[YH1]CAN A SINGLE WITNESS EXEMPT A WOMAN FROM YIBUM
QUESTION: The Gemara discusses whether the testimony of a single witness is
accepted to permit a woman to marry in cases other than that of the Mishnah
(87b). The second version of the Gemara asserts that a single witness is
certainly believed to say that the woman's husband died in order to allow
her to do Yibum when her husband had no children. This is because a single
witness is believed *more* than a woman is believed, and we know that a
woman alone is believed to say that her husband died without children and
thereby permit herself to do Yibum (114b). The question is only if a single
witness is believed to testify that a woman does *not* have to do Yibum (by
testifying that her Yavam died, or that her husband died before his children
died), even though there is a Chazakah that she is obligated to do Yibum. In
such a case, the woman is not believed, as the Mishnah later says.

The Gemara inquires whether the single witness should be believed because
his testimony is "Avida Ligluyei" (will eventually become known), or whether
he is not believed because the woman does not carefully attempt to verify
the facts because she wants to exempt herself from Yibum, since she hates
the Yavam.

Why does the Gemara ask specifically about the Halachah in this case -- when
the single witness testifies against the Chazakah and says that the woman is
*not* obligated to do Yibum? The same can be asked about a case where he
testifies against a Chazakah that she is exempt from Yibum, testifying that
she *is* obligated to do Yibum (such as by testifying that her husband died
after his children died)! (TOSFOS DH Ki)

ANSWERS:
(a) TOSFOS first answers that the two questions are indeed identical, and
the Gemara mentions the question of a witness permitting her to marry by
exempting her from Yibum because it happens to be that this was the question
that was posed due to an incident than occurred at the time.

(b) The RAMBAN and other Rishonim suggest that the Gemara chose the case of
exempting her from Yibum in order to teach the point that even though
exempting her from Yibum involves only a question of an Isur Lav (the Isur
of Yevamah la'Shuk) and not an Isur Kares, and, in addition, even though the
testimony of the single witness that the Yavam died is something that is
"Avida Ligluyei" (will become known later) -- nevertheless it is not clear
that the witness should be believed, because the woman might not check it
out so carefully.

(c) TOSFOS and the RA'AVAD (cited by the Ramban) suggest another
explanation. They say that although we find that a woman is not believed,
without the testimony of witnesses, to permit herself to the Yavam (by
saying that her child died before her husband died), it is not because she
does not check it out. The love for a Yavam does not overcome the woman's
common sense to persuade her to testify that her husband is dead without
checking it out. Why, then, is she not believed? She is not believed because
the reason to be lenient of "Mishum Iguna" does not apply, since there will
be no "Igun" if she does not end up becoming permitted to the Yavam. If so,
when there is a single witness testifying that she is permitted to the
Yavam, the testimony of the witness *combined with* the fact that a woman
checks the story out for herself provide enough reason to be lenient (even
when there is no "Igun") and to allow her to theYavam.

On the other hand, when the woman testifies that she is *not* obligated to
do Yibum, then not only is there no reason to be lenient because of "Iguna"
(since she will not be left unable to marry; she can marry the Yavam), but
we also suspect that she will not properly verify that she is really exempt.
Since we suspect her of hating the Yavam, she will fail to investigate
whether she is really exempt from Yibum, for her hate *can* overcome her
common sense. The emotion of hate tends to be more powerful than the emotion
of love.

Therefore, even when a single witness testifies on her behalf, his testimony
cannot be accepted because we do not have the added factor that the woman
checks out the facts for herself carefully. That is why the Gemara questions
only what the Halachah is with regard to *exempting* her from Yibum.

 [YH2] יבמות פ"טו מ"א: האשה שהלכה היא ובעלה למדינת הים שלום בינו לבינה ושלום בעולם ובאתה ואמרה מת בעלי תנשא מת בעלי תתיבם

 [YH3]A SECOND SET OF WITNESSES WHO SAY THAT "THE OPPOSITE OCCURRED"
QUESTION: The Gemara attempts to prove that a single witness is believed to
exempt a woman from Yibum. The Gemara quotes the Mishnah that says that if
witnesses "told her that her husband died before her son died (and thus she
is exempt from Yibum), and then she remarried, and afterwards two other
witnesses told her that the opposite occurred (her son died before her
husband died, and thus she is obligated to do Yibum), she must leave both
husbands."

The Gemara asks how many witnesses does the Mishnah mean when it says that
they testified that she could remarry; if it was two witnesses, then even
when another two witnesses come they should not be able to override the
first pair (rather, it should be a situation of "Trei u'Trei")! It must be
that the first testimony was given by a single witness, and when two
witnesses come they are able to override his testimony. The Gemara rejects
this proof by saying that the first testimony was indeed given by two
witnesses, and the reason why the second pair is able to override the first
pair's testimony is because the second pair of witnesses are Edim Zomemim
who are believed to refute the testimony of -- or, more specifically,
disqualify -- the first pair of witnesses, and thus the situation is not one
of "Trei u'Trei."

How can the Gemara say that when the Mishnah says that a second pair of
witnesses came and testified that "the opposite occurred" (the son died
before the father died) it is referring to Edim Zomemim? Edim Zomemim only
testify that the first set of witnesses could not be telling the truth
because they were not where they claimed to have been when they saw the
events about which they are testifying, and thus they could not have seen
those events. The second pair of witnesses are not testifying that "the
opposite occurred," but merely that what the first pair of witnesses cannot
be true!

It cannot be suggested that the Gemara means that the second pair of
witnesses said two things -- first, that the first pair was with them at the
time the events occurred, and second, that the opposite of what they say
occurred -- because such testimony would not suffice to make the other pair
of witnesses Edim Zomemim (see Makos 5a, RAMBAM Hilchos Edus 18:2 and Lechem
Mishnah)! (ARUCH LA'NER)

In addition, it cannot be suggested that there are *two* additional pairs of
witnesses testifying against the first pair -- one pair serving to make the
first pair Zomemim, and the other pair testifying that the opposite of what
the first pair said occurred -- because the words of Rashi and the Rishonim
imply that only one other set of witnesses came!

ANSWER: Perhaps when the Mishnah says that the second pair of witnesses say
that "the opposite occurred," it does not mean that those witnesses testify
that the opposite actually happened, but rather they say that the opposite
*might* have happened.

Why, though, does the Mishnah emphasize that the "opposite" might be true?
If the second pair of witnesses made the first pair into Zomemim, there is
an even greater concern -- that the husband is still alive!

The answer is that the Mishnah is teaching that the second pair of witnesses
made the first into Zomemim *only with regard* to the first pair's testimony
concerning the timing of the death of the son. The husband, though, is
certainly dead, just like the first pair testified, and what remains in
question is whether the son died before the father or after him. The Mishnah
uses such a case in order to demonstrate that if the son indeed died first,
the children that the woman subsequently bears from another husband are
Mamzerim, in accordance with the view of Rebbi Akiva who says that the
children of a Yevamah la'Shuk are Mamzerim. (M. Kornfeld)

 [YH4]MARRYING ONE'S MOTHER-IN-LAW AFTER THE DEATH OF ONE'S WIFE
OPINIONS: The Gemara cites a Machlokes between Rebbi Yishmael and Rebbi
Akiva (according to the way Rava learns the Machlokes) regarding whether a
person is punished for living with his wife's mother (Chamoso) after his
wife has died. The Gemara concludes that even according to Rebbi Akiva --
who says that one is punished with Sereifah only when he commits the Isur
while his wife is still alive -- an *Isur* nevertheless remains even after
the wife's death.

What is the Isur that remains after the wife's death? It cannot be the verse
in Parshas Kedoshim (Vayikra 20:14) which ascribes the death penalty for
marrying a woman and her mother, because that verse applies only when the
wife is alive, according to Rebbi Akiva! What, then, is the Isur?

(a) TOSFOS (DH mei'Isura, and 98b, DH Kalash), the RAMBAM (Hilchos Isurei
Bi'ah 2:5), and the RA'AVAD (quoted by the ME'IRI in Sanhedrin 76b) write
that the Isur that remains is an Isur of Kares and a Lo Ta'aseh, as derived
from the verse in Parshas Acharei Mos (Vayikra 18:17) which ascribes Kares
and a Lav to the act and does not limit the Isur of Kares and Lav to when
they are both alive.

(b) However, RASHI in Sanhedrin (76b, DH Rebbi Akiva) explains that
according to Rebbi Akiva, there is *no* Isur Kares or Lo Ta'aseh at all for
marrying one's mother-in-law after the death of one's wife. Rather, after
the death of one's wife, marrying one's mother-in-law is only "Asur
b'Arur" -- the Torah places a curse on one who marries his mother-in-law, as
the verse states in Parshas Ki Savo (Devarim 27:23). There is no distinct
negative prohibition, though.

Strong support for the view of Rashi can be derived from the wording of the
Gemara in Sanhedrin (as the MAHARSHAL here points out), which says that
marrying one's mother-in-law after the death of one's wife involves an
"Isura b'Alma" -- only a "minor Isur." Further support can be adduced from
the Gemara later in Yevamos (98b), as TOSFOS there (DH Kalash) writes.

Rashi's opinion is also that of the RASHBA and RAMBAN (98b) who say that
there is only an Isur Arur for one to marry his mother-in-law after the
death of his wife.

1. The ARUCH LA'NER here asks that there are actually *six* relatives who
are prohibited by the Isur of "Ishah u'Vitah:" one's mother-in-law and *her*
mother or mother-in-law, one's wife's daughter and her son's or daughter's
daughter. The verse of "Arur," however, refers to only one of these
relatives -- to one's mother-in-law. Consequently, there should be no Isur
at all, not even an Arur, for having relations with one's wife's daughter or
granddaughter, or with one's wife's mother's mother or mother-in-law, after
the death of one's wife!

And if it is true that one's wife's mother's mother is permitted to him
l'Chatchilah after the death of his wife, then the question of the Gemara
returns: why did Rebbi Akiva not say that there is another Ervah who needs a
Get? If one was Mekadesh a woman and then he heard that she had died, and he
went and married her mother's mother who is permitted to him l'Chatchilah
since his wife is presumed to be dead, then if his wife returns alive, he
should have to give a Get to her mother's mother! The Gemara has not
answered its question that there is an additional Ervah which Rebbi Akiva
should have included in his list!

The RAMBAN and RASHBA (98b) answer that the verse teaching the Isur of Arur
includes not only one's mother-in-law, but also her mother, and her
mother-in-law. (See Aruch la'Ner who suggests a different answer.)

2. However, this answer only explains why Rebbi Akiva did not list one's
wife's grandmother among his list of Arayos who need a Get if one marries
them by accident under the presumption that one's wife is dead. However, why
did he not mention the Ervah of one's wife's daughter or granddaughter? If
one thinks that his wife is dead and he marries his wife's daughter or
granddaughter, then he should have to give her a Get since they are
permitted after his wife's death, and the verse of Arur does not apply to
them!

The RAMBAN and RASHBA (ibid.) explain that Rebbi Akiva's view that the Isur
of "Ishah u'Vitah" does not apply after the death of one's wife is said
*only* with regard to one's wife's mother or grandmother, which is what the
verse "Oso v'Es'hen" (Vayikra 20:14) is discussing. One's wife's daughter or
granddaughter, though, are not permitted after the death of one's wife.

However, the RAMBAM (Hilchos Isurei Bi'ah 2:7-8) understands that Rebbi
Akiva is referring to any of the Arayos in the two generations above *or
below* one's wife, and not just to those in the two generations above one's
wife (i.e. one's wife's mother or grandmother). According to the Rambam, in
all of these cases, Rebbi Akiva says that there is no Isur of Sereifah!

Rashi also seems to agree with the Rambam in this point, as is evident from
Rashi's words earlier (2a and 9b; see Insights to 9b), where Rashi implies
that one's wife's daughter or granddaughter becomes permitted to him after
his wife's death. If so, she should be permitted to him l'Chatchilah, since
the Torah does not write an Arur that applies to one's wife's daughter or
granddaughter!

Apparently, the answer is that Rashi indeed learned that the Arur of living
with one's wife's close relatives applies to all of the Arayos that are
included in "Es Ishah v'Es IMah." Just like Rashi learns that the words "Es
Ishah v'Es Imah" (from which Rebbi Akiva learns that one's mother-in-law is
permitted after the death of one's wife) refer to either the wife and her
mother or grandmother, or the wife and her daughter or granddaughter, so
too, when the Torah writes "Chosanto" (his mother-in-law) in the verse of
the Arur it includes all of those included in "Es Ishah v'Es Imah."

(Although it is true that Rashi in Sanhedrin says that the "Isur" mentioned
by Rebbi Akiva here means that there is only an "Arur," TOSFOS YESHANIM here
and the RITVA (98b) quote Rashi as saying that after the death of one's
wife, his mother-in-law *is* prohibited with Kares and a Lav, but not with
Sereifah. Apparently, they inferred this from the words of Rashi later (98b,
DH Kalash), where Rashi writes that after the death of one's wife, the man
is "not punished with Seriefah" for living with his mother-in-law. This
implies that an Isur Kares and a Lav do remain. However, as we have seen,
the words of Rashi in our texts both in Sanhedrin and in Yevamos seem to say
otherwise and to prohibit one's mother-in-law and one's wife's daughter
after the death of one's wife with only an Isur of Arur, but not with an
Isur of Kares and Lav.)