THE DVAITA TRADITION OF MADHWA

-by

Prof. D. Prahladachar.

Vice-Chancellor,

Rashtriya Sanskrit Vidyapeetha. {Deemed University}.

Tirupati. INDIA.

Most of the historians tracing the history of the Indian Philosophical systems, tend to ignore the Dvaita Vedanta School of Philosophy as a minor event, by holding that the contribution of this school to the Indian Philosophical thought, is either nil or very much negligible. Apparently, this tendency seems to be justifiable also. For, the main tenets of this system such as the supremacy of the Lord Vishnu, difference between the God and the Universe comprising both cit and acit, Reality of the Universe etc., were already propounded by the Visistadvaita school and other philosophical systems and thus there seems to be no novelty in those concepts. The stress laid by this system, on the path of Bhakti as the only means of salvation, and the glorification of the personal God-Vishnu, also create an impression that the main thrust of this school, is in the area theology and religion rather than in the realm of philosophy. In addition to these, a student of philosophy who tries to search the answers for his inquisitions in the original texts of Madhwa will have to face the irritating brevity in the expressions and also the absence of linguistic charisma which is abundantly found in the texts of other philosophical schools. The present paper makes an attempt to answer some of these allegations. As is well known the philosophical schools of this country, are broadly divided into two groups. One group consists of such schools which uphold idealism and the other consists of those that support realism. While the Buddhist school of philosophy particularly, the Vijnanavada school and the Advaita school uphold idealism, the other schools such as Jaina, Sankhya, Nyaya-Vaisesika, Purva Mimamsa, the Visistadvaita and the Dvaita schools uphold the theory of realism. Thus it may be noted that the concept of either idealism or realism, is not exclusive to any school of philosophy, but is shared by many other schools. The Indian tradition does not accept even the view that one school is the earlier one and the other are later schools and are influenced and have borrowed the ideas from the earlier one. Accordingly, all the schools of philosophy, are beginningless, but in the manner of a stream. In the stream of eternal time, sometime, a philosophical system becomes more popular and after sometime it disappears but only to appear once again and to become popular. Thus, there is no total disappearance of any philosophical school, as such. Thus in the Indian context, no school of philosophy can claim that it is the sole originator of the philosophical concepts that it attempts to uphold. However, its contribution lies in the fact as to how much it has improved upon those concepts that already exist and what are the new arguments and additional sources that it puts forward to support those concepts. With this back ground, I would like to discuss here some Dvaita concepts by presenting which in an ingenuous way the Dvaita Vedanta advocated by Madhwa, has made a significant contribution to Indial philosophical thought.

THE CONCEPT OF BRAHMAN

As is well known, the main difference between the Advaita view of the Brahman and the Dvaita view of the same, is that as per the Advaita view the Brahman is devoid of any attribute whereas the Dvaita School considers the Brahman as Savisesa - the abode of infinite auspicious qualities. But, at the same time, the Dvaita school also holds that the Brahman is akhanda i.e. "an entirely self-contained, single transcendent susbtance having no trace of an 'other' in its being." It means that though the Brahman being the antaryamin - the inner controller of all the infinite sentient and non-sentient beings, has infinite forms, infinite qualifies and infinite actions in him, they are not considered as different from the Brahman and they do not have any difference even among themselves. This complete absence of internal distinction - svagatabheda, in Brahman, is conveyed by the famous upanishidic statement - 'Ekam eva advitiyam Brahma'. Another well known upanishidic sentence - 'neha nanasti kincana' which the Advaita School quotes to establish the unreality of the world, is also interpreted by Madhwa as conveying the same 'Svagata bheda vivarjitatva' - iha - in this Brahman, nana kincana nasti - there is nothing different from Him. Thus, Madhwa - even having admitted the savisesatva of the Brahman, maintains that His akhandatva i.e. indivisibility is in tact. Thus, while according to Sankara, Brahman is akhanda but Gunasunya, according to Madhwan, Brahman is akhanda and at the same time Gunapurna also. It is generally believed that both Ramanuja and Madhwa considering the Lord Vishnu as the supreme being and savisesa in the sense that He is the locus of infinite virtues, hold absolutely identical view about the nature of ParaBrahman. But, actually this identity is just apparent. For, from Ramanuja's point of view, the Brahman is not akhanda in the sense in which Madhwa holds Him as akhanda. As already said, Madhwa's Brahman is akanda in the sense - 'Svagatabheda vivarjita', while Ramanuja's Brahman is 'Svagatabheda - sahita' for, he holds that the Brahman and his infinite qualities, actions etc., are mutually different. Further, while Ramanuja holds the view that the bliss of the Brahman and that of the liberated souls, are absolutely equal, Madhwa is of the view that they are not so. In other words, Madhwa is of of the view that equality with the Brahman, in whatsoever manner, will come on the way of His absolute supremacy. Thus, while Ramanuja's Brahman is Gunapura but not akhanda, Madhwa's Brahman is both Gunapurna and Akhanda.

Although thus Madhwa's concept of Para Brahman is quite different from that of both Sankara and Ramanuja, the question will remain as to how far Madhwa could succeed in defending his concept of Brahman. The pertinent question that arises here is as to how to explain the difference between the nirvisesa Brahman of Sankara and the savisesa Brahman of Madhwa. For, though Sankara maintains that paraBrahman is devoid of any attribute, he does not reject the view that the Brahman is identical with the qualities such as jnana and ananda. Following the Srutis such as 'satyam jnanam anantam Brahma' and 'anando Bramheti vyajanat' etc., he admits that the Brahman is the very nature of jnana, ananda etc. It may be contended that as per the Sankara the Brahman is not the locus of the qualities, whereas according to Madhwa He is the locus of them and this makes the difference. But, how could the Brahman be both identical with the qualities and also the locus of the same. For, as is obvious, one can be the locus of something when one is different from it. Thus, the Dvaita position that Brahman is both identical with and locus of the attributes, seems to be quite illogical.

Madhwa's reply to these questions can be said as being as ingenuous as it is logical. Positing an entity called visesa, he explains that there are three types of identity. The first is that which exists without visesa and it is called nirvisesa-abheda. The second type of abheda co-exists with visesa and is appropriately called savisesa-abheda. There is also another kind of abheda that co-exists with bheda and is naturally called bhedabheda. Visesa so conceived by Madhwa can be described as "a distinct thought category or outological principle that is entirely self sufficient and wholly self-determined and self-determining". Accordingly, visesa is such an entity that it acts as the representative of bheda where bheda is absent. Because of visesa only the words signifying one and the same thing, can remain as non-synonyms. For instance, in the upanishiadic sentence 'satyan jnanam anantam Brahma" all the words are agreed as signifying the same Brahman. Normally, the words signifying the same thing are known as synonyms. The words such as ghata and kalasa are the examples. But, the words such as 'satya', 'jnana' and 'ananta' though are admitted as denoting the same Brahman, are also considered as n-synonyms. Madhwa is of the view that it is the visesa which is also described as 'a peculiar capacity of the thing - 'Samarthya visesa, which does the job of difference, in the absence of difference This visesa which exists in all the things, is also present in the Brahman, and takes care of the 'bheda vyavahara' between the Brahman and His infinite forms, qualities and actions, although there is no difference between them. Thus, when we describe the Brahman as the locus of infinite attributes - This usage indicating the relation of adhara and adheya i.e. locus and existant, is not actually due to difference, instead it is due to the visesa --The representative of difference. Madhwa, thus maintains the akhandatva - The indivisible nature of the Brahman, not being affected even by holding Him as the abode of infinite qualities.

CONCEPT OF DIFFERENCE

The concept of difference also, can not be said as originated by the Dvaita tradition of Madhwa. As a matter of fact, right from the Sankhya many philosophical schools, even before Madhwa, have all along been proclaiming difference as one of the important tenet of their respective systems. Yet, they either do not take cognisance of the severe attack of the Advaita dialecticians like Sriharsa and others, on the concept of bheda, or they fail to convincingly repulse the same. The pertinent question raised against the concept of difference, is whether it is different from its locus or identical with it. If between difference and its locus, difference is admitted it will lead to the fallacy of infinite regress. If, they are held as identical then again the question as to how they are cognised as adhara and adheya etc. will arise. Again, difference is always cognised in relation to its terms, either as residing in one of them or having one of them as its correlate. In any case, the cognition of difference depends upon the cognition of the relata and the cognition of the relata also depends upon the cognition of difference. Thus the concept of difference, it is pointed out, also involves the fallacy of mutual dependence - anyonyasrayatva.

Refuting these contentions Madhwa points out that these fallacies would occur if difference is considered as an attribute of its relata. Instead, it is identical with its dharmin - The locus and is signalised by the other term - the correlate. Since it is identical with its locus, naturally it is also cognised along with its locus and that is why the questions whether the cognised object is different from the others or not, normally do not arise. It may be contended that sometimes although the object is grasped, the difference is not grasped. For instance, when a piece of rope is perceived in darkness, the difference of snake, which is identical with the rope is not grasped and this shows that the object is not identical with the difference. This problem, Madhwa claims, can be solved only by positing an entity called visesa. If such an entity is not envisaged, he maintains that the problem which is commonly faced by all the philosophical schools, can never be solved.

Thus, though Madhwa seems just to repeat so many philosophical concepts that were already known to the philosophers, he has his own way of solving the problems that are normally associated with those concepts. Madhwa's ingenuity is evident even in the field of epistemology. The concept of Saksin, the theory of svatah-pramanya, the theory of anvitabhidhanavada are a few instances. The issues such as these were not unknown to the other philosophical systems. But, it is Madhwa who while dealing with them, treads a new path and here lies his contribution to the philosophical thoughts of this country.