Khe Sanh Veterans Association Inc.

Red Clay
Newsletter of the Veterans who served at Khe Sanh Combat Base,
Hill 950, Hill 881, Hill 861, Hill 861-A, Hill 558
Lang-Vei and Surrounding Area

Issue 54     Winter 2002

Short Rounds

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In This Issue
Notes from Editor and Staff     Web Briefs     Incoming     Memoirs
In Memoriam     A Sprinkling Of Your Poetry

by J. Thomas Dilberger

    Of course, as a Vietnam veteran and a man, I find myself looking back on those days when I was a young Marine rifleman. That is normal and for many years I was caught up in questioning the right or wrong of the war. However, I was looking for answers in the wrong places. I have finally found my answer and it has nothing to do with whether our fighting that war was "Right" or "Wrong." The answer is that we as soldiers did what men have done for centuries. We answered the call to arms of our nation. This doesn't mean that we were heroes, but it does mean that we did honor to our families by being true to our upbringing. We were raised from infancy to be honorable men and we did not let our families, church, school, or town down. We walked through the bush enduring intense heat, leeches, rain, heavy packs and combat. We were also pitted against a worthy foe, who was doing the same thing we were, but for his country. .Make no mistake, our enemies helped mold us into the men we have become.

    All these things give us a way of looking at life our peers who haven't had our experiences cannot hope to comprehend. The crucible that combat soldiers experience leaves on them an indelible benchmark. This gives a man a certain standing in society that men without his background can never attain All this because as a young man he allowed himself to be tested by friend and foe alike and was not found wanting. I guess it takes the passage of Time for certain things to become clear.

War Resisters
    If I am in a group of people and the subject of the war comes up, it is interesting to see men my age, after all this passage of time still justifying their reasons for not fighting, whereas veterans need only to say their units and that is the end of their explanation. I have an idea that all these years later, men who didn't serve their country in the 60s have had plenty of time to think over their actions and aren't too happy with what they did -- or is it, didn't do? The thing about this whole affair is that it is like a door opening and shutting. Either you go through the door when it is open to you and prove your manhood, or, if you refuse, the door shuts on you and you have lost your opportunity forever. I think that is why some men today are super patriots. They think that somehow, by making a show of patriotism, they will make up for what they didn't do when their own names were called and they failed to respond.

The Price
   Now that I have reached middle age, I am impressed by some things I have learned, such as how much I don't know, and that none of us are going to get out of this life alive. Another thing I have learned is that everything has a price and that price must be paid. There is no getting away with anything without paying the full tab. In the case of men who have done their duty by serving their country honestly, their bill is marked paid. For those men who didn't do their duty as men, the bill is still outstanding. Nobody has the ability to turn their backs on this debt and walk away as if nothing happened. The payment is variable and nobody knows how it will manifest itself. But the debt has been building interest since the time when these men first failed their country and themselves. Many times such men seem to be doing well in life, and nobody can see that he is paying any price at all, and maybe he won't be aware of it himself. Maybe it won't even affect him but maybe a family member. Whatever the case, a man refuses to do his duty as a man at his own peril.

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*****

By Terry Lacy

    On October 23,1998 I finally got a little closure in my life. After thirty years of Vietnam and trying to ask God for forgiveness, it finally arrived. In May of 1968 on Hill 55, Vietnam. 2nd squad was getting ready to depart on a squad-size ambush. My friend John Wielebski, who was the squad leader, was standing around talking and smoking. I went to light a Salem when my lighter refused to light -- it was out of fluid. John said take mine, I won't need it out there. Little did I know that it would be the last time I would see .John. His squad was hit and John lost his leg for his heroism he was awarded the Silver Star

    For thirty years, I have fought PTSD, which I really didn't think I had. Plus, I didn't think God would ever forgive me for the things I have done over that period of time. Thanks to a loving wife and two great kids I finally got some help. I would like to thank Danny Sissel and the Veterans organization for their help.

    Closure comes to those who wait, I guess, and it comes in different ways. I had a heart attack last year on February 11. After four bypasses and a defibrillator inserted in my chest, I started on the road to recovery. With the help of Southern Ohio Medical Center and the fine program they have, it has really paid off. I would like to thank all the people who put me on their prayer list in the many churches out here in Mcdermott, Otway, Raden, and Portsmouth. With nothing to do, I started playing around on my son's computer. I looked up several military organizations and some home pages. I finally found what I was looking for -- Khe Sanh Veterans. After signing many guest books and leaving many messages I started getting some feedback. I found a few guys I was in Vietnam with but did not really know. Then the break came about six months ago. I found John Wielebski but was afraid to call him.

    For the last thirty years, I would get my dad's old three C footlocker out and go through all my junk. I always told my wife and kids that someday I would like to give John's lighter back to him.. Well, I finally got up the courage to call him. He was as glad to hear from me as I was hearing from him. As we emailed each other over the months, he decided he would visit me October 25. I was surprised when I found out he had become a Catholic priest. It should not have been that much of a surprise, he was a really nice guy in Nam. When he called me and said he couldn't come, I got really depressed. About a half hour later, he called back and said he was coming. He arrived on Friday afternoon and I picked him up at the Ramada. We spent the whole afternoon together, and I showed him around our little town of Portsmouth. Then I gave him his lighter back and we took pictures, he said that a thousand lighters wasn't as good as renewing our friendship.

He engraved the lighter:

LOANED TO SGT. TERRY LACY, ON HILL 55, SOUTH VIETNAM, MAY 22, 1968. RETURNED OCTOBER 23,1998 PORTSMOUTH, OHIO.

THANKS FOR REMEMBERING

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*****

Excerpts From a Story
By Mark Moser

Copyright c The Vail Trail, 
March 17, 2000

    As the van carrying peace trees volunteers stopped, Don Shanley shot out the door and scrambled through the fog. He sprinted across remnants of the pock-marked, red clay airstrip, disappearing into the misty countryside. An eerie silence enveloped him along with the group. You could feel the ghost of the past. Without fanfare, the clouds lifted, unveiling the hill where Shanley and his men once fought. But this was different than he remembered. Coffee plants now thrive on what was once a bloody battlefield known as Khe Sanh. Nature had healed most of the earth's war wounds.

    It had been 32 years since Shanley, assigned as a Marine lieutenant, had set foot on this scene where he and his men endured incessant mortars, as they struggled to survive by digging underground pits. "I remember trying to sleep fitfully in a hole filling with water," Shanley said. "Then I'd crawl out at daylight to munch on a dry cracker. We were in rain all day, being pounded by mortars for 20-30 days straight with no relief. It was hell on earth." Shanley, now 55, remembers patrolling this defoliated area where scarcely a blade of grass could survive. And he remembers the many men who needlessly lost their lives in a war that never seemed to make sense. "There was no reason to take the casualties we did," he said. "It turns one bitter."

    But no remnants of that bitterness seemed to linger as Shanley returned to Vietnam. A California landscape designer, maybe it was traveling with Peace Trees Vietnam, a non-profit organization with a mission to reverse the legacy of war, that helped transform those once bitter memories. Shanley, who holds a bachelor's degree in history from Stanford and was headed for a master's from the University of California, Berkeley when he joined the Marines through Officers Candidate School, says he experienced a totally new reality seeing Vietnam today. It's definitely not the same war-torn hell he remembers from decades ago.

    Shanley, who admits it will take some time to completely process all his thoughts and emotions, said he experienced something completely different than he imagined he would. Visiting a cemetery where 10,000 Vietnamese are buried stands out as the most powerful few hours of his trip. Reading the names and dates on grave markers drove home the magnitude of their loss. Nearly all those soldiers died before reaching 22 or 23 years of age. Many were only 16 or 17. More than 300,000 Vietnamese are still listed among those missing in action. "I gained a better understanding of the other side's perspective," he said. Their casualties were so extreme. That hit me. I have always had a need to honor all the Americans and Vietnamese who lost their lives during the war. 

    "It was important for me to put to rest so many images I had brought back from the war in Vietnam," Shanley added. ".It was awful and will never go away, but it's now in a more modern context. I've supplanted old images and [the trip] gave me new positive ones to deal with."

    Steve Shanley of Edwards was only 8-years-old when his Uncle Don went off to serve in Vietnam. He remembers vividly sitting around the television each evening with his family as the horrors of the Vietnam War were beamed into their home. "This guy was more than an uncle to me; he was my idol, my hero, and a great role model," Steve said. "I've always had such a great respect for him. Even today, when I'm faced with a tough life situation, I think about how Don might handle that same situation."

    Coffee plantations now thrive in Khe Sanh. Rubber trees line the road to the cemetery along the Ben Hai River, like sentinels guiding the way. The young people of Vietnam are moving on. And yet so many Americans seem to be stuck in Vietnam -- the war.

From Vietnam Magazine, 
October, 1999, pp. 22-28 
©1998 by Peter Brush

    American military commanders sought to present a united front, to speak with one voice, regarding the successes of U.S. military efforts during the Vietnam War. This unanimity, however, was more apparent than real. To the extent it was successful, moreover, it minimized the very fundamental differences that existed between the U.S. Army and Marine Corps as to the most effective method of waging war in Vietnam.

    Over time these differences became acute. On January 22, 1968, the commander of American forces in Vietnam, General William Westmoreland, sent a TOP SECRET cable to General Earl Wheeler, Chairman of the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS). This cable noted that the professionalism of the Marine Corps in Vietnam had fallen "far short of the standards that should be demanded by our armed forces" and that Marine performance throughout their ranks required "improvement in the national interest." What caused this polarization? An examination of the differences between U.S. Army and Marine Corps military doctrine in Vietnam furnishes some clues.

    Military doctrine may be defined as the distillation of collective wisdom that the institutional leadership uses to effect the ways in which the military executes and plans training and operations. U.S. Army doctrine in the 1960's was forged from its successes in the conventional wars of the Twentieth Century, and modified by the political realities of limited war as waged in Korea. The U.S. Army rode these successes into the battlefields of Vietnam. Limited war, by definition, places constraints on the use of military resources, constraints that are lacking in conventional wars. The superiority of U.S. firepower and technology in World Wars I and II were incorporated into the doctrine employed in the Korean conflict: massive firepower and the attrition of Communist forces. Although failure in war may incline an army to question the efficacy of its doctrine, the U.S. Army was not so inclined in Vietnam. It was not conceivable that an army capable of defeating both Japanese militarism and Nazi fascism would be inadequate to the task of defeating Vietnamese communism.

    In June 1954, the U.S. received permission from France to participate in the training of the Vietnamese armed forces. When the French expeditionary force withdrew from Indochina in 1956, the U.S. Military Assistance Advisory Group saw its goal primarily as one of creating a conventional army of divisional and supporting units of the Vietnamese National Army (VNA, later ARVN). The divisional force structure of the ARVN was organized to deal with a Korea-style invasion from North Vietnam. U.S. Army Tables of Organization and Equipment were translated into Vietnamese and issued to the ARVN with no major variations. By 1959, the ARVN had seven standard divisions (plus armored cavalry) which closely paralleled U.S. Army units in World War II.

    The administration of U.S. President Kennedy brought a change from the massive retaliation strategy favored by President Eisenhower to one of flexible response, which would meet aggression at any level of violence. Kennedy correctly saw that insurgencies were the preferred mechanism by which the Communists would attempt to spread their influence in future wars. Senior Army commanders, however, strongly resisted the Kennedy administration's emphasis on developing counter-insurgency capabilities. Traditional Army doctrine persisted even after U.S. ground forces began fighting in Vietnam. Counter-insurgency remained an added duty to the regular combat mission of Army divisions and brigades. Even the Special Forces, that Army contingency regarded as most capable of meeting the challenges of counter-insurgency, were configured to train and control guerrilla forces and to conduct guerrilla warfare in support of conventional operations. The problem facing the South Vietnamese government (GVN), however, was not one of waging guerrilla warfare; rather, it was one of defending against the Communist insurgency. By 1965, the Viet Cong (VC) were "annihilating ARVN battalions as a blast furnace consumes coke." In order to assure the survival of the GVN, in 1965 President Lyndon Johnson granted General Westmoreland's request that 200,000 U.S. troops be deployed to South Vietnam.

    It was a different historical baggage train that carried the Marine Corps into Vietnam. The traditional Corps' mission of policing Navy yards and manning the rigging of Navy fighting ships in the nineteenth century evolved into that of a colonial light infantry expeditionary force in the early twentieth century.

    Historically, the Marines had been "First to Fight" because of their ability to mount small infantry strike forces on short notice. Regular Army troops had larger logistical needs, which required more expense and delay. Further, there was the feeling within the U.S. government that intervention by Marines was less provocative than the dispatch of regular Army forces. In this view, the deployment of Marines abroad was not considered tantamount to an act of war, while deployment of Army troops was. As a result, in the period between World Wars I and II, the Marines acquired considerable experience in such aspects of counterinsurgency as pacification and the creation of native gendarmeries during operations in Haiti, the Dominican Republic, and especially Nicaragua.

    During World War I, Marine commanders had resented attempts by the Army to use highly trained Marine forces in rear zones as support troops for the American Expeditionary Force. The Marines preferred the division of military resources employed in World War II, in which the Army concentrated its efforts in the European theater and the Marines assumed a leading role in fighting the Japanese, to that of Korea, where Marine ground and air forces were under operational control of the Army and Air Force and did not operate independently. In Vietnam, the Marines hoped to avoid the allocation of their resources in a manner subservient to other services.

    In February 1965, the U.S. embarked upon a policy of sustained air strikes against North Vietnam (Operation ROLLING THUNDER). Senior Army commanders concluded that deployment of American ground forces to Vietnam was essential to provide base security for the air campaign. Upon being informed of this decision, Vietnamese commanders expressed concern about the reaction of the Vietnamese population to the presence of U.S. combat troops. Given the historical basis for the deployment of Marines abroad, it is ironic that in March, 1965, Assistant Secretary of Defense John T. McNaughton stated the desirability of deploying the Army's 173d Airborne Brigade rather than the 9th Marine Expeditionary Brigade (9th MEB): some planners felt the impact of light airborne infantry would constitute a "quieter arrival" than the formidable brigade of Marines with tanks, amphibious tractors, and other heavy weapons embarking from an sea-borne armada. General Westmoreland preferred the Marine force as being more self-sustaining. Executing a plan that had been in existence since 1959, the Marines came ashore by sea and air on March 8.

    The Vietnam War was primarily a land war, and it was the U.S. Army that determined the operations, tactics, and most of the strategy employed in ' Vietnam. Army theory held that the insurgency in Vietnam would be conducted in three phases. In the first phase, the Communists would proselytize among the masses; in the second, guerrilla operations would commence; the third phase would see open warfare as the now-strong insurgents sought to topple the GVN. By 1965, according to General Westmoreland, North Vietnamese Minister of Defense General Vo Nguyen Giap had moved the fighting in Vietnam to the third phase, which would necessarily be a big-unit war. The U.S. Army committed its ground forces to counter this perceived threat. The emphasis was on conventional operations.

    The initial mission for the Marine force was limited in scope. The JCS landing order directed that the Marines would not engage Viet Cong in combat. Marines would only defend the Da Nang airfield. The JCS favored an enclave strategy whereby the U.S. would increase its logistic capabilities to allow for the absorption of additional American combat forces. Westmoreland, still displaying concerns over the vulnerability of base areas to enemy action, suggested the deployment of additional Marine forces to guard the Army communications installation at Phu Bai, north of the enclave at Da Nang. This recommendation was supported by the JCS. Differences between the Marine Corps and the U.S. Army-led Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (MACV) date from this period.

    Victor H. Krulak, Commanding General of the Fleet Marine Force, Pacific, and former Special Assistant for Counterinsurgency for the JCS, felt that Phu Bai was tactically indefensible. Krulak was cognizant of the numerical limitations of Marine forces in Vietnam and felt the Army facility should be moved to another place. This would allow Marine forces to remain concentrated in areas where they would be more productive. Army wishes prevailed, and in April 1965, two Marine battalions were deployed to establish an additional enclave at Phu Bai.

    Leaders in Washington were convinced the situation in Vietnam had continued to deteriorate. Additional U.S. troops arrived in Vietnam, the Viet Cong achieved major victories in May and June, and the relatively low-risk enclave strategy was discarded. According to the Pentagon Papers, Westmoreland and the JCS articulated the strategy of search and destroy in keeping with sound military principles garnered by men accustomed to winning. The foundation of this strategy was to take the war to the enemy and deal him the heaviest possible blows. Combat restrictions placed on the Marine force were removed. The new mission included offensive operations to find and destroy the VC in the general Da Nang area. Although initial contacts with the VC were light, Department of Defense officials felt this situation was only the lull before .the oncoming storm. In this view, large enemy units remained the major threat to South Vietnam. Marines established another base south of Da Nang at Chu Lai. The 9th MEB became the III Marine Amphibious Force(III MAF) with Major General Lewis Walt commanding.

    Senior Marine commanders placed less emphasis on search and destroy operations than did Army commanders, because the Marines viewed large units of enemy forces as the secondary threat to the security of South Vietnam. General Walt, shortly after taking command, noted that 150,000 Vietnamese civilians were living within mortar range of the Da Nang airfield. Walt conveyed to the JCS his conviction that the real target in Vietnam should not be the Viet Cong or North Vietnamese Army (NVA) but the Vietnamese people. Only with the support of the civilian population could the enemy operate in sufficiently close proximity to Da Nang to cause damage to U.S. facilities. By winning over the allegiance of the Vietnamese to the GVN, base security would be accomplished. Large enemy formations posed no threat if they could not operate in populated areas.

    Retired Marine general Edward H. Forney, then Public Safety Advisor with the U.S. Operations Mission in Saigon, felt the historical experiences of the Marine Corps in Haiti, the Dominican Republic, and Nicaragua had particular relevance to the insurgency in Vietnam. Forney said the Marines should link their pacification efforts with Vietnamese militia at the local village and hamlet level in order to provide the sort of operation around which the people of Vietnam would rally. According to Forney, lack of emphasis on this type of pacification was the major deficiency in operations then being conducted in Vietnam.

    Westmoreland felt the Marines were wrong. In June 1965, MACV requested that a total of forty four allied battalions be committed to Vietnam. If 'South Vietnam were to survive, the U.S. had to have a hard-hitting offensive capability on the ground. Westmoreland wanted to forget about enclaves and take the war to the enemy with allied troops that could be maneuvered freely. General Krulak observed that the Marines never felt the war stood to be won by grand maneuvers of large forces "in the Tannenberg or Chancellorsville image," but rather in the villages and hamlets. Army General Harry Kinnard, commander of the 1st Air Cavalry, felt the Marines did not know how to fight on land and were reluctant to do so. General William Deputy of the MACV staff felt the Marines "...came in and just sat down and didn't do anything." Different philosophies regarding the appropriate emphasis on pacification versus search and destroy operations would remain at the heart of the disagreements between the Army and the Marine Corps in Vietnam. 

    Krulak felt there was no virtue in seeking; out large units of NVA in the mountains and jungles of Vietnam; as long as they stayed away from populated areas they posed no threat to anyone. By destroying the guerrilla fabric among the people, the U.S. would deny the enemy the logistic bases necessary for continued operations against the GVN. The U.S. should only fight large enemy units when they posed a particular threat to the populated areas. Westmoreland had a different perception. Intelligence reports in February 1966, indicated that two NVA divisions had infiltrated across the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ) into the two northernmost provinces of South Vietnam. The MACV commander felt the intention of the NVA was to seize Quang Tri and Thua Thien provinces and the important city of Hue to use as bargaining points in future negotiations. 

    The Marines resisted every effort to extend their forces northward, preferring to concentrate efforts on pacification in the more densely populated south. In April 1966, at the insistence of General Westmoreland, the Marines began reconnaissance operations near Khe Sanh in the northwestern corner of Quang Tri province. Initial sightings of enemy troops caused the deployment of additional Marine reconnaissance elements in the DMZ area. By July 1966, heavy fighting occurred in the DMZ region between regular NVA and Marine units. Bases were established at Dong Ha, Cam Lo, and the Rockpile.  Westmoreland became alarmed at the extent of the fighting in the north. Fearful that large NVA units would bypass the Marine defenses in the Dong Ha/Rockpile/Central DMZ area and enter South Vietnam from the northwest, Westmoreland suggested the Marines reinforce Khe Sanh. 

    The Marine command also resisted Westmoreland's suggestion regarding Khe Sanh. The assistant commander of the 3d Marine Division, General Lowell English, claimed that Khe Sanh had no tactical value; if it were lost, it would make no difference. In the Marine view, Khe Sanh was too isolated and would be too hard to support. Bowing to the inevitable, the Marines agreed to reinforce the base in order to retain the prestige of doing it On their own rather than being forced to do so. MACV was convinced the NVA were planning a massive advance into Quang Tri province. The 3d Marine Division was ordered north from Da Nang to meet this threat. Army troops moved to Da Nang to replace the departing Marines. 

    The expected enemy offensive along the DMZ did not materialize. Nevertheless, a sizeable Marine presence would remain in the north, seriously hampering . the Marine pacification program in the southern sector of their Tactical Area of Responsibility (TAOR). General English summed up the Marines' frustration in Vietnam at the end of 1966 by noting the Corps had been assigned too much real estate and not enough troops. Generals Krulak and Walt thought the Communist leaders wanted to draw the Marines out of the populated I Corps coastal area into a campaign of attrition in the underpopulated areas of northern Quang Tri province. Since attrition was central to Westmoreland's strategy of search and destroy, the objectives of the Communists and MACV were such that continued fighting between the Marines and NVA along the DMZ was bound to occur.

    By 1966, it became evident that Operation ROLLING THUNDER had proven ineffective in stopping the infiltration of men and supplies into South Vietnam from the north. In the search for a better way to stop this infiltration, the Department . of Defense proposed the construction of a barrier across the DMZ and Laotian panhandle. In October 1966, Westmoreland ordered his subordinate commands to study the barrier concept as developed by the MACV staff. The Seventh Air Force developed an aerial barrier in Laos, while III MAF and MACV planned for a conventional barrier along the DMZ. III MAF commander General Walt ordered 3d Marine Division commander General Wood Kyle to design the Marine component of the barrier. Both Marine generals expressed strong reservations about the barrier concept, and Marine Corps opposition to it remained consistent. In their view, the barrier concept was fantastic, absolutely impractical, and would tie down additional troops that could be more effectively deployed in other ways. Neither Walt nor Kyle had any choice in the matter, and MACV ordered the Marines to construct the barrier. 

    In the fall of 1967, MACV received intelligence reports of massive NVA troop buildups in the vicinity of Khe Sanh. General Phillip Davidson, the MACV intelligence chief, felt General Giap intended to overwhelm the base in order to force an end to the war in Vietnam. General Westmoreland was convinced that the Marines under-appreciated the severity of the enemy threat to Khe Sanh. Feeling Marine assets were inadequate to the task, Westmoreland ordered U.S. Army troops into I Corps to reinforce the Marines. I Corps had been predominantly a Marine preserve since 1965. In the view of MACV, the Marines had lost the initiative against the NVA; Westmoreland began to consider putting the Army in charge of I Corps. 

    The Marines suffered heavy casualties in 1967 during heavy fighting with the NVA at Con Thien along the DMZ. During this battle, the Marines asked the Air Force for tactical support. After the fighting, the Marines were bitter in their assessment of the assistance provided by the Air Force. Marine General John Chaisson, chief of the MACV operations center, told Air Force General William Momyer he had no doubt in his mind that the Air Force had put insufficient emphasis and effort into assisting the Marines at Con Thien. Months later, while preparing for the defense of Khe Sanh, General Westmoreland asked III MAF commander General Cushman to release control of Marine tactical aircraft that were not actually supporting Marines in combat. Cushman, remembering Con Thien, bristled at the suggestion. 

    Marine forces were outfitted with fewer artillery pieces than Army units. In  theory, Marines got gun fire support from Navy ships. When operating beyond the range of naval  gunfire, Marines relied on the tactical air support of Marine pilots who had ear lier trained as infantrymen. It was this special relationship between comrades that Cushman opposed severing. The disagreement over control of tactical air assets reached into the highest levels of the U.S. military establishment. III MAF seemed to be in virtual revolt over the matter. The Army felt the Marines had more available tactical support than they needed and should be willing to share it with Army forces. Westmoreland was unwilling to budge on this controversy -- indeed, he felt so strongly  about this that he claimed it was the one issue during his Vietnam service that prompted him to consider resigning. Eventually, the Marines were forced to accept Westmoreland's concept for a single air manager. 

    The war dragged on in the face of these disharmonies between the Army and Marine Corps. American civilian leaders remained concerned with managing the bombing campaign against North Vietnam. As long as MACV restricted military operations to South Vietnam, the Army continued to play the lead role in deciding the best way to wage war. General Westmoreland explicitly rejected the Marine policy of paying less attention to large units of enemy troops, while favoring small unit activities to accomplish pacification.

    The Marines in I Corps fought two wars: one of counter-insurgency in the heavily populated southern portion of their TAOR, and a more conventional war, at MACV insistence, against large NVA formations in the north. By being forced to fight two wars, the Marines felt they had inadequate  assets to properly wage either. MACV felt the Marines were too parochial in their outlook, that the threat of NVA forces entering Vietnam from various avenues within I Corps threatened the integrity of the entire nation of South Vietnam.

    General Westmoreland remained convinced of the critical importance of Khe Sanh. The Marine combat base there remained garrisoned as long as Westmoreland was the MACV commander. In April 1968, the Army 1st Cavalry Division (Airmobile) was assigned the lead role in the operation to establish overland communications with the Marines at Khe Sanh. MACV felt Army high-mobility tactics would be more effective against NVA forces in northern I Corps than anything the Marines could offer. On i July 1968, General Creighton Abrams replaced Westmoreland as MACV commander. The Khe Sanh Combat Base was immediately shut down and abandoned. 

    Marine and Army tactics began to converge. General Abrams was willing to place more emphasis on pacification and lead Army operations away from their previous conventional orientation. The reversion by the enemy to a lower-level insurgency after the losses suffered during Tet, 1968, inclined the Americans to respond with smaller unit activities. MACV was coming to the realization that large-scale U.S. combat operations had brought little in the way of over-all security to the countryside of South Vietnam. The attrition of enemy forces remained the primary goal of American forces, however. 

    Tactics employed by the Marines also changed. In May 1968, Major General Raymond Davis assumed command of the 3d Marine Division. Davis ordered the division to forego its earlier reliance on fixed defensive positions. In the latter half of 1968, the Marines received additional helicopter assets with the arrival in large numbers of the CH-46 medium transport helicopters. Davis also secured the promise of Army helicopter support from Army General William Rosson, Provisional Corps commander, and from General Richard Stillwell, Rosson's successor at XXIV Corps. With this helicopter support, the Marines moved out of their positions south of the DMZ and began Army-style mobile operations in western Quang Tri province.

    It was domestic political considerations and not successes on the battlefield, that offered impetus to the American decision to begin withdrawing its combat forces from Vietnam. General Abrams believed that an American military victory was impossible considering the restrictions under which they were compelled to operate. U.S. Defense Secretary Melvin Laird was determined to effect a major change in American policy toward the war in Vietnam. Despite the unanimous view of the major U.S. agencies involved in the war that the policy of Vietnamization would be  unable to deal with the threat posed by the Vietnamese Communists, the new administration of President Nixon instructed MACV to develop plans for turning the war over to the Vietnamese armed force.

    When it came time for the first pullout of U.S. forces in July 1969, General Abrams favored the departure of the 3d Marine Division. General Westmoreland, still convinced .of the threat posed by NVA forces in the northern provinces, interceded to keep the Marines in I Corps. Abrams later agreed that the first U.S. troops removed from Vietnam would be a combination of 3d Marine Division and Army 9th Infantry Division units. Departing Marine units were not directly replaced. As the Marines pulled out of their positions in the north, the bases were offered to the Army. This offer was rejected. 

Marine strength in I Corps at the beginning of 1969 was 81,000, with 50,000 Army troops under III MAF command. By the end of the year, Marine strength had fallen to 55,000 men as Army forces replaced the Marines. In 1970, III MAF relinquished control of I Corps to the Army XXIV Corps. Defense of the northernmost provinces was no longer the responsibility of the Marine Corps. 

    At the beginning of large U.S. troop deployments to Vietnam, the various services were eager to participate. The Army wanted to regain influence lost to the Air Force and Naval Air that had dominated the strategy of massive retaliation dominant in the early years of the Cold War. Matters of service prestige and career enhancement were at stake in Vietnam. During the advisory period, Marine commanders were concerned that the Corps was only moderately involved in the conflict, which was contrary to Marine Corps tradition. The Marines had no special counter-insurgency units such as Army Special Forces. The only solution to this problem was for the Marines to commit regular Fleet Marine Force units on a large scale.

    The Marine command in I Corps would have preferred a free hand in waging war, free of Army super vision. Vietnam was the longest and, in many ways, the most difficult war for the Marines-- Marine casualties in Vietnam exceeded those of World War II. By the time U.S. forces began redeployments in 1969, it was clear that Vietnam was more a place for the military services to lose prestige rather than gain it. The MACV initial plan to re-deploy the 3d Marine Division only included ground units. The Marines, still opposed to the breakup of the their air/round team, favored the removal of both fixed-wing and rotary air assets along with the ground units of the 3rd Marine Division. Marine Commandant General Leonard Chapman noted that although these air assets were not organic to the Marine division, they were essential if the division was to be used as a strategic reserve in the Pacific. The Corps was looking beyond Vietnam, seeking the re-creation of  its force deployment that existed prior to participating in this unsatisfactory war.

    Army doctrine was a major contributor to the determination of Army tactics in Vietnam. General Westmoreland claimed to understand tl~e historical rationale behind the employment of Marine Corps doctrine in Vietnam. He understood that the Marines were employed in Vietnam on operations contrary to their mission simply because they existed and were available in time of need. While allowing that Marine doctrine neither trained nor equipped them for sustained operations ashore, such was the manner in which they were deployed by MACV in Vietnam. Given the inability of the Army to operate in a manner contrary to their own historical experiences, it seems simplistic for Westmorela.nd to fault the Marine Corps for an over-rigid adherence to its own doctrine.

    In 1975, South Vietnam succumbed to a conventional invasion of North Vietnamese army forces. This historical reality gives support to the Army belief that the threat posed by large enemy forces to the GVN was a critical threat. However, the rapid crumbling of the civil and military institutions of South Vietnam in the face of this invasion supports the Marine Corps view that winning over the allegiance of the people of South Vietnam to their government was also a matter of strategic importance. The insufficient achievements of pacification exemplify the failure of nation building by the United States in South Vietnam.

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by Gary Foster

Following is a letter I wrote to Donna Elliot in response to her request to help find her brother Jerry who was MIA near Khe Sanh in 1968 (See Red Clay, (Winter 2001). I was unable to provide much input or to assist her in her efforts, but the day I drove to Khe Sanh from Dong Ha proved interesting and I thought I would share the events with her. Others may be interested to read of the events, which have little to do with Khe Sanh in the late 60s but proved an interesting day for me nonetheless. I met Donna in Washington, DC in late spring 2002, and we had a long conversation about her brother, the day he went MIA and how she has struggled over the years to locate him. It is to her credit that she carries such a torch. She is persistent and tenacious. I continue to stay in touch with Donna. She is a source of inspiration for all. Now, my letter to Donna from Dong Ha, Vietnam.

March 31, 2002 
Dong Ha

Dear Donna,

    My day spent looking for information on your brother.

    Slept very little the night before my trip to Khe Sanh and Lao Bao. Arrived at the guesthouse in Dong Ha around 7pm. No dinner, could not eat. Had some peanuts and a couple of Halida beers (warm). Bags carried to the room on the second floor by the driver. Not a very good driver. Too indecisive when he needs to pass, not a good trait when driving in Vietnam. People who pace other cars when passing only cause potential calamity. My driver did just that. Why he drives 30 miles per hour in fifth gear remains a mystery to me. Why he drives 30 mph at all is an even more mysterious question.! "Hoang, we got to get rid of this guy. Makes me nervous..." Not that I'm not already a nervous wreck by the time we finish the drive south from Hanoi to Dong Ha on Highway 1.

Room 205: accommodations spacious with two adjoining rooms and a bathroom: high ceilings, street light outside always on and pointed unerringly straight into my room. I always get this room. Air conditioner straight out of wind tunnel testing, but it's at least very cool. Slippers at the door - too small, hmmm. Fridge contains water and beer and coke. I know to turn down the thermostat to its coldest level and I do so. That's the first thing I do at the Dong Ha Guesthouse, as I call it, having been here many times before. The second thing I do is to spray for mosquitoes. I hate mosquitoes and there are millions of them. 

Knock at the door and then it opens. 

Mr. Gary, we need your passport for reception and registering.

" Here Hoang," as I toss it to him. 

You drink beer again?

" Yes Hoang. Got any bourbon?

" We eat dinner?

" You go ahead, Hoang, I'm going to stay here and relax.

" You OK?"

'I’m OK, Hoang, just tired and need some silence; wan to relax

" you too old" 

"Get stuffed, you too old too,  you more older  than me and you're more ugly."

    No one would ever understand the dialogue that ensues between Hoang and I. We have become good friends and I enjoy his sense of humor. We have developed a vocabulary unique to our conversation. The grammatical articles such as "the" or "a" or "an" are usually missing from otherwise intelligent conversation. I have traveled with Hoang throughout Vietnam. He is my  constant companion and can pave the way for me. He finds me to be a real curiosity and he still thinks I am a spy, but to be honest, the thought has crossed my mind more than a few times that he is a spy too. His name is Hoang Tran Dung. Dung, now that's really his first name. I was introduced to him as Mr. Hoang, but Dung is to him what Gary is to me. Unfortunate name, but in Vietnamese a "D" is pronounced as a "Z." His first name is pronounced "Zung," or more phonetically in English, ."Zoong." Sometimes I call him Zung but mostly I call him Hoang. Hoang was a captain in a communications regiment with the North Vietnamese Army. He is three years younger than I and he was in the army for 8 years. During the last few years of the Vietnam War, he walked from Hanoi to Pleiku in three months, and after the war he walked back. He never saw frontline action, being in communications, but he did witness a few B-52 strikes and many other events. He knows every American combat airplane and every American weapon. He asks me constantly what DMZ means~ "For the umpteenth time Hoang, it means the De-Militarized Zone."  "But we never de-militarized it," he responds. "Well, you should have," is my retort. "OK, Hoang, let's go eat." I already know the restaurant. The people there know me and that I like green onions, raw. "Bad for your breath but good for your heart," I always say. Anyway, I don't think Sharon Stone will be passing our restaurant in Dong Ha anytime soon.

    Next day, woke up at four; not by sound of my alarm clock but by a friendly gecko lizard trying his best to talk to me and to tell me to get up. When he saw I was not responding, he raised his pesky voice. Peeked at me from the behind the air conditioner and then slithered back behind it. How come the air conditioner wasn't working? What's going on? Where's the remote? The remote?! Where's the light? No electricity in Dong Ha town. More totally undecipherable verbage from that damned lizard hiding behind the AC. Now wide-awake, I got up and stumbled to the fridge and grabbed a bottle of water --naw, it was a beer. Thank god, I had turned the temp in the small fridge way down the night before; the beer was delightfully cold, even at 4am. Only 3 hours until we hit the road again to Khe Sanh and then bump along to Lao Bao. Sat up in bed. The gecko, pleased with his work, continued to talk to me. Just like home, right? Power still off and no light. Well, at least the light just outside my window was out. 

    Starting to get warm...need water...cold water. Jump in shower in darkness. No water. Dummy! No electricity, no pump, no water -- it's a simple concept. 

    Gray dawn. Clothes on, wallet and passport safe. Left Danh Ba Dien Thoai Nha khach Uy Ban Ttinh "(Whew!) "Guesthouse "at 7:00am for a restaurant to down some "pho "(noodle soup). Drove past a military crane and two destroyed tanks, an M48 and a T54, barrels' on both tanks in the fully depressed position, hatches open. Continued on into main part of Dong Ha. Motorbikes everywhere, dark skies, humid, everyone spitting and coughing. Parked the car out side the restaurant; immediately told we had parked in the wrong place and had to move it. This just after we had driven over a 300 feet extension cord and crushed it. The Dong Ha-ians were setting up a stage for the 30-year anniversary of the liberation of Dong Ha and found an electrical outlet in a building to power the sound stage. Ran the cord outside the building through the front door and over the road to the stage, 300 feet. Anyway, I didn't know Dong Ha was ever liberated: I thought it  was just invaded and overwhelmed.

"OK, no, Mr. Gary, Dong Ha was liberated."

"OK, Hoang," I said. "Jesus!" We had to move the car and then went inside the restaurant first by walking down an incline and then ducking my head to enter. I was the center of attention. Found a table recently vacated by a family of four and sat down amid all the debris left on the floor: napkins, lemons, chopsticks -- one broken, bottle tops, chicken bones, and chewed but discarded various other animal parts, etc. The day, my friend, has just started. Great.That's right! Big smile, big stretch, and wait for that great meal of bacon, eggs, and hash browns and the occasional beer. 

    In your dreams. I ordered my "pho, "as usual -- I seldom eat anything else. I have lost my sense of culinary adventure. It arrived in a large bowl. Clean my chopsticks with a napkin the size of a postage stamp, throw it on the floor just like everyone else. Could spit too and be in vogue. Very hot stuff in a large bowl; needed to cool down. Ordered soy sauce, and sliced red chilies. I like my "pho" spicy. Drank tea. Already getting hotter outside. Made a big mess of the soup, hate the spoons they give me. Soup all over my chin and down my shirt. Dropped orange juice from a slice of orange on my brand new white Nordstrom shirt -- bummer. Hey, I look great in white even if it is  covered in orange and noodle stains and the dust already being stirred up by the traffic outside. The restaurant owner turned up the music. Screaming music. Finished up, paid the girl, let's roll. "Hoang, get in!" 

    I stole the keys from Hoang -- he drives OK but too slow and stops only when he wants to stop. I was showing my new project manager the road between Dong Ha and Lao Bao and I didn't want to have to plead every time I wanted to show him a culvert or a bridge abutment. Into town center, then headed west now, first Cam Lo; traffic begins to thin, but still a few maniacs on the road, then Ca Lu, then the Rockpile. Lots of blasting going on. No traffic but was reminded to bang on the horn constantly. Hoang says, "Make sound of horn. You never know," he says."Never know what?" I ask. "What, the VC may come out of the jungle and get me?" 

    Then a small bridge, then parallel to the Rao Quan Riven Had stopped at Cau Dau Mau to show new PM the bridge and the supposed new alignment. We looked to the right but the new road alignment is to the left. What the hell! People honking at us for no good reason and all saying, hello, goodbye and trying to act as if they meant it. Stopped at another bridge Cau Sa laman, big Bru  area and thousands of kids about 3 or 4 descended upon us and we could not open the doors of the car. Finally managed to open the door and were met again with hello, good-bye, hello, goodbye...again!

    Walked the length of the bridge, shirt now filthy and covered in stickers from a thorn bush below the bridge that I brushed up against. Traffic starting to flow, and slowing across the bridge at km 47. Old bridge, not looking good, needs to be replaced. Corn growing in the creek bed below. Naked kids playing in muddy water, water buffalos snorting and meandering like some people I see in the mall, old ladies smiling with blood red teeth from the betelnut, old men sitting, just like all over the world, kids on bicycles without tires, women carrying fruit to market, wherever that is, in baskets balanced on a pole across their shoulders. Everyone dirty, and by now even me. Everything just peachy keen here on Quoc Loang 9 in Quang Tri Province, Vietnam. 

    Reached Da Krong, stopped to see a wedding procession, took some photos. No film. Terrific. Was asked to attend but was hardly dressed for the occasion in my white, but turning red, Reeboks. Man falls off his bike. Another man asks me for a cigarette. Sweat pouring out now, shirt sticking and red clay dust in my mouth eyes, ears and elsewhere. Worried cheap hotel pen would bleed and gave it to passerby on a bike. Put it behind his ear and peddled on. Thanks, or at least I think that's what he said. Where's my Mont Blanc? I left it in the hotel room! 

    Drove on to Cau Rao Quan. Inpressive sight but not as impressive as the cable-stayed bridge across the Rao Quan River (Highway No. 14) but new PM not pleased with architecture. What!

    Road rises up to the plateau and we reach Khe Sanh finally and stop for 10 minutes then continue on to Lao Bao. Cigarette smugglers and moneychangers everywhere. All look the same. The same driver on a 110 Honda with a cute girly on the back holding bags of cigarettes bound for Dong Ha.

    God, it's getting hot! On to Lao Bao, stop in Lang Vei and try to talk to military people who have a tent over the old US Green Beret camp. Whatchaguys doing? How goes it? Zappnin? You know, usual banter with complete strangers in a country where nobody speaks American. I mean this is Quang Tri Province, right? Good Copy? Man, what are you guys doing here? No response. 

    Back in the car, continue to Lao Bao. Road not good, bumpy. AC on full blast, shirtsleeves filthy from rubbing the sweat from my face. Hoang not happy about my driving: not blowing the horn enough. I blast it 20 times in an attempt to appease but still not good enough. Arrive at Lao Bao, look for old French fort, not there, of course, but people in Khe Sanh could not answer my question and Hoang was not interested to know either. You know, a little sightseeing never hurt anyone. But the Old French prison is over there. We go there. Totally destroyed by big-time bombs; craters so big you could put my T-bird in them. Yep, craters still evident after 35 years. See Laos border down in the valley with mountains of Laos just behind. Hoang worried that I may cross the border with his car. Are you nuts? I'm already in Vietnam, why sink deeper into Laos? Hang around for 20 minutes looking at drainage and road way shoulders. Money launderers trying to make a quick kill. I pull out the big bucks - phony $1 million notes handed out by my bank back home as a promo and try to get some Dong. I mean, I have a dong, I just need more Dong -- you know, money.

    Drove back up the mountain back towards Khe Sanh past Lang Vei and a small reservoir to the left onto the Khe Sanh plateau, and boom, re-entered Khe Sanh. Saw a large bomb on the right side of the road. Stopped and took a look. Big goddamn bomb. Across the street was a junkyard filled with wreckage from the combat base. Owners each had 4 fingers missing from the same hand from trying to cut into a mortar shell. The surprising thing is they are still alive. They showed me where the accident took place and it was just in front of their home/house/shop on the side of the main road. So much for UXO. Lots of junk from the war. Strange business, strange people, produced strange feeling, Let's get the hell out of here.

    Got back in car and drive to the base. New museum being built, the highway to the base is under construction, what a pain. No heavy equipment, just hands-on by thousands of Vietnamese and, I suppose, Bru. Glad to see the Vietnamese trying to spruce things up a bit there. Needs an  American flag, I think; maybe just a small one. Doesn't look likely though. Leave the base and drive back to Khe Sanh Ville'. Accident between two trucks, didn't see it, but driver's seat on the highway. Did not see driver of either vehicle. Stop for a cold beer. Not cold but plenty of ice. Ice block being splintered into small fragments on bathroom floor. Oh, just great. How do,you like your beer? With typhoid or with -- oh, what's that other stupid water-borne disease? Cholera, that's it. Looking for Jerry Elliot, asked for the French fort, no one knows. I don't know whether they know but can't imagine why they don't know. Shirt sopping wet now, shirt tail out, hair -- well, not much hair a total wreck. Hot and no wind. But plenty more red dust from the highway as the trucks blowing their  horns pass through town at the speed of light. Lady moves a floor fan near us, cord now does not reach outlet but she points the fan in our direction anyway, smiles and sits back down; fan blades motionless.

    Hey, this international stuff just does not get any better than this: blaring trucks, red dust, a motion less fan, and typhoid beer! Paid for the beer, Dong back in my pocket; not that Dong, the money dong. Back in the car, start motor and we are off to find a restaurant near the French fort. Found the  restaurant OK, same as the morning: detritus and maybe a few human parts on the floor beneath the table. Old dog in the corner, too hot to move. Kids looking inside. Eat the usual white rice, rice paper, noodles, and greens. Pay up and blast off again. This time to the Dong Ha bypass, not built yet, that's what we are going to do. Turn off the road towards Con Thien, run smack dab into the new Ho Chi Minh highway. Thousands of people working. More dust. Not a bad drive, decide to look for the Con Thien base. Completely miss it and never found it, turn back and find the road back to Highway 1 and follow it south to Dong Ha, over the bridge. Pigs strapped upside down onto the seat of motorbikes for market, man on bicycle taking red plastic buckets to market piled 10 feet high on bike, accident between motorbike and pedestrian, everyone honking, trucks blaring, and peasants walking in middle of highway. "Make sound of horn," Hoang tells me. Dodging more people, swerve through side street to market, kid runs in front of car, sound of brakes and tires on pavement, what was in the backseat now in the front seat, arrive at hotel and slug down another beer, this time without ice. Never found the French fort. Shirt completely red with dust and sweat. Hair, still not much hair, a disaster. 

That was yesterday.
Not much help to you Donna. God bless you, Jerry.

Gary

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*****

    My name is Patrick Hall and I see you are the site Secretary. I just wanted to tell you that my hero is Mort Freedman who was a USAF Combat Controller at Khe Sanh. He earned the Silver Star at Kham Douc when the C-123 pilot Joe Jackson, earned the Medal of Honor. I entered the USAF in 1980 and went to Clark AB, Philippines. I've heard many Vietnam Vets ask how I made it back. I always found this odd, as I was not there, yet I think I know the answer now. All my NCOs were Vietnam Vets, who trained and taught me all they had to offer. Because of it, I am alive today. Your generation is still giving so much to this day. Mort lives in Angeles City, Philippines, and was in the Marine Corps during the Korean War. Whenever Marines stopped at Clark during my tenure of 1982-1984, Mort would have them all for dinner, it never mattered how many showed up. He pounded into our heads the honor and the courage of the Marines at Khe Sanh. I went to Coronado Island for scuba school with men from Recon. With them was a Gunnery Sergeant whom I told how blown away I was by the respect and admiration his men had for him. At the time I was an E-4 Senior Airman. He spent an entire weekend explaining his responsibilities to his men, which he   learned in Vietnam. The knowledge he learned in Vietnam, which he shared, shall last a lifetime. God Bless you Sir, and all the Marines, past present and future, 

Welcome Home.
Patrick Hall

P.S. You might find some people you know here,

http://hometown.aol.com/i-nnicreynolds/index.html.

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*****

Dear Jim Wodecki,

    Although you may not remember me, in Feb 2001 you helped my family and me search for information regarding the death of my brother, Noble Jackson. Noble was killed in action on 28 May 1967, during Operation Choctaw, in Thua Thien Province RVN, while serving with E Company 2/4, 2nd Platoon. You took time from your own life to help my mother and me research the archives of the 2nd Battalion, 4th Marines. Through your efforts we were able to locate former Marine, Robert Stefanellie. Robert resides in Brooklyn, NY, served with a 106 Recoilless Rifle Platoon, and was attached to E Company 2/4. We exchanged emails and learned we both resided on Staten Island, N.Y. We had lunch together, and he brought his 2/4 Marine book, along with his military records containing all the operations he and my brother went on together. I had also brought my brother's military records. We learned they were both very close. They left out of Kennedy Airport together right after Thanksgiving in 1966 and arrived in Vietnam together. While attached to E Co 2/4, Robert and Noble went on many operations together. Robert cried and told me what happened  the day, during Operation Choctaw when Noble was KIA. 

My family and I now know the circumstances surrounding my brother's death. We owe it all to you for doing the original research. I do not now feel the pain and emptiness that was my companion for 35 years. I salute you and your family for helping my family finally bring closure to my brother's death. You finally brought peace to my mother's heart. 

Again, thanks, may you and your family enjoy the holidays and God Bless and keep you, 

Sincerely yours, 
Teddy Jackson and Family 

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