Casualties in Iraq are down because troops have been ordered to patrol less to reduce bad PR for Bush re-election. Type B personality NG troops are also less inclined to patrol and launch raids against the resistance. MSNBC's Chris Matthews on Hardball yesterday asked former presidential national security advisor, Sandy Berger about this. He is worried chaos will break out with the U.S. exerting less control. The cat-is-out-of-the-bag. I didn't want to say anything about this. But its all directly linked to our troops not being equipped with the proper M113 Gavin light tracked AFVs which are sitting back here in the U.S. when they should be there in Iraq. The bills for the Bush Administration neocons have also come in, Rumsfeld doesn't want to ask for a supplemental infusion of money because this will make the deficit bigger and harm Bush's chance for re-election. The result will be our troops in Iraq will have to do without gear that could save their lives. The big Cold War weapons systems that are too costly and not needed are coming under scrutiny as our article by Mike Sparks details but one pundit has said "there isn't a fixed-wing aircraft that the Rumsfeld DoD doesn't like".

The Bush DoD has a Tofflerian war philosophy: they think all you need to win wars is steer FIREPOWER by mouse clicks and "mop up" with troops-in-trucks. This has failed on the non-linear battlefield in Iraq where the enemy can attack in any direction at any time; 550 dead, 10,000 wounded Americans some maimed for life. Rather than admit their view of warfare is wrong, the Tofflerians want a 2-year expensive program to slap armor onto wheeled trucks which also doesn't work and will make the entire Army road-bound if we have to fight in the mud/rice paddies of the far east. The answer to save our troops in Iraq and future battles is to value ground MANEUVER and send over the thousands of M113 Gavin light tracked armored fighting vehicles now sitting in storage; the National Guards now in Iraq left 235 of these thick-skinned, go-anywhere vehicles. Upgrade these sound platforms for future warfare not waste money and time on trucks. A tracked AFV is 28% more space/weight efficient than a wheeled truck; we cannot afford to throw out 1/4 of our armor protection by rolling on air-filled rubber tires, and the troops cannot wait 2 years for a HMMWV armor cover-up.

EXCLUSIVE! WHY TRUCKS ARE NOT COMBAT VEHICLES:

To show a little of the lethal NLB firepower possible today, we have this video gun camera footage from Iraq of a 224th Attack Aviation Battalion AH-64 Apache lighting up some Iraqi terrorists in soft-skin wheeled trucks using the M230 30mm autocannon. The point is, watch what these large, exploding bullets do to human bodies and thin-skinned trucks. THIS IS WHY THE MINIMUM TRANSPORTATION STANDARD ON THE BATTLEFIELD MUST BE A LIGHT TRACKED ARMORED FIGHTING VEHICLE NOT A WHEELED TRUCK.

Shame on you, National Guard: leaving over 235 life-saving light tracked armored vehicles and accepting active army hand-me-down trucks in Iraq

The National Guard's leadership in Washington D.C. and in the 30th and 81st Brigades is so lacking in professional military knowledge--even self-preservation survival instinct---that they are going to Iraq as "temporary help" underlings of the active army without demanding they take with them their 235+ M113 Gavin light tracked armored fighting vehicles which are perfectly suited to urban stability operations threatened by car/road bombs, grenades, RPGs and AK47 attacks. I say "+" because I'm not counting the M113s their Combat Engineers use. If you count just the M113 Gavins their Infantry and Armor Battalions use/have they have over 235 light tracked AFVs which can each move 11 Soldiers at a time, or 2,585 people under full armor protection at a single time.

81st ARMOR BDE = 94 x M113 Gavin-type light tracked AFVs
30th INFANTRY BDE = 141 M113 Gavin-type light tracked AFVs

_______________________________________________________

TOTAL 235 x M113 Gavin-type light tracked AFVs

www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/ policy/army/toe/mech.htm

81st Armored BDE = has 94 x M113 Gavin type light tracked AFVs

http://216.239.41.104/search?q=cache:C6nd5-g1-pcJ:www.washingtonguard.com/81bde_Mob/81FAQ_Home.html+81st+brigade+washington&hl=en&ie=UTF-8

The designation "Armor Brigade" points to the two battalions of tanks and a battalion of infantry that provide the robust coverage for a myriad of possible scenarios.

30th Infantry BDE = has 141 x M113 Gavin type light tracked AFVs

www.globalsecurity.org/military/agency/army/30in-bde.htm

The 30th eHSB, headquartered in Clinton, is the largest brigade in the North Carolina Army National Guard. The brigade has three maneuver battalions, two infantry and one armor. However, there appears to be an extra tank battalion from the West Virginia National Guard that is a part of the 30th IB BDE, making it have 2 battalions of infantry and two battalions of armor.

· HHC, 30th HSB (M)
· 1-119 IN
· 1-120 IN
· 1-150 AR
· 1-252 AR
· 1-113 FA
· 230th Support Bn
· 105th ENG Bn (Combat)
· Trp E/196th CAV
· 230th MI Co - Burlington
· G/2-202 ADA - Marseilles, IL [IL ARNG]

2 Tank Battalions of Armor = 64 x M113 Gavin-type light tracked AFVs
2 BFV Infantry Battalions = 46 x M113 Gavin-type light tracked AFVs

7 Points why the Army's Wheeled Vehicle Iraq Policy must be changed

1. The Absurd Wheeled Vehicle-Only Policy underway for the 1st Infantry/1st Cavalry Division/30th/39th/81st Brigade Troop Occupation of Iraq starting in February 2004

Currently in Iraq, the Army is sending the 1st Cavalry Division, North Carolina National Guard 30th Infantry and 81st Armor Brigades WITHOUT THEIR TRACKED "TANKS". Together with the Arkansas National Guard 39th Light Infantry Brigade they have been thrown into HMMWV trucks ad hoc to present a "kinder, less threatening appearance" to the Iraqi people.

While the enemy is INCREASING in its roadside bomb attack lethality, WE ARE DECREASING VEHICULAR PROTECTION FOR OUR TROOPS. On today's non-linear battlefield (NLB) where the enemy can attack in any direction at any time, there are no "safe" rear areas for wheeled trucks to operate in. If you are not already in a thick-skin armored track when the bomb goes off, its too late to take cover.

Another excuse to not use tracked tanks is the misconception that they tear up pavement; which is not true when rubber pads are on steel tracks and even less a factor for light, under 11-ton M113 Gavin light tracked vehicles that press down softer at 8 psi than heavy 11-30 ton Army Stryker trucks with psis in excess of 30. So the truth is that, light M113 Gavin tracks can go anywhere at any time in Iraq without damaging roads while offering far greater armored protection than any rubber-tired wheeled vehicle which is 28% less space/weight efficient. With a 3.5 mpg fuel rate, M113 Gavins are affordable to operate, by nearly everyone unit in Iraq instead of vulnerable HMMWV trucks. One M113A3 Gavin at 3.5 mpg is roughly the same as operating two HMMWV trucks @ 10 mpg each which comes to 5 mpg to move the same 9-man rifle squad. Thousands of thickly-armored M113 Gavins are in storage ready to be sent to Iraq in a matter of weeks at a fraction of the cost of expensive armored HMMWV trucks that will always be vulnerable and needs years to build. Soldiers in M113 Gavins in Iraq since the war began have suffered less casualties than any vehicle except the ultra heavy 70-ton M1 Abrams tank, and even then not by much. More Soldiers have died in HMMWVs, other Army trucks, Stryker armored cars and even Bradleys than Gavins. The handful of Soldiers that have died in M113s did not have the underbody, side and gunshield armor that would have saved them because the Army refuses to supply these things to our troops despite President Bush directing that our troops get everything they need to win the war on terrorism.

But now the Army wants almost all of its tracked "tanks" removed from Iraq when every ounce of their protection is needed. A few days ago the Army's Commander General almost got assassinated when his vulnerable HMMWV truck convoy was ambushed. What more of a "wake-up call" do we need?

2. Outward Appearances?

M113s are indeed actually "tanks"--light tanks. Anything that is tracked and armored is a "tank". In WWI tanks didn't have 360 degree revolving turrets and they were still called "tanks". I am certain the Army's ARMOR branch's narrow definition of "tank" as being only an above 40-ton tracked armored vehicle with a turret has done more damage than anything towards full development/usage of the tank in our military.

What's the difference--TO AN IRAQI--between a wheeled HMMWV and a M113 Gavin light tracked AFV following in trace in overwatch to troops on foot? Are we saying, that the Iraqis will see the HMMWV, a thin box 85" wide, 180 inches long on 4 rubber tires with a .50 cal machine gun on top, and a M113 Gavin, a thick box, 98" wide at its tracks, 207 inches long with a .50 cal machine gun on top and see the former as "OK" and the latter is not? The M113 Gavin is far smaller than the Stryker or AAV-7 Amtrack, its HMMWV-sized and taller.

While the image of a "tank" intimidates, its far more important that its actual increased protection be used than its perception of strength. We need to ask ourselves if appeasing the Iraqis that are offended by "tanks" is more important than offering our enemy easy casualties in vulnerable wheeled trucks which show our weakness and inability to defend the Iraqi people?

3. There are at least Two basic factions in Iraq, those who are undecided and those who ooppose the U.S..

GROUP A Fence-Sitters: Might become pro-American if persuaded

We are in a Vietnam-style situation in Iraq, where we have different groups of people we are trying to tailor/cater our actions to. There may be a group of Iraqis who see tracked vehicles and are offended/intimidated by them. I don't think so, I think those that are offended are offended because of who we are and we are occupying their country--not the vehicle type we use. But let's say there are Iraqis who will be won over to our side if we use rubber-tired trucks. OK?

GROUP B Rebels: Anti-American no matter what vehicles we use

Its also certain there is definately a violent group separate from the ones who will appreciate our "softer image" (Group A) who are going to exploit our driving in rubber-tired trucks and blow us up to kill us, hoping our casualty toll will make us pull out of Iraq.

If Group A sees Group B easily killing and wounding us, they will not likely see us as being able to PROTECT them since we cannot even defend ourselves.

Some say gain the trust of the Group As and expand group so there are less Group Bs. I agree with this, except we will not expand Group A if we let Group B short-circuit everything by easily blowing us up and demonstrating our weakness and inability to keep the peace. The process of Group As becoming Group Bs is an issue, but we have to accept the reality that a lot of Group Bs already exist separately from the Group As.

Some think using tanks short-circuits the expansion of Group A by offending them with a too war-like appearance.

Others think not using tanks short circuits the expansion of Group A by allowing Group B easy targets to demonstrate we cannot protect them. Bill Lind says 4th Generation War (4GW) is all about the nation-state maintaining law and order. How can we do this if we can't even stop ourselves from being killed after being blown up?

This is the essence of the dilemma.

4. Functional Realities

I'm not convinced having troops LIVE 24/7/365 with the Iraqis will make them like us (USMC CAP philosophy). I would think it would make them hate us even more. But if I had to trade distance for closeness, I'd want to have a light track to fall back onto than a wheeled truck.

So what functionally is objectionable to the troops having a thick box on tracks with rubber pads instead of a thin box on air-filled rubber tires?

5. The TechnoTactical Problem in Iraq: at the Soldier-level

The guerrillas attacking our men in Iraq live there. They can intrude into homes and use buildings for ambush cover and concealment.

Americans are trying to create a condition of open-ness where its safe to move OVERTLY, to walk down a street safely without fear.

Light infantry, a man with a weapon in his hand, equipment on his body---can move very paranoid from cover-to-cover IN TIME OF WAR. In war, you cannot afford to be caught in enemy fire as light infantry so you "hug" every scrap of concealment and cover you can find. You fire pre-emptively at suspected enemy positions to compensate again for your absolute requirement not to receive ANY enemy fire.

We are not in a war where all pretensions of normalcy are off and you act as paranoid as possible.

6. Weak Vehicles = "Spray 'n Pray"

We are in a stability and support operation (SASO).

This means we have to operate in the open so others can. The problem is we are using light infantry without light tracked AFVs or light infantry in thin trucks on rubber tires which from the get-go are 28% less space/weight efficient and thus protected than light tracks. Armored HMMWVs have 4 windows, 4 doors, a large windshield, and roll on air-filled rubber tires easily penetrated by enemy bullets, RPGs, explosions and god forbid, molotov cocktail flame weapons. When we move overtly using vulnerable trucks and the enemy ambushes us we cannot "shrug off" the enemy fire because it it becomes effective it riddles our bodies and soft-skin vehicles making dead and burning metal hulks. So we return fire in all directions using fire as a "shield" aka Somalia. As we kill innocent civilians we alienate them against the U.S. and make new enemies who want revenge for their father, mother, sisters and brothers killed in blind retaliation of somebody else's ambush (Group B). Group A people become Group B rebels.

This is again, why we need light tracked AFVs, so we can avoid having to use fire as indiscriminate 360 directional shields and focus our fires at positively identified bad guys. This is what I mean by our light infantry having a "glass jaw" when it is on foot and uses wheeled vehicles.

7. Better COIN Tactics

Those are the horns of the dilemma upon which this discussion - and American policy - rest. So, the question is, which theory of the war should we follow. However, I think that our military history reflects a clear preference for the naive wheeled vehicle way which will increase the daily number of casualties beyong the current 550 dead and over 10,000 wounded. There is however, a very good way of doing basic Counter-Insurgency (COIN) tactics better by using light tracks and good tactics. However, we've never really tried - in good faith, across the board - this way, and what little historical evidence there is suggests that success is possible.

Think back to Somalia. _Before_ the mission changed. We had made some good progress in settling things down, the Army and marines were respected because THEY WERE IN FORCE IN TRACKS, so they didn't have to bludgeon the people to achieve it. Here is where tracked "tank" intimidation" helped. I know one of the BN COs who served in Mogadishu then - they were making progress. Instead of going after Aideed, we ought to have figured a way to make him - or at least his tactics - irrelevant because the people didn't want that sort of life. Or not, and that would have been instructive as well.

We are literally strong enough when we are in tracked "tanks" that we don't always need to break things to prove it. Sometimes strength is proven in what we choose not to do, or the price we are willing to pay to do the things we choose. We have gone to Iraq to give them freedom - let's show them what freedom really tastes like. Here is a good place to start to get a sense of the theory of warfare I am working towards. I am not saying that I take his idea wholesale, but it is one component. Here is the link:

http://cgsc.leavenworth.army.mil/carl/resources/csi/trinquier/trinquier.asp#52

Our ideas are also supported by (in no particular order of relevance):

-Martin Van Crevald: "The Transformation of War" why we are in a 4th Generation War (4GW)
-marine corps "Small Wars" Manual
-Rifleman Dodd
-Various histories of the CAP
-USMC Evans Carlson: "Twins Stars of China"
-Various histories of the marine Raiders
-Mao: various
-Sun Tzu (attack the enemy where he is weak: where is the insurgent weak? with the people, because he does not have their full support: "attack" there)
-A Respectable Army: The Military Origins of the Republic, Martin and Lender
-Decisive Engagements, Westad
-Extensive research in Vietnam infantry and airmobile infantry memoirs
-The Army and Vietnam, Krepinevich
-A Viet Cong Memoir, Troung Nhu Tang
-Various histories of the Balkan Wars of the 1990s
-On Future War
-PREPARING FOR ASYMMETRY: AS SEEN THROUGH THE LENS OF JOINT VISION 2020, Melissa Applegate

Finally, I believe in time that the proper understanding of these events will be to reckon them as "The Insurgent Wars". That's what Al Qaeda and other "terrorist" organizations are, transnational insurgents. (I put terrorist in quotes because I would prefer to accord them more respect - their tactics are irregular, they are pushing the bounds of war, but in many respects they represent a legitimate political force.) I think we'll reduce the problem of terrorism far more if we consider the problem as insurgencies coming from various socio-political-economic forces and how do we deal with that. The "terrorist" actions will whither on the vine and become what we have here - crime. Mostly, our lives here are fairly secure - we have no real insurgents, the biggest problem of that sort is crime. And the media notwithstanding, most of us live a life free from it - that's why we're not backing anything politically radical. Bad, bad crime is a signal that you might have a larger political problem looming. It is proto or incipient insurgency, and below a certain point the police handle it, but it awaits that watershed event or critical mass of discontent to turn over to a fully fledged insurgency. That is, the problems lie in what causes the insurgency, what populates the "gangs" with new members - that is essentially what we need to do: reduce the flow of volunteers to the point that the organizations are irrelevant.

Carol Murphy
Editor

FEEDBACK!

A concerned citizen Andy MacDougall writes:

"One of my most favored ideas is that of an 'Air Mechanized Guerrilla' force. One of it's central premises is organization as networks (guerrilla/terrorist style) versus true hierarchies (traditional-military style). Operationally the way in witch networks would differ from hierarchies, amongst other things though this is indicative, is lack of centralization of forces in a say a base. Instead of having a battalion-sized force in a operations base a guerrilla/terrorist might operate out of 100-200 'cells'. These cells work collaboratively and may even have more or less common doctrine and to some extent training. But operationally they are independent until required to 'mass on the objective'. My version of this calls for widely dispersed formations, only platoons, sections or even individual tracks and their crew/infantrymen operating 90% of the time independently, collecting intel and relaying it back to an 'operational HQ'. This HQ then at some point will call on all required forces in it's proximity to show up at so-and-so location at so-and-so time to do so-and-so, once the mission is achieved they 'disappear back into the landscape' to go back to both avoiding and scouting the enemy. This avoids the commotion-at-base-alerts-the-enemy syndrome and it's various ancillary diseases of a centrally-run military force in an asymmetric battlefield. One of the main advantages of centralization though, other than theoretically protecting your LOCs (even AMGs depend on air resupply witch means semi-permanent and completely obvious air bases almost certainly within the enemy's reach, who protects them?), is the ever-stressed need/desire for pre-op rehearsal. My question is, other than occasional in- or extra-theater remedial courses, no greater than platoon-sized, and really quite basic if at all, METL-prep and 'on the job experience' pre-op training is zilch, much less rehearsals, so is it really that necessary? Can it's value be offset by the benefits of an 'AMG' doctrine? Guerrilla/terrorist forces, especially the former, have essentially no system of rehearsals, they just receive the word, pick up their weapons and go, and amateurs though they may be they seem quite successful for the most part. Denying our enemies the value of a continuing CABATE syndrome would seem to override any loss of 'professionalism' or whatever some would call it."

NEW BOOK:

BLOOD DEBT:

SECRETS OF DEFEATING AFGHAN AND IRAQI TERRORISTS:

By Rod McCoy, author of "Secrets of the Viet Cong"

Rod writes to LPT:

"During my research for BLOOD DEBT, I have uncovered information on several heretofore undeveloped aspects of the 4th World War, the War Against Muslimism, including:

--Data regarding the alliance between Marxist/hard left/leftist elements and Muslim Terrorist support organizations, within America

--The three chief leftist/Muslim tactics in AmericaL Netwar, Legalism and purchased influence

--Data regarding the CIA's pro-Muslim maneuvering

--Data regarding Muslim plans to make the USA the Center of Gravity for Muslim expansionism

--Data regarding unbelievable incompetence by American generals

--Proof that the total defeat of America and the onset of Muslim control along with of anti-Christian pogroms, is a much more dangerous threat than ever before imagined.

My book now consists of over 400 pages which I will sell in two volumes, each for $35.00"

Rod McCoy
www.geocities.com/quikmaneuvers

---

GEOSTRATEGIC

Out-of-control platform-centric, DoD headed towards a total melt-down: like the Roman Empire, America cannot afford to defend itself this way

By Mike Sparks

Right now, America is fighting the war on terror using the war machines built during the 1980s. The machines slated to replace the current machines are more complex, more costly and often simply do not work. The crisis is brewing to dangerous proportions because even if the new war machines were vastly superior to give us a significant advantage in war, they are so costly we cannot buy enough of them to replace what we have now. DoD pundits say we will simply shrink the force and use less war machines since they can "do more". This cliche' is false because it doesn't realize the cost of the new war machines has already reached the "threshold of impotence" where we will find ourselves dangerously unable to defend ourselves, our invincible "Tiger tanks" surrounded by more enemy "T-34s" than we have cannon shells to destroy them with.

The Impotence Threshold

The earth is a big place; to apply military force over it and against human enemies requires quantity--numbers as well as qualitative superiority over other human war machines. The impotence threshold for the U.S. where we can no longer defend 270 million Americans in a 3,000 mile long land mass is 1,000 war machines of every basic type (air, land, sea) for 1 week of nation-state war. You can argue all you want about qualitative advantages, but if the enemy nation-state fights us "even" in an all-out, non-nuclear war, in 1 week we must be ready to lose 1,000 war machines and keep fighting. The model for us to study is the 1973 Arab-Israeli war. The Israelis lost about 1,000 tanks and 500 war planes in 1 week of war. They would have lost more planes had they had more and decided to continue to send them into combat without taking out the enemy's surveillance strike system (SSC) first. 1,000 war machines also includes infantry Soldiers. Right now, the U.S. military is BELOW the impotency threshold. The United States is no longer building 1,000 each year of ANY large war-machines except infantry Soldiers. The United States on the average has gone to war every 10 years with another nation-state military since WWII. This means at the very minimum, we could get by with producing 100 war machines for 10 years, and when the war comes be ready with the worse-case thousand platform losses. However, we are not even building 100 war machines each year! Because we have a "Tiger tank" mentality where each war machine must be replaced with a dramatically improved war machine that exalts human technohubris and ego, it takes 10 years to develop the war machine and it costs at least 10 times as much as what it is supposed to replace. Thus, we can only buy 1/10th of the new war machines assuming we have the same national willpower and monies available as we had when we bought the previous war machines. At the end of the 10-year development cycle we end up with things like V-22, F-22 and RAH-66 that even if they worked, we simply cannot afford to buy, so they are cancelled or if they cannot be made to work, are delayed again and again from going into production. The war platforms we have are then made to "soldier-on" for another 10 years; in the case of CH-46 helicopters it means men dying in crashes as the USMC waits for the "perfect solution" so they can pretend to be a quasi-Airborne force to compete with the Army Airborne using sound USAF fixed-wing aircraft for global strategic mobility.

What Kills War Machines: not just the enemy

Contrary to popular belief, the number #1 killer of war machines is not combat against other humans but operations against mother earth. Weather, corrosion, accidents, human and mechanical failures destroy more of our war-machines than any other factor. The most at risk of the war machines are air/sea machines since man-made things do not normally reside in those mediums. Chuck Spinney's "Death Spiral" is felt the most there.

U.S. Army Death Spiral

The Army has 10 Divisions; only 6 are half-inside tracked armored vehicles, the other ride in unarmored trucks. The other 4 Divisions have no armored vehicles at all, and walk or ride in unarmored rubber-tired, wheeled trucks. No armored vehicles are being mass-produced. Because of Army Generals being techno-arrogant, the thousands of M113 Gavin light tracked armored vehicles that were mass-produced and sitting in storage that could be upgraded to fully air-mechanize the entire Army are ignored, so troops continue to get killed and maimed on foot and in trucks in the guerrilla war in Iraq. The Army's only "get out of jail free card" to avoid their death spiral is not used. Instead, the Army buys handfuls of expensive, over-weight, over-priced $3 million dollar Canadian-made Stryker and $250,000 HMMWV wheeled trucks with make-shift armor slapped on and a computer inside to micro-manage the Gen-X/Y slackers inside. The American-made "Future Combat System" after 10 years and billions of dollars will be found at $10 million each unaffordable to buy. Once the tracked armored vehicles die off, all that will be left will be the un-armored wheeled trucks that didn't get worn out carrying all the make-shift armor that they were not designed to carry.

To try to increase its size, the Army wants to create smaller units composed of young recruits with a rifle in their hand, driving around in the wheeled trucks; ie we are becoming the Italian Army of WWII. The post-Baby Boom America has less young people than needed to stay above zero population growth, and as America ages, many of the young people available are off-spring of immigrants with little if any loyalty to the U.S. by culture but desperately needing economic advancement. To attract them to military service to get their use as a war machine, weak, co-dependant cannon fodder, increased amounts of All Volunteer Force (AVF) pay/benefits (bribes) have to be offered to get them to be our mercenaries (Roman Legions all over again).

We are basically becoming mirror images of civilian society that only mass-produces SUVs and babies at a ZPG rate; an Army with slacker nintendo video-game kids with a sporting rifle riding around in a HMMWV truck.

In the air, Army Aviation is dying having wasted $10 Billion and 10 years on the RAH-66 stealth scout helicopter that refused to work and is unaffordable to buy in quantities. No Army helicopter is being mass produced as the numbers of existing helicopters dwindle from mother earth and combat losses; all are under 1,000 in number except for the UH-60 Blackhawk. The CH-47 production line is completely closed. The conventional helicopter for V/TOL flight comes at only great costs and dubious speed, range and altitude making them easy for the enemy to inflict losses.

Navy Death Spiral

It costs $3.5 BILLION dollars to build a nuclear aircraft carrier; it costs $3 BILLION to scrap one. Almost every ship the Navy builds has become a $1 billion dollar purchase. With less than a dozen ships built each year, how long the 300-ship Navy can exist is in doubt. In 10 years only 100 ships will have been made, by the time the 20 year mark hits, the 300 ships will have to be retired and then the Navy will atrophy down into a 200 ship fleet. In the next 20-year cycle the Navy will shrink to just 100 ships. With only 1/3 of our ships at sea at any time, this means only 33 ships for two oceans or just 16 ships for each. That's just two aircraft carrier battle groups, or in essence two floating airfields operating at best 4 squadrons of fighter-bombers.

The aircraft on the Navy's carriers have dwindled to where now almost every mission will be flown by the overweight F/A-18 Hornet. Each year dozens of aircraft are lost in carrier operations (mother earth strikes again); in fact the number of Hornets bought only keeps up with these losses. A massive infusion of new aircraft will have to be received to give the Navy's dozen aircraft carriers something to fly. USN is banking everything on the F-35 JSF to stay in business.

Air Force Death Spiral

The U.S. Air Forces new F-22 fighter is already in "production", with 25 built (for testing and training), and 19 to be manufactured this year. The air force wants to eventually buy 276, at a cost of over $250 million each. The F-22 is the "pinnacle" of 20th century warplane design and technology. Unfortunately, it's now the 21st century and new aerial threats are appearing that may make the F-22 obsolete before it even enters service at the end of the decade. One thing that has always threatened the F-22 has been cost. Development costs kept growing beyond constantly increased budgets, to the point where the development bill was nearly $30 billion. The large cost of the F-22 was always a threat to the project. Originally conceived in the 1980s as the successor to the F-15, and the primary weapon to keep the Soviet air force from controlling the skies, the F-22 prototypes first flew just as the Cold War ended. At that point, the air force planned to buy 648 aircraft, almost the 1,000 threshold required to be relevent. That number has come down steadily as development costs escalated, and no credible threat to American air supremacy appeared to replace the Soviet Air Force.

The main threat to F-22s are advances in radar technology that are making the stealthiness of these aircraft less effective. A lot of this has to do with improvements in computer and software technology, but the end result is more vulnerability for a few very expensive aircraft that was banking on invulnerability like the RAH-66.

Marine Death Spiral

Realizing there will never be enough ships to get to a fight before the Army Airborne can get there by aircraft, the USMC desperately needs the V-22 tilt-rotor to give them the speed/range and not require empowering its men to parachute jump which would require a cultural change from the asshole S&M culture of blind obedience the weak co-dependant egotist revels in while "being" a "marine". The problem is that at $80 million each the V-22 is not affordable to replace all the helicopters the corps has even if it did work. If the USMC gets the V-22, many will crash/burn and word that it is a deathtrap will make even the most ardent self-egotist to think twice about enlisting and filling a char-broiled body bag.

DoD thinks Unmanned Vehicles are its salvation

Like the crumbling Roman empire, America thinks the way out of its inward moral decay is the mercenary, in this case a techno-mercenary in the form of unmanned vehicles so you don't have to pay for a man to operate the war machine. To prevent a man having to be there to kill the other enemy human, a precision guided munition will be launched to strike at him. Aside from the fact that real military force is more than blowing things up, that it is actually about controlling ground and people, the unmanned revolution has not panned out as a way out of the technoarrogant death spiral. Unmanned systems like Predator, Global Hawk etc. have been proven not only just as expensive as manned war machines, they have a nasty lack of a survival instinct and mother earth is killing them so fast that no monies are being saved.

Some say the F-22 is now threatened by combat UAVs (unmanned aerial vehicles) or "UCAVs". These UCAVs are being built and tested by the air force and navy. The technology is somewhat mature and widely available. The rest of the world is waiting to see what the United States comes up with, knowing that if it works this is the desired future advantage and it will be software, more than anything else, that will make a superior UCAV. If UCAVs can be made effective, and other nations start building UCAVs, the current American fleet of manned warplanes will be threatened. UCAVs are slightly cheaper than manned aircraft, and can be used more aggressively. You don't have to worry about losing pilots. Not just because you don't like to see your pilots get killed, but also because of the time and cost required to produce effective combat pilots. UCAVs are slightly cheaper to build, use and lose but whether this will pan out with their propensity to self-destruct without the manned pilot survival instinct embedded. Many UCAVs will be bombers, and the Air Force, Navy, Marines see their new F-35 Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) threatened as well. UCAVs being developed are stealthy, and can take risks you would avoid when using manned aircraft. If the Air Force decides it needs a lot of UCAVs in a hurry, Congress will probably not put up with buying expensive F-22s and F-35s (which cost about $40 million each) as well. So the air force is looking into the possibility of cutting or canceling F-22 and F-35 production, and upgrading current aircraft (F-15s, F-16s and A-10s) to "hold the fort" until the UCAVs are available in quantity. The huge development costs for the F-22 and F-35 won't be wasted. Those technologies can be applied to UCAVs, which can be built slightly cheaper (at least 20% percent cheaper) because these aircraft don't have to carry a pilot. That means F-22 class UCAVs could be built for under $100-150 million each which is still far too expensive. The F-22 UCAV would be a slightly more capable aircraft, being able to perform maneuvers a human pilot could not survive but would be lost in routine crashes negating the cost savings desired.

The Real Way-out is a new DoD populated by entirely new people with new, sound concepts

Before outlining what the sounder, more affordable war-machine types would be for each category, ground vehicle, air vehicle, sea vehicle, combat Soldier---we must say that nearly everyone involved in DoD needs to be fired and America must start completely over. Defense contractors must be barred from ANY political campaign contributions. Anyone who serves in uniform cannot work for a defense firm for 10 years after leaving the service. America must get EVERYONE involved in national life by a repeal of the 17th Amendment direct election of senators and having state capitals become once again the centers for national issues debate. 2 years of national service for everyone who is an American citizen. All elected officials must be graduates of 2 years of national service.

The solution to the DoD platform centricity death spiral is to consciously--by choice---use robust, simple, durable and easy-to-maintain platforms that can last for at least 5 R&D cycles; ie 50 years. These platforms must be affordable to be mass-produced at 1,000 war machines a year to "surge" to equip the entire force, and replace emergency combat losses. After the force is fully equipped, the production line slows to 100 war machines a year to replace losses against mother earth and keep the line open to surge in war. No ground combat vehicle should cost more than 1/10th of an R&D cycle or $1 million each. No air combat vehicle should cost more than $10 million each. No transport aircraft more than $100 million each. No combat ship more than $1 billion each.

U.S. Army REFORM

Light Tracks
The Army must face the realities of the non-linear battlefield means the days of driving around in "safe", "rear" areas" are over and should cancel Stryker and HMMWV truck purchases. Computer mental gymnastics cannot mouse-click reality into a linear battlefield that doesn't physically exist. The Army should at the very minimum move completely inside, simple, easy-to-maintain M113 Gavin light tracked AFVs modernized from the thousands in storage. Use amphigavins with waterjets to expedite prepo-ship off-loads.

The FCS-3D and FCS-2D prototypes using the M113 Gavin's simplicity as inspiration would be $1 million each make-overs of light M113s and the existing M2 medium and M1 heavy to improved capabilities.

Fast Helicopters
A simplified, bare-bones UH-60 Blackhawk with Piasecki VTDP and wings ("SpeedHawks") to unload the rotors to fly at 200+ mph speeds and 2,000 mile ranges must be mass-produced to be the Army standard and fitted with stork landing gear to transport a miniaturized M113-type light tracked AFV under 4 tons in weight like one-half of the NATO Bv206S. The conventional slow helicopter is dead meat on the modern battlefield and if it doesn't deliver a light tracked AFV contributes only fight-the-enemy-even cannon fodder. Use trailers to move SpeedHawks without having to work around having to fly them.

Small Jets
Re-open A-37 Dragonfly production line and use as 2-seat FAC aircraft, either manned or unmanned, an "U/MCAV". Tow by trailers to move alongside ground forces and launch using Zero Length Launch (ZEL) techniques.

The Adult Soldier
Make the Army a place that is tolerable, where adult warriors not egomaniacs populate. A place where empowerment, innovation and initiative are rewarded.

U.S. Navy REFORM

Armored Precision Strike Battleships
Restore two Iowa class battleships back to reserve duty Develop long-range (over 500 miles) precision 16" shells use them not manned fighter-bombers, expensive PGMs

Jet Seaplanes/resupply ships for heavy bombing
Develop P6M SeaMaster type seaplane jet bomber to replace the aircraft carrier bombing mission, use water as runways

Affordable Flight Deck Destroyers to get naval air supremacy
Everyone; USAF, Navy/Marines buys STOVL F-35 JSFs to get air-to-air fighter cover operated from small destroyers with a small adjacent flight deck and ski jump end

U.S. Air Force REFORM

Cancel F-22

SLEP A-10s into two-seat, up-engined OA-10Bs

Re-open production line for generic F-16, A-10s to 1,000

Create fleet of prepo-cargo 747s pre-loaded with Army light tracked AFVs to surge in time of war

Mass produce F-35 JSF to over 1,000; use trailers to move alongside Army maneuver units, use ZEL to launch

U.S. Marines REFORM

Cancel V-22, buy Speedhawks with Army to get back into mass-production
Develop VTDP SpeedStallion version of CH-53E
Cancel AAAV
Use Amphigavin variant of Army's M113 Gavin light tracked AFVs
Retire AV-8Bs, use OA-10B SeaHogs for CAS

The Adult marine
Make the USMC a place that is tolerable, where adult warriors not egomaniacs populate. A place where candor, empowerment, innovation and initiative are rewarded.

---

OPERATIONAL

Tale of Two Airbornes: 173rd in northern Iraq, near-drop of the 82nd into the Karbala Gap: quality must be improved not just quantity

The Army expansion plan to Congress calls for more Airborne and Air Assault Brigade Units of Action (BUAs). The 82nd and 101st would each have 2 BUAs that are Airborne and Air Assault capable. What is missing in this QUANTITATIVE reorganization is QUALITATIVE improvements of the basic immobility and vulnerability of both type forces. The Army plan presented to the House Armed Service Committee:

Army Expansion Plan to HASC

The 173rd Airborne Brigade after jumping into Northern Iraq had 15 x M113A3 Gavins flown in by airland to move a mechanized infantry company. Details:

www.geocities.com/equipmentshop/m113a3setaf.htm

However, if the Airborne was smarter they could have parachute airdropped the M113 Gavins with Paratroopers and saved days of time denying Saddam time to escape to Tikrit, possibly getting him earlier and saving hundreds of American lives.

In the south, the 3rd ID Mechanized and 101st AASLT Divisions were stopped by a sand storm. The 82nd Airborne had two battalions rigged to jump into the Karabala Gap to get the offensive going again, a TACTICAL use of airborne troops as Rick Atkinson's recent Washington Post articles reveal.

The whole point of the V/TOL helicopter was to provide air attack and transport like WWII aircraft could do using short, grassy fields. We have lost this by Army Aviation becoming pampered and lazy via our own branch wanting to operate farther in the rear. However, the helicopter mentality we have adopted demands we work around THEM instead of working alongside ground maneuver elements. The way to get away from this need to have an assembly area secured ahead of time for Army helicopters to then fly into is to enable them to be TOWED BY TRAILERS alongside Army ground maneuver elements until needed in the air. Trailers for all of the Army's helicopters and TAFVs to tow them would solve two problems at the same time: get Army aircraft ground mobility to conserve fuel and increase flexibility and provide organic self-defense of Aviation Assembly areas via TAFV mobile patrols.

Had the 101st Airborne (Air Assault) Division had trailers to tow all 200 of their helicopters they could have kept moving along with ground maneuver units and saved an incredible amount of fuel. When Army helicopters can't fly they need to be able to move on the ground until such time that they can take to the air.

At least tacticians within XVIII Airborne corps are starting to see the light:

Inside The Army
February 16, 2004
Pg. 1

Paratroopers' Needs Rekindles Talk Of Defunct Armored Gun System

The 82nd Airborne Division at Ft. Bragg, NC, still needs a rapidly deployable vehicle with firepower, a requirement some say could be met sooner rather than later if the Army is willing to shake the mothballs from its defunct Armored Gun System, sources say.

"They want an air-droppable platform for forced entry," said a service source, and "they want it now."

As a result, the division recently passed along an "operational needs statement" to Army Forces Command that outlines the unfulfilled requirement, said Maj. Rich Patterson, a spokesman for the 18th Airborne Corps, which oversees the division. The Army's operations and plans office, or "G-3," is reviewing the requirement with Training and Doctrine Command, but no decision has been reached, Patterson said.

While Army leadership may determine AGS is not the solution, the idea of moving the system back into the limelight, at least in a limited way, has caught the attention of a lawmaker who represents the Ft. Bragg area.

The requirement for an air-droppable platform has existed at least since the late 1990s, when the division disbanded one of its battalions -- the 3rd Battalion of the 73rd Armored Regiment, which was equipped with an aging armored reconnaissance vehicle called the Sheridan. At the time, service officials thought other capabilities would become available to the Paratroopers once the M551 Sheridan retired.

When the division deactivated the armored battalion in 1997, however, Army officials had already terminated AGS, which had been regarded as the Sheridan's replacement. Proposed in the 1980s as a lightweight combat vehicle that could fit aboard a C-130, AGS featured a 105 mm cannon, an ammunition autoloader and options for armor protection. United Defense LP had produced a handful of prototypes of the vehicle in 1996, when then-Army Chief of Staff Gen. Dennis Reimer terminated the program. Eliminating AGS freed more than $1 billion over the service's outyear funding plan -- money that was badly needed for other cash-strapped programs, officials said at the time.

What was not eliminated was the need to equip light forces with an air-droppable platform that had enough firepower to hold off opposing forces until heavier forces arrived, sources said.

According to the Army's program executive office for ground combat systems, five AGS prototypes exist today. Four systems reside at UDLP's manufacturing facility in York, PA; one is at a UDLP facility in San Jose, CA.

Herb Muktarian, a spokesman for UDLP's ground systems division in York, said the four M8 AGS vehicles there have been regularly maintained.

"They are in a standard configuration and are in excellent condition," he said. "We are prepared to provide the vehicles and any required support if we were to receive an official request from the Army."

The unmet requirement has caught the attention of Rep. Robin Hayes (R-NC), a member of the House Armed Services Committee whose district includes Ft. Bragg. Hayes contacted the Army's legislative liaison office last December requesting specifics on the ongoing "discussion about getting the AGS" into Army "tactics, techniques and procedures."

"What is your assessment of the immediate operational need for a system to support airfield seizure, forced entry and other missions of the 82nd Airborne Division?" Hayes asked in a Dec. 15, 2003, e-mail. "Can the AGS serve as a near-term solution to an immediate operational need?"

Hayes requested several other details from the Army, including the cost of reviving AGS, spare parts needs and the status of the 82nd Airborne's needs statement. Hayes' spokesman, Jonathan Felts, said Feb. 10 that the congressman has not yet received a response from the Army.

"Congressman Hayes' top priority is that we help our Soldiers in the field as quickly as possible," Felts wrote in a statement.

"Let me be very clear to say that this is not a matter of advocating one system over another," he added. "Rather, the congressman knows that there is an existing technology presently sitting unused, and he is simply inquiring if it is feasible to utilize the capabilities while awaiting future technologies that are in production."

The division's interest in an AGS-like system is nothing new. The division's 17th Cavalry Regiment expressed a desire for such a system several years ago, according to the Army source.

As Inside the Army reported in the fall of 1999, service officials then were looking at all vehicles that could serve as a near-term solution for light forces -- including AGS, the marine corps' Light Armored Vehicle, the Pandur lightweight vehicles used by the Kuwait National Guard and a variant of the M113 armored personnel carrier (ITA, Oct. 4, 1999, p1; Sept. 27, 1999, p1).

The PEO for ground combat systems, which had overseen the AGS program, was directed to conduct a review of the various candidates. For AGS, the office provided Army leaders information on three options: field AGS in the state it was in when the program was terminated; revamp the system with newly developed technologies, then field it; or field AGS in the condition it was in when terminated, but with plans to retrofit the system with new technologies.

Past inquiries into AGS and other systems, however, have failed to "go anywhere," the service source said.

Pulling AGS out of storage might be a more tenable idea today, however, than in 1999 when then-Army Chief of Staff Gen. Eric Shinseki announced plans to invest heavily in a lighter, more lethal future force. After years accepting considerable risk in its current force to fund transformation goals, the Army once again shifted gears last year to focus on ensuring the current force -- stretched thin across the globe -- is adequately equipped. Gen. Peter Schoomaker, who took over Shinseki's job last August, told reporters in October 2003 that he had directed his staff to scrub the force and its transformation plans for existing technologies and equipment that could be used by troops in Iraq or Afghanistan (ITA, Oct. 13, 2003, p1).

-- Anne Plummer

FYI the Army has already a field manual online outlining how to employ a light armor platoon using M8 Buford Armored Gun System light tanks, called FM 17-18 Light Armor Operations:

Army Digital Library

www.adtdl.army.mil/cgi-bin/atdl.dll/fm/17-18/f1718.htm

However the Airborne will need infantry to accompany and escort the M8 AGS light tanks and these can moved in conjunction by employing 11-ton M113A3 Gavin light tracked armored personnel carriers which were flown into Northern Iraq by 3D maneuver and were very effective during the 2D maneuver drive into Baghdad:

www.geocities.com/equipmentshop/m113combat.htm

The Army has thousands of M113 Gavins in storage and they are certified for parachute airdrop. The easiest way to employ M8 AGS light tanks and M113 Gavins would be by designating an infantry battalion's "Delta" Weapons company to use M8s/M113s instead of vulnerable HMMWV trucks. Details:

www.geocities.com/equipmentshop/itmaneuversabattalion.htm

Lastly, the reason the Airborne desperately needs light tracked armored vehicles is best shown in the power point show we made for the Airborne Combat Engineers:

www.geocities.com/lightmechsappers

FCS-NOW: Replace HMMWV trucks in all Army Airborne, and Light Infantry Division Delta Companies with hybrid-electric M113A4 Gavin light tracked AFVs upgraded affordably from the thousands of surplus M113A2s the Army has in storage; integrate a Combat Engineer platoon and call an ECAV Troop. ECAV Troops can give A, B, C infantry companies a "ride" as needed without them becoming stuck in motor pool and losing infantry skills. C4ISR package

The 101st Air Assault Division ECAV troop would have 7-ton M973A2 armored SUSV (Bv206Ss) Ridgways that are CH-47D internal load-able and UH-60 split-load-able

TECHNOTACTICAL

www.militaryinfo.com/news_story.cfm?textnewsid=692

Injuries Expected to Drop With New Parachute

By PFC. Eliamar Castanon
Army News Service

FORT BENNING, Ga., December 10, 2003 -- Airborne Soldiers should expect to see a new parachute system in the next few years that will replace the T-10 model that has been in use since the 1950s.

The Advanced Tactical Parachute System is expected to decrease the landing impact velocity for jumpers, provide a more reliable reserve system than the Modified Improved Reserve Parachute System of the T-10 and improve the harness.

"We were looking for a parachute that will lower the rate of descent and lessen the impact with the hopes and expectations that this would result in a reduction in injuries," said Joe Jones, combat development specialist with the Directorate of Combat Developments.

Rate of descent is the speed at which jumpers fall to the ground.

The T-10 has been modified a number of times but has reached the limits of its growth. A new approach had to be taken, Jones said, resulting in an entirely different design.

The ATPS canopy is not circular in shape, as the T-10 is. It is a highly modified cross-shaped canopy with an inflated diameter 14 percent greater than that of the T-10, with 28 percent more surface area.

The reserve unit is a cone-shaped, center-pull deployment system. It includes apex scoop pockets at the top of the canopy and skirt assist lines at the system's hem to promote fast opening during low-speed malfunctions.

The main container bag is made of Cordura, an abrasion- and water-resistant fabric.

Both the ATPS main and reserve canopies are made of low-porosity ripstop nylon with Teflon-coated suspension lines.

The entire system weighs 51.2 pounds, compared to the T-10's 44 pounds.

The 14-percent weight increase earns jumpers a 25-percent reduction in rate of descent. The T-10's rate of descent is 22 to 24 feet per second, causing a strong landing impact. The ATPS' rate of descent is 16 feet per second, reducing the landing impact by 53 percent.

The T-10 parachute system was designed when the total weight of a jumper and equipment averaged 300 pounds.

During Operation Just Cause, more than 4 percent of Soldiers from the 2nd Battalion, 75th Ranger Regiment, suffered jump-related injuries - 28 Rangers and their equipment weighed between 350 and 435 pounds.

"The T-10 was originally intended for jumpers who didn't weigh what Soldiers weigh today and wasn't intended to carry the loads that Soldiers carry today," Jones said.

Other advantages of ATPS are the reserve system and the harness, said Jones. The ATPS reserve offers improved reliability, he said.

"The ATPS has a reliability of .95, compared to the .75 to .80 of the T-10," he said.

The reserve is also equipped with enhanced deployment techniques, which equal low opening shocks. It may be deployed using either hand, offers a soft loop closure and has a rate of descent of approximately 26 feet per second with low oscillation.

The biggest advantage in the improvements of the harness is the attaching point of the reserve parachute system, said Jones.

When a T-10 reserve is activated, the opening forces are located in the waist area; essentially, this bows the jumper, he said. ATPS reserve risers connect to the harness in the shoulder area. Now when the reserve canopy opens, the opening forces are passed down through the long axes of the body, minimizing the bow effect.

The harness is also fully adjustable and is compatible with the current and future battlefield equipment.

The T-10 and ATPS are mass tactical parachute canopies, meaning they are not steerable. Because these are not steerable, distribution is managed by exit sequences and timing, aircraft altitude and speed, wind and canopy drift characteristics, Jones said.

Because ATPS is not a steerable parachute, test developers are still trying to increase the obstacle avoidance variable while in the sky or on the ground, said Maj. Jason Craft, assistant program manager of personal airdrop systems at the Natick Research Laboratories in Natick, Mass.

"The bottom line is that ATPS reduces jump injuries to airborne Soldiers so they're in better condition to go into combat operations," Craft said.

The ATPS is being tested at Yuma Proving Grounds in Yuma, Ariz., and will be fielded between 2005 and 2006.

February 3, 2004

Army Study of Iraq War Details a 'Morass' of Supply Shortages

By ERIC SCHMITT

ASHINGTON, Feb. 2 ­ The first official Army history of the Iraq war reveals that American forces were plagued by a "morass" of supply shortages, radios that could not reach far-flung troops, disappointing psychological operations and virtually no reliable intelligence on how Saddam Hussein would defend Baghdad.

Logistics problems, which senior Army officials played down at the time, were much worse than have previously been reported. While the study serves mainly as a technical examination of how the Army performed and the problems it faced, it could also serve as a political document that could advance the Army's interests within the Pentagon.

Tank engines sat on warehouse shelves in Kuwait with no truck drivers to take them north. Broken-down trucks were scavenged for usable parts. Artillery units cannibalized parts from captured Iraqi guns to keep their howitzers operating. Army medics foraged medical supplies from combat hospitals.

In most cases, Soldiers improvised solutions to keep the offensive rolling. But the study found that the Third Infantry Division, the Army's lead combat force, was within two weeks of being halted by a lack of spare parts, and Army logisticians had no effective distribution system.

"The morass of problems that confounded delivering parts and supplies ­ running the gamut of paper clips to tank engines ­ stems from the lack of a means to assign responsibility clearly," the study said.

It also found that the Pentagon's decision to send mostly combat units in the weeks before the invasion had the "unintended consequence" of holding back support troops until much later, contributing greatly to the logistics problems.

The findings are contained in a 504-page internal Army history of the war written by the Army's Combined Arms Center at Fort Leavenworth, Kan. The unclassified study, a draft of which was obtained by The New York Times, was ordered last spring by the former Army chief of staff, Gen. Eric K. Shinseki, who clashed with Defense Secretary Donald H. Rumsfeld over troop strength for postwar Iraq. It draws on interviews with 2,300 people, 68,000 photographs and nearly 120,000 documents.

Its senior author was Gregory Fontenot, a retired Army colonel who commanded a battalion in the Persian Gulf war in 1991 and a brigade in Bosnia.

Army officials said the timing of the study was not intended to influence passage of a proposed military budget the Bush administration submitted to Congress on Monday. But it could fuel a debate on Capitol Hill over whether the military, and the Army in particular, has enough troops to carry out missions in Iraq, Afghanistan and other trouble spots.

Senior Army officials say lessons from the study ­ from revamping how soldiers are deployed to overhauling battlefield supply-distribution networks ­ are already being incorporated into Army training centers and among the 110,000 troops now replacing 130,000 Soldiers in Iraq.

The bulk of the study is a lucid narrative devoted largely to detailed accounts of several pivotal battles. For the most part, it praises the Army's combat operations and the ability of soldiers and commanders to adapt to rapidly shifting conditions on the battlefield.

The report refers only glancingly to two of the most contentious issues of the war: Iraq's suspected illicit weapons and the Pentagon's preparations for securing and rebuilding the country after major combat ended.

The study does note, however, that the strategy of starting the war before all support troops were in place, in order to achieve an element of surprise, taxed the postwar resources of local commanders, who in many cases were shifting back and forth between combat operations and the task of restoring civil services.

"Local commanders were torn between their fights and providing resources ­ Soldiers, time and logistics ­ to meet the civilian needs," the report concluded. "Partially due to the scarce resources as a result of the running start, there simply was not enough to do both missions."

The study's authors saved their most biting critique for the logistics operations. When the combat forces raced ahead, the supply lines ­ "force flow" in military jargon ­ could not keep pace. "As the campaign progressed, the force flow never caught up with the operational requirements," it found.

Put more bluntly elsewhere in the study, it said that "no one had anything good to say about parts delivery, from the privates at the front to the generals" at the command headquarters.

Other problems cropped up. While divisional commanders could communicate with one another, officers at lower levels often could not. Units separated by long distances in the fast-moving offensive found their radios suddenly out of range, leaving troops to improvise solutions using mobile phones or secure e-mail messaging.

Commanders were relying on an extensive psychological operations campaign of leaflets and broadcasts to coax Iraqi soldiers into surrendering, as they did in large numbers in the 1991 gulf war, and to refrain from sabotaging Iraq's oil fields.

The study found that those messages either had failed to reach many of the intended Iraqi units or had baffled the Iraqi soldiers who got them. In addition, Saddam Fedayeen paramilitary fighters inserted in Iraqi Army units threatened and, in many cases, killed Iraqi soldiers who tried to desert or surrender.

Leaflets were prepared for the first 48 hours of combat, but the system to approve new written messages was so cumbersome that psychological operations teams on the ground were forced to rely solely on loudspeakers. "It is clear that on the whole, psyop produced much less than expected and perhaps less than claimed," the report found.

Despite elaborate Army planning for a final battle in Baghdad ­ including the mapping of every section and building in the city of 5.5 million people ­ commanders and intelligence analysts were at a loss to determine how the Iraqis would defend Baghdad, if at all.

"Intelligence officers at all echelons continued to have great difficulty accurately describing the threat in the city," the study concluded.

Not until armored columns carried out probes, called "thunder runs," through Baghdad, the study found, did American commanders realize that the city was not heavily defended.

The study also found that future adversaries could draw several lessons from the war: that American forces' reliance on high-tech surveillance satellites and aircraft could be countered by decoys and the imaginative disguise of weaponry; that more powerful warheads for rocket-propelled grenades, already effective against helicopters and light vehicles like Humvees, could offset American armor; that American forces could be drawn into a protracted, costly urban war, more effectively than they were by the Iraqis; and that American forces are vulnerable to classic insurgency tactics, like car bombs.

SOMETHING TO LIFT YOUR SPIRITS!

Toby Keith & Willie Nelson - Beer For My Horses Lyrics

Modified by the 1st TSG (A) for U.S. military application

Well a man come on the 6 oclock news
Said somebodys been shot, somebodys been abused
Somebody blew up a building
Somebody stole a car
Somebody got away
Somebody didnt get too far yeah
They didnt get too far

Grandpappy told my pappy, back in my day, son
A man had to answer for the wicked that he done
Take all the guns in Texas
Build a camp called GITMO, round up all of them bad boys
and throw-away the key, let all the people in the world see

Justice is the one thing you should always find
You got to saddle up your boys
You got to draw a hard line
When the gun smoke settles well sing a victory tune
Well all meet back at the local saloon
Well raise up our glasses against evil forces
Singing whiskey for my men, beer for my horses

We got too many gangsters doing dirty deeds
Weve got too much corruption, and crime in the streets
Its time the long arm of the law put a few more in the ground
Send em all to their maker and hell settle em down
You can bet hell set em down cause

Justice is the one thing you should always find
You got to saddle up your boys
You got to draw a hard line
When the gun smoke settles well sing a victory tune
Well all meet back at the local saloon
Well raise up our glasses against evil forces
Singing whiskey for my men, beer for my horses

Justice is the one thing you should always find
You got to saddle up your boys
You got to draw a hard line
When the gun smoke settles well sing a victory tune
Well all meet back at the local saloon
Well raise up our glasses against evil forces
Singing whiskey for my men, beer for my horses

Professional Military Education Hot Link

---

Another insurgency to study is the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Land Power Transformation suggests reading this report on the IDF's new security barrier:

THE "BUFFER ZONES" MYTH

A light tracked AFV is a MOBILE WALL ON TRACKS. If you are getting blown to bits you are not maintaining any kind of order. This is why we focus in so hard on the light tracked AFVs. When push-comes-to-shove talk is cheap. Unless we on the ground have PHYSICAL SUPERIORITY through protected mobility we cannot maintain order. Lind and others are so eager to bash icons they neglect the business end of things except for Van Crevald supporting walls. If you don't take care of "business" and maintain order because you are too busy putting out HMMWVs on fire and rushing men that are bleeding to death you are looking like fools not protectors of law and order.

We know our military neither wants light tracked AFVs nor better COIN tactics that go along with them. Such things would require humility---and our military would rather get blown up than have to change (implication is they were wrong).

Got bad Soldier gear? U.S. bureaucracy not listening?

Post your gear requests/ideas to Brigade Quartermasters, they will get good gear to the good guys (YOU)

www.actiongear.com

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