The American Decision to us the Atomic Bomb against Japan at Hiroshima

Matthew Self
Theology Research Paper
Mr. Sciuto
5/1/07

World War II brought terror to the lives of many people in many different parts of the globe. Death and destruction became a part of life throughout Europe, as the Allied and Axis forces fought and continued to raise the death toll in the fight for power. Germany had begun to move steadily toward victory before the United States entered the War. However, one day after the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor in December 1941, President Franklin Roosevelt asked Congress to declare war on Japan; they did so swiftly. It soon became clear that American involvement in the global war was helping the Allies achieve victory in Europe, but the Japanese continued to fight strongly despite oncoming defeat. The decision to use the atomic bomb at Hiroshima came after nearly three years of war with Japan, but more importantly after consideration of both the causes for and the consequences of using such a destructive weapon against fellow men.
When the American people elected Harry S Truman to be the Vice President in 1944, most knew that he would become the President shortly after taking office, due to the failing health of President Roosevelt. As a child, Truman had often been regarded as weak and feminine; but once he became the leader of the free world, it was evident that he would not allow himself to be pushed around by anyone.1 He had a strong will and exemplified the belief that Americans refuse to regret and look back on their decisions. Within a few weeks of becoming president, Truman was informed of the Manhattan Project—a top secret attempt to produce the first atom bomb, costing 2 billion dollars.2 He couldn't have displayed much reaction because, at that point, there was no bomb and the scientists could only estimate the potential power of the weapon. Although unaware of the bomb’s destructive force, President Truman was aware of the continuing fight against Japan and of their refusal to accept inevitable defeat.
Harry Truman understood the growing impatience of Americans for war and their desire to leave the war without establishing the United States as a weak power.3 After victory in Europe had been achieved, it was only a short matter of time before Japan would be defeated. Their country was steadily declining due to poor leadership and also to insufficient materials for a wartime economy.4 Although Japan was a short push away from toppling, Truman did not want to prolong the defeat, but rather gain a quick success and final end to the Second World War. The destructive force of an atomic bomb would cause great psychological harm to the Japanese people and instill a great reluctance to fight and further increase the body count.
As president, Truman’s duty was to work for the best interest of the American people. He thoroughly believed that an invasion of Japan would be terrible for the American morale and precipitate strong and furious opposition to any more involvement of the United States in a foreign war. British Prime Minister Winston Churchill claimed that such an invasion would cost at least 1 million American lives and 500,000 British lives.5 However, the President learned a non-propaganda number from a team of advisers he had set up with the specific purpose of calculating the death toll. A closer estimate was 193,500 killed/missing/wounded, but in an attempt to rally support for the use of the bomb, our leader said that an invasion would cost half a million American lives—a number much greater than the deaths caused by an atomic attack.6 Japan was not the only opponent that the United States feared near the end of World War II. Russia’s continuous expansion into Eastern Europe frightened American politicians and was seen as a threat to the ultimate goal of the Allies: to preserve Europe without the spread of opposition to capitalism.7 With the use of the atomic bomb would come a demonstration of the newly acquired power held only by the United States, the hope being that the Soviet Union would then be hesitant to challenge the U.S.8
In the decade prior to World War II, Japan had begun to establish itself as an imperial nation with the desire to expand its territories. When it did invade China, the U.S. refused to trade with them, preventing the arrival of much needed resources such as oil.9 Japan interpreted this limit as an act of aggression, and many Japanese leaders believed that if they were to pursue their imperialist goals, a war with the United States was inevitable. They saw their attack on Pearl Harbor as completely justified; their goal had been to destroy the powerful American fleet, and the attack left a large portion of it damaged or sunk.10
Since war with the U.S. was inevitable, a quick attack would be the smartest thing for Japan to do. However, three years gave Americans a great amount of time to anticipate an utter defeat of Japan. American hostility, distrust, and hatred toward “Japs” grew over the years, as the memory of tragedy at Pearl Harbor refused to leave their minds. Defeat for the Japanese was apparent in the events prior to the bombing of Hiroshima. Japanese leaders were willing to surrender but only under the condition that the emperor could retain his place. The United States was obstinate and would accept only an unconditional surrender. To the Japanese, this demand was impossible and also reason enough to fight to the death. Their citizens held a loyalty that might seem strange to many Americans, but a part of life for their people.11 Many scientists that had played roles in the research or creation of the atomic bomb had a greater knowledge of the terrible power of this new weapon of mass destruction. Prior to the first test at Alamogordo, New Mexico, they still remained ignorant of the full potential of the atomic bomb. Americans believed that if they were unable to first achieve the successful construction of the bomb, then one of their enemies—most likely Germany—would gain a stronger control over the rest of the world.12 The truth was that German scientists gave up on their efforts to make such a weapon, understanding that it would take too long to prove any use in the war. The threat of Russian success still proved to be a major reason to work faster and with a greater sense of necessity as the war dragged on.13 Many American scientists believed that the atomic bomb should not be first used on a Japanese city, but rather in a display of its power in a deserted location on Japan. However, President Truman did not believe that this demonstration would be enough to force Japan into surrendering. The city of Hiroshima was chosen as a target because it had never been bombed before and was also large enough to allow the American scientists to properly evaluate the effects of the bomb.
None of the scientists that worked on the bomb predicted the mysterious plague that occurred after the bombing of Hiroshima, later known as atomic radiation.14 This disease caused tens of thousands of deaths, which was usually accompanied by extended periods of suffering. The people of Hiroshima had become contaminated, as well as all of the food and water near the explosion. These victims were stranded and helpless, left to fight an invisible and unpredicted epidemic.
What scientists feared the most were the possibilities in the future if atomic bombs became stronger and more common throughout the world. They knew that the use of these weapons of mass destruction would then bring about a nuclear holocaust, leaving few survivors with few resources.15 After the bombing of Hiroshima, some physicists, like Albert Einstein, began to regret their support of the weapon’s use, as they witnessed the destructive power and loss of life brought on by the bomb. As tensions between the United States and the Soviet Union rose, the probability of a post-war arms race grew at a similar rate.
The decision to use the atomic bomb at Hiroshima came after nearly three years of war with Japan, but more importantly after consideration of both the causes for and the consequences of using such a destructive weapon against fellow men. Without a doubt, it was a difficult one to make, but it was made easier through the typical American refusal to question one’s actions and thereby learn from the past.


Endnotes

(1) Takani, Ronald. Hiroshima: Why America dropped the Atomic Bomb. Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1995, p. 146.
(2) Takani, p.147.
(3) O’Neal, Michael. President Truman and the Atomic Bomb. San Diego: Greenhaven Press, Inc. 1990, p. 48.
(4) Weale, Adrian, ed. Eye-Witness Hiroshima. New York: Caroll & Graf Publishers, Inc. 1995, p.196.
(5) Weale, p.123
(6) Takani, p.23
(7) Takani, p.7
(8) Takani, p.7
(9) Takani, p.23
(10) Takani, p.33
(11) Weale, p.103
(12) Takani, p.7
(13) Fogelman, Edwin. Hiroshima: the Decision to use the A-Bomb. New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1964, p.67
(14) Weale, p.67
(15) Fogelman, p.79-80B


Bibliography

Fogelman, Edwin. Hiroshima: the Decision to use the A-Bomb. New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1964.

Maddox, Robert James. The Biggest Decision: Why We had to drop the Atomic Bomb. [Online] Available. http://web.ebscohost.com/src/detail?vid=1&hid=19&sid= 76f05040-993a-4ce8-a12d-389de3006276%40sessionmgr9, April 11, 2007.

O’Neal, Michael. President Truman and the Atomic Bomb. San Diego: Greenhaven Press, Inc. 1990.

Takani, Ronald. Hiroshima: Why America dropped the Atomic Bomb. Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1995.

Weale, Adrian, ed. Eye-Witness Hiroshima. New York: Caroll & Graf Publishers, Inc. 1995.