changes to the brigades. The report included analysis of possible changes, including the addition of major weapon systems like Comanche, as well as alternative cost estimates.

Sources familiar with the plan submitted by the Army say Shinseki suggested OSD fund no fewer than six brigades -- a number he believed was necessary to provide sufficient interim capabilities until the service could build its brigade-like “unit of action” networked with the Future Combat System (ITA, June 23, p2).

-- Anne Plummer

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IRAQ: WE HAVE SEEN THIS MOVIE BEFORE

by Garrett Jones

December 15, 2003

Garrett Jones is a 1993 graduate of the U.S. Army War College. He served as a case officer with the CIA in Africa, Europe, and the Middle East. He retired from the CIA in 1997 and now lives in the Northwestern United States.

Identify the following country: a mid-sized non-European country with a history going back to Biblical events. An ancient trading center, it figured in the works of ancient historians. It has an almost exclusively Muslim population, a troubled colonial history, and until recently was governed by an absolute dictator. The dictator, who ran a corrupt regime and aggressively attacked his neighbor, was ousted by force. The country, whose economy has since collapsed, is occupied by a multinational-armed force that is the frequent target of violent attacks--a mix of locally inspired efforts and actions planned or inspired by the Al Qaeda terrorist organization. It is believed to possess significant untapped oil reserves.

No, it is not Iraq. It is Somalia in 1993. [1] While one would not want to overreach in drawing a comparison between Somalia in 1993 and the current situation in Iraq, our experience in Somalia may be instructive in important respects. When I was serving in Somalia in 1993 as chief of CIA operations, some of the attacks against both multinational and U.S. forces were inspired or at least assisted, by elements of the Al Qaeda terrorist organization. At the time, we did not know that. We did know that "foreigners" who had served in the Afghanis' jihad against Soviet forces were assisting the Somalis in their attacks. In fact, we believed we knew the names of some of the individuals. However, in 1993, Al Qaeda was an unknown organization and Osama bin Laden was simply a "person of interest" in the terrorist world. Subsequently, we discovered that bin Laden had sent members of his organization to Somalia from Sudan to assist local Somali warlord Muhammad Farrah Aidid. According to statements allegedly made by bin Laden, he is doing the same thing in Iraq today.

Examining what happened in Somalia in 1993 may provide us with clues to how Al Qaeda is operating today in Iraq: its structure, personnel, and targeting criteria. For the capture of Saddam Hussein does not end the threats to our troops there. It also may, by exclusion, permit us to distinguish between Al Qaeda-inspired attacks and cases of local Iraqis' "venting" through armed actions. Much as we did not know exactly what we were up against in Somalia in 1993, in Iraq today we have been trying to "drain the Babylonian swamp" without always knowing the enemy.

IMPROVISED EXPLOSIVE DEVICES

I believe that all of the improvised explosive devices (IEDs) used against multinational forces in Somalia were command detonated. I also believe these attacks were done under the guidance of Al Qaeda. Al Qaeda did not appear to use or encourage the use of pressure mines or booby traps. This may have been to conserve resources or (a very distant second) to prevent casualties to locals. It seemed that a very few highly trained Al Qaeda members were operating in a sea of willing local "trigger pullers." The locals had a wide range of motivations, from a hatred of the multinational forces to a desire to enhance their own reputations, or most often, we believed, because they were well paid for their efforts. The IEDs were evidently fabricated by one or two Al Qaeda bomb makers and then passed to other Al Qaeda operatives, who would select and train locals to actually carry out the operation. Al Qaeda operatives would select and help place the IEDs, but no Al Qaeda operatives would be present when the devices were employed in ambushes.

The placement of the IEDs and the escape routes for the locals who set them off were competently planned and well thought out. Targeting of specific vehicles was striking. While there were only a few IED ambushes in Somalia, they were all against a Humvee traveling in a convoy of Humvees and other vehicles. This seemed to be the case even when, militarily, there were higher-value targets in the same convoy. This may be because a Humvee usually means U.S. passengers. Alternatively, the bomb makers may have fabricated the explosive charge in the IED to be most effective against a target the size and armor level of a Humvee. One is also drawn to conclude that Al Qaeda had very low confidence in the local collaborators. It may have figured that the Humvee, with its distinctive appearance, could be recognized the locals. It may well be worth comparing the "forensic signature" of the IEDs currently in use in Iraq with those used in Somalia, to determine whether the bomb makers active in Iraq were trained by the same instructors or in the same facilities as those involved in Somalia, or even if they are the same bomb makers.

In 1993, we also received numerous reports that weapons and explosives were being smuggled into the Mogadishu area hidden beneath large shipments of scrap metal. The Somalis, perhaps at the direction of their Al Qaeda advisors, tended to make one large shipment hidden under scrap metal in a single truck, as opposed to small shipments scattered among many trucks. Apparently, the theory was that good security on one truck was easier to maintain than merely adequate security for many trucks.

RPG-7s AND INDIRECT FIRE WEAPONS

RPG-7s were widely used against the multinational forces in Somalia in 1993, including in an anti-helicopter role. While local warlords were actively seeking man-portable surface- to-air missiles (SAMs) to use against the coalition, no SAMs were actually used against the coalition forces. The use of RPG-7s in an anti-helicopter role probably resulted from training by Al Qaeda operatives, who would have picked up the concept during their battles with Soviet forces in Afghanistan. This Al Qaeda training led to three distinct and identifiable "signatures" that should be watched for should this tactic be employed against the U.S.-led forces in Iraq.

Volley fire: While we do not know whether RPG-7s were used because of the unavailability of SAMs or because the Al Qaeda operatives believed the poorly trained local forces would do better with the RPG-7, we do know that the volley fire of large numbers of RPG-7s against low-flying helicopters was effective. It downed three helicopters and seriously damaged several others.

Fuse cutting of RPG-7 warheads: We received numerous reports on this modification, and I believe I personally witnessed the tactic in action against one of the early Task Force Ranger raids. More than half a dozen RPG-7s were fired at low-flying helicopters in this instance, all of which appeared to have detonated early and while the projectile was still on an upward trajectory. As we understood the procedure, the fuse leading from the rocket body to the warhead was shortened. In normal use, when the RPG-7 rocket exhausts it fuel, it also ignites a length-of-time fuse that burns down and then detonates the rocket warhead. This prevents a warhead that misses its target and fails to detonate from being recovered by opposing forces and its explosives employed against the original user. The Al Qaeda technique was to shorten the warhead's time fuse, resulting in the warhead's detonating much earlier. This in effect made the RPG-7 an air-bursting weapon. This may be a unique signature of Al Qaeda training.

Scorch-and-debris wounds: There were several anecdotal reports that the individuals who attempted to use the RPG-7 against helicopters frequently suffered from scorch and debris wounds on their lower bodies as a result of the back blast from the tube striking the ground behind them. The RPG-7 was of course never intended for use against targets much above the horizontal, and even in normal use, great care must be exercised to avoid injury from its substantial back blast. The U.S.-led forces now in Iraq should use their access to local hospitals in the wake of any RPG-7 attacks to identify possible suspects.

Indirect fire weapons: These were frequently used against the multinational compounds in Somalia, mostly in the form of less than half a dozen rounds of nighttime harassing fire from a single mortar tube. All indications suggested that local Somalis operating in small groups, whose make-up changed from incident to incident, carried out these attacks. The individuals were well paid for their efforts and operated on the general plan of dropping a few rounds into a tube and then running. The only criterion for success seemed to be that the mortar rounds needed to impact somewhere on a multinational force compound.

In contrast to these harassing attacks, one very different mortar attack was carried out against Task Force Ranger shortly after its arrival in the country. This attack involved multiple mortar tubes in sustained fire, with direct observation of the target and fire correction, along with a radio communication net to tie together the forward observer and mortar crews. The mortar tubes rotated their turns firing to avoid pinpointing by counter-battery radar and helicopter patrols. The planning and disposition of forces was professional (though the effectiveness of the attack suffered from poorly maintained ammunition and lousy Somali shooting skills). We believed at the time and remain convinced now, based on the professionalism of the attack, that Al Qaeda planned it.

CHARITIES, NGOS, AND THE UN

It was my unfortunate experience to observe the local Somali warlords and their Al Qaeda advisors effectively and thoroughly penetrate and co-opt most of the charities, nongovernmental organizations, and the civilian sectors of the UN operating in Somalia a decade ago. These organizations were at best incredibly naive, and at worst ignored activities around them out of fear. This cooption and penetration ran from using charity-owned vehicles to move weapons through the city to using NGOs' radios and radio frequencies for communications (no telephone network existed in Somalia in 1993), to using UN compounds for safe houses and hiding places and extorting funds from these organizations in return for refraining from staging violent attacks on their facilities and personnel.

None of these organizations was then in any way prepared to meet the challenges of operating in an environment containing a well-organized terrorist organization. I doubt this has changed. The sophistication of these activities was probably beyond the local Somalis. Even if it were not, Al Qaeda must have learned the lesson that these organizations can be a valuable resource in confronting a multinational force. By the time the U.S. pulled out of Somalia, any charitable organization or UN compound not being shot at by the warlords was considered by us to be exempt because it represented too valuable a resource to the warlords to threaten. Multinational forces in Iraq today should make it a priority to investigate the circumstances of all these organizations to determine to what extent Al Qaeda operatives are exploiting them.

SEARCHING FOR "ELVIS"

After the August 1993 arrival of Task Force Ranger in Somalia, the main tasking for the CIA presence in Mogadishu was to find Somali warlord Muhammad Farrah Aidid. (Elvis was the nickname used by U.S. forces in Mogadishu for Somali warlord Muhammad Farrah Aidid.) While we believe we located Aidid on several occasions, we were never able to pinpoint him with enough confidence and for a sufficiently long enough periods for Task Force Ranger to launch a raid. Despite our lack of success, we did note several sophisticated MO's being used by the Somali forces protecting Aidid. It is likely that least some of these procedures were because of recommendations given to Aidid's forces by al-Qaeda operatives advising them.

While the capture of Saddam Hussein takes the Iraqi "ace of spades" off the wanted list, there are undoubtedly other individuals still in Iraq who are leading the "insurgency" and will be targets for capture by the multinational forces. If media reports are to be believed, the circumstances of Hussein's capture strongly indicated that he had little or nothing to do with the insurgency. There was not even a pretense of a command-and-control apparatus around Hussein, and his reported mental condition suggests he was in no condition to track, much less direct, a nationwide resistance movement. This strongly suggests the clearly coordinated attacks against multinational forces are being directed and coordinated by an outside organization, such as Al Qaeda. Multinational forces now in Iraq and tasked with the capture of the "Babylonian Elvis" may benefit from looking for traces of the MO's used in Mogadishu.

All multinational force locations were carefully monitored for activity. Whenever significant activity was observed that could possibly be preparations for a raid, this activity was reported on a radio net monitored by Aidid's security force. (The radio frequencies used by Aidid's security forces were those set up by charities and other NGO's. Aidid's forces pirated the frequencies and used the NGO's transmissions as cover.) Aidid's security force never came up on this radio net, but coordinated itself using point-to-point transmissions with walkie-talkies. Whenever multinational force activity was reported, Aidid immediately moved from his location and remained in transit until the multinational force activity subsided. Aidid never left a location in the same vehicle in which he arrived. Aidid's subordinates would prearrange times and places for meetings, but they would never know if Aidid would be at these meetings until he walked through the door. All contact with Aidid was person-to-person: he never used a radio or satellite telephone once Task Force Ranger began searching for him. Aidid always remained in an urban area. At night, he would always sleep at a multi-resident compound containing many innocent bystanders, such as a hospital, mosque or orphanage, which would present any raiding force with a significant "collateral damage" problem.

While there may have been procedures which we did not identify in use in Mogadishu, multinational forces in Iraq may wish to consider at minimum: launching capture raids from out of area bases, examining all NGO communication networks for co-option, being prepared to target any vehicle leaving a raid location, planning to deal with large numbers of innocent bystanders at any raid site and in urban locations, being prepared for the target to flee the location on foot.

THINGS WE TRIED OR WANTED TO TRY

Do not fort up: Taking the fight to the enemy not only disrupts his plans and achieves attrition of his forces, it is vital to maintaining a Humint program. If intelligence officers cannot get out on the streets, meet their sources, and search for new sources, Humint suffers. Humint more than anything else identifies the enemy's plans and intentions and, in the end, gets a combatant to the "tipping point" that will destroy the enemy. In this vein, value walk-ins. Invaluable sources have often simply walked into the strangest places at the strangest times and volunteered their services. Too often they have been turned away or had to try numerous times before someone realized their value and listened to them. Every one of the troops, civilians and contractors in Iraq should be aware and active as a Humint operator. They should know what a walk-in is, how to handle one, and that they may have to talk to many unworthwhile walk-ins for every one good one.

If the troops do not speak Arabic, they should have "walk-in cards." These are as old as the hills and can be kept and carried by anyone. They are simply pertinent questions, in English on one side and the local language on the other. If troops can handle "yes" and "no" in the local language, with a dozen or so index cards they can begin debriefing a walk- in anywhere, anytime. Multinational troops should have the same cards in their native languages.

Look for welding and cutting torches: In Mogadishu, we worried about the bad guys putting together "technicals" (a civilian four-wheel drive truck to the back of which a crew- served or heavy automatic weapon has been lashed, used in the role of a heavy weapons squad) in their backyards and local garages. As a result, after dark, we had airborne platforms looking for the unusual light signature that welding rods and cutting torches produce. These light signatures are difficult to suppress, especially after dark, even when the work is done indoors.

While technicals do not seem to be a problem in Iraq, improvised rocket launchers and car bombs are being used with good effect. Cutting torches and welding rods are almost certainly used in fabricating these weapons. Much of the work is probably performed after dark, out of the view of the local neighborhood. Airborne platforms will be at their most effective in detecting the unique light signatures put out by welding rods and cutting torches. Anyone using a welding rod or cutting torch in Baghdad at 3am probably warrants a visit from a ground patrol or gunship.

Money: As in Somalia, in Iraq a significant amount of "rent- an-insurgency" is apparently being undertaken. This means cash and a lot of it. Cash has to be stored, protected, moved around, and accounted for. This is one more set of targets for intelligence program. While we were never able to achieve progress on this in 1993, we were very interested in how Aideed financed his operation and moved his money around. In retrospect, a much more interesting question would have been to what degree Al Qaeda was involved and how it structured its financing.

In 1993, we wanted to get Humint reporting into the money- changing/jewelry section of Mogadishu, where what passes for consumer banking there is conducted. It would be surprising if this were not the case now in Baghdad and other parts of Iraq. Money has to be changed from dollars to dinars, large- denomination bills must be converted to small denominations, and funds need to be moved in and out of the country and from city to city. Humint penetration of the money- changing/jewelry market should give a good insight into who the players are and how active they are.

Meeting Engagement: While "preparing" for a meeting engagement (a combat action that occurs when a moving force, incompletely deployed for action, engages an enemy at an unexpected time and place, usually with high casualties on both sides) may seem like a contradiction in terms, we could have done a better job of it in Somalia and it needs to be done in Iraq. The multinational force military leadership will deal with the battle itself; but both the civilian and military multinational forces need to prepare for handling the aftermath. While the U.S. and multinational political leadership seem prepared to stay the course in Iraq (unlike Somalia in 1993), the civilian and military leadership in Iraq need to be ready to react when, not if, this occurs. A U.S.-led multinational military force can win a meeting engagement, but the military leadership needs to view this as an opportunity and follow on immediately across the board with aggressive activity to exploit the disarray such a battle always brings to the opponent. The civilian authorities should be prepared to deal with the local population's understandable concern and apprehension as well as the international media's inevitable inflamed reporting of this kind of battle. In Mogadishu, U.S., forces won the battle and lost the media war. Well-thought-out guidance, with accurate and timely briefings and an aggressive and broad-based military response, will go along way in countering the "CNN effect" that carried the day in Mogadishu.

CONCLUSION

Somalia ten years ago and Iraq today are not the same places. If, however, Al Qaeda and its operatives are active in Iraq, it is likely and logical that the multinational forces in Iraq will see traces of MOs and signatures that were used with success in Somalia. While these will have been updated and modified to the local environment, with careful analysis, they should still be identifiable. Being able to distinguish Al Qaeda-inspired efforts from local Iraqi "venting," or even from the actions of other terrorist organizations, would be valuable in prioritizing multinational force efforts to curtail the current violence in Iraq.

Notes

[1] Somalia, about the size of Texas, was called the "Land of Punt" by ancient Egyptian writers. The frankincense referred to in Biblical narratives probably originated in the land that is now Somalia, which was visited and written about by Arab historian Ibn Battuta in 1331. Chinese historians record visits of Chinese fleets beginning in the eleventh century and continuing intermittently until the 1400s. The 2003 CIA World Factbook lists Somalia as almost exclusively Sunni Muslim. It was colonized into separate protectorates by the British in 1886-1960 and the Italians in 1889-1960. The dictator Muhammad Said Barre began a series of border wars starting in 1974 with Ethiopia over the Ogaden region. Barre was ousted in a 1991 coup. The attacks on the multinational forces of Operation Restore Hope include the infamous October 3, 1993 attack on Task Force Rangers in Mogadishu that was the subject of Mark Bowden's book Black Hawk Down (New York. Atlantic Monthly Press, 1999), the best general account of the event. As of 2003, oil exploration rights to Somalia were still carried as an asset by ConocoPhillips in SEC filings; exploration operations had been suspended due to "force majeure."

THIS MATERIAL HAS BEEN REVIEWED BY THE CIA. THAT REVIEW NEITHER CONSTITUTES CIA AUTHENTICATION OF INFORMATION NOR IMPLIES CIA ENDORSEMENT OF THE AUTHOR'S VIEWS.

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OPERATIONAL

Unclassified After Action Report (AAR) From Iraq

ALL AFVs need spaced applique' and/or Explosive Reactive Armor (ERA) fitted like this Bradley in Iraq to deter RPG attacks

www.strategypage.com/dls/articles/20030912.asp

By Jim Dunnigan's superb Strategypage.com
September 12, 2003
24 APRIL 2003

SUBJECT: Operation Iraqi Freedom After Action Review Comments

1. The purpose of this document is to provide after action review comments after combat operations conducted by TM C/3-15 Infantry, Task Force 1-64 Armor "Desert Rogues" during "Operation Iraqi Freedom.

2. All comments will be broken down into the following format: issue, discussion, and recommendation.

3. Doctrine/TTP's (Tactics, Techniques and Procedures).

Issue: Current Urban Operations Doctrine does not support operations conducted by this unit.

Discussion: The current doctrinal manuals on Urban Operations do not address how best to utilize armored forces in an urban environment. The enemy faced by this unit hid his tanks and vehicles under camouflaged covers, beneath bridge overpasses, inside of buildings on narrow streets, and under low trees. These enemy systems were not seen until they were only meters away. No degree of IPB (Intelligence Preparation of the Batlefield) could compensate, alert, or prepare any US force for the massive numbers of RPGs (Rocket Propelled Grenades) stored in houses, shacks, lockers, and cars. The only way to counter RPGs fired from covered and concealed positions was to absorb the hit, identify the source of the fire, and respond with massive overwhelming firepower.

Tanks and Bradleys repeatedly sustained hits from RPG's and ground directed anti aircraft fire that dismounted infantrymen, HMMWVs and other light skinned vehicles could not sustain. Bradleys successfully protected the infantrymen inside while at the same time delivering a massive volume of fire against dismounted enemy, trucks, tanks, and armored vehicles. The firepower and shock generated by tanks and Bradleys could never have been matched by dismounted infantry. Without the use of these systems initially, the enemy would have caused many more casualties.

The current doctrine recommends clearing the built up area with dismounted troops prior to any armored vehicles entering. This Task Force proved that this is not a requirement and is not necessarily the best initial course of action. By moving armored vehicles along a pre determined route and destroying any enemy forces whether dug in, in buildings, or on roof tops with massive overwhelming fires from M1A1 tanks and M2A2 fighting vehicles, an entire line of communication can be opened up allowing access not only into the built up area but through it also. Once the line of communication is open, clearing operations with dismounted forces are much easier. A key to this is the overwhelming psychological effect the firepower of these weapon systems have on the enemy once the initial raid is conducted, almost all remaining enemy forces will withdraw from the initial shock. This initial shock of overwhelming firepower facilitates the attacks of dismounted infantrymen into the built up area.

Recommendation: The BCT submit to the United States Army Infantry School and the United States Armor School an update to the current urban operations doctrine. Additionally, send only vehicles that can sustain RPG hits into urban combat zones.

Issue: Problems arising from the simultaneous conduct of SASO (Stability and Support Operations) and combat operations in Iraq.

Discussion: After less than 48 hours after the first battlefield engagement, members of this company team were tasked to conduct checkpoint operations southwest of An Najaf. With no training, soldiers were expected to search vehicles, interact with civilians with no CA (Civil Affairs) or PSYOPS (Psychological Warfare) support, detain EPW's (Enemy Prisoners of War), and confiscate weapons. Less than 48 hours after this, the unit was again heavily engaged in combat operations. The radical and swift change from combat operations to SASO and back to combat operations over and over again causes many points of friction for the Soldiers and their leaders.

With the exception of a class given to the platoon leaders, there were not formal classes or training conducted by CA prior to the operation. No training on checkpoint operations or dealing with civilians was received.

Material resources continued to be an issue. The team brought extra CL IV on all vehicles in anticipation of having to conduct blocking operations but the capability to haul the quantities required by SASO was not there. Having emplaced checkpoints on four different occasions, by the time the unit reached Baghdad, there was no remaining CL IV (construction and barrier materials). The unit was in desperate need of materials for force protection. It took weeks for materials to arrive; in the meantime the unit utilized destroyed cars, flower posts, bicycle racks, and whatever else was available for force protection.

Interpreters were not available to the company team at any point during the operation. These interpreters are critical to the team's ability to interact with civilians, discern their problems, and broadcast friendly unit intentions. Often times the unit had crowds and upset civilians to deal with and absolutely no way to verbally communicate with them.

Lack of information from higher headquarters greatly complicated the task of converting from high intensity conflict to SASO. Weeks after occupying Baghdad in force, the unit is still unable to direct the civilian populace to humanitarian agencies other than the Red Crescent. We have no way to direct people to places to receive food and water, to search for loved ones, to located deceased personnel. The unit did not have the ability to answer any questions simply because of the unsynchronized and unplanned operations of the Civil Affairs community and other non-governmental organizations.

The problem with the switching from combat to SASO is the impact on the Soldiers and leaders of the unit. Transitioning from combat to SASO requires a substantial and fundamental shift in attitude. The Soldiers have been asked to go from killing the enemy to protecting and interacting, and back to killing again. The constant shift in mental posture greatly complicates things for the average Soldier. The Soldiers are blurred and confused about the rules of engagement, which continues to raise questions, and issues about force protection while at checkpoints and conducting patrols. How does the Soldier know exactly what the rule of engagement is? Soldiers who have just conducted combat against dark skinned personnel wearing civilian clothes have difficulty trusting dark skinned personnel wearing civilian clothes.

Recommendation:

A. Integrate SASO training into the unit METL (MISSION-ESSENTIAL TASK LIST). This was has provided ample instances where units are conducting both combat and stability operations at the same time. Thus, we should no longer expect to be able to compartmentalize ourselves as either "war fighter: or "peacekeeper". With the ever-present threat of terrorist attack, it is critical that Soldiers know the correct tactics, techniques, and procedures for providing security while also enforcing peace.

B. Heavy duty CL IV materials are required for blocking positions and should be maintained at the task force or BCT level. Lift and freight assets need to be responsive and capable of delivering reinforcing materials in short order.

C. Civil Affairs, pysops, and interpreters must be integrated at the company team level. Every checkpoint must have an interpreter and these interpreters must be with the company team throughout the operation as it is impossible to predict when you may be required to fight or keep the peace.

D. Improved information flow and the quicker establishment of Civil Military Operations Centers. Units occupying positions in built up areas make frequent contact with civilians. Information and a centralized theme must be passed to the company team level as quickly as possible to ensure the proper message is being sent to the populace, and in turn, input from the populace is reaching the highest levels. The company team level is the level where the interaction with the populace occurs.

E. We must train our leaders and Soldiers in the conduct of SASO operations. Leaders must be sensitive to the flux between war fighting and peacekeeping and the demands of each not only on the unit but the individual. We owe it to our Soldiers to train them on the differences. It is the responsibility of leaders to ensure PVT Plunger and PVT Snuffy know what the proper posture or attitude is and to enforce it.

Issue: The employment of Hunter Killer teams.

Discussion: This unit, while conducting combat operations, had great success through the utilization of hunter killer teams. The combination of scouts with LRASS (Long-Range Advanced Scout Surveillance System) and tanks and fighting vehicles proved invaluable at the detection and destruction of enemy vehicles and dismounted infiltration attempts.

By locating a scout section with LRASS, which could observe out to 10,000m, at a location that had maximum observation, the scouts, could provide real time intelligence and 10 digit grid locations to the company team enabling the company team to move to and engage with direct fires and/or utilize mortar fires to destroy enemy forces. This proved to be a great TTP (Tactics, Techniques and Procedures) while at OBJ RAMS, An Najaf, and while blocking on HWY 1.

Recommendation: Doctrine be published based upon the success of the task force operations utilizing hunters and killers, specifically, integrating scouts, infantry, and armor forces into an effective organization which can identify, assess, and destroy the enemy.

4. Training

Issue: Urban Operations Training for armor forces

Discussion: The armor platoon attached to this CO/TM was fortunate enough to receive UO (Urban Operations) training prior to operations in Iraq. They learned valuable lessons such as firing from the GAS sight at extremely close ranges, entering a battle sight range of 300m while in urban environments for the main gun, and decentralizing the location of CL I (food), water, and CL III(P) (fuel) on the tank in order to protect from losing all supplies due to a single hit or building strike. They learned to keep their tanks out of intersections and to scan the upper stories of buildings and rooftops for enemy forces. They practiced transporting infantry and coordinating direct fires with dismounted forces. These and other TTPs gave the platoon the confidence and experience required when attacks to Baghdad and raids south on HWY 8 were conducted.

Recommendation: All armor platoons should be trained and integrated into urban operations training. Although the tactics trained may not have been executed, the lessons learned regarding load plans, fire control system adjustments, fire patterns, and scanning responsibilities were instrumental to the platoon's success. Every effort should be made to teach these lessons prior to combat.

Tank platoons should also train with a dismounted squad under the control of a tank platoon leader. At a battle position in Baghdad, 3/A/1-64 AR was attached a weapons squad from an infantry platoon. These soldiers were critical to the platoon's defense. They were tied in between two tanks along a dismounted avenue of approach. It was composed of a heavy tree line and thick vegetation that closed to within 50 meters of the platoon's position. The squad repelled an RPG team's attempt to infiltrate the platoon BP and also cleared seven bunkers full of weapons and ammunition. These feats could not have been accomplished without the task organized infantry squad.

Issue: Machine gun engagement training for loaders.

Discussion: Thanks to numerous live fire opportunities, the armor platoon loaders were all experienced in firing the loader's M240 machine gun prior to operations in Iraq. When battle came, these Soldiers comfortably understood the behavior of their weapons system and were able to place effective, deadly fire on the enemy. There was a dramatic improvement in their performance from the first time they fired their machine guns in training to the use of the weapons in combat.

Recommendation: Incorporate a loader's engagement into Tank Table VIII scenarios. This will compel units to train loaders on their weapon system and give loaders invaluable experience and opportunities to refine their techniques. This unit was fortunate enough to have the time and ammunition to learn these skills on their own; others may not have that luxury.

5. Equipment.

Issue: The lack of adequate armor on the flanks of Bradley and Tank turrets and hulls.

Discussion: Enemy fire from recoilless rifles and RPGs was able to penetrate fuel cells, turrets, and ammunition compartments at ranges of less then 200m. Penetrations in tanks occurred in armor behind the number six skirt and in the turret armor at the rear corners of the turret.

The Task Force was not issued reactive armor for the Bradley Fighting Vehicle even though it is available in the Army system. This armor would have prevented the 4 direct penetrating hits from RPG rounds received by fighting vehicles in the task force.

As a result of not being issued reactive armor, both Bradley and tank crews had to "create" their own armor through the use of rucksacks, water boxes, MRE's, etc. All of which helped but were still penetrated by the RPG and recoilless rifle rounds.

Recommendation: Issue reactive armor to all available vehicles to prevent penetration by AT systems. Ballistic skirts should be fitted along the entire flank of vehicles going into urban combat. Reactive armor on the turret flanks and the turret top would protect the crew from anti tank weapons fired from rooftops as well as ground level.

The armor packages need to be modular and configured so that the crew or organizational mechanics can apply or remove the armor.

This armor is currently available for the M2A2 but needs to be made available for the M1A1 and the M113 series vehicle for the conduct of combat in urban operations.

Issue: Lack of a Bradley CDR (commander) weapon system.

Discussion: During the conduct of urban operations by this unit, due to limited visibility within the turret and the threat encountered not only from the front but from both flanks of the vehicles, Bradley commanders were required to expose themselves outside of the turret in order to acquire enemy forces, to control movement, and protect their own vehicles. As a result of this, most BC's adapted to this and began to keep M231 port firing weapons and "bags of hand grenades" on top of their turrets in order to defeat enemy forces in close proximity to their vehicle or enemy forces on the side opposite of gun tube orientation.

Recommendation: A M240 machine gun similar to that mounted on the M1A1 tank for loaders, be mounted on the M2 Bradley Commander's Turret. This would enable the BC to defend his vehicle from threats opposite of the gun tube and also in close proximity to the vehicle. BC's would no longer be required to keep their personal weapons or hand grenades on top of the turret in order to repel enemy attacks.

Issue: Effective communication between tanks and dismounted Infantry.

Discussion: On several occasions, infantry squads were attached to the armor platoon in the CO/TM to provide additional security at checkpoints/blocking positions and to defend dismounted avenues of approach at battle positions. The tanks were forced to utilize Motorola "talkabout" radios to communicate with the squad. This was problematic for several reasons: 1. Lack of net security, 2. "Talkabout" radios are not integrated into the tank internal communication system, 3. Lack, or prohibition of "talkabout" radios in theater. This is the same problem encountered by infantry platoons due to the lack of dismountable frequency hop capable radios at the platoon level.

Recommendation: Issue PRC148, frequency hop capable radios, to all infantry squads or give each tank platoon an extra dismountable SINCGARS radio. TA1 phones mounted externally to the tank proved to be inadequate. They were unreliable and lacked the flexibility to successfully move with the infantry as they left their holes and cleared bunkers.

Issue: Loaders exposed to enemy machine gun fire at close range in urban operations combat.

Discussion: Loaders played a critical role in identifying, suppressing, and destroying enemy infantry, vehicles, and RPG teams on the flanks of their vehicles down alleys and behind buildings as we advanced in column along roads. The observation and suppression abilities of loaders are critical to the success of the tank and the unit and compel them to stay outside the loader's hatch. However, the only protection for loaders against enemy small arms fire came from the spall vests and effective suppression of the enemy. Had enemy fire been more accurate or intense, many loaders would have been killed or wounded.

Recommendation: Develop and employ an armor plate that attaches to the loader's M240 machine gun mount and covers the vital areas of the loader's body. It should be easy to add or remove quickly (within seconds) in order to facilitate the expedient closure of the loader's hatch. It must be capable of stopping 7.62mm fire.

Issue: Need for more effective anti-personnel capability for the M1A1.

Discussion: The majority of enemy forces faced were dismounted infantrymen. They could be effectively engaged and destroyed by 7.62 and .50 CAL fire. This, however, took time, and forced loaders and tank commanders to repeatedly expose themselves to reload under close combat. These small arms also hindered the fast clearing of fields of fire in thick vegetation.

Recommendation: Develop and field 120mm anti personnel munitions for the M1A1. The additional shock and firepower of anti personnel main gun rounds such as white phosphorous and "beehive" would have facilitated the quicker destruction of the enemy and the collapse of his will to fight. Due to burning or shotgun like effects, these rounds also bring about the quick exposure of camouflaged enemy positions. This, in turn, translates, into safer conditions and fewer US casualties.

Issue: The lack of proper night vision equipment and target acquisition systems.

Discussion: Elements of this unit consistently hesitated to engage and destroy enemy forces due to caution and the inability to clearly identify the enemy in daylight, thermal, and passive night vision sights. The Army's current policy of outfitting light units with the newest night vision technology, specifically passive night vision, is seriously flawed as demonstrated during this conflict. The PVS 7As currently utilized by most members of the company team proved all but worthless. The light units simply followed the heavy units which reinforces the need for the mechanized and heavy units to have the newest in night fighting equipment as heavy units are much more versatile than light units ever dreamed of being. Several vehicles crashed into berms and wadis due to the lack of proper night vision equipment. GPS and TIS sights could not provide positive identification of small arms, RPG's, or mortars beyond 800m, thus making it impossible to determine enemy activity or presence on vehicles without closing range or aid from scout vehicles.

Recommendation: At a minimum, upgrade the thermal sights on the M1A1 tank and M2A2 Bradley. Provide the most up to date passive night vision to heavy units, even if it means taking it from the "premier" light units who in fact followed this unit throughout Iraq. It would be ideal to see 3rd generation FLIR, CITVs, and fourth generation passive night vision.

6. Manning.

Issue: Three 9-man squads vs. two 9-man squads and a 9-man weapons squad.

Discussion: While conducting multiple dismounted operations, the ability to commit two maneuver squads and still retain the flexibility to maintain an adequate suppressive fire platform from the ground was very critical to the success of this unit in combat operations. Having the weapons squad in its entirety, to deploy and maintain an overwhelming amount of firepower, under the control of one competent squad leader, enabled the two maneuver squads to execute their assigned tasks with all nine of their Soldiers. This allowed for the training conducted to be executed in the same manner. Through repetition, the squads were very proficient in the execution of room/building clearing. This allowed the squad leader and the platoon leader to concentrate on the clearing of the building.

Recommendation: The two 9 man rifle squads and one-man weapon squad should replace the current three 9-man squad concept. The current doctrine has one soldier qualified on three weapon systems, depending on the environment of the operation. This concept does not provide for the loss of one of those personnel. The composition of the weapon squad should be as follows: 1 SSG squad leader, 3 M240B machine gunners, 3 M240B assistant gunners, and 2 Javelin AT gunners.

7. Logistics.

Issue: CL IX (spare parts) parts flow throughout the operation was non-existent.

Discussion: Throughout the conduct of combat operations, the only CL IX parts available were those brought forward by the task force or those, which were cannibalized off of destroyed or damaged vehicles. This made maintenance operations difficult if not impossible for long periods of time.

Recommendation: A CL IX package specific to the unit be loaded onto vehicles which have the capability to move forward with the speed of the combat units and the ability to mount weapon systems in order to expedite the movement of parts forward to the war fighter and the UMCP. Without this capability, the unit loses combat power critical to the conduct of the fight or stability operations.

8. Maneuver.

They learned valuable lessons such as firing from the GAS sight at extremely close ranges, entering a battle sight range of 300m while in urban environments for the main gun, and decentralizing the location of CL I, water, and CL III(P) on the tank in order to protect from losing all supplies due to a single hit or building strike. They learned to keep their tanks out of intersections and to scan the upper stories of buildings and rooftops for enemy forces. They practiced transporting infantry and coordinating direct fires with dismounted forces. These and other TTPs gave the platoon the confidence and experience required when attacks to Baghdad and raids south on HWY 8 were conducted.

Recommendation: All armor platoons should be trained and integrated into urban operations training. Although the tactics trained may not have been executed, the lessons learned regarding load plans, fire control system adjustments, fire patterns, and scanning responsibilities were instrumental to the platoon's success. Every effort should be made to teach these lessons prior to combat.

Tank platoons should also train with a dismounted squad under the control of a tank platoon leader. At a battle position in Baghdad, 3/A/1-64 AR was attached a weapons squad from an infantry platoon. These Soldiers were critical to the platoon's defense. They were tied in between two tanks along a dismounted avenue of approach. It was composed of a heavy tree line and thick vegetation that closed to within 50 meters of the platoon's position. The squad repelled and RPG team's attempt to infiltrate the platoon BP and also cleared seven bunkers full of weapons and ammunition. These feats could not have been accomplished without the task organized infantry squad.

Issue: Machine gun engagement training for loaders.

Discussion: Thanks to numerous live fire opportunities, the armor platoon loaders were all experienced in firing the loader's M240 machine gun prior to operations in Iraq. When battle came, these Soldiers comfortably understood the behavior of their weapons system and were able to place effective, deadly fire on the enemy. There was a dramatic improvement in their performance from the first time they fired their machine guns in training to the use of the weapons in combat.

Recommendation: Incorporate a loader's engagement into Tank Table VIII scenarios. This will compel units to train loaders on their weapon system and give loaders invaluable experience and opportunities to refine their techniques. This unit was fortunate enough to have the time and ammunition to learn these skills on their own; others may not have that luxury.

Issue: Attack aviation support was non-existent from LD throughout the entire combat operation.

Discussion: Throughout "OIF" from the crossing of the line of departure to the cessation of hostilities in Baghdad, the task force did not have any attack aviation support. As the brigade and division main effort, attack aviation should have been available at all times during combat operations or when enemy contact was likely. As it was, the aviators were not willing to fly to support the troops on the ground.

Recommendation: The method in which commander's plan to employ attack aviation as a combat multiplier needs to be reviewed. Currently, commanders and staffs rely too much on attack aviation being a combat multiplier when conduct combat ratios, when as in this fight, it is discovered to be unreliable or non-existent. Commanders and staffs must plan primarily for each fight without the support of "attack" aviation as the aviators are unreliable at best.

Issue: Special operations forces brought absolutely nothing to the fight during the conduct of combat operations but wanted support during SASO operations.

Discussion: Throughout this operation, special operations forces brought no information, which was of any value to the unit. In fact, never at one time did this unit have any special operations forces forward in zone or along an axis of attack providing critical information or intelligence. In fact, the situation was just the opposite. The special operations forces, hid or moved behind the protection of armored forces throughout the operation. This became especially evident during the transition from hostilities to SASO as this unit was tasked at least daily to provide either a QRF or transport to special operations forces into areas of the city to meet contacts or conduct "snatches".

Recommendation: Conventional ground commanders, the backbone of the army, cannot expect to receive any timely information from special operations forces during combat operations such as those experienced by this unit during "OIF". Additionally, the United States Army should review its current doctrine or lack of doctrine reference the integration of SOF and armor and mechanized infantry forces.

TECHNOTACTICAL

Strykers: "Waste of money at any price?"

By Scott Taylor ON TARGET

I MUST ADMIT Defence Minister John McCallum's announcement of the government's commitment to purchase 66 new armoured vehicles came as something of a shock.

I had incorrectly judged McCallum's recent allusions to an imminent procurement of the Stryker mobile gun system as being nothing more than another diabolical PR stunt: With everyone upset about our troops in Afghanistan operating in clapped-out 19-year-old Iltis jeeps, the Liberals were desperate to convince Canadians that the lives of our Soldiers really do matter. The standard vague platitudes about "commitment" and hollow promises of new equipment, however, rarely translate into anything tangible.

This time is different; in fact, so different that defence analysts and retired senior officers wasted little time before heaping criticism on poor old McCallum.

One would have thought that the minister would have been hailed as a hero for having pushed a $600-million armoured vehicle procurement package through the cabinet approval process in record time. What angers the critics is that this purchase of Strykers is being touted as a replacement for our existing 115 C-2 Leopard main battle tanks. How, they ask, can these 20-tonne, lightly armoured wheeled Strykers replace nearly double the number of 38-tonne tracked Leopards?

The official line is that our tanks are "Cold War" weapons and that with the Strykers, the army would become a "leaner and meaner" one, able to cope with a modern battlefield.

To justify this purchase, the defence department also points out that the U.S. Army is acquiring up to 2,000 units of the Stryker family of armoured vehicles. The U.S. Army's overall tactical concept is to equip a "light" armoured division that could be deployed as a sort of fire brigade anywhere in the world within 96 hours. The objective would be for these Stryker-equipped troops to hold the line - or provide a secure environment - until "heavy" armoured units could be brought in. The Canadian army's strategic planning appears somewhat different, since the Strykers would constitute our army's heaviest weapon system in spite of the fact our air force does not have the lift capacity to transport these machines anywhere.

However, those who are most puzzled by Canada's announcement to buy the Stryker are actually American military pundits who remain vehemently opposed to the ongoing acquisition of these vehicles by the U.S. Army.

"The Stryker is a black joke that was foisted upon the American taxpayer, and now the Canadians will be paying their share towards this absolute boondoggle," said Ben Works, director of the Washington-based Strategic Issue Research Institute.

Also puzzling to Mr. Works was the $600 million cost for 66 vehicles. "The U.S. Army is buying the mobile gun system variant (the Stryker) for about $4 million U.S. a unit. It sounds as though the Canadians will be paying an inexplicable 30 per cent premium."

Victor O'Reilly, another U.S. military analyst, = believes the Strykers are "a waste of money at any price." In an effort = to curtail the U.S. Army's ongoing procurement, O'Reilly has outlined = the many shortcomings of this family of light vehicles, in particular = the mobile gun system.

"Why, despite fundamental failures on just about every issue, is the Army pushing to get the Stryker gun system into production?" asks O'Reilly in his August 2003 report. "It is the wrong gun on the wrong chassis," says O'Reilly. "The 105-millimetre gun was originally designed to sit in an 18-tonne turret atop a 54-tonne tank. Now the entire vehicle weighs in at around 21 tonnes."

O'Reilly concludes that the Stryker MGS is "top heavy = and prone to rolling" and "cannot be fired accurately while on the = move." Worse yet, the power of the 105-millimetre cannon has proven = problematic.

The troubles of the MGS are so significant that testing has been halted. And when the U.S. 1st Brigade (Stryker-equipped) deploys to Iraq next month, it will do so without any of their MGS support weapons.

When questioned about the purchase, McCallum claimed he didn't listen to the opinions of retired officers, implying he was taking counsel from still-serving senior officers. However, an internal DND assessment of the Stryker MGS last year concluded purchasing these vehicles as tank replacements would be morally and ethically wrong.

So just who is McCallum really listening to?

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Professional Military Education Hot Link

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Since the occupation of Iraq has become an insurgency, Land Power Transformation suggests reading the U.S. Army's Field Manual:

FM 90-8 Counter-Insurgency Operations

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