IDF Sniper

Overview
The Israeli Defense Force (IDF) sniper school- overview
Problems in the IDF’s sniper school
The history of the Israeli Sniper Weapons Systems (SWS)
Other Sniper Weapons Systems (SWS)
The organization of snipers in counter terrorist /hostage rescue teams

Note: unless specify otherwise, the following refers to the entire Israeli snipers community, including both Special Forces (SF) and regular infantry snipers, and to both civilian and military units’ snipers.

Since the very establishment of the Israel state and its army- Israel Defense Force (IDF)- in 1948, the IDF was a different kind of an army. with a shoe-string budget, a very small territory to protect and surrounding by powerful enemies, out numbering it both in weapons and in manpower, the IDF needed to established its own unique doctrines and strategy.

As a result, the IDF’s strategy was always very high speed attacks, design to bring the war into the enemy territories, since the Israeli population and territory are too small to sustain a long time campaign. In this kind of attack, patience and targets selection, the very essence of a sniper are considered non-existent words.

This way of thought deeply reflected on the role of the Israeli sniper throughout the years. for many years, and to a certain extent even today, the sniper was considered just another profession, almost a luxury, and was treated as such- bad manpower both for the snipers itself an their instructors, bad training and bad attitude from the officers and the fellow solders. in fact the sniper was almost an outcast profession.

In the Special Forces (SF) units the situation was a little a better but not by a long shot. the sniper was considered just as another good shooter and not as key member of the team, able to gather information as well as taking out highly tactical importance targets. even sniper assignation/ambushes, a very popular technique in SF units world-wide, were very rarely executed. The few that were made were conducted by Shayetet 13 (a.k.a. S’13), the IDF’s naval commando unit, which was much influenced in this field by their regular and favorite foreign ‘training buddy’- the American Navy SEALs.

With very low emphasis on personal proficiency and sniper skills (camouflage, target selection, intelligence gathering, etc.), the Israeli SF sniper is one of the worst in the world. most of them can’t shoot behind 600-700 meters, while most western snipers can shoot well up to 1000 meters. Today, this approach towards snipers is slowly changing, but it will take a few more years until the Israeli snipers will reach proper level.

The main guilt, in the poor Israeli sniper situation, is aimed against the IDF’s snipers school, located in the Mitkan Adam army base, the IDF’s special training installation.

Other then their length, the two basic snipers curses are identical in content. there are several reason why the SF course is shorter:

Note: Unit 707 is also located in the Mitkan Adam, right across from the sniper school.

The IDF’s sniper school course teach the basic of sniping and focus on long range, open field combat, infantry style shooting (up to 800 meters). the unit 707’s course put its focus on short range heads shots sniping (up to 150 meters) for CT, HRT and for Close Quarters Combat (CQB) scenarios.

Until 1997, the year in which the IDF switched is main issue sniper rifle from the semi-auto Israeli modified M14 to the American bolt action M24, there was another difference between the two schools: the IDF’s sniper school only thought the usage of the semi-auto sniper rifles, while unit’s 707 thought the usage of bolt action sniper rifles.

The 50. caliber course is a separated course which is given to non-sniper personal. this course’s graduates are only qualified to activate the Barrett 82A1, and are not really considered as snipers. the Barrett main Use in the IDF is for Hard (light armored) Target Interdiction (HTI) shooting, and not for extreme range sniping. the Barrett is basically Used as a very accurate heavy fire support, to take out Armored Caring Vehicles (acv), jeeps, cars, shoot through walls, etc.

the problems in the snipers school are numerous starting with the selection and criteria for future snipers (there aren’t any), with the structure of the course itself (allot of time wasted), the quality of the instructors personal and later the sniper training in their own units.

The IDF’s mandatory service is three years. because of budgetary reasons solders and Non Commissioned Officers (NCO) rarely serve more then the regular three years (while in the mandatory service the solders receive a symbolic fee of 150-200$, after the mandatory service they receive a more "normal" fee of 1000-1300$). on the other hand, the training regime in infantry units last 14 months and in SF units 20 months. after this period the solders are re-assigned, some remain with the team, other go to officers course or to NCO command positions in other teams. so when a commander (a team leader in SF units or platoon commander in infantry units) makes a decision, on who to send to a sniper course, he takes into consideration that if he send a high-quality guy to the sniper course, most likely that this guy will later go to a command position elsewhere and he will lose a sniper. Therefore in most cases the ones actually send to the snipers course are the worst personal in the team/platoon. in SF units this is less of a problem since most of the personal are high-quality, but in regular units where quality personal is in short, it’s a major problem.

Unfortunately this is an objective problem that can’t be solved, since everyone prefer that the IDF will have the best officers and NCO it can produced, and less skilled snipers, rather the other way around.

Another problem is that (from the physical point of view) the sniper course is a bad joke. most of the time the student seat down in the sun, talking to his friends and staring at the good looking female snipers instructors. all in all, the school is regarded in the IDF as ‘the IDF’s Club Med only without the good food’. because of that, allot of times the solders who are sent to the course are solders with leg problems and other physical injuries, that are being send to the course in order to have few weeks to heal up.

The tests in the acceptance to the school are also a bad joke. the only test done is groups test with the solders own issue M16 (the future snipers are required to shoot three groups of five rounds each, at 25 meters and under five centimeters average for group). the test itself is regarded as MP- Must Pass. meaning even if the solder will do worst then five cm per group he will still be accepted. sometimes, when the school’s stuff is short on time, the test is not run at all. No physical tests are done (not even 20/20 eye sight test), no interview, nothing!

The IDF’s sniper school stuff simply knows that if it will flank someone on the tests, or during the course itself for that matter, it is not likely to receive another sniper to replace the one that flanked, so the student "mother" unit will be one sniper short. the attitude is basically ‘we prefer a bad sniper then no sniper at all’. as a result, unlike most snipers courses in the world, which are considered fiscally and mentally hard and only the best and the most fitted ones pass, in the IDF’s sniper course everyone are excepted and everyone pass. in fact in order to fail the sniper course the student should shoot someone else or do other severe damage. no one is flanked based on its pure sniper skills. basically if you are doing what you’re told, you will pass the sniper course even if you are the worst sniper in the world, and couldn’t heat a tank from 100 meters.

The biggest problem is that nobody really cares. most of units’ officers, team leaders and NCO are too busy getting their hands on cool toys like Oakley goggles, and black combat vests, and wasting energy on argue which unit is better, then to do something about the pathetic sniping state. even the sniper school’s stuff is just passing time until it can go home in the weekend. since most of the high brass don’t even know and don’t want know what a highly trained sniper is capable of, the entire ‘circus’ is going on undisturbed for dozens of years. so while in most countries the snipers are proud to carry their sniper insignia, given to them on completion of the course, almost none of the snipers in Israel do, not even the sniper school’s instructors themselves (expect for the female ones that were any insignia they could get their hands on). when most IDF’s solders think about snipers then think about someone whose just lying around all day, sun bating, when everybody else are running around doing real combat. with such bad reputation no wonder the snipers course rarely attract high quality personal.

The Mitkan Adam army base, and the IDF’s sniper school located in it, were always considered as the number one in the combat solders’ reassignments list, not so much for the ‘sex-appealing’ of sniping profession (which nobody cares about any way), but rather for the extremely good conditions. the Mitkan Adam is located in forest, in a center of Israel, only 30 minutes driving away from Tel-Aviv, which is very comfortable when you go home, the accommodation are build rather then tents like in many bases, the food is good, everybody gets M16 CAR15 (the carbine version of the M16A1), you are paid like a combat soldier, the base has allot of rookies (many SF units do their first stage of training, the infantry stage, in the Mitkan Adam) and courses personal to do all the chores for you (guard, kitchen, etc.), and a two very big bonus- you get home every weekend and dozens of good looking female instructors walking around in half civilian-half military clothing. while these reasons may sound juvenile to non-Israeli reader, one must remember that the IDF’s solders are mostly 18-21 years old, right out of high-school, and more or less with same interests as teenagers. the instructors can be roughly divided into two groups: male and female.

the female are all qualified infantry instructors, which got to the school after finishing their infantry instructors course, pass to a sniper course, a two weeks sniper instructors course and start teaching. the female instructors are all very highly motivated, high-quality personal. the problem is that unlike the popular (outside Israel) belief, the female instructors simply don’t know the first thing about being in the field, not to mention that their physical stamina is not a match to that of the infantry students, yet alone to that of the SF ones. while being excellent patient theory teachers, when it comes down to actual fieldcraft, the female instructors have the about same combat skills as kindergarten boys fighting each other. since the female instructors only experience with sniping is what they were subjected to in the sniper course, they can’t give the solders a sense of what it’s actually like to be a full fledge sniper in a combat situation. this by no mean says that the female instructors don’t do their best, since most of them do, and in most cases even more then the males, but they simply don’t have the necessary knowledge and experience to make good sniper instructors.

The students themselves knows that the female don’t know much more then they do, so they don’t really respect them. the luck of respect from the IDF itself is showed in the weapons given to the female sniper instructors- Israeli Military Industries (IMI) Uzi Sub Machine Gun (SMG). the female are issued the long, standard, version of the Uzi which no combat solders in the IDF carry or Use, and further then that- they only carry the weapons when they go home for the weekend. the male instructors, however, receive the M16 CAR15, like most other combat solders, and the weapon is attached to them always. the female instructors don’t even share guarding assignments with the male instructors (as duty sergeant). so basically all the politically correct sex equality, the IDF is so proud of, is remaining on paper.

In most snipers schools around the world the typical sniper instructor is an experienced sniper doing another tour as instructor. in the IDF, however, all male instructors are dropouts- from infantry units, SF units, and various command courses (mostly officers and NCO courses). some of these dropouts were snipers when they were still combat solders, but many didn’t, and only went through sniper training on the arrival to the school. most of this dropouts didn’t arrive to school because of a particular burning passion to the sniping profession but rather because of the good conditions the school has to offer. unlike the female instructors who arrive ‘fresh’ to the school, with only few months of service and full of motivation to show their stuff, most of the males arrive after at least one year in the service, some after very unpleasant situations like kicking out of their ‘mother’ unit, so their motivation is not exactly in flying colors and is mostly aimed in to getting home as much as possible and hitting it off with their fellow female colleagues. most of the instructors don’t really care if they teach sniping or something else as long as they enjoy Mitkan Adam good conditions. most of them don’t have any special respect or desire for the job, and the students sense it, and since they know all of the instructors are dropouts they don’t much respect them as well.

However, unlike the female, most of the male instructors have some kind of real field experience, if not in the sniping field then as a regular solders, and many (especially those who came from infantry units) USually also have some combat experience that they can contribute. the problem is that they are very few combinations of males that were both snipers in their prior service and are combat experienced in sniping.

Many say that this grim situation is again a result of the three years IDF’s mandatory service limit and the long period of the combat units training regime. meaning- no one will send a full qualified sniper, after finishing his training regime, to be an instructor in the school. but unlike the problem in the selection phase which is un-solvable, this problem could have been easily solved if the IDF would have recruit the sniper instructors in the same way it recruits its parachuting instructors- select them prior to their military service, attached them to a infantry brigade for 6.5 months of basic and advance infantry training, send them to sniper course and then let them do actual combat sniper deployment in South Lebanon for four months and then reassigned them back to the school. it’s not the ideal but this way the IDF can enjoyed both world- on the one hand combat experienced snipers, and on other hand instructors with over two years to teach, and high motivation.

Note: because of Operational Security (OPSEC) considerations, the actual contents and structure of the sniping course won’t be discussed in this article. however, both the contents and the structure are also full of problems and need much improvement.

For the same reasons no detailed information will be provided on unit 707’s CT/HRT sniper course. unit 707’s sniper course, however, run smoothly in most cases and is in reasonable level. the majority of problems are in the IDF’s sniper school which the basic of sniping.

When the IDF was founded in 1948, it was very short on financial resources. the only weapons he could afford were guns that were Used in World War 2 (WW2). because of its low budget, the IDF couldn’t afford to be picky so its first SWS was the Mauser K98 7.92 mm. ironically some of this weapons were originally belong to the Wermacht (the Nazi army) and were imported to Israel with the Nazi cross still on them. but the original German Mausers were a minority. the majority of the Mausers were actually Czechlovakian replicas.

The Mauser, that was equipped with X4 fixed scope, stayed as the main sniper rifle in the IDF until 1974. while being old fashion bolt rifle, the Mouser large, unusual caliber and its bolt mechanism made it a fairly accurate rifle. the Mouser was also an extremely reliable and easy to maintain. Because the Mauser was a bolt action rifle (with internal five rounds magazine) the snipers work back then was more or less the classic snipers work as we know it today.

Until 1967 (when the Arab-Israeli Six Day war broke) the IDF mainly purchased its weapons arsenal from Europe. after the Six Way war started, France, which was the IDF main weapons supplier, decided it would be better (for financial reasons mainly) to take side with Arab countries attacking Israel and lunched the "French weapons embargo" on Israel. the embargo meant that the IDF could no longer purchased new weapons from France, not to mention spare parts for its current arsenal.

Luckily for Israel the war was very short (as its name suggest) and resulted in a devastating Israeli victory. after the war ended, Israel immediately started looking for a new weapons supplier and a strategic airly. the Europe countries were all pro Arab- most of them were afraid to lose rich Arab clients if they sale to Israel and also the Arabs had a strong influence among the European leaders- so Israel turned to the US. in the US, Israel had allot of fellow Jewish in key position in politics, entertainment and economy forming a very effective and strong lobby, and a favorite public opinion that insured almost free access for all the latest in military technologies and state of the art hardware.

At the time, the US was also looking for someone to maintain its interest in the middle east, and Israel as the only democracy in the area was the natural candidate.

In 1973 the Israeli-Arab Yom Kippur war (a.k.a. the October war) broke. Israeli was taken by surprise and took heavy causalities in both manpower and equipment, so the US lunched a major airborne aid to Israel in order to assist it. among the many weapons, that arrived in the airborne aid, were dozens of thousands of American M14 7.62 mm and M16 5.56 mm assault rifles. most of the m14 were US’s armed forces surpluses, most of them thrown a way when the m16 was introduced. most of the m16, however, were brand new.

Even before the war started the IDF already made a descion to go along with the NATO fashion at the time and to change rifles caliber from 7.62 mm NATO the lighter 5.56 mm rounds.

The main rifle back then in the IDF was the FN FAL 7.62 mm, and the newly introduce IMI Galil Assault Rifle (AR) was in its last pre mass-production stages. so the IDF saw an opportunity to switch to a smaller caliber as well as to get rid of the European FN FAL. so while the m16 almost immediately entered into service in infantry and SF units and stayed their as the main assault rifle along side with the Galil AR until the early 90’s (when the M16’s carbine family- the M4 and CAR15 become the sole assault rifles in most field units), the m14 really didn’t fit the program and the natural thing to do was to simply through them a way. but with such a short budget thronging things a way is luxury the IDF can’t afford, so going along with American M21 (a modified m14 sniper version) project the IDF came out with the "bright" idea of transforming the m14 into a sniper rifle. the main problem was that the m14 were all second hand, some of them dating back even to the Korea war. most of the m14 were also heavily fired automatically (in the American infamous "spray and pray" method), so most of the M14’s barrels were baldly damaged. the IMI was chosen for the project. it tested all m14 and selected the best 10000, mainly according to their barrel status and other accurization standards . the rest of the m14 were taken down as spare parts.

The m14 were modified with the El-Op 6x40 Nimrod scope, Harris bi-pod, an adjustable chick piece, a rubber stock cover and were issued to all snipers to replace the Mouser 98.

When the IDF start using the m14 it needed a high-quality sniper 7.62 ammunition, so the IMI began producing the sierra M852 168 gr. round. this ammo is still used to this very day in all Israeli 7.62 mm sniper rifles. for few years now, the IDF want to switch the m852 to the American m118 round. the m118 is a heavier round and therefore bring up the sniper rifle maximum range. however do to budgetary cut the IMI can’t afford to buy the new machines needed to produce the m118, and it also put allot of political pressure so that the IDF wouldn’t buy the m118 directly from the US. so for the time being the IDF is reaming with the m852.

The modified m14 stayed as the main SWS until 1997 when the American M24 was introduced. currently the m24 is the standard SWS for open field combat shooting. most of the m14 were sold the third world countries and some remained in the IDF’s reserve forces. The M24 is equipped with a fixed x10 f Leupold M3 scope.

Many think that the fact that the IDF switched from the semi-auto m14 to the bolt action m24 is the result of some IDF decision to upgrade its snipers capability and turned them into ‘real snipers’ with ‘real’ bolt action SWS. unfortunately this theory give the IDF credit it doesn’t deserve. while the IDF is one of the most combat capable, motivated armed force in the world and definitely the most experienced one, the IDF is also the less organized one. in fact, the IDF, although relatively small, is less organized then a boy-scout camp, especially when it comes down to it vast SF ‘autonomous’ community.

The real story beyond the switch between the m14 to m24 is that in the early 90’s when the IDF realize that IMI Galil Sniper Rifle (a 7.62 mm sniper version of the Galil AR, a.k.a. GSR, GALATZ) is no more an option to replace the m14 (because of its high price and low performance), it started looking out for SWS abroad.

The IDF wanted a semi-auto SWS with close capabilities to a bolt action SWS, so it can enjoyed both worlds- the superior accuracy of the bolt action SWS and the high fire-power of the semi auto SWS.

The IDF’s sniper school tested several SWS and came out with three final candidates: the German made Walter WA2000 and the Heckler and Koch (HK) PSG1, and the American SR25. the HK PSG1 and the WA2000 were both outstanding sniper rifles (especially compare to other semi auto rifles) but they had two main problems:

Note: even if the few German sniper rifles, used today in the IDF, such as the mouser SR82 and HK PSG1, were all both via third world countries with which the IDF is involved (mainly south Africa, a long time customer for Israeli weapons). however, the 9 mm Sig Souer handguns common in the IDF were all both directly from the company (especially since Sig Souer had a factory in the US so the IDF can used the US-Israeli military aid to buy them).

Finally, the IDF’s sniper school recommended the SR25 only to found out that in the mean while the IDF’s Land Corps Command (MAFHACH) conduct it own experiment (without prior sniping experience), got a really good deal on the m24 (that were very cheap since they were already starting to be mass produced in the US army), and placed an order in advance.

Another theory is that until 1997 (the reintroduction of bolt action sniper rifle in the IDF) the IDF utilize its sniper in a ‘designated marksman’ role- meaning that the sniper is basically just another solder only equipped with longer range rifle, scope and a bi-pod and will help the advancing infantry force with short-medium range fire support- rather then a ‘silent professional’ lurking hundreds meters way for a target to pass his cross-hair. acutely this theory is only partly correct, the IDF’s snipers training before and after 1997 is the same. but since the IDF’s snipers couldn’t hit targets in long ranges they were employed as the equal of the western designated marksman.

Today the IDF is moving towards complete separation of the two roles. the snipers are beginning to move from the platoon level to the company and even to battalion level, and are reorganized in ‘all sniper’ squads, plus the IDF had formed an officially designated marksman role.

The need for designated marksman rise up in 1997 when the snipers receive the bolt action m24 and could no longer give high-speed fire support to the moving force. today the designated marksman are very popular in all units. they are equipped with ‘long’ M16A2 with ARMS slide (allow to locate and relocate rifle mounted accessories without loosing rezoning), ACOG 4x32 day scope and a Harris bi-pod, and are supposed to engage targets up to 500 meters, while the snipers are suppose to engage targets up to 800 meters.

The previous mentioned SWS (Mouser 98, m14 and m24) were the most common SWS in the Israeli SF community, how ever over the years the IDF introduced more SWS for special needs, like for CT and HRT scenarios and for easier concealment.

The Sirkis M36 SWS is the Israeli bullpup version of the M14. Due to its unique bullpup design the rifle is very short (even shorter than a regular M16). Because of financial and technical problems the M36 was never mass produced, but the ones that did are excellent both for concealment and close range shooting. The Sirkis also have very strong firepower due to its M14’s 20 rounds magazine.

The Sirkis M36 was presented in 1986 and was operational ready in 1987. Its small size made it an ideal weapon for concealment, so it was mainly issued for units who spend most of their time in civilian clothing, Hence Mistaravim type units. At the time there were four such units:

at the beginning the Sirkis (as well as the m14 and the GSR) was equipped with the Nimrod 6x40 scope (produced in Israel by El-Op). In the early 90’s most of the Nimrod scopes were chanced to the Svarovski 6x40 scopes. In 1994, all the old Nimrod and Svarovski scopes were changed to the new Svarovski model Futonick 6x42 scope (this applies to the GSR, the M14 and the M36).

The GSR was built in the mid 80’s by the IMI and was suppose to replace the m14. but the GSR was too expensive, and further more it wasn’t a big leap forward comparing to the m14 so the GSR was never mass produced.

Unit Yamam , the Israeli elite domestic CT/HRT unit always had a special place for the GSR. Mainly due to the fact, that they had very good connections with the IMI- the manufacture of the GSR. Due to that special relationship, the Yamam was able to hand pick the best GSR out of the ones that were produced. Also, the Yamam’s rich budget allowed them to much improve and modify the GSR to their needs (much like the US. Navy SEALs and XM25, the highly modified version of the M21). As a SWS the GSR has all the advantages and the disadvantages of its "father"- the IMI Galil AR 5.56 mm. On the one hand it has superior dust and send reliability and can stand almost any kind of field handling as well as non stop shooting of most types of 7.62 mm ammunition (even ammunition which originally came from 7.62 mm machine guns). like the Galil AR the GSR also have a folded stock making the weapon very easy for concealment carrying. On the other hand, it has a rather low accuracy, especially compare to the modern western/NATO standards. it low accuracy made the GSR unfit for CQB, CT and HRT scenarios (involving close range pin-point sniping). Another disadvantage of the Galil, the high weight , becomes a natural advantage in the sniper version.

Although it wasn’t a very accurate rifle the GSR was considered as a very ‘cool toy’ and was very popular among the Israeli SF community in the late 80’s and in the 90’s. regardless of its low accuracy, the SF snipers used the GSR to everything from CT scenarios to long range sniping. unfortunately more then this say something about the capabilities GSR as a sniper rifle, it reflect on the low level of the Israeli snipers.

The GSR is still used, in diminishing numbers, by most of the SF units for open field combat. The reason is that within 600 meter range, the GSR’s semi-auto, high fire-power capability (the GSR has 20 round magazine), makes it an ideal weapon for accurate fire support in close-medium range engagements, especially compared to the m24 bolt action rifles. in fact, now that the m24 replace the m14, the GSR had witnessed a small resurrection. they were pulled out of storage and become a very wanted item functioning in many SF units in the role of a designated marksman rifle.

Unlike the M36, the Galil 7.62 mm is still produced (both in the regular version and in the sniper version). It’s sold mainly to Africa, and it’s a well-known fact, that the GSR is one of the most popular weapons among the South Africa’s SF units.

note: the Yamam unit is the only civilian unit that use the GSR. this is because the Yamam is the only civilian unit that engage in long ranges and therefor need a fire support rifle. unlike most SWAT type units around the world the Yamam is more a paramilitary elite SF unit. the Yamam conduct dozens of highly classified missions in the South-Lebanon front, most of those missions are assignations for the Israeli General Domestic Security Service (SHABACH). all other civilian SF units only operate in short rangers (CT/HRT/CQB scenarios) and there for can settled for bolt action rifles alone, the Yamam, however, which is employed in all possible ranges also needed an semi-auto rifle for fire suppression, hence the Yamam special attitude thourds the GSR. the Yamam’s snipers are also considered to be the best in Israel.

The 86SR is the Israeli SF community standard rifle for CT/HRT/CQB scenarios. the 86SR replaced in 1996 the old Mouser 66SP that was in service. As result of the massive purchase of the 86SR in 1996-1998, most of the M36 and GSR’s were put out of service.

The CT/HRT teams are made of three sections: entry section, climbing and fast roping section and snipers section.

The Snipers Section consists of eight members. four snipers (known as "Snipers 1") and four targets Spotters (known as "Snipers 2") - one for each sniper 1.

In short/medium range scenarios three Snipers 1 will carry the Mouser SR82 Sniper SWS.

In long range scenarios, three Snipers 1 will carry the IDF’s standard issue long range (open field infantry style combat) SWS- the American M24 7.62 mm. the M24 SWS can also be easily switched to fire .300 win. mag. ammunition (ammo) and there for bringing up the SWS maximum effective range to up to 1000 meters, but since the Israeli sniper is rarely capable of shooting behind 800 meters this switch is rarely being done.

Some units, however, tend to use more exotic firearms like the semi-auto HK PSG1 SWS. This superb and very expensive weapon (close to $10000) is only used by the Takeover units (this is due to budget problems).

Engagement units however often use (in long range scenarios) the American Robar SR60 .300 Win. Magnum outfitted with custom Macmillan fiberglass stock.

The fourth Sniper 1 always carry the Barrett Model 82A1 .50 BMG light fifty SWS, in both short-medium and in long range sniping scenarios. In theory, the Barrett should be used for extreme long range shooting (over 1000 meters) as well as for HTI missions In practice, the Barrett is one of the worst sniper rifles around, especially since the IDF can’t afford the very expensive .50 match ammo, and use the Barrett with standard armor piercing .50 ammo. so the Barrett is mainly used for HTI shooting.

The Snipers 2 (the spotters) carry the M4 with the Israeli CT/HRT kit, but instead of Trijicon ACOG 4X32 day sight they have a weapon mounted laser range finder device attached to the M4 weapons slide.