[1] TELLING A GER ABOUT AVODAH ZARAH
QUESTION: The Gemara derives the things that we tell a Nochri who wants to
convert from the things that Naomi told Ruth when she wanted to convert.
Naomi told her about the Mitzvah of Techum Shabbos, and that there are 613
Mitzvos that a Jew must observe, and that once a person becomes a Ger it
becomes forbidden for the person to serve Avodah Zarah.

Why do we tell a prospective Ger that if he becomes Jewish, he will no
longer be permitted to serve Avodah Zarah? It is forbidden for a person to
serve idols even if he is not Jewish! (MAHARSHA, 47a)

ANSWERS:
(a) The MAHARSHA answers that Naomi did not actually tell Ruth that it will
be forbidden for her to serve Avodah Zarah if she converts. Rather, she told
her that once she becomes Jewish, it will be prohibited for her to leave
Eretz Yisrael and go to Chutz la'Aretz, because one who lives in Chutz
la'Aretz is "as if he has no G-d" (Kesuvos 110b).

(b) The ARUCH LA'NER answers that she was referring to forms of Avodah Zarah
worship that are permitted only to a Nochri and not to a Jew, such as
"Shituf" (worshipping another god along with Hashem), according to some
Rishonim (see Tosfos, Sanhedrin 63b, DH Asur l'Adam).

Other Acharonim (MITZPEH EISAN) add that a Jew may not derive benefit from
an object worshipped as Avodah Zarah, while a Nochri may derive benefit from
it. The TUREI EVEN (Chagigah 11b) says that it is prohibited (with an Isur
Lav) for a Jew to kiss an object of Avodah Zarah, while a Nochri is
prohibited only from serving it in one of the main forms of worship (by
offering a Korban to it or prostrating oneself to it), or by serving it in
the way it normally is served. The RIF on the Ein Yakov adds that it is
prohibited for a Jew even to own an object of Avodah Zarah and to keep it in
one's home, even if he does not intend to worship it, while a Nochri is
permitted to keep such an object in his home.

(c) The RIF on the Ein Yakov asks another question. Naomi had already told
Ruth that there are 613 Mitzvos. Since the Isur against serving Avodah Zarah
is one of the 613 Mitzvos, why did she have to state specifically that
Avodah Zarah is Asur?

The MITZPEH EISAN and IYUN YAKOV suggest that she was warning Ruth that the
Avodah Zarah of a Jew remains Asur forever and cannot be annulled. In
contrast, the Avodah Zarah of a Nochri becomes permitted once he shows that
he no longer worships it. Naomi was telling Ruth not that there is an Isur
of Avodah Zarah, but that the Avodah Zarah of a Jew is more severe than that
of a Nochri.

[2] THE SOURCE FOR AN SLAVE'S OBLIGATION IN MITZVOS
QUESTION: The Gemara says that an Eved does not need Kabalas Mitzvos when he
is freed in order to complete his Geirus. RASHI explains that when he first
became an Eved and did Tevilah l'Shem Avdus (with intention to become an
Eved), "he was already Shayach to Mitzvos." Which Mitzvos were applicable to
him as an Eved? Rashi says that the Eved had the Mitzvah of "l'Ma'an
Yanu'ach Avdecha" (Devarim 5:14), which requires that he rest from Melachah
on Shabbos, and, in addition, we derive from a Gezeirah Shavah of "Lah Lah"
that he is obligated in the same Mitzvos in which a woman is obligated.
Therefore, since he is already obligated in certain Mitzvos at the time that
he becomes an Eved, he does not have to undergo a new Kabalas Mitzvos at the
time of the Tevilah of his emancipation.

Why does Rashi mention two sources for the obligation of an Eved to observe
Shabbos? It is clear that a slave must observe the Mitzvos in which a woman
is commanded, as Rashi says. Why does Rashi mention that the Eved is
commanded to keep Shabbos because of the verse "l'Ma'an Yanu'ach Avdecha?"
(ARUCH LA'NER)

Moreover, it does not seem correct to cite the verse of "l'Ma'an Yanu'ach
Avdecha" as a source that an Eved is obligated in Mitzvos. That Mitzvah is
specifically directed to a Jewish master and it is commanding him not to
have his Eved work on Shabbos. It does *not* tell us that the Eved himself
has a Mitzvah to refrain from working on Shabbos (like the Gemara mentions
later, on 48b; see also Rashi there, DH Bein ha'Shemashos)!

ANSWER: Rashi here is bothered by a problem in the Gemara. How can the
Gemara say that the reason the Eved does not need a Kabalas Mitzvos when he
is released is because he already had a Kabalas Mitzvos when he become an
Eved? The Gemara itself says that one can force a person to become an Eved
against his will. If an Eved can become an Eved against his will, then
certainly he did not accept upon himself the Mitzvos at the time he became
an Eved. How, then, can the Gemara say that he does not need Kabalas Mitzvos
when he is released?

The answer to this problem can be inferred from the Gemara later (48a). The
Gemara there explains that there is a Machlokes Tana'im whether an Eved is
exempt from Kabalas Mitzvos when he is freed only if he has been an Eved for
a long time, or even if he is freed immediately after becoming an Eved.
Rashi  (DH b'Yefas To'ar) explains that an Eved who has been an Eved for a
long time does not need Kabalas Mitzvos at the time of his release, because
during his Avdus he was *practicing* the Mitzvos in which an Eved is Chayav,
and thus, through observing those Mitzvos, he accepted the Mitzvos upon
himself.

Apparently, even the opinion that holds that an Eved *does not* need Kabalas
Mitzvos if he was released immediately after becoming an Eved (which is the
opinion that the Gemara is discussing here) will also follow the same logic,
even though the Eved has not yet had a chance to practice the Mitzvos. By
virtue of becoming an Eved (whether voluntarily or not), he has become
resigned to observing the Mitzvos *in the future*, and thus it is considered
an acceptance of the Mitzvos. This is the logic for positing that the
Gezeirah Shavah of "Lah Lah" makes his Kabalas Mitzvos unnecessary.

However, Rashi may have been in doubt whether this is correct. Perhaps it is
not proper to assume that an Eved, being immersed against his will, is
already resigned to keeping the Mitzvos. Rather, just as the master immerses
the Eved against his will, so, too, he "accepts the Mitzvos" for the Eved
when he immerses the Eved against his will. The master, though, cannot
accept for the Eved to do Mitzvos; rather, he accepts that *he*, the master,
will observe the Mitzvos that apply to him due to the Eved -- such as
Lema'an Yanu'ach, not making the servant work on Shabbos. His acceptance
takes the place of the servant's. That is why Rashi mentions here that the
obligation of Lema'an Yanu'ach makes an Eved "Shayach to Mitzvos."