LAND POWER TRANSFORMATION The Land Power Journal

Vol. 2 No. 8

August 2004

"You betcha. Brads are great for rolling around like a turtle and knowing nothing can touch you, but the problem with the insurgents here is that every time they take a shot at you and no one shoots back, they get bolder.

Now, take my boys in 91st engineers. We roll around with a gun in the tub, the back top open and guys hanging out with ARs and optics.

Go ahead, step out from behind that building against riflemen who are excellent snap shooters.....and can engage 360 degrees and up and down almost 180 degrees.....pretty much wherever they can point the rifle.

In a M113, this is almost everywhere.

Just my firsthand experience day after day in Gazalea and Abu Graib."

Jim

Table of Contents EDITORIAL BREAKING NEWS: U.S. Army Stryker debacle in formerly quiet Northern Iraq: look for Army to spin this screw-up into a great "Blackhawk Down!" "victory" FEEDBACK! All Soldiers should have language skills to better fight foreign wars, keep the peace GEOSTRATEGIC Colonel Douglas Macgregor exposes Army transformation plan based on vulnerable Stryker trucks, electronic gadget crutches and micro-brigades fatally flawed CIA Director George Tenet resigns suddenly due to "personal reasons", RIGHT. OPERATIONAL Army needs "battle boxes" TECHNOTACTICAL Army set to deceive Congress & American people with Stryker without 105mm gun airdrop test Where are the GUNSHIELDS? WWIII? Is there anything to the "ZERO FACTOR"? DoD HOT LINKS Carlton Meyer's www.G2mil.com Summer 2004 Articles Letters - comments from G2mil readers The Netfires Boondoggle - $1.1 billion wasted this year alone The Calamity of Urban Warfare - a 2002 G2mil article C-Mag - twin rotary rifle ammo drums For the Record - the U.S. Army's official report on prisoner abuse Army Running Out of Ammo - not good The Gray Zone - Rumsfeld's Secret Technical Realities - National Missile Defense is a scam 2004 U.S. Air Force Almanac - every fact you need Defensetech - G2mil without the attitude The U.S. Navy's New Automated Ship - fewer sailors U.S. Troops Intrude - Pakistan remains a safe haven for terrorists Military Prepositioning - GAO report on recent and future ops (pdf) Prison Abuse in Iraq - an insider clue Russian Airmobile Forces - still impressive An Open 2002 Letter to President Bush - prisoner abuse is not new Military Week - military news Previous G2mil - May 2004 issue Transforming National Defense Past Editorials - by Carlton Meyer 2005 Base Closures- likely closures Library Tour Visit G2mil's library Library Entrance PME HOT LINK U.S. Air Force Air University Report: Beware of Cruise Missiles and Theater Ballistic Missiles E-mail Land Power Transformation Staff ON THE RADIO AND TV General David Grange daily and weekly Thursday appearance as Military Commentator on CNN's Lou Dobbs MOMEYLINE Show, "Grange on Point" Return to Land Power Transformation home page, click here

BREAKING NEWS! EDITORIAL Stryker debacle in the formerly quiet Northern Iraq, our stoic Soldiers ill-equipped, hiding the wheeled deathtraps vetoed by vote of the enemy The Situation a. U.S. Forces in Iraq are hunkering down in their base camps to reduce casualties so Bush can get re-elected in November. KIAs must be kept under 1,000 or Bush is toast. Current deaths are 912. 84 days 'til the November election. Do the math. b. The Stryker base camp leaders obviously are not doing a very good job of patrolling the 5 km area around their camp to deter indirect fire weapons like medium mortars and gets a "fire for effect" barrage of mortars to make them come out and play. c. The Stryker CO obliges and takes all his vulnerable, wheeled vehicles parked in the motor pool into the street to give the enemy something to ambush with direct-fire weapons. The vehicle: Stryker has fatal shortcomings 1. Vehicle has serious blind spots, the lack of 360 security quickly becomes evident. 2. Gunner/TC cannot engage targets while moving with unstabilized RWS. 3. Gunner blind in hull, can easily traverse remote weapons system .50 cal and have it fire into/over anyone standing through top "air guard" hatches. No wonder why we have seen photos of a lot of Strykers have gear strapped on top of these hatches to prevent them from being opened. 4. Only has 200 rounds of ammo and must expose himself outside of vehicle to reload 5. No shields on top to protect men who have to button up to survive; enemy escapes and is free to shoot. Our SOF magazine article warned them about this, they didn't even stack sand bags so now they have folks with head and face injuries. 6. Rubber tires easily attacked to immobilize vehicles 7. Thin armor, easily overcome by RPGs 8. All of this leads to desperate, wild firing in all directions by desperate, scared men trying to save their lives, killing and destroying innocent people and surroundings REFERENCES www.cbftw.blogspot.com/ Men In Black This is what CNN wrote on their website about what happened yesterday here in Mosul: Mosul clashes leave 12 dead Clashes between police and insurgents in the northern city of Mosul left 12 Iraqis dead and 26 wounded, hospital and police sources said Wednesday. Rifle and rocket-propelled grenade fire as well as explosions were heard in the streets of the city. The provincial governor imposed a curfew that began at 3 p.m. local time (7 a.m. EDT), and two hours later, provincial forces, police and Iraqi National Guard took control, according to Hazem Gelawi, head of the governor's press office in the Nineveh province. Gelawi said the city is stable and expects the curfew to be lifted Thursday. Now here's what really happened: I was in my room reading a book (Thin Red Line) when the mortars started coming down. Usually when we get mortared it'll only one, maybe two mortars. But this mortar attack went on for almost 20 minutes. Each one impacting the FOB every couple minutes. Something was up. My roommate ripped open the door and yelled "Get your guys, Go to the motor pool! The whole BATTALION is rolling out!" Holy shit, the whole Battalion? This must be big. So I ran over and woke my guys up, yelled, "Get your fuckin shit on and head down to the motor pool! Time: Now!" I grabbed my shit and started running to the motor pool, hearing small arms fire off in the back ground. By now everybody was running to motor pool. Putting their cloths on while they were running. At the motor pool, everybody was strapping on there shit and getting ready. One by one a Stryker was rolling out of the motor pool ready to hunt down whoever was fucking with us. People were hooting and hollering, yelling their war cries and doing the Indian yell thing as they drove off and locked and loaded their weapons. These guys that are attacking us just fucked with the bee's nest, and now they're getting the swarm. As I got the vehicle ready to go I overheard on our radio that shit was hitting the fan all over Mosul, large amounts of people attacking us with small arms, RPG attacks, burned vehicles, and there was a bunch of people in all black armed with AK's over by the bridge in front of the Mosul Hotel. Fuck. I overheard one of our iraqi interpreter say in broken English, "Give me gun, I want to kill these motherfuckers!" As we rolled out the main gate, our FOB was getting attacked, we had Soldiers laying down in the prone up on the outer perimeter of the FOB firing there weapons out. We rolled down the main exit out and drove down a busy two way street. I was the T.C. for our vehicle, my job is to be behind the .50 cal, and operate the system, which allows me to fire it, which down in the hatch, it is this little black and white TV screen with red cross hairs in the middle of the screen. On the right of my seat I have a little joystick type thing, kinda like what fighter pilots have, that has a trigger on it which allows he to fire the 50 when I'm down in the hatch. This was only my second day as a T.C. Sitting right next to me out the hatch was my Plt Sgt.. Shortly as we were driving down the main street leaving our FOB, a man, dressed in all black, jumped out from the side corner of a building, pointed his AK47 right at me. Right at my fucking head and all I saw was the fire from his muzzle flash leaving the end of his barrel as he was shooting at me. I heard and felt the bullets whiz literally inches from my head, hitting all around my hatch and 50 cal mount making a "Ping" "Ping" "Ping" sound. I ducked the fucked down in the hatch. I yelled "We're taking fire! 3 O'clock!!! Turned the gun around towards where the guy was and fired a burst. I fired a burst right over our back air guard hatch where our First Sgt was sticking out of and shooting. He yelled "Tell him to stop fucking shooting over my head!!!" Shit. My bad. I looked over and my PLT Sgt who was sticking out the hatch next to me a couple seconds ago was now dropped down from the hatch and now on his back. He was yelling, "I'm Hit! I'm hit!" I looked at his helmet and a bullet went right through his helmet and exited through the other side. Holy shit! I didn't see any blood on him. He looked completely dazed though. He took his Helmet off and observed the holes in his helmet. No fucking shit, the bullet entered his helmet, and exited through the other side, missing his upper forehead by like 1-100th of an inch. A fuckin miricale. He was standing right next to me, that's how close the bullets were from hitting us. We continued driving. We had to drive to the Mosul Bridge that was right next to the Mosul hotel about a couple miles away. There was reports of a buncha people, wearing all black armed with AK's hanging out there. Our job was to locate and kill them. We were driving there on that main street, when all of the sudden all hell came down all around on us, all these guys wearing all black (Black pants, and a black t-shirts tucked in), a couple dozen on each side of the street, on rooftops, alleys, edge of buildings, out of windows, everywhere just came out of fucking nowhere and started firing RPG's and AK47's at us. I freaked the fuck out and ducked down in the hatch. I yelled "WE GOT FUCKIN HAJI'S ALL OVER THE FUCKIN PLACE!!! THERE ALL OVER GOD DAMNIT!!!" Bullets were pinging off our armor all over our vehicle, and you could hear multiple RPG's being fired and flying through the air and impacting all around us. All sorts of crazy insane Hollywood explosions bullshit going on all around us. I've never felt fear like this. I was like, this is it, I'm going to die. I cannot put into words how scared I was. The vehicle in front of us got hit 3 times by RPG's. I kind of lost it and I was yelling and screaming all sorts of things. (mostly cuss words) I fired the .50 cal over the place, shooting everything. My driver was helping me out and pointing out targets to me over the radio. He helped me a lot that day. They were all over shooting at us. My PLT was stuck right smack dab in the middle of the ambush and we were in the kill zone. We shot our way out of it and drove right through the ambush. The street we were driving down to escape, had 3 to 4 story high buildings all along each side, as we were driving away all you could see were 100's and 100's of bullets impacting all over these buildings. Finally we went over to the bridge that was next to the Mosul hotel. We parked there, and dismounted the guys. The Pepsi bottling building across the street was all up in flames. Then we were told to load up and go back to where we got ambushed. I'm not going to lie, I didn't want to go back. Fuck that shit, I don't want to get killed. That was the last place on earth I wanted to be. I was scared to death. But we had to go back, and we did. On the way back I was up out of the hatch, scanning, I saw people running down steets that we passed with AK47's, I didn't have a shot at them with the 50, cuz we were going way to fast and how the gun was positioned. We past several men with a AK's running down a street, I pulled out my Berretta and fired a mag at them. We rolled back to the area where we all just dodged death, and we were taking fire from all over again. Again, I fired and fired and fired and fired and fired. At everything. We were taking fire from all over. I was just 360ing the 50 cal and shooting at everything. We were taking fire from all over, and every single one of us had our guns blazing. At one time I saw a dog try to run across the street, and somebody shot it. Again, at one time I had the 50 cal traversed and pointing all the way back of the vehicle and I was firing at some guys who were shooting at us up on a rooftop, and I didn't know I was shooting right above the guys heads who were in the back airguard hatchs on our vehicle. My roommate (Sgt from Idaho) tapped my arm, which startled the hell out of me and I quickly jerked back and looked at him and he yelled, "Hey!! Get that gun to the 12!!! Let that one go!! Your doing good!!!" He later told me, when he tapped me on the shoulder, and I jerked back to look at him, I had this crazed look in my eyes that kind of freaked him out. Hovering up above we had Army Kiowa and Apache attack helicopters engaging the enemy on rooftops with Hellfire missiles and rockets. At one time I had to reload the 50 with ammo. The ammo was on the outside of the vehicle on the side. Why they fucking they put it there I don't know. So with my hands I did the sign of the cross thing on my chest, said a prayer (Please god, I don't want to fucking die) and as my Plt Sgt layed down some suppressive fire, I got up out of the hatch, got my whole body completely outside of the vehicle and went over to where the extra ammo was, grabbed a full ammo box, and went back to the hatch, as fast as possible. Scared out of my fuckin mind as I did this. RPG's were still whizzing by and non-stop gun shots were being fired all over. We had our guys in 3rd Sqd dismounted, they had both 240's with them and they were in heavy contact with the enemy, firing AT4's and everything they had at them. Strykers were also launching Tow missiles back at them. I got down in the hatch and started scanning my sector with the 50. Suddenly about 300 meters away I saw 2 guys creeping around this corner, they were hunched down sneaking around hiding behind a stack of truck tires. I could tell by their body language something was up. I placed the cross hairs right on them, but I didn't fire, because I didn't see a weapon on them and I wanted to wait. Next thing you know, I saw another guy come out of that corner with an RPG in his hands. I freaked the fuck out and yelled "RRRPPPPGGGGGGG!!!" My hands was shaking like crazy, my cross hairs were bouncing all over the screen. I gathered my composure as fast as I could, put the cross hairs on them and engaged them with a good 10 round burst of some 50 cal, right at them. Get Some. My Plt Sgt said "good job!". I didn't see anybody move from behind those tires after that. Shortly after that the vehicle parked directly in front of us took an RPG. This gunfight went on for 4 1/2 hours. 23 Victor got fucked up with three RPG's, and their TC (The guy who wrote SOF magazine that letter) took shrapnel to the face, and had to go back for medical attention. So 3nd squad was now going to roll in our vehicle because there vehicle was all fucked up and had go back to the FOB to be repaired. The ING's showed up, and they were clearing the buildings on the street. 3nd squad was helping them, and I was providing over watch for them with the 50. Then all the sudden mortars started impacting around us. These bastards were now firing mortars at us. Time passed and we were extremely low on ammunition and all out of water. My entire DCU uniform was completely wet from sweat and filth. So we all mounted up and drove back to the FOB to get more ammo, water and re-fuel. On the way to the FOB we passed a watermelon stand, all the watermelons had bullet holes in them. In fact, everything on that street had bullet holes in it. The cars, the buildings, everything. There were thousands and thousands of brass shell casings littered all over the streets. Our vehicle was also covered inside and out with brass shell casings and links. Once we got to the FOB, and parked near the motor pool to re-supply, a Sgt ran up to us holding all his gear and his kit and asked, "Hey you guys rolling back out? Do you have room for one more?" This guy who asked us if he could ride with us back out, was in that vehicle that was right in front of us earlier that got RPG'd. They had to drive back to the FOB and the LT was seriously hurt. And now he was now asking us if he could come with, to go give em some more hell. We had no room for him in our vehicle, we were jam packed because we had the guys from third squad with us because there vehicle was out of commission from multiple RPG hits. Since there was no room for him, he gave us all the ammo and his water he had on him, and told us "Go get em." By now it was night, and we were now fully stocked and ready to roll back out. I didn't want to go back out, but you don't have a choice, you have to. Right when we were about to leave the gate, they told us to go back to the motor poll and stand by. So we drove back packed the vehicles, and waited. I was chain smoking right now, one right after another. My nerves were completely shot and I was emotionally drained and physically exhausted. My hands were still kinda shaking. I was sitting up against the tires by myself on the side of the vehicle smoking a cigarette. I've never been through anything like that. I've never felt fear like that. And I've never seen anything like that. Usually these guys do this hit and run bullshit, but these guys today were on the offensive and showed no fear of us. My friend from San Diego, came over and sat next to me. Asked if I was O.K., and I told him "I don't know." We discussed everything that happened today, how it went down, what he did, what I did, what they did. Then the Battalion Commander came by the motor pool and told us all we all did a great job today. Finally they told us to go back to our rooms. I went back to my room, thanked god, and passed out on my bed. Note: I dont think CNN's report of only 12 dead is accurate. Quote of the day: "I just want this day to end." www.cbftw.blogspot.com/ Friday, August 06, 2004 AL QAEDA Those psychopaths that attacked us the other day wearing all black were all members of Al Qaeda. Today we had a Company formation and our C.O. came out and talked to us. We told us we all did an incredible job and was proud of all of us. He said we all executed our jobs perfectly. He also informed us that the people that were wearing all black were actually insurgents from Iran, members of Al Qaeda. He said the Army estimated that there were at least 100 of them out there attacking us the other day. The C.O. also compared the ambush to what those Rangers went through in Mogadishu. Our battle lasted 9 hours, there's lasted 18. But it was kinda like the same thing. Definitely not as many attacked us as them (again, they estimated that it was only 100 Al Qaeda attacking us, those rangers had way more than that) but we did have people engaging us with AK fire and multiple RPG fire from all directions from these building that were along the street we were driving down. Kinda like what they went through. Our CO said he stopped counting the number of RPG's fired after the number 12. He also said that if there were ever going to be a movie about the Strykers, the other day would have been the perfect story for it. We also had the Chaplain walking around yesterday, checking up on us and available for us just in case we wanted somebody to talk to. There was no need for me to talk to him, I did enough talking to god the other day. Today was spent cleaning out our vehicle inside and out, which was no easy task. No matter how well we try to clean it, we're always finding brass shell casings and links somewhere. We also fixed whatever was broken. I cleaned the .50 Cal inside and out. I discovered the remains of a smashed up impacted 7.62 bullet that had my name on it by my hatch. I put that in my pocket. If I ever have kids, and I get all old and have grand kids, I could show them the bullet that Al Qaeda tried to kill me with. Have them bring that in for show and tell at school.Later on in the day we had an OP (Observation Post). It was weird exiting the FOB , I was super paranoid, I was flinching from the smallest thing, and I was totally looking for anybody dressed in all black. What's up with the all black wardrobe anyway? Are these guys like Goth Terrorists or something? Whatever. Once we got to our OP, I was feeling kinda hungry, so I grabbed an MRE from the top of the vehicle, and there was bullet hole right through it. My Plt Sgt who took that bullet right through his Helmet the other day, is still in the Hospital. He was wearing a CVC helmet, which is made of Kevlar. He got a major concussion from it, and they're keeping their eyes on him at the hospital. The TC for 23Victor, who took some rpg shrapnel to the face, is ok now and should be back to work any time now. I had a NCO who was with me a majority of the day when they attacked us read my entry that I wrote the other day, I wanted to make sure it was as close to being correct and accurate as possible. And he told me I left out a lot of glory type stuff that everybody was doing that day. I told him it would be impossible, and I didn't have the time to write down everything that happened that day. He did correct me one part of the story I left out, because I didn't not know that it happened till he brought it up, was that when we went to the bridge by the Mosul Hotel, and loaded back up to get back to the fight where we were ambushed, we were the only vehicle from our Plt that went back down there to engage the enemy. There was plent of other guys there from other PLT's already there, but we were the only vehicle from our Plt to go there. It was just my vehicle and the guys from 3rd Squad. (Their vehicle got tore the fuck up from 3 RPG's) So they all loaded into our vehicle and used both 240's and AT4's that we had in the back. Almost used up all the ammo as well. All the other vehicles in my Plt stayed at the bridge. We drove back down to the ambush site with the a couple Strykers from another Plt, and we were the only vehicle that dismounted its troops in that area, which was 400 meters away from the traffic circle. I provided cover fire for them while they moved around, which they complemented me on later. (Had to toot my horn right there, sorry) Another correction, I meant to say ten round burst not ten second burst. My bad. After he read my take on what happened the other day, he said that I was pretty dead on, and he commented me on my writing and said, "Your pretty good with words and writing. You know what, I'm going to have you help me out with writing the awards out, and the paperwork were turning in." Damnit. "OFFICIAL" VERSION BY ARMY SHILL GILBERT www.tribnet.com/news/iraq/stryker/story/5408782p-5344534c.html Stryker brigade slammed by insurgents MICHAEL GILBERT; The News Tribune It didn't get much media coverage, but troops from the Fort Lewis-based Stryker brigade say fighting last Wednesday in Mosul was the heaviest and most sustained combat they've seen in their nine months in Iraq. Insurgents with mortars, rocket-propelled grenades, AK-47s and improvised bombs fought a series of coordinated, running attacks against Stryker and Iraqi troops. One estimate put the number of attackers at 30 to 40, another at more than 100. Either way, U.S. and Iraqi forces killed an undetermined number of them - the official estimate is at least a dozen - while suffering no losses themselves. About a dozen Stryker troops were wounded; all but two returned to duty, said Lt. Col. Kevin Hyneman, the brigade's deputy commander. The two more seriously wounded include Lt. Damon Armeni, 25, of Tacoma, a Wilson High School and Pacific Lutheran University graduate, who is reported in critical condition and is awaiting surgery at Walter Reed Army Medical Center for shrapnel wounds, his family said Monday. There was no information available Monday about the other wounded soldier. A Soldier in Armeni's company - Blackhawk Company of the 1st Battalion, 23rd Infantry Regiment - said the lieutenant was injured by a rocket-propelled grenade blast after maneuvering his Stryker in to protect five infantrymen under fire. "Needless to say, we are proud of our son's actions but hurt so very much for what he is going through, praying that he'll pull through," said his father, Dan Armeni. In an interview Monday, Hyneman said the fighting took place on the east and west sides of the Tigris River, which bisects the city, and at a hotel near the northernmost of the city's five major bridges. The insurgents also attacked a hospital and a power plant, and ambushed Stryker convoys as they rolled past multistory buildings on the way to the fight, according to other sources. Insurgents in Mosul typically attack Iraqi authorities and American troops with car bombs, sporadic mortar fire into U.S. camps and small-scale ambushes with small arms and RPGs. "Anti-Iraqi forces tried a pretty widespread offensive action, uncharacteristically," Hyneman said. "I think they were surprised by how the Iraqi National Guard and the coalition fought together as a team." The official version as reported that evening in a news release by Task Force Olympia, the Fort Lewis-based command for northern Iraq, said "multinational forces served in a supporting role, providing additional support where and when the Iraqi leaders involved in the attacks requested it." Hyneman and the task force spokesman, Lt. Col. Paul Hastings, said the fighting drew in virtually all the troops in the brigade's two infantry battalions in Mosul, as well as elements from other brigade units in the city. One Soldier described what it was like on his Web log on the Internet. The Soldier, who identifies himself as CBFTW, is attracting readers with his absorbing, personal account of Army life in Mosul. "We were driving there on that main street, when all of the sudden all hell came down all around on us, all these guys wearing all black ... a couple dozen on each side of the street, on rooftops, alleys, edge of buildings, out of windows, everywhere just came out of ... nowhere and started firing RPGs and AK-47s at us," he wrote. CBFTW described how a bullet passed in one side of his buddy's helmet and out the other without hitting his buddy - he suffered a concussion, is all. "Bullets were pinging off our armor all over our vehicle, and you could hear multiple RPGs being fired and flying through the air and impacting all around us. All sorts of crazy insane Hollywood explosions ... going on all around us," he wrote. "I've never felt fear like this. I was like, this is it, I'm going to die. I cannot put into words how scared I was." "My platoon was stuck right smack dab in the middle of the ambush and we were in the kill zone," CBFTW wrote. "We shot our way out of it and drove right through the ambush." Hyneman said about a dozen Strykers were damaged, mostly the tires and some sections of slat armor that protects the vehicles from RPGs. All were repaired and returned to service within two days, he said. Chaplains and mental health counselors were sent around to check with soldiers the next day. CBFTW said he and his buddies also spent much of the next day cleaning up the brass shell casings out of their vehicle, fixing broken parts and cleaning their weapons. "I discovered the remains of a smashed up impacted 7.62 (mm) bullet that had my name on it by my hatch. I put that in my pocket," he wrote. "If I ever have kids, and I get all old and have grandkids, I could show them the bullet that al-Qaida tried to kill me with. Have them bring that in for show and tell at school." Michael Gilbert: 253-597-8921 mike.gilbert@mail.tribnet.com • To read CBFTW's account of last week's Stryker brigade battle in Mosul, go to cbftw.blogspot.com The Army is cursed to have such a propagandist as Gilbert who can conjure up silver linings in every cloud. The young lieutenant was wounded so badly he had to be flown all the way from Iraq to Walter Reed in Maryland is nothing to boast about. As the Army wastes $BILLIONS on these Stryker death traps, there is no money left for SHIELDS for the majority of the 130,000 troops in Iraq. When CPT Chris Cash was hit in the head on top of his Bradley tracked AFV he was without a shield and not so lucky, he's now dead. There are no Army shills like Gilbert speaking out for heroes like Chris that they get supplied the shields they need. Improving tracked AFVs is not a part of Schoomaker's wheeled and foot Army agenda. Carol Murphy Editor FEEDBACK! Why not have every Soldier skilled in a foreign language? Last Dingo asks; "Everybody wants HUMINT, many outside of Iraq seem to think that living in Saddam's palaces and barracks was no good idea, many are complaining about language barriers, there's much heart-and-minds talk out there... How about beginning NOW to make language skills a precondition to promotion beginning in 2005 (Like either you know to read/understand by listening/spell each 500 Arab and Spanish words in both directions or you stay - rising requirements beginning now with up to 2000 words in Arab and Spanish plus each 500 in French, Chinese and Russian)? And next time you go ito another country, no creation of huge fortified fort compounds but small protected laagers for working only. And the soldiers would live in willing indigenous family households as lodger pairs after going through a 'heart and minds' one-month course? The'd be protected by hospitableness in most regions. With the lodgers as income source, the community would have a strong incentive to keep good relations, and the private contacts would create informants or even scouts. You just need to keep the Soldiers out of households with girls of a specific age range (I propose 15-30). There's no argument left for them if it's presented in terms of 'new words per day'. Say four new words a day - you can hardly need more than ten minutes for that. You can even learn most during running... That would make a Soldier capable enough for basic communication in two languages within a single year (with some sort of visual signalling). FIRST REPLY: "But, Sven, that would mean less time mowing lawns and standing on those lawns for change-of-command and retirement ceremonies... It would mean actually THINKING, having Soldiers use their minds. The Generals/Admirals don't want this. Army CSA spoke two days ago to the HASC on this very subject. His reply was that he was in Army SOF and it was too hard just to keep elite Green Berets to gain/maintain simple language proficiencies than to do it force-wide throughout the conventional Army. He said it was a lofty and desirable goal but too-hard-to- do. I disagree with him. Its only too hard to do if you don't want to CHANGE THE ARMY and cut out the bullshit that has nothing to do with combat but everything to do with narcissistic egomania. The mediocre, narcissistic, closed-minded, RMA Tofflerian senior leaders of the Army/ marines can ill afford their troops to start thinking and become professional warriors, this would reveal their inadequacies. They'd rather have everybody pissed off, sleepless and full of rage that results in article 15s than have an adult professional force. They are comfortable "with the devil they know". Where the garrison daily grind is all about making those of lesser rank eat their feces. To understand what its like on active duty watch a prison movie. Mike ANOTHER REPLY: "I think this is a excellent idea. As a former SSG and educator I feel our enlisted men are alot smarter that our Generals give them credit for. They don't want to do it because thay wouldn't be able to control a truely professional military. It's beyond the general's capabilities." Jim GEOSTRATEGIC Congress questions Colonel Douglas Macgregor on the Army "Transformation" into 2-battalion micro-brigades driving around in wheeled Stryker/HMMWV trucks packed with electro-gadgets www.house.gov/hasc/openingstatementsandpressreleases/108thcongress/04-07-15Macgregor.pdf Statement of Colonel Douglas Macgregor, PhD, USA (ret.) Testifying before the House Armed Services Committee on July 15, 2004 in 2118 of the Rayburn House Office Building. Army Transformation: Implications for the Future Page 1 Current Army transformation programs are not informed by the realities of modern combat or rigorous testing and experimentation. While it is gratifying to see interest in the concepts of rotational readiness and unit cohesion, the disastrous decision to keep American Soldiers and units in Iraq for 12 months at a time reinforces my broader reservations about Army transformation. Today, our ground force is apparently exhausted and incapable of securing the stretch of road from downtown Baghdad to Iraq’s international airport. Thus, my greatest concern is that the current thrust of Army transformation may actually reduce the Army's fighting power and operational flexibility just as the international environment is placing greater demands on our ground forces. I will begin by examining two of the fundamental assumptions that are distorting Army transformation. The first of these distortions arises from the belief that information can substitute for armored protection, firepower and off-road mobility. Assumptions Perfect situational awareness, the key underlying assumption of the Army's future combat system is an illusion, or perhaps a delusion. Situational awareness promises that information about the enemy and his intentions will always be available when it is needed. It also assumes that everyone inside the battlespace will create and exploit information in exactly the same way. As a result, situational awareness demands a greater level of technological capability than is attainable today or in the decades ahead. Most important, there is no evidence that plentiful networked information can replace killing power and inherent survivability, especially in close combat. Timely and useful information is critical, but it cannot substitute for firepower, mobility and armored protection. During Operation Iraqi Freedom, despite unparalleled intelligence assets, most of the fighting on the ground was characterized by the participants as resulting from meeting engagements-battles in which American forces unexpectedly bumped into the enemy.[i] No one should have been surprised. Land warfare is by its very nature chaotic. No technologies or systems exist to prevent such surprises in towns, cities or complex terrain populated by non-combatants and systems on today’s drawing boards are unlikely to be effective for many, many years-if ever. As experience in Iraq demonstrates, another flawed assumption is the belief that strategic speed (deployment) is worth sacrificing protection and firepower. Page 2 What the Army does after it arrives in a theater of crisis or conflict is much more important than how fast it gets there. Formidable Army ground forces can be organized, equipped, trained, and postured through a joint rotational readiness system to deploy a powerful force in a matter of days and decisively influence events. Getting a light force to the same place a few hours or days sooner does not have the same effect. In fact, it may produce a speedy defeat rather than a decisive victory. Large quantities of light infantry with nothing more than the weapons they can carry after they dismount to attack from either up-armored HMMWVs or Strykers will sustain heavy losses. Light infantry is not designed to lead penetration attacks into urban areas or against any prepared enemy defense and should never be used in that role.[ii] For light Infantry to succeed, it must be integrated with real mobility, devastating firepower, and armored protection so that it does not become a road-bound paramilitary police force subject to blockade and ambush. If we stay on the current intellectual path, we risk fielding Army units that will end up like the 1st Cavalry Division in the Ia Drang valley, calling for air strikes on its own position to avoid annihilation. The greatest irony is that our current inventory of tanks and armored fighting vehicles actually arrive as quickly as the so-called light force. In the future, Army forces arriving from the air or the sea must include heavy or true medium weight armor – Abrams and Bradleys, or platforms similar to the M8 Armored Gun System and TRACER equipped with hybrid-electric engines and band track, respectively. These platforms and systems are capable of augmenting light infantry and punching through enemy forces with devastating effect. Ultimately, airpower, armor, stand-off attack in the form of UCAVS, mortars and artillery, special operations forces, engineers and infantry all must cooperate in contemporary combat. But armored forces are central to dominating the enemy on the ground with impunity.[iii] Page 3 Now, I will turn briefly to a short discussion of the Army’s three main transformation initiatives or programs. I realize that the members of Congress listen to a host of problems on a daily basis. As a result, I am including some recommendations that may be of use to you as you work closely with the Army’s senior leadership in the future. Stryker Brigades The current Stryker brigade combat team lacks the joint C4ISR, firepower, protection, mobility and organic logistical support to be a full-dimensional warfighting organization and its operational utility will continue to be limited to peace support or paramilitary police operations. A glance at the Stryker brigade in Northern Iraq provides ample evidence for this statement. The Army’s senior leadership wisely decided to keep the Stryker brigade remote from the scene of the action in Central Iraq where the lethal quality of close combat might inflict serious casualties on it. Frankly, in peace support operations, the block III LAV with its stabilized 25mm chain gun with stand-off engagement capability, though lighter and never designed for close combat, is more lethal and less expensive than the Stryker carrier. According to its published doctrine, the Stryker brigade is designed to move light infantry quickly on primary or secondary roads to a point where the infantry will dismount and conduct combat operations on foot with unstabilized machine guns and, eventually, 105mm guns on Strykers in support, presuming the mobile gun system can be made to work. Page 4 This approach is familiar to anyone who has read tactical manuals for mechanized infantry in the 1960s. In anything but an environment where the enemy’s anti-armor, artillery and mining capabilities are slim to nonexistent, these tactics are a prescription for mass slaughter. The lethality of small arms is simply too great. Lastly, the claim that this formation can deploy into action anywhere in the world on C-130s in 96 hours is not supported by empirical evidence.[iv] Given the size, weight and volume of wheeled armored vehicles, the Stryker brigade is not suitable for strategic air lift and will deploy as a unit via sealift as seen quite recently when the Stryker brigade currently serving in Iraq arrived via ship in Kuwait City harbor. RECOMMENDATION: Recommend that Congress curtail the acquisition of more Strykers and shift funds into the acquisition of more promising technologies and platforms with close combat capability in urban or complex terrain. Congress should also demand that the Army provide a plan for pooling Strykers in support of Army units rotating through peace support missions on the British Army model. A cost-effective alternative to permanently equipping light infantry with Strykers would involve the purchase of a limited number of wheeled armored vehicles for use by Army units rotating through routine peace support missions. The British Army uses this approach in Ulster and Cyprus with considerable success. Modular Brigade Plan Let me turn now to the Army’s "modular" brigade plan – a plan for smaller, less capable versions of today’s formations. The Army’s plan to reorganize the Army’s ten division force into two battalion brigades with reconnaissance elements, half of whom are mounted in up-armored HMMWVs is dangerous and unsupported by either contemporary battlefield experience or rigorous analysis. Because no thorough plan to fundamentally restructure how the Army supports When is a Brigade no longer viable? - 26% - 33% - 30% - 50% - 48% -16% % Change - 1300 3700 4709 4,900 Total Troops (reinforced) - 8 - 6 - 36 -73 -11 Total Change 16 18 24 155mm Artillery 14 14 20 120mm Mortars 36 54 72 Infantry Squads 76 121 149 M2/M3 56 53 67 M1 2004 1998 1994 Loss of Combat Power in reinforced Mechanized Infantry Brigade Combat Teams* •Comparison based on heavy mechanized infantry brigade combat team with MI, Signal, Artillery, Cavalry, Air Defense, Military Police attached. During OIF, 3rd ID BCTs were reinforced to 5,000 or more troops. In garrison, brigades number roughly 2300. Page 5 fighting forces was developed in parallel, the more numerous two-battalion brigades actually result in a personnel requirement for more support troops. Organizationally, the concept increases dependency on external support from Army division and corps echelons, as well as the larger joint force and defeats the very idea of independence in mobile, dispersed, 360 degree warfare. In practice, modular means “stand alone” and these new formations will not be capable of independent operations inside a joint expeditionary force. The concept looks like an attempt to equate a near-term requirement to rotate smaller formations through occupation duty in Iraq or Afghanistan with the transformation of the Army into a new warfighting structure, but the two missions are not the same at all. We can do both. During Operation Iraqi Freedom, Army brigades in the 3rd Infantry Division had to be significantly reinforced to operate across the Iraq in an environment where units fought in all directions or 360 degrees. This condition resulted in the expansion of brigade combat teams in the 3rd Infantry Division from 3,900 troops to 5,000 or more troops. This was necessary to give brigades the fighting power and organic logistical support to operate independently. The formations to which I am referring, combat maneuver groups, are detailed in my two books, Breaking the Phalanx and Transformation under Fire. What these reinforced brigades lacked, however, were the joint C4ISR plugs, armed helicopters, adequate organic support and depth in the Page 6 command and staff structures; the very capabilities provided inside the combat maneuver group shown above. As the reinforced brigades grew in size and complexity, the commanders and their staffs were required to perform tasks historically coordinated and executed at division and corps levels. These tasks were really too challenging for a colonel with a staff of one lieutenant colonel, two majors and numerous captains and lieutenants to handle on an ad hoc basis. Furthermore, as our commanders in the field repeatedly tell us, today’s battalions and brigades are already too small for either sustained combat or post-war security operations. To be independent, combat formations must be able to sustain casualties and keep fighting. Making brigades smaller is not the answer. It just makes us weaker. Recommendation: Congress should suspend the Army’s on-going plans to reorganize the ten-division force into new two-battalion brigades. Congress should direct the Army to stand-up the alternative of brigadier-general commanded formations of between 5,000 and 5,500 troops, formations larger than current brigades, but smaller than existing divisions. Congress should mandate the independent examination of this force design in the field, as well as in joint simulation within a prescribed schedule for completion in not more than 12 months.[v] Future Combat System Next in line for discussion is the Army’s Future Combat System or FCS. In theory, the FCS will produce a family of systems that will replace virtually the entire mix of Army combat systems, as they exist today. FCS, however, is not a single system, but an undefined architecture of force structure, systems, and tactics without any tie to field-testing or examination. The problem is that it is difficult enough to test all the systems in a single platform without requiring multiple platforms to function in a coordinated fashion when the tools to evaluate and test such an array do not presently exist. There is also the unspoken and unsupported assumption that FCS will be cheaper and easier to employ and require fewer soldiers. The catch, however, is that the complex network of unmanned vehicles, and precision fires may reduce personnel, but increase the cost and the complexity of the system to unacceptable levels.[vi] In terms of doctrine, tactics and organization, the Army views FCS as shaping the battle “out of contact,” assuming that perfect situational awareness will turn every actual engagement into an exploitation operation rather than a decisive battle. Of course, unless the network operates perfectly the FCS equipped force may not be powerful enough to shape the battle extensively, much less win an engagement in contact. More important, the kind of thinking that underpins the FCS also denies the enemy a vote in how he will fight.[vii] In a period when rapid obsolescence is a high risk, “wildcatting” with new designs, even aggressively courting failure with limited numbers of prototypes, is absolutely necessary. The Army transformational methodology should be: Look forward to the next technology we can exploit that will help. Field it in limited Page 7 quantities to the current force. Play with it. Test it. Develop new operational, organizational and doctrinal modes for it. Feed that back into building the next capability and iterate. This means going through a rigorous process of experimentation in order to reach the goal of sustained military superiority.[viii] Recommendation: Congress should insist on the rapid prototyping of new technologies and platforms as they mature inside new organizations with new mixes of capabilities and require demonstrated performance of the proposed FCS network before more funds are released. In budget terms, scaling back FCS in this way would see FCS funding drop to perhaps a billion dollars a year. This would be enough money for aggressive prototyping and true experimentation, but would allow the army to pay other important bills. The Army should not halt R&D, but it must avoid approaches that are unlikely to succeed. Army’s Current and Projected Future Echelons of C2 Modified Echelons of C2 as outlined in SECDEF’s April ‘03 guidance and in Transformation under Fire Page 8 W2A New Operational Architecture Let me now turn to the Army’s proposed, new operational architecture. It appears that this new architecture is not new, but instead arbitrarily derived from the Cold War force structure. The principle result is a unit of action or UA that is actually nothing more than a conventional brigade while the unit of employment or UE equates to a division or corps as shown in the chart above.ix The Unit of Employment discussion (in which the Army conceals the truth that UEx = division and UEy = corps) is at best confusing and at worst misleading.x Other than adding still more inadequately staffed brigade headquarters to an already top-heavy force plus many more support troops, the approach amounts to no change in the way the army is commanded, and controlled. In sum, chopping up the existing division into smaller pieces does not change the current warfighting paradigm, reduce or eliminate echelons of unneeded C2, or advance jointness on the operational level where it must be seamless. Recommendation: Congress should demand that the Army explore new force designs that eliminate unnecessary command levels and create viable joint planning and execution capability under a Standing Joint Force Headquarters. Congress should instruct the Secretary of Defense to establish one Standing Joint Force Headquarters under a three-star officer within six months. An independent assessment monitored by this Congress should follow the stand-up of this new command structure. Army Culture Finally, a discussion of Army transformation without a note on Army service culture would miss a key element in the transformation process. Whenever an Army Chief of Staff makes a pronouncement, regardless of whether the pronouncement is based on sound analysis and accurate data, every officer knows that in order to be promoted, he or she must sign on unconditionally for the “party line.” In this cultural setting, there is no argument, no debate and no experimentation. One experienced observer of Army experimentation remarked to me that current programs remind him of the Queen’s declaration in Alice in Wonderland: “First the verdict, then the trial!”xi Experimentation is simply designed to demonstrate the rightness of whatever the Chief of Staff or any other four star general said. This condition was the consequence of the former Army Chief of Staff’s statement to the Senate Armed Services Committee in the spring of 2000 that “it was now possible to think of placing the whole Army on wheels.” Although the statement had no basis in fact whatsoever, no one in either the Congress or the Senate challenged it so it was never challenged inside the Army. The current emphasis on the formation of two battalion brigades and an army composed increasingly of light, vulnerable forces has had a similar chilling effect inside the Army even though the evidence from Iraq and Afghanistan does Page 9 not support this conclusion. Our soldiers, sergeants, lieutenants and captains are among the best we have ever had. They now have much more combat experience than the generals commanding them, but they are not being listened to. If asked, they will tell congress that when we have armor and firepower, we crush the enemy. When we match our unsupported light infantry against the Iraqi insurgent under conditions of symmetry, we take losses and the attacking enemy frequently escapes. Ignoring this reality because it contradicts our personal preferences is unacceptable. This sort of bias reinforces a flawed institutional culture that teaches officers to “always give the boss what the boss wants” in a setting where every officer knows that the senior man present is always right. The result is that caution, conservatism, and compliance are the qualities that the Army cultivates, and, during the initial stages of any conflict, these qualities always convey an impression of reasoned judgment. A sobering example of how seductive these qualities can be was illustrated by the decision in April of this year that we should negotiate a settlement with the insurgents in Fallujah instead of eliminating them. The result is that until crisis and conflict demand decisive action, officers who are willing to risk action—the essence of initiative—are viewed with considerable apprehension. As long as this culture is allowed to persist, it will also militate against the agility of mind that is so critical to success in both nation-state and sub-national war. It is important to remember, that the balance of force on the ground is much less meaningful in defeating insurgencies. The success of counter-insurgency operations depends much more on the agility of mind than on any other single factor and it’s the absence of this agility at high levels that, I suspect, constrains us most today in Iraq. Recommendation: This is a complex issue because people carry culture. Congress should investigate how officers in the Army are advanced to senior rank and what can be done to change the current institutional culture. Summary To briefly sum up, today’s senior leaders, dealing as they do with life and death should be as utterly realistic and ruthless in discarding the old for the new, as General Marshall from the time he was elevated from one star to four stars in June 1939. But the historical record makes clear that senior officers are not always realistic. Comfort with the status quo breeds distrust of change. Victory over weak, incompetent adversaries creates the illusion of strength and capability when the reality may be quite different. Ultimately, new fighting forces with new ideas and new capabilities emerge as the result of political interest and private sector pressure. In the 1930s for instance, the Germans got tanks and the French got forts. In the United States where there was no interest in the Army at all, there was no pressure to Page 10 make substantive change and the Army’s generals were given tacit leave to romanticize warfare in the form of horse cavalry. Today, the Army’s generals are investing approximately 12 billion dollars in Stryker initiatives, when much of that money could be invested more usefully in new fuel-efficient engines inside more survivable and lethal armored platforms for use in urban environments and dispersed mobile warfare. Congress should remember that a pipeline carrying fuel from a refinery in Kuwait to Iraq had to be built to sustain the offensive to Baghdad. This obvious vulnerability demonstrated first during Desert Storm is too dangerous to ignore for another 12 years. The Soldiers, sergeants, lieutenants and captains fighting this war must have a decisive role in shaping the content of new tactical organizations and equipment. Based on personal conversation with officers ranging in rank from lieutenant to general, this Congress should know that had the officers of the 3rd Infantry Division been allowed to do so, the formations that would have emerged in the wake of Operation Iraqi Freedom would have resembled those outlined in Transformation under Fire and Breaking the Phalanx, not the ones they are currently compelled to establish. The Army must provide the joint force with a diversity of capabilities from theater missile defense to rapidly deployable armored fighting forces. One size does not fit all. In fact, if Iran launched its numerous tactical ballistic and cruise missiles at US targets in the Persian Gulf today, we would be discussing the shortfalls in the Army’s theater missile defense capabilities, rather than uparmored HMMWVs and Strykers. What happens if nothing is done? Real change in the international system is outpacing anticipated change. Future, large-scale regional war aimed at American interests now seems no more than 4 to 5 years off with the strategic threat that the United States could be deprived of oil from the Middle East. However, these conditions were not inevitable. Our friends in Egypt and Jordan along with our British and Italian Allies watched in disbelief through the summer and fall of 2003 as our strategy of indecision on the ground in Iraq produced inaction against known pockets of resistance on the one hand and, on the other, humiliated, killed or incarcerated thousands of Iraqi Arabs without trial, the vast majority of which were not the enemy. The result was: we nurtured the insurgency. We cannot change the past, so we must confront the present and act decisively or face the possibility that our perceived failure to control Iraq seduces millions of poor, hopeless Arabs from Morocco to the Persian Gulf to join forces with our enemies throughout the Islamic World. Keep in mind that our enemies do not have to defeat us in the conventional sense to achieve their strategic aims now or in the future. They simply have to create conditions similar to those we see today in Iraq on a wider regional level. We must face facts. Saudi Arabia may be reaching the end of its fragile existence. Iran is in a race to develop and field nuclear warheads for its already Page 11 impressive arsenal of theater ballistic missiles and cruise missiles in the hope that it will be positioned to pick up the pieces if we just leave. A nuclear-armed Pakistan could lurch openly into the Islamist camp on very short notice. Back off now, Iraq will ulcerate and regional order will eventually disintegrate.xii The oil may well stop flowing from the Persian Gulf and chaos could infect the whole region, producing a global economic disaster. Incidentally, if the oil stops flowing, who will intervene to secure the oil fields and guarantee that oil is exported to the United States, China, India, Japan and the rest of the World? The answer is obvious: American Soldiers and marines. Facing an enemy willing to take heavy losses to inflict pain on the American body politic through our armed forces demands that our ground forces do much more than win engagements or defeat improvised explosive devices. Transformation must result in an Army organized, trained, equipped and led to create a sense of futility in the mind of any current or future enemy by systematically crushing him using every asymmetrical advantage we possess. Page 12 i. Source: Colonel Richard Hooker, USA, former special assistant in the office of the Secretary of the Army. ii. In the past four months of fighting, the 2nd Battalion of the 4th Marine Regiment has lost 31 killed and 175 wounded, roughly 20% of its 1,000-man fighting strength. iii. These points relate to another flawed assumption: The belief that we should optimize our tactical units for the lowest level threat, not the high-end threat. Special Operations Infantry received well-deserved credit for its performance in Iraq, but we must be careful not to assume that conventional infantry will fight similar enemies under the same conditions. When conventional light infantry, Army or Marine, advanced on foot or in wheeled vehicles in Iraq they habitually conducted "movements to defense." Why? When American light infantry is armed with automatic weapons and the enemy has automatic weapons, any resistance is stiff because the two forces are on an equal footing. When this happens, the light infantry turns to the most powerful weapon in its inventory-the radio, because the radio calls in the U.S.A.F., U.S.N., artillery, or armor. Armor may be the first help to arrive, and when it does, the battle ends quickly. Why would a nation with global interests and a population dwarfed by its prospective enemies seek symmetry in combat? Why not instead lead with irresistible strength? iv. Megan Scully, “Permanent Waiver Allows Strykers To Be Deployed By C-130s,” Inside the Army, August 12, 2002, page 1. v. There are unintended benefits from this approach. 5,000 – 6,000 man formations can sustain casualties and keep fighting. Another is that eliminating some of the career gates on the Army career ladder also changes career patterns, allowing more time for lieutenant colonels and colonels to become educated and joint; something that the current Army career patterns obstruct. This promotes breadth of experience that is not rewarded in a branch-dominated promotion system that reinforces narrowness of experience. Another is the placement of a brigadier general in command on the tactical level. vi. Current Blueforce tracking systems are not interoperable with FBCB2 and neither of these systems is interoperable with FCS. Since FCS-equipped and non-FCS-equipped formations will operate side-by-side until after 2030, this is a serious problem. vii. Clayton M. Christensen, The Innovator’s Dilemma: When New Technologies Cause Great Firms to Fail (Boston: Harvard Business School Press, 1997), 159. In his landmark book, The Innovator’s Dilemma, Clayton Christensen explains why the massive Army investment program in Stryker and the undefined FCS may be a mistake. He does so by explaining why the Intel struggle to figure out how to market micro-processing technology was successful when the efforts of other firms were not: “Many of the ideas prevailing at Intel about where the disruptive microprocessor could be used were wrong; fortunately, Intel had not expended all of its resources implementing wrong-headed marketing plans while the right market direction was still unknowable. As a company, Intel survived many false starts in its search for the major market for microprocessors viii. Limited numbers of prototypes can be examined under fire before billions of dollars in scarce investment funding are committed to much larger acquisition programs. viii. In many ways, what I am recommending is no different from the “experiments” undertaken by both the Russians and Germans during the Spanish Civil War of the late 1930s. The Germans in particular benefited from this practice through the use of a limited number of selected aircraft, tanks, and guns that were tested under combat conditions. Some platforms, such as the Junkers Tri-Motor bomber, turned out to be better suited as a transport aircraft. In other cases, there were clear winners such as the 88-mm antiaircraft gun that proved valuable as an antitank weapon. Why is this experience with experimentation important? The Technological pace is quickening again. For instance, over time, unmanned combat aerial vehicles (UCAVs) have the potential to exert a similar influence on the conduct of land warfare. It is increasingly clear that a larger UCAV with more range, loiter time, and payload will eventually be able to fulfill many of the armed reconnaissance and sensor relay functions that armed helicopters are expected to perform. Page 13 However, it takes time to perfect new warfighting systems within new organizations to realize true potential—and therein lies the rub. viii. Unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) ability to provide a substantial capacity for fires to the point where they can supplant manned aviation or artillery systems is limited. At the moment, they present a command and control (C2) nightmare for fires and can carry only limited munitions load. ix. Nothing in the current CSA’s plan deviates substantially from this statement: “The Objective Force is organized around a common divisional design, allowing interchangeable full spectrum capability. Division and Corps level headquarters set the conditions for and integrate all elements of the joint/multinational/interagency force, directing and supporting the operations of its maneuver and fighting units through inter-netted linkages to joint C4ISR and joint effects.” See Louis Caldera, Secretary of the Army, and General Eric K. Shinseki, Army Chief of Staff, United States Army Transformation Campaign Plan, August 1, 2000, 5. x. See TRADOC Pamphlet 525-3-90/Operational and Organizational Plan for Maneuver Unit of Action, July 22, 2002. xi. Suggested to the author by Lieutenant Colonel (P) H.R. McMaster, US Army. xii Patrick J. McDonnell and Suhail Ahmed, “Resentment is Festering in Little Falloujahs,” Los Angeles Times, July 13, 2004, page 1. “Personal Reasons” By © A. Scott Piraino CIA Director George Tenet officially resigned last week after a tumultuous, seven year tenure. President Bush offered a conciliatory speech to the outgoing Director, and claimed Mr. Tenet had resigned for “personal reasons”. He is absolutely right. George Tenet’s reason for resigning is his personal disgust with the White House, and the “neo-conservative” alliance that undermined the U.S. intelligence agencies. The Bush Administration is responsible for the lies that led to the invasion of Iraq, not the CIA. And George tenet knows this better than anyone. Last week also saw the release of a Senate investigation into U.S. intelligence failures leading up to the War in Iraq. Not surprisingly, the report blames the CIA for falsifying and overstating analyses on Iraq’s Weapons of Mass Destruction. However, the Senate report only investigated the CIA’s role in the Iraqi intelligence fiasco. The report does not address the manipulation of that intelligence by the White House and Defense department to bolster the case for war. The Republicans were determined not to undermine the President’s re-election bid, and defeated attempts to investigate the Bush administration’s shenanigans regarding Iraq. Their role in creating evidence of Iraq’s WMDs, and connections to al-Qaeda will be the subject of a separate Senate investigation. A second report pertaining to the misuse of intelligence will be released by the end of the year, but after the election on November 2nd. This Senate Report is a whitewash, and a public relations coup for the Bush administration. They are off the hook, while George Tenet and the CIA take the fall for the faulty intelligence that justified the invasion of Iraq. This is the last, not the first time George Tenet has been held responsible for Bush administration lies. In late 2001 forged documents were “discovered” stating that Saddam Hussein had attempted to purchase uranium in Niger. British Intelligence had supplied the original forged documents, and they came to the British from an unnamed foreign source. Even though the documents did not originate from CIA sources, Vice President Cheney pressured the CIA into investigating the report. In February of 2002 retired ambassador Joseph Wilson was dispatched to Niger. After returning, he concluded that no exchange of uranium between Niger and Iraq took place, and said as much to CIA officials. George Tenet then informed the White House that the story was false. This did not stop President Bush from using the allegations in his State of the Union address in January of 2003. When the press began investigating these reports, the notorious “yellow cake” scandal unfolded. The Bush administration saved face by forcing George Tenet to accept responsibility for the faulty intelligence. He publicly apologized by saying: “The President had every reason to believe that the text presented to him was sound.” The Bush Administration would repay the CIA’s loyalty by releasing the name of a covert agent in retaliation for criticism of the White House. In July of last year Joseph Wilson wrote an Op-Ed piece for the New York times aptly titled, "What I Didn't Find in Africa". His piece criticized the Bush administration’s use of bogus information in the State of the Union address, and further claimed that they knew the yellow cake story was not true. In retaliation, an unknown White House official (Karl Rove), leaked the name of his wife to reporters and told them she was a CIA agent. This is a federal crime, and a serious one. National Security laws protect the identity of covert agents, penalties for revealing classified information range from fines to up to ten years in prison. In September the CIA, with George Tenet’s approval, formally requested a Justice department investigation. The ongoing Grand Jury investigation has questioned several high-ranking White House officials and Vice President Cheney. Three weeks ago, the investigation reached the President himself. The White House press secretary declared that, “no one wants to get to the bottom of this matter more than the president of the United States”. However, the President had a private lawyer present during his hour long interrogation by Justice Department investigators. The Valerie Plame affair is not the only case where the Bush administration broke the law in order to control information about Iraq. Federal Investigators are now asking questions about illegal contacts between the Bush administration and Ahmad Chalabi. The Defense Department has been secretly funding Chalabi and his Iraqi National Congress for the past four years, to the tune of 33 million dollars. Chalabi wanted the United states to overthrow Saddam Hussein. The Bush administration needed propaganda about Iraq’s weapons of mass destruction in order to justify the invasion they also wanted. According to the Wall street Journal, Ahmad Chalabi attended a secret Defense Policy Board meeting just days after September 11th. The subject of the meeting was how to use the 9/11 attacks as a pretext to invading Iraq. In return for funding from the Bush administration, Chalabi‘s Iraqi National Congress leaked false stories to the press about Iraq’s WMD programs. Including the reports of Iraq’s mobile bio-weapons labs, which turned out to be nothing but tractor trailers. These reports were used by the Bush administration as evidence of Iraq’s WMD programs. Again, the CIA knew these stories were false, and that Chalabi was unreliable. After U.S. forces had invaded Iraq, Chalabi was groomed for the role of interim Prime Minister, and given a seat on the Iraqi Governing Council. When asked by a reporter about Iraq’s weapons of mass destruction, weapons his INC clamed were there but had not been found, Chalabi said: “As far as we're concerned we've been entirely successful. That tyrant Saddam is gone and the Americans are in Baghdad. What was said before is not important.” Then, on May 20th, coalition forces in Iraq raided the mansion of Ahmad Chalabi. Just days before the coalition raided his house, the Bush administration cut funding to Chalabi, and distanced themselves from their new pariah. President Bush even remarked to King Abdullah of Jordan, "you can piss on Chalabi". U.S. officials now suspect Chalabi of passing classified information to Iran. Apparently Mr. Chalabi has informed the Iranians that U.S. intelligence agencies have cracked their communications codes. Worse, they suspect that Defense Department officials who had frequent contacts with Chalabi leaked that information to him, and Chalabi in turn passed it on to Iran. This information is highly classified, and Iran will surely take precautions to prevent further access to their secrets by U.S. Intelligence. The FBI has begun questioning the few Defense Department officials who had access to the information. Interestingly, both Donald Rumsfeld and Dick Cheney deny any knowledge that the investigation is even taking place. Warrants were issued for fifteen of Ahmad Chalabi’s associates, all INC officials. Their crimes ranged from kidnapping, fraud, running stolen car rings, illegal seizure of property, and "associated matters". Nevertheless, Chalabi continued to protest his innocence, and even blame George Tenet for his crimes. He publicly accused the CIA director of providing “erroneous information about weapons of mass destruction to President Bush, which caused the government much embarrassment at the United Nations and his own country.” He added that George Tenet, “was behind the charges against me that claimed that I gave intelligence information to Iran.” George Tenet has been forced to endure this abuse, because if he spoke out he would have to admit that Chalabi is a paid stooge of the White House. The Bush administration’s relationship with Chalabi provides a glimpse of where the real case for war in Iraq was made. The fact is, the CIA is a professional organization, ran by career civil servants. The bush administration could strong-arm the agency into reporting that Iraq was a threat to the U.S., but the White house could not just order the CIA to lie. But the truth can only be stretched so far, and the truth was Iraq was not a threat. So neo-conservatives in the Defense Department created the Office of Special Plans. The OSP publicized the few bits of information that showed Iraq was a threat to the US, and ignored the preponderance of data that said otherwise, thus creating propaganda to support the march towards war. The Office of Special Plans also invented lies. This secret organization within the Pentagon, answerable to no one, funded Chalabi. The OSP also created evidence that Saddam Hussein’s regime was connected to al-Qaeda. During the buildup to war, Vice President Cheney began claiming that Mohammed Atta, one of the September 11th hijackers, met with an Iraqi intelligence officer. The alleged meeting took place in the Czech Republic in April 2001. Bush administration officials made repeated references to this meeting as evidence that Iraq was cooperating with al-Qaeda to strike at the United states. The CIA had published contrary intelligence about Mohammed Atta as early as December 2001. FBI Evidence of Mohammed Atta‘s whereabouts place him in the United States at the time of the alleged meeting in Prague. The Senate’s 9/11 report concurred with CIA analysts, the meeting never took place.  In testimony before the 9/11 Commission George Tenet admitted that the OSP briefed white House officials on ties between Iraq and al-Qaeda without his knowledge. He also revealed a memo he sent to the Under Secretary of defense. The memo stated that Mr. Tenet did not agree with "the way the data was characterized", pertaining to the alleged meeting between Mohammed Atta and the Iraqis. The Defense Department issued a correction, but not before they had leaked the story to the press. During the build up to war administration officials referred to the meeting between Mohammed Atta and Iraqi intelligence officers as fact. Vice President Cheney repeatedly mentioned the alleged meeting, even after the 9/11 Commission had ruled the story a farce, by saying that the meeting “couldn’t be ruled out.” Again the Bush administration’s intelligence was a lie, and again the CIA was not responsible. Vice President Cheney was lying, they were all lying, but Mr. Tenet could not speak out. After the Chalabi fiasco and the Intelligence Committee report, Mr. Tenet had all he could take, and he tendered his resignation. One Democrat flatly stated that George Tenet “fell on his sword". They failed to implicate the Bush administration for lying about Iraq, but Senate Democrats did attach nine “alternative opinions” to the report issued last week. This appendix details Bush administration pressure on the CIA to modify analyses, and provides the first official evidence of the Office of Special Plans. People must realize that the CIA works for the White House. This has put George Tenet in a difficult position. The CIA cannot publicly condemn the President‘s propaganda campaign, because he is their boss. In addition to being double crossed by the Bush administration, the CIA has had to answer for the September 11th attacks, and the faulty intelligence that led to the war in Iraq. We must also realize that the CIA is on record as opposing the Invasion of Iraq. The Bush administration has co-opted the CIA in order to prosecute their mad war, and they bear the responsibility. As CIA Director, George Tenet was used by the Bush administration, and discarded. For George Tenet, this was personal. … OPERATIONAL Smoke, Mirrors & Parachutes: Army preparing to airdrop Stryker WITHOUT 105mm gun to deceive Congress and the American people that Stryker-MGSs with 105mm guns are airdroppable By LPT Staff The Army is going to lie to Congress and the American people by airdropping a Stryker without a 105mm gun on top out a huge C-17 to somehow equate this as meaning a Stryker-MGS with a 105mm gun on top that's over 106 inches high is somehow going to fit through a C-17 opening that's only 118 inches high for airdrop. The 105mm gun and its mountings, electronics/optics are not even being tested to see if they could survive airdrop. Got this from informed Army Sources: The Airdrop at Edwards AFB on 16 Aug. will not be a Stryker MGS. It will be a ESV. This has caused a major issue at TSM MGS @ Ft. Knox because the critical part of the test is the the Guntube and trunion mounting being able to withstand the shockload. The Crunch is on. The MGS still cannot be deployed on a single C130 -- it is still a two aircraft mission. This violates the Key Performance Parameters, but the Army is going to waive it regardless. They will rehearse MGS loading next week at Aberdeen and then demonstrate it to the testers the following week. Worst of all, the Autoloader still does not work reliably. The Army will submit MGS to the DAB for approval with a failure rate of 1 per 12 rounds, and they will propose an extended RAM test that will incorporate design changes and will not be completed until 1 year after the LRIP decision. [EDITOR: LRIP = Low Rate Initial Production, an excuse to build something without having it tested] TECHNOTACTICAL WHERE ARE THE BRADLEY SHIELDS? On June 24, 2004, in Iraq, Captain Chris Cash was riding in the turret top of a Bradley Fighting Vehicle (BFV) which the Army has neglected to fit shields for like its M113 Gavins can have fitted. An enemy bullet hit him in the head and he died, leaving behind a wife and 2 sons. We have known continually from Fort Polk, JRTC and Fort Irwin, NTC force-on-force MILES laser tag war games that crewmen in Bradleys, Abrams and Gavins can be killed from sniper's bullets if not fitted with shields. The same applies to HMMWV trucks which after Somalia received gun shield kits but the enemy just has to shoot through the weak body of the vehicle and through its windows and doors to kill and maim. The Army's tracked armored fighting vehicles (AFVs) with solid bodies could be made fully RPG and roadside bomb resistant with multiple layers of armor and be operated safely from open hatches to see outward and respond to the enemy first---if the Army cared to upgrade them. The good news is that manufacturers are ready to make clear ballistic shields for BFVs (see computer drawing above). Further investigation of this preventable tragedy reveals that clear ballistic shields for Bradleys are available if the Army asks for them, but apparently there are Army officials who don't want to spend the estimated $3,000 per Bradley to save the Soldiers who walk down the same corridors of Building 4 as they do daily; which included at one time Chris Cash. The irony here that a good man and infantry officer has died because some bureaucrats in the Army don't want to spend the "cash" is not a "freak" occurrence. It would be even funny if it were not that we have already lost dozens of real Soldiers to real bullets while operating unshielded M2 Bradleys and M1 Abrams, medium and heavy tanks. However, some people in our Army do not care about its tracked vehicles or the men that use them and want to instead waste billions instead on rubber-tired HMMWV and Strykers trucks that can never be adequately protected or maneuverable enough on the non-linear battlefield where close-range combats are the rule not the exception. They'd rather spend $3.3 million for each Strykers truck that is hidden in a quiet place in Iraq than spend $3 thousand dollars per Bradley, Abrams or Gavin to save heroes like Chris Cash who are actually engaged in combat. Strategic Capabilities: ISO Container "Battle Boxes": Containerize the entire U.S. Army "The ultimate objective of an army is to impose its collective will on the enemy. But its first mission is simply to exist. Its first problem is to feed and clothe and shelter itself, and to be able to move itself from one place to another. Most people think of an army as expending its energy in fighting the enemy. Actually, most of an army's energy goes into keeping itself alive and in being; and in getting itself to where a very small portion of its numbers can fight an equally small portion of the enemy's total army. As soon as we won in Tunisia, we had no place for our army to fight the Reichswehr. But even when Rommel's armies were still terrible, a surprisingly small portion of the Allied "armed forces" in Africa was engaged in fighting it. And of those who are entitled to battle stars on their ribbons, only a small fraction were killing in the literal sense. And even the killers spent most of their time --I would guess an average of twenty-two hours out of twenty-four-- in house-keeping for themselves, and in moving from one place to another. Yet the whole effect of the army is as integrated as the 'shaft and the head and the point of the tip of a spear.' A human being is such a frail thing that he cannot live more than a few days without both food and sleep. Nature is still his real enemy even though he takes his eternal struggle with her for granted. So the army as a whole must survive against nature before it can harm a single enemy by surviving and moving itself from one place to another is ninety per cent of the army's business, and unless it does this well it is not an army. The army solves its problems of surviving by two dull words: organization and standardization --and an enormous personal effort and submergence of the individual will to the collective welfare." - Capt. Ralph Ingersoll, The Battle is the Pay-Off; 1943; pp. 84-85 Regarding operations of U.S. Army Rangers and the 1st Infantry Division near El Quettar, Tunisia in early 1943 ******************************************* The Roman Legions used to carry EVERYTHING they needed to form their own stockade, an armed camp to include the wood for fencing! No matter where they were, deserts, woods, swamps they could stop and set up a protective camp. In fact, you can still see the traces of their encampments today in archaeological ruins. However, when one examines the U.S. make shift presence in Iraq where our men are getting killed in their vulnerable base camps as they hunker down to avoid getting killed on the main supply routes by roadside bombs and RPGs, you have to wonder if we are up to the task of world conquest when we don't have the Roman Legion's encampment and stay ensconced capability. We are paying civilian truck drivers to shuttle fuel in unarmored trucks to keep our Soldiers/marines supplied in Iraq, and that they are refusing to be a human BBQ should come as no surprise. Were we Americans always this inept? The answer to this question can be found in our past and projected into the present with new technologies to reverse the present debacle. How did America win the West? We conquered the west with covered wagons that protected ourselves and our supplies to sustain us for days, weeks and months before game could be shot and killed and crops grown. With Indians shooting at us with arrows and throwing Tomahawk axes, this was good enough for that 1st Generation War threat; but its not enough for today's 4th Generation of War (4GW) threats. We have forgotten that we have a legacy of self-sufficient mobile warfare and need to rediscover it in 21st century form so we bring our own infrastructure to sustain ourselves against the battle against the earth and protect it against man. Today's covered wagon descendents, the soft-skin, canvass covered rubber-tired truck with an internal combustion engine will not cut it against RPGs and RSBs let alone weapons of mass destruction (WMDs) delivered by theater ballistic missiles (TBMs). Our civilian lives are held together today by "covered wagon" tractor-trailers piloted by brave truck drivers who go without sleep, but of course no one is shooting at them as long as they don't go on strike. So why should we try to resupply ourselves with unarmored tractor-trailers in a shooting war? War is different than peace-time. The U.S. Army has been inadequately cobbling together ad hoc, non-comprehensive field living work-arounds for decades after the motor driven truck was invented and are still not properly adapted to the earth environment. Human needs are scoffed at with machismo disdain. The U.S. Army still lives in completely vulnerable tents that we pack, repack and erect wasting enormous time and of course fail to protect our Soldiers! The time has come for us to adapt once and for all to earth field living conditions, the non-linear battle enemy threat and end the scourge of the garrison pampered/field deprivation feast/famine mentalities. We can no longer every time we go to war learn our adolescent machismo is no match for bullets, bombs and infections. We need to grow up about field living and war conditions, and admit we are not third world fighters who will live in squalid conditions and trade years off our lives in order to win in battle. The way to success is to properly take care of our high health standard human needs and then focus all of our, in general, greater available energies to warfighting. Make Sea/Air/Land ISO Containers our "building blocks" The number one, central piece of "equipment" for the Navy is ships. For the Air Force its aircraft. For the Army/marines its BUILDINGS. Do we go to war with buildings? No. Then why are we spending most of our garrison day on lawn and building care on buildings that do nothing for us in a fight? We have a solution. Awhile back, British military expert, William Owen suggested we put light tanks like M113 Gavins inside sea/air/land containers also known as "milvans" in U.S. parlance to container ship and truck them into battle areas. Its a great idea I haven't stopped tinkering with. I think small aircraft and helicopters need to be carried inside armored milvans as suggested by Brent Orr to effect the ground mobility I propose so we don't have to work around them like we do now and get them co-located with ground maneuver units for more responsiveness. My buddy from college is a SF MSG, and he just returned from Iraq. He gave me this picture of the Sea/Air/Land container HOUSE he lived in called a "Cormex". He says its made in Italy and not only stacks like a container for ship, truck, air transport, they FLATTEN, too. I haven't found much on the www of this development. Here's the pic: Here's some info: www.monmouth.army.mil/monmessg/ newmonmsg/oct242003/m43qatar.htm EXCERPT: "As a deployed civilian, I was assigned to live in a 'Cormex,' a steel box composed of "storage container" components. Storage containers are often stacked three high on the deck of ocean-going ships. The interior walls and ceiling of units were covered in thick plastic, with a linoleum-covered floor. Cormexes have a front door and small window. The unit is eight strides long and three strides wide and contains two beds, two nightstands, a shelf attached to one wall and two chairs." Scott Miller adds: "This isn't a bad system but we can actually do better as well - expandable containers are available in a variety of designs allowing for even more room. I've advocated these for years as replacements for all major tentage. Keep the force mobile in the early stages of conflict and when it's time to settle in, truck in these shelters on load handling trailers. Also ideal for office space. The medical corps is already working on converting to this format with the primary mode of transport being an LHS-equipped MTV." So let's get rid of all the buildings and lawn areas possible from the Army and marines. What are we waiting for? Are we warfighters or janitors? The key invention here is the sea/air/land ISO shipping container which easily stacks on top of each other for container ship delivery by sea, mounts on railroad flat cars, truck beds and in aircraft. Here is where equipment and doctrine collide. Replace everything with military ISO sea/air/land containers that are mobile by trains, trucks and planes. If it cannot fit in an ISO and deploy with us to war, throw it out. What we do in garrison out of ISO containers better damn well be exactly what we would do in war. Thanks to my friend Last Dingo, we have done a quick "market survey" of the military ISO containers out there. There are ISO containers that FLOAT that connect like lego pieces to form piers and causeways...there are several fully functional hospitals with patient bed ISOs....aircraft workshop repair facilities (no excuse not to do our aircraft-in-a-box idea!), kitchens, commo facilities, CPs..... Researcher Phil West uncovered the following: "Some more stuff on container living from the guy who first put me onto them" Phil There's a follow-up article for your 1st link: http://www.escapeartist.com/efam17/Nomadic_Housing.html I must admit that I have lost track with the majority of my shipping container housing URL's, having gone through a number of computers since posting to you on that subject. I have looked through your links (thanks) and searching through several Google results pages and see the topic has proliferated. As I recall, the container that caught my eye was an expandable mil spec unit...from a Norwegan company named Uniteam (at www.uniteam.org) ,it was designed as a command post or something, with the sidewalls sliding outwards (like a Caravan or RV's "tip-out" rooms) to convert from a standard container-width, to triple size after being towed to a destination. Made for NATO. Exterior view: http://www.army-technology.com/contractors/field/uniteam/uniteam3.html Interior view: http://www.army-technology.com/contractors/field/uniteam/uniteam4.html Uniteam International AS Tevlingveien 23 PO Box 200 N-0614 Oslo Norway Tel: +47 23 14 22 80 Fax: +47 23 14 22 90 Email: international@uniteam.no URL: www.uniteam.org There are also a number of pre-fab shelters that are sold in a shipping container and which setup "quickly". One such are Deltec prefab homes. Google it. Also a yurt is a very livable shelter which can be transported in the back of a truck. Build a deck and setup on top. Might look at some at http://www.nbyurts.com/ - Here's a compact treatise on how to make a small fortune by living in a yurt. Inspiring: "Stop paying rent without mortgaging your next 30 years. Shelter is an area where all people experience a common ground - everyone needs a place to stay warm and dry. Fortunately, we have choices. For example, instead of paying $600 a month rent, why not stay at a friend's or camp out for 3-4 months? You could use the $2400 you would save to buy a Yurt. Then find some land you could use for low or no cost. In 2 years, you could save $14,400 - enough to buy some nice land and move your portable Yurt. 10 years of saving the $600 a month rent yields $72,000; over $100,000 if reinvested at 10%" Retire in some easy 3rd world country. Someplace like Goa, Thailand, Panama...move to Brazil and take up the saxaphone...it's your call. Good hearing from you, but I've been up about 24 hrs., so must steal some sleep before doing another night shift...you know how it is. best, Chris These are some I found http://www.escapeartist.com/OREQ4/Nomadic_Housing2000.html http://www.escapeartist.com/efam17/At_The_Edge.html http://www.enr.com/news/buildings/archives/031117.asp http://www.archpaper.com/feature_articles/shipping_news.html http://www.totse.com/en/ego/self_improvement/howtomakeachea173260.htm l http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A28394-2004May14.html OK, the Euros may not be the most willing to fight, but they are sure damn well better organized to do it than we are! Chuck Jarnot here is your "modules" you wanted for a future Army aircraft. Air-Mech-Strike co-author, Chuck and I have long advocated the Army needs to start training as we would fight by using modules that would be ready to go to snap into deployment aircraft CH-54 SkyCrane style. Well we don't have to wait. We should get on board with the sea/air/land ISO concept and containerize EVERYTHING, troop barrack areas, bunkers for defenses, ammunition, supplies, transport our aircraft and tanks in ISO containers. What are we doing in the U.S. Army? We are still foolng around with TENTS that don't protect against SQUAT, be it the battle against the earth weather let alone the battle against humans. If we are serious about rapid-deployment, we should cut out all of this break-bulk packing and repacking non-sense that is hidden away during garrison and get everything ready-to-use and ready-to-go NOW via ISO battle boxes. Palletized Loading System/ISO container interface kit exists---what are we waiting for? The rest of the world uses ISO containers to move everything to include our NATO allies; everybody but the U.S. Army seems to have grasped some but not all of their utility and potential. What we need is for the U.S. Army to develop a family of ISO container "battle boxes" that can deploy ALL of its men, equipment and supplies and then dig them in if necessary to withstand possible WMD attacks. We need to "circle our wagons" but they need to be armored to withstand Indians with modern weaponry like RPGs, RSBs, AKMs and WMDs. We need to containerize the entire U.S. Army to instill an expeditionary mindset NOW and to get our geare packed NOW. Proposed U.S. Army Standard ISO Battle Box (BB) * Outer sacrificial wall to predetonate RPGs which can be filled with ice/sand/dirt * Drop-down wheels to be a trailer when required * PLS interface built-in to be picked up and dropped off by PLS system equipped vehicles * Wartertight, able to float to form bridges * Insulated to be cool in summer/warm in winter even without heat/AC * Electrical outlets/wiring for 110V and 12V via roof solar panels * Top troop hatches on roof to fight from while moving as troop transport or stationary as pillbox/guard towers * Side entrance/exit doors * Link together to form unified walls * Lightweight versions airland and cargo parachute air-droppable Gavin Light Mechanized Infantry Company: trains exactly as it fights, packed and ready at all times, NOW Consider a Light Mechanized Infantry Company designed for 3D air/land/sea maneuver with 14 x M113A4 Gavin hybrid-electric 500 hp drive light tracked Infantry carriers. They would have 14 ISO Battle Boxes (BBs). In CONUS, 7.5 BBs would store their M113A4s, 2 per BB to keep them out of the sun, heat, dust, rain, snow, cold to better preserve them for when they are needed in battle, saving millions of dollars in the long run. PMCS can be done within the BB to protect Soldiers from skin cancer causing sun, saving more money and making motor stable less onerous a task. There is no "motor pool" to guard and have vandals take parts from vehicles. The 14 Gavins are securely locked in their BBs in the company area which can be guarded at the same time the company office, also in a BB is manned by a phone watch CQ. The 8 BBs used for vehicle storage in the field would be used as armored troop barracks/pill boxes as the tactical situation dictates by snapping in bunk hammocks into slots in the BB walls. Except for weapons that would be secured in a static building's security vault, EVERYTHING the infantry company owns would be in their 14 BBs and ready to go to war instantly without days, weeks and months of break bulk packing to fit into trucks and other makeshift schemes to get overseas. There would be enough BBs space for over 1 year's of food and just before deploying months of ammunition and water. One BB would have decontamination/shower/washing machine/toilet facilities with water tanks on top and below to recover from NBC attacks as well as to sustain the troops indefinitely in the field. Power would be from solar panels stretched on top of the roof, portable JP8 generators or other power piped in. Its time we stop the macho posturing and face the fact that the human body cannot stay healthy and dirty at the same time. So instead of living in denial, let's factor this need in and make it organic to every company sized unit in the army to be self-sufficient. Clean Soldiers and uniforms saves money and logistics for medical care and replacing ACU uniforms at $80 each. Another BB would be a solar powered kitchen with insulated refrigeration and bulk water purification capable of walk in and out feeding of the entire company in the field. The men would return to their troop living battle boxes to eat under armor protection. All Soldiers in the company would take turns being cooks. A water well drilling kit would be standard to get water from the ground to purify if a lake/river is not nearby. One BB would be conference room/recreation room with computers to stay in contact with home when overseas via satellite link up. The point is that the Infantry Company even in garrison need not get bogged down with lawn and building care, they work out of the exact troop BBs that they would use in combat. When time to go into the field, they can use their 14 M113A4 Gavins to tow their BBs to their training area and set up a Forward Operating Base (FOB) just as they would during real world missions. With 14 BBs, a walled inner perimeter could be made (circle-the-wagons) to protect the Tactical Operations Center (TOC) M113A4 Gavin from observation and possible enemy snipers. A landing spot for helicopters to land and take-off could be formed as the British container Ship Atlantic Conveyor did for CH-47 Chinooks in the Falklands war in 1982. If the BN M88 or a M113 Gavin recovery vehicle's crane is available, BBs could be stacked to be elevated guard towers. The BBs could stay on their trailer towing wheels or be lowered onto the ground for better protection. With a blade-equipped M113A4 Gavin, all 14 BBs could be dug into the ground for further protection from enemy weaponry, concealment to include WMDs. The outer perimeter would be manned by the ultimate mobile battle box itself, the M113A4 HED Gavin with lots of battery electrical power to operate turrets and electro-optical sensors and its Soldiers. As these Soldiers need relief they can go into the company perimeter center and get hot chow and a shower as well as a safe, protected night's sleep in a BB in the inner perimeter. To deploy off-post, the company gets its last minute fill of ammunition/supplies, draw weapons and hops on a train co-located with their BBs for a trip to Fort Iwin, NTC or Fort Polk, JRTC saving the Army lots of money. To go overseas, their 14 BBs can be loaded onto a civilian contract or a new high-speed U.S. Landing Ship Tank Battle Box (more on this later). If they are needed faster, they can fly by 7 x C-17 Globemaster III jet sorties. Its even possible that BBs could be cargo parachute airdropped along with the men who would jump using personnel parachutes. Once on the scene of battle, the BBs could be opened, their M113A4 Gavins driven out, and used to destroy the enemy and secure the drop zone. After this, the BB's wheels could be lowered and they are towed out the DZ or picked up by a XM1108 Gavin variant with PLS flat rack/BB pick-up capability to be positioned as pill boxes to further strengthen the perimeter defenses or moved out to follow the light mechanized infantry company as it moves ahead on offense. Once the BBs catch up with their Gavin infantry they can form their own company perimeter defense or with other units form an outer walled perimeter (think Fort Apache in the Old West movies or the Mormon base camp in the film Starship Troopers). If the Gavins deploy inside their BBs in less dramatic form, their ships could offload them and prime mover truck drivers link them up with their infantrymen at an assembly area prior to going into battle. The mech infantry company could tow their own BBs and their own protected logistics if there is still more distances to travel or leave them behind at the assembly area to be shuttled forward. This could mean their own JP8 fuel in Flex-Cell bladders strapped to their vehicle outsides and/or packed in their 7.5 BB's space freed by their vehicles no longer inside. When you consider a Hybrid-Electric drive M113A4 Gavin gets twice the fuel economy and range compared to a conventional engine (7.0 mpg for 600 mile range vs. 3.5 mpg and 300 mile range) the ability to essentially have several ARMORED tractor/trailers full of fuel enables the force to operate for days and weeks without vulnerable resupply along road MSRs. Once the infantry company has its BBs its almost completely self-sufficient and need not occupy former enemy palaces to inflame the locals who we are trying to win over by toppling their former dictator(s). They even have the infrastructure to share with suffering peoples who need water, food and power. At all times our troops have at least some protection from enemy artillery and indirect fires while in base camps. AH-64 Apache Attack Helicopter Company new mobile, non-linear warfare capabilities Consider an AH-64 Apache gunship company that would have BBs and be able to do everything the mech infantry company could do with its BBs; plus it would be able to sea deploy without costly and time consuming plastic shrink wrapping that doesn't physically protect the birds. In BBs, the Apaches are totally safe from bumps and collision damages. Standard container ships instead of aircraft carriers or top deck space on RO-RO ships can now transport Army helicopters. The BBs enable the force commander to save enormous amounts of JP8 fuel because he can truck his Apaches if they are not needed to fight in the air. He can conceal who he is from the enemy by thenm being covered in their BBs until they exit their cacoons and take flight to strike with tactical and even strategic surprise. The enemy doesn't know if the BB is full of MREs or Apaches or troops. At a fixed air base the BBs become defacto hardened shelters. The BBs enable the apaches to be maintained in clean environments so their flight hours before overhaul are conserved and allows them to be forward deployed and co-located with ground maneuver units! Their BBs can be staggered to form a wall yet still offering an open end for them to emerge and roll out into the perimeter center to take-off and fly into battle. Wounded aircraft are not stuck with BBs. Downed aircraft can be recovered by BBs and prime movers instead of being destroyed in place as took place in Afghanistan months ago. A Forward Arming And Refueling Point (FAARP) could be in Indian country using BBs to form a protective perimeter via ground personnel in BBs and roving in XM1108 Gavin prime mover AFVs. Crews could sleep soundly inside a BB in the perimeter center to be ready to fly after their rest period. The helicopters themselves would have a shielded, center landing zone to operate from wherever they take their BBs. Landing Ship Tank Battle Box (LST-BB) As Colonel Douglas Macgregor surmised in his visionary book, "Transformation under Fire" we again need a new fleet of Landing Ship Tanks (LSTs) that can deliver Army forces right onto beaches by bow ramps since the navy/marines have given up on the idea. Churchill's idea of a LST saved the day in WWII and in Korea and many wars before the seamine problem overcame the complacent navy/marines leading them to their current impotent over-the-horizon (OTH) mentality of problem avoidance. At some point we are going to have to clear the sea lanes of mines and we don't need to be pussy footing around with offloading because we are in a wimpy high speed, fuel hog catamaran ferry that needs a pierside port or a RO-RO ship that needs deep waters near the shore just to get close to a port. We need a new technology LST that is a fast catamaran for better stability in the oceans than the flat bottom LSTs that made them unpopular with sailors but can land its bow upon a beach to roll off Army tracked armored fighting vehicles and BBs in trailer configuration. We also need a seaplane transport that can do this with M113A4 Amphigavins, too. A LST-BB would have overhead snatch and move superstructures to pluck a BB and lower it onto the front bow ramp when beached so a prime mover can hook up to it after it drops its trailer wheels. If the sea lanes are not clear the superstructure should be able to lower a BB over the side onto a landing craft air cushion platform with a LCAC parked on it so it can be shuttled at 60 mph ashore on a 5-8 foot air cushion above the water and sea mines. Another option to create RO-RO ship berthing for 200 drivers to already be on the ship to offload their vehicles is to use ISO Container "Battle Boxes" with living facilities built into them. Place about 10-20 living area ISO BBs on deck. Don't Live in Palaces here at home or abroad: stay humble, stay in your Battle Box Let's stop talking about "out-of-box" thinking and get ourselves IN battle boxes so we can cut through this time-wasting and start being what we need to be right now. With ISO "battle boxes" everything we would use for war is readily available in peacetime for training just as we would use it in war because we would be the same military for war as we are 24/7/365. Now I know why God kept Moses and the Israelites mobile for all those years--to keep them on their toes. CSA Gen Schoomaker talks about a "modular" Army: ISO battle boxes would make it modular for REAL. Army Artillery expert and Vietnam combat vet, LTC Larry Altersitz writes: "I suggested to the Field Artillery they put the Bn TOCs in band tracked vans towed by M577s to avoid the tent city syndrome and provide a little more protection and speed for a TOC. Notice the alacrity with which they jumped on the idea. No bn or higher TOC should be in tents unless it's a very light infantry bn. Use permanent trailers, configured for operational work, connected by fiber optic cable, under some light armor for any Hqs. Saves set-up/tear-down time, allows mobility to keep up with the fastest ground elements and doesn't wear out the troops with being part of a circus. Since the ISO containers aren't carrying great weights, it might be easier to have several configured for bn or higher level staffs and towed by a single prime mover. No playing with expanding walls, setting up supports underneath the expanded portion, everything in its own place with no movement, hard wired, etc. Link them with fiber-optic cables and a local TV network for that important 'eye contact' via big screen displays. Far easier to disperse the containers and run cabling between them to reduce a target signature. And put an antenna farm a km or so away from the TOC, so that a DF system doesn't call a single MRL launcher to plaster your location with cheap rockets. Ditto the generators, to reduce signature even more. If you use solar panels for some power, cover them with 'tan thru' swimsuit material to reduce reflection." Larry Last Dingo comments: "About other containers; they're nice, but they also have limits. I think a command centre shouldn't be installed in boxes. It should consist of easily (5min setup) networked MilSpec laptops, external 17" flat monitors, two (map) printers (UV and water protection inclusive), to laptops with external hubs for glass-fiber cable connections to several spaced directional radio, short wavelength and satellite comm. radios, two electricity generator some folding stools and folding tables and easily fit into a civilian house (supermarket and such). Same equipment with different softwares should be used from company up to corps level, just varying in the long-range communication assets. Software-based is the key. It hurts to read that special equipment instead of a software upgrade is used to implement BFT, Predator movie download for infantry company HQ and such." PREDICTING WORLD WAR III By Stanley C. Crist If there is any truth to the old adage that history repeats itself, it might be possible to look to the past for predictors of the future. Intriguing parallels can be seen when comparing the Civil War with the Vietnam War, and the Spanish-American War with Operation Desert Storm, that might actually foretell World War III. THE CIVIL WAR (1861-1865) Deeply-held convictions divided the populace, often to the extent of pitting family members against one another. There was a widespread draft, which spawned numerous protests and riots by many of the individuals who were subject to conscription. There was a concurrent, widespread, civil rights movement involving the black race. A president with a 7-letter last name was assassinated, and succeeded in office by a vice-president named Johnson. Armored riverboats called "monitors" were employed by the U.S. Navy in massive riverine operations. Manually-operated "assault rifles" (the lever-action, 16-shot Henry rifle) were used by the U.S. Army. Hand-cranked Gatling guns were first used in combat by the U.S. Army. The Civil War is still a controversial topic. THE VIETNAM WAR (1961-1975) Deeply-held convictions divided the populace, often to the extent of pitting family members against one another. There was a widespread draft, which spawned numerous protests and riots by many of the individuals who were subject to conscription. There was a concurrent civil rights movement involving the black race. A president with a 7-letter last name was assassinated, and succeeded by a vice-president named Johnson. Armored riverboats called "monitors" were employed by the U.S. Navy in massive riverine operations. Gas-operated assault rifles (the selective-fire, 20-shot M16A1 rifle) were used by the U.S. Army. Electrically-powered Gatling guns were first used in combat by the U.S. Army. The Vietnam War is still a controversial topic. THE SPANISH-AMERICAN WAR (1898) The first combat employment of all-steel battleships by the U.S. Navy. Called "the Splendid Little War" because of its short duration and minimal U.S. battle casualties. Waged against a country that had a seemingly formidable military force. After the cessation of hostilities, a warning voiced by many in the U.S. armed forces, to "not congratulate ourselves too much for defeating what was in actuality a third-rate power -- such thinking can prove dangerous for us in the future." The conflict was heralded as having healed the wounds of the Civil War. The entire nation was excited and happy with the victory, and made heroes of the returning veterans. Teddy Roosevelt -- who was Assistant Secretary of the Navy prior to the war -- became the Republican candidate for vice-president in the election of 1900. OPERATION DESERT STORM (1991) The last combat employment of all-steel battleships by the U.S. Navy. The ground phase of Desert Storm was called "the 100-Hour War" because of its short duration; U.S. battle casualties were minimal. Waged against a country that had a seemingly formidable military force. After the cessation of hostilities, a warning voiced by many in the U.S. armed forces, to "not congratulate ourselves too much for defeating what was in actuality a third-rate power -- such thinking can prove dangerous for us in the future." The conflict was heralded as having healed the wounds of the Vietnam War. The entire nation was excited and happy with the victory, and made heroes of the returning veterans. Dick Cheney -- who was Secretary of Defense prior to (and during) the operation -- became the Republican candidate for vice-president in the election of 2000. * * * The amazing similarities within each pair of conflicts may represent nothing more than an incredible degree of coincidence. However, what if the relationship between the Civil War, the Spanish-American War, and the onset of World War I points the way to a similar relationship between the Vietnam War, Operation Desert Storm, and the advent of World War III? It's clear there is not a one-to-one correlation for the elapsed time between the wars in each group, so it's not reasonable to think that WWIII will happen 19 years (the amount of time after the Spanish-American War that the U.S. entered WWI) after Desert Storm. Perhaps a proportional comparison of the elapsed time between conflict start dates in each time line? That would require setting up a ratio of the spreads between 1861, 1898, and 1917, and those of 1961, 1991, and the unknown, WWIII. Subtracting 1861 from 1898 gives 37, and 1898 from 1917 is 19. This means that the elapsed time between the Spanish-American War and U.S. entry into World War I is roughly half of the time span between the beginning of the War Between The States and that of "the Splendid Little War." Since there are thirty years between the time President Kennedy vowed to support South Vietnam against Communist aggression, and the initiation of Desert Storm, adding half of thirty to 1991 puts the start of World War III in the year 2006. Of course, if 1914 is used as the beginning of WWI instead of the year the United States entered the conflict, it shifts the equation slightly, indicating 2004 as the onset of the next global war. It may be that the foregoing is no more than an astounding chain of coincidences, but the results of the national election in November, 2000 provide further evidence to support the theory. As in 1900, the Republicans were victorious at the polls, so that Dick Cheney -- like Teddy Roosevelt a century earlier -- is now vice-president. The historical pattern has therefore been fully repeated. ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- THE "ZERO-YEAR" EFFECT Although it does not necessarily affect the prediction of World War III, it is interesting to note another unique grouping of coincidental events in American history. It is a fact that of the ten individuals who were elected (or reelected) to the presidency in a year ending in zero -- from 1800 to 1980 -- seven died in office, and an eighth nearly died from the bullet of a would-be assassin. A listing of these presidents, and their "zero-year" election dates follows: 1800 Thomas Jefferson - Completed his term 1820 James Monroe - Completed his term 1840 William Harrison - Died of natural causes 1860 Abraham Lincoln - Assassinated 1880 James Garfield - Assassinated 1900 William McKinley - Assassinated 1920 Warren Harding - Died of natural causes 1940 Franklin Roosevelt - Died of natural causes 1960 John Kennedy - Assassinated 1980 Ronald Reagan - Severely wounded, but completed his term In stark contrast, only two of the 26 men elected as president in other than a "zero-year" -- James Polk and Zachary Taylor -- failed to survive their term in office. Clearly, this does not bode well for George W. Bush, who was elected in 2000, although it raises the possibility of there being yet one more set of historical parallels between Dick Cheney and Teddy Roosevelt -- the latter succeeded to the presidency after McKinley was assassinated a century ago... Professional Military Education HOT LINK: THIRD WORLD TRAPS AND PITFALLS: BALLISTIC MISSILES, CRUISE MISSILES, AND LAND-BASED AIR POWER BY WILLIAM C. STORY, JR. http://www.fas.org/man/eprint/story.htm Got bad Soldier gear? U.S. bureaucracy not listening? Post your gear requests/ideas to Brigade Quartermasters, they will get good gear to the good guys (YOU) www.actiongear.com Return to Main Page, click here equipmentshop@yahoo.com