I continuously offe my salutations to Lord Narayana who is absolute free from blemishes, who possesses infinite auspicious attributes, who is distinct and superior to Ksara, i.e. Jivas and Jadas, Akshara i.e godess Laksmi, and who is chiefly conveyed by the sacred scriptures.
I shall establish the doctrine conveyed by the adjectives given to Narayana in the above benedictory verse by quoting the authorities from the scripture and the arguments not contradictory to the scripture for the comprehension of the deserving persons in the order in which these adjectives are mentioned above.
Rigveda, Yajurveda, Samaveda and Atharvaveda, Mahabharatha, the entire Pancharatra, Original Ramayana, the Puranas that are not contrary to these and all such works that follow these are the sacred scripture. The other texts that are opposed to these and indifferent to the tenets in these, are perverted texts. These do not help to know Narayana.
Narayana could be known by his sacred scripture by those who are continuously engaged in the study of these, who are devoted to Narayana, and who have the firm faith in him.
Narayana cannot be comprehended by mere speculation or sense-perception or any other such means. He can be comprehended by the sacred scripture only and by the devoted persons only. Not in any other way.
“He who does not know the Veda etc., sacred scripture will not be able to comprehend the Supreme God who possesses infinite attributes and who is omniscient. The Veda teaches the Supreme God to enable the seeker to obtain the liberation” – thus states the Taittiriya Sruti.
“The Knowledge of the Supreme God cannot be obtained by logic nor it can be removed by the logic if already obtained. The knowledge of the Supreme God imparted by a competent teacher will lead to the vision of the God.” – thus states the Kathaka Sruti.
“Not the senses, nor the inferences help one to comprehend the God. Vedas alone enable to comprehend him” – thus states Pippalada Sruti.
These statements cannot be treated as not authoritative. The Vedas are not the compositions of any individual. “Itihasa and Purana” are the fifth Veda among the Vedas. These are in agreement with the Vedas.
It cannot be contended that there can be no statement which is not composed by a person. Because, if a statement that is not made by any individual is not accepted, that is to say, if impersonal verbal authority is not accepted, then Dharma, Adharma etc., ethical and religious tenets, that are beyond sense perception will go without a source of authority to convey them. However, these tenets i.e., Dharma, Adharma etc, that are beyond sense perception are accepted by all religious and philosophical thinkers.
One who does not accept Dharma, Adharma etc., is not a religious and philosophical thinker at all. Because, such a thinker’s philosophy will go without a subject and a purpose. He cannot claim that teaching the absence of Dharma, Adharma etc., itself is his subject, because, such a teaching will not foster people’s welfare. On the contrary, if people come to believe that there is no Dharma, Adharma etc., to regulate them, they will become more and more aggressive. This will result in a calamity to the people.
Further, nothing is gained by a philosopher who teaches the absence of Dharma, Adharma etc. He does not believe in the results beyond the world of sense perception. Therefore, a philosopher who claims to teach the absense of Dharma, Adharma etc,, has to tactly accept the purposelessness of his teaching and therefore, he is not a philosopher at all.
Dharma, Adharma etc., tenets that are beyond sense perception cannot be comprahended through the statements or compositions made by individual persons. There is a possibility of ignorance and deception on the part of such persons.
To envisage an omniscient person to avoid the contingency of ignorance and deception will not be proper. Because, such envisaging will involve the envisaging of an omniscient person, his being free from the drawbacks of ignorance, and deception, and envisaging that he composed the work considered as authority. This amounts to postulating too many things, not observed elsewhere.
On the other hand if a revealed scripture is considered as the source of Dharma, Adharma etc., nothing beyond this needs to be postulated.
The fact that the Vedas are revealed and not composed by any individual is self evident since the Vedas are known to be without any author by a long tradition. Inspite of such a long tradition if an author is postulated, then, it would be a superfluous postulation. In view of this, if any author is not postulated, then impersonal nature of the Vedas is a foregone conclusion.
It cannot be contended that Vedic statement also have an aothor, like any other statement, because there is no tradition of authorlessness in case of other statements.
Similarly, no one can claim a statement to be a Vedic statement in the absence of such a long tradition.
On the other hand the statements that are revealed to those to whom these spontaneously reveal themselves cannot be considered as non-Vedic, because, these do have the features of the Vedic statements known by the long tradition. These portions do possess the attributes that are stated to be the attributes of Vedic seers.
Brahmanda Purana states: Those hymns are Vedas that are intuitively seen as Vedas by those who possess not less than twenty attributes of an ideal person, who are engaged in penance, and who know many hymns of the Vedas.
The validity of cognition is self evident. If its validity is to be confirmed by another cognition, then, a third cognition will be needed to confirm the validity of the second cognition and so on. This leads to infinite regress. The reason given earlier to point out the authoritative ness of the Vedas were not intended to establish the validity of the knowledge derived from the Vedas. But these were intended to remove certain faults of thinking. For those whose thinking is free from the faults, the validity of cognition is self-evident.
The contention that a cognition needs another cognition to confirm its validity only when there is such a need, is not a normal requirement. Therefore, that there is no infinite regress is not correct. For, this very need is an indication of a faulty thinking. Such doubts arise only to locate the invalidity of cognition and it is invalidity that is not self-evident but needs scrutiny. So far as validity of a cognition is concerned it is self evident.
The contention that the Varnas i.e. letters are created when they are pronounced (and perish soon after ) is not correct. Because, a Varna i.e letter is recognized as the same that was heard on an earlier occasion. To consider Varnas as created will be contrary to such recognition.
It cannot also be contended that the so called recognition is a mistaken notion due to similarity. Because in this case even the well known instance of a recognition viz. “He is the same Devadatta “ may have to be treated as a mistaken notion but not an instance of recognition.
Even the Buddhist who claim everything to be momentary cannot dismiss the recognition of Dik i.e Akasa as an illusion. Because, they have accepted Dik i.e. Akasa as permanent. This is because, according to them Akasa is different from the five Skandas (which only are momentary).
The contention of some Buddhists who claim even Diks i.e. different quarters of Sky as illusory is also not correct, because, in that case even Vijnana and Sunya may have to be treated as illusory.
The contention that the quarters East, West etc are envisaged on the basis of sunrise etc., is also not correct, because, even in darkness one comprehends the quarters east, West etc. An occasional confusion in respect of East, West etc, only is removed by a reference to sunrise etc. Such a confusion can be pointed out even in respect of Vijnana and Sunya also as these very concepts are opposed by others. Thus, the quarter of Akasa are permanent (Therefore, the possibility of recognition has to be accepted in respect of these and hence the possibility of recognition in respect of Varnas cannot be questioned.).
Therefore, the eternality of Varnas and consequently of Vedas is established. The Vedic sentences are recognized as the same sentences all along.
Anumana, Pauruseya etc. are not the source of knowledge of Dharma, Adharma etc., with out the support of Vedas. Dharma, Adharma etc. are not comprehended by Anumana, human made sentences etc. These are comprehended only by not human made Vedas. Therefore, all have to accept non-human made scripture.
The validity of Vedas and the validity of the knowledge obtained from it does not depend upon any external cause. It is self-evident.
On the other hand the invalidity of erroneous knowledge is due to external causes such as defective sense organs etc. Such a position has to be accepted, otherwise, defective sense organs and defective inferences etc., would not be the grounds for invalid knowledge. Not accepting them as the grounds for invalid knowledge is against the experience.
A Sruti passage says: “O sage Virupa ! praise the Supreme God by the eternal speech i.e. Vedas.
Another Sruti passage states : I Pray the Brahman who is the highest object to be obtained by the liberated, both by the eternal and non-eternal speech.”
Paingi Sruti states: “Sruti i.e, Veda is eternal. Smriti and other scriptural literature in non-eternal. Smriti and other scriptural literature in non-eternal.
Katyayana Sruti states: “Brahman is the highest object to be known. Sruti is the highest means to know the Bnrahman. This Sruti is beginning less and eternal. Brahman is also so. He cannot be comprehended without Sruti”.
Infinite are his glories. Each glory is infinite. The extent of Vedas is same as that of Brahman in respect of space and time. Who the wise knows the full import of the Vedas and who can give an exposition of Veda understanding its full import ?
The entire Veda consisting of Vidhi, Arthavada, Samkalpa, Prarthana etc., is eternal and always of the same form. It is present in the mind of the Supreme God always in the same form. At the commencement of each creation the Vedas are uttered by the Supreme God in the same order, with the same letters, and with the same accent without any change. The Vedas are only heard by all and therefore are designated as Sruti. These are partly revealed to the seers who had heard them in the previous births, by the grace of the Supreme God. These are seen by the Supreme God and heard by others. Therefore, these are designated as Sruti and described as seen by the ancients.
The mention of these, sometimes, as created should be taken in the sense of manifested, as in the case of a soul.
Puranas that are intended to explain the import of the Vedas are only changed by the changes in words, sequence etc., at the commencement of each creation. Therefore these are non-eternal. However, their import will be same as in the previous creation.
The Sruti passages that mention the creation of Vedas, state it from the point of view of their manifestation. This may also be taken from the point of view of the secondary abhimana deities. The non-eternality of Vedas is not at all intended by these passages. There is no question of non-eternality of Vedas that are undoubtedly eternal. This is stated in Brahmanada Purana.
If Vedas were not eternal, then, the use of special words Sruti, Veda etc, would not have been justified.
These are called Vedas, because, these are always present; called Sruti, because, these are heard by all, and called Amnaya, because, these are ever present in God’s mind in the same way. This is stated in Varaha Purana.
But for the eternality of Vedas, the reference to them as seen would not have been justified.
It is not justified to say that the letters, the Vedic words and Vedic sentences are not eternal. Because, this are always present in God’s mind and the God is omniscient.
It is also not justified to say that it is only the impressions of these that are present as in the case of Jar etc., objects present in the mind. Because, this will go against the fact that there is a recognition of these. This is already stated.
The non-eternality of Puranas also is in the sense that their wordings are changed in each creation.
Therefore, the letters that are manifested in the sound that is an attribute of Akasha, the Vedas that are the sequencial arrangement of these are eternal.
It is not correct to argue that the Vedas are not the valid source for the knowledge of the Supreme God since no sentence can convey an object that is just there. It is observed that the objects mutually related are conveyed by the sentences.
One knows the meaning of the expressions “the mother”, “the father” etc., when these are used with reference to the persons concerned introducing them by pointing out to them by extending fingers etc.
He who insists that the sentences communicate only such entities that are related with the activity has to realize that the so called activity is not related with any further activity but still it is communicated by the sentence. If it is contended that an activity need not be related to any other activity for being communicated, it is in the case of other entities that they have to be related with some or other activity for being communicated, then two standards are set for the communication by the sentences, and this is accepting something more than needed.
Sentences such as “She is your mother”, “He is your father”, “You are beautiful” do convey the entities that are not related to any activity but that are just there. It is the experience of all that these sentences validily convey these objects.
A sentence has no other purpose than conveying its meaning. This is done in case of communicating the entities that are just there.
A person proceeds to do something when he knows that it is desirable to him and witdraws from something when he knows that it is undesirable to him. Therefore, all sentences communicate siddha only.
It is acceptable by all schools of thought that grammar, etymology etc., communicate facts only without relation to any activity. If these branches of knowledge are not accepted as communicating, then, verbal communication itself becomes impossible. This is stated in Naradiya purana.
The Vedas and the other sacred literature convey the supreme God Narayana who is omniscient, creator of all, free from the defects and inadequancies, and Supreme. Veda, Itihasa purana and other scriptures convey him. The other things i.e. Dharma etc., are conveyed only to enable us to understand his glory.
The convention that the Vedas convey the identity between the Jivas and Brahman is not tenable, because, there are no Pramanas to support this contention.
Further the contention that the difference between the Jivas and the Brahman is already known by Pratyaksha and Anumana, and therefore the Sruti passages only re-state what is already known and hence are not Pramana is also not tenable, because, one of the parties to the difference viz., Brahman cannot be known by Pratyaksha or Anumana. Hence the Sruti passages that convey the difference are not mere restatements of what is already known. Hence, these are Pramanas.
The contention that Ishvara can be known by inference is also no tenable, because the absence of God also can be proved by inference.
The syllogism ‘the products earth, trees etc., that have no known producer have a producer i.e, Agent because, these are products can be countered by a counter syllogism ;the products earth, trees etc., do not have a producer, i.e, an agent, because, the producer as envisaged by you is not acceptable to us.
If, for the second syllogism “akaryatva” is stated to be ‘Upadi’ i.e, a conditioning factor, then we say that ‘Sarirajanyatva’ is Upadhi for the first syllogism.
If the difference is established by Pratyaksha and Anumana, then, the Sruti that is supposed to convey abheda will be Apramana. Consequently, if Abheda Sruti is Apramana because it is opposed to Pratyaksha and Anumana, then, there is no question of Bhedasruti being treated only a anuvada or re-statement. A stronger pramana will not be Anuvada; it will strengthen what is already conveyed by durbala Pramana.
Though normally sruti is superior to Pratyaksha and Anumana, when these are Upajivya the Sruti is not Pramana as against these. Because, these Upajivya Pramanas provide the subject matter for Upajivaka Pramana i.e, Sruti.
Even for advaitin the subject matter of Abhada Sruti viz, Jiva and Ishvara are provided by the Pratyaksha and anumana. While arguing for anuvaditva of Bheda Sruti Advaitin stated that Ishvara is known by Anumana and Jiva is known by Pratyaksha. Hence, if abheda is opposed to these Pramanas, then abheda Sruti cannot be Pramana. As regards the Bheda between Isvara known through Anumana and Jiva known through Pratyaksha, the very experience conveys the difference since every one knows that Jiva is not Sarvakarta.
Agama that is in conflict with the experience of Saksin cannot be considered as Pramana. In that case even the experience of Agamapramana may have to be treated as Apramana.
Further, there being many Pramanas in a given case affirms its validity. When many mention the same thing and it is also confirmed by observation, it results in the affirmation of its validity.
When there is no dispute in respect of the contention made, then only, mentioning of second and further Pramanas results in anuvada i.e., re-statement. In the present case, the abhedavadins oppose bheda and therefore, there is a need to affirm Bhedapramanya by Sruti.
When something is opposed to many Pramanas, then it is Apramana. This is observed in the case of Suktirajata.
The contention that ‘Suktirajata is Apramana, not because, it is opposed to many Pramanas but because, it is defective’ is not correct, because, whetever is opposed to many Pramanas that is bound to be defective. In fact, the fact of its being defective is detected by the opposition of many Pramanas.
The senses eye, ear etc., free from the defects constitute Pratyaksha, Tarka i.e Anumana free from the fallacies is inference, the statements free from the defects are Agama. The Skshijnana is called Anubhava. The defects are detected by the Superior Pramanas. The auperiority of Pramanas is on two grounds viz.
Between these two criteria that which is superior by its very nature has to be preferred to that of the support of many Pramanas, Upajivyatva etc., constitute the grounds for the superior nature of a Pramana.
Conveying the objects as they are, constitutes Pramanya of Pramanas. This is primarily done by the knowledge. The knowledge is of two types viz.
Between these two experience is superior.
Pratyaksha, Anumana and Agama constitute Anu-Pramana. Among Pratyaksha, Anumana and Agama, the Agama is normally superior. However, when Agama is in conflict with Upajivya Prtyaksha etc., then Upajivya is superior.
This Pararthanumana is stated to consist of Prtijna etc., three or more avayavas. However, these are superfluous, since Upapatti i.e, the presentation of Hetu that has Vyapti is the chief requirement and the statements of Pratijna, Hetu etc., are only intended to present the Hetu that has Vyapti to the mind of the person who has to infer. Without reminding the presence of Hetu that has Vyapti, the mere Pratijna etc., statements will not help him. Depending upon the need of the person any one of these avayavas can remind him of the presence of Hetu that has Vyapti. Therefore to insist on three or more avayavas is superfluous.
Presentation of Hetu that has Vyapti constitute the chief element in the process of reasoning to infer. This can be brought about by the statement of Pratijna alone, Hetu with distant alone, Upanaya or Nigamana alone.
From experience it is clear that any one or two or three of these can lead to the reasoning necessary to the inference depending upon the need of the person who is to be enabled to infer.
Virodha i.e, syntactical incongruity, Adhikya i.e, extra words, Nyunata i.e, incompleteness, Asangati i.e, absence of reciprocity, these are the defects of reasoning. Virodha i.e, incongruity is of two types viz.
These defects along with Samvada i.e acceptance of the disputed point, and Anukti i.e, keeping mum, constitute nigrahasthanas.
Arthapatti is presumed something to justify what is already known but needs justification.
Comprehension of similarity in something that was seen before by now seeing a similar objects is Upamana.
Abhava is comprehended in two ways.
Arthapatti and Upamana are varieties of Anumana.
Agama is of two types : Nitya i.e, eternal and Anitya i.e, created.
Pratyaksha is of three types viz, Isvara Pratyaksha, Yogi Pratyaksha and Ayogi Pratyaksha. All these three arise by senses. The senses of Vishnu and Lakshmi are eternal, of the nature of consciousness, and part of their very nature. The senses of others are of two types viz.,
The later are of three kinds: Daiva, Asura and Madhya.
Since the Aksa i.e, senses move towards the objects the knowledge obtained by them is called Pratyaksha. The senses of God are Aksa in the primary sense since these never perish. In the case of others as their senses develop through ego at the commencement of creation and subside again during destruction, these are Aksa only in secondary sense.
Sambhava is also a form of reasoning. Therefore, it is not a separate Pramana. Anumana establishes things when duly supported by Pratyaksha and Agama. In other cases, there is no certainty about its conclusions. This is all stated in Brahmatarka.
Now, the Pramanas that convey Bheda are Uipajivya and therefore, are superior. Therefore, it is proper to take even the so called Abhada Sruti as conveying Bhada only. If Bheda is not conveyed by Pratyaksha which is Upajivya Pramana here, then, how can Bhada sruti be considered as anuvada, and if bheda is conveyed by Prtyaksha, then, how can Abheda Sruti remain without being repudiated?
Unless the subject under reference is already conveyed by some other Pramana earlier, the later Pramana will not be anuvada. If it is contended that the earlier Pramana i.e, Pratyaksha is inferior, then, later Pramana i.e, bheda Sruti willnot be anuvada at all. Therefore, bheda Srutis are superior.
In case the statements that are in conflict with all other Pramanas are considered as authoritative and superior then, the purport of the statements such as ‘Idam agre naiva kinchana asit’ etc. (There was nothing at the commencement of the creation. It was all sunya. Therefore the Sunya is the cause of the world etc.) has to be taken as authoritative and as the purport of the entire scripture, without any scrutiny, on the ground that it has apurvata since it is opposed to all other Pramanas.
It cannot be argued that such a purport is opposed to reason and therefore cannot be taken as authoritative, because, in the openion of those who consider the opposition of other Pramanas as the ground of apurvata, the opposition of reason will be a merit. In case the purport of the statements such as ‘Idam vaagre naiva kinchana etc., is considered as supported by reason, then, it will be anuvada.
The correct position is, whatever is supported by other Pramanas that cannot be denied. If it is contended that Bheda is not supported by Pratyaksha and Anumana, then, Bheda sruti will not be Anuvada and will validly convey Bheda. In either case Bheda Sruti are authoritative and superior.
It is not correct to say that when there are many Pramanas in a matter the second and later Pramanas are not authoritative as these merely restate what is already conveyed. It is observed that when there are many Pramanas in a matter , there is affirmation of it. If such a position is not accepted, then, Abhyasa etc, will not determine the authoritativeness. All have accepted the fact that Abhyasa determines the Purport.
In case Abhyasa is not accepted as a determinative of purport by the Advaitin, then, the abhyasa i.e, repetition of ‘Tatvamasi’ nine times will have to be considered as mere anuvada i.e, restatement but not as an authority in respect of Abheda.
