BUKHARIN IS ALERT AND LUCID AT HIS TRIAL AND
DENIES SOME ACCUSATIONS
During the trial's dozens of hours,
Bukharin was perfectly lucid and alert, discussing, contesting, sometimes
humorous, vehemently denying certain accusations.
Martens,
Ludo. Another View of Stalin.
SOLZHENITSYN
WORKED WITH REACTIONARIES AND SUPPORTED TRAITOROUS GENERALS
We would like to open a brief
parenthesis for Solzhenitsyn. This man
became the official voice for the five per cent of Tsarists, bourgeois,
speculators, kulaks, pimps, maffiosi and Vlasovites, all justifiably repressed
by the socialist state.
Solzhenitsyn the literary hack lived
through a cruel dilemna during the Nazi occupation. Chauvinist, he hated the German
invaders. But he hated socialism even
more passionately. So he had a soft spot
for General Vlasov, the most famous of the Nazi collaborators. Although Solzhenitsyn did not approve of
Vlasov's flirt with Hitler, he was laudatory about his hatred of Bolshevism.
Martens,
Ludo. Another View of Stalin.
Solzhenitsyn's politics are those of
the extreme right in the West. He is
opposed to detente, to wars of national liberation, to multiparty parliamentary
forms. He advocates an active and
aggressive Western offensive against the
Szymanski,
Albert. Human Rights in the
SOME
PEOPLE ARE EXPELLED AND READMITTED MANY TIMES
Riz, lieutenant-captain in the navy,
was the head of the clandestine movement in the
Martens, Ludo. Another View of Stalin.
[Footnote]: Frumkin. Vice-Commissar for Foreign Trade since 1928,
having also held that post from 1924 to 1926.
An old Bolshevik and member of the armed underground in 1906, he was
accused by Stalin of "opportunist, right-wing deviations" at the
November 1928 Plenum of the Communist Party Central Committee. Removed from Office in 1930, he was again
appointed to the Commissariat for Foreign Trade two years later.
Litvinov,
Maksim Maksimovich. Notes for a Journal.
[Footnote]: Serebryakov. Former Secretary of the Central Committee of
the Communist Party, 1919-20 and later Commissar for Communications. Expelled from the party in 1927; reinstated
in 1930; tried and executed in 1937.
Litvinov,
Maksim Maksimovich. Notes for a Journal.
Radek: He returned to
Litvinov,
Maksim Maksimovich. Notes for a Journal.
It was logical that sooner or later
the factional activities of the opposition which in themselves endangered the revolution
by attempting to undermine the party's authority--would lead to open
counter-revolutionary acts. This was the
case on Nov. 7, 1927, on the occasion of the Tenth Anniversary of the
Revolution.
On this date the leaders of the
opposition attempted to organize a demonstration against the Central Committee
of the Party and the Soviet Government.
After such an act the question of their expulsion was unavoidable.
On December 18, 1927, 75 leading
members of the opposition were expelled from the Party. Later Zinoviev and Kamenev again
"recanted," and were readmitted to the Party, only to be again
expelled in 1932 for duplicity and deceiving the Party.
Once more, in 1933, Zinoviev and
Kamenev publicly renounced their views, and just prior to the Seventeenth Party
Congress, in 1934, were readmitted to the Party--at a time when, as subsequent
events showed, they were organizing the murder of Kirov and plotting the murder
of Stalin and others....
All their "recantations"
and "pledges" turned out to be double-faced dealing. Events proved that they never gave up their
struggle. Their thirst for power took
them along the path to terrorism.
Shepherd,
W. G. The
He [Zinoviev] was nominal head of
the Troika in 1924. In 1925, he joined
with Trotsky's Left Opposition and was expelled from the CPSU by the 15th Party
Congress in December 1927. Sent to
He [Kamenev] was a member of the
Troika with Zinoviev and Stalin but was expelled from the CPSU in 1927. He recanted, was readmitted, and like
Zinoviev, he again was expelled, recanted, and was readmitted in 1932.
Bazhanov,
Boris. Bazhanov and the Damnation of Stalin.
Kamenev--Soviet
revisionist politician; USSR Commissar Of Trade (1926-27); Minister to Italy
(1927); leader of Trotskyist opposition (1926-28); expelled from CPSU (1927);
readmitted (1928); Chairman, Main Concessions Committee (1929); again expelled
from party (1932); again readmitted (1933); expelled from party for third time
(1934); sentenced to imprisonment for terrorism (1935); sentenced to death for
treason and executed (1936).
In 1921 he [Radek] was made secretary
of the Comintern. In December 1927, at
the 15th Party Congress, he was expelled from the CPSU for "Left
Oppositionism" and was banished to the Urals but soon recanted and was
reinstated. In 1932 he was the
Comintern representative in
From 1921-26 he [Sokolnikov] was
deputy, then chairman, of Narkomfin, but his descent began in 1925 when he
joined with Zinoviev, Kamenev, and Krupskaya in opposition to Stalin. He was sent to the
Bazhanov,
Boris. Bazhanov and the Damnation of Stalin.
In 1925 he [Evdokimov] joined the
Central Committee and was a strong supporter of Trotsky in 1927. He was expelled from the Party in 1935,
recanted and was readmitted to the Party, then was purged with Zinoviev and
Kamenev and executed in 1936.
Bazhanov,
Boris. Bazhanov and the Damnation of Stalin.
Uglanov--Commissar of Labor
(1928-30): expelled from Party (1932); reinstated in the Party (1934):
re-expelled from the Party, arrested, tried for and found guilty of anti-Soviet
activity, and sentenced to imprisonment (1936)
Bukharin--Editor of Pravda
(1918-29); editor of Bolshevik (1924-29); editor of Izvestia (1934-37); Member
of Politburo (1924-29); President of Communist International (1926-29);
expelled from Party to (1929); readmitted to Party (1934); arrested (1937)
Kamenev--member of Politburo
(1919-25); expelled from Party (1927); readmitted to Party (1928); re-expelled
from the Party (1932); arrested (1935); sentenced for being guilty of moral
complicity in the murder of Kirov (1935); found guilty of actual complicity in
the murder of Kirov (1936)
Ryutin--expelled from the Party
(1930); acquitted of counter-revolutionary activity and readmitted to the Party
(1931); published the Ryutin Manifesto for the Opposition (1932); re-expelled from
the Party (1932); arrested and imprisoned (1932); retried for, and found guilty
of, treason (1937)
Zinoviev--President of Communist
International (1919-26); member of Politburo (1921-26); expelled from the Party
(1927); readmitted to the Party (1928); re-expelled (1932); readmitted (1933);
re-expelled (1934); arrested (1935) and tried for, and found guilty of moral
complicity in the murder of Kirov; tried for and found guilty of actual
complicity in murder of Kirov (1936)
Zinoviev--
Soviet revisionist politician; Member, Politburo, Central Committee of the CPSU
(1925); headed Leningrad opposition (1926); expelled from CPSU (1927);
readmitted (1928); again expelled from Party (1932); again readmitted (1933);
imprisoned for terrorism (1935); sentenced to death and executed for treason
(1936).
Lominadze--Secretary of Communist
Youth International (1925-26); expelled from Party for factionalism (1927);
reinstated in Party and again expelled (1936); found guilty of treason (193
Throughout [until] 1937, ex-Party
leaders who had been demoted, expelled, or sent into exile, were routinely
brought back into leadership positions.
Once they criticized their past practices they were released from
banishment (for example, many of Trotsky's supporters, including numerous
former supporters of the United Opposition of 1926-27, were released in 1928,
after they had endorsed the new rapid industrialization line of the Party) and
restored to a high level positions in the Party and state. For example, Bukharin, Zinoviev, Kamenev,
Rykov, Tomsky, leaders of the various oppositional factions in the Party in the
1924-29 period, were restored to leadership positions-- although never to the
powerful positions they once held.
Bukharin, for example, lost his important posts in 1929 including
membership on the Politburo, the editorship of Pravda and the chairmanship of
the Comintern for actively opposing the collectivization and rapid
industrialization campaign. In the
relatively tolerant climate during 1932-34, however, he was first made director
of the research department of heavy industry and then given the responsible
post of editor of Izvestia, which he held from 1934 to 1937. Tomsky, although he lost his position as
leader of the trade unions and his seat on the Politburo (for the same reasons
that Bukharin lost his position), remained on the Central Committee of the
Party, and was re-elected at the 16th Party Congress in 1930. At the 17th Party Congress in 1934 both
Tomsky & Bukharin were elected as candidate members of the Central
Committee, as were other prominent, past opponents of the prevailing party
policies (for example, Rykov), and one of them, Pyatakov, was elected as a full
member. Zinoviev and Kamenev who,
together with Stalin, had represented the maximal leadership of the Party in
1924-26, were removed from the Politburo and other leading positions, and in
1927 they were expelled from the Party for active opposition, including
organizing street demonstrations to oppose the Party's continuing endorsement
of the moderate New Economic Policy. In
1928, when most of their earlier critique was finally incorporated into the
Party's new program of rapid industrialization and collectivization, they were
both re-admitted and assigned relatively minor official posts. In 1932, they were once again expelled (and
arrested) for oppositional activities, but again in the tolerant atmosphere
prior to the
Szymanski,
Albert. Human Rights in the
Bukharin was expelled from the
Politburo in 1929, and although appointed editor of Izvestia, the official
government newspaper, in 1934, he never regained his previous power or
influence....
Richardson,
Rosamond. Stalin’s Shadow.
Mdivani--
Georgian nationalist politician; expelled from party for Trotskyism (1928);
reinstated (1931); again expelled (1936); sentenced to death for treason and
executed (1937).
[At the
closed joint meeting of the ECCI party organization and the ECCI Komsomol
organization on 28 December 1934]
HECKERT : But Zinoviev is very well known. For many years he duped the Comintern with
his theory of two perspectives. He was
expelled from the party three times, and three times he appealed [for
readmission]. Three times he betrayed
the friends to whom he was tied. And
such an educated man as Magyar considered Zinoviev a distinguished personality,
from whom he received advice. I am
completely unable to understand it.
Chase,
William J., Enemies Within the Gates?, translated by Vadim A. Staklo,
The pair [Zinoviev and Kamenev] had
been expelled from the party in 1927 and readmitted in 1928, only to be
re-expelled, and exiled within the
McNeal,
Robert, Stalin: Man and Ruler.
INCOMPETENT
PARTY LEADERS ARE EXPELLING AND PURGING THE WRONG PEOPLE
In January 1938, the Central
Committee published a resolution on how the purge was taking place. It reaffirmed the necessity of vigilance and
repression against enemies and spies.
But it most criticized the “false vigilance” of some Party Secretaries
who were attacking the base to protect their own position. It starts as follows:
“The VKP(b) Central Committee plenum
considers it necessary to direct the attention of party organizations and their
leaders to the fact that while carrying out their major effort to purge their
ranks of Trotskyite-rightist agents of fascism they are committing serious
errors and perversions which interfere with the business of purging the party
of double dealers, spies, and wreckers.
Despite the frequent directives and warnings of the VKP(b) Central
Committee, in many cases the party organizations adopt a completely incorrect
approach and expel Communists from the party in a criminally frivolous way.”
Robert H. McNeal, editor,
Resolutions and Decisions of the Communist Party of the
Martens,
Ludo. Another View of Stalin.
...Yes, some Communists were
unjustly hit, and crimes were committed during the purge. But, with great foresight, Stalin had already
denounced these problems when the operation had only been running for six
months. Eighteen years later, Khrushchev
would use as a pretext the criminal activities of these provocateurs and
careerists, denounced at the time by Stalin, to denigrate the purge itself and
to insult Stalin!
Martens,
Ludo. Another View of Stalin.
Shortly before the Central Committee
Plenum of January 1938, the press attacked the "false vigilance" of
party secretaries who had victimized rank-and-file members to cover
themselves. The January 1938 plenum
produced a resolution that took a hard line against "certain careerist
Communists who are striving to become prominent and to be promoted by
recommending expulsions from the party through the repression of party members,
who are striving to insure themselves against possible charges of inadequate
vigilance through the indiscriminate repression of party members." This type of person "feels it
unnecessary to make an objective evaluation of the accusations submitted
against the Communist," "indiscriminately spreads panic about enemies
of the people" and "is willing to expel dozens of members from the
party on false grounds just to appear vigilant himself."
According to the resolution, such
persons adopt "a completely incorrect approach, and expel Communists from
the party in a criminally frivolous way."
The resolution states, "There have been many instances of party
organizations, without any verification and thus without any basis, expelling
Communists from the party, depriving them of their jobs, frequently even
declaring them enemies of the people without any foundation, acting lawlessly
and arbitrarily toward party members....
It is time to understand that
Bolshevik vigilance consists essentially in the ability to unmask an enemy
regardless of how clever and artful he may be, regardless of how he decks
himself out, and not in indiscriminate or “on the off-chance’ expulsions, by
the tens and hundreds, of everyone who comes within reach."
...The resolution gave several
examples in which many expulsions from 1935-36 had been reversed by the higher
party bodies or the Party Control Commission.
The "heartless, bureaucratic attitude" on the part of the
local party leaders allowed this to take place.
Leaders were not considering their people on a "careful individual
basis" and instead were "acting in an intolerably arbitrary
manner."
Getty, A.
Origins of the Great Purges.
In his final comment on the mistakes
of the cleaning operations,
It might seem that such righteous
indignation [at these plenums] after the operation was at least hypocritical
and that, by speaking out at this late date, the leadership was trying to shift
the blame for the repression that they themselves had encouraged or
tolerated. This is the general
explanation for these remarks given by most students of the period. Its flaw, however, is that these criticisms
had been voiced many times before, even during the cleaning operations
themselves. The Central Committee had
taken a stand on these errors at least as early as March 1936 (when, according
to Khrushchev-era party histories, the first complaints from party members
reached Pravda and the Central Committee).
Indirect evidence even suggests that the matter was discussed in the
Central Committee as early as December 1935, in connection with Yezhov's report
on the proverka. Stalin associated his
name with the criticism as early as June 1936 and strongly condemned the
"outrageous practices," including even indiscriminate approaches to
Trotskyists, in his speech to the February plenum in 1937. An attack on the local leaders responsible
for these mistakes was the main topic at the January 1938 plenum, whose
resolution finally led to a reversal of many of the errors. It was not that the Central Committee had
been silent all the time, but rather that its admonitions had been ignored by
local secretaries.
Getty, A.
Origins of the Great Purges.
PEOPLE
UNJUSTLY EXPELLED AND PURGED APPEALED AND WERE READMITTED
Even before the 1938 Plenum, there
were 53,700 appeals against expulsions.
In August 1938, there were 101,233 appeals. At that time, out of a total of 154,933
appeals, the Party committees had already examined 85,273, of which 54 per cent
were readmitted.
J. Arch Getty, Origins of the Great
Purges: The Soviet Communist Party Reconsidered, 1933--1938 (New York:
Cambridge University Press, 1985), p. 190.
Martens,
Ludo. Another View of Stalin.
It [Pravda] noted that, before the
January 1938 plenum, there had been 53,700 appeals under consideration. Since the plenum, an additional 101,233 had
been submitted, making a total of 154,933.
Of these, party committees had so far examined 85,273, and 54 percent
(46,047) of those appealing had been readmitted.
Getty, A.
Origins of the Great Purges.
PURGES
WERE NECESSARY AND SAVED THE SU FROM THE FIFTH COLUMNISTS AND DEFEAT
It is precisely because of the purge
and the education campaign that accompanied it that the Soviet people found the
strength to resist. If that steadfast
will to oppose the Nazis by all means had not existed, it is obvious that the
fascists would have taken Stalingrad,
Martens,
Ludo. Another View of Stalin.
Footnote: In his book Only the Stars
Are Neutral, written after ten weeks in
Knightley,
Phillip. The First Casualty.
BEFORE
HITLER
Until Hitler's coming to power,
Martens,
Ludo. Another View of Stalin.
STALIN
DISTRUSTS REPORTS OF GERMAN AGGRESSIVE ACTS
On June 13, Marshal Timoshenko
phoned Stalin to place the troops on alert.
“We will think it over,” Stalin replied.
The next day, Timoshenko and Zhukov came back. Stalin told them.
“You propose carrying out
mobilization, alerting the troops and moving them to the Western borders? That means war! Do you two understand that or not?!'
Zhukov replied that, according to
their intelligence services, the mobilization of the German divisions was
complete. Stalin replied:
“You can't believe everything in
intelligence reports.”
Martens,
Ludo. Another View of Stalin.
Recalling and analyzing all of
Stalin's conversations with people close to him I have come to the firm
conclusion that all his thoughts and deeds were dictated by the desire to avoid
war and the confidence that he would succeed in that.
Today our attention is being
concentrated, especially in popular mass publications, on the warnings received
that preparations were being made for an attack on the
On February 15, 1941, acting on
instructions from Hitler given at a conference on Feb. 3, 1941, Field Marshal
Keitel, Chief of Staff of the Supreme High Command, issued a special
"Directive for Misinforming the Enemy". In order to conceal preparations for the
Barbarossa operation, the intelligence and counter-intelligence division of the
General Staff evolved and carried out numerous operations in spreading false
rumors and information. It was leaked
out that the movement of troops to the East was part of the "greatest
misinformation maneuver in history designed to distract attention from final
preparation for the invasion of
Maps of
Information of this kind along with
the shortcomings in the general combat readiness of the Soviet armed forces
explain the extreme caution Stalin displayed when it came to carrying out the
basic measures contemplated in the operational-mobilization plans regarding
preparations for repulsing possible aggression.
While wishing to preserve peace as
the decisive condition for building socialism in the USSR, Stalin saw that the
governments of Britain and the United States were doing everything possible to
incite Hitler to make war on the Soviet Union, that Britain and other Western
countries, being in a critical military situation and striving to save
themselves from catastrophe, were extremely interested in a German attack on
the USSR. That was why Stalin was so
distrustful about information from Western governments that
Zhukov,
Georgii. Memoirs of Marshal Zhukov.
On June 13, Marshall Timoshenko
phoned Stalin in my presence and asked permission to give orders for the troops
of the border Districts to be alerted and the first echelons deployed according
to the plans for protection. "We
will think it over," Stalin replied.
The next day we again went to Stalin
and informed him of the anxiety in the Districts and the necessity of putting
the troops into full combat readiness.
"You propose carrying out mobilization,
alerting the troops and moving them to the Western borders? That means war! Do you two understand that or not?!"
But then Stalin asked, nevertheless:
"How many divisions have we got in the Baltic, Western,
We told him that by June 1 there
would be 149 divisions....
"Well, isn't that
enough?" Stalin said. "According to our information the
Germans do not have so many troops."
I informed him that according to
intelligence information the German divisions were manned and armed on a
wartime footing. The strength of a
division came from 14 to 16,000 men. Our
divisions, even those of 8000 men, were actually only half as strong as the
German divisions.
Stalin remarked: "You can't
believe everything in intelligence reports."
Zhukov,
Georgii. Memoirs of Marshal Zhukov.
We were categorically forbidden to
move up any troops to the front line under the border protection plan without
Stalin's personal permission.
On June 21, in the evening,
Lieutenant-General Purkayev, Chief of Staff of the Kiev Military District,
telephoned to inform me that a German sergeant-major had crossed over to our
frontier guards and declared that German troops were moving up to the departure
areas for an attack which was to begin on the morning of June 22.
I at once informed the Commissar for
Defense and Stalin what Lieutenant-General Purkayev had reported. Stalin said:
"Come to the Kremlin with the
Commissar."
Taking with me a draft of the
directive for the troops, I went to the Kremlin along with the Commissar and
Lieutenant-General Vatutin. On the way
we agreed that at all costs we must get permission to alert the troops.
Stalin was alone when he received
us. He was plainly worried.
"But perhaps the German
generals sent this deserter to provoke a conflict?" He asked.
"No," we replied. "We think the deserter is telling the
truth."
At that moment members of the
Politburo came in.
"What are we to do?" Stalin asked.
No one answered.
"A directive must immediately
be given to alert all the troops of border Districts," the Commissar said.
"Read it!" Stalin replied.
I read the draft directive. Stalin said:
"It's too soon to give such a
directive--perhaps the question can still be settled peacefully. We must give a short directive stating that
an attack may begin with provocative actions by the German forces. The troops of the border Districts must not
be incited by any provocation, in order to avoid complications."
Without losing time Vatutin and I
went into the next room and quickly drew up a draft of the directive to be sent
by the Commissar.
We then went back to the office and
asked for permission to read the directive.
Stalin listened to the draft
directive and then read it over again himself, making some amendments, and gave
it to the Commissar to sign.
Vatutin at once took this directive
to the General Staff to have it immediately transmitted to the Districts. Transmission to the Districts was completed
at 00:30, June 22, 1941. A copy of the
directive was forwarded to the People's Commissar of the Naval Forces.
Timoshenko and I were returning from
Stalin with some odd feeling of duality.
On the one hand, it seemed we had
been doing everything we could to meet the imminent military threat with
maximum preparedness: a number of large-scale organizational measures were
carried out in the line of mobilization and strategy; everything possible was
done to strengthen the western military districts which would have to be the
first to engage the enemy; at last, we were authorized that day to issue a
directive alerting the troops of the frontier military districts.
On the other hand, the German troops
could pass to the offensive the next morning, while we had not completed a
number of most important measures. This
would seriously impede the struggle with the experienced and strong enemy. The directive that the General Staff was
transmitting to the military districts at that time could come too late.
About midnight [on June 21] the commander
of the Kiev District, Kirponos reported over the H. F. (high-frequency
telephone) from his command post at Ternopol that another German soldier had
appeared in our lines besides the deserter previously mentioned by Gen.
Purkayev. He was from the 222nd Infantry
Regiment of the 74th Infantry Division.
Swimming across the river, he presented himself to our frontier guards
and told them German forces were going to mount an offensive at 4 a.m.. Kirponos was ordered to speed up transmission
to all units of the directive calling for alert status.
Everything was now pointing to the
fact that German forces were moving up to the frontier. At 30 minutes past midnight we notified
Stalin. Stalin inquired whether the
directive had been sent to all districts.
I replied in the affirmative.
Various stories have appeared after
Stalin's death to the effect that on the night of June 21 some commanders and
their staffs had been either peacefully asleep or even making merry without an
inkling of suspicion that anything was amiss.
This is not true in fact. The ut
three minutes later Stalin picked up the receiver.
I reported the situation and
requested permission to start retaliation.
Stalin was silent. The only thing
I could hear was the sound of his breathing.
"Do you understand me?"
Silence again.
At last Stalin asked:
"Where is the Commissar for
Defense?"
"Talking with the Kiev District
on the H. F."
"Go to the Kremlin with
Timoshenko. Tell Poskrebyshev to summon
all Politburo members."
At 4:30 a.m. all the Politburo
members were assembled. The Commissar
for Defense and I were called in.
Stalin, his face white, was sitting at the table cradling a
tobacco-filled pipe in his hand. After
some time he said:
"We must immediately phone the
German Embassy."
The Embassy replied that Ambassador
Schulenburg was anxious to deliver an urgent message.
Molotov was authorized to receive
the Ambassador.
Meanwhile, the First Deputy Chief of
Staff, General Vatutin, had passed word that following a strong artillery barrage
on several sectors in the north-western and western directions German land
forces had mounted an assault.
A while later Molotov hastened into
the office and said:
"The German Government has
declared war on us."
Stalin sank down into his chair and lost
himself in thought.
There was a long and pregnant pause.
... "Issue a directive,"
said Stalin.
Zhukov,
Georgii. Memoirs of Marshal Zhukov.
Despite German efforts at
concealment and disinformation, designed to lull Soviet intelligence into
thinking that the military preparations were for the war with
Overy, R.
J. Russia's War: Blood Upon the Snow.
STALIN
ORDERED THE ATTACK DIRECTIVE BE WRITTEN BUT THE ATTACK DID NOT HAPPEN
Zhukov proposed that the enemy units
should be attacked immediately. Stalin told
him to write up the directive, which was sent at 7:15. But “considering the balance of forces and
the situation obtaining it proved plainly unrealistic---and was therefore never
carried out.”
G.
Zhukov, Reminiscences and Reflections (Moscow: Progress, 1985), vol. 2, p. 282
Martens,
Ludo. Another View of Stalin.
KHRUSHCHOV
LIED WHEN HE SAID STALIN ORDERED NO RETURN FIRE
Khrushchev's affirmation that Stalin
had “issued the order that the German fire was not to be returned” is clearly
false.
Martens,
Ludo. Another View of Stalin.
NAZIS
VIEWED COMMUNISTS AND MARXISTS AS THE MAIN ENEMY
Note that discussion refers to a
“final solution,” but not against the Jews.
The first promises of a “war of annihilation” and of “physical
destruction” were addressed to the Communists.
And, sure enough, the Bolsheviks, the Soviets, were the first victims of
mass extermination.
General Nagel wrote in September
1941:
“Unlike the diet for other prisoners
(i.e. British and
Alan
Clark, La Guerre l'Est (Paris: Robert Laffont, 1966), p. 250.
Martens,
Ludo. Another View of Stalin.
In the
Arno
Mayer, Why Did the Heavens Not Darken? The “Final Solution’ in History. (New
York: Pantheon Books, 1988), p. 349.
Martens,
Ludo. Another View of Stalin.
There were 3,289,000 Soviet
prisoners of war, dead in the concentration camps, “while travelling” or under
“various circumstances”! When epidemics
took place in the barracks of Soviet prisoners, Nazi guards only entered with
flame-throwing teams when, “for hygiene reasons,” the dying and dead were
burned along with their lice-ridden beds.
There can easily have been 5,000,000 assassinated prisoners, if we take
into account the Soviet soldiers who were “simply killed on the spot” when they
surrendered.
Alan
Clark, La Guerre l'Est (Paris: Robert Laffont, 1966), p. 251.
Martens,
Ludo. Another View of Stalin.
Therefore the first extermination
campaigns, in fact the biggest, were against the Soviet peoples, including
Soviet Jews. The peoples of the
Until the invasion of the
Martens,
Ludo. Another View of Stalin.
This reality, of the unbelievable
terror that the Nazis practiced in the
In a remarkable book, Arno J. Mayer,
whose father was left-Zionist, shows that the extermination of the Jews only
began once the Nazis had, for the first time, suffered heavy losses. It was in June--July 1941, against the Red
Army. The bestiality against the
Communists, followed by the unexpected defeats that demolished the sentiment of
invincibility of the Ubermenschen (Supermen), created the atmosphere that led
to the Holocaust.
“The Judeocide was forged in the
fires of a stupendous war to conquer unlimited Lebensraum from
Arno
Mayer, Why Did the Heavens Not Darken? The ``Final Solution'' in History (New
York: Pantheon Books, 1988), p. 234.
Martens,
Ludo. Another View of Stalin.
...Once the Nazis had to face the
defeats on the Russian front, they decided on a “global and final solution” of
the “Jewish problem” during the Wannsee conference of January 20, 1942.
For years, the Nazis had put forward
their hatred of “Judeo-Bolshevism,” Bolshevism having been the worst invention
of the Jews. The determined resistance of
the Bolsheviks prevented the Hitlerians from finishing off their principal
enemy. So the latter turned their
frustations on the Jews, whom they exterminated with blind fury.
Martens,
Ludo. Another View of Stalin.
the Nazis were the greatest enemy of world communism.
Service,
Robert. Stalin.
In
Parenti,
Michael. Blackshirts and Reds, San
Francisco: City Light Books, 1997, p. 6
STALIN
CONSULTED AND LISTENED TO OTHER GENERALS IN THE WAR
During the entire war, General
Shtemenko worked for the Chief of Staff, first as Chief of Operations, then as
under-Chief of Staff.
“I must say that Stalin did not
decide and did not like to decide for himself important questions about the
war. He understood perfectly well the
necessity of collective work in this complex area, he recognized those who were
experts on such and such a military problem, took into account their opinion
and gave each their due.”
ChtEmenko,
L'tat-Major gEnEral soviEtique en guerre (Moscow: ditions du ProgrŹs, 1976),
vol. 2, p. 319.
Martens,
Ludo. Another View of Stalin.
Zhukov wrote subsequently:
"Today, after Stalin's death, the idea is current that he never heeded
anybody's advice and decided questions of military policy all by himself. I can't agree with it. When he realized that the person reporting
knew what he was talking about, he would listen, and I know cases when he reconsidered
his own opinions and decisions. This was
the case in many operations.
Grey,
Ian. Stalin, Man of History.
But Stalin's independence was not
tinged with smugness. He had a large
group of advisers, and he listened to them.
I personally had occasion to observe that he had great respect for
technical experts, among others.
Tuominen,
Arvo, The Bells of the Kremlin:
He set great store by the work of
the General Staff, and trusted it implicitly.
As a rule, he never adopted important decisions without first looking
into the General Staff’s analytic situation report and its proposals.
Zhukov,
Georgi. Reminiscences and Reflections Vol. 1.
The activity of the Supreme Command
is indissolubly associated with Stalin's name.
I met him often during the war.
Mostly, those were formal occasions at which issues related to the
conduct of the war were dealt with. But
many important issues were decided at dinners to which Stalin invited his
associates. What I liked about Stalin
was the complete absence of formalism.
Everything that he did in the framework of the Supreme Command or the
State Defense Committee led to the immediate fulfillment of any decisions that
these bodies may have taken. And
fulfillment was closely controlled by the Supreme Commander himself or, on his
instructions, by one of his subordinates.
True, such practice imposed a heavy
physical burden on the members of the Supreme Command in the State Defense
Committee, but people gave no heed to that during the war. Everyone did his utmost and his best. Everyone took the cue from Stalin, and the
latter, despite his age, was always active and buoyant. When the war ended and his day’s work became
relatively routine, he seemed to grow old at once, to become less mobile, still
more taciturn and thoughtful. The past
war and everything related to it had a strong and visible effect on him.
Zhukov,
Georgi. Reminiscences and Reflections Vol. 1.
After Stalin's death, the idea
became current that he alone took decisions on questions of a military and
strategic nature. I cannot agree with
this. I have already mentioned above
that when someone who had a good knowledge of the matter made a report to him,
he would take notice of it. I even know
of cases when he changed his mind with respect to decisions previously
taken. This was the case in particular,
to the schedule of many operations.
Zhukov,
Georgi. Reminiscences and Reflections Vol. 2.
STALIN’S
REASONS FOR NOT VISITING THE FRONT DURING THE WAR ARE JUSTIFIED
As for General Shtemenko, he
directly addressed Khrushchev's accusation that Stalin, not visiting the front,
could not know the realities of war.
“The Supreme Commander could not, in
our opinion, visit the fronts more frequently.
It would have been an unforgivably lightheaded act to abandon, even for
a short period, the General Headquarters, to decide a partial question on a
single front.”
Chtemenko,
L'Etat-Major general sovietique en guerre (Moscow: Editions du ProgrŹs, 1976),
vol. 2, p. 354.
Martens,
Ludo. Another View of Stalin.
Hitler issued an order that 'the
Kremlin was to be blown up to signalize the overthrow of Bolshevism'....
He [Stalin] was, incidentally, to
remain thus voluntarily immured in the Kremlin throughout the war. Not once, so it seems, did he seek direct
personal contact with his troops in the field.
Trotsky in the civil war moved in his legendary train from front to
front, exploring, sometimes under the enemy's fire, advanced positions and
checking tactical arrangements.
Churchill mixed with his soldiers in the African desert and on the
Deutscher,
Isaac. Stalin; A Political Biography.
I have heard a variety of opinions
about Stalin’s personal knowledge of life at the front. In fact, as already mentioned, he visited the
Western and the Kalinin Fronts in August 1943.
The journey by car took two days and certainly had an impact on the
morale of the troops....
In my view, Stalin as head of the
Party and the country as a whole had no pressing need to make such trips. The best thing for the front and the country
was his presence in the Party Central Committee and the GHQ, to which led all
telephone and telegraph communications and all manner of information. Front commanders regularly reported to him on
the situation at the front and on all substantial changes in that
situation. Thus, the Supreme high
Commander had extensive information every day, and sometimes every hour on the
course of the war, the needs and difficulties of front commands; and he could,
while in
Vasilevskii,
Aleksandr M. A Lifelong Cause.
Stalin has been criticized by some observers
(not generals) for not visiting his troops on the battlefield. General Shtemenko comments: 'It seems to me
that Stalin could not visit the front lines more often than he did. It would have been unpardonably negligent for
the Supreme Commander to lay aside overall leadership even for a time so as to
decide particular problems on one of the Fronts. (In the summer of 1943 Stalin made a visit to
the front lines, first to the command post of General Sokolovsky and then to
that of General Eremenko.)
Axell,
Albert. Stalin's War: Through the Eyes of His Commanders.
CHURCHILL
BLASTS TROTSKY AND HIS IMMENSE EGO
It is probable that Trotsky never
comprehended the Marxian creed: but of its drill-book he was the incomparable
master. He possessed in his nature all
the qualities requisite for the art of civic destruction--the organizing
command of a Carnot, the cold detached intelligence of Machiavelli, the mob
oratory of a Cleon, the ferocity of Jack the Ripper, the toughness of Titus
Oates. No trace of compassion, no sense
of human kinship, no apprehension of the spiritual, weakened his high and
tireless capacity for action. Like the cancer
bacillus he grew, he fed, he tortured, he slew in fulfillment of his nature. He found a wife who shared the Communist
faith. She worked and plotted at his
side. She shared his first exile to
... All the collectivism in the
world could not rid him [Trotsky] of an egoism which amounted to a disease, and
to a fatal disease. He must not only
ruin the State, he must rule the ruins thereafter. Every system of government of which he was
not the head or almost the head was odious to him. The Dictatorship of the Proletariat to him
meant that he was to be obeyed without question. He was to do the dictating on behalf of the
proletariat. “The toiling masses,” the
“Councils of Workmen, Peasants and Soldiers,” the gospel and revelation of Karl
Marx, the Federal Union of Socialist Soviet Republics, etc., to him were all
spelt in one word: Trotsky.
Churchill,
Winston. Great Contemporaries.
The Army must be remade; victory
must be won; and Trotsky must do it and Trotsky must profit from it.... He used his exceptional prowess to the
full. The officers and soldiers of the
new model army were fed, clothed and treated better than anyone else in
Churchill,
Winston. Great Contemporaries.
REVOLUTIONARY
INTELLECTUALS OFTEN PUT THEIR EGOS ABOVE THE CAUSE
...But the revolutionary
intellectuals, time and again in moments of crisis, have shown their tendency
to put personal prestige before everything else, and to fight to the bitter end
against political opponents, even if this sacrifices the very principles that
they were verbally accepting.
Pritt,
Denis Nowell. The Moscow Trial was Fair.
It a surely of such men that Mao was
thinking when he wrote: "All wisdom comes from the masses. I've always said that intellectuals are the
most lacking in intellect. The
intellectuals cock their tails in the air, and they think, 'If I don't rank No.
1 in all the world, then I'm at least No. 2.'"
Spence,
Jonathan D. Mao Zedong.
1936
TRIAL WAS NO FRAME-UP
And now as to the "frame
up." The actual question is: Why
did 16 accused men all confess guilt, participate in a lively way in the court
proceedings, and show all their old capacity for public speaking and repartee,
and yet plead "Guilty"?
It is not because they had been
rotting in dungeons or anything of that kind.
Actually, the most recently arrested of the accused were at liberty in
the
No--the fact is this: The prisoners
had four alternatives. First, to plead
innocent. Second, to plead
guilty--making political speeches against the Soviet government, the
"Stalinist bureaucracy," and justifying their crime. Third, to plead guilty and say no more. Fourthly, to confess, and give a full account
of their activities. Besides these
possibilities, there was no other way open to them--except suicide, the way
chosen by Tomsky alone.
To plead innocent was impossible
because the proofs were overwhelming, and all these people knew this. They knew what additional evidence could be
brought against them if they tried to prove their innocence.
To attack the Soviet government and
the "Stalinist bureaucracy" was impossible--because for nearly 10 years
now these people have had absolutely no political policy to oppose to that of
Stalin. The fact is that Stalin's policy
is a success, and this has robbed his opponents of every excuse of a political
attack. This fact is openly admitted by
the accused.
And so, before all the men, against
whom the proofs were overwhelming, who had no policy, there was the one
possibility of pleading Guilty--with, or without, details of their crime.
Pritt,
Denis Nowell. The Moscow Trial was Fair.
The newspaper, the
"Observer" of August 23, no lover of the Bolsheviks, "old
guard" or new, was bound to conclude:--
"Stalin is now the acknowledged
leader of the unified party, whose prestige in the country is now unquestioned.
"The defendants admitted
frankly that they resorted to individual terror as a last resort, fully knowing
that disaffection in the country now is not sufficiently strong to bring them
into power by any other way....
"It is futile to think the
trial was staged and the charges trumped up.
The Government's case against the defendants is genuine."
Pritt,
Denis Nowell. The Moscow Trial was Fair.
ALBANIAN
ECONOMIC POLICY WAS SUCCESS WITHIN STALIN’S LINES
The Editor [of this book, Jon
Halliday] says, “Overall, Albanian economic policy has been a success, within
rather rigid traditional Stalinist lines.
Food self-sufficiency, in particular, has allowed the state considerable
political leeway.”
Hoxha,
Enver. The Artful Albanian.
VYSHINSKY
TELLS HOXHA THAT TITOISM IS NOT SOCIALISM
"The object of this
meeting," said Vyshinsky in general outline, "is to exchange our
experience and reveal our joint knowledge about the betrayal of the Yugoslav
Titoites, about their undermining activity against our countries, parties and
socialism, and to define the method of combating and unmasking their deviation
which is dangerous for communism in general and for the Yugoslav Communist
Party and socialism in Yugoslavia in particular."
Hoxha,
Enver. The Artful Albanian.
[Vyshinsky said to Hoxha,]
"...Their activity is identical with the activities of the Trotskyites,
Bukharinites and agents of world capital whom we have unmasked in our
trials."
Hoxha,
Enver. The Artful Albanian.
"Stalin personally criticized
Tito for this impermissible act which he wanted to commit against you,"
said Vyshinsky.
Hoxha,
Enver. The Artful Albanian.
STALIN
DISCOUNTS THE POPE AS AN ALLY AND CONSIDERS HIM REACTIONARY
"The
During the talk with Roosevelt,
Churchill and others on problems of the anti-Hitlerite war, they had said:
"We must no longer fight the pope in
"I have nothing against
him," Stalin had replied.
"Then, let us make the Pope our
ally," they had said, "let us admit him to the coalition of the great
allies."
"All right," Stalin had
said, "but the anti-fascist alliance is an alliance to wipe out fascism
and Nazism. As you know, gentlemen, this
war is waged with soldiers, artillery, machine guns, tanks, aircraft. If the Pope or you can tell us what armies,
artillery, machine guns, tanks and other weapons of war he possesses, let him
become our ally. We don't need an ally
for talk and incense."
After that, they had made no further
mention of the question of the Pope, and the
Hoxha,
Enver. The Artful Albanian.
Churchill said, "The British
people have a sense of moral responsibility with regard to the Polish people
and their spiritual values. It is also
important that
"And how many divisions does
the pope have?" Stalin suddenly
asked, interrupting Churchill's train of oratory.
Berezhkov,
Valentin. At Stalin's Side.
MEETINGS
WITH STALIN WERE MUCH FRIENDLIER THAN WITH KHRUSHCHOV & HIS ALLIES
Once in
Hoxha,
Enver. The Artful Albanian.
HOXHA
ATTACKS KHRUSHCHOV FOR WANTING TO COPY HITLER
"In regard to a number of
special products of industry," Khrushchev said, "among other things,
we must do as Hitler did. At that time
We could not believe our ears! Could it be true that the first secretary of
the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the
Hoxha,
Enver. The Artful Albanian.
HOXHA
DESCRIBES THE CHANGES OF THE CHINESE LINE FROM ANTI TO PRO TO ANTI MARXIST
... This Mao's theory of 100
flowers, widely proclaimed in May 1956 by Lu Dingyi, constituted the Chinese
variant of the bourgeois-revisionist theory and practice about the "free
circulation of ideas and people", about the co-existence of a hotch-potch
of ideologies, trends, schools and coteries within socialism. (It turned out later that Mao's utterly
revisionist decalogue "On the Ten Major Relationships" belongs
precisely to this period of the "spring" of modern revisionism.)
Many a time later I have turned back
to this period of history of the Communist Party of China, trying to figure out
how and why the profoundly revisionist line of 1956 subsequently seemed to
change direction, and for a time, became "pure",
"anti-revisionist" and "Marxist-Leninist". It is a fact, for example, that in 1960 the
Communist Party of China seemed to be strongly opposing the revisionist theses
of Khrushchev... . It was precisely
because
However, time confirmed...that in no
instance, either in 1956 or in the '60s did the Communist Party of China
proceed or act from the positions of Marxism-Leninism.
In 1956 it rushed to to take up the
banner of revisionism, in order to elbow Khrushchev out and gain the role of the
leader in the communist and workers' movement for itself. But when Mao and his associates saw that they
would not easily emerge triumphant over the patriarch of modern revisionism,
Khrushchev, through the revisionist contest, they changed their tactic,
pretended to reject their former flag, presented themselves as "pure
Marxist-Leninists", striving in this way to win those positions which they
had been unable to win with their former tactic. When this second tactic turned out no good,
either, they "discarded" their second, allegedly Marxist-Leninist,
flag and came out in the arena as they had always been, opportunists, loyal
champions of a line of conciliation and capitulation towards capital and
reaction.
Hoxha,
Enver. The Artful Albanian.
HOXHA
DESCRIBES THE UNDERMINING OF
As was becoming apparent,
I have been closely acquainted with
Rakosi and I liked him.... Rakosi was an
honest man, an old communist and a leader in the Comintern. His aims were good, but his work was sabotaged
from within and from without. As long as
Stalin was alive everything seemed to be going well, but after his death the
weaknesses in
Hoxha,
Enver. The Artful Albanian.
HOXHA
TOLD SUSLOV THAT IMRE NAGY WAS A TRAITOR
"He [Imre Nagy] is a
traitor," I told Suslov, "and we think that you are making a great
mistake when you hold out your hand to a traitor."
Hoxha,
Enver. The Artful Albanian.
HOXHA
SAYS SUSLOV WAS A DEMAGOGUE
... Suslov was one of the greatest
demagogues of the Soviet leadership.
Hoxha,
Enver. The Artful Albanian.
HOXHA
ARGUES WITH KHRUSCHOV ABOUT WHO IS A MARXIST
"You Albanians astound
me," he [Khrushchev] said, "You are stubborn."
"No," I said, "we are
Marxists."
Hoxha,
Enver. The Artful Albanian.
HOXHA
SAYS KOSYGIN IS A REVISIONIST MUMMY
We walked away from that revisionist
mummy [Kosygin].
Hoxha,
Enver. The Artful Albanian.
EXPULSIONS
& REINSTATEMENTS BY POLICE HELPED DETERMINE WHO WERE RELIABLE POLICE
Riz was, I think, four times
expelled from a party and four times reinstated. In the
Tokaev,
Grigori. Comrade X. London: Harvill Press,1956, p. 6
EXILED
PEOPLE WERE ALLOWED TO RETURN
... he (Generalov) was sent to an
obscure job in
Tokaev,
Grigori. Comrade X. London: Harvill Press,1956, p. 9
THOSE
ALLOWED TO RETURN STILL TALKED OF ASSASSINATION
Such was the atmosphere of those
days; men of gentle character and high ideals, like Generalov, talked calmly of
assassination.
Tokaev,
Grigori. Comrade X. London: Harvill Press,1956, p. 10
My next visit, on Generalov's
suggestion, was to a man high up in the Dniepropetrovsk administration. Generalov had hopes of this man, whom we will
call Brezhnov, partly because he was an underground Trotskyist. For this reason I however had misgivings
about asking his assistance, but ardour overcame my convictions.
Tokaev,
Grigori. Comrade X. London: Harvill Press,1956, p. 14
CASE WAS
BEING BUILT AGAINST YAGODA WHILE HE STILL WORKED FOR THE SECRET POLICE
... For instance, we knew beyond
question that the dossier against Yagoda was being built up while he was still
Stalin's trusted tool.
Tokaev,
Grigori. Comrade X. London: Harvill Press,1956, p. 17
[Tovstukha said]... "Comrade
Yagoda has just phoned. He wants to see
you urgently"
"Yagoda? What the devil for?" my uncle answered
irritability. "He just left
here!"
"He says something new has
developed in--about--about the case," Tovstukha said.
"...tell Yagoda if he doesn't
stop splitting hairs [in the Zinoviev-Kamenev business] I'll break him! If he thinks he can play a double game, he's
all wrong. The opposition has become
criminal. It will be broken,
crushed! And anyone who tries to protect
it, directly or indirectly, will be crushed too! Tell Yagoda that!"
Svanidze,
Budu. My Uncle, Joseph Stalin.
Speaking of Yagoda, Koba said,
"I know he is a scoundrel. But we
dare not risk smashing the fragile apparatus of the GPU by removing Yagoda and
his associates. This would be exploited
by class enemies at home and abroad. We
shall settle out accounts with Yagoda at the right moment." He added, "If you want to understand
revolutionary tactics, read Schiller's Fiasco's Conspiracy. Revolutions always require Moors, but they go
when they have served their purpose--they are sent to the gallows. Only you must not miss the right moment, or
else they will send you to the gallows.
I know precisely who is a friend and who is a foe. You, Papasha, grumble frequently, but I know
that you will never be guilty of a stab in the back. I respect you and shall stand up for
you. But we shall wage a life and death
struggle with double-crossers. We carry
an historic responsibility for the destiny of the country and of the
revolution...."
Litvinov,
Maksim Maksimovich. Notes for a Journal.
Berzin had proved before the war
that Yagoda was neither a Latvian nor a communist.
Litvinov,
Maksim Maksimovich. Notes for a Journal.
REAL
DESTRUCTION OF ZINOVIEV AND KAMENEV OCCURRED IN MAY 1935
In fact, May 25, 1935, was a more
significant date in the destruction of the old leaders than January 16th, when
the press had announced the startling news that the first group of leaders on
trial, Zinoviev, Kamenev, Evdokimov and others, had 'confessed that they were
guilty of terrorist activities'. Only
sentences of terms of imprisonment had followed, despite the law of December
1st, 1934, providing for the immediate death of terrorists.
Tokaev,
Grigori. Comrade X. London: Harvill Press,1956, p. 19
The investigation did not establish
facts that would provide a basis for describing the crimes of the Zinovievites
as instigation of the assassination of
Medvedev,
Roy. Let History Judge.
YENUKIDZE
HAD PLANNED TO DESTROY STALINISM ROOT AND BRANCH
... a few words must be said about
the program of Yenukidze and his group.
I myself was never a supporter of Yenukidze's program, nor was I in his
conspiracy. Yet his proposals are of
considerable interest, as representing the conception of a reformed
Yenukidze was not at once
imprisoned, but was put under house arrest in a small building, standing by
itself on the outskirts of
Tokaev,
Grigori. Comrade X. London: Harvill Press,1956, p. 20-21
SOVIET
LEADERS DO NOT KNOW OF THE SECRET UNDERCOVER PILOTS
At this time, the vanguard of the
opposition was in the Soviet Air Force.
On May 15th, 1935 Bulganin, as Chairman of the Moscow Soviet, gave the
French visitors a gala reception.
...Stalin, together with Molotov,
Chubar, Voroshilov and others of the Kremlin, chose to pay an unexpected visit,
on May 2nd, 1935, to the Frunze Central Military Airdrome, one of the centers of
his irreconcilable enemies. Pilots were
braced and even kissed and all manner of sweet, winning words were said to
them.
Tokaev,
Grigori. Comrade X. London: Harvill Press,1956, p. 31-32
The enemies of Stalin, as of Lenin
and socialism, were masked so cleverly that it was sometimes impossible to see
through the heavy mist of falsification and outright provocations.
Rybin,
Aleksei. Next to Stalin: Notes of a Bodyguard.
THERE WAS
A RIGHT-WING MILITARY UNDERGROUND IN
... These were the work of the
leaders of the united right-wing military underground of
Tokaev,
Grigori. Comrade X. London: Harvill Press,1956, p. 42
[Footnote: Likhachev editor of Posev
was in the Far Eastern Red Army in 1937-38 and describes a genuine military
plot against the Stalinist leadership, which Stalin smashed in a countercoup].
Getty, A.
Origins of the Great Purges.
This affair [the military officers]
began more or less in August 1936, just days before the first
Until May 1937 Primakov
categorically denied any kind of counter-revolutionary activity, though he
wrote to Stalin that after breaking with Trotskyism in 1928 he "had not
completely severed personal contacts with Trotskyites." Putna, on the other hand, quickly admitted to
participation in current "Trotskyist-Zinovievist centers" and an
organization within the Soviet military.
He named Primakov as a member....
Meanwhile one of the defendants at the August show trial referred to
Putna as an "active participant" in terrorist work.
The major event occurred in April
1937. Marshall Tukhachevsky, one of the
best-known officers in the Soviet Union, a colonel under the tsarist regime,
and then a Civil War hero for the Reds, had been scheduled to travel to
But then several officers being
held...by the NKVD named Tukhachevsky as a plotter against the government....
The accounts of two NKVD men
therefore show that Yezhov personally drove the generals' affair forward. Of course, Stalin may well have been behind
him, issuing orders. But the impression
these reports make is one of Stalin reacting to information as it came to him,
not initiating matters. During the
investigation he met with Yezhov almost daily, and from May 21 to 28 he also
met regularly with Frinovsky [one of Yezhov's aides]. Such close attention to a case that would
never come to public trial suggests that Stalin wanted not to manufacture
evidence but to learn what the police had found. He might have pushed Yezhov forward in this
case in order to investigate something he feared. That Stalin and the Politburo reacted to
Yezhov's report about a plot to murder Tukhachevsky in
Another variant was offered by the
ex--NKVD officer Almazov. In one of his
manuscripts in the Hoover Archives, he claimed that a real military conspiracy
against Stalin existed. Planning to rely
on several army units and on political prisoners as their main forces,
Tukhachevsky and his followers intended to surround the Kremlin, arrest key
leaders, and kill Stalin in one quick blow.
But they were discovered in 1936, when Putna was recalled to
It must be noted that Almazov
offered different versions of the background to the "generals'
plot." Yet he was not alone in
claiming that a real conspiracy against Stalin existed in the armed
forces. Likhachev, a Red Army officer
who served in the Far Eastern military district for six years prior to his
ouster from the service in 1937 or 1938, also maintained that such a plot was
under way and provided extensive details about it. He insisted that he was not directly involved
but that he knew many officers who were.
They told him that Tukhachevsky and Gamarnik had begun to lay plans in
1932 (that fateful year once again). The
affair centered in the
The chief plotters did not feel that
they could trust their troops to follow them against Stalin (an interesting
comment on popular loyalties), so they planned to stir up the men by announcing
that foreign infiltrators had taken over the NKVD headquarters in
Thurston,
Robert. Life and Terror in Stalin's
There was, moreover, always a grain
of truth to the accusations of the show trials: the Trotskyist bloc had existed
in the
Thurston,
Robert. Life and Terror in Stalin's
The principal line of the Generals
appears to have been that a conflict with Germany must be avoided at all costs
and that the necessary territorial concessions must be made in order to buy the
Germans off, and as this was clearly impossible without a change of Government,
the Generals were prepared to steer for that in peace or in war. Just as reactionaries in Western Europe are
prepared to divert Germany from attacking in Western Europe by offering it a
free hand in the East, so the renegade Generals were prepared to offer it a
free hand in the West. But from the
German point of view, this policy had to be backed by something more than promises. The Generals had not only to declare their
willingness to make territorial concessions, but also to prove the genuineness
of their attitude by giving the German General Staff information as to the
military position in the
Campbell,
J. R. Soviet Policy and Its Critics.
On May 24, 1937 the following
document, signed by Stalin, was circulated to members of the Central Committee
requiring their vote:
"On the basis of facts which
expose Central Committee member Rudzutak and candidate member Tukhachevsky as
participating in an anti-Soviet Trotskyite-Right conspiratorial bloc and
espionage work against the USSR for Fascist Germany, the Politburo of the
Central Committee puts to the vote the proposal to expel Rudzutak and
Tukhachevsky from the party and to hand their case to the commissariat of
internal affairs."
The vote was unanimously in
favor. No one had any doubts, no one
came to the victims' defense.... Some
members went even further than Stalin's resolution. For instance, Budenny wrote on the voting
slip 'Definitely yes. These scoundrels
must be punished.' Mekhlis as usual
underlined his 'yes' several times. Neither
Voroshilov, nor Yegorov, who had both served with Tukhachevsky, nor Khrushchev
and Mikoyan, who were later to condemn this act... found the courage to abstain
from writing the fateful 'yes'. For
unexplained reasons, Stalin as usual left his voting slip blank.
Volkogonov,
Dmitri. Stalin: Triumph and Tragedy.
[Footnote]: That the officers had,
at least, discussed a coup d'etat is authenticated. A former German Communist, Schutz, was
imprisoned in
Alexandrov,
Victor. The Tukhachevsky Affair.
[1929] Our military people have told
their German counterparts that they are prepared to collaborate with them against
the Communist Party and that at a chosen moment they could seize power and set
up a pro-German government in the
Litvinov,
Maksim Maksimovich. Notes for a Journal.
BUKHARIN
WAS BECOMING A SOCIAL-DEMOCRAT LIKE THOSE IN THE WEST
... Stalin aimed at one-party
dictatorship and complete centralization.
Bukharin envisaged several parties and even nationalist parties, and
stood for the maximum of decentralization.
He was also in favor of vesting authority in the various constituent
republics and thought that the more important of these should even control
their own foreign relations. By 1936,
Bukharin was approaching the social democratic standpoint of the left-wing
socialists of the West.
Tokaev,
Grigori. Comrade X. London: Harvill Press,1956, p. 43
SUBVERSIVES
AND TERRORISTS DECIDE IT IS TIME TO ACT
In August, 1936,... my own
conclusion was that the time for delay was past. We must make immediate preparations for a
general armed uprising.
I was sure then, as I am today, that
if Comrade X had chosen to send out a call to arms, he would have been joined
at once by many of the big men of the
Through my mind flashed a succession
of Russian terrorists of the past, women among them. No other country had so persistent a
tradition of assassination as ours.
Passionlessly, Klava Yeryomenko had come to the conclusion that she
should take her place in that tradition.
Her plan was one of stark simplicity.
Stalin would come down to his palace at nearby Gagry. She would gain entry. When the principal tyrants were gathered
together, she would destroy them. She
too would perish, but they would be no more.
She already knew officers of Stalin's bodyguard who could be won
over. A clever woman, she said, could
get what she wanted, especially if she was also good-looking. With the disappearance of Stalin, Molotov,
and Yezhov, Comrade X could then seize the Kremlin and the principal government
offices; Riz would take command of the Black Sea Fleet; Belinsky and Demokratov
together would control Leningrad; Sheboldayev and Gunushvili would take over
the Caucasus; Generalov the Ukraine, and so on.
In two or three days it would be all over, the country would be in the
hands of the new men.
Tokaev,
Grigori. Comrade X. London: Harvill Press,1956, p. 48
Our purpose this time was not only
to hold discussions. We had moved a
decisive step further: we went to assess the chances of an armed uprising
against Stalin in the immediate future.
Tokaev,
Grigori. Comrade X. London: Harvill Press,1956, p. 156
COMRADE X
TURNS DOWN ASSASSINATION OF STALIN IDEA BECAUSE 15 HAVE FAILED
Nevertheless, although in principle
we were opposed to terroristic acts, I considered it right, in the changed
situation, to put Klava's proposal before Comrade X. He gave it serious thought, but in the end
rejected the suggestion. He pointed out
that there had already been no less than 15 attempts to assassinate Stalin,
none had gotten near to success, each had cost many brave lives. 'There is a right place and time for
everything,' he said, 'but now (in mid-1936), Yeryomenko's suggestion is out of
place.
Tokaev,
Grigori. Comrade X. London: Harvill Press,1956, p. 49
PEOPLE
ARE EXPELLED AND REINSTATED REPEATEDLY
... He [Yefimov] was a sturdy little
army engineer, an old Party member, but with no less than 10 expulsions and
reinstatement behind him;...
Tokaev,
Grigori. Comrade X. London: Harvill Press,1956, p. 60
My own record was dismal: expulsion
from the Komsomol; expulsion from my Trade Union; Trade Union reprimand;
expulsion from Leningrad; the charge of Trotskyism; the charge of Right-wing
deviation and “civilian democratism”; one expulsion from the Party; a second
expulsion from the Party; a stern Party reprimand; a second stern Party
reprimand; a third expulsion from the Party which ended in a stern Party
reprimand with final warning.
Tokaev,
Grigori. Comrade X. London: Harvill Press,1956, p. 74
Zinoviev and Kamenev had been
expelled for the third time in 1934, on suspicion of politically inspiring
Conquest,
Robert. The Great Terror.
TOMSKY
HAD MANY JOBS BESIDES BEING ON THE POLITBURO
Up to 1930 he [Tomsky] had been a
member of the Politburo. He had also
been head of the Soviet Trade Unions.
Latterly he had been chief of the State publishing system, the OGIZ.
Tokaev,
Grigori. Comrade X. London: Harvill Press,1956, p. 62
PEOPLE
TAKEN OFF THE POLITBURO STILL RETAINED HIGH POSITIONS
... Since 1930, when the Buryto
group (Bukharin, Rykov, Tomsky) were relieved of their high posts, he [Rykov]
had been People's Commissar of Communications....
Tokaev,
Grigori. Comrade X. London: Harvill Press,1956, p. 63
Although a confidential letter of
the Central Committee was circulated in early 1935 to warn against the dangers
represented by former oppositionists, their repented leaders continued to hold
more or less important posts, including membership in the Central Committee,
throughout the "verification" and "exchange" of Party
cards.
Rittersporn,
Gabor. Stalinist Simplifications and Soviet Complications, 1933-1953.
REMOVAL
OF YAGODA COSTS THE OPPOSITION DEARLY
...
the first step was taken to bring about the downfall of Yagoda. He was removed from the NKVD and we lost a strong link in our opposition
intelligence service.
Tokaev,
Grigori. Comrade X. London: Harvill Press,1956, p. 63
ANDREYEV
AND MALENKOV WERE SECRET TROTSKYITES AND RADEK KNEW IT
Radek's appearance in the dock
created a sensation.... With which
Trotskyists did he maintain contact? asked Vyshinsky--and out came the list
they wanted: Mrachkovsky, Smirnov, Dreitzer, Gayevsky, Pyatakov,
Preobrazhensky, Smilga, Serebryakov...but of course, never a mention of such
real Trotskyists as, for instance, Andreyev-or Malenkov.
Not that Malenkov has ever been a
very precise ideologist.... However, in
1924 he became secretary of the Party branch of the Moscow Technical Institute,
then one of Trotsky's bastions. In those
days Malenkov signed many an anti-Stalin, Trotskyist resolution: not by deep
conviction, but rather by sheer inertia.
Of all the living members of the Soviet Olympus, Andreyev and he had
been the most outstanding supporters of Trotsky. This Radek knew quite well, yet never a hint
did he give at the trial.
Tokaev,
Grigori. Comrade X. London: Harvill Press,1956, p. 67
OPPOSITION
HAS NO MASS SUPPORT BECAUSE IT HAS NO PROGRAM
My old friend Belinsky, the
acknowledged leader and thinker of our group in
Tokaev,
Grigori. Comrade X. London: Harvill Press,1956, p. 74
BOLSHEVIK
PARTY WAS NOT MONOLITHIC
It is a dangerous illusion to think
of the Bolshevik party as “monolithic”.
It began as a fraction of another party and continued thereafter to
produce further fractions and splits.
Every year continuously after the Revolution some group opposed the
central leadership....
Tokaev,
Grigori. Comrade X. London: Harvill Press,1956, p. 85
BERIA
EXPOSES THE GREAT EXCESSES OF YEZHOV
It was Beria's diagnosis of the
danger of Yezhov's excesses that had induced Stalin to trust him and brought
him to power. Throughout the country
these excesses had cast their shadow. At
one sitting alone, the Central Committee of the Azerbaizhan Party had expelled
279 members, the Ukrainian Stalinsk Provincial Committee 72, the Ordjonikidze
Regional Committee 101--it was the same everywhere.... The fear of being suspected of lack of
vigilance drove local fanatics to denounce not only Bukharinists, but also Malenkovists,
Yezhovists, even Stalinists. It is of
course not impossible that they were also egged on to do so by concealed
oppositionists! Hence Beria's task when
he was summoned from
To give Beria his due, he pulled no
punches. At a closed joint session of
the Central Committee and the Central Control Commission of the Party, held in
the autumn of 1938, he declared that if Yezhov were not a deliberate Nazi agent
he was certainly an involuntary one. He
had turned the central offices of the NKVD into a breeding ground for fascist
agents. He had scorned citizens'
constitutional rights and used illegal methods of extorting information, to
such an extent that he had set quite non-political people against the Government. For a rank-and-file member of the Central
Committee to say this was the height of courage.
The impression produced on Stalin
and Molotov was tremendous. The Central
Committee resolutions dismissing Yezhov (Member of the Politburo, the Orgburo, and
the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet, Secretary of the Central Committee, and
People’s Commissar of Internal Affairs; were written in Beria's hand. Beria's first acts as head of the NKVD, were
the arrest of Yezhov and the issue of orders quashing an enormous number of
sentences and recently-started proceedings.
People who had been unjustly repressed were even indemnified by the
State. Special commissions inquired into
the past of convicted persons.
Tokaev,
Grigori. Comrade X. London: Harvill Press,1956, p. 119
Evgeniia Ginsburg, who was in
Yaroslavl Prison and who saw no newspapers, said that the prisoners could tell
when Yezhov fell: The draconian regime in the prisons (frequent solitary
confinement and deprivation of all privileges) was relaxed one day. The timing was confirmed a few days later
when Beria's name began to appear on official prison notices.
Getty, A.
Origins of the Great Purges.
... the replacement of Yezhov by
Beria was received as a hopeful sign.
And in fact, right after Yezhov's replacement mass repression was
discontinued for a while. Hundreds of
thousands of cases then being prepared by the NKVD were temporarily put aside.
Medvedev,
Roy. Let History Judge.
SUBVERSIVES
TRIED MANY TIMES TO KILL STALIN AND HIS ALLIES
... “In other words,” Smolninsky
asked at last in a hushed voice, “you are suggesting that I should organize the
assassination of
I replied that this is what I
meant.... I had already sent both to him
[
But, though it was I who made the
suggestion in
Tokaev,
Grigori. Comrade X. London: Harvill Press,1956, p. 157
... I remembered Klava Yeryomenko,
who was then still at liberty, saying to me only the previous autumn: 'It will
be your duty to kill Stalin if he asks you to make him rockets and bombers.'
Tokaev,
Grigori. Comrade X. London: Harvill Press,1956, p. 319
We Georgians are a very
superstitious people--and very fatalistic also--and I doubted that my uncle was
entirely an exception to that rule. On
the eve of a battle in which he might easily lose his life--for the youth of
Moscow were reading the tracts smuggled in secretly from Paris, in which
Trotsky's son Sedov was clamoring for "the immediate death of
Djugachvili"--Stalin felt more assured when he had at his side a young man
[me], not only of his country, but of his tribe:...
This, of course, is only my personal
interpretation of Stalin's attitude; but I believe it is correct.
Svanidze,
Budu. My Uncle, Joseph Stalin.
[The Editors of Secret Documents
state], All the facts point to a definite doing-away with Stalin. There cannot be any other conclusion. The whole gamut of lies, falsification of
historical truths and documents--noticed even by foreign journalists, writers,
analysts, who in 99 percent of the cases were or are anti-Communist, cannot be
just pushed aside!
It is also interesting to note that
many important and damaging documents in the Archives are either
"missing," or in the hands of Western Intelligence Agencies!
Lucas and
Ukas. Trans. and Ed. Secret Documents.
KILLING
STALIN BEFORE THE WAR WOULD HAVE BEEN STUPID AND SPELLED
All the members of the council [our counter-revolutionary
group] spoke in agreement, and a resolution was passed: Hitler was enemy No. 1;
until that enemy was accounted for all anti-Stalinist activity was to cease.
Today the question is raised whether
we were not mistaken, and fascist emigres have not stinted their attacks upon
me since I appeared in the West [in 1948].
And not only fascist. An American
Russian language newspaper, Novoye Russkoye Slovo (November 30th, 1951), has
even gone so far as to accuse me of committing a crime in not shooting
Stalin. This is so ridiculous a charge
that it is hardly worth answering. Whose
flag, do these gentlemen think, would now waive over the
Tokaev,
Grigori. Comrade X. London: Harvill Press,1956, p. 189
Mikhail Boikov claimed that in July
1936 members of a terrorist organization shot at President Kalinin while he was
at a resort. Tokaev mentioned several
groups that discussed assassinations and professed membership in one of
them. We may recall the reports that a
plot against the government existed in the armed forces. Medvedev, without specifying his sources,
recounts several attempts on the life of
Thurston,
Robert. Life and Terror in Stalin's
SAYING
THE SOVIET PEOPLE MET THE NAZIS WITH HAPPINESS OR RELIEF IS ABSURD
Certain Russian emigre circles have
roundly declared that at the beginning of the war the peoples of the
The idea that they [the peoples of
the
Of course we had our Quisling's and
our Haw-haws --I have been asked if the Vlasov movement was evidence of mass
desertion. If their numbers seem large
we must remember that out of hundreds and hundreds of divisions and a
population of 200 million the proportion is minute. The vast majority remained completely
loyal. The very nature of the Vlasov
forces goes to prove my point, for they were the most heterogeneous mob that
ever took the field in modern times--a medley of honest prisoners and emigre
adventurers and fascists, criminals and dregs of no known origin. Vlasov himself, according to the evidence,
never contemplated treachery until his capture--he had fought the Germans
cleverly and bravely and was indeed largely responsible for the successful
defense of Moscow; it was not until he was a prisoner that the so-called
'National Labor Union of Russian Solidarists (whom Hitler's men mockingly
described as 200 percent Nazi) flocked around him and turned his head. The few genuine Soviet people who took service
under him had been conditioned in Nazi camps--as were some forced recruits of
other countries, by a diabolical technique of hunger training; and even among
them there were some men who remained true to their ideals and who could swear
that every bullet which they fired missed its mark.
Tokaev,
Grigori. Comrade X. London: Harvill Press,1956, p. 189-190
... the slowly moving crowd was
laden with shapeless bundles; some carried their household goods or dragged
them in their barrows. Their faces were
grimly set; I don't think many of them had the vaguest notion where they were
going, except that it was to the East, away from the oncoming enemy. It never entered my head that slanderers in
the Western world would invent the story which has been circulated since the
war, that the people of
Tokaev,
Grigori. Comrade X. London: Harvill Press,1956, p. 213
... Neither the panic among the
elite nor the disorder among the masses [at the time of the Nazi approach to
Tokaev,
Grigori. Comrade X. London: Harvill Press,1956, p. 216
SOME
PARTY MEMBERS WERE WORTHLESS
Another interesting example of the
attitude of prominent personalities was given me by Col. Gorchakov. He and his young wife, Raissa, had asked me
in for a drink. He said that it was
years since he had had a chance to relax, but now that the 'dam Germans with
their air-raids' sent a man to cover, he could put his feet up. He was already soaked in drink and I could
see the expression of disgust on Raissa's face.
She was better educated than her husband, for he had only been through a
series of Party courses some 15 years earlier, while she had recently taken a
diploma at one of
Tokaev,
Grigori. Comrade X. London: Harvill Press,1956, p. 207
NAZIS
RE-OPENED THE CHURCHES BUT THE PEOPLE REMAINED LOYAL TO SOVIET POWER
It was known to Soviet Intelligence that
in the occupied zones the Germans had reopened the churches. Throughout
... The re-opening of the churches
in 1943 [by the Soviet government] has
been taken as a sign that a liberal policy towards religion was established and
that there was a great return to religion in the country. Neither of these conclusions is based on
sufficient evidence. The people, under
the awful stresses of war, certainly found solace in religion, but it is a long
way from this to a real religious revival (such as some Western radio stations
have assumed in their Russian language programs). There is certainly a considerable total
number of believers, but the number of unbelievers is immeasurably greater.
Tokaev,
Grigori. Comrade X. London: Harvill Press,1956, p. 251
MILITARY
OFFICERS WHO PLANNED TO OVERTHROW STALIN TURNED IN HIS FAVOR
In short, as the war drew to its
close, those of us who or were still anti-Stalinist and had kept our sense of
the objective facts, found ourselves more and more isolated. This had some ironical results. The Air Force officers who in 1941 had tried
to get me to join them in an anti-Stalin coup tried as passionately in 1944 to
convince me that there could now be no reason to object to Stalin's rule. 'Stalin has opened the churches,' said one of
them, 'he has dissolved the Comintern, he has set of the All-Slav Committee,
his allies are the most democratic nations in the world, he relies loyally on
the Russian people, he is restoring the true Russian traditions.... What more do we want?' In 1943 and 1944 I do not think that there
was a trace of opposition in the
Tokaev,
Grigori. Comrade X. London: Harvill Press,1956, p. 253
THE
PEOPLE STALIN PUNISHED WERE NOT INNOCENT BUT GUILTY
... When in 1947 I spoke to some
people of the West regarding what had happened they shrugged their shoulders
non-committally and said that such 'punitive action' was an internal matter and
that after all Stalin's victims were not innocent as Hitler's had been: had I
not admitted that they had taken advantage of the war to declare against the
Stalin regime?
Tokaev,
Grigori. Comrade X. London: Harvill Press,1956, p. 260
Colonel Koznich [Estonian Military
Attache in
Litvinov,
Maksim Maksimovich. Notes for a Journal.
Anyone who doubts this should read
an article entitled "Red Wreckers in Russia" in the Saturday Evening
Post, Jan. 1, 1938, in which John Littlepage, an anti-Communist American
engineer, describes in detail what he saw of this sabotage while he was working
in the Soviet Union. In fact, Littlepage
gives this judgment:
"For 10 years I have worked
alongside some of the many recently shot, imprisoned, or exiled in
Franklin,
Bruce, Ed. The Essential Stalin; Major Theoretical Writings. Garden City,
RUSSIAN
REFUGEES HAVE NO SUBSTANCE
I met many of these “Russian
refugees” in the course of my work. They
are one of the strangest phenomena I have found in the Western world. They are such thin shadows of the past that
one even doubts if they are real at all.
One hesitates to speak frankly to them less their brittle corporeality
should disintegrate altogether, like thin ice in late spring.
Tokaev,
Grigori. Comrade X. London: Harvill Press,1956, p. 307
STALIN FURIOUS
OVER TREATMENT OF FORMER NAZI SCIENTIST
STALIN:
And why was he [Tank--a German scientist] not given work?
TOKAEV:
Generals Kutsevalov and Lukin said he was a former Nazi and so should not be
given work.
Stalin's features were gripped with
icy rage. His piercing eyes swept the
whole company, as if to ask how such idiocy was possible. He asked me my view. I said frankly that I had never agreed with
Kutesevalov or Lukin on this matter.
STALIN:
And in my opinion, you were right. But
where is Tank now?
TOKAEV: I
do not know.
STALIN:
Comrade Serov, what does all this nonsense mean? Tank came over himself, asked for work, and
was turned away. Find him for me!
Tokaev,
Grigori. Comrade X. London: Harvill Press,1956, p. 328
WESTERN
SPIES ARE IMMORAL AND UNSCRUPULOUS
Here, since our subject concerns the
ethics of the relations between man and man, man and the State, and one nation
with another nation, I must relate the sorry sequel to my action. It is not only the men of the Soviet secret
service who are devoid of moral standards, not only the
I have never in my life been more
astonished. My hand for a moment rested
on the butt of my automatic, but I controlled myself; even with a worm like
this, I could not sink to Serov's level.
“A wonderful proposal,” I said, striving to measure my words. “Mr.
So-and-so is asked by me to take steps to look after Prandtl, and the answer I
get is the proposal of a dirty little spy.
In Russian, we have an expression for all such scallywags which you may
care to take back to your master”--and I pointed. The agent actually tried to argue back, and
compelled me to draw my pistol to get rid of him. I do not suppose it had ever occurred to him
or his master that the Soviet world, like the Western, is composed of
individuals, and that a Soviet man may have more honor than many a lackey of
the Western regime.
But this is not all. I had to unburden myself to somebody. One feels when such a thing happens as if the
insult had left its trace, like the passage of a snail. I told the whole story to my personal driver,
called Boldakov, an unpretentious decent Soviet man. He had a similar story to tell. An agent had offered him 500 marks--if he
would get me to the Western Zone unprotected, to be kidnapped! I could have wept with mortification. I did not want to go to the West, but somehow
I had considered that world to be above such things, and the thought had been a
kind of encouragement. Now I had the
sense of being set about by amorality on all sides. It was a blow to be made to realize that the
same disease existed everywhere. It was
also depressing to discover again how the two worlds intermingled.
Nor, when at last I was driven out
of self-preservation to cross the frontier, did the official insults
cease. I was approached by a man who, I
think, represented a certain military intelligence service and offered a
trifling sum of money and free passage and entry to a certain Western
country--in return for information on the set-up and activities of certain
opposition groups in the
Many people would like to imagine
that coming from the Eastern to the Western world was like coming out of
darkness into full sunlight. Alas, for
me it was no such thing.
Tokaev,
Grigori. Comrade X. London: Harvill Press,1956, p. 342
... Soviet intelligence treated him
[Tank] exactly as I was to be treated by the British Intelligence within a
year; he found himself in a villa surrounded by armed sentries and with a pair
of young intelligence officers constantly in the next room.
Tokaev,
Grigori. Comrade X. London: Harvill Press,1956, p. 351
My situation was unbearable. I wanted to be a loyal son of my country and
as such to play an honorable part in trying to influence its policy at home and
abroad.... And to my unutterable
disgust, the war-time Ally who was loudest in denouncing the tyranny which I
opposed, so far from giving our anti-Stalinist struggle its moral support,
attempted to buy me, to kidnap me, spied on me mercilessly and used its
knowledge to threaten to betray me to the MGB!
We were not communists at all.
Tokaev,
Grigori. Comrade X. London: Harvill Press,1956, p. 358
STALIN
COMPLIMENTS TOKAEV
... Stalin, of all men, had said that
the “single-mindedness and caution of Tokaev are evidence of his maturity”, and
“Tokaev is not to be hampered in his work; if he makes no promises, that means
he will give the country a great deal”; (these are his words as reliably
reported to me).
Tokaev,
Grigori. Comrade X. London: Harvill Press,1956, p. 345
TROTSKY
STARTS BY WANTING TO END THE KULAKS AND LATER DEFENDS THEM
Trotsky, who in December 1925, at
the 14th Party Congress of the CPSU, had tried to force on the Party the policy
of immediate collectivization of the peasantry, when the conditions necessary
for such collectivization were totally lacking, this same Trotsky in 1933, when
collectivization was well on the way to completion, comes out in opposition to
the policy of liquidating the kulaks as a class, demanding instead the
establishment of "a policy of severely restricting the exploiting
tendencies of the kulaks."
Brar,
Harpal. Trotskyism or Leninism. 1993, p. 36
KHRUSHCHOVISM
IS TROTSKYISM IN ESSENCE
The events of the last few years,
which have overwhelmed Eastern Europe and the USSR, have not only proved the
utter bankruptcy of Khrushchevite revisionism but also exposed, if such
exposure was ever required, the thoroughly counter-revolutionary nature of
Trotskyism. These events have proved
beyond doubt the inner affinity, notwithstanding the differences in form, of
revisionism and Trotskyism.
Khrushchevite revisionism, right in form and in essence, was aiming,
through the Communist Party, for the same aim of restoring capitalism in the
USSR and other East European countries that Trotskyism, 'left' in form and
right in essence, had been attempting ever since the twenties through the
so-called "anti-bureaucratic revolution."
Brar,
Harpal. Trotskyism or Leninism. 1993, p. 68
TROTSKY DENOUNCES
LENINISM
That Trotsky launched vicious
attacks against Leninism and Lenin is not an 'invention' of Stalin's, as the
Trotskyites usually assert, can be seen from the following extracts from a
letter of Trotsky's to Chkiedze written in 1913:
"The entire edifice of Leninism
is built on lies and falsification and bears within itself the poisonous
elements of its own decay."
Further on in the same letter
Trotsky describes Lenin as: "a professional exploiter of every kind of
backwardness in the Russian working-class movement."
Here, straight from the horse's
mouth, you have in unadulterated form the true regard that Trotskyism has for
Leninism....
Brar,
Harpal. Trotskyism or Leninism. 1993, p. 82
LENIN
OPPOSES TROTSKY ON MAJOR ISSUES
Proceeding from the theory of
'permanent revolution' Trotskyism cannot but attack Leninism. Leninism says that the proletariat in a
single country can build socialism, whereas Trotskyism says that it cannot. Leninism holds that the peasantry is a
reliable and firm ally of the proletariat, while Trotskyism says it is
not. Leninism says that under the
conditions of the dictatorship of the proletariat and the leadership of the
working-class it is possible to mobilize the poor and middle peasantry in the
task of building socialism, whereas according to Trotskyism this is an
impossibility.
Brar,
Harpal. Trotskyism or Leninism. 1993, p. 150
MEDVEDEV
IS A BOGUS SCHOLAR WHO RELIES ON GOSSIP RATHER THAN DOCUMENTATION
On the question of socialism, as indeed
on other questions, the attacks on Stalin and 'Stalinism' are almost always
attacks on Lenin and Leninism. In order
to show the correctness of this statement it would be useful to look at a book
called Let History Judge written by a Soviet bourgeois intellectual by the name
of Roy Medvedev. Medvedev attacks Stalin
but 'praises' Lenin. Medvedev's attack
on Stalin is not based on any facts or documentation, but on mere gossip and
the fertile imagination of a bourgeois brain whose input in terms of fabrication
is unlimited. Even the reactionary
anti-communist columnist Edward Crankshaw, one of the reviewer's of this book
in the Observer of March 26, 1972 had to admit that Medvedev was "denied
access to all official archives".
This however, does not prevent Crankshaw from agreeing with, and
admiring, Medvedev's attack on Stalin, the reason for this being that
"this book is high drama of a gifted intellectual wrestling for the truth,
guided only by his inner light."
This is how 'truth' is established by the bourgeois mind, i.e., by
completely ignoring the facts and relying on one's "inner light."
Brar,
Harpal. Trotskyism or Leninism. 1993, p. 163
RUTHLESS
STRUGGLE GAINING MIDDLE CLASS SUPPORT WAS NEEDED FOR COLLECTIVIZATION
Capitalist elements in the
countryside--the kulaks--could only be eliminated by a ruthless class
struggle. For this class struggle, the
proletariat needed a firm alliance with the middle peasantry. This alliance could only be strengthened by
turning the middle peasant to collectivization.
This in turn could only be accomplished when industry was sufficiently
developed to give real, active support to the peasantry by the provision of
tractors, other agricultural machinery, fertilizers, and when the state was
able to advance credits. Last, though
not least, the middle peasantry had to be persuaded on the basis of their own
experience, and by example--not by coercion or force--to turn from individual
farming to collective farming.
Brar,
Harpal. Trotskyism or Leninism. 1993, p. 168
DESCRIPTIONS
OF ALL THE DEFENDANTS AT THE FOUR MAJOR TRIALS
A mixed Trotskyite and Zinovievite
group, exposed at the first
Zinoviev and Kamenev
They were the leaders of
the former
Other Zinovievites were:
Bakayev, who was in charge of the
day-to-day organization of terrorist attacks against the leaders of the Party
and government.
Reingold, who was the most active
member of the Zinovievite underground counter-revolutionary reorganization and
who was at all times in direct contact with Zinoviev and Kamenev and took part
in all the secret conferences of the Zinovievites.
Yevdokimov
Pickel, who was one of Zinoviev's
most trusted men and was for many years in charge of his secretariat. He was an active member of the
The Trotskyites were:
Smirnov, who was a firm supporter of
Trotsky during the Party debate of 1923-27, Trotsky's deputy in the
Dreitzer, who was responsible for
the day-to-day organizational work of this group. Trotsky described Dreitzer has "an officer
of the Red Army. During and after my
expulsion he had, together with 10 or 12 of the officers, organized a guard
around my home." Together with
Trotsky he had organized the counter-revolutionary demonstration of November 7,
1927. When Trotsky was in exile in
Mrachkovsky, who was the man most in
Trotsky's confidence and personally closest to him. He had at one time occupied an important
position in the army.
Holtzman, who was an active member
of the Trotskyite counter-revolutionary organization, personally connected with
Smirnov on whose instructions he maintained contact with the Trotskyite center
abroad. In 1932 he personally received
from Trotsky instructions regarding preparations for terroristic acts against
the leaders of the CPSU.
Ter-Vaganyan, who admitted in court
that he was one of the organizers of the Trotskyite-Zinovievite center and that
this center was organized on the basis of Trotsky's instructions on terrorism.
Olberg, "that peculiar citizen
of the
M. Lurye, who left
N. Lurye, who arrived in the
Berman-Yurin
Fritz David, who was also sent to
the
A parallel center of
Trotskyites. This center was exposed at
the second
Pyatakov, the Vice-Commissar of
Heavy Industry, who as a result of occupying this very important post was able
to place other members and supporters of the center into key positions. He was one of the leaders of the so-called
parallel center.
Radek, who adhered to the Trotskyite
theory of the impossibility of building socialism in the
Sokolnikov, the Assistant People's
Commissar for Foreign Affairs and one-time People's Commissar of Finance, who
in 1925 slandered the Soviet state by his assertion that the internal trading establishments of the
Serebryakov, who was another of the
leaders of the so-called parallel Trotskyite center and who had opposed Lenin
in the discussion on the trade unions.
He held a liquidationist position with regard to the Party.
Muralov, who was a Trotskyite 'soldier',
one of Trotsky's most loyal and steadfast aides. He too confessed that he was a wrecker and a
diversionist.
Livshitz, who was an ex-Assistant
People's Commissar of Railways and simultaneously Pyatakov's assistant in
criminal affairs on the railways.
Drobnis, who was an old professional
Trotskyite who exterminated workers in accordance with the formula 'the more
victims the better'.
Boguslavsky, a Trotskyite.
Knyazev, who was a Japanese spy who
wrecked dozens of trains.
Rataichak, who occupied the key post
of Chief of the Central Administration of Chemical Industry. In this responsible post 'this super-wrecker,
develops his chemical talents,... causes
explosions, destroys the fruits of the labor of the people, kills people"
(Vyshinsky).
Norkin
Shestov
Stroilov
Turok
Hrasche, whom Vyshinsky described as
"a man not only of three dimensions, but at least of three citizenships,
who himself described his principal occupation by the eloquent, but not very
pleasant word, spy."
Pushin
Arnold, who was described as
"this international tramp", and was a man of many names, a hardened
scoundrel and a trusted Trotskyite agent.
As can be seen this group held very
important positions in the Soviet government and industry, much more so than
those held by the first-mentioned group.
The Bloc of Rights and
Trotskyites. This Bloc was exposed at
the third
Bukharin, who for years occupied
many important positions in the Party, though he was known for his vacillations
in politics and for his opposition to Lenin and the line of the Party.
Rykov, who was an ex-Prime Minister
of the
Yagoda, who was head of the
political police, the OGPU, until 1936.
Trotskyites in the Bloc.
Krestinsky, who was an ex-ambassador
to
Rakovsky, who was an ex-ambassador
to
Rosengoltz, who was the People’s
Commissar of Foreign Trade of the
Bessonov
Nationalist allies of the Rights and
Trotskyites were:
Grinko, who was People's Commissar
of Finance of the
Ikramov, who was one of the leaders
of the bourgeois nationalist organization in
Khodjayev, who was also one of the
leaders of the bourgeois nationalist organization in
Sharangovich, who was one of the leaders
of the Byelorussian national fascist organization which had set itself the aim
of undermining Soviet power and of severing Byelorussia from the USSR and
placing it under the rule of Polish capitalist and landlords. He was
recruited and sent by the Polish intelligence service to carry on espionage
work in the
Chernov, the People's Commissar of
Agriculture of the
Levin, who, like Pletnev and
Kazakov, was one of a group of doctors under the influence of Yagoda.
Pletnev
Kazakov
Zelensky, who was a former head of
the All Union Administration of Co-operatives.
Other's of less political
importance, who were merely tools of the leadership group, were:
Ivanov
Zubarev, who was one of the
organizers and leaders of the counter-revolutionary underground organization of
the Rights in the Urals.
Bulanov, who was former Secretary of
the People's Commissariat of Internal Affairs.
Kryuchkov, who was the former
secretary of
Maximov-Dikovsky, who was a former
secretary of
The military group included:
Tukhachevsky
Yakov
Uborevitch
Kork
Eidemann
Feldman
Primakov
Putna
Brar,
Harpal. Trotskyism or Leninism. 1993, p. 209
TROTSKY
ADVOCATED TERRORISM IN HIS PUBLICATION
In the Trotskyite Bulletin of the
Opposition, Nos. 36-37, of October 1933, we find a number of direct references
to terrorism as a method of fighting against the Soviet government. Here is an example:
"It would be childish to think
that the Stalin bureaucracy can be removed by means of a Party or Soviet
Congress. Normal constitutional means
are no longer available for the removal of the ruling clique.
They can be compelled to hand over
power to the proletarian vanguard only by force."
Trotsky was beyond the reach of the
arm of Soviet law when he wrote the above sentences in which he advocated
terrorism. So none of the Trotskyite and
other bourgeois critics of the trials will be able to claim that Trotsky was
forced to write the above lines by the OGPU.
So when the various accused at the trials declared that they had
organized terrorist acts on the direct instructions of Trotsky, they were
compelled to say what was actually true and, to put it in the words of Comrade
Vyshinsky, "no chatter, no slander, known simulations, and no Trotskyite
line can obscure this fact!"
Brar,
Harpal. Trotskyism or Leninism. 1993, p. 226
Once again calling Trotsky's open
letter from 1932 a terrorist directive, Vyshinsky added a reference to one more
article written by Trotsky which contained, in his words, "in rather open,
uncamouflaged form... directives for terror." This time, Vyshinsky quoted not two words,
but several sentences from Trotsky's article: "It would be childish to
think that the Stalinist bureaucracy can be removed by means of a party or
Soviet Congress.... For removing the
ruling clique there remain no normal, 'constitutional' means. The bureaucracy can be forced to transfer
power to the proletarian vanguard only by force." "What can this be called,"
Vyshinsky declared, "if not a direct call... for terror? I can assign no other name to this."
Rogovin,
Vadim. 1937: Year of Terror.
Trotsky argued that after all the
experiences of recent years it would be childish to think that it was possible
to depose Stalin at a Congress of the Party or of the Soviets. "No normal constitutional ways are left
for the removal of the ruling clique.
Only force can compel the bureaucracy to hand over power into the hands
of the proletarian vanguard."...
The
Deutscher,
Isaac. The Prophet Outcast.
OPPOSITIONISTS
COMMITTED MANY DIFFERENT TYPES OF CRIMES
These professional wreckers set themselves
the task of destroying what the Soviet people were building.... And in strict adherence to Trotsky's
instructions "to strike the most palpable blows at the most sensitive
spots", these 'heroes' blow up bridges, cause explosions in factories and
gas mines, kill workers, wreck power stations, cause train accidents, destroy
horses and kill cattle, sabotage agricultural plans, weaken the defense
industry, sabotage the country's finances and foreign trade, create an
artificial shortage of essential supplies, put nails and glass in butter! No crime is too monstrous for this gang.
Brar,
Harpal. Trotskyism or Leninism. 1993, p. 245
THE VERY
PEOPLE WHO SHOULD HAVE PROTECTED THE STATE MOST WERE THE CRIMINALS
In order to fully realize the utter
monstrosity of these crimes, one must not lose sight of the fact that not only
were these crimes committed but they were committed by the very people who were
entrusted with the protection of the interests of the Soviet state against
every kind of encroachment. These people
should have been the first to protect Soviet industry and safeguard it from all
damage, but they acted like downright traitors.
Pyatakov, Assistant People's Commissar of Heavy Industry, should have
been the first to protect this important section of the Soviet economy but as a
matter of fact he was its wrecker-in-chief.
Rataichak should have been the first to safeguard the chemical
industry. Livshitz, The Assistant People's
Commissar of Railways; Chernov, the People's Commissar of Agriculture; Grinko,
the People's Commissar of Finance; Sokolnikov, assistant People's Commissar of
Foreign Affairs--all these people should have been the first to sound the alarm
at the slightest sign of any danger to the interests of the Soviet state, but
instead they acted as wreckers, in breach of the trust placed upon them, and in
violation of their duty to the land of the Soviets. This really is monstrous and shows the utmost
limits of moral depravity these people attained.
Brar,
Harpal. Trotskyism or Leninism. 1993, p. 254
BOURGEOIS
VERSION OF THE TRIALS HAS NOTHING TO DO WITH REALITY
It is not surprising, therefore,
that the world bourgeoisie should have come out as the foremost vilifier of
Soviet revolutionary justice. In these
circumstances the
Brar,
Harpal. Trotskyism or Leninism. 1993, p. 294
BOURGEOIS
EXPLANATION OF THE CONFESSIONS MAKES NO SENSE
On the one hand the Trotskyites and
other bourgeois critics of the trials continue to assert that the accused at
the trials were Bolsheviks and old revolutionaries who were fighting against
the "Stalinist bureaucracy", "the ruling caste," and found
themselves in the dock because Stalin wanted to get rid of them. On the other hand we are told by the same
gentry that the accused accepted false accusations, made false confessions that
they knew would cost them their lives, out of party duty and to please
Stalin! In other words, they took upon
themselves false confessions all for the love of the "bureaucracy,"
the "ruling caste," and the "chief bureaucrat," Stalin,
i.e., for the love of, and out of duty to, the same Party which they had
hitherto regarded as bureaucratic and had devoted themselves wholeheartedly to
fight against.
Brar,
Harpal. Trotskyism or Leninism. 1993, p. 307
SECRET
POLICE PERSONNEL ARE ARRESTED FOR BEING UNJUST TO PEOPLE
“Alexis Pushnov, the NKVD chief in
Brar,
Harpal. Trotskyism or Leninism. 1993, p. 326
When, early in 1939, the Soviet
press started to report the arrest of various NKVD officers for extorting false
confessions, one case at Leninsk-Kuznetsk in the
Conquest,
Robert. The Great Terror.
...Garanin, launched on a campaign
of, even by NKVD standards, maniac terror, torture, and execution, with the
shooting in 1938 of an estimated 26,000 men in a special camp set up for the
purpose. Garanin was soon shot, and his
successor, Vyshnevetsky, also lasted a very short time, receiving 15 years for
a disastrous expedition intended to open up new areas.
Conquest,
Robert. The Great Terror.
Preparations for the greatest trial of
all were in less expert hands than those which had produced the Zinoviev and
Pyatakov shows. The NKVD veterans had
gone. Agranov had by now followed Yagoda
and his staff, being "in 1937 expelled from the Party for systematic
breaches of socialist legality,"... He died, presumed shot, in 1938.
Conquest,
Robert. The Great Terror.
[Footnote]: Zakovsky, Deputy Chief
of the NKVD under Yezhov. He was shot in
1938.
Litvinov,
Maksim Maksimovich. Notes for a Journal.
In January 1938, The Central
Committee criticized local Party organizations for exaggerated vigilance and
excessive expulsions. The intensity of
the purge then diminished. After the
last of the 'Great Purge Trials,' expulsions and arrests markedly
decreased. Abuses were, in part,
attributed to 'careerists trying to gain merit by throwing people out of the
Party, trying to gain security for themselves through mass repressions against
the rank-and-file members.'
In December 1938, the campaign came
to a complete halt. Most pending
investigations for counter-revolutionary activities were dropped and the
suspects released. Yezhov was dismissed
as head of the NKVD and replaced by Beria.
A number of leading NKVD officers were arrested and some executed for
having extracted false confessions. Most
regional heads of the security police were purged, and many were subject to
criminal actions. Past abuses were
widely criticized. Both Yagoda and
Yezhov were denounced as enemies of the people.
Numerous cases were reinvestigated and quite a few of the sentenced
released; conditions in the labor camps were ameliorated.
Szymanski,
Albert. Human Rights in the
Former NKVD officials Yezhov,
Frinovsky, Agranov, Nikolayev, Dmitriyev, Tserpento, Ushakov, Chris
Boldakovtov, Passov, Kogan, Gerzon, Glebov, Lulov and others, who had
investigated this case [the Bukharin case] and others were convicted for making
illegal arrests and falsifying evidence.
Political
Archives of the Soviet Union (Vol. 1, No. 2) Commack,
Compared with the loss of life
caused directly and indirectly by collectivization the deaths caused by the
great Stalin purges of the late 'thirties were almost negligible,.... But apart from those executed (for example
those sentenced to death in the famous open purge trials of 1936-38, and in the
trial of Marshal Tukhachevsky and other army leaders) and those shot in greater
"privacy," the deaths directly caused by the purge resulted from the
overzealousness of certain "examining magistrates" whose tortures of
those unwilling to "confess" merely led to the prisoner's death.
Werth,
Alexander.
TROTSKYISM
HAS NEVER SUCCEEDED IN LEADING ANY NATION
Trotskyites have never ever made a
successful revolution nor will they ever be able to make a revolution unless
and until they shed their Trotskyism...
Brar,
Harpal. Trotskyism or Leninism. 1993, p. 335
THE
PEASANTS SUPPORTED THE BOLSHEVIKS ON ONE ISSUE AFTER ANOTHER
Anyone who thinks that the Soviet
peasantry "remained a sullen and disenchanted force," that it was
never won over wholeheartedly for the revolution, let him answer the following
questions: How was it possible, without winning the peasantry wholeheartedly,
for the Bolsheviks to come to power? How
was it possible for them to defeat the combined strength of the Russian
Whiteguards and the 14 imperialist and non-imperialist countries who, armed to
the teeth, attacked the young
Brar,
Harpal. Trotskyism or Leninism. 1993, p. 499
STALIN
SAYS FASCISTS ARE NOT NATIONALISTS BUT ARE IMPERIALISTS
In order to hide their reactionary, Black-Hundred,
imperialist essence from the German and other peoples, the fascists continued
to commit their heinous crimes--the subjugation of the peoples abroad and of
the German people at home--by calling themselves 'National Socialists'. Stalin in his speech refuted the claims of
these fascists to be either socialists or nationalists. The fascists, he said, were not socialists,
for they were the most vicious enemies of the working class of
Brar,
Harpal. Trotskyism or Leninism. 1993, p. 577
LENIN
ADVOCATED THE USE OF TERROR
In January 1918 Lenin had said,
"Until we use terror against speculators--shooting them on the
spot--nothing will happen."
Koenker
and Bachman, Eds. Revelations from the Russian Archives.
[Letter from Lenin to communist
leaders in
Comrades! The revolt by the five kulak volost's must be
suppressed without mercy. The interest
of the entire revolution demands this, because we have now before us our final
decisive battle "with the kulaks."
We need to set an example. 1) You
need to hang (hang without fail, so that the public sees) at least 100
notorious kulaks, the rich, and the blood suckers. 2) Publish their names. 3) Take away all of their grain. 4) Execute the hostages--in accordance with
yesterday's telegram. This needs to be
accomplished in such a way that people for hundreds of miles around will see,
tremble, know, and scream out: let's choke and strangle those blood-sucking
kulaks. Telegraph us acknowledging
receipt and execution of this. PS. Use your toughest people for this.
Koenker
and Bachman, Eds. Revelations from the Russian Archives.
DZERSHINSKY
ACCUSES BUKHARIN OF BEING OPPOSED TO THE GPU
[Letter from Bukharin, editor of
Pravda, to Dzerzhinsky, December 1924 on the necessity for more liberal
policies]
I was not at the last meeting of the
executive group. I heard that you, by
the way, said there that I and Sokolnikov are "against the GPU" etc.
Koenker
and Bachman, Eds. Revelations from the Russian Archives.
MANY
SECRET POLICE ARE GUILTY OF GREAT ABUSES AND CRIMES AND PUNISHED
Resolution by the USSR Council of
People's Commissars and the Party's Central Committee, Nov. 17, 1938, on
improving NKVD arrest procedures]
... This is all the more necessary
as the mass operations to crush and root out hostile elements carried out by
NKVD agencies in 1937-38 employing simplified investigation and prosecution
could not but result in a number of gross inadequacies and distortions in the
operations of the NKVD agencies and the Procuracy. More importantly, enemies of the people and
spies from foreign intelligence services who have infiltrated NKVD agencies
(both central and local), continuing to carry on their subversive activity,
have tried in all conceivable ways to confound investigative and undercover
activities, have knowingly violated Soviet laws, have carried out unfounded
mass arrests, while protecting their collaborators, particularly those planted
in NKVD agencies.
Below are described the most
significant shortcomings recently uncovered in the operations of agencies of
the NKVD and Procuracy.
First of all, NKVD employees have
completely abandoned undercover work, preferring to work in an oversimplified
manner using mass arrests, paying no attention to the thoroughness and quality
of the investigation.
NKVD employees have grown so
unaccustomed to painstaking, systematic undercover work and have taken such a
liking to the oversimplified modus operandi until very recently they have
objected to placing limits on their execution of mass arrests.
Koenker
and Bachman, Eds. Revelations from the Russian Archives.
Second, a very gross inadequacy in
the operation of the NKVD agencies is the deeply rooted, oversimplified procedure
of investigation, whereby, as a rule, the examining magistrate limits himself
to obtaining a confession of guilt from the accused and completely ignores
substantiating this confession with the necessary documentary evidence
(testimony of witnesses, expert depositions, statements, material evidence,
etc.).
... Enemies of the people, having
infiltrated NKVD and Procuracy agencies, often have skillfully exploited this
irresponsible attitude toward investigative work and this gross violation of
established legal procedures. They have
knowingly twisted Soviet law, committed forgery, falsified investigative
documents, indicted and arrested on trumped up charges and even without any
grounds whatever, brought charges (for provocation) against innocent persons,
while doing everything possible to conceal and protect their collaborators in
criminal anti-Soviet activity. These
kinds of things went on in both the central and local bureaucracy of the NKVD.
All these in tolerable failings in
the work of NKVD Procuracy agencies were possible only because the enemies of
the people, having infiltrated the NKVD and Procuracy agencies, made every
conceivable attempt to sever the work of NKVD and Procuracy agencies from party
organs, to escape party control and supervision, and thus make it easier for
themselves and their collaborators to continue their anti-Soviet, subversive
activity.
In order to eliminate the
above-described failings and properly organize the investigative work of NKVD
and Procuracy agencies the [Central Committee of the Communist Party] resolves:
1) To prohibit NKVD and Procuracy agencies from carrying out any kind of mass
arrests or evictions....
Koenker
and Bachman, Eds. Revelations from the Russian Archives.
[Letter from members of the
Procuracy of the
Dear Comrade Zhdanov!... The Party's Central Committee decision of
Nov. 17, 1938, identified the grossest distortions of Soviet laws by NKVD
organs and obligated those organs and the Procuracy not only to stop these
crimes but also to correct the gross violations of law that have resulted in
mass sentencing of totally innocent, honest Soviet persons to various sorts of
punishments, often even execution. These
persons--not a few, but tens and hundreds of thousands--sit in camps and jails
and wait for a just decision; they are perplexed about why and for what they
were arrested and by what right the bastards from Yezhov's band persecuted
them, using medieval torture.
It would seem that the party's
Central Committee decision of Nov. 17, 1938, should have mobilized all
attention on immediately rectifying the criminal policy of the bastard Yezhov
and his criminal clique, which has literally paralyzed Soviet persons, upright,
dedicated citizens, old party members, and entire party organizations.
In reality, something else is
happening.
Comrade Pankratev, who replaced
Comrade Vyshinsky, cannot guarantee implementation of this critical decision of
the party Central Committee because of his lack of authority in the Procuracy
and particularly in the eyes of NKVD personnel.
It is strange to say, but it is a
fact that Comrade Beria not only is not burning with desire to free totally
innocent people, but to the contrary is conducting a definite policy to handle
this effort and is using his authority to maintain the "honor of the
uniform."
Therefore, the decision to charge a
special conference of the NKVD with reviewing its own decisions executed by
Yezhov's band is a big mistake.
Here, at a special conference, the
decisive role and final word belong not to the representative of
supervision--the Procurator--but to Comrade Beria and his entourage, who, with
all the means and resources at their disposal, are violating the requirements
of the Procuracy to stop these actions.
Koenker
and Bachman, Eds. Revelations from the Russian Archives.
Comrade Pankratev, who attends these
meetings, bows his head to Politburo candidate member Comrade Beria and
silently goes along with obviously wrong decisions.
Thus, at these special conferences
the absolutely correct and lawful protests of the Procuracy of the
One only needs to review what took
place at the last special conference sessions and speak with the procurators
who directly prepared these matters and it becomes apparent that the line
followed by Comrade Beria has nothing in common with party directives.
Such practices have disoriented the
staff of the Procuracy of the
We earnestly beseech you, comrades
Zhdanov, to take up this matter of utmost importance, and if there is no chance
of changing the criminal practices pursued within the walls of the NKVD, to
change the system, to entrust the Procuracy with reviewing matters incorrectly
handled by Yezhov's band--excluding from these matters the authority of Comrade
Beria, who intentionally or unintentionally is cultivating a defense of the
"honor of the uniform" of NKVD personnel at all costs.
... We ask you to think about
this. We are completely convinced that
all that has been described here is being concealed from the party's central
committee--obviously it is more advantageous that way for someone.
The procurators of the Procuracy of
the
Koenker
and Bachman, Eds. Revelations from the Russian Archives.
Executions are going on. Several groups of opposition members have been
shot in the Urals. The situation is
particularly terrifying in
Litvinov,
Maksim Maksimovich. Notes for a Journal.
Such was the case with the letter by
Eikhe, an alternate member of the Politburo, whose spine was broken by his
interrogator; the letter by Rudzutak, chairman of the Central Control
Commission, also tortured cruelly;...
Nekrich
and Heller. Utopia in Power.
As for Stalin himself, on the other
hand, he had publicly admitted, not in 1956, but at least as early as 1939, the
innocent people had been convicted and punished in the purge: "It cannot
be said that the purge was not accompanied by grave mistakes. There were unfortunately more mistakes than
might have been expected." (Report
to the 18th Congress.) That is one reason why many of those tried and convicted
in the last trials were high officials from the secret police, the very people
guilty of forcing false confessions.
Franklin,
Bruce, Ed. The Essential Stalin; Major Theoretical Writings. Garden City,
When asked about the fate of the
perpetrators of the repressions and about the statute of limitations,
Solomontsev answered:
"With regard to those instances
of violations of socialist legality in the '30s, '40s, and early '50s that have
been revealed, the culprits have already been punished through criminal, legal,
and party channels. It is obviously not
a secret to everyone that Avakumov, Ryutin, Leonov, Komarov, Likhachev,
Shvartsman, and other former leaders and personnel of the USSR Ministry of
State Security were sentenced to death for fabricating investigation
materials...."
Even more amazing was an interview
given by Pirozhkov, deputy head of the KGB.
When asked how many hangmen had been brought to trial, he answered that
1,342 NKVD officials had been sentenced for severe violations of socialist
legality, including Beria, Yezhov, Kobulov, Frinovsky, Agranov, Avakumov and
others.
Laqueur,
Walter. Stalin: The Glasnost Revelations.
No matter how Yezhov tried to conceal
these arrests and killings from Stalin, this news reached him soon enough. Sensing his own danger, Yezhov started to
befriend Stalin, trying by all sorts of methods to convince him of his
dedication and loyalty to socialism.
Stalin was beside himself, tried to contact Yezhov in every known place,
and the answer was always that no one of his helpers knew where Yezhov
was. Stalin sent a Colonel Kirilin with
a package to Podlipki where he finally located Yezhov, demanding that Yezhov
sign the envelope that he had received this package. Fatianov, assistant to Yezhov, tried to save
his chief, willing to sign the envelope himself, but Kirilin refused, so that
Yezhov was forced to sign this himself.
This was a request for Yezhov to appear before the meeting of the
Central Committee.
The plenum of the Central Committee
ACP[B] was held in January of 1938.
Stalin spoke at this Plenum, analyzed and criticized the work of the
NKVD, which had abandoned its revolutionary principles. This activity of disregarding some
organizational rules extended to higher commands and to some sections of the
Red Army. Yezhov was removed from his
post as head of the NKVD. In the ranks
of the NKVD, there took place a very sharp debate and criticism to such an
extent that the present "Glasnost" would be put to shame. There was a concerted aim of saving the
leadership of the NKVD from criticism.
But all over the country, there were stormy meetings and criticism of
the leadership of the NKVD. In all
districts, there took place a removal of provocateurs, spies, quislings, and
perpetrators of injustices and some of them were jailed, while others, after
being tried, were sentenced to death for the harm that they had done to the
country, to the party, and to socialism.
Right in the Central Committee of the NKVD, there was a commission
looking into this, headed by Andreev.
After this country-wide cleansing of the NKVD and other security
branches, over 30,000 members were arrested, who, over the years, were placed
there by Yezhov and before then, by Yagoda and others. One of these arrested came into my
jurisdiction....
Rybin,
Aleksei. Next to Stalin: Notes of a Bodyguard.
In fact it is quite typical that in
1933, just as top decision-makers were beginning to be preoccupied with the
excesses of the apparatus, the Supreme Court of the Russian Federation
recommended in the same document strong measures to be taken not only against
officials guilty of having recourse to "violence, weapons, cruel and
insulting acts," but also against participants in "mass
unrests,"...
Rittersporn,
Gabor. Stalinist Simplifications and Soviet Complications, 1933-1953.
As secretly as the Trotskyists, the heads
of the troikas which had condemned them, as well as members of the execution
squads, were shot in 1938. The few who
escaped by chance were those who had left the service.
In 1939 came the turn of Yezhov,
whose orders they had carried out and by whose order most of them had
died. The only announcement was of his
transfer to another post, but he vanished completely.
Berger,
Joseph. Nothing but the Truth. New York,
John Day Co. 1971, p. 98
On 20 June 1937, with Stalin’s
approval, the first NKVD “conspirators” group was shot, among them Gai and S.
V. Puzitskii, the head of the operational department of Dmitrov camp, or
Dmitlag,
In early June a commission of the
NKVD and the Procuracy, or dvoika, was created for quick examination of such
cases. During the following months a
great number of former OGPU-NKVD leaders were shot: on 14 August Pauker,
Prokofiev, Shanin, and Firin; on 21 August former Foreign Department head A.
Kh. Artuzov; on 2 September Piliar and S. A. Messing; on 9 October Molchanov;
on 15 November Bokii and Sosnovskii; and on 27 November F. D. Medved’ and V. A.
Balitskii.
According to official NKVD
statistics, from 1 October 1936 to 15 August 1938, that is, during the Ezhov purge,
throughout the country 2,273 state security officers were arrested.
Jansen,
Marc & Petrov, Nikita. Stalin's
Loyal Executioner: Yezhov,
No quotas were set in the national
operations; the regional NKVD chiefs were given free rein. As a result, people were arrested
indiscriminately and on a large scale.
In the words of the Krasnoiarsk province Party secretary, Sobolev: “Stop
playing internationalism, all these Poles, Koreans, Latvians, Germans, etc.
should be beaten, these are all mercenary nations, subject to termination. . .
all nationals should be caught, forced to their knees, and exterminated like
mad dogs.” This may have been an
exaggeration, but (after Ezhov’s fall) he was accused of this by the
Krasnoiarsk state security organs’ Party organization: “By giving such
instructions, Sobolev slandered the VKP(b) and comrade Stalin, in saying that
he had such instructions from the Central Committee and comrade Stalin
personally.”
Jansen, Marc
& Petrov, Nikita. Stalin's Loyal
Executioner: Yezhov,
SUBVERSIVES
PENETRATED THE GOVT AND WERE ELIMINATING BONA FIDE MARXISTS
The enemies of the workers' state
had penetrated the Party, the State police, and the judicial system, and, as we
might expect, made use of the situation to get rid of pro-socialist people in
every field.
Cameron,
Kenneth Neill. Stalin, Man of Contradiction.
...Opponents hiding within the party
led conspiracies to expel the greatest possible number of loyal Communist
cadres. About this question, one
opponent testified:
“We endeavored to expel as many
people from the party as possible. We
expelled people when there were no grounds for explusion (sic). We had one aim in view---to increase the
number of embittered people and thus increase the number of our allies.'
J. Arch Getty, Origins of the Great
Purges: The Soviet Communist Party Reconsidered, 1933--1938 (New York:
Cambridge University Press, 1985), p. 177.
Martens,
Ludo. Another View of Stalin.
...Furthermore, enemies of the
people and foreign secret service spies penetrated the NKVD, both at the local
and central level. They tried by all
means to disrupt investigations. Agents
consciously deformed Soviet laws, conducted massive and unjustified arrests
and, at the same time, protected their acolytes, particularly those who had
infiltrated the NKVD.
“The completely unacceptable defects
observed in the work of the NKVD and prosecutors were only possible because
enemies of the people had infiltrated themselves in the NKVD and prosecutor
offices, used every possible method to separate the work of the NKVD and
prosecutors from the Party organs, to avoid Party control and leadership and to
facilitate for themselves and for their acolytes the continuation of their
anti-Soviet activities.
“The Council of People's Commissars
and the Central Committee of the CPSU(b) resolves:
1. To prohibit the NKVD and
prosecutors from conducting any massive arrest or deportation operation ....
The CPC and the CC of the CPSU(b)
warn all NKVD and prosecutor office employees that the slightest deviation from
Soviet laws and from Party and Government directives by any employee, whoever
that person might be, will result in severe legal proceedings.
V. Molotov, J. Stalin.”
Martens,
Ludo. Another View of Stalin.
Over the Purge period, the
Stalinists themselves, except for a small and peculiar personal following, were
destroyed.
Conquest,
Robert. The Great Terror.
This idea of Stalin's was grasped
best of all by Evdokimov, who declared, "The counter-revolutionary band of
Trotskyists, Zinovievists, Rightists, 'Leftists,' and other
counter-revolutionary scum has seized the leadership of the overwhelming part
of the region's cities. This band set
itself the task of undermining Soviet and Party work, in order to discredit the
party and the Soviet regime. It
suppressed self-criticism in every way, instilled bureaucratism in the party
and Soviet organizations, and persecuted people who dared to speak out against
them, which was a direct mockery of the inner -party and Soviet
democracy." As confirmation of
this, Evdokimov offered the testimony of arrested party functionaries about
how, in order to arouse dissatisfaction with the party apparatus, they
"suppressed self-criticism, smothered the living word, and left without
any consequences the declarations and complaints of workers. Anyone who tried to criticize these
conditions at a meeting was persecuted."
Rogovin,
Vadim. 1937: Year of Terror.
Under the command of Menzhinsky and
Yagoda, countless innocent people were arrested and many were shot just because
they served Lenin faithfully and were loyal Bolsheviks. Even some of the members of Security force,
loyal Bolsheviks, who worked underground against the Tsar, fought for the
Revolution, then on trumped-up charges, were arrested, sometimes without Lenin
or Stalin knowing about this until it was too late. How was this possible?
We must understand that the enemies
were entrenched inside every important position in the NKVD and State
Security--well hidden, well masked and cleverly utilizing their power, getting
rid of dedicated communists.
Being chairman of the NKVD, Menzhinsky
and Yagoda hired only former ruling class kulaks, barons, whiteguards who
really terrorized the dedicated communists and workers, those who showed that
they were absolutely loyal to the party, to the motherland, to Lenin and
Stalin, and other leaders of the state.
Among these lackeys of Yagoda was an officer called Ofitserov. In some cases where a member of the security
team would get drunk, thus having to be given a reprimand plus five days in
jail, Ofitserov, instead of the prescribed reprimand, had that person
shot. On Stalin's demand, [the engineer]
Nazvanov was released but not without Ofitserov putting a pistol to his back,
stating, "Next time, I shall get you!"
Thus, Nazvanov [an engineer] was
saved from the clutches of these hidden enemies of Lenin and Stalin, and of
Socialism, hiding under the cloak of performing their duties to save the
"socialist state" from "perceived enemies."
Rybin,
Aleksei. Next to Stalin: Notes of a Bodyguard.
The foul murder of Comrade Kirov was
the first serious warning showing that the enemies of the people will practice
duplicity and, in so doing, will disguise themselves as Bolsheviks, as Party
members, so as to worm their way into our confidence and open a path for
themselves into our organizations....
The Central Committee of the CPSU in
its closed letter of January 18, 1935, regarding the foul murder of Comrade
Kirov, gave a resolute warning to the Party organizations against political
complacency and parochial gaping.
Stalin,
Joseph. Mastering Bolshevism.
However, the best indication that
the programs of the "amnesty" and the "police purge" were
endorsed, was not personnel changes--always of uncertain significance--but a
decree put out by the conclave of the Party.
This document recalled that the Central Committee had frequently warned
against arbitrary expulsions from the Party, and then went on to condemn the
procedure practiced by local and regional leaderships, of mass expulsions
without careful examination of the charges.
In a way that was very unusual for this kind of Party document, the
decree listed a large number of cases from major regions throughout the country
to show how widespread these excesses were, and then concluded that
"careerists" and in particular "disguised enemies" had
instigated most of the unjust punitive actions against members, their families,
and friends.
...Many organizations of the Party
and their leaders have not been able to identify and unmask the skillfully
disguised enemy.... The worst traitor,
usually such a disguised enemy is shouting louder than anyone about vigilance,
rushing to 'unmask' as many [people] as possible and doing all this in order to
conceal his own crimes from the Party and to turn the attention of the Party
organization away from the uncovering of the real enemies of the people. A vile double-dealer, such a disguised enemy
is doing his best to create a climate of unwarranted suspiciousness in Party organizations,
a climate where any member of the Party who stands up for a slandered communist
is immediately accused of lack of vigilance and collusion with the
enemy.... Instead of exposing and
unmasking the instigative activities of such a disguised enemy, Party
organizations and their leaders often follow their lead, create an atmosphere
where honest communists can be slandered with impunity and themselves adopt the
line of unfounded mass expulsions....
Moreover, even after the discovery of enemies who have been infiltrating
the Party apparatus and slandering honest communists, our Party leaders often
do not take measures to liquidate the consequences of sabotage in Party
organizations concerning the unfair expulsion of communists from the Party. It is time for all Party organizations and
their leaders to completely unmask and exterminate the disguised enemy who has
been infiltrating our ranks and trying to conceal his hostility behind a false
clamor for vigilance and remain in the Party to pursue in it his vile [and]
treacherous work."
Rittersporn,
Gabor. Stalinist Simplifications and Soviet Complications, 1933-1953.
The party had been infiltrated by
alien and anti-Soviet elements.
Service,
Robert. Stalin.
For seven years he [Inzhir] lived a
double life. He devoted his knowledge
and talents to the service of the regime he hated but thereby greatly
benefited. He could not in fact do
otherwise for the slightest act of sabotage in the kind of work he was doing
threatened him with death. At the same
time, as a secret informer of the political department of the NKVD, he took his
revenge on the Bolsheviks by entangling and compromising Party members with
whom he came into contact in the course of his work, and thereby helped to
liquidate them.
In these activities Inzhir evidently
found an inward satisfaction... As to
the Bolsheviks he betrayed, his conscience did not trouble him in the least.
Berger,
Joseph. Nothing but the Truth. New York,
John Day Co. 1971, p. 102
STALIN
TELLS BUKHARIN THAT TROTSKY, ZINOVIEV & KAMENEV ARE WORKING WITH HITLER
[Excerpt from Bukharin speech to the
Central Committee Plenum of Feb. 23, 1937, in response to charges made by
Yezhov]
STALIN
(to Bukharin): You must come around to our position. Trotsky with his disciples, Zinoviev and
Kamenev, at one time worked with Lenin, now these people have negotiated an
agreement with Hitler. After this, can we
label such things as shocking!
Absolutely not. After everything
that has happened to these gentlemen, former comrades, who have negotiated an
agreement with Hitler, a sellout of the
Koenker
and Bachman, Eds. Revelations from the Russian Archives.
THE
CENTRAL COMMITTEE ATTACKS THE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY’S RECORD
[Resolution of the Plenum the
Central Committee, March 3, 1937, on Yezhov's report of what was learned from
the sabotage, subversion, and espionage committed by Japanese and German
Trotskyite agents]
The Plenum of the Central Committee
believes that all the facts established during the investigation of the
anti-Soviet Trotskyite center and its local accomplices show that the People's
Commissariat of Internal Affairs was at least four years late in unmasking
these most vicious enemies of the people.
The Motherland's
traitors--Trotskyites and other double-dealers, in union with German Japanese
counterintelligence--had managed with relative impunity to carry on wrecking,
sabotage, espionage, and terrorist activities and to damage socialist progress
in many branches of industry and in transportation. They were able to do this not only because of
defects in the work of party and economic organizations, but also because of
slipshod work by the Department of state security of the People's Commissariat
of Internal Affairs....
Despite numerous warnings by the
Central Committee on redirecting all Cheka work toward a more organized and
acute struggle against counter-revolution... the People's Commissariat of
Internal Affairs has not carried out these party and government directives and
has turned out to be unable to expose the anti-Soviet Trotskyite gang in time.
Koenker
and Bachman, Eds. Revelations from the Russian Archives.
CC PLENUM
COMPLAINS THAT PRISONS ARE TOO COMFORTABLE AND LIKE REST HOMES
[Resolution of the Plenum the
Central Committee, March 3, 1937, on Yezhov's report of what was learned from
the sabotage, subversion, and espionage committed by Japanese and German
Trotskyite agents]
The major defects in the work of
state security agencies that have decisively contributed to the delay in
unmasking the Trotskyite anti-Soviet organization continue to be:
... d) Even more intolerable is the
People's Commissariat of Internal Affairs prison policy for the most vile
convicted enemies of the Soviet government, the Trotskyites, Zinovievites,
Rightists, Socialist-Revolutionaries, and others.
As a rule these enemies of the
people have been sent to so-called political isolation facilities supervised by
the People's Commissariat of Internal Affairs.
The political isolation facilities have been quite comfortable,
resembling involuntary rest homes more than prisons.
Inmates in the isolated political
prisons have had the opportunity to talk to each other, to discuss all political
events in the country, to elaborate political plans of anti-Soviet activity for
their organizations, and to establish contacts outside of prison. The prisoners have enjoyed access to
literature, paper, and writing tools in unlimited quantity, and the right to
receive unlimited numbers of letters and telegrams, to acquire their own
equipment in their cells, and to receive along with prison food parcels from
outside prison in any quantity or assortment.
Koenker
and Bachman, Eds. Revelations from the Russian Archives.
During the purges of the 1930s, he
[Stalin] would support a proposal by Yezhov that the system for holding
political prisoners be altered. At
Stalin's instigation, the February-March 1937 Central Committee plenum
introduced a special point into the decree on Yezhov's report, namely, that
'the prison regime for enemies of Soviet power (Trotskyites, Zinovievites,
SR's, etc.) is intolerable. The prisons
resemble nothing so much as compulsory rest homes. [The prisoners] are allowed to socialize,
they can write letters to each other at will, receive parcels and so on. Steps were taken, of course. There was to be no question of 'universities'
for these unfortunates.
Volkogonov,
Dmitri. Stalin: Triumph and Tragedy.
Neither orally nor in writing did
Stalin ever call publicly for the repressions of 1937-38 to be
intensified. Even the speech he gave at
the February-March 1937 plenum, published in abridged form in Pravda, amounted
only to a call for greater vigilance against the danger of Trotskyism and so
on.... he edited [rewrote] the
resolution on Yezhov's report to the February-March 1937 plenum, including the
following points:
...c. The system that has been created for enemies
of the Soviet regime is intolerable.
Their accommodation often resembles compulsory nursing homes more than
prison (they write letters, receive parcels and so on).
Volkogonov,
Dmitri. Stalin: Triumph and Tragedy.
The resolution [of late Feb. 1937]
on Yezhov's report repeated the formulation of the September telegram from
Stalin and
... It [the resolution] said that
the previous leadership of the NKVD, having carried out "an incorrect correctional
policy, particularly with regard to Trotskyists," had established "an
intolerable...prison regime when it came to the convicts who were the most
vicious enemies of the Soviet regime--Trotskyists, Zinovievists, Rightists,
SR's, and others. As a rule, all these
enemies of the people had been sent to so-called political isolators,
which...provided beneficial conditions and were more apt to resemble mandatory
rest homes than prisons.... Those under
arrest were given the right to enjoy literature, paper and writing utensils in
an unlimited quantity, to receive an unlimited number of letters and telegrams,
to outfit their cells with personal effects, and to receive, along with
official nourishment, packages from outside the prison in any quantity and
assortment."
Rogovin,
Vadim. 1937: Year of Terror.
Still, compared with the camps of
later years, Solovki was almost a luxury resort. It had a theater ("
Laqueur,
Walter. Stalin: The Glasnost Revelations.
CC PLENUM
COMPLAINS THAT VETTING OF CHEKA PEOPLE IS LAX AND SUBVERSIVES GET IN
e) A very serious flaw in the work
of state security organs is the practice of selection, promotion, and training
of Cheka personnel. People's
Commissariat of Internal Affairs staff as a whole are unquestionably
experienced, professional Chekamen, selflessly devoted to the goals of our
party. In spite of this, in practice,
promotions and appointments of people have not been performance-based. In many cases people were promoted not by
reason of their loyalty to the party, capabilities, or expertise, but for their
servility and ability to flatter.
As a result, alien and criminal
elements have infiltrated some units of state security organs. Several cases have been revealed where even
foreign intelligence agents have managed to infiltrate state security organs“
...This very lack of professionalism
in promoting people and also the lack of political training have created
conditions that have enabled outright Trotskyite traitors to obtain supervisory
positions in the Cheka.
Some of them have systematically
informed members of the Trotskyite organization about People's Commissariat of
Internal Affairs materials on the anti-Soviet activities of the latter
(Balaniuk, head of the Taganrog Department of the People's Commissariat of
Internal Affairs, Shapovalov, head of the Novocherkassk Department of the
People's Department of Internal Affairs; Kozelskii, former head of the Secret
Political Division of the Ukrainian People's Commissariat of Internal Affairs).
Koenker
and Bachman, Eds. Revelations from the Russian Archives.
Relatives of "enemies of the
people," former oppositionists, former Mensheviks, and so on could be
found at the highest levels. No agency
was stricter in selection of personnel than the NKVD, yet that agency had the
most alien elements, people who had once been expelled from the party, people
with criminal records and dubious political histories.
Medvedev,
Roy. Let History Judge.
TIMASHUK
SAYS SHE SAID
[Letter from Dr. Timashuk to the
Presidium of the 23rd Communist Party Congress, March 31, 1966, asking to have
her name cleared of any responsibility for the "Doctors’ Plot"]
Koenker
and Bachman, Eds. Revelations from the Russian Archives.
Perhaps nothing could have saved
Naumov
and Brent. Stalin's Last Crime.
Naumov
and Brent. Stalin's Last Crime.
Stalin charged that Vlasik did not
verify the Timashuk letter in order to protect Yegorov. Yegorov and Vlasik were drinking buddies, as
Maslennikov noted in his testimony, and their friendship may well have gone beyond
this.
Naumov
and Brent. Stalin's Last Crime.
In early 1949 she [Timashuk] wrote
once more to Kuznetsov. Again she
received no reply. The implication was
obvious: Kuznetsov took no interest in saving
Naumov
and Brent. Stalin's Last Crime.
PRISONERS
WHO HELPED CONSTRUCT THE
[Resolution of the USSR Central
Executive Committee, Sept. 1, 1932, on privileges for convict-workers at the
White Sea-Baltic Canal construction site]
... In connection with the
successful completion of the basic work on the White Sea-Baltic Waterway, this
great new accomplishment of the Soviet regime, the USSR Central Executive
Committee resolves:
1.
To give the Unified State Political Directorate [OGPU] the right to free
those prisoners who distinguished themselves on the construction project from
serving the remainder of their sentences, and where needed, from serving
supplementary sentences.
2.
To instruct the OGPU to grant to all other prisoners (participants who
worked conscientiously in the construction of the White Sea-Baltic Waterway),
in addition to existing ordinary privileges in the corrective labor camps, a
reduction in the term of measures taken to insure the defense of society.
3.
To instruct the OGPU to present for review by the USSR Central Executive
Committee the expunging of the convictions of those freed in accordance with
paragraph 1 of this resolution.
Koenker
and Bachman, Eds. Revelations from the Russian Archives.
To trace down all the criminals, old
and new types, is a big enough job, and requires a large police force. But the Soviet police also have many
constructive tasks, as I have already suggested. Because they are in charge of all the men and
women put at forced labor, and because tens of thousands of people have been
sentenced to such labor, the police operate some of the greatest construction
and industrial enterprises in
Littlepage,
John D. In Search of Soviet Gold.
[In 1931] at first specialists were
returned to their former places under the supervision of OGPU bodies, then a
"pardon" was declared for a number of individuals previously labeled
"saboteurs" in view of their readiness to work for the good of socialism.
Siegelbaum
and Sokolov. Stalinism As a Way of Life.
Being human, the prisoners whose
labour brought
At the end of the war what happened
was that the free salaried men, who directed the work, received decorations and
promotion while some prisoners who had overfulfilled their norms, even some
held under Article 58, were let off one, two, three or four years of their
sentence. Of course, if they were
serving a sentence of twenty or twenty-five years this did not mean very much,
but at least it was taken as a good omen.
Berger,
Joseph. Nothing but the Truth. New York,
John Day Co. 1971, p. 206
THOSE
PRISONERS WHO FOUGHT FOR THE POLES IN SEPT 1939 RECEIVE FAIR TREATMENT
[NKVD order, Oct. 3, 1939, on
disposition of prisoners of war in Soviet camps]
The following resolution of the
Central Committee of the all Russian Communist Party dated October 2 concerning
prisoners of war is reproduced below for your information and guidance:
Approve the following proposals of
comrades Beria and Mekhlis:
... 1. Prisoners of war of Ukrainian, Byelorussians,
and other nationalities whose homes are located in the western
2.
25,000 prisoners of war will be kept to build the
3.
Prisoners of war whose homes are located in the German part of
... 6. The Czech detainees (approximately 800
individuals) will be released after they have signed a pledge not to fight
against the
... 8. Officer prisoners of war will receive better
rations than enlisted prisoners of war.
... 10. All prisoners of war, including officers and
enlisted men, will be required to surrender all valuables and any money over
the limit established by the POW Affairs Administration to the administrations
of the camps for safekeeping in exchange for a receipt.
... 3. All POWs whose homes are located in the
German part of
4.
All other enlisted POWs, including Ukrainians, Byelorussians, and other
nationalities whose homes are located in our territory, should be immediately
sent home. They should be given all
possible assistance, including advice, in getting home. Major political indoctrination efforts should
be initiated for these POWs to remind them that they will soon be citizens of
the
Koenker
and Bachman, Eds. Revelations from the Russian Archives.
EFFORTS
TO CENSOR FEUCHTWANGER’S BOOK ARE STOPPED
Jan. 27, 1938 letter from Glavlit
[the Main Directorate for the Protection of State Secrets in the Press],
concerning the incorrect removal of a book by Feuchtwanger]
To all chiefs of main directorates
for protecting military and state secrets in the press:
Glavlit has been receiving
information that attempts have been made in certain places to remove
Feuchtwanger's book
Koenker
and Bachman, Eds. Revelations from the Russian Archives.
HUMANE
RESETTLEMENT OF GERMANS FROM THE
[Resolution of the State Defense
Committee, Sept. 22, 1941, on removal of Germans from certain areas of the
... 4. To allow the re-settled persons to bring with
them their personal property and a supply of provisions for the journey in the
amount of 200 kg for each member of the family.
5.
Buildings, agricultural implements, livestock, and cereal/grain fodder
belonging to the resettled persons will be handed over to the following
commissioner representatives: the local executive committee, the People's
Commissariat for Agriculture, the People's Commissariat for Meat and Dairy
Production, and the People's Commissariat for State Purchases, and will be
restored at the place of settlement in accordance with confirmed instructions
from the Council People's Commissars, the People's Commissariat for
Agriculture, and the People's Commissariat for Meat and Dairy Production.
Structures for kolkhozes and kolkhoz
farm personnel will be provided at the place of settlement by delivery of
prefabricated houses.
Those re-settled persons not
provided homes at the place of supplement will be given loans for construction
and, if necessary, repair of housing from the Agricultural Bank in the sum of
up to 2000 rubles to be repaid in five years at 3% annual interest with
amortization of the loans starting the second year after received.
... 7. To task the People's Commissariat of Foreign
and Domestic Trade with providing food to the resettled persons at locations as
ordered by the NKVD.
8.
To task the USSR People's Commissariat for Health with providing medical
service for the re-settled persons in transit, for which medical personnel,
medicines, and first-aid supplies will be allocated as ordered by the NKVD.
9.
To release from the reserve fund of the Council of People's Commissars
and the NKVD the sum of 15 million rubles for resettlement expenses.
10.
To put the chairman of the Council of People's Commissars of the Kazakh
SSR and the Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of
Kazakhstan in charge of organizing the reception, settling, and household
arrangements for the resettled persons.
Koenker
and Bachman, Eds. Revelations from the Russian Archives.
... The Volga Germans, whose
position was similar to that of the Japanese Americans, became suspect owing to
their particular language and culture, and were largely relocated to
non-strategic areas but, unlike Japanese-Americans, without confinement.
Szymanski,
Albert. Human Rights in the Soviet Union.
In fact, the resettled peoples were
allotted land and given state assistance to build a new life in the areas in
which they were resettled. The Volga
Germans, for example, were resettled:
"with the promise that the
migrants shall be allotted land and that they should be given assistance by the
State in settling into new areas."
(Decree of the presidium of the USSR
Supreme Soviet, 28 August 1941).
while the resettled Chechens and
Crimean Tatars
" were given land, together with the
necessary governmental assistance for their economic establishment."
(Decree of the Presidium of the USSR
Supreme Soviet, 25 June 1946)
The
Enforced Resettlements Speech to the Stalin Society by Bill Bland, 1993.
HUMANE
RESETTLEMENT OF CRIMEAN TATARS
[Decree of the State Defense Committee,
May 11, 1944, signed by Stalin, on deportation of Crimean Tatars to
During the Patriotic War many
Crimean Tatars betrayed the Motherland, deserted Red Army units that defended
the
The Crimean Tatars actively
collaborated with the German occupation authorities, participating in the
so-called Tatar national committees, organized by the German intelligence
organs, and were often used by the Germans to infiltrate the rear of the Red
Army with spies and saboteurs. With the
support of the Crimean Tatars, the "Tatar national committees," in
which the leading role was played by White Guard-Tatar emigrants, directed
their activity at the persecution and oppression of the non-Tatar population of
the Crimea and were engaged in preparatory efforts to separate the Crimea from
the Soviet Union by force, with the help of the German armed forces.
Taking into account the fact cited
above, the State Defense Committee decrees that:
1.
All Tatars are to be banished from the territory of the
The following procedure and
conditions of resettlement are to be established:
a) The special settlers will be
allowed to take with them personal items, clothing, household objects, dishes and
utensils, and up to 500 kilograms of food per family.
... Exchange receipts will be issued
in every populated place and every farm for the receipt of livestock, grain,
vegetables, and for other types of agricultural products.
By July 1 of this year, the NKVD,
People's Commissariat of Agriculture, People's Commissariat of the Meat and
Dairy Industries, People's Commissariat of State Farms, and People's
Commissariat of Procurement are to submit to the USSR Council of People's
Commissars a proposal on the procedure for repaying the special settlers, on
the basis of exchange receipts, for livestock, poultry, and agricultural
products received from them.
... d) To each convoy of special
settlers, the People's Commissariat of Public Health is to assign, within a
time frame to be coordinated with the NKVD, one physician and two nurses, as
well as an appropriate supply of medicines, and to provide medical and
first-aid care to special settlers in transit;
e) The People's Commissariat of
Trade will provide all convoys caring special settlers with hot food and
boiling water on a daily basis....
... e) To grant plots of farm land
to the newly arrived settlers and to help them build homes by providing
construction materials;...
... 4. Seven-year loans of up to 5000 rubles per
family, for the construction and setting up of homes, are to be extended by the
Agricultural Bank to special settlers sent to the Uzbek SSR, in their places of
settlement.
5.
Every month during the June-August 1944 period, equal quantities of
flour, groats, and vegetables will be allocated by the USSR People's
Commissariat of Procurement to the Uzbek SSR Council of People's Commissars for
distribution to the special settlers.
Flour, groats, and vegetables are to
be distributed free of charge to the special settlers during the June-August
period, as re-payment for the agricultural products and livestock received from
them in the areas from which they were evicted.
Koenker
and Bachman, Eds. Revelations from the Russian Archives.
HUMANE
RESETTLEMENT OF CRIMEAN TATARS, BULGARIANS, GREEKS, & ARMENIANS
[State Defense Committee resolution,
June 2, 1944, to evict from the Crimean Republic 37,000 Bulgarians, Greeks, and
Armenians, cited as German collaborators]
The State Defense Committee resolves
to:...
3. ... Direct the People's Commissar
of Agriculture, the People's Commissar of the Meat and Dairy Industry, the
People's Commissar of Procurement, and the People's Commissar of State Farms to
ensure that the evicted Crimean Greeks, Bulgarians, and Armenians receive
livestock, grain, and collective farm products using exchange receipts....
5.
Direct the People's Commissar of Trade to provide food for 37,000 people
during the convoy of special settlers from the
8.
Direct the People's Commissar of procurement to determine the methods to
be used by the oblast executive committees... in distributing provisions to the
special re-settlers during the first three months after resettlement
(July-September) in equal monthly portions....
The distribution of foodstuffs to the special re-settlers during
July-September will be free of charge taking into account the collective farm
foodstuffs and livestock received at the place of eviction.
Koenker
and Bachman, Eds. Revelations from the Russian Archives.
BERIA
SAYS THE RESETTLED PEOPLE FOUND GOOD LIVING CONDITIONS AT THEIR DESTINATION
[Report from Beria to Stalin, July
4, 1944, stating that re-settlement of Tatars, Bulgarians, Greeks, Armenians,
and others from the
... All of the special settlers who
have reached their destination have found satisfactory living conditions. A significant number of the resettled,
able-bodied Tatars special settlers have been engaged in agricultural work on
collective and state farms, in logging, in industry, and in construction. There were no incidents during the
resettlement operation on site or during transit.
Koenker
and Bachman, Eds. Revelations from the Russian Archives.
POLITBURO
TELLS THE ENGLISH THEY WILL EXECUTE PRISONERS IF THE ENGLISH DO
[According to the minutes of a Politburo
meeting on Sept. 11, 1919, the following questions were decided within the
Politburo.
... 7. The question of expulsion of Communists from
Murmansk by the English and executions of some of them.
Proposed that the People's
Commissariats of Foreign Affairs send a radio broadcast to protest the
execution of prisoners and the aerial bombing of innocent civilians and declare
that imprisoned English officers are to be sentenced to execution. The sentence will be carried out if the
English engage in any further such actions.
Koenker
and Bachman, Eds. Revelations from the Russian Archives.
LENIN
SAYS BOURGEOIS INTELLECTUALS ARE NOT THE BRAINS OF THE NATION BUT ITS SHIT
[Letter from Lenin to
... The intellectual forces of the
workers and peasants are growing and getting stronger in their fight to
overthrow the bourgeoisie and their accomplices, the intellectuals, lackeys of
capital, who consider themselves the brains of the nation. In fact they are not its brains, but it's
shit.
Koenker
and Bachman, Eds. Revelations from the Russian Archives.
LENIN
TELLS STALIN WHO HE FEELS SHOULD BE DEPORTED
[Letter from Lenin to Stalin, July
17, 1922, on deporting Mensheviks, Popular Socialists, and Constitutional
Democrats]
On the matter of deporting
Mensheviks, Popular Socialists, Constitutional Democrats (Kadets), etc. from
Has the decision been made to
"eradicate "all the Popular Socialists? As far as I'm concerned, deport them all. They're more harmful than any
Socialist-Revolutionary because they're more clever.
Also Potresov, Izgoev and all the
Economist contributors. The Mensheviks
Rozanov (a physician, cunning),... Radchenko and her young daughter (rumor has
it they're the vilest enemies of Bolshevism), Rozhkov (he has to be deported,
incorrigible),... The commission supervised by Mantsev, Messing et al. should
present lists and several hundred such ladies and gentlemen must be deported
without mercy. Let's purge
As for Lezhnev... lets think it
over: shouldn't we deport him? He will
always be the wiliest sort as far as I can judge based on his articles I have
read.
Ozerov as well as all the Economist
contributors are the most ruthless enemies.
All of them--out of Russia. This
must be done at once. By the end of the
Social Revolutionary's trial, no later.
Arrest a few hundred and without a declaration of motives--get out,
ladies and gentlemen!
Deport all authors of Dom
literatorov Mysl from Petrograd; ransack
Koenker
and Bachman, Eds. Revelations from the Russian Archives.
Lenin's lists [of subversives] were
extensive, and bore such sub-headings as: Professors of 1st Moscow University;
Professors of Petrovsko-Razumovsky Agricultural Academy; Professors of
Institute of Railway Engineers; [those involved in] the case of the Free
Economic Society; anti-Soviet professors of the Archeological Institute;
anti-Soviet figures connected with Bereg publishing house; people involved in
case No. 813 (Abrikosov group); anti-Soviet agronomists and cooperativists;
physicians; anti-Soviet engineers; writers; Petrograd writers; and a special
list of Petrograd anti-Soviet intellectuals.
The first contingent numbered 120
people. The document ordering their
expulsion was first signed on 31 July 1922 by Kamenev, Kursky, and Unshlikht.
Volkogonov,
Dmitrii. Lenin: A New Biography.
In an extensive memorandum to Stalin
in the autumn of 1922, Lenin targeted individuals who were either associated
with anti-Bolshevik publications or whom he regarded as especially perceptive
opponents of his regime. The memorandum
conveys the tone of Lenin's obsessive concern to rid himself of such people:
"On the question of expelling
Mensheviks, Popular Socialists, Cadets, etc., I'd like to ask a few questions,
as this matter, which was started before I went on leave, is still
unfinished. Has it been decided to
'uproot' all Popular Socialists?
Peshekhonov, Myakotin, Gornfeld?
Petrishchev and the others? I
think they should all be expelled.
They're more dangerous than any SR, because they're more cunning. Also Potresov, Izgoev and all the people on
[the journal] Ekonomist, (Ozerov and many many more). The Mensheviks Rozanov (a physician, cunning),
Vigdorchik (Migulo, or some such), Radchenko and her young daughter (allegedly
the most malicious enemies of Bolshevism); Rozhkov (he has to be expelled; he's
incorrigible); Frank (the author of Methodology), the Mantsev-Messing
commission should compile lists and several hundred such gentlemen should be
deported from the country without mercy.
We'll cleanse
As for Lezhnev... we should think
about it: shouldn't we expel him? He'll
always be utterly crafty, as far as I can judge from his articles. Like all the people on Ekonomist, Ozerov is
the most relentless enemy. All of them
must be chucked out of
Volkogonov,
Dmitrii. Lenin: A New Biography.
STALIN
ALLOWED GREATER FREE SPEECH THAN HIS SUCCESSORS
... Two writers, Daniel and
Siniavskii, were arrested in 1966 for having published satirical stories abroad
under pseudonyms. Their crime was
"spreading anti-Soviet propaganda."
Even Stalin had not used this argument against intellectuals. Daniel and Siniavskii were sentenced to terms
in a labor camp, but their convictions spurred 63 members of the Moscow Union
of Writers to protest the harm such persecution could do to Soviet
culture. Further arrests led to further
protests, a phenomenon unknown under Stalin's terror.
Koenker
and Bachman, Eds. Revelations from the Russian Archives.
[Feb. 7, 1970, letter from
Tvardovskii, the manager of Novyi Mir, to Brezhnev]
No matter how strange it may seem,
Stalin showered me with decorations and medals when he was alive, while the
Stalinists of today are hounding me.
Koenker
and Bachman, Eds. Revelations from the Russian Archives.
CULTURE
DIRECTOR SAYS SOLZHENITSYN PROVED HE WAS A SUBVERSIVE FROM THE START
[Memorandum from Shauro, director of
the Department of Culture, to the Central Committee, June 20, 1975, regarding
the publication in the West of Solzhenitsyn's The Oak and the Calf and
proposing publication of a book to expose Solzhenitsyn as a slanderer--rejected
by the Writers'
In his new work Solzhenitsyn declares
his long-standing hatred of the socialist social order, of Lenin and Leninism,
of everything Soviet. Calling himself a
"writer-member of the underground," he confesses that since his youth
he nurtured plans to undermine the Soviet government. The book The Oak and the Calf represents the
cynical confession of an ideological saboteur.
Koenker
and Bachman, Eds. Revelations from the Russian Archives.
EARLY
REPORT SAYS OPPOSITION TO GRAIN REQUISITIONS CAUSED BY GOVT INEPTNESS
[Party memorandum of May 1929
reporting on resistance in the countryside to grain requisitioning, food
shortages, and the closing of religious institutions]
... In his letter Comrade Khataevich
arrives at the following conclusions:
"An investigation of the role
of local party and Soviet organizations in all the aforementioned incidents
which provoked mass uprisings has revealed that, in most cases, party and
Soviet organizations were guilty of tactlessness, egregious blunders, and a lack
of skill and proficiency in their preparations for vital efforts. This made the anti-Soviet activities of the
kulaks and the clergy much easier. The
latter were able to respond quickly, flexibly, and skillfully to the
blundering, tactlessness, and ineptitude of our local party and Soviet
organizations. The kulaks were
particularly successful in taking advantage of incidents where local party and
Soviet organizations closed churches and so forth by administrative fiat,
without careful preparations at the lowest levels and without explaining,
persuading, and gaining the support of most of the poor and middle
peasants." Signed Bogomolov, Head
of the Information Department
Koenker
and Bachman, Eds. Revelations from the Russian Archives.
HUMANE
EVICTION OF KULAKS FROM THE POLES REGION OF THE
[Ukrainian Communist Party Central
Committee resolution, April 1, 1932, on the eviction of kulaks from the Poles'
region]
1.
It must be considered essential to purge the Poles' region of kulak
elements, as we have determined the number of families subject to deportation
to be 5000.
2.
The deportees are to be utilized to develop quarries for stone, clay,
etc., and for this purpose permanent kulak settlements are to be established on
the left bank of the Dnieper River in regions where quarries are located.
3.
It is ordered:
a) organizations which
will utilize the labor of the special deportees are to provide fully the food supply,
living quarters, and cultural-medical services to the special deportees. In particular, the People's Commissariat for
Supply of the
Koenker
and Bachman, Eds. Revelations from the Russian Archives.
These people [kulaks] were obviously
small farmers, used to hard work, as we could tell by the rough hands of both
men and women, and they had the ruddy complexions of people who work on the
land. But at this time they were a
bewildered-looking lot. They didn't seem
to know what was happening to them, or why, and neither did the other Russians
who saw them being moved about. Well,
these people were "kulaks," and they were being
"liquidated." This was the
process which has been described by many an "expert" in many a book
about
I watched the "liquidation of
kulaks" before I had read any expert interpretations of the process. It just looked to me as if most of the small
farmers in
Littlepage,
John D. In Search of Soviet Gold.
UKRAINIAN
PARTY ORDERS CAUSES OF FAMINE BE EXPOSED AND PEOPLE BE HELPED
[Supplement to minutes of the
Ukrainian Party Kiev bureau, Feb. 22, 1933, instructing that the famine be
alleviated and that "all who have become completely disabled because of
emaciation must be put back on their feet" by March 5]
... 10. In view of the continued attempts by our
enemies to use these facts against the creation of collective farms, the Raion
Party Committees are to conduct systematic clarification work bringing to light
the real causes of the existing famine (abuses in the collective farms,
laziness, decline in labor discipline, etc.).
Koenker
and Bachman, Eds. Revelations from the Russian Archives.
INDUSTRIAL
SUCCESS WAS THE KEY TO THE COMMUNIST SYSTEM AND NATIONAL PROSPERITY
Industrial development had been the
raison d'etre of the Communist system, and the first five-year plan named the
expansion of industry as the key to national prosperity. The industrial front was deliberately touted
as the symbol of the successes of Soviet planning: 1500 big enterprises were
built during the first five-year plan, including the
Koenker
and Bachman, Eds. Revelations from the Russian Archives.
Meanwhile, there is no more gripping
economic and social phenomenon recorded in the pages of history than the
superhuman effort which is being made in the Soviet Union to industrialize in
the shortest possible time a fundamentally agricultural country, to awaken a
powerful people out of its traditional lethargy, and to build a new social
order from which the last vestiges of human exploitation and slavery are
ultimately to vanish.
Davis,
Jerome. The New Russia.
LENIN
ORDERS THE MOST REACTIONARY CLERGY TO BE SHOT AND THEIR PROPERTY TAKEN
[Memorandum from Lenin to Molotov
and Politburo members, March 19, 1922, with instructions for responding to the
resistance to the confiscation of Church valuables in Shuia]
... Now and only now, when people are
being eaten in famine-stricken areas, and hundreds, if not thousands, of
corpses lie on the roads, we can (and therefore must) pursue the removal of
church valuables with the most frenzied and ruthless energy and not hesitate to
put down the least opposition. Now and
only now, the vast majority of peasants will either be on our side, or at least
will not be in a position to support to any decisive degree this handful of
Black Hundreds' clergy and reactionary urban petty bourgeoisie, who are willing
and able to attempt to oppose the Soviet decree with the policy of force.
...
One clever writer on statecraft correctly said that if it is necessary
for the realization of a well-known political goal to perform a series of
brutal actions, then it is necessary to do them in the most energetic manner
and in the shortest time, because masses of people will not tolerate the
protracted use of brutality.
... Therefore, I come to the
indisputable conclusion that we must precisely now smash the Black Hundreds'
clergy most decisively and ruthlessly and put down all resistance with such
brutality that they will not forget it for several decades.
... Send to Shuia one of the most
energetic, clear-headed, and capable members of the All-Russian Central
Executive Committee...giving him verbal instructions through one of the members
of the Politburo. The instructions must
come down to this, that in Shuia he must arrest more, if possible, but not
less, than several dozen representatives of the local clergy, the local petty
bourgeoisie, and the local bourgeoisie on suspicion of direct or indirect
participation in the forcible resistance to the decree of the party on the
removal of valuables from churches.
Immediately upon completion of this task, he must return to
... The greater the number of
representatives of the reactionary clergy and the reactionary bourgeoisie that
we succeed in shooting on this occasion, the better because this
"audience" must precisely now be taught a lesson in such a way that
they will not dare to think about any resistance whatsoever for several
decades.
Koenker
and Bachman, Eds. Revelations from the Russian Archives.
GPU
REPORTS ON THE CLERGY’S SUBVERSION OF THE PEASANTRY
[Summary report on the religious
movement among the peasantry, July 2, 1924]
IVANOVO-VOZNESENK Guberniia. The kulaks are employing an original type of
religious agitation. They agree to give
one or two sheep to a poor peasant if he agrees to pray to God and read the
gospel. They also tell him that if he
doesn't meet their conditions they'll take the sheep back (from a GPU report
for July 12, 1924).
Koenker
and Bachman, Eds. Revelations from the Russian Archives.
AMERICAN
SAYS THERE IS MORE INCORRECT INFO ABOUT THE SU THAN ANY OTHER TOPIC
[Speech given by Col. Cooper of the
United States to the American section of the All-Union Western Chamber of
Commerce, Sept. 14, 1928, on his impressions of the USSR during four visits
lasting a total of eight months]
…When I was in
... I am well aware that the
Koenker
and Bachman, Eds. Revelations from the Russian Archives.
TROTSKY
WAS A PROLIFIC WRITER ALWAYS READY TO LIE ABOUT OPPONENTS
Trotsky was a fierce hater and a
prolific writer, a polemicist rather than a historian, who was always ready to
distort and invent evidence against his enemy.
Grey,
Ian. Stalin, Man of History.
STALIN
WAS DEFINITELY NOT THE GREY BLUR IN SOVIET HISTORY TROTSKY SAID HE WAS
Far from being a "grey
blur," he was gaining the respect and confidence of members, as was shown at
the Seventh Party Conference in late April 1917, when he received the third
highest number of votes after Lenin and Zinoviev in the secret ballot for the
Central Committee.
Grey,
Ian. Stalin, Man of History.
Trotsky, in one of his articles,
wrote about Stalin's lack of creative input from 1900 to 1910. This assertion is unjust. Stalin was not only an activist; he also
aspired to the role of theoretician, at least on the Transcaucasian level. From 1900 to 1910 he wrote quite a few
articles and pamphlets,... But it is
incorrect to speak of a complete absence of creative output on Stalin's part.
Medvedev,
Roy. Let History Judge.
Much has since been written in order
to belittle or to exaggerate Koba's role in those days [imprisonment in the
early 1900s]. This suggests that at the
age of 22 he was already some sort of 'grey eminence' in the underground of his
native province. He was certainly not
the undistinguished member of the rank-and-file, the nonentity, described by
Trotsky.
Deutscher,
Isaac. Stalin; A Political Biography.
When the Seventh Party Conference
assembled toward the end of April 1917, the membership was approaching
80,000.... Stalin was elected to the
Central Committee and his current stature in the Party was attested to by the
fact that in the secret balloting he received 97 of the 109 delegate votes. Only Lenin with 104 and Zinoviev with 101
were ahead. The barely known Caucasian
of 1912, the man whom five weeks earlier it had been proposed should be kept
out of the Party councils because of his bad temper and manners, was now freely
acknowledged by his fellow Bolsheviks to be the leading "practitioner"
in
the
Party. In the turbulent months ahead
Stalin remained at the center, one of the principal leaders of the Party,
though only a secondary figure of the Revolution.
Ulam,
Adam. Stalin; The Man and his Era.
But those who concluded that he was
a 'grey blank' simply demonstrated their ignorance of central party life.
Service,
Robert. Stalin.
True, he was not a gray blur or a
mediocrity or the "creature of the party bureaucracy" claimed by
Trotsky in later years.
Laqueur,
Walter. Stalin: The Glasnost Revelations.
STALIN
WAS ONE OF THE EARLY OUTSTANDING LEADERS OF THE REVOLUTION
Stalin's handling of the Sixth Party
Congress raised his prestige and authority.
In the elections to the Central Committee he came after Lenin, Zinoviev,
Kamenev, and Trotsky in the number of votes polled. When the Central Committee elected the
editorial board of Pravda, Stalin received the most votes and Trotsky failed to
gain election. When it was decided to
elect a 10-man inner cabinet of the enlarged Central Committee, Stalin again
prevailed in the balloting.
Grey,
Ian. Stalin, Man of History.
Among the Party officials Stalin was
preferred to his future rival [Trotsky], and this is well attested by the first
acts of the new Central Committee. In
the voting for the editorial board of the Bolshevik newspaper Stalin received
the most votes, and the motion that Trotsky, if released from jail, should be
asked to join it was rejected 11 to 10.
Ulam,
Adam. Stalin; The Man and his Era.
After Lenin's return to Finland
Trotsky took charge. He was chairman of
the Military Revolutionary Committee of the Petrograd Soviet, set up on Oct.
25. Serving as the headquarters staff of
the Revolution, this committee controlled the Red Guard and all military units
in the city which supported the Bolsheviks.
There was also a special military revolutionary "center,"
consisting of five members, elected or appointed on Oct. 29. Stalin, but not Trotsky, was a member of this
center, which has been described as the real organizing force of the
Revolution.
Grey, Ian.
Stalin, Man of History.
In October 1917 Lenin, meanwhile,
was calling on all organizations and all workers and soldiers to engage in
outright and intensified preparation for an armed uprising. The party Central Committee appointed an
operations center, consisting of Bubnov, Dzerzhinsky, Uritsky, Sverdlov, and
Stalin, to supervise the organization of the uprising.
Volkogonov,
Dmitri. Stalin: Triumph and Tragedy.
Organizing the uprising had been the
responsibility of the five-man practical center, including Stalin, and the
Military Revolutionary Committee, which did an enormous amount of work
recruiting forces for the decisive onslaught.
Volkogonov,
Dmitri. Stalin: Triumph and Tragedy.
STALIN
PROTECTS ZINOVIEV AND KAMENEV FROM LENIN’S WRATH
Meanwhile Kamenev and Zinoviev,
apparently in a mood of panic, were publicizing their opposition and
emphasizing the dangers involved. To
Lenin and others it was treason to oppose and to reveal Bolshevik
intentions. It was all the more culpable
since the Party rank-and-file were increasingly alarmed by their warnings. This was more than Lenin could stand. He had returned to
At a meeting of the committee on
Oct. 17, 1917, Trotsky advocated stern action against Kamenev and Zinoviev and
branded them as traitors. He was not
influenced by the fact that Kamenev was his brother-in-law; indeed, he was
demonstrating that loyalty to the party stood far above personal
relationships. Other members supported
the case for severe punishment. It was
Stalin who brought the note of moderation into the fury of the discussion. His argument in favor of tolerance flowed not
from a passive, oil-on-troubled-waters attitude, nor from some incredibly
farsighted realization that he might need the support of these two comrades in
the future, but from a deep concern for the unity of the party at this critical
time. Summarily expelling two comrades
of long-standing would cause discord and solve nothing. Kamenev and Zinoviev knew that they had acted
irresponsibly, and they would not repeat their mistakes. After his intervention, the proposal to expel
them was dropped. Then it was decided to
remove Kamenev from the editorial board of Pravda. This, too, was dropped, when Stalin resigned
in protest and the committee refused to accept his resignation.
Grey, Ian.
Stalin, Man of History.
Stalin took part in the decisive
Central Committee meetings of October 10 and 24, at which the decision for an
armed insurrection was made on the basis of reports by Lenin. Only Kamenev and Zinoviev voted against the
decision, and in violation of all conspiratorial norms they published their
objections in the non-Bolshevik newspaper Novaya zhizn. As is generally known, Lenin demanded that
Zinoviev and Kamenev be expelled from the party. The only central committee member who opposed
Lenin on this question was Stalin.
Medvedev,
Roy. Let History Judge.
...for when Lenin was to demand
severe disciplinary measures against Kamenev and Zinoviev, it was Stalin who
led the opposition to him.
Service,
Robert. Stalin.
THE
CONSTITUENT ASSEMBLY IS DISBANDED AS COUNTER-REV
In January 5, 1918, the Constituent
Assembly held its opening session in the
On the same date the Central
Executive Committee, appointed by the Congress of Soviets, which had a
Bolshevik majority, approved the suppression of the Constituent Assembly. The justification was that it was an organ of
counter-revolution....
Grey,
Ian. Stalin, Man of History.
Its [the Assembly] dispersal
presented no difficulty. The Assembly
was incapable of rallying any section of the people in its defense.
Deutscher,
Isaac. Stalin; A Political Biography.
At the start, the Bolsheviks
co-operated with the extreme left wing of the SR's and accorded them a place in
the government.
One of the first things to be dealt
with was the Constituent Assembly, which had at last been elected by universal
franchise for man and woman to settle the new constitution of
Pares,
Bernard.
STALIN
WAS NOT GRASPING FOR POWER BUT WAS GIVEN IT BY LENIN
Although it a usually assumed that
Stalin was covertly grasping at positions of power and influence, the fact is
that he was promoted mainly on the initiative of Lenin. Once appointed to his various offices he was
prompt to exercise the authority necessary to carry out the work.
Grey,
Ian. Stalin, Man of History.
It was at Lenin's suggestion that
Stalin was named commissar of nationalities and commissar of state control, and
later commissar of the Workers' and Peasants Inspection (or Rabkrin, to use the
Soviet acronym).
Medvedev,
Roy. Let History Judge.
Stalin, in truth, did not look to be
a formidable competitor for power. He
had no gift of speech as Trotsky had. He
was not an imposing figure. He wore an
old khaki tunic with a button missing.
He never went to the cleaners.
His black hair was uncouth; his thick mustache dropped. He did not have his own automobile as Trotsky
had. He was still smart at raiding banks
and confiscating money for the Party, but money did not find its way into his
pocket. He never showed off in any
way. His face was a mask; it looked
stupid and narrow-minded but benevolent.
Graham,
Stephen. Stalin.
After the conquest of power, Stalin
began to feel more sure of himself, remaining, however, a figure of the second
rank. I soon noticed that Lenin was
"advancing" Stalin, valuing in him his firmness, grit, stubbornness,
and to a certain extent his slyness, as attributes necessary in the struggle.
LENIN’S
ILLNESS WAS AFFECTING HIS MENTAL BALANCE
This and other incidents suggested
that Lenin's illness was affecting him mentally. He had become increasingly capricious and
flew into rages over minor matters.
Grey,
Ian. Stalin, Man of History.
STALIN IS
DEEPLY HURT BY LENIN’S CRITICISM AT THE END
Stalin must have felt surprised and
hurt by Lenin's behavior during the last months. As yet he knew nothing of the Testament which
was still held secret, but he had been made aware of Lenin's personal
hostility. He had served Lenin and the
Bolshevik cause loyally for 20 years; he had worked closely with him as a
member of the Central Committee for 10 years.
On occasions he had expressed disagreement, and during the Civil War
when they had been under unbearable pressures, he had shown bad temper, as had
Trotsky and others. Lenin had uttered no
recriminations. Their relationship had
always been based on trust and devotion to the cause and he had never conspired
to displace him or to undermine his authority.
The reward for this loyalty was a vicious campaign to destroy his
position in the party. Stalin can only
have seen it as a terrible betrayal.
Certainly he did not respond then or later with hostility or
resentment. In fact his attitude towards
Lenin was accurately expressed in his lecture to the
Grey,
Ian. Stalin, Man of History.
STALIN
WAS QUIET, RESERVED, CALM THOUGHTFUL, PATIENT, RETICENT AND MODEST
Stalin did not appear to be a
contender. Unobtrusive, quiet, modest,
he was plainly the party worker who attended to the essential tasks of
administration and organization. But he
was always accessible to members and officials, listening patiently to their
problems and complaints. Boris Bazhanov,
a former official on the staff of the Central Committee who claimed to have
been Stalin's personal secretary, described him standing in a corner, puffing
his pipe, listening for an hour or more while an agitated provincial secretary
or ordinary party member poured out his troubles. His patience was unlimited and, although he
rarely committed himself, he earned the gratitude of many members in this
way. He was always reticent, a man of
few words who kept his own counsel.
Grey,
Ian. Stalin, Man of History.
As for myself, I am merely a pupil
of Lenin, and my aim is to be a worthy pupil of his.
Stalin,
Joseph. Stalin's Kampf.
When executions were taking place,
and all the others were much shaken, he 'slept soundly, or quietly studied
Esperanto....
Conquest,
Robert. Stalin: Breaker of Nations.
...at the meeting of October 17,
1917,...amid the frayed tempers Stalin
once again emerged as conciliator and voice of moderation.
Ulam,
Adam. Stalin; The Man and his Era.
In his domestic life, Stalin is
exceptionally modest and virtuous. He is
51, his wife is 28. He loves her
deeply. Stalin has a son of 22 by his
first wife. He has two children, a boy
of 10 and a girl of five, by his present one, Nadya Alliluieva. His children go to the Kremlin school where most
of the commissars’ boys and girls get their education. The oldest son, Yasha, was sent by his father
to an Institute of technology to study railroading.
Levine,
Isaac Don. Stalin.
Baibakov also recalled that Stalin
never held discussions until he had studied the available material. He was well informed about many matters. He seldom raised his voice and scarcely ever
bawled at anyone or even expressed irritation.
Service,
Robert. Stalin.
STALIN
WAS OFTEN MORE LENIENT THAN LENIN, ZINOVIEV, SECRET POLICE HEADS & OTHERS
In the Civil War he had borne heavy
responsibilities and had faced dangers in the way that had brought him credit
throughout the party. He had dispensed
summary justice when necessary and had shown that he could be ruthless, but he
had not shown the brutality for which Voroshilov, Budenny, and others were
notorious. In his speeches he was
moderate and reasonable. He handled
criticisms with apparent good humor, and even when attacking the Opposition he
was less savage than Lenin or Zinoviev.
In Politburo meetings he sought to be agreeable.
Grey,
Ian. Stalin, Man of History.
New evidence casts doubts on rumors
and myths that have become prevalent.
Thus the new documents provide no evidence for the existence of a bloc
of Stalinist moderates who tried to restrain Stalin's alleged careful plan for
terror.
[Footnote]: This hypothetical bloc,
variously said to consist of Ordjonikidze, Postyshev, and others was used to
explain the zigs and zags of Stalin's policy: supposedly he faced resistance
from this group and frequently had to back down. But documents suggest that, for example, no
one defended Bukharin and Rykov at the February 1937 plenum.
Nove,
Alec, Ed. The Stalin Phenomenon.
But the sequence of events presented
in the written evidence is also consistent with a second scenario... in which
Yezhov pursued initiatives, prepared dossiers, and pushed certain
investigations in order to promote his own agenda. Although that agenda was often the same as
Stalin's, it may not have been identical.
We know, for example, that although Stalin agreed to review a manuscript
Yezhov was writing on how Opposition inevitably becomes terrorism, he never
allowed publication.... Events seemed to
show that in the cases of Pyatakov and Bukharin, Yezhov and others were
possibly ahead of Stalin in pushing the need for severity.
[Footnote: Starkov writes in this
volume that at the time of his fall, "Yezhov's primary crime, however,
consisted in the fact that he had not informed Stalin of his
actions." Stalin's relationship to
Yezhov's predecessor Yagoda was equally complex. In March 1936, Yagoda proposed to Stalin that
all Trotskyist everywhere--even those convicted already--should be re-sentenced
to five additional years out of hand and that any of them involved in
"terror" should quickly be shot.
Stalin referred Yagoda's plan to Vyshinsky for a legal opinion, which
came back positive in six days. Although
Yagoda was ready to move immediately, it was nearly two months before Stalin
issued an order to this effect.]
Getty and
Manning. Stalinist Terror.
To be fair, on November 28, 1917 at
a meeting of the Council of People's Commissars (Sovnarkom), he [Stalin] did
stand alone against the rest, including Lenin, when he voted against handing
over leading liberals to revolutionary tribunals as enemies of the people.
Volkogonov,
Dmitri. Stalin: Triumph and Tragedy.
...Some years later, in the 1930s
and in the company of his cronies, hearing of Trotsky's most recent speech
abroad, he [Stalin] snapped: 'We made two mistakes on that occasion. We should have left him for a time in
Volkogonov,
Dmitri. Stalin: Triumph and Tragedy.
I had a surprise telephone call from
Yagoda. He demanded the immediate
closure of the Narkomindel's hairdressing saloon and gave us 24 hours in which
to do it. He said that he had proof that
most important state secrets were being discussed there. He hinted that the staff of the saloon,
especially women, were under suspicion and warned that unless we closed the
shop within 24 hours they would all be arrested and transported to
I summoned the assistant manager of
the hairdressing saloon.... The entire
staff were indignant about the closure....
Yagoda came on the phone again. He informed me that the decision to close the
hairdressing saloon had been rescinded.
I had a short talk with him. He
was obviously embarrassed... one would think that the closure was an important
affair of state....
Mossina came to see me. It transpired that Koba had personally
ordered Yagoda to leave our hairdressers alone.
Litvinov,
Maksim Maksimovich. Notes for a Journal.
A telephone call from Koba. He asked me whether I had received Mekhlis's
letter. He said: "You will greatly
oblige me personally if you get him a visa.
You understand that otherwise he will come to a bad end .... I do not want our revolution to devour its
own children...."
Litvinov,
Maksim Maksimovich. Notes for a Journal.
Kamenev was the only one who saw
Stalin. He stayed with him for more than
an hour.... Stalin later told Mekhlis that Kamenev the only one deserving
mercy....
Litvinov,
Maksim Maksimovich. Notes for a Journal.
At a meeting of the Sovnarkom on 28
November 1917, for instance, he [Lenin] proposed a decree on "the arrest
of the most prominent members of the central committee of the party of the
enemies of the people [i.e. the Constitutional Democrats], and their trial by
Revolutionary tribunal." The only
member of the government to oppose this measure was Stalin,...
Volkogonov,
Dmitrii. Lenin: A New Biography.
[Footnote]: In a letter to Lyova (19
November 1937) Trotsky relates that, when the issue came before the Politburo,
he was for attacking Kronstadt while Stalin was against it, saying that the
rebels, if left to themselves, would surrender within two or three weeks. Curiously, in his public polemics against
Stalin (and in his biography of Stalin) Trotsky never mentioned this fact,
although he usually made the most of any instance of Stalin's political
"softness" or deviation from Lenin's line. Is it that Trotsky somehow felt that in this
case "softness" might redound to Stalin's credit?
Deutscher,
Isaac. The Prophet Outcast.
The Central Committee met to discuss
Zinoviev's and Kamenev's misdemeanor, and Trotsky demanded their expulsion from
the Central Committee. Koba's proposal
was quite different: these two comrades should be required to submit to the
will of the Central Committee, but should be kept in it. Trotsky's proposal prevailed, whereupon Koba
announced his own resignation from Worker's Path.
Radzinsky,
Edvard. Stalin.
The MGB thought Karpai's further value to the investigation
was nil and recommended she be shot.
Stalin thought otherwise.
Naumov
and Brent. Stalin's Last Crime.
KRUPSKAYA
BRINGS FORTH THE TESTAMENT AT THE LAST MINUTE TO DAMAGE STALIN
Stalin's majority support in the
Central Committee and the Central Control Commission and his control of the
party apparatus made his position seem unchallengeable. But five days before the 13th Party Congress
was to open, something happened which suddenly threatened his career. Krupskaya sent to Kamenev notes which Lenin
had dictated between December 23rd, 1922, and January 23rd, 1923, with a
covering letter explaining that she had suppressed the two notes, known as the
"Testament," because Lenin had expressed the "definite
wish" that these notes should be submitted to the next Party Congress
after his death.... Her reasons for
holding them secret for so long were not stated, but in bringing them forward
at this time she was clearly seeking to damage Stalin politically.
Grey,
Ian. Stalin, Man of History.
ZINOVIEV
& KAMENEV WANT TESTAMENT IGNORED SO STALIN
IS IN POWER AGAINST TROTSKY
Zinoviev and Kamenev were both
concerned to keep Stalin in office. He
was their indispensable ally against Trotsky and the oppositionists. Zinoviev declared that, while they had all
sworn to carry out Lenin's wishes to the letter, they knew that his fears about
their General Secretary had been baseless.
Trotsky recalled that during the
discussion Stalin referred to the Lenin who had dictated these notes as "a
sick man surrounded by womenfolk," a barbed reference to Krupskaya, but he
did not take an active part. Trotsky
himself did not contribute to the discussion.
Finally by 30 votes to 10 it was decided that the notes should not be
published, but that their content should be conveyed to selected delegates to
whom it should be explained that Lenin had been seriously ill at the time and
misinformed by those around him.
Grey,
Ian. Stalin, Man of History.
Kamenev opened the seance and read
Lenin's letter. There was silence. Stalin's face was somber and strained. Following a scenario prepared in advance,
Zinoviev took the floor right away: "Comrades, you all know that Lenin's
posthumous wishes, each word of Ilyich, is law for us. We have sworn more than once to accomplish
what Lenin passed on to us. And you know
perfectly well that we will do so. But
we are happy to note that on one point it seems that Lenin's fears were not
justified. You have all witnessed our
joint work during these past months and, just like me, you have been able to
see with satisfaction that that which Ilyich feared has not happened. I speak of our general secretary and the
dangers of scission within the Central Committee." (I've given the sense of his presentation.)
...Everyone kept quiet. Zinoviev proposed that Stalin be re-elected
general secretary. Trotsky kept silent
also, but he showed his extreme disgust with the comedy by a vivid mimicry.
Kamenev, for his part, urged members
to keep Stalin in the general secretaryship.
Stalin continued to gaze out of the window, teeth clenched and features
drawn. His career was at stake.
Because there was silence, Kamenev
proposed to settle the matter by vote.
Who favored leaving Stalin in as general secretary? Who was against? And who abstained? I looked down the rows, counting the votes
and giving the totals to Kamenev. The
majority voted in favor of Stalin, while the small Trotsky group voted
against. There were some abstentions. I was busy counting the votes and didn't
notice who abstained, which I much regret.
In addition to leaving Stalin as
general secretary, the plenum decided not to read Lenin's Testament to the
congress and not to distribute his text to the delegates. Instead, the heads of delegations were to
convey it to their own delegates.
Bazhanov,
Boris. Bazhanov and the Damnation of Stalin.
The Central Committee and senior
delegates met on 22 May 1924 to acquaint themselves with Lenin's will which had
hitherto been in Krupskaya's keeping.
The reading of the will had the effect of a bolt from the blue. Those present listened in utter perplexity to
the passage in which Lenin castigated Stalin's rudeness and disloyalty and
urged the party to remove him from the General Secretariat. Stalin seemed crushed. Once again his fortunes trembled in the
balance. Amid all the worshipping of
Lenin's memory, amid the endless genuflexions and vows to "hold Lenin's
words sacred," it seemed inconceivable that the party should disregard
Lenin's advice.
But once again Stalin was saved by
the truthfulness of his future victims.
Zinoviev and Kamenev, who held his fate in their hands, rushed to his
rescue. They implored their comrades to
leave him in his post. They used all
their zeal and histrionic talents to persuade them that whatever Lenin held
Stalin guilty of, the offense was not grave and that Stalin had made ample
amends. Lenin's word was sacred,
Zinoviev exclaimed, but Lenin himself, if he could have witnessed, as they all
had, Stalin's sincere efforts to mend his ways, would not have urged the party
to remove him....
All eyes were now fixed on Trotsky:
would he rise, expose the farce, and demand that Lenin's will be
respected? He did not utter a word. He conveyed his contempt and disgust at the
spectacle only through expressive grimaces and shoulder shrugging. He could not bring himself to speak out on a
matter in which his own standing was so obviously involved. It was resolved to disregard Lenin's advice on
Stalin.
Deutscher,
Isaac. The Prophet Unarmed.
The 13th Party Congress had
arrived. Lenin's "Letter to the
Congress" was to be read there. On
the eve of the Congress Krupskaya solemnly presented the Central Committee with
certain sealed packets.
...Yaroslavsky recalled that
"when these few pages written by Lenin were read to the members of the
Central Committee the reaction was one of incomprehension and alarm." It was true.
The members of the Central Committee could not understand what Lenin
wanted. Why was he abusing all the
leaders, without suggesting any replacement?
Why should Stalin be driven out of the Secretariat if all he could be
reproached with was rudeness? Besides,
they all knew that it was Lenin, not Stalin himself, who had "concentrated
power" in the Gensek's hands. It
was all rather embarrassing because it seemed that the only reason for these
attacks was that Lenin's wife had been offended. That Stalin was terrified of this letter,
that he was saved by Kamenev, and so on, is mere legend. Kamenev spoke for everyone when he said that
"our dear Lenin's sickness prevented him at times from being fair. And since Stalin has already confessed to the
character faults noted by Lenin and will, of course, correct them, we should
begin by accepting the possibility of leaving Stalin in the post of
Secretary-General." And so, out of
concern for Lenin's reputation, it was resolved that these "sickbed
documents" should not be reproduced.
They would be read to each delegation separately.
Radzinsky,
Edvard. Stalin.
BUKHARIN
WAS PUT ON THE POLITBURO TO FILL LENIN’S VACANCY
Bukharin was elected to the
Politburo to fill the vacancy left by Lenin.
Grey,
Ian. Stalin, Man of History.
MEMBERS
OF THE OPPOSITION ATTACK ONE ANOTHER AS MUCH AS THEY ATTACK STALIN
The opposition groups remained small
minorities within the party. Their
leaders were motivated mainly by resentment of Stalin's powering
position,... The opposition leaders
were, moreover, filled with malice and hatred towards each other. Zinoviev and Kamenev had vied in the virulence
of their attacks on Trotsky. Trotsky had
never disguised his contempt for his opponents and had been brutally outspoken
in attacking them.
Grey,
Ian. Stalin, Man of History.
The commonest characteristic of
these [anti-Soviet] organizations was their disdain or even hatred of each other.
Alexandrov,
Victor. The Tukhachevsky Affair.
MAJOR
OPPOSITION LEADERS RECANT THEIR FACTIONALISM TO RETAIN SOME PARTY POWER
At the same time Stalin set about
discrediting the opposition, alleging with dubious evidence that it was not
really left-wing, but a right-wing bourgeois deviation. Then the opposition leaders played into his
hands. They organized demonstrations in
factories, demanding full party discussion of their proposals. This was a flagrant breach of discipline and
an affront to party unity. Appalled by
their own temerity and recklessness, the six leaders--Trotsky, Zinoviev,
Kamenev, Pyatakov, Sokolnikov, and Evdokimov --confessed their guilt in a
public declaration and swore not to pursue factional activity in the
future. They also denounced their own
left-wing supporters in the Comintern and the Workers' Opposition group. Apparently their confession was voluntary and
an attempt to salve their consciences.
They had sought, they admitted naively, only to retain some influence
within the party. Their pusillanimous
conduct exposed them and their few supporters to reprisals.
Grey,
Ian. Stalin, Man of History.
At the same time that Rightists were
being defeated, a number of left oppositionists were being readmitted to the
party. With Stalin's shift to the left,
Radek, Pyatakov, Smirnov, and other Trotskyists recanted their
"errors" of 1927 and announced their solidarity with the new policies
of the Stalinist apparatus. In fact,
until 1935, it was only necessary for an oppositionist to recant to be
readmitted to the party. So, beginning
in 1929, the former leftists returned from their exiles and rejoined the
party. Trotsky, from his lonely exile in
Getty, A.
Origins of the Great Purges.
In mid-1928 Zinoviev, Kamenev, and
many of their supporters were readmitted to the party and given posts in the
government and economic apparatus.
Medvedev,
Roy. Let History Judge.
After renouncing their oppositional
views, the majority of them directed whole branches of the national economy,
large collectives and important structures in the economy and culture of the
nation. On the same days when fear,
hatred and despair ate away at their souls, they participated in making
important decisions about the structure of investments (like Pyatakov), about
the publishing plans of an enormous complex (like Tomsky), or about the most
crucial diplomatic actions (like Radek).
Rogovin,
Vadim. 1937: Year of Terror.
After another month of haggling, on
13 July, Radek, Preobrazhensky, Smilga, and 400 other deportees finely
announced their surrender. The
advantages that Stalin derived from this were many. No event since Zinoviev's and Kamenev's
capitulation at the 15th Congress, in December 1927, had done so much to
bolster Stalin's prestige. As he was
just engaged in a heavy attack on Bukharin's faction, the disintegration of the
Trotskyist Opposition relieved him of the need to fight on two fronts
simultaneously. Trotsky had often said
that in the face of an acute "danger from the right" Trotskyists and
Stalinists would join hands. Well, they
were now doing so, but on Stalin's own terms--he was winning them over to his
side without and even against Trotsky.
Many of the capitulators were men of high talent and experience with
whom he would fill industrial and administrative posts from which the Bukharinists
were being squeezed out. He knew that
the capitulators would throw themselves heart and soul into the industrial
drive--many of them were to serve under Pyatakov, the arch-capitulator who was
the moving spirit of the Commissariat of Heavy Industry. Radek alone was, as a propagandist, worth
more to Stalin than hosts of his own scribes.
Deutscher,
Isaac. The Prophet Outcast.
Many of the former members of the
opposition were allowed to take up useful employment. Bukharin, for example, was appointed chief
editor of Izvestia, second only to Pravda as the voice of official policy, and
was now able to write regular signed and unsigned articles.
Bullock,
Alan. Hitler and Stalin: Parallel Lives.
Immediately before and after the
17th Party Congress of 1934 some leaders of former oppositions were restored to
party membership, including Kamenev, Zinoviev, Preobrazhensky, and
Uglanov. Bukharin was appointed to the
quite important post of chief editor of the newspaper Izvestia.
Shabad,
Steven, trans. The Stalin-Kaganovich Correspondence, 1931-1936.
Expelled from the party with the
other Trotskyites in 1927, Pyatakov had discovered that there could be no life
for him without it and that, as he told a former colleague in 1928, in order to
become one with it he would abandon his own personality and be ready to declare
black white, and white black, if the party required it. Breaking with Trotsky and returning to
Bullock,
Alan. Hitler and Stalin: Parallel Lives.
In 1933 Bukharin began to participate
more actively in Party and public life.
He took part in a joint session of the Central Committee and the Central
Control Commission in January, where the successful completion of the first
Five-Year Plan was announced.
Medvedev,
Roy & Zhores Medvedev. The Unknown Stalin.
BERIA
DISLIKES SEROV IMMENSELY
(Beria, who was Serov's direct
chief, disliked him [Serov], and was heard to say that it was 'going to be
difficult for Tokaev to work in with that barbarian' [Serov].)
Tokaev,
Grigori. Comrade X. London: Harvill Press,1956, p. 335
STALIN
WAS VERY PATIENT, LENIENT, AND TOLERANT OF THE OPPOSITION
The [1927 British] war scare died
away, but the ferment continued in the party.
Stalin's patience with the opposition leaders was exhausted. He had always stood against their expulsion,
at the 14th Congress in December 1925 he had explained why he had opposed the
demand of Zinoviev and Kamenev for the expulsion of Trotsky. Now his view was different. The party would be at risk as long as the
oppositionists were active within its ranks.
Lenin would never have tolerated them.
He had been determined in 1917 and later to smash the Mensheviks and the
Socialist-Revolutionaries, and he had insisted in 1921 on the prohibition of
factions within the Bolshevik party.
Stalin himself had always shared his view that the party must be
completely united. He had hoped that
some genuine settlement might be reached.
This hope was no longer tenable.
The party and regime were facing immense problems and fighting to
survive. The opposition exercised a
debilitating influence, which was not permissible at this crucial time.
At the Plenum of the Central
Committee at the end of July 1927 he moved a resolution for the expulsion of
Trotsky and Zinoviev from the committee.
He could be sure of a majority in the committee, whereas in the
Politburo the right-wing members--Bukharin, Rykov, Tomsky, and Kalinin --were
said to oppose such drastic action. The
central committee approved the resolution, but then it was rescinded. Ordjonikidze, who was now chairman of the
Central Control Commission, had mediated with the opposition, who once again
had made a declaration of unconditional surrender. Stalin then agreed to the withdrawal of the
resolution. It was clear, however, that
time was running out for the opposition leaders.
In September 1927, as preparations
were getting underway for the Fifteenth Party Congress, the opposition drew up
the third statement of their aims and policies.
Their chief purpose was to change the party leadership, eliminating the
right-wing and Stalin in particular although the statement did not specify
names....
Grey,
Ian. Stalin, Man of History.
It is further significant that many
people who had been close to Lenin were not arrested, though they were out of
Stalin's favor and had been close friends with those already condemned as
enemies. These individuals were merely
demoted. Stalin did not arrest
Podvoisky, Kon, Petrovsky, Stasova, Tskhakaya, Makharadze, or many other once
prominent leaders whose names were mentioned in slanderous denunciations and
confessions.
Medvedev,
Roy. Let History Judge.
... In the fabricated depositions of
arrested artists, writers, and film workers there were allegations against
hundreds who were not arrested. For
example, Boris Pasternak and Yuri Olesha were named as accomplices of
Medvedev,
Roy. Let History Judge.
I have already mentioned the arrest
of
Medvedev,
Roy. Let History Judge.
It was very hard to guess how Stalin
would decide the fate of certain people who had been close to him. Consider, for example, Stalin's strange
behavior toward his old Comrade Kavtaradze, who had done Stalin many favors
during the underground years. Kavtaradze
had risked his own safety on one occasion to help Stalin hide from detectives
in
Medvedev,
Roy. Let History Judge.
Critics of the trials repeatedly
make the mistake of not applying the historical method to their consideration
of them. Thus, to call Radek, Pyatakov,
Smirnov, Kamenev, and Zinoviev Old Bolsheviks is as essentially true as to call
Mr. J. H. Thomas, Mussolini, and Sir Oswald Mosley Old Socialists. Marx himself would have been the first to
recognize that the truth of such descriptions is relative to time.
Little is known generally in this
country of the "Opposition" which functioned in the
Edelman,
Maurice. G.P.U. Justice.
Stalin's private secretary Kanner
has described this period:
"The
leaders of the Opposition made a promise to submit to the decisions of the 15th
Party Congress, and to observe the discipline of the statutes of the Party.
'I don't believe them,' said Stalin,
'but we must make the experiment of readmitting them to the Party. I feel that I am under a personal obligation
to do so, and that I am loyal and impartial, even towards my personal enemies.'
Fishman
and Hutton. The Private Life of Josif Stalin.
The Tenth Anniversary of the
Bolshevist government was approaching.
Stalin displayed extraordinary restraint and prudence.
Levine,
Isaac Don. Stalin.
Comrade Lenin saw all things in a
different light. You know that in 1921
Lenin proposed that Shlyapnikov be expelled from the Central Committee and from
the Party not for organizing an anti-Party printing press, and not for allying
himself with bourgeois intellectuals, but merely because, at a meeting of a
Party unit, Shlyapnikov dared to criticize the decisions of the Supreme Council
of National Economy. If you compare this
attitude of Lenin's with what the party is now doing to the opposition, you
will realize what license we have allowed the disorganizers and splitters....
You surely must know that in 1917
just before the October uprising, Lenin several times proposed that Kamenev and
Zinoviev be expelled from the Party merely because they had criticized
unpublished Party decisions in the semi-socialist, in the semi-bourgeois
newspaper Novaya Zhizn. But how many
secret decisions of the Central Committee and the Central Control Commission
are now being published by our opposition in the columns of Maslow's newspaper
in
Stalin,
Joseph. Works.
It is said that such things are
unprecedented in the history of our Party.
That is not true. What about the
Myasnikov group? What about the
"Workers' Truth" group? Who
does not know that the members of those groups were arrested with the full
consent of Zinoviev, Trotsky, and Kamenev?
Why was it permissible three or four years ago to arrest disorganizers
who had been expelled from the Party, but is impermissible now, when some of
the former members of the Trotskyist opposition go to the length of directly
linking up with counter-revolutionaries?
You heard Comrade Menzhinsky’s
statement. In that statement it is said
that a certain Stepanov (an army-man), a member of the Party, a supporter of
the opposition, is in direct contact with counter-revolutionaries, with
Novikov, Kostrov, and others, which Stepanov himself does not deny in his
depositions. What do you want us to do
with this fellow, who is in the opposition to this day? Kiss him, or arrest him? Is it surprising that the OGPU arrests such
fellows?
Lenin said that the Party can be
completely wrecked if indulgence is shown to disorganizers and splitters. That is quite true. That is precisely why I think that it is high
time to stop showing indulgence to the leaders of the opposition and to come to
the conclusion that Trotsky and Zinoviev must be expelled from the Central
Committee of our Party. That is the
elementary conclusion in the elementary, minimum measure that must be taken in
order to protect the Party from the disorganizers' splitting activities.
At the last plenum of the Central
Committee and Central Control Commission, held in August this year, some
members of the plenum rebuked me for being too mild with Trotsky and Zinoviev,
for advising the plenum against the immediate expulsion of Trotsky and Zinoviev
from the Central Committee. Perhaps I
was too kind then and made a mistake in proposing that the milder line be
adopted toward Trotsky and Zinoviev. But
now comrades, after what we have gone through during these three months, after
the opposition has broken the promise to dissolve its faction that it made in
its special "declaration" of August 8, thereby deceiving the Party
once again, after all this, there can be no more room at all for mildness. We must now step into the front rank with
those comrades who are demanding that Trotsky and Zinoviev be expelled from the
Central Committee.
In expelling Trotsky and Zinoviev
from the Central Committee we must submit for the consideration of the 15th
Congress all the documents which have accumulated concerning the opposition's
splitting activities, and on the basis of those documents the congress will be
able to adopt an appropriate decision.
Stalin,
Joseph. Works.
[In a speech delivered regarding the
party and the opposition at the 16th Moscow Gubernia Party Conference on November
23, 1927 Stalin stated] The entire history of our disagreements during the past
two years is a history of the efforts of the Central Committee of our Party to
restrain the opposition from taking steps toward a split and to keep the
opposition people within the Party.
Stalin,
Joseph. Works.
[In a November 19, 1928 speech at
the plenum of the Central Committee of the CPSU Stalin stated] Already in 1924
our Party and the Fifth Congress of the Comintern passed a resolution on
Trotskyism defining it as a petty-bourgeois deviation. Nevertheless, Trotsky continued to be a
member of our Central Committee and Political Bureau. Is that a fact, or not? It is a fact.
Consequently, we "tolerated" Trotsky and the Trotskyists on
the Central Committee. Why did we allow
them to remain in leading Party bodies?
Because at that time the Trotskyists, despite their disagreements with the
Party, obeyed the decisions of the Central Committee and remained loyal. When did we begin to apply organizational
penalties at all extensively? Only after
the Trotskyists had organized themselves into a faction, set up their factional
centre, turned their faction into a new party and began to summon people to
anti-Soviet demonstrations.
Stalin,
Joseph. Works.
Trotsky was sent away. Bukharin could also have been.
Those were difficult and complicated
times. This only shows Stalin's
patience, that he carried along with Trotsky, Zinoviev and Kamenev up til
1927. Kamenev in those days had
organised a parallel rally: 'Down with the Government, Down with Stalin!' Then he was dropped from the Politbureau, he
was a member of the P.B. until 1927. How
forbearing Stalin was! There were times
when Kirov and Kamenev wanted to drop Trotsky from the Politbureau and Stalin
was defending him.
THUS
SPAKE KAGANOVICH by Feliks Chuyev, 1992
IN
MID-20’S THE OPPOSITION SWEARS AN OATH OF ALLEGIANCE
The opposition was taken aback by the
initial success of the official policy.
Zinoviev, Kamenev, Pyatakov, Sokolnikov, Trotsky, and Evdokimov went so
far as to sign a declaration on Oct. 16, 1926, which was in effect a confession
of defeat and of support for the official policy.
Grey, Ian.
Stalin, Man of History.
STALIN’S
GENERALS IN 1941 LED HIM TO BELIEVE WAR IS NOT IMMINENT
Among members of the Politburo and
the Soviet High Command the firm opinion was that war would be averted in
1941.
Grey,
Ian. Stalin, Man of History.
Stalin's generals do not excuse his
miscalculations at the start of the war.
But in memoirs, and in other recollections, the generals assert that the
blame was not only Stalin's but must be shared with the top military
leadership. Marshal Zhukov, in his
memoirs admits a share of responsibility for the miscalculations on
invasion-Day.
Axell,
Albert. Stalin's War: Through the Eyes of His Commanders.
STALIN
TRIES TO FORESTALL AN ATTACK UP TO THE LAST MINUTE BUT STILL PREPARES
Timoshenko produced a draft
directive, alerting all commands. But
Stalin had not given up hope that might be a false alarm. He had the directive redrafted and finally
approved its dispatch. It ordered all
units on the fronts of the
Grey, Ian.
Stalin, Man of History.
In mid-March 1941 Timoshenko and I
asked Stalin's permission to call up the inductible reserve personnel so as to
update their military training in infantry divisions without delay. At first our request was declined. We were told that calling up reservists on
such a scale might give the Germans an excuse to provoke a war. At the end of March, however, we were allowed
to call up 500,000 men and non-coms and send them to border military districts
to augment infantry divisions there, bringing the strength of each up to at
least 8000.
To dispose of this subject, I shall
tell you that another 300,000 reservists were called up a few days later so as
to man the fortified areas fully with specialists, as well as to augment other
arms and services, general headquarters reserve artillery, engineer, signal,
air defense, and Air Force logistical service troops. Thus on the eve of the war the Red Army received
an additional 800,000 men.
Zhukov,
Georgii. Memoirs of Marshal Zhukov.
It is true that in March 1941
Stalin, grudgingly, agreed to Zhukov's request to call half a million reservists to the colors, with a
further 300,000 several days later.
True, too, that the frantic rearmament called for in 1940 brought new
labor laws in June 1940 that lengthened the working week to seven days on, one
day off.
Overy, R.
J. Russia's War: Blood Upon the Snow.
In these circumstances it is not
surprising that Stalin avoided as much as possible any appearance that he was
preparing for immediate war. Had not
Nicholas II brought about the German attack in 1914 by mobilizing his army? Considering that it was well known that
Soviet military doctrine stressed the offensive, would not an increase in
Soviet battle-readiness have invited a German preemptive blow? This was the sense of Stalin's response to
the proposal of the narkom of defense, Marshal Timoshenko, and General Zhukov
on 14 June that the Red Army should undertake full mobilization. 'That's war,' replied Stalin, 'Do you
understand that or not?' Even on the
evening of 21 June, by which time reports of an imminent attack had
intensified, Stalin rejected the recommendation of these military men. Full wartime mobilization would be
'premature'. The question still can be
settled by peaceful means', said Stalin, and he approved a compromise order
that ambiguously acknowledged the possibility of German attack on 22-23 June
and urged troops not to yield to 'provocation'.
...In a a few hours the German
onslaught destroyed a large part of the Soviet Air Force, had penetrated the
positions of forward Soviet formations and, perhaps, most important, had
smashed Soviet communications, which depended heavily on vulnerable wire lines
to Moscow. The first reports to reach
the capital were treated as provocation, but within only about an hour Stalin
had accepted Zhukov's affirmation of their validity and at 4:30 a.m. convened
the Politburo. Stalin was 'pale', Zhukov
recalls, and his first thought was that they must contact the German
ambassador. Evidently he still hoped to
find a diplomatic alternative. Within an
hour or two Molotov had received what amounted to a declaration of war in the
name of the Fuhrer. Stalin reacted to
this news with a prolonged silence, which Zhukov broke to propose that they
order the troops to fight. Stalin then
approved orders for the Red Army to destroy the invader on Soviet territory,
but not to pursue him to the west. As
matters turned out, this was an irrelevant constraint, but it reflected
Stalin's intent, even in the circumstances, of leaving open the door for a
negotiated settlement.
McNeal,
Robert, Stalin: Man and Ruler.
From memoirs and speeches we know
that Stalin had no illusions about Hitler's
Far from trusting Hitler, Stalin had
secretly moved sizable forces up to the border before the invasion. These comprised five Russian armies,
according to a former chief of the General Staff Shtemenko. In the critical days and weeks before the
invasion, the following additional measures were taken to strengthen the armed
forces in the border areas. Taken
together these steps show, in the words of Marshal Bagramyan, that a 'titanic
effort was made to prepare the nation for war'.
The measures were:
1.
In mid-May as many as 28 divisions started moving to border districts on
General Staff directives.
2.
On 27 May the General Staff ordered the western border districts
'urgently' to build up front command posts and on 10 June the Baltic, Western
and Kiev Military Districts were ordered to move their front commands to the
newly built posts.
3.
In early June, 800,000 reservists were called up for field training and
sent to reinforce the western military districts.
4.
The Odessa Military District (on the
5.
On 12-15 June the military districts were ordered to bring their
divisions closer to the border.
6.
On 19 June the military districts were ordered to camouflage airfields,
army units, transport, depots and other bases and to disperse the aircraft on
the airfields.
7.
By mid-1941,
8.
In June instructions were issued to naval vessels to intensify
patrols. Naval bases were moved to safer
ports. On the eve of the invasion, the
Baltic, Northern and Black Sea Fleets were placed on battle alert.
Axell,
Albert. Stalin's War: Through the Eyes of His Commanders.
STALIN
HONORED WITH A CEREMONIAL BRITISH SWORD AT
Shortly after the session of
November 29 began [at
Grey,
Ian. Stalin, Man of History.
CHURCHILL
IS MAD ABOUT STALIN’S JOKE OF SHOOTING 50,000
GERMAN OFFICERS
On a number of occasions Stalin made
teasing remarks which Churchill took in good part. But at dinner on the first evening of the
conference, he was not sure at one point whether Stalin was serious or joking,
and he overreacted.
Talking of the punishment to be
inflicted on the Germans after the war, Stalin said that the German general
staff must be liquidated and that since German military might depended on some
50,000 officers, they should all be shot.
He may have been serious, but, in fact, field Marshal von Paulus and
other officers, taken prisoner at
Churchill responded vehemently that
"the British Parliament and people would not tolerate mass
executions." Stalin mischievously
repeated that "50,000 must be shot!"
Churchill blazed with anger.
At this point Roosevelt's son,
Elliott, an uninvited guest who had joined the company after dinner, ineptly
made a speech stating that he agreed with Stalin's plan and that he was sure
the U.S. Army would support it.
Churchill got up from the table and walked into the adjoining room. A minute later he felt hands clapped on his
shoulder and turned to find Stalin and Molotov grinning broadly. They assured him that it had only been a
joke....
Grey,
Ian. Stalin, Man of History.
STALIN
TRIES TO GET ALONG WITH THE WEST AFTER WWII
At Dumbarton Oaks the Soviet government
had demanded that the republics of the
Grey,
Ian. Stalin, Man of History.
POLISH
UNDERGROUND FOUGHT THE SU BUT ITS LEADERS WERE TREATED LENIENTLY
In January 1945 the Armija Krajowa
[Polish underground] was converted into an underground army on the orders of
the Polish government in
On his arrival in Moscow Hopkins
interceded with Stalin on behalf of the Polish underground leaders. In June 1945 they were tried in
Grey,
Ian. Stalin, Man of History.
MILLIONS
MOURNED AT HIS FUNERAL AFTER STALIN’S DEATH
Early in the morning of March 6,
In every part of the country from
Vladivostock in the east to
Grey,
Ian. Stalin, Man of History.
When he [Stalin] died in March 1953
the grief of hundreds of millions, both in the
Medvedev,
Roy. Let History Judge.
I wanted to do my job so that he
[Stalin] would be pleased. His smile of
approval was a priceless gift. I didn't
identify the things that happened to my father with Stalin but rather with the
bad people who had penetrated his inner circle.
Was it not Stalin who with his article "Dizzy with Success"
had tried to put the brakes on the runaway forced collectivization? He didn't hesitate to remove or execute the
people who violated "socialist law."
Yagoda, Yezhov, and other butchers paid for their lives for their
hideous crimes. He was also ruthless to
those who departed from or perverted Lenin's teaching.
Millions and millions of Soviet
people shared that thinking then. I was
one of them who just happened to have the good and rare fortune to be near the
Great Leader.
Stalin's death hit me hard. For me he was not just the leader of our
country, a faithful follower of Lenin and the alpha and omega of all we lived
by before, during, and after the war.
For me he was someone I had known personally, someone I had sat next to,
hanging on his every word in an effort to get across to his interlocutors the
tone and tenor of his every thought.
When he died, I no longer felt heartbroken over the fact that he had
spurned me. What was my puny pain compared
to the irreparable loss for our people and for humanity as a whole!
Berezhkov,
Valentin. At Stalin's Side.
For three days the body lay in state
at the Hall of Columns in the House of Trade Unions, three blocks from the
Kremlin. On the first day hundreds died in
the crush of thousands pushing forward, not knowing that admission to the hall
was by ticket.
Deriabin,
Peter. Inside Stalin's Kremlin. Washington [D.C.]: Brassey's, c1998, p. 137
Anatoly remembered the day Stalin
died, and how everyone around, even those with parents and friends in the
camps, wept as if the world were lost.
"It was March 1953," he said.
"I was a Young Pioneer, and we always wore those orange scars. They gave us black ones to wear, and when the
teacher started crying, we cried, too.
Remnick,
David. Lenin's Tomb.
The first blow fell powerfully, on
March 5, 1953, with Stalin's death. For
the overwhelming majority of Russians, that was a day of emotional trauma. It is hard for Americans, who see Stalin as
an evil tyrant, to understand how differently Stalin was seen at that time by
his own people.
Stalin's death was personally even
more devastating for Russians than the assassination of John F. Kennedy was for
many Americans a decade later. To this
day, Russians can remember what they were doing when they heard Stalin had
died, where they were standing, how they were feeling--as if it were
yesterday. For most of them, Stalin was
not the paranoid dictator of the purges, but their infallible leader, the
father of their country. Stalin had
industrialized country, had led them to victory in war. Millions had gone into battle shouting,
"For the Motherland, for Stalin!"
He was the linchpin of their universe, their compass, their czar, the
ruler who held life together and gave it meaning. His death shattered their national
self-confidence, leaving them feeling bereaved and abandoned, vulnerable to
external enemies, uncertain of a future without him. On the day of his funeral, millions stampeded
in the center of
Smith,
Hedrick. The New Russians (Pt. 1).
"When my father died there was
a tremendous outpouring of feeling from the people as he lay in state. It was all filmed by Gerasimov who had by
then made a lot of documentaries and feature films. I knew him very well, and he told me, "I
filmed mostly the ordinary people, not the official personnel. I am not making the official
version!" That was in 1953. When I asked him, years later, what had
happened to the film of the funeral, he said, "I showed it and it was
banned. It was banned because it showed
the truth of what happened. The later
official story was that nobody cried."
"All his marshals stood near my
father's open coffin, and Marshal Rokossovsky was weeping. He was Polish, and had been saved from prison
by my father and had risen to high rank under him." Rokossovsky had joined the Red Army in 1919
and had a brilliant career, being one of the most outstanding generals of the
Second World War. He was twice awarded
the title of Hero of the Soviet Union for his part in the defense of
"General Vishnevsky told me,
"When I was fighting in the war, I was not afraid of anything. I was under shellfire, I was wounded, and I
didn't care. But when I saw your father
in his coffin, when we all came to say goodbye in the civil farewell, and when
I saw all those marshals sobbing, my knees gave out. I had to go looking for a chair and I sat
down like a sack! I couldn't stand
up. It was a very strong emotion."
Richardson,
Rosamond. Stalin’s Shadow.
"When the funeral was
over," continues Svetlana, "there were so many wreaths in Red Square
that they could not all be put on the mausoleum, but on the stone ramparts
where the people came to watch."
...On New Year's Eve 1991 there were
more flowers on Stalin's grave than on any other in sight.
Richardson,
Rosamond. Stalin’s Shadow.
When the news of his death reached
Berger,
Joseph. Nothing but the Truth. New York,
John Day Co. 1971, p. 236
The funeral took place on the
ninth. Not only the whole of
Berger,
Joseph. Nothing but the Truth. New York,
John Day Co. 1971, p. 238
BERIA WAS
A TRAITOR, CAPITALIST AGENT, CAREERIST, AND LIAR TO STALIN
MOLOTOV: It
is totally obvious that he kept his plan secret, a plan aimed against building
Communism in our country. He had another
course--a course for Capitalism. This
faint-hearted traitor, like other faint-hearted traitors whom the Party has
dealt with satisfactorily, was planning nothing less than a return to
Capitalism.
I must again draw your attention to
Beria's attempts to establish ties with Rankovich and with Tito, which Comrade
Malenkov has already mentioned.
Stickle,
D. M., Ed. The Beria Affair.
MOLOTOV:
Hence it follows that we must seriously dig into his biography, into his past,
in order to fully understand his rotten, treacherous role in our country, in
our Party. We have studied his biography
very little. Let as now take this up
more seriously.
How did it happen, that such an
inveterate enemy like Beria, could get into our Party and into its leadership
organs?
Without going into the deeper
reasons for this type of fact, one can give a simple answer to this question:
This is the result of insufficient vigilance on the part of our Central
Committee, including Comrade Stalin.
Beria found certain human weaknesses in Comrade Stalin, and who doesn't
have them? He skillfully exploited them,
and was able to do so for many, many years.
Stickle,
D. M., Ed. The Beria Affair.
MOLOTOV:
Although it was written by certain of Beria's self-serving cronies, he didn't
hesitate to put his name on the brochure, which was destined to play its role
in his progress toward a central job.
Beria also used other methods for his careerist goals. The methods of a smooth operator and
unforgivable careerist, when activity in work is hardly explained by
ideological ideas or true faithfulness to the Party. We can't deny his organizational abilities,
which showed in organizing and implementing a number of economic measures. The Party had to use these abilities when
they were used to execute necessary tasks.
The Party does not refuse to use even the abilities of exposed wreckers,
when it has the opportunity to do so.
Stickle,
D. M., Ed. The Beria Affair.
BULGANIN:
All these facts tell us that Beria was acting on the principle of: the worst
things are, the better things are for him.
Stickle,
D. M., Ed. The Beria Affair.
BAGIROV
(Candidate Member of the Presidium of the Central Committee): Beria--this
chameleon, this most evil enemy of our Party, our people--was so cunning and
adept that I personally, having known him for some 30-plus years before his
exposure by the Presidium of the Central Committee, could not see through him,
could not draw out his true enemy nature.
I can only explain this as my excessive gullibility, and the dullness of
my Party and Communist vigilance toward this double-dealer and scoundrel. This will be a serious lesson for me, too.
Stickle,
D. M., Ed. The Beria Affair.
MALYSHEV
(Member of the Central Committee): For example, I, as a minister, have worked
under the leadership of several comrades--Comrade Molotov, Comrade Kaganovich,
and Beria. I must say, that each time
you go to report on some matter to the comrades, you go with different
feelings. You go to comrade Molotov with
one feeling--we know that he is a strict leader, demanding, but whenever you go
to him you know that there will be no hasty decisions, adventurist decisions,
if you made a big and serious mistake you will never be struck at because of
his mood. Then there's comrade
Kaganovich--a sometimes hot tempered fellow, but we know that he does not bear
grudges. He'll erupt, but it quickly
passes and he makes the right decision.
Beria is another thing. We
minister's knew that you would enter his office a minister, but who you would
be on return--you didn't know. Perhaps a
minister, or perhaps you'd land in prison.
This was his method: "A knock on the head"--and you'd come out
staggering. In one word, Beria's
leadership style was the crude style of a dictator, no Party spirit. And speaking of Party spirit, I worked under
Beria during the war, in charge of tanks,... and I was convinced that he never
had any Party spirit.
Stickle,
D. M., Ed. The Beria Affair.
MIKOYAN:
From the date when Comrade Stalin fell ill, and the doctors told us he would
not recover, the chief concern of each of us was to preserve the iron unity of
the Party leadership collective, since Party unity had been secured during
Stalin's lifetime.
Many comrades may ask how is it that
members of the Central Committee who knew Beria for many years weren't able to
recognize in their midst this foreign and dangerous person for such a long
time. By the way this wasn't such a
simple matter, it wasn't so easy to achieve.
In the first place, we didn't know all the facts. In the second place, the facts occurred at
various times and, taking each one separately, they didn't have the same
significance which they take on when you see them all together. We mustn't forget that there was a good deal
of skillful work in masking these facts, in muddying up their significance and
interpreting them in a totally different meaning. There were many instances of Beria's positive
work, and in the shadow of these successes the negative facts were hidden.
Stickle,
D. M., Ed. The Beria Affair.
MIKOYAN:
Even before Beria's coming to
I must say that lately Comrade
Stalin didn't trust Beria. Beria was
forced to recognize, at his last session of the Presidium of the Central
Committee, that Comrade Stalin didn't trust him,...
During the war Comrade Stalin
divided the MVD and State Security. It
seems to me that this, too, was done from a certain lack of trust in him,
otherwise there was no point in dividing the ministry. This had to be done in order to take away his
rights as a Minister. At that time they
appointed him to the Council of Ministers and to the GOKO. This, too, was one of the first signs of a
lack of trust. But in spite of all this,
Comrade Stalin showed him a great deal of trust.
... He feigned being a buddy--first
of one-person, then another--saying one thing to your face and another behind
your back, he alienated the comrades -- first some, then others--and stacked the
deck for his purposes. We all saw this,
but didn't give it the significance which it all took on after Comrade Stalin
was gone.
Stickle,
D. M., Ed. The Beria Affair.
MIKOYAN:
A few days before his death the late
Stickle,
D. M., Ed. The Beria Affair.
SHATALIN
(Secretary of the Central Committee): In the light of materials we now have on
Beria, it is absolutely clear that presenting the Doctor's Affair was useful
only to him and his protectors. He
wanted to use this incident to make points as a humanitarian and brave
initiator. What does this rogue care for
the interests of the State.
Stickle,
D. M., Ed. The Beria Affair.
SARKISOV
(For 18 years he worked in Beria's security force): I also know that Beria
cohabited with a certain Sophia. At
Beria's suggestion, through the Chief of the Health Department of the USSR MVD,
she had an abortion. I repeat, Beria had
many, many such relationships.
On Beria's instructions, I kept a
special list of women with whom he cohabited.
Later, at his suggestion, I destroyed this list. However, I kept one list. In this list are the surnames and names and
addresses of telephone numbers of more than 25 such women. This list is in my apartment in my jacket
pocket. (The list to which Sarkisov was
referring was found, it contained 39 names of women.).
One or 1 1/2 years ago, I learned
for a fact that, as a result of his relationships with prostitutes, Beria
contracted syphilis. He was treated by a
doctor in the MVD clinic, initials U.B.
I don't remember his name.
Stickle,
D. M., Ed. The Beria Affair.
VOROSHILOV:
However, the question reasonably arises, why was this subject able to freely
work in Party leadership and government for so long, without being exposed
sooner, why did he have such a great authority, and hold such high Party and
State positions? The question is
entirely legitimate.
First and foremost,... Beria is an
insidious and cunning enemy, a consummate adventurist, schemer, who knows how
to skillfully worm his way into the trust of a leader, who can hide his base
plans for a long time and wait for the proper moment. He witnessed the daily life of the great
Stalin. Together with all of us he knew
that Stalin, as the result of intense work, often fell sick in recent years,
obviously this circumstance to a certain extent was the basis for Beria's vile
tactics. He waited in the hope that
sooner or later Stalin would be no more.
As the facts have now shown, after the death of Stalin this adventurist
was counting on the speedy realization of his criminal plans against the Party
and the State. That's why he was in such
a hurry after the death of Stalin, or perhaps he was being hurried....
In all these characteristics of his,
Beria feared Stalin, he ingratiated himself with Stalin, but skillfully, in his
own way; he would whisper all manner of disgusting things, would completely
confuse him. And we could tell just by
Comrade Stalin's mood, when we met either for business or other reasons, we
could all feel whom Beria had been "whispering" against that day.
Stickle,
D. M., Ed. The Beria Affair.
VOROSHILOV:
We were by our Stalin's side until his last breath, and Beria immediately
demonstrated his "activity"--as if to say don't forget, I'm here.
Stickle,
D. M., Ed. The Beria Affair.
ANDREYEV
(Member of the Central Committee and the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet): In
this sense, Beria's plan differed from the plan of other traitors of the Soviet
people, former enemies. As we now know,
this plan was about:
Firstly, worming his way into the
trust of Comrade Stalin, whatever the cost.
This he considered a fundamental condition for his enemy activity. And so in any way he tried to worm his way
into Stalin's trust. Did he achieve
this? Undoubtedly he did. Comrades here have already mentioned that
Comrade Stalin had a weakness of being too trusting. This is the truth.
The second, and obviously the
central, task in his plan, was to destroy the Bolshevik nucleus of our
leadership.... to undermine the trust Comrade Stalin had in various leaders, to
sow strife among the Party leaders and the leaders of the government.
Was he able to achieve any of
this? Certainly, he was successful for a
time.
Now Comrade Voroshilov spoke about
Comrade Ordjonikidze. Ordjonikidze was
the most honest, most noble Bolshevik, and you may be sure that he was a victim
of Beria's intrigues....
Beria divided Comrade Stalin and
Ordjonikidze and Comrade Ordjonikidze's noble heart couldn't take it; thus
Beria took out of commission one of the best leaders of the Party and friends
of Comrade Stalin.
Going on. All of us Chekists and the new ones too, know
what a warm key friendship there was between Comrade Stalin and Molotov. We all considered this a natural friendship,
and were happy for it. But then Beria
appeared in
Stickle,
D. M., Ed. The Beria Affair.
ANDREYEV:
It was only lately, in the German question, and in other questions, that we saw
his bourgeois degeneracy.
Stickle,
D. M., Ed. The Beria Affair.
ANDREYEV:
And Beria, of course, at times did great work, but this was work done for a
disguise, and in this was the difficulty of exposing him. He created himself a halo, that, for example,
during the war he was during enormous work, etc., he was blackmailing in the
name of Comrade Stalin. He was difficult
to expose.
Stickle,
D. M., Ed. The Beria Affair.
TEVOSYAN
(Member of the Central Committee): Yesterday, we learned from the speech of
Comrade Kaganovich that this scoundrel Beria protested against referring to
Comrade Stalin--along with the names of Marx, Engels, Lenin--when speaking
about the teachings which guide our Party.
That's how far this scoundrel went.
Stickle,
D. M., Ed. The Beria Affair.
MALENKOV:
As you see, comrades, great people, too, can have weaknesses. Comrade Stalin had these weaknesses. We must say this, in order to bring up the
need for collective party leadership properly, like Marxists, the need for
criticism and self-criticism in all branches of the party, including, before
all else, the Central Committee in the Presidium of the Central Committee.
Stickle,
D. M., Ed. The Beria Affair.
Special
Judicial Session of the Supreme Court: All the accused were indisputably proven
guilty of the accusations against them, through original documents, exhibits,
handwritten letters of the accused, and the testimony of numerous witnesses.
Stickle,
D. M., Ed. The Beria Affair.
Another provocation... an anonymous
letter from
Stalin decided after this to set up
a commission, under Malenkov, to look into the finances. The commission detailed all of the expenses
of running the government Dacha. Malenkov
brought this to Orlov in order for him to sign.
Orlov refused, because Stalin was a light eater, hardly drank, and took
no liquors. A bottle of
"Tsinandali" was enough to last him for two weeks. It was proven that it was Stalin's
"friends," under the aegis of Beria, who really lived it up, charging
the cost to Stalin's budget. Vodka was
the main culprit in the inflated costs charged to Stalin's name.
Rybin,
Aleksei. Next to Stalin: Notes of a Bodyguard.
Grandma Olga and Anna used to
say--which always sounded strange to me but now I don't think it's so
strange--"Your father could be influenced very easily. He could be influenced by good people:
Richardson,
Rosamond. Stalin’s Shadow.
MOLOTOV
SAYS THERE ARE ANTI-SOVIET TRAITORS IN THE POST-STALIN GOVT
MOLOTOV:
We can be certain that foreign capital would throw any millions and billions of
rubles--merely for the chance to back any political organization opposing the
Communist Party in power in the
Stickle,
D. M., Ed. The Beria Affair.
STALIN
MADE MISTAKES AND ADMITTED AS MUCH
KAGANOVICH:
We know very well that even every great person has faults, Comrade Stalin had
them, too. And we, his pupils, do not
intend to deify him, describe him with no faults.
Stickle,
D. M., Ed. The Beria Affair.
BERIA HAD
A POOR KNOWLEDGE OF MARXIST IDEOLOGY
... he [Beria] himself not only
underestimated this theory, but simply didn't understand it--in his speeches,
both published and unpublished, you'll find very little Marxism-Leninism. He did not know Marxism-Leninism. He had a poor theoretical foundation; the
book mentioned by Comrade Molotov was written not by him, he was using it to
earn points for himself.
Beria had a hostile response to
statements that Stalin was a great continuer of the work of Lenin, Marx, and
Engels.
Stickle,
D. M., Ed. The Beria Affair.
VYSHINSKY
WAS VERY INTELLIGENT
Vyshinsky, the former Public
Prosecutor, at that time a Deputy Foreign Minister,... Of all the officials we dealt with, he was
unquestionably the brightest and most intelligent. As a former teacher of Latin, and with a
legal career behind him, he had many intellectual advantages over his
colleagues.
Birse,
Arthur Herbert. Memoirs of an Interpreter.
VYSHINSKY
DEFENDS HIMSELF IN THE TRIALS
Then we somehow got onto the theme
of his having been Public Prosecutor during the Great Purge shortly before the
war. I felt this was delicate ground and
I should have to be careful what I said, but he came out with the following:
"I know what you people abroad have been saying--that I was responsible
for the death and exile of many innocent people. But do you realize that I saved the lives of
thousands who might have been engulfed in the plot to undermine the safety of
our State?"
Birse,
Arthur Herbert. Memoirs of an Interpreter.
ADVANCEMENTS
AND ACCOMPLISHMENTS OF THE REVOLUTION
Inside the
When Eric Johnston, President of the
United States Chamber of Commerce, returned from an extensive inspection trip
of
Granted the correctness of Mr.
Johnston's contention, and in the article he goes on to argue that the Russian
rank-and-file support their leaders in this position, it is evident that the
revolution has brought benefits that make it appear superior to Czarism. What are some of those benefits?
1.
A people, living in the dark, has been enlightened. An illiterate famine-ridden exploited
community, saturated with superstition, has been replaced by a literate,
scientifically-minded generation, convinced that it can play a major role in
shaping its own destiny and in modifying the destiny of the entire human race.
2.
A technically backward community has been converted, within one
generation, into one of the most technically advanced areas of the world. This transformation has been effected as a
result of social plans which the masses helped to make and to carry out. The collectivization and mechanization of
agriculture is one of the most important aspects of this technological
revolution.
3.
A widely-flung nation, consisting largely of farmers scattered in some
300,000 villages and enjoying few social services beyond those grudgingly
rendered by a poorly served ecclesiastical apparatus, has come into possession
of an elaborate social security and social service organization including
public health, public education, public recreation, multiple social insurance,
electrification, postal service, roads.
4.
Industrialization, technical improvements, the broadening of scientific
activity, the encouragement of the arts and the growth of the social services
have created an unprecedented demand for trained personnel. Consequently, within a decade after the
revolution the
5.
Socialistic construction offered energetic, ambitious boys and girls of
the new generation an opportunity to make a career for themselves in the
professions of their choice. Youth
responded, as young people anywhere respond under similar circumstances,
crowding into the schools, activating organizations, pouring time, energy, and
enthusiasm into the multiple channels opened to them by the revolution....
7.
Czarism confined opportunity to a relatively small group at the apex of
the social pyramid. In accordance with
feudal tradition, the top leaders were generally born to authority, whether
they were capable of exercising it or not.
The revolution opened the gates of opportunity to the masses, and
through them flooded a great wave of popular enthusiasm to know, to plan, to
build and create.
Nearing,
S. The Soviet Union as a World Power. NY:
The goal of the party founded by
Lenin was to create a genuinely socialist society. After the October Revolution quite a lot was
done toward that goal through the efforts of the party and the people. The October Revolution made the factories the
property of the workers' state and gave land to the peasants, thereby laying
the economic foundation for a truly socialist democracy. The workers won extensive social rights and
freedoms, women received equal rights with men, the road to culture and
education was opened to the masses, and the way to abolition of national and
class antagonisms was cleared. It would
be wrong to deny these achievements....
In place of relationships of enmity, rivalry, and exploitation those of
friendship and co-operation came into existence more and more.
Medvedev,
Roy. Let History Judge.
It would be wrong to deny that much
has been achieved in the social and cultural life of the country: employment,
social security (albeit on a very low basis), universal education of quite a
high caliber, bringing the rudiments of culture to the broad masses, free (if
poor quality) medical treatment, low prices for basic foodstuffs,
extraordinarily low rents for (uncomfortable) state-owned apartments,
children's summer camps, kindergartens and creches at nominal charges, and
various other social amenities. The
trend towards gradual but perceptible improvement inspired the people.
Volkogonov,
Dmitri. Stalin: Triumph and Tragedy.
(Sinclair’s
comments only)
There is a great deal in
Sinclair
and Lyons. Terror in
An account provided by Malakhov about
the fate of his generation conveys a general picture very similar to that given
by Benediktov:
"I am amazed how we had the
strength for all that. When did we sleep
and eat? And when did we find time to
love, to rejoice, and to raise our cultural level? Our Komsomol girlfriends also combined work,
studies, and social affairs and still managed to be very pretty, sweet, modest,
kind, and loving. And they were able to
manage at home, too, without shirking any kind of work. And how chaste the relationships were among
the young women and men! We were afraid
to offend our young girlfriends with awkward advances, immodest words, or crude
behavior.... At night we slept soundly,
for we were tired from our hard and intensive labor, and we did not lie awake
listening for the knock on the door.
What's more, the door to the house was seldom locked, for it was always
open to our friends and neighbors, and thieves had no use for our poor
possessions. These days it is acceptable
among young people if everything is not just so at home or at work to write, to
demand, to complain to all levels of authority.
In my time such things simply could not be; there was no one and nowhere
to complain to.... There were perhaps
some people "overzealous" in their demands on themselves and their
comrades. It was considered shameful to
visit restaurants; divorce was condemned, as were unofficial marriages and
modish or ostentatious clothing. On the other
hand, high-value was put on labor, knowledge, friendship, patriotism, social
activities, discipline, and proletarian internationalism. Narcotic addicts and prostitutes were simply
unheard of in our working milieu, and drunkenness and absenteeism were punished
severely.... Our life was not
idyllic. There were many hardships;
there was hunger and cold, the destruction of basic tools and equipment as a
result of the civil war. There was an
acute ideological war and sabotage and wreckers (yes, wreckers: these were not
statements of the imagination of state authorities suffering from acute
paranoia).... We wanted universal
knowledge. We studied philosophy and
literature. We were interested in
scientific innovations. We delved into
politics; we learned to know music and the fine arts, everything that our
family and school could not give us."
Laqueur,
Walter. Stalin: The Glasnost Revelations.
THE
NUMBER OF WORLD POWERS HAS STEADILY GONE DOWN FOR OVER 100 YEARS
Through the greater part of the
19th-century
Nearing,
S. The Soviet Union as a World Power.
SURROUNDING
WORLD CAPITALISM HAS MADE SOVIET SOCIALISM SOMETHING IT IS NOT
In a very real sense, Soviet world
policy today is Our Baby. We have made
it what it is. It is opposed to
socialistic theory and is inimical to Soviet interests as these were conceived
for 15 years after the Revolution. So
the world policy is a departure from world socialism and a reluctant adaptation
necessitated by a ring of armed imperial enemies.
Nearing,
S. The Soviet Union as a World Power.
Communist Russia, born in the throes
of foreign intervention, has never got free of its obsession that the
capitalist States all around her are planning her overthrow.
Pares,
Bernard.
But far more striking and far more
convincing was the new direction taken in internal policy in
Pares,
Bernard.
The intense repression in the
Szymanski,
Albert. Human Rights in the Soviet Union.
They [the Soviet leaders of the
1920s and 1930s] expected further foreign wars because it was in the nature of
imperialism, as Lenin had also argued.
They anticipated ceaseless struggles against the domestic enemies of
revolution, whether peasant-capitalists or foreign spies. The result was a society that was kept in an
almost perennial state of mobilization.
Overy, R.
J. Russia's War: Blood Upon the Snow.
Then there were the distorting
effects that unremitting capitalist encirclement had up on the building of
socialism. Throughout its entire 73 year
history of counterrevolutionary invasion, civil war, forced industrialization,
Stalinist purges and deportations, Nazi conquest, cold war, and nuclear arms
race, the
Parenti,
Michael. Blackshirts and Reds, San
Francisco: City Light Books, 1997, p. 84
DUMA
TRIES TO LULL PEOPLE AND DIVERT THEM FROM THE REAL
The miserable Duma with its
miserable Cadets is high and dry in this midstream. It wants to reconcile the revolution with the
counter-revolution, so that the wolves and the sheep may lie down together--and
thus "at one stroke" lull the storm of the revolution. That is why the Duma has so far done nothing
but beat the air; that is why it has not been able to rally any part of the
people around it, and is left high and dry.
The street still remains the main arena of struggle. The facts prove this. Moreover the same facts tell us that in
today's struggle, in the street fighting, and not in the palaver of the Duma,
the forces of counter-revolution are weakening and disintegrating day by day,
while the forces of revolution are growing and mobilizing themselves;...
Stalin,
Joseph. Stalin's Kampf.
STALIN
SAYS LAND MUST BE TAKEN FROM NOBLES AND GIVEN TO PEASANTS
The land was taken away from the
peasantry and handed to the nobles; all this land must be taken back without
any compensations or remunerations for the nobility!
Stalin,
Joseph. Stalin's Kampf.
[1939 essay on life in Voronezh
Oblast village sent by rural correspondent Grebennikov to Krest'ianskaia
Gazeta]
And only Soviet rule loosened the
grip of landowners, which for many years squeezed the
Siegelbaum
and Sokolov. Stalinism As a Way of Life.
Whoever thinks that under our
conditions alliance with the peasantry means alliance with the kulaks has
nothing in common with Leninism. Whoever
thinks of conducting a policy in the countryside that will please everyone,
rich and poor alike, is not a Marxist, but a fool, because such a policy does
not exist in nature, comrades.
Stalin,
Joseph. Works.
STALIN
CONTRASTS MARXISM WITH ANARCHISM
Marxism and anarchism are based upon
entirely different principles, irrespective of the fact that they both enter
the arena of struggle under a socialist flag.
The cornerstone of anarchism is the individual, whose emancipation,
according to it, is the main prerequisite for the emancipation of the mass,
i.e., according to anarchism the emancipation of the mass is impossible until
the individual is free; hence its slogan: "Everything for the individual." The cornerstone of Marxism, on the contrary,
is the mass, the emancipation of which, according to it, is the main
prerequisite for the emancipation of the individual, i.e., according to
Marxism, the emancipation of the individual is impossible without the emancipation
of the mass. Hence its slogan,
"Everything for the mass."
Stalin,
Joseph. Stalin's Kampf.
STALIN
REJECTS POSITION THAT PROLETARIAT MUST BE A MAJORITY FOR THE REVOLUTION
The opportunists of the Second
International have a series of theoretical dogmas which they always use as a
starting point. Let us consider some of
them.
First dogma: Concerning the
prerequisites for the seizure of power by the proletariat. The opportunists assert that the proletariat
cannot and ought not to seize power if it does not itself constitute a majority
in the country. No proofs are adduced,
for this absurd thesis cannot be justified either theoretically or practically. Let us admit this for a moment, Lenin replies
to the gentleman of the Second International.
But suppose an historic situation arises (war, agrarian crises, etc.) in
which the proletariat, a minority of the population, is able to rally around
itself the vast majority of the working masses, why should it not seize power
then? Why should it not profit by the
favorable internal and international situation to pierce the front of
capitalism and hasten the general climax?
Did not Marx say, as far back as the 1850s, that the proletarian
revolution in
Stalin,
Joseph. Stalin's Kampf.
The revolution of 1848 in
Stalin,
Joseph. Stalin's Kampf.
The October Revolution undoubtedly
presented the happy combination of a "peasant war" and a
"proletarian revolution" of which Marx wrote, all the chatterboxes
and their "principles" notwithstanding. The October Revolution proved that such a
combination is both possible and feasible.
The October Revolution proved that the proletariat can seize power and
maintain it, provided it is able to wrest the middle strata, especially the
peasantry, from the capitalist classes, provided it knows how to transform the
strata from reserves of capitalism to reserves of the proletariat.
Stalin,
Joseph. Stalin's Kampf.
MARXISTS
SAY FIGHT FASCIST VIOLENCE WITH FORCE
Take
Fascism for example. Fascism is a
reactionary force which is trying to preserve the old world by means of
violence. What will you do with the
fascists? Argue with them? Try to convince them? But this will have no effect upon them at
all. Communists do not in the least
idealize the methods of violence. But
they, the Communists, do not want to be taken by surprise, they cannot count on
the old world voluntarily departing from the stage, they see that the old
system is violently defending itself, and that is why the Communists say to the
working class: Answer violence with violence; do all you can to prevent the old
dying order from crushing you, do not permit it to put manacles on your hands,
on the hands with which you will overthrow the old system. As you see, the Communists regard the
substitution of one social system for another, not simply as a spontaneous and
peaceful process, but as a complicated, long and violent process. Communists cannot ignore facts.
Stalin,
Joseph. Stalin's Kampf.
RULING
CLASS WILL NOT LEAVE VIA REFORMS AND CONCESSIONS
That
is why we cannot count on the change of social systems taking place as an
imperceptible transition from one system to another by means of reforms, by the
ruling class making concessions.
Stalin,
Joseph. Stalin's Kampf.
DICTATORSHIP
OF THE PROLETARIAT CAN ONLY COME ABOUT THROUGH VIOLENT REVOLUTION
Can
such a radical transformation of the old bourgeois system of society be
achieved without a violent revolution, without the dictatorship of the
proletariat?
Obviously
not. To think that such a revolution can
be carried out peacefully within the framework of bourgeois democracy, which is
adapted to the domination of the bourgeoisie, means one of two things. It means either madness, and the loss of
normal human understanding, or else an open and gross repudiation of the
proletarian revolution.
Stalin,
Joseph. Stalin's Kampf.
STALIN
SAYS THE DIC, OF THE PROL. IS THE ENTIRE PERIOD FROM CAPITALISM TO COMMUNISM
We must,
therefore, regard the dictatorship of the proletariat, the transition from
capitalism to communism, not as a fleeting period replete with
"super-revolutionary" deeds and decrees, but as an entire historical
epoch full of civil wars and external conflicts, of persistent organizational
work and economic construction, of attacks and retreats, of victories and
defeats.
Stalin,
Joseph. Stalin's Kampf.
STALIN
SAYS IT IS MASSES, PEOPLE, THAT COUNT, NOT LEADERS
I
recall an incident in
Here
you have a case, not very significant perhaps, but very characteristic. It seems to me that the indifference shown by
certain of our leaders to people, to cadres, and their inability to value
people, is a survival of that strange attitude of man displayed in the episode
in far-off
And
so,... if we want successfully to overcome the famine and the matter of people
and to provide our country with sufficient cadres capable of advancing
technique and setting it going, we must first of all learn to value people, to
value cadres, to value every worker capable of benefiting our common
cause. It is time to realize that of all
the valuable capital the world possesses, the most valuable and most decisive
is people, cadres....
...In
this connection there is too much talk about the merits of chiefs, about the
merits of leaders. All or nearly all our
achievements are ascribed to them. That,
of course, is wrong, it is incorrect. It
is not merely a matter of leaders....
Stalin,
Joseph. Stalin's Kampf.
Josef Stalin was a great man; few
other men of the twentieth century approach his stature. He was simple, calm and courageous. He seldom lost his poise; pondered his
problems slowly, made his decisions clearly and firmly; never yielded to
ostentation nor coyly refrained from holding his rightful place with dignity. He was the son of a serf, but stood calmly
before the great without hesitation or nerves.
But also -- and this was the highest proof of his greatness -- he knew
the common man, felt his problems, followed his fate.
Statement
by W.E.B DuBois regarding COMRADE STALIN on March 16, 1953
We may take it as the rule that as
long as the Bolsheviks maintain connection with the broad masses of the people
they will be invincible. And, on the
contrary, as soon as the Bolsheviks become severed from the masses and lose
their connection with them, as soon as they become covered with bureaucratic
rust, they will lose all their strength and become a mere squib.
In the mythology of the ancient
Greeks there is the celebrated hero Antaeus who, so the legend goes, was the
son of Poseidon, god of the seas, and Gaea, goddess of the earth. Antaeus was particularly attached to his
mother who gave birth to him, suckled him and reared him. There was not a hero whom this Antaeus did
not vanquish. He was regarded as an
invincible hero. Wherein lay his
strength? It lay in the fact that every
time he was hard pressed in the fight against his adversary he touched the
earth, his mother, who gave birth to him and suckled him, and that gave him new
strength. But he had a vulnerable spot
-- the danger of being detached from the eaarth in some way or other. His enemies took this into account and
watched for it. One day an enemy
appeared who took advantage of this vulnerable spot and vanquished Antaeus. This was Hercules. How did Hercules vanquish Antaeus? He lifted him off the ground, kept him
suspended, prevented him from touching the ground and throttled him.
I think that the Bolsheviks remind
us of the hero of Greek mythology, Antaeus.
They, like Antaeus, are strong because they maintain connection with
their mother, the masses who gave birth to them, suckled them and reared
them. And as long as they maintain
connection with their mother, with the people, they have every chance of
remaining invincible.
This is the key to the invincibility
of Bolshevik leadership.
Stalin,
Joseph. Works, Vol. 14, Speech in Reply to Debate, 1 April 1937, Red Star
Press, London, Pravda 1978, pp. 292-296.
STALIN
SAYS FREEDOM MUST BE ACCOMPANIED BY GOODS IF IT IS TO BE WORTHWHILE
Our revolution is the only one which
not only smashed the fetters of capitalism and brought people freedom, but also
succeeded in creating for the people the material conditions for a prosperous
life. Therein lies the strength and
invincibility of our revolution. It is a
good thing, of course, to drive out the capitalists, to drive out the
landlords, to drive out the Tsarist henchman, to seize power and achieve
freedom. That is very good, but,
unfortunately, freedom is far from enough.
If there is a shortage of bread, a shortage of butter and fats, a shortage
of textiles, and if housing conditions are bad, freedom will not carry you very
far. It is very difficult, comrades, to
live on freedom alone. In order to live
well and joyously, the benefits of political freedom must be supplemented by
material benefits. The distinctive
feature of our revolution is that it brought the people not only freedom, but
also material benefits and the possibility of a prosperous and cultured
life. That is why life has become joyous
in our country, and that is the soil from which the Stakhanov movement sprang.
Stalin,
Joseph. Stalin's Kampf.
PARTY
PEOPLE MUST NOT BE FAVORED OVER NON-PARTY PEOPLE FOR JOBS
Certain comrades think that only Party
members may hold leading positions in the mills and factories and for that
reason ignore and hold back non-Party comrades who possess ability and
initiative, and advance Party members instead, although they are less capable
and possess less initiative. Needless to
say, there is nothing more stupid and reactionary than such a policy, if it may
be called a policy. That such a policy
can only discredit the Party and repel non-party workers from it, needs no
proof. It is not our policy to transform
the Party into an exclusive caste. It is
our policy to achieve, as between workers who are members of the Party and
workers who are not, an atmosphere of "mutual confidence," of
"mutual control" (Lenin)"....
Stalin,
Joseph. Stalin's Kampf.
STALIN
SAYS THEY MUST NOT AUTOMATICALLY ASSUME EVERY EXPERT IS GUILTY
But from this it follows that we
must change our policy towards the old technical intelligentsia. If, during the height of the wrecking
movement, we adopted smashing tactics toward the old technical intelligentsia,
now, when these intellectuals are turning toward the Soviet government, our
policy toward them must be one of conciliation and solicitude. It would be wrong and dialectically incorrect
to continue our former policy when conditions have changed. It would be foolish and unwise to regard
almost every expert and engineer of the old school as an undetected criminal
and wrecker. "Expert-baiting"
always was, and still is regarded by us as a noxious and disgraceful
phenomenon.
Stalin,
Joseph. Stalin's Kampf.
STALIN
SAYS RESTORATION OF CAPITALISM IS POSSIBLE BECAUSE OF SMALL PRODUCTION
Do the conditions exist in our
Soviet country that make the restoration of capitalism possible? Yes, they do exist. That may appear strange, but it is a
fact. We have overthrown capitalism, we
have established the dictatorship of the proletariat, we are intensely
developing our socialist industry and are closely linking it up with peasant
economy; but we have not yet torn out the roots of capitalism.
Where are these roots
implanted? They are implanted in the
system of commodity production, in small production in the towns, and
particularly in the villages. As Lenin
said, the strength of capitalism lies "in the strength of small
production, for unfortunately, small production still survives in a very, very
large degree, and small production gives birth to capitalism and to the
bourgeoisie, constantly, daily, hourly, spontaneously and on a mass
scale." Hence, since small
production is a mass phenomenon, and even a predominant feature of our country,
and since it gives birth to capitalism and to a bourgeoisie constantly and on a
mass scale, particularly under the conditions of NEP, it is obvious that the
conditions do exist which make the restoration of capitalism possible.
Stalin,
Joseph. Stalin's Kampf.
VICTORY
OF THE RIGHT IN THE SU WOULD MEAN A CAPITALIST VICTORY
There cannot be the slightest doubt
that the triumph of the Right deviation in our Party would release the forces
of capitalism, would undermine the revolutionary position of the proletariat
and increase the chances for the restoration of capitalism in our country.
Stalin,
Joseph. Stalin's Kampf.
CAPITALIST
ENCIRCLEMENT ALWAYS MEANS POSSIBLE FASCIST ATTACK
Indeed, it would be ridiculous and
stupid to close our eyes to the capitalist encirclement and to think that our
external enemies, the fascists, for example, will not, if the opportunity
arises, make an attempt at a military attack upon the
Stalin,
Joseph. Stalin's Kampf.
SOMETIMES
FORCE AGAINST THE KULAKS WAS NECESSARY
What must be done in order to obtain
grain surpluses? We must, first of all, put
an end to the mentality of waiting for the grain to come itself, as a harmful
and dangerous one. Grain collections
must be organized. We must mobilize the
poor and middle peasants against the kulaks and organize their public support
for the measures adopted by the Soviet government for increasing the grain
collections.... It is true that this
method is sometimes coupled with the application of emergency measures against
the kulaks, which calls forth the comical wailings of comrades Bukharin and
Rykov. But what is wrong with that? Why is it wrong, sometimes, under certain
conditions, to apply emergency measures to our class enemy, the kulaks? Why is it permissible to arrest the
speculators in the towns by hundreds and exile them to the Turukhan region, and
not permissible to take surplus grain from the kulaks--who are trying to take
the Soviet government by the throat and enslave the poor peasants--by methods
of public coercion, and at prices at which the poor and middle peasants sell
their grain to our grain collection organizations. What is the logic of this? Has our Party ever declared itself opposed in
principle, to the application of emergency measures against the kulaks? Comrades Rykov and Bukharin apparently are
opposed in principle to the application of any kind of emergency measures
against the kulaks. But that is a
bourgeois liberal policy, and not a Marxist policy.
Stalin,
Joseph. Stalin's Kampf.
TRYING
TO MERELY PERSUADE SOME KULAKS TO YIELD THEIR GRAIN IS STUPID
Those who support Comrade Bukharin's
group, hope to persuade the class enemy that he should voluntarily forego his
interests and voluntarily surrender his grain surplus. They hope that the kulak, who has grown, who is
able to avoid giving grain by offering other products in its place and who
conceals his grain surplus, they hope that this same kulak will give us his
grain surplus voluntarily at our collection prices. Have they lost their senses? Is it not obvious that they do not understand
the mechanism of the class struggle, that they do not know what classes
mean? Do they know with what derision
the kulaks treat our people and the Soviet government at village meetings
called to assist the grain collections?
Have they heard of facts like this, for instance: one of our agitators
in
Stalin,
Joseph. Stalin's Kampf.
Summing up the results of the First
Five-Year Plan at the January 1933 plenum, Stalin included a special section on
the tasks and results of the struggle against 'the remnants of the hostile
classes'. Despite the fact that he was
talking about 'remnants', he nevertheless issued a call to 'struggle against
them implacably'. And not a word about
re-education, or bringing many 'ex-people' and their families into the new life
which might the more effectively help to change their outlook and their 'class
instincts'. Depicting the social scene,
he said:
"The remnants of the dying classes--industrialists
and their servants, private traders and their stooges, former nobles and
priests, kulaks and their henchmen, former White officers and NCOs, former
gendarmes and policemen--they have all wormed their way into our factories, our
institutions and trading bodies, our railway and river transport enterprises
and for the most part into our collective and state farms. They have wormed their way in and hidden
themselves there, disguised as 'workers' and 'peasants', and some of them have
even managed to worm their way into the party.
What have they brought with
them? Of course, they have brought their
hatred of the Soviet regime, their feeling of ferocious hostility to the new
forms of the economy, way of life, culture....
The only thing left for them to do is to play dirty tricks and do harm
to the workers and collective farmers.
And they do this any way they can, on the quiet. They set fire to warehouses and break
machinery. They organize sabotage. They organize wrecking in the collective and
state farms, and some of them, including a number of professors, go so far in
their wrecking activities as to inject the livestock in collective and state
farms with plague and anthrax, and encourage the spread of meningitis among
horses, and so on."
Volkogonov,
Dmitri. Stalin: Triumph and Tragedy.
BECAUSE
EXCESSES HAPPEN DOES NOT MEAN A CORRECT POLICY SHOULD BE ABANDONED
A most fashionable word among the
opposition is the word "excesses," as applied to grain
collections. That word has become the
most popular word among them, since it helps them to mask their own line. When they want to mask their own line they
usually say we, of course, are not opposed to pressure being exerted on the
kulak, but we are against the excesses which are being committed in this sphere
and which hurt the middle peasant. They
then go on to relate stories of the horrors of these excesses, they read you
letters from "peasants," panic-stricken letters from comrades, such
as Comrade Markov, and they then draw the conclusion: the policy of bringing
pressure to bear on the kulaks should be abandoned. How do you like that? It appears that because excesses occur in
carrying out a correct policy, the correct policy must be abandoned. That is the usual trick of the opportunists:
on the pretext that excesses are committed in carrying out a correct line, to
abandon that line and replace it by an opportunist line. Moreover, the men in Comrade Bukharin's group
are very careful to say nothing about the fact that there is another kind of
excess, which is more dangerous and more harmful, namely, excess expressed in a
tendency to become merged with the kulak, to adapt oneself to the wealthy
sections of the countryside, to replace the revolutionary policy of the Party
by the opportunist policy of the Right deviationist.
Of course, we are all opposed to
excesses. None of us want the blows
directed against the kulaks to fall on the middle peasants. That is obvious, and there can be no doubt on
that point. But we are most decisively
opposed to the nonsensical talk about excesses which Comrade Bukharin's group
so zealously indulges in being used in order to secure the abandonment of the
revolutionary policy of our Party and to substitute for it the opportunist
policy of the Bukharin group.
Is there a single political measure
taken by the party that has not been accompanied by excesses? The conclusion we must draw is that we have
to combat excesses. But ought we for
this reason decry the line itself, the only correct line? Take a measure like the seven-hour day. There can be no doubt that this is one of the
most revolutionary measures carried out by our Party in recent years. Who does not know that this measure, which in
itself is a most revolutionary one, is frequently accompanied by excesses,
sometimes of a most objectionable kind?
Does that mean that we ought to abandon the policy of the seven-hour
day? Does the opposition understand what
a mess it is slipping into, when it tries to make capital of the excesses
committed during the grain collections?
Stalin,
Joseph. Stalin's Kampf.
STALIN’S
NATIONALITIES PROGRAM HAS DEGREES OF
Soviet autonomy is not a rigid thing
fixed once and for all time; it permits of the most varied forms and degrees of
development. It passes from narrow
administrative autonomy (the Volga Germans, the Chuvashes and the Karelians) to
a wider, political autonomy (the Bashkirs, the Volga Tatars and the Kirghiz);
from wide political autonomy to a still wider form of autonomy (the Ukraine and
Turkestan); and finally from the Ukrainian type of autonomy to the supreme form
of autonomy --contractual relations (Azerbaijan). This elasticity of Soviet autonomy
constitutes one of its prime merits, for this elasticity makes it possible to
embrace all the various types of border regions in
Soviet autonomy is the most real and
concrete way of uniting the border regions to
Stalin,
Joseph. Stalin's Kampf.
There was a brighter side, too, to
Stalin's activity. He worked with great
vigor and determination on one of the most difficult problems that the
revolution had inherited. It will be
remembered that in 1918 he called to life the self-governing
In the summer of 1922, soon after Lenin's
first stroke, the Politburo began to discuss a constitutional reform that was
to settle the relations between
During his first convalescence Lenin
was consulted on the scheme and endorsed it.
The Politburo once again pressed the Georgians to join the
Transcaucasian federation. The
Ukrainians demurred at
Deutscher,
Isaac. Stalin; A Political Biography.
Politically the point was to
reconstruct the Tzarist empire, that prison of nations, territorially,
politically, and administratively, in line with the needs and wishes of the
nations themselves.
CONSTITUTION
PRESERVES THE DICTATORSHIP OF THE PROLETARIAT
Such are the facts. And facts, it is said, are stubborn things.
I must admit that the draft of the
new Constitution really does preserve the regime of the dictatorship of the
working-class, just as it also preserves unchanged the present leading position
of the Communist Party of the
Stalin,
Joseph. Stalin's Kampf.
THE
EXTERNAL ENEMIES CAUSE NEED FOR THE CHEKA NOT THE INTERNAL ENEMIES
I do not mean to say by this that
the internal situation of the country is such as makes it necessary to have
punitive organs of the revolution. From
the point of view of the internal situation, the revolution is so firm and
unshakable that we could do without the GPU.
But the trouble is that the enemies at home are not isolated
individuals. They are connected in a
thousand ways with the capitalists of all countries who support them by every
means and in every way. We are a country
surrounded by capitalist states. The
internal enemies of our revolution are the agents of the capitalists of all
countries. The capitalist states are the
background and basis for the internal enemies of our revolution.
Stalin,
Joseph. Stalin's Kampf.
RELIGION
IS THE OPPOSITE OF SCIENCE AND MUST BE FOUGHT
The Party cannot be neutral towards
religion, and it does conduct anti-religious propaganda against all and every
religious prejudice because it stands for science, while religious prejudices
run counter to science, because all religion is something opposite to science.
Stalin,
Joseph. Stalin's Kampf.
His attitude toward conventional
religion is purely negative. His
religion...is his work; communism is enough faith for him. Stalin has said, "The party cannot be
neutral toward religion, because religion is something opposite to
science." Nevertheless, it is
noteworthy that he permitted his wife an almost orthodox religious burial.
... People who know him well call
him "Yosif Visarionovich"; others simply say Tovarish (Comrade)
Stalin. He has no title.
Gunther,
John. Inside Europe.
NOWADAYS
WARS ARE NOT DECLARED BUT JUST BREAK OUT
War may break out unexpectedly. Wars are not declared, nowadays. They simply start....
Stalin,
Joseph. Stalin's Kampf.
NATIONAL
SELF-DETERMINATION IS SECONDARY TO PROLETARIAN DICTATORSHIP
The right of self-determination
means that a nation can arrange its life according to its own will. It has the right to arrange its life on the
basis of autonomy. It has the right to
enter into federal relations with other nations. It has the right to complete secession. Nations are sovereign and all nations are
equal.
This, of course, does not mean that
Social-Democrats will support every demand of a nation. A nation has a right even to return to the
old order of things; but this does not mean that Social-Democrats will
subscribe to such a decision if taken by any institution of the said
nation. The obligations of
Social-Democrats, who defend the interests of the proletariat, and the rights
of a nation, which consists of various classes, are two different things.
... It should be born in mind that
besides the right of nations to self-determination there is also the right of
the working class to consolidate its power, and to this latter right the right
of self-determination is subordinate.
There are occasions when the right of self-determination conflicts with
the other, the higher right--the right of a working class that has assumed
power to consolidate its power. In such
cases--this must be said bluntly-- the right to self-determination cannot and
must not serve as an obstacle to the exercise by the working class of its right
to dictatorship. The former must give
way to the latter.
Stalin,
Joseph. Stalin's Kampf.
STALIN
SAYS THE REVOLUTION CAN BEGIN IN LESS RATHER THAN MORE DEVELOPED NATIONS
Where will the revolution begin? Where, in what country, can the front of
capital be pierced first?
Formerly, the reply used to be--
where industry is more developed, where the proletariat forms the majority,
where culture is more advanced, where there is more democracy.
The Leninist theory of the
revolution says: No, not necessarily where industry is most developed, and so
forth; it will be broken where the chain of imperialism is weakest, for the
proletarian revolution is the result of the breaking of the chain of the
imperialist world front at its weakest link.
The country which begins the revolution, which makes a breach in the
capitalist front, may prove to be less developed in a capitalist sense than
others which are more developed but have remained, nevertheless, within the
framework of capitalism.
To put it briefly, the chain of the
imperialist front should break, as a rule, where the links are most fragile
and, in any event, not necessarily where capitalism is most developed, or where
there is a certain percentage of proletarians and a certain percentage of
peasants, and so on....
Stalin,
Joseph. Stalin's Kampf.
ENGLISH
WERE THE PRIME OPP0NENTS OF PEOPLE GAINING FREEDOM
... the English bourgeoisie has
always been in the front rank of the annihilators of the movements for freedom
of humanity....
This was also the case after the
October Revolution in the Soviet Union, when the English bourgeoisie, after
having attacked the Soviet Union, attempted to set up "an alliance of 14
states," and, when, in spite of this, it was driven out of the
Stalin,
Joseph. Stalin's Kampf.
INDIVIDUAL
& COLLECTIVE, SOCIALIST, INTERESTS WORK IN HARMONY NOT CONFLICT
There is no, nor should there be,
irreconcilable contrast between the individual and the collective, between the interests
of the individual person and the interests of the collective. There should be no such contrast, because
collectivism, socialism, does not deny, but combines individual interests with
the interests of the collective.
Socialism cannot abstract itself from individual interests. Socialist society alone can most fully
satisfy these personal interests. More
than that; socialist society alone can firmly safeguard the interests of the
individual. In this sense there is no
irreconcilable contrast between "individualism" and socialism.
Stalin,
Joseph. Stalin's Kampf.
AMERICAN
PRESIDENTS LIKE
... I have some experience in
fighting for socialism, and this experience tells me that if
Stalin,
Joseph. Stalin's Kampf.
MARXISTS
SUPPORT REFORMS, COMPROMISE AND AGREEMENTS
What is the difference between
revolutionary tactics and reformist tactics?
Some are of the opinion that
Leninism is opposed to reforms, opposed to compromises and to agreements in
general. That is absolutely untrue. Bolsheviks know as well as anybody else that
in a certain sense "every little [bit] helps," that under certain
conditions reforms, in general, and compromises and agreements, in particular,
are necessary and useful.
Stalin,
Joseph. Stalin's Kampf.
But since Communists had to fight
for partial gains and reforms they had some common ground, however narrow, with
the Social Democrats and the moderate trade unionists. They should try to concert action with them
within a united front....
Lenin had expounded these ideas as
early as 1920 in the Infantile Disease of "Leftishness" in Communism,
where he dwelled on the harm done to communism by unreasoning ultra-radical
sectarians. The need for a firm and
formal disavowal of "ultra-radicalism" became pressing after the
German March rising of 1921. It was then
that Lenin placed proposals for the new policy before the Executive of the International. He met with strong opposition from Zinoviev,
Bukharin, Bela Kun, and others. For a
moment it seemed that the ultra-radicals would prevail. It was only after animated debates in the
course of which Lenin and Trotsky jointly faced the opposition that the
Executive was persuaded to authorize the policy of "gathering
strength" and to instruct both Lenin and Trotsky to expound it at the
forthcoming congress of the International.
... The Communist parties had come
into existence in a desperate struggle against the leaders of the old Socialist
parties whom they blamed for supporting the "imperialist slaughter"
of 1914-18, for the subsequent suppression of revolution in Europe, for the
assassination of Rosa Luxembourg and Karl Liebknecht, and for an ambiguous
attitude towards European intervention in
Deutscher,
Isaac. The Prophet Unarmed.
...Lenin and Trotsky had set the
Communist parties the dual task of fighting arm in arm with the reformists
against the bourgeoisie and of wresting from the reformists influence over the
working class. The idea of the united
front embodied the whole practical experience of the Bolsheviks who had indeed
fought first against Tsardom, then the cadets, and then Kornilov, in a sort of
united front with the Mensheviks and Social Revolutionaries until, in the end,
they gained ascendancy over the latter too.
Deutscher,
Isaac. The Prophet Unarmed.
STALIN
PREDICTS AN ECONOMIC CRISIS IN THE
I think the moment is not far off
when a revolutionary crisis will develop in
Stalin,
Joseph. Stalin's Kampf.
STALIN
SAYS COMINTERN LEADERS ARE NOT DIRECTING THE WORLD’S COMMUNIST PARTIES
The assertion that the American
Communists work under "orders from
Is it not clear that Green and his
friends in the American Federation of Labor slander the American Communists
when they slavishly repeat the capitalist legends about "orders from
Stalin,
Joseph. Stalin's Kampf.
At the turn of the decade [from the
20’s to the 30’s]Stalin's mastery of the Comintern was still superficial. Almost anyone who spent those years in the
Communist party can relate from experience the bewilderment and the reluctance
with which cadres and rankers alike began to conform to the new orthodoxy
consecrated in
Deutscher,
Isaac. The Prophet Outcast.
STALIN
REFUSES TO LECTURE THE CAPITALISTS ON MORALITY WHEN THEY HAVE NONE
Far be it from me to moralize on the
policy of non--intervention, to talk of treason, treachery and so on. It would be naive to preach morals to people
who recognize no human morality.
Politics is politics, as the old, case-hardened bourgeois diplomats say.
Stalin,
Joseph. Stalin's Kampf.
Actually speaking, the policy of
non-intervention means conniving at aggression, giving free rein to war and
consequently transforming the war into a world war. The policy of
non-intervention reveals an eagerness, a desire not to hinder the aggressors in
their nefarious work... Far be it from me to moralize on the policy of
non-intervention, to talk of treason treachery and so on. It would be naive to
preach morals to people who recognise no human morality.
Stalin, Joseph. Works.
STALIN’S
EXILE, IMPRISONMENT, AND ESCAPE CAREER SHOWS GREAT DETERMINATION
1902,
April 5: Stalin is arrested in Batum (first arrest).
1903,
April 19: Stalin is transferred to the Kutais Provincial prison.
1903,
Nov.: Stalin is exiled for three years to the
1904,
Jan. 5: Stalin escapes from exile (from Balagansk,
1908,
March 25: Stalin is arrested in
1908,
Sept. 20: Stalin is exiled for two years to the city of
1909,
June 24: Stalin escapes from the
1910,
March 23: Stalin is arrested in
1910,
August 27: By order of the Vice-Regent of the
1910,
Sept. 23: Stalin is exiled to the city of
1911,
July 6: Stalin escapes from exile (3d escape).
1911,
Sept. 9: Stalin is arrested in
1911,
Dec. 14: a Stalin is exiled to the city of
1912,
Feb. 29: Stalin escapes from exile (4th escape)
1912,
April 22: Stalin is arrested in
1912,
Beginning of summer: Stalin is exiled for four years to the
1912,
Summer: Stalin escapes from exiled (from Narym) and returns to
1913,
Spring: Stalin is arrested in
1913,
June: Stalin is exiled for four years under police surveillance to the
1913,
June to Feb. 1917: Stalin is in exile in the
Stalin,
Joseph. Stalin's Kampf.
His education awed the the womenfolk
among my family and our friends. The men
were more impressed by his record as a fighter against the authorities. One of them, Siko Karangozichvili, said to me
one day, "Your uncle is a real hero.
He has been fighting all his life to free our country from the
Russians. They keep putting him in jail
and he keeps getting out.
Svanidze,
Budu. My Uncle, Joseph Stalin.
He [Stalin] was arrested for the
first time in 1902, and in the following year married Yekaterina Svanidze
--said to be his one true love--before beinng transported to
Escaping from exile in 1904,
Djugashvili returned to
Arrested again in 1909 and exiled to
Solvychegodsk in the north of the
In 1913 he was arrested again in
Volkogonov,
Dmitrii. Autopsy for an Empire.
He carried on Socialist propaganda
unceasing among the leather, tobacco, and mine workers. He worked as a bookbinder to earn his own
living, while at the same time he set up and printed his own newspaper in a
cellar or sometimes in a wooden hut. He
took part in preparations for organizing attacks against the government and for
that reason was constantly watched by the Imperial Police. In spite of his false beards and other
disguises he was discovered again and again; and from his 24th to his 34th year
he was imprisoned six times, first in the Caucasus and then in St.
Petersburg. Following each imprisonment
he was outlawed and exiled to
...during this first decade as an
active Socialist, from the age of 16 to that of 26, neither ambition nor the will
to power, nor the desire for action on a broad scale, nor recognition by his
comrades, brought him any satisfaction.
For in all that he did he remained anonymous.
Ludwig,
Emil. Leaders of Europe.
Though born in the South and
accustomed to the southern sun, he had to pass the dreary years of the war in
this arctic North, wavering between hope and doubt, rather weakened in health
through long spells of imprisonment, entirely alone, living in a miserable
wooden shack amid the snows, shooting wild geese and duck for his food during
the winter and fishing for it in summer.
He cooked for himself, made his own clothes and whatever implements he
needed for digging and shoveling and building, while at the same time he read
Marx and Darwin, for under the Czarist regime all political prisoners were
allowed to take books with them into exile....
Ludwig,
Emil. Leaders of Europe.
Between his flights from city to
city, he was six times imprisoned, for periods of 3 to 10 months; he was exiled
to Siberia, escaping five times at the end of a few weeks or months to reappear
under a new name. Between times a
bookbinder, a compositor, a printer of prohibited papers in cold cellars, or
again a traveling agitator in tobacco factories or coal mines. Can such an early life, with its sacrifices
of money and security, of the cheerful, hopeful education of children, of the
respect of the world about him, with no hope of reward or fame--can such a
life, if it does not break the man who bears it, make him other than a
passionate champion of his community...?
Ludwig,
Emil. Three portraits: Hitler, Mussolini, Stalin.
Map of Stalin's six exiles and five
escapes
The
complete records:
First
arrest, Batum, April, 1902;
First
exile, to Novaya Uda,
First
escape, January, 1904.
Second
arrest,
Second
exile, to Solvychegodsk,
Second
escape (to
Third
arrest,
Third
exile,
Third
escape (two
Fourth
arrest,
Fourth
exile to
Fourth
escape to
Fifth
arrest,
Fifth
exile to Narym region, June, 1912
Fifth
escape to
Sixth
arrest,
Sixth
exile to Turukhansk District
Liberated
in February, 1917, arriving in
Barrett,
James. Stalin and God.
He [Stalin] had worked in the
capital of the oil industry for nearly eight months, he had spent nearly six
months in the
SPECULATIONS
ON STALIN’S MENTAL STATE AND PRIVATE ATTITUDES ARE BASELESS
Unlike some approaches to the
politics of the '30s, however, this analysis does not concentrate on Stalin's
personality. Although he was certainly
the most authoritative political actor of the period, speculations on his mental
state, private attitudes, and prejudices are baseless, given the lack of
primary evidence on these matters.
Getty,
A. Origins of the Great Purges.
Rumors abounded, of course, but in
actual fact there was not much to report about his [Stalin] private life.
Laqueur,
Walter. Stalin: The Glasnost Revelations.
NUMBERS
GIVEN FOR PEOPLE REPRESSED ARE FAR TOO UNRELIABLE AND BIASED
No attempt is made to fix the total
number of victims of the Great Purges.
Because there are no convincing statistics, all calculations are quite
subjective and appear to reflect the point of view of the person making the
calculation.
Getty,
A. Origins of the Great Purges.
EVERYBODY
SUPPORTED STALIN AT THE 17TH CONGRESS
The victory of the General Line at
the 17th Congress was demonstrated by the return of defeated oppositionists to
party life, provided they publicly accepted the Stalin line. Many of them, including Zinoviev, Kamenev,
Preobrazhensky, Pyatakov, and Bukharin, addressed the congress itself. Although several of them were greeted with
catcalls and interruptions from the floor, the fact that they spoke at the
congress at all indicated a relatively "soft" attitude on the part of
the regime toward the oppositionists, at least in early 1934.
Getty,
A. Origins of the Great Purges.
I can at least answer for
myself. I spent two years in the
Pioneers, six years in the Komsomol, 16 years in the Party. For 15 years I belonged to the Corps of
Officers of the armed forces, for ten of them I was a leading Party member and
a senior reader of a
I attended the [1934 17th Party]
Congress as a visitor. I recall how
Postyshev, the Chairman, called on Bukharin to speak, and how Stalin stared at
Bukharin with parted lips as if wondering what he would say....
All the outstanding oppositionists
were prevailed upon to attend. Bukharin,
Rykov, Tomsky, Preobrazhensky, Lominadze, Kamenev--all were there.
Tokaev,
Grigori. Betrayal of an Ideal.
And in fact all his former opponents
spoke [at the 17th Party Congress in February 1934], admitting they had been
wrong, praising him enthusiastically, and promising total support for the party
line: Zinoviev and Kamenev; Bukharin, Rykov and Tomsky; Pyatakov, Radek,
Lominadze... Kamenev, in the typical
tone of the defeated factions, spoke of the Ryutinites as 'kulak scum' who had
needed 'more tangible' rebuttal than mere ideological argument.
Conquest,
Robert. Stalin: Breaker of Nations.
Some of the erstwhile oppositionists
were elected to the leading organs [at the 17th Party Congress]: Pyatakov, full
member; Bukharin, Rykov, and Tomsky, alternates in the Central Committee. The Congress laughed with, as much as at,
Radek, currently an authoritative journalistic spokesman on foreign affairs,
when he recounted that he had been cured of Trotskyism.
Ulam,
Adam. Stalin; The Man and his Era.
BUKHARIN
AND RYKOV RECANT BUT OTHER RIGHTISTS DO NOT
While Bukharin, Rykov, and Tomsky
had abandoned the opposition and publicly associated themselves with the Stalin
policies, other rightist oppositions surfaced between 1929 and 1932.
... repression of these new
dissidents was immediate but uneven.
Some were expelled from the party, but others were merely censured
publicly. Thus A. Smirnov was expelled
from the Central Committee but not from the party. Lominadze was expelled from the party for
short time, but soon was readmitted and appointed the party secretary in charge
of the important
Getty,
A. Origins of the Great Purges.
CENTRALIZATION
AND TOTALITARIANISM DID NOT RULE IN THE SU OF THE 30’S
According to most Western views,
power was transmitted from the top to the bottom, from the center to the
localities.... Theoretically, every
committee was completely subordinate to the one above it, and individual
members had no power or control at all.
The political reality was much
different. In fact, the chain of command
collapsed more often than it functioned.
The Communist Party, far from having penetrated every quarter of Russian
life, was more an undisciplined and disorganized force with little influence
outside the cities. Soviet
Getty,
A. Origins of the Great Purges.
The party in the '30s was neither
monolithic nor disciplined. Its upper
ranks were divided, and its lower organizations were disorganized, chaotic, and
undisciplined.
Getty,
A. Origins of the Great Purges.
Keeping the obvious source caveats
in mind, the present analysis has suggested a number of conclusions about
Soviet political history in the 1930s.
First, it seems that the Bolshevik party was not the monolithic and
homogeneous machine both totalitarian theorists and Stalinists would have us
believe. Administration was so chaotic,
irregular, and confused that even Fainsod's characterization of the system as
"inefficient totalitarianism" seems to overstate the case.
Although the Soviet government was
certainly dictatorial (or tried to be), it was not totalitarian. The technical and technological sophistication
that separates totalitarianism from dictatorship was lacking in the '30s. The primitive texture of the Smolensk
Archive, the real weakness of the central government in key areas, and a
certain degree of political pluralism argue strongly against any totalitarian
characterization.
Getty,
A. Origins of the Great Purges.
The
Future Did Not Work by J. Arch Getty, Book Review of The Passing of an Illusion
by Franois Furet [March 2000
THE
PURGE OR PROVERKA WAS NOT A RESULT OF THE
But the fact that a verification had
been approved before
Getty,
A. Origins of the Great Purges.
Another lie is that the party card
control would have been an act of revenge by the party leadership by which is meant Stalin of course for the assassination of
Sousa,
Mario. The Class Struggle During the
Thirties in the
Conquest mixes up the party card
control with the very events connected with the police investigation of the
assassination of
...the Zinoviev-Kamenev trial took
place between 16th and 23rd January 1935.
This was during the new registration of party members which had been
decided in October 1934 and which, in January 1935 had almost died out without
any result. The party card control,
which according to Conquest was a revenge against the opposition, was a result
of the earlier control having proved insufficient for the great problems
revealed. It started only in June 1935,
five months after the termination of the Zinoviev-Kamenev trial and after the
prison sentences for the opposition. The
party card control could not have influenced the trial, nor could it have been
a revenge on the accused. Conquest is
aware of the great ignorance about the historical questions of socialism and
does not hesitate to use the ignorance of people to divulge his dirty
propaganda.
Sousa,
Mario. The Class Struggle During the
Thirties in the
It is sometimes thought that
Getty,
A. Origins of the Great Purges.
The Nicolaevsky scenario suffers
from serious flaws. In the first place,
virtually no evidence suggests that
The rumor that
Certainly
Getty,
A. Origins of the Great Purges.
Simply reading through the minutes
of the 17th Congress is enough to raise doubts over
Rittersporn,
Gabor. Stalinist Simplifications and Soviet Complications, 1933-1953.
Service,
Robert. Stalin.
Wishful thinking of this sort may
have informed the report of Medvedev and Antonov-Ovseenko that on the eve of
the 17th Party Congress, about January 1934, a small group of leading
Bolsheviks proposed to
McNeal,
Robert, Stalin: Man and Ruler.
STALIN
AND KIROV WERE ALLIES
If Stalin and Kirov were
antagonists, it would be difficult to explain
Much more probable than a
Getty,
A. Origins of the Great Purges.
Stalin was often visited by Kirov
who even slept on Stalin's divan.
They took steam baths together. Such companionship and understanding between
them, no one else of the Politburo had with Stalin. Stalin was very proud of
Rybin,
Aleksei. Next to Stalin: Notes of a Bodyguard.
On December 1,
Goodbye, my dear friend....
After the death of his wife, there
was no other such close friend as was
Rybin,
Aleksei. Next to Stalin: Notes of a Bodyguard.
His [
Tucker,
Robert. Stalin in Power: 1929-1941.
In the late summer of 1934
During the meeting at
Tucker,
Robert. Stalin in Power: 1929-1941.
Stalin was friends with
Radzinsky,
Edvard. Stalin.
[During the
(I've
never seen him do that) and said "now I'm all alone in the
world." Pavel says it was so moving
that he jumped up and kissed him. Joseph
told Pavel that
Radzinsky,
Edvard. Stalin.
...Kirov (the only man to figure in
the whole of Stalin's career as a genuine personal favorite).
Delbars,
Yves. The Real Stalin.
Stalin was shocked white and rigid
[at the killing of
Service,
Robert. Stalin.
Stalin attended
Service,
Robert. Stalin.
Most biographers date the beginning
of the purges from
Richardson,
Rosamond. Stalin’s Shadow.
NEW
EVIDENCE DIRECTLY IMPLICATES ZINOVIEV AND KAMENEV IN
But in mid-1936, 18 months after the
assassination, the
Getty,
A. Origins of the Great Purges.
According to the letter, Zinovievist
and Kamenevist opposition circles in the USSR had established contact with the
emigre Trotskyists four years before (in Berlin in 1932 when defendant Ivan
Smirnov contacted Sedov) and had jointly plotted the assassination of Soviet
leaders. They had done this because the
success of the party in industry and agriculture since 1929 meant that
opposition politicians had no chance to take power via a political
platform. What could they propose, given
the successes of recent years? Thus, the
opposition had turned to terror and assassination and had become "the
organizing force for remnants of smashed classes" and "leading
detachment of the counter-revolutionary bourgeoisie."
Getty,
A. Origins of the Great Purges.
Kamenev and Zinoviev were originally
tried for complicity in
... The accused were fluent in their
confessions, as fluent, for example, as police witnesses speaking with their
notes. Does this suggests that their
evidence, therefore, is concocted? I
have shown in my record of my examination how the preliminary interrogation
before the charges are fully formulated discards all that is doubtful and
accidental and concentrates on what is positive and fundamental.
Edelman,
Maurice. G.P.U. Justice.
Kirov, one of the most important
leaders in the Communist Party in the
That was the extent of their
admission of guilt and they were sentenced accordingly. When people in
Campbell,
J. R. Soviet Policy and Its Critics.
STALIN
URGES TREATING TROTSKYISTS AND FORMER TROTSKYISTS FAIRLY
Stalin again argued for
circumspection (if not restraint) on the liquidation of Trotskyists. After noting that, of course, the present
wreckers, spies, etc., had to be smashed, he reflected: "But here is the
question--how to carry out in practice the task of smashing and uprooting the
German-Japanese agents of Trotskyism.
Does this mean that we should strike and uproot not only the real
Trotskyists, but also those who wavered at some time toward Trotskyism, and
then long ago came away from Trotskyism; not only those who are really
Trotskyist agents for wrecking, but also those who happened once upon a time to
go along a street where some Trotskyist or other had once passed? At any rate such voices were heard at the
plenum. Can we consider such an
interpretation of the resolution to be correct?
No, we cannot consider it correct.
On this question, as on all other
questions, there must be an individual, differentiated approach. You must not judge everybody by the same
yardstick....
Among our responsible comrades,
there are a certain number of former Trotskyists who left Trotskyism long ago,
and now fight against Trotskyism not worse, but better than some of our
respected comrades who never chanced to waver toward Trotskyism. It would be foolish to vilify such comrades
now."
Stalin seemed to be cautioning
against uncontrolled witch hunting of persons with only tenuous connections to
Trotskyism. "Voices" at the
plenum had apparently supported such measures, and it seems safe to presume
that they came from two sources. First,
Yezhov and Molotov may have argued for such a root-and-branch approach to
Trotskyism in the party and economic leadership. Stalin warned against vilifying such
"responsible comrades" simply because they were former adherents of
Trotskyism. Second, regional party
secretaries frequently sought to demonstrate their own vigilance by
"unmasking" the enemy (currently defined as Trotskyists) among the
rank-and-file. Given this record, it
would not have been strange for local officials to protect their cronies by
encouraging the expulsion of rank-and-file members with remote (or no)
connections to Trotskyism. Despite
Stalin's strictures, this practice would continue because it was the obvious
way for local leaders to expel troublesome critics and subordinates while
appearing to be zealous.
Getty,
A. Origins of the Great Purges.
...on June 14, 1939 Ulrich reported
to Stalin and Molotov that a 'large number of cases were pending against
members of Right-Trotskyite, bourgeois nationalist and espionage
organizations:... For the sake of
secrecy, we suggest the defendants not be allowed to attend their trials. I await your orders.' There is no indication on this document of
Stalin's response, but given the huge deficiency of officers in the face of a
looming war, it is possible that he rejected it as an example of 'mistakes and
slander'.
Volkogonov,
Dmitri. Stalin: Triumph and Tragedy.
Thus, on the very eve of 1937,
Stalin let it be known that people with "the past sins of Trotskyism"
could enjoy "full confidence."
Rogovin,
Vadim. 1937: Year of Terror.
Just as during the sharpest moments
of the legal struggle against the Oppositions of the 1920s, Stalin
superficially was distancing himself from the extremist moods of Central
Committee members and was speaking in favor of "flexible" decisions. He declared, "you cannot measure all
people by the same yardstick.... Among
our leading comrades there are a certain number of former Trotskyists who long
ago abandoned Trotskyism and are now waging a battle against Trotskyism no
worse, and even better than a few of our respected comrades who did not have
the occasion to waiver in the direction of Trotskyism."
Rogovin,
Vadim. 1937: Year of Terror.
The third episode involved the fate
of Khrushchev himself. Knowing that during
the discussion of candidacies, the slightest affiliation of each candidate in
the past to "Trotskyism" would be presented, inevitably in an
especially biased manner, Khrushchev was terrified that some of the delegates
might remember a dangerous page in his biography: during the discussion of 1923
he had spoken in support of Trotsky on the question of inner-party
democracy. Understanding that if this
fact became known in the heated atmosphere of the conference, he "would
find it very difficult to give an explanation," Khrushchev decided to
confess directly to Stalin. Imagining
what consequences this confession might entail, he sought advice from
Kaganovich, who at that time was very favorably disposed toward him. Kaganovich, who "had been entrusted with
observing the
After he had told Stalin about his
"mistake," Khrushchev added that he "had been taken in at that
time by Kharechko, who was a rather well-known Trotskyist." Stalin reacted to his words:
"Kharechko? Oh, I knew him. He was an interesting man." (Kharechko at that time was in a
Thirty years after the event,
Khrushchev recalled that this discussion produced a certainty in him that
"those who had been arrested were truly enemies of the people, even though
they had acted so craftily that we were unable to notice because of our
inexperience, political blindness, and trustfulness. Stalin...seemed to rise up even higher on the
pedestal: he saw everything, knew everything, judged people's mistakes fairly,
defended and supported honest people, and punished those who were undeserving
of trust."
Kaganovich treated this episode
somewhat differently in his discussions with Chuev. Kaganovich reported that Khrushchev came
running to him with tears in his eyes: "What am I to do? Should I speak at the conference or
not?" Kaganovich promised to seek
advice on this question from Stalin.
When he learned that Khrushchev "had been a Trotskyist,"
Stalin asked, "And what about now?"
Kaganovich replied, "He is very active, and fights
sincerely." Then Stalin said:
"Let him speak, let him tell about it.
Then you should speak and say the Central Committee knows about this and
trusts him...." As Kaganovich
recalls, "That's what was done."
The episode of Khrushchev's
"Trotskyist past" had a noteworthy continuation. At the session of the Presidium of the
Central Committee in June 1957, when Molotov and Kaganovich proposed to remove
Khrushchev from his post as First Secretary of the Central Committee, one of
their main arguments was reference to Khrushchev's "Trotskyism." Kaganovich was particularly impassioned in
exposing Khrushchev as a "Trotskyist." When several participants at the session
began to protest against this "inadmissible method," Molotov
declared, "But it all happened."
Rogovin,
Vadim. 1937: Year of Terror.
As at the February-March plenum,
Stalin declared his readiness to give indulgences to former Trotskyists who
"have left Trotskyism, left it for good and who are putting up a very good
fight against it." Having said that
he could "count 20 or 30" such people, Stalin named as an example the
Politburo member Andreev, who "had been a very active Trotskyist in
1921," but now "was fighting very well."
Rogovin,
Vadim. 1937: Year of Terror.
Some of those present had outdone
themselves in calling for punishment of all who had ever had the most tenuous
ties with Trotskyists or Trotskyism.
This we may infer from the fact that Stalin now cautioned against
demands "heard here at the plenum" for casting out not only
"real Trotskyists" but also those who had once oscillated toward
Trotskyism but then turned away from it, and even those who had occasion
"to walk along the same street as a Trotskyist." An individualized approach was needed, he
[Stalin] said. Some one-time
Trotskyists had really reformed, and some non-Trotskyists had maintained
personal ties with individual Trotskyists for a time. But such comrades must not be lumped
together with the Trotskyists.
Tucker,
Robert. Stalin in Power: 1929-1941.
But the question arises: how is this
task of smashing and uprooting the Japano-German Trotskyite agents to be
carried out in practice? Does that mean
that we must strike at and uproot, not only real Trotskyites, but also those
who at some time or other wavered in the direction of Trotskyism and then, long
ago, abandoned Trotskyism; not only those who are really Trotskyite wrecking
agents, but also those who, at some time or other, had occasion to walk down a
street through which some Trotskyite had passed? At all events, such voices were heard at this
Plenum. Can such an interpretation of
the resolution be regarded as correct?
No, it cannot be regarded as correct.
In this matter, as in all others, an individual, discriminate approach
is required. You cannot measure
everybody with the same yardstick. Such
a wholesale approach can only hinder the fight against the real Trotskyite
wreckers and spies.
Among our responsible comrades there
are a number of former Trotskyites who abandoned Trotskyism long ago and are
fighting Trotskyism not less and perhaps more effectively than some of our
respected comrades who have never wavered in the direction of Trotskyism. It would be foolish to cast a slur upon such
comrades now.
Among our comrades there are some
who ideologically were always opposed to Trotskyism, but who, notwithstanding
this, maintained personal connections with individual Trotskyites which they
did not hesitate to dissolve as soon as the practical features of Trotskyism
became clear to them. Of course, it
would have been better had they broken off their personal friendly connections
with individual Trotskyites at once, and not only after some delay. But it would be foolish to lump such comrades
with the Trotskyites.
3)
What does choosing the right people and putting them in the right place
mean?
It means, firstly, choosing workers
according to political principle, i.e., whether they are worthy of political
confidence, and secondly, according to business principle, i.e., whether they
are fit for such and such a definite job
Can it be said that this Bolshevik
rule is adhered to by our Party comrades?
Unfortunately, this cannot be said.
Reference was made to this at this Plenum. But not everything was said about it. The point is that this tried and tested rule
is frequently violated in our practical work, and violated in the most flagrant
manner. Most often, workers are not
chosen for objective reasons, but for casual, subjective, philistine,
petty-bourgeois reasons. Most often,
so-called acquaintances, friends, fellow-townsmen, personally devoted people,
masters in the art of praising their chiefs are chosen without regard for their
political and business fitness.
Stalin,
Joseph. Works, Vol. 14, Speech in Reply to Debate, 1 April 1937, Red Star
Press, London, Pravda 1978, pp. 279-280
The campaign against the Party
opposition continued. Ezhov drafted the
Politburo resolution “On the Attitude to Counterrevolutionary
Trotskyist-Zinovievist Elements,” which Stalin signed on 29 September; the
“Trotskyist-Zinovievist scoundrels” should from now on be considered “foreign
agents, spies, subversives, and wreckers on behalf of the fascist bourgeoisie
in
Jansen,
Marc & Petrov, Nikita. Stalin's
Loyal Executioner: Yezhov,
STALIN
SAYS LEADERS SHOULD JUDGE PEOPLE AS INDIVIDUALS NOT AS PART OF A GROUP
Finally, Stalin touched a longtime
sore point: the "formal and heartless bureaucratic attitude of some of our
party comrades toward the fate of individual party members" who had been expelled
from the party.
"The fact is that some of our
party leaders suffer from lack of attention to people, to party
members.... They have, therefore, not an
individual approach to party members.
And just because they have not an individual approach when appraising
party members, they usually act at random, either praising them wholesale,
without measure, or crushing them, also wholesale and without measure,
expelling thousands and tens of thousands from the party....
But only people who in essence are
profoundly anti-party can have such an approach to members of the party."
Getty,
A. Origins of the Great Purges.
It was Stalin who called a special
plenum of the Central Committee in January 1938, when more than half of the
members of the Central Committee had already been arrested, to pass the
resolution "On the mistakes of party organizations in expelling
Communists, on the bureaucratic handling of the appeals of those expelled, and
on measures to eliminate these shortcomings." Presenting scattered figures on expulsions
that had been rescinded by the Control Commission and on "enemy"
accusations that had been proved groundless by the NKVD, the resolution
attacked the expellers and accusers:
"All these facts show that many
of our party organizations... have not exposed the cleverly massed enemy who
hides... behind shouts for vengeance...
and tries to slaughter our Bolshevik cadres and sow distrust and excessive
suspiciousness in our ranks."
Whereupon the Central Committee
ordered all party organizations to cease "mass, wholesale
expulsions," to decide each case on an individual basis, to get rid of
party officials who did not take the individual approach, and to review the
appeals of expelled members within the three-month period.
... Only on the eve of the 18th
Party Congress, after Yezhov's dismissal, did the press begin to emphasize
Stalin's leading role in the assault on "enemies of the people." The theme was continued by many speakers at
the congress itself in March 1939.
Shkiryatov, for example, declared:...
"Comrade Stalin has directed
the work of purging enemies who have wormed their way into the party. Comrade Stalin taught us how to fight
wreckers in a new way; he taught us how to get rid of these hostile elements
quickly and decisively."
...Many years later, further details
were made public. At first Shkiryatov
was given the job of checking Mishakova's accusations. He supported her, but only to the extent of
suggesting that Kosarev be reprimanded for "persecuting"
Mishakova. Shkiryatov sent this proposal
to Stalin, with a covering note: "Dear Joseph Vissarionovich: As always, I
am sending this memo to you. If
something is not right, you will correct me." And Stalin did "correct"
Shkiryatov. In his speech to the seventh
plenum of the Komsomol Central Committee, Shkiryatov shouted: "You,
Kosarev, wanted to kill everything Stalinist and Bolshevik in Mishakova, but
you didn't succeed, because Stalin intervened in this matter."
Medvedev,
Roy. Let History Judge.
On this question, as on all other
questions, there must be an individual, differentiated approach. You must not
measure everyone with the same yardstick.
Such a sweeping approach can only harm the cause of struggle against the
real Trotskyite wreckers and spies.
Among our responsible comrades there
are a certain number of former Trotskyites who left Trotskyism long ago, and
now fight against Trotskyism not worse but better than some of our respected
comrades who never chanced to waver toward Trotskyism. It would be foolish to vilify such comrades
now.
Among our comrades there are also
those who always stood against Trotskyism ideologically, but in spite of this
kept up personal contacts with individual Trotskyites, which they did not delay
in liquidating as soon as the actual visage of Trotskyism became clear to them. It is, of course, not a good thing that they
did not break off their personal friendly connections with individual
Trotskyites at once, but belatedly. But
it would be silly to lump such comrades together with the Trotskyites.
Stalin,
Joseph. Mastering Bolshevism.
Given the explicit assumption at the
February 1937 Plenum that "enemies" were within the gates, Stalin's
measured call for an "individual, differentiated approach" to the
verification of comrades was overwhelmed by the cacophony of calls for
vigilance, for giving the NKVD increased powers, for smashing the enemy. His cautions may have tempered somewhat the
resolution of the Plenum, but such nuances were drowned out by the rallying
cries of the advocates of vigilance, comrades who believed that the August 1936
and January 1937 trials and other recent revelations proved that
"enemies" threatened the party and national security. Of course, none of them believed that they
themselves were "enemies."
Chase,
William J., Enemies Within the Gates?, translated by Vadim A. Staklo,
IN
1937 STALIN WARNED AGAINST EXCESSES AGAINST MANAGEMENT AND LEADERS
Although Stalin certainly supported
the liquidation of highly placed "spies, wreckers, and enemies" and a
promotion of "control from below," there is no reason to believe that
he intended for the fusion of the two campaigns to produce the chaos it
did. Almost immediately,
Even as the press continued to push
anti-bureaucratic and mass criticism themes,
In June 1937, the press continued to
criticize radical "excesses."
Pravda complained that criticism of leaders had sometimes gone too
far. Production and labor discipline had
suffered as rank-and-file activists criticized their leaders and managers. The press warned that such excesses were
dangerously reminiscent of the anti-party activities of Trotskyists....
Later in October 1937, Stalin made
one of his rare 0lympian pronouncements, which esoterically condemned radical
excesses. In a reception for lower-and
middle-level leaders of industry from the
Getty,
A. Origins of the Great Purges.
Although sources on this period are weak
and vague, there are signs that Stalin may not have been entirely satisfied
with other events in mid-1937. He
certainly favored an offensive against disobedient, suspicious, and corrupt
members of the bureaucracy, but it is by no means certain that he was
comfortable with the accompanying excesses.
For whatever reason, he seems to have tried to reduce the cult of the
NKVD by putting a certain distance between himself and the radical efforts of
the police.
Getty,
A. Origins of the Great Purges.
STALIN
AND HIS ALLIES TRIED TO CONTROL EXCESSES AND UNJUST EXPULSIONS
Although
In 1937 and 1938, Stalin and company
tried to contain radicalism through press articles, speeches, revised electoral
plans, and deglorifying the police. That
they had to take such measures shows their lack of tight control over events.
Getty,
A. Origins of the Great Purges.
But we have still another error in
this field. The fact is that our
comrades do not recognize the mean between two extremes. It is sufficient for a worker, a Party
member, to commit some small offense, to be late two or three times at a Party
meeting, not to pay membership dues for some reason or other, and in a flash he
is thrown out of the Party.
No interest is taken in the degree
of his offense, the cause of his non-appearance at the meeting, the cause of
the non--payment of membership dues. The
bureaucracy of this is simply unparalleled.
It is not difficult to understand that, precisely as a result of such a
heartless policy, splendid skilled workers, excellent Stakhanovites, have been
thrown out of the Party. And was it
impossible, before expelling them from the Party, to give a warning, and if
this had no effect, to censure them, or administer a reprimand, and, if this
had no effect, to set a period for reformation, or in the extreme case to
reduce to the position of a candidate, but not expel them with a sweep of the
hand from the Party?
Of course it was possible.
But this requires an attentive
attitude to people, to the Party members, to the fact of Party membership. And this is exactly what some of our comrades
lack.
It is high time to put a stop to
this outrageous practice.
Stalin,
Joseph. Mastering Bolshevism.
PURGES
DECREASED THROUGH THE 30’S AND DIFFER FROM THE EZHOVSHCHINA
The traditional view of the events
of 1933-39--which sees them as related and incremental parts of the same terrorist
crescendo--needs revision. Fainsod and
others described the 1933-39 period as an "almost continuous purge"
in the Western Region, and his conceptual framework has dominated nearly all
views of the period. It is based on the
idea that after 1933 (or 1934) there was a constantly increasing level of
"purging" accompanied by a similarly rising curve of fear and
panic. According to this view, the
continuous purge began in 1933 with the chistka. The assassination of Politburo member Kirov
in December 1934 "touched off a new round of almost continuous
purges," which expanded in "everwidening circles." In the months after
This view is weakly supported by the
available primary evidence. Aside from
particular errors...this interpretation suffers from grave phenomenological
problems.
First, in terms of their attrition
to the Party the 1933-36 membership screenings were actually a decrescendo, in
that each operation expelled fewer members than the previous one. Indeed, these purges were milder than their
direct ancestors of the 1920s.
Second, most expulsions were for
nonideological and nondissident infractions: violations of party discipline,
theft, abuse of position. Simple
nonparticipation accounted for more of those expelled than did political
crimes. The screenings were hardly
"heresy hunts," and to associate the benign exchange of party
documents with the "acts of the purge" is at least inaccurate.
The chistki were different from the
Ezhovshchina, although Yezhov was involved in both. They had different targets and were conducted
by different agencies for different reasons.
In fact, the membership purges ended before the Ezhovshchina began, and
readmission upon appeal began before, and continued during, the terror.... All political events of 30s were not simply
related parts of the same Great Purges crescendo.
Getty,
A. Origins of the Great Purges.
Given the one-sided nature of
discourse in the field, it may perhaps not be gratuitous to point out some of
the minor, more technical aspects of the revisionist view of the origins of the
terror that are being confirmed by new archival evidence.
First, when Stalin said in the fall
of 1936 that the NKVD was "four years behind" in uncovering
oppositionist plots, he was indeed referring to the 1932 united oppositionist
bloc brokered by Trotsky & Smirnov, and not to the Ryutin platform. The 1932 bloc was, then, the catalytic event
in the escalation of Stalinist terror.
Second, we also now have
confirmation of the fact that party expulsions in the 1935-37 period (that is, after
the Kirov assassination and before the onslaught of the terror) were steadily
decreasing in number, even after the first show trial in the summer of 1936 and
were not especially directed against oppositionists, "wreckers," or
"spies."
Third, the January 1938 Central
Committee resolution criticizing excessive vigilance and unjust persecutions
was directed against regional party machines and their leaders who, like
Postyshev, expelled rank-and-file members to divert attention from their own
people. It had nothing to do with the
NKVD.
[Footnote: Roughly 264,000 people
were expelled in 1935, 51,500 in 1936.
In both years of "chistka" only 5.5% of those expelled were
accused of opposition and .9% for being "spies" or having "connections
to spies." Class- alien origins and
personal corruption comprised the overwhelming majority.]
Getty
and Manning. Stalinist Terror.
A resolution on a more general
purging of the Party was passed by a plenum of the Central Committee on 12
January 1933. More than 800,000 members
were expelled during the year, and another 340,000 in 1934.
Conquest,
Robert. The Great Terror.
Between November 1936 and March
1939, including 1937, when the 'Great Purge' was at its most intense, roughly
160,000 to 180,000 people left the CPSU (for any reason). This represented about 8% of total Party
members, far fewer than those who were expelled in the purge of 1933.
In 1937, at the height of the Great
Purge in
Szymanski,
Albert. Human Rights in the Soviet Union.
THERE
IS NO EVIDENCE OF A STALIN MASTER PLAN TO ELIMINATE OPPONENTS IN THE 30’S
Some will feel that this study has
taken a naive view of Stalin's role as planner and perpetrator. There's no doubt that he had chief
responsibility for political leadership, but the present account has more than
once failed to conclude that the events were part of a coherent plan. Evidence of high-level confusion,
counterproductive initiatives, and lack of control over events has not supported
the notion of a grand design. Careful
analysis of archival, documentary, press, and creditable memoir sources neither
supports nor disproves the existence of a plan.
It is still possible that the events of 1933-39 were parts of a devilish
and devious strategy, but the evidence indicates that a master Stalin plan must
remain an a priori assumption, an intuitive guess, or a hypothesis. It can be suspected but not established on
the basis of the presently available classes of evidence.
Stalin did not initiate or control
everything that happened in the party and country. The number of hours in the day, divided by
the number of things for which he was responsible, suggests that his role in
many areas could have been little more than occasional intervention, prodding,
threatening, or correcting. In the
course of a day, Stalin made decisions on everything from hog breeding to
subways to national defense. He met with
scores of experts, heard dozens of reports, and settled various disputes
between contending factions for budgetary or personnel allocations. He was an executive, and reality forced him
to delegate most authority to his subordinates, each of whom had his own
opinion, client groups, and interests.
Getty,
A. Origins of the Great Purges.
First, the results of [Getty’s]
research show that the political events during the thirties were not “a unified
phenomenon (the Great Purges), which can be studied as a process planned, prepared, and carried out” by
Stalin and his most intimate men.
Second, the research shows that the
allegation that “the Old Bolsheviks of Lenin’s (and Stalin’s) generation were
the purges’ target” has no relationship with reality. Further, Getty confirms that it is time to
review what has been taught about the
Sousa,
Mario. The Class Struggle During the
Thirties in the
Some students of the 1930s view the
period from December 1934 to 1939 as one in which Stalin orchestrated events according
to a preconceived plan. To date, there
is no evidence to prove that argument, which is based on assumptions about
Stalin's intentions.
Chase,
William J., Enemies Within the Gates?, translated by Vadim A. Staklo,
Everything seems to indicate that
Stalin and his lieutenants worked to expand their power at the expense of local
leaders, to centralize decision-making power by reducing local authorities use
of repression, and to modernize the judicial system by making it more uniform,
transparent, and predictable. The
eruption of mass repression in the kulak order of mid-1937 seems therefore not
to have been part of any long-term planning or policy. Stalin had gone out of his way to identify
himself with those who opposed mass operations; this would have been poor
strategy indeed had he planned to launch one.
Getty,
J. Arch. "Excesses are not
permitted, "Russian Review 61 (January 2002) p. 122.
SOME
PEOPLE ARE OBSESSED WITH WRITING AGAINST STALIN
The book that I am presenting for
the readers consideration is the main work of my life. I have been occupied with it nearly all my
adult years.
Medvedev,
Roy. ”Let History Judge.
RUMOR,
GOSSIP, AND HEARSAY DOMINATE ANTI-STALIN PROPAGANDA WRITINGS
History cannot be written unless the
historian can achieve some kind of contact with the mind of those about whom he
is writing. [TOO BAD MANY IGNORED THIS
ADVICE]
Viola,
Lynne. The Best Sons of the Fatherland.
Estimates of those who perished
under Stalin's rule--based principally on speculations by writers who never
reveal how they arrive at such figures--vary widely.
Parenti,
Michael. Blackshirts and Reds, San Francisco:
City Light Books, 1997, p. 77
My collaboration with the people I
have mentioned was based exclusively on personal initiative and trust. I did not make use of or have access to any
closed archives, "special collections," or any other limited-access
depositories and I am not familiar with any.
Medvedev,
Roy. Let History Judge.
In the nature of things there could
not be a published source for much of the information in this book; it was
passed on by the victims of repression or their friends or relatives.
Medvedev,
Roy. Let History Judge.
In some western newspapers after
Stalin's death as well as in the Russian emigre press of the '20s there were various
speculations on the subject of Stalin and women. One author, hiding under the pseudonym
Essad-Bey, claimed that Stalin, like an Oriental sheik, kept his beautiful wife
locked up at his Kremlin apartment or at his dacha and forbade her to show herself
to other men, so that even his Kremlin colleagues never saw her face. Others asserted that Stalin married secretly
after Alliluyeva's death or that he held orgies at his dachas or in his Kremlin
apartment. All this is the product of
unfounded rumor or deliberate fabrication.
Medvedev,
Roy. Let History Judge.
To this very day allegations
occasionally appear in the foreign press that Lenin did not die a natural death
but was killed by Stalin. For example,
in 1976 the journal Veremya i my ran such an article by Lydia Shatunovskaya
entitled "The Secret of One Arrest," in which she repeats a story
supposedly told to her by Ivan Gronsky, a former editor of Izvestia and Novy
mir, to the effect that Stalin murdered Lenin.
As the story goes, Stalin was visiting at Gronsky's apartment, drank so
much that he lost all self-control, and had to stay overnight; during this
drinking bout Stalin told his host about the murder. This is all pure fantasy, though probably
Gronsky's rather than Shatunovskaya's.
It is true that Gronsky was a well-known figure in the literary world in
the early 30s. He was the editor in
chief of Novy mir and took part in preparations for the First Congress of
Soviet Writers, but he was not elected even as a delegate. Stalin knew Gronsky, but to say that he was
"Stalin's most trusted man on literary questions" or that he
"can go and see Stalin any time without a report to give"--these
assertions were made up by Gronsky. In
1937 Gronsky was arrested and 16 years later returned from prison with a highly
tarnished reputation. In order to win
people's confidence again, or at least to attract their attention, he was
capable of making up the most unlikely stories about his life before and after his
arrest.
Medvedev,
Roy. Let History Judge.
To this day, in works published
outside the
Medvedev,
Roy. On Stalin and Stalinism.
Trotsky, too, spread similar stories
in the last years of his life. His
version was so unbelievable that Life magazine, which had contracted with Trotsky
for an article on Lenin, refused to print it.
Several other American magazines rejected the article, and it did not
appear until August 10, 1940, in the Hearst publication
Medvedev,
Roy. Let History Judge.
On Dec. 22, he [Lenin] requested
Fotieva to provide him with cyanide in the event he lost the capacity to
speak. He had made a similar request of
Stalin as early as May, a fact in which Maria Ulianova saw proof of Lenin's
special confidence in Stalin.
[Footnote]: In 1939, shortly before
he was murdered, Trotsky recalled an incident at the Politburo meeting in
February 1923, at which Stalin, with a sinister leer, reported that Lenin had
asked him for poison to end his hopeless condition. Trotsky to the end of his life believed it
likely that Lenin died from toxin supplied by the General Secretary: There was something disingenuous about
Trotsky's claim, because he was in possession of a cable from Dzerzhinsky,
dated February 1, 1924, that advise him that the autopsy had revealed no traces
of poison in Lenin's blood: according to Fotieva, Stalin never supplied Lenin
with poison.
Pipes,
Richard.
Volkogonov promised to support my
rehabilitation in exchange for my cooperation.
When we met on November 4th, 1989, I suggested that Volkogonov correct
his account of the Stamenov episode, which had just appeared in a literary
journal. He claimed in the article that
Stalin had personally met Stamenov, which I knew was untrue. I myself had handled the probe to plant
disinformation among Nazi diplomats, feeling out the Germans' desire for a
peace settlement in 1941. When
Volkogonov's book appeared, the episode was not corrected. He sticks to the version that Stalin and
Molotov planned a separate Brest-Litovsk type peace treaty with Hitler,...
Sudoplatov,
Pavel. Special Tasks.
For no other period [the Great
Purges of the 1930s] or topic have historians been so eager to write and accept
history-by-anecdote. Grand analytical
generalizations have come from secondhand bits of overheard corridor
gossip. Prison camp stories ("My
friend met Bukharin's wife in a camp and she said...") have become primary
sources on central political decision making.
The need to generalize from isolated and unverified particulars has
transformed rumors into sources and has equated repetition of stories with
confirmation. Indeed, the leading expert
on the Great Purges [Conquest] has written that "truth can thus only
percolate in the form of hearsay" and that “basically the best, though not
infallible, source is rumor." [The
Great Terror, 754]
[Footnote:
Such statements would be astonishing in any other field of history. Of course, historians do not accept hearsay
and rumor as evidence. Conquest goes on
to say that the best way to check rumors is to compare them with one
another. This procedure would be sound
only if rumors were not repeated and if memoirists did not read each other's
works.]
As long as the unexplored classes of
sources include archival and press material, it is neither safe nor necessary
to rely on rumor and anecdote.
Getty,
A. Origins of the Great Purges.
1[Footnote on page 265: The basic
works on the Great Purges are uniformly based on memoir sources. Conquest, Terror, Medvedev, History: and
Solzhenitsyn, the Gulag Archipelago, all rely almost exclusively on personal
accounts.]
Soviet history has no tradition of
responsible source criticism. Scholars
have taken few pains to evaluate bias, authenticity, or authorship. Specialists have accepted "sources"
that, for understandable reasons, are anonymously attributed ("Unpublished
memoir of"), and treat them as primary.2
2[Footnote on Page 265: Much of the
documentation in Medvedev's and Solzhenitsyn's works is of this form, as is
much of the samizdat material. Such
documentation is methodically unacceptable in other fields of history. One would be dubious about a footnote to the
"unpublished memoir of the Duc de" in a work on the French
revolutionary terror.
Getty,
A. Origins of the Great Purges.
Each of the emigre and defector
sources represents a variant on the vast pool of such rumors and stories
[regarding the
Indeed, in the rush to support a
particular scenario, scholars have been strangely selective in their use of
emigre memoirs. They have accepted and
used those that supported their preconceptions and ignored those that did
not. Students have embraced the rumors
and flawed stories of Orlov, Barmine, and Nicolaevsky while ignoring accounts
that call
Getty,
A. Origins of the Great Purges.
One such work, however, was never
published in the
Nearly all Medvedev's work is based
on the post-1956 recollections of surviving party members. Many such reminiscences appeared in the press
in 1956-64, usually in connection with obituaries or anniversaries, and
Medvedev apparently collected such statements and interviews as the basis of
his work. He made virtually no use of
central or local press sources, published material, or contemporary
documentation. However, his introduction
shows that he was familiar with the vast corpus of Western scholarship about
Stalin, and in some places where Old Bolshevik circumstantial testimony is
lacking (Stalin's hand in
Medvedev's is probably the most
useful account of the fates of various people.... Like the previously cited works, however, its
problem is the distance between his sources and central events. Like all the above sources, none of
Medvedev's often anonymous informants was close enough to the center of power
to tell why things were happening or indeed exactly what was happening. Medvedev is able to catalog events better
than other writers, but he is not able to chronicle or analyze
A work that deserves passing mention
because of its current popularity is the Gulag Archipelago by
Solzhenitsyn.... The work is of limited
value to the serious student of the 1930s for it provides no important new
information or original analytical framework.
Many of the linchpins of the Western
interpretation are based almost solely on an uncritical acceptance of rumors
from persons not in a position to know.
This is not to say that these works are worthless lies bearing no
relation to the truth. They are quite
valuable descriptions of personal experiments and should be taken as such. But they are not primary sources that cast
light on central decision making, or even on events of a national scale. Because many of these writers were victims or
opponents, they may have known less about high policy than we do.
One need only scan the footnotes of
any standard account of the Great Purges to see how much of the basic material
of this view comes from the speculations of these contradictory and
self-serving sources, who were in no position to report anything but gossip. Most Western accounts were written during the
post-World War II period, and their authors relied on emigre and defector
accounts for the vital underpinnings of their view. The inaccessibility of Soviet archives on
these events compounded this tendency.
Yet if one applies strict rules of evidence and of source criticism to
these works, accepting only that which the informant can report firsthand,
several aspects of the Western interpretation collapse.
[Footnote: In Conquest's, Terror,
half the notes in the chapters "Stalin Prepares" and "The Kirov
Murder" are to emigre and defector raconteurs who were not close to the
events they describe. Two-thirds of the
references in the chapter "Architect of Terror" are to such secondhand
accounts, which can in no way be tested for an account of the
"architect."]
Although the main weakness of the
sources is their removal from the events they so freely judge, the question of
political bias is also worth considering, as it is in other areas of historical
inquiry. Orlov, Trotsky, the Mensheviks,
and Khrushchev were all self-interested political actors and had little
incentive to produce an objective view....
...a generation of Cold War
attitudes have contributed to what would be considered sloppy and methodically
bankrupt scholarship in any other area of inquiry. Historians of modern
Getty,
A. Origins of the Great Purges.
Joel Carmichael writes:
"One of the principal oddities
throughout this strange interval of hesitation [the period from the end of
August through the end of October 1917] was that since Lenin was in hiding his
place as the most authoritative Bolshevik was occupied by Trotsky, at least as
far as the public was concerned. In
effect this turned a man who had been an implacable opponent of the Bolsheviks
for 15 years into their most authoritative spokesman...."
Such assertions are mistaken; they
fly in the face of generally known facts.
Trotsky's name certainly did appear side-by-side with Lenin's during the
October days, but side-by-side does not mean equal. Even the broad public understood the
different political weight of the two men.
This was no secret to the enemies of the Bolshevik Party either. As for the "consciousness of the
party," there the names of Lenin and Trotsky were not at all equal. The party had only one leader, Lenin, and he
alone was the inspirer and organizer of the October Revolution. It was not accidental that, while praising
Trotsky, Lenin noted that the Mezhraiontsy had "hardly been tested in
proletarian work in the spirit of our party."
Medvedev,
Roy. Let History Judge.
The question of
“The plot of this story may suggest
to the reader that
Pilnyak displayed detailed knowledge
of many circumstances surrounding the operation [for Frunze's stomach ulcer]
and Frunze's death and stated bluntly that the "order" for the
operation came from "Number One, the unbending man," who "headed
the triumvirate".... It is not
surprising that the entire printing of the magazine was quickly
confiscated.... In the next issue of
Novy Mir the editors admitted that publication of Pilnyak's story had been an
"obvious and flagrant mistake."
Antonov-Ovseyenko has no doubt that
"It is probably that Pilnyak
was put up to it by somebody who wanted to strike at Stalin. The remarkable thing is that nothing happened
at the time to Pilnyak or to the editor....
Whether out of contempt for the slander or a calculated restraint, or
both, Stalin chose not to react to a libel which even in a [bourgeois]
democratic society would have provided ample grounds for criminal proceedings
against its author and publisher."
Medvedev,
Roy. Let History Judge.
This was slander, and it is probable
that Pilnyak was put up to it by somebody who wanted to strike at Stalin. The remarkable thing is that nothing
happened at the time to Pilnyak or to the editor. In 1937 [11 years later] they were both
arrested, but on other charges,...
Whether out of contempt for the
slander or a calculated restraint, or both, Stalin chose not to react to a
libel which even in a democratic society would have provided ample grounds for
criminal proceedings against its author and publisher.
Ulam,
Adam. Stalin; The Man and his Era.
The opposition leaders were able to
speak out as late as the autumn of 1927 through 'discussion sheets' which
Pravda carried in preparation for the 15th Party Congress in December, and
Trotsky was able to publish a statement in Pravda as late as August 1927. The boldest attempt of the opposition to use
the open press was the publication in the literary journal The New World of
'The Tale of the Unextinguished Moon' by Boris Pilniak in May 1926. This was a barely disguised version of the
death on 31 October 1926 of Trotsky's successor in the post of narkom of
defense,
McNeal,
Robert, Stalin: Man and Ruler.
It is impossible in the nature of
the case to exculpate Stalin. One might
even speculate that he did not feel able to oust Zinoviev from
McNeal,
Robert, Stalin: Man and Ruler.
(J. Arch Getty)
Frustrating to historians and
journalists, this strange situation has inevitably spawned a heterogeneous
collection of purportedly serious writings on Stalin. In the absence of reliable first-hand
testimony or revealing written evidence, and in their desperation to understand
the man, writers on Stalin and his period have offered the specialized and
general public a diverse but sometimes troubling bill of fare.
Although there have been some
outright forgeries, the more common tradition has been to infer the details of
his personal life and actions. Novelists
(and novelists pretending to be historians) have presented fictitious dialogs
and purported soliloquies by the dictator.
Others have made dubious claims of having known him closely and many
memorists have reported scenes with Stalin that they did not witness. We also now have published collections of
myths about Stalin.
Consider for example the famous
"Letter of an Old Bolshevik."
First published in a Menshevik journal in 1936, the text reports to be
the record of a conversation between Bukharin and Nicolaevsky in
It may well be that some of what
Nicolaevsky & Orlov report is true.
But the dubious origins of the works must cast doubt on their
claims. How does one know what is true
and what is not? Does one accept what
one likes and believes and reject the rest?
In most other fields of historical research, such flimsy tales would be
rejected as sources out of hand. Were we
to do this here, we would discover that we no longer have evidence of
In addition to suspicious memoirs
and pretended letters, there is a large corpus of historical fiction and
fictional history. The problems with
such literary sources have been analyzed in print. They tend toward fictionalization, are
tailored to produce emotional responses, and try to make moral points. Despite apparent similarities between
historical and literary works as texts, they are different genres. Historians conduct research and handle data
differently than do creative writers.
Hypotheses are tested, discrete interpretations are discussed and documented,
and evidence is carefully weighed. For
example, Rybakov's Children of the Arbat, which has played a key role in
anti-Stalin shock work and is even hailed as a historical source, contains
numerous factual errors and flights of literary fancy. Even Volkogonov's more scholarly Triumph and
Tragedy contains invented dialogue between Stalin and his clique.
Unlike historians, literateurs are
generally unconcerned about verifying their sources. Consider two recent examples. First, Shatrov in his play Dal'she, Dal'she,
Dal'she tells the story of Zinoviev and Kamenev being brought from prison to
the Kremlin in order to be persuaded to confess. His account of this alleged event in fact
closely paraphrases the first account of this tale in the spurious Secret
History of Stalin's Crimes, published in the West decades after the event. It is also noteworthy that no evidence to
support this tale was found in the Party Central Committee's recent exhaustive
archival examination and documentary publication on the interrogation and trial
of Zinoviev and Kamenev.
Second, there is the currently
popular story that Lenin's Testament was never discussed at a party congress
and that, if it had been, Stalinism could have been prevented. In fact, the document was considered by the
Party Central Committee shortly after Lenin's death and again in a closed
session at the congress in 1927. At that
time, Pravda published a Stalin speech which included excerpts from it,
including the part in which Lenin criticized Stalin's rudeness and called for
his removal from the post of General Secretary.
It was (like Khrushchev's "Secret Speech" to the 20th party
congress in 1956) not published until recently.
But the congress delegates who heard the Testament consisted of
virtually all key party leaders and even a scattering of common folk from
across the country....
The results of historical
investigations into the Stalin period have in many cases been colored by two
factors inherent in the subject itself.
First, as we have seen, the paucity of reliable and creditable sources
on the man (and even on the basic functioning of the system) has given rise to
a most diverse and free-wheeling literature that often bears weak allegiance to
basic rules of historical investigation.
Secondly, nearly all studies have reflected the moral and political
agendas of the authors. We have
sometimes seen the eclipse of detailed scholarship by didactic preaching and
political advocacy.
Nove,
Alec, Ed. The Stalin Phenomenon.
The tale wags the dog: the critical
use of sources, validity of scientific deduction, and strength of argument--the
traditional measures of scholarly worth--take second place to the perceived
values of the author. Reviewers worry more
about the intentions of the author than about the sources or methodology
involved and scholarship is transformed into a rite of exorcism. As we shall see below, this attitude is as
prevalent in the former
Politically, writing about Stalinism
has meant taking a stance. Alec Nove has
clearly shown how attitudes toward Stalin flow from the political agendas of
the authors. The overarching importance
of the Soviet Union and socialism to twentieth century political history, the
strong communist, anti-Communist, and patriotic passions they have inspired,
and the tendency of revolutions to create camps of winners and losers have
guaranteed a partisan field of study from the beginning.
Nove,
Alec, Ed. The Stalin Phenomenon.
But without the participation of
professional historians, the process of glasnost will remain dangerously
inchoate. Unevaluated and undocumented
rumors, contradictory claims, and false information will continue to cloud the
historical and literary air in the former
Nove,
Alec, Ed. The Stalin Phenomenon.
Although the "shock work"
of publicist is important, it does not generally represent serious historical
research. Professional historians in the
former
Nove,
Alec, Ed. The Stalin Phenomenon.
Finally, I wish I could be as
"crystal clear" about what happened in the 1930s as Sergo Mikoyan is,
but we still have few sources and a lot of work to do.
Nove,
Alec, Ed. The Stalin Phenomenon.
Stories about Stalin have circulated
at least since the 1920s and include aspects of his genealogy (he was said to
be descended from Georgian or Ossetian princes), personal life (secret wives,
amorous ballerinas, and illegitimate children in the Kremlin), and the
circumstances of his youth and death.
Even at this writing, characterizations of Bolshevism as a Jewish
conspiracy are routinely heard even in educated circles in
Given Russian cultural traditions,
there is nothing particularly unusual about such folklore. What should be surprising is that so much of
the oral tradition has found its way into the corpus of scholarly
literature. Secondhand personal memoirs,
gossip, novels, and lurid accounts by defecting spies eager to earn a living in
the West are soberly reviewed in scholarly journals, cited in footnotes, and
recommended to graduate students.
Fictionalized "letters of old Bolsheviks," political histories
with invented Stalin soliloquies, and even dramatic plays are routinely
incorporated into academic treatments in ways that would be laughable in other
national historical studies.
Getty
and Manning. Stalinist Terror.
In other words, Rittersporn is
saying: “Look, I can prove that most of the current ideas about Stalin are
absolutely false.’ But to say this
requires a giant hurdle. If you state,
even timidly, certain undeniable truths about the
Martens,
Ludo. Another View of Stalin.
Most of the new material seems
presented to make two points long accepted in the West: the terror was
widespread and that Stalin had a personal role in it. Virtually all of the latest historical
revelations are aimed at illustrating these points and the documents presented
seem chosen for this in mind.
Getty
and Manning. Stalinist Terror.
(Arch
Getty)
It is easier to reject contradictory
evidence with the deus ex machina [any unconvincing character or event brought
artificially into the plot of a story to settle an involved situation] of
Stalin's supposed cleverness: All twists and turns, hesitations and
contradictions are thus the result of his incredible deviousness, sadism, or calculating
shrewdness. There is really no counter
to such ahistorical assertions, except that they are based on faith: the a
priori presumption of a plan and the belief that anomalies were intentionally
part of it. Such elaborate constructs
are unnecessary to explain events; the simplest explanation with the fewest
assumptions and consistent with the evidence is usually the best.
Getty
and Manning. Stalinist Terror.
(Stephen
Wheatcroft)
Although there is a role for
literary and propagandist works to force a process of rethinking upon closed
minds, there is also a need for serious historical work to produce an
unemotional and accurate portrayal of reality.
So far we have seen relatively few serious historical works on this
subject. Such work will require more
than literary creativity; you'll need a professional, objective evaluation of
evidence which until recently has not been available for examination.
Getty
and Manning. Stalinist Terror.
I heard, when I was still in the
Alliluyeva,
Svetlana. Only One Year.
We have been considering Stalin's
psychological attitudes.
Conquest,
Robert. Stalin: Breaker of Nations.
[Footnote:] Trotsky suggests that
Stalin may have poisoned Lenin. But this
is no more than a vague surmise, as Trotsky himself states; and it sounds
unreal in view of the fact that Trotsky never leveled that charge, or even
hinted at it, during the many years of his struggle against Stalin up to
1939-40, when he raised it for the first time.
Apparently, Trotsky projected the experience of the great purges of the
late 30s back to 1924. Yet such a projection
contradicts Trotsky's own characterization of Stalin. “If Stalin could have foreseen”, says
Trotsky, “at the very beginning where his fight against Trotskyism would lead,
he undoubtedly would have stopped short, in spite of the prospect of victory
over all his opponents. But he did not
foresee anything”. Thus even after he
had charged Stalin with poisoning Lenin, Trotsky still treated the Stalin of
1924 as an essentially honest but short-sighted man, a characterization that
can hardly be squared with the accusation.
There is also the fact that Stalin did not dispose of Trotsky himself in
a similar manner, while the latter was in
Deutscher,
Isaac. Stalin; A Political Biography.
Trotsky, relating the foregoing
[accusing Stalin of giving him the wrong date for Lenin's funeral], added,
"Stalin... might have feared that I would connect Lenin's death with last
year's conversation about poison...and demand a special autopsy. It was, therefore, safer to keep me away
until after the body had been embalmed, the viscera cremated and a post mortem
inspired by such suspicions no longer feasible." But if Trotsky thought that at the time, he could
have called for a post mortem from
Bazhanov,
Boris. Bazhanov and the Damnation of Stalin.
In the intrigues following Lenin's
death, he [Trotsky] was by no means straightforward, but at once "devious
and faint-hearted," and his own account is "pathetic in its
half-truths and attempts to gloss over the facts." [from The Bolsheviks by
Adam Ulam, NY, 1965, pp. 573-575]... But
Trotsky had never failed in his duty to suppress or misrepresent facts in the
interests of politics. And his general
reliability on the period in question could have been considered in the light
of his accusation that Stalin poisoned Lenin.
There is no evidence whatever that this is true, and Trotsky himself
only brought it up many years later--in 1939....
Conquest,
Robert. The Great Terror.
...a few Western Sovietologists
began to assert that the Terror had claimed far fewer victims, and that
ordinary life was not affected. The
writer of a Western Sovietological textbook concerned to reduce the estimates
to, as he put it, a few hundred thousand or even a few tens of thousands,
wrote, "Surely we don't want to hypothesize 3 million executions or prison
deaths in 1937-1938 or anything like this figure, or we are assuming most improbable
percentages of men dying." The key
word here is "improbable." The
Stalin epoch is replete with what appear as improbabilities to minds unfitted
to deal with the phenomena. Similarly
the argument that Stalin could not have killed millions of peasants, since that
would have been "economically counterproductive." Following such leads, a new group of
Westerners came forward, with singularly bad timing, in the mid-1980s and told
us (in the words of one of them) that the terror had only killed
"thousands" and imprisoned "many thousands." Such views could only be formed by ignoring
or actively rejecting, the earlier evidence [WHAT EARLIER EVIDENCE]. This was accomplished by saying that those
who produced it were opposed to Stalin and Stalinism, and therefore prejudiced,
and that some of the material was secondhand.
Thus it was not merely a matter of mistaken assessment of the
evidence. It was, contrary to the duties
of a historian, a refusal to face it.
Conquest,
Robert. The Great Terror.
With any of these authors [Western
Sovietologists and Russian dissidents], it is not difficult to find many
factual errors, in exact formulations, juggling of facts, and outright
distortions. This can be explained on
the whole by two reasons. The first is
the limited nature of the historical sources which these authors had at their
disposal. Thus, the basic research for
Conquest's The Great Terror consists of an analysis of Soviet newspapers and
other official publications, to which are added references to the memoir
accounts of several people who managed to escape from the
... Solzhenitsyn's book, Gulag
Archipelago, contains no references whatsoever to Trotsky's works. Solzhenitsyn's work, much like the more
objective works of Medvedev, belongs to the genre which the West calls "oral
history," i.e., research which is based almost exclusively on eyewitness
[actually secondhand--me] accounts of participants in the events being
described. Moreover, using the
circumstance that the memoirs from prisoners in Stalin's camps which had been
given to him to read had never been published, Solzhenitsyn took plenty of
license in outlining their contents and interpreting them.
Rogovin,
Vadim. 1937: Year of Terror.
However, very soon it became clear that
the themes of the Great Terror and Stalinism were being used by many authors
and organs of the press in order to compromise or discredit the idea of
socialism. This anti-communist and
anti-Bolshevik approach had largely been prepared by the activity of Western
Sovietologists and Soviet dissidents from the 1960s through the 1980s, who had
put into circulation a whole number of historical myths.
Rogovin,
Vadim. 1937: Year of Terror.
Bourgeois historiography, despite
its superficial objectivity and respectability, is politicized and
tendentious.... This becomes abundantly
clear upon reading the most substantive work devoted to the history of the
great purge, Robert Conquest's book The Great Terror. Without touching on the numerous other
mistakes and juggling of facts which we have found in this work, let us stop to
examine the contents of the three pages (and no more) which the author felt
were sufficient to illustrate Trotsky's views and activities. On these pages, Conquest managed to present
no less than ten theses which remain unsupported by citations or by any other
evidence, and which do not withstand criticism if they are juxtaposed with
actual historical facts. Let us name
several of these theses, after arranging them, so to speak, according to the
chronological framework of the falsifications.
FROM
HERE ON I AGREE WITH CONQUEST AND DISAGREE WITH THE TROT ROGIVIN
1.
Trotsky "firmly crushed the democratic opposition within the
party."
2.
Trotsky was a "leading figure among the 'Leftist' Old Bolsheviks,
that is, those doctrinaires who could not agree with Lenin's concessions to the
peasantry. These people, and Trotsky in
particular, preferred a more rigorous regime even before Stalin began to carry
out such a line."
3.
Trotsky "never expressed a word of sympathy for the deaths of
millions during collectivization."
4.
"Even in exile during the 1930s, Trotsky was not by any means a
forthright revolutionary out to destroy a tyranny."
5.
Trotsky did not oppose Stalin ideologically, nor did he expose him as
the gravedigger of the revolution, but "simply quarreled with Stalin about
which 'phase' of evolution toward socialism had been attained" in the
6.
Trotsky "stood, in fact, not for the destruction of the Stalinist
system, but for its takeover and patching up by an alternative group of
leaders."
7.
Trotsky's political judgment was "unbelievably inept."
8.
Trotsky's influence in the
9.
All these points are logically crowned with "an alternative
prognosis" or "a prognosis aided by hindsight": if Trotsky had
come to power, then he would have ruled only "less ruthlessly or, to be
more precise, less crudely, than Stalin."...
In turn, Conquest did not think up
the argument cited above, which bear the stamp of lightweight journalistic
escapades. Rather he copied them from
the works of anti-communist ideologues of the 1930s.
Rogovin,
Vadim. 1937: Year of Terror.
But in 1950 a book appeared by the
French journalist Delbar, The Real Stalin.
I didn't know Delbar, but I recalled that he'd collaborated with
Bessedovsky. I was interested and read
the book. It was full of lies and inventions. I realized at once that it was Bessedovsky's
work. Things I'd told him earlier about
Stalin and other Party leaders figured in the book, but completely distorted,
full of lies, and in effect an insult to the reader. In addition there was frequent mention that
such and such a detail (usually false or invented) had been given to the author
by a former member of Stalin's secretariat.
This cast a shadow on me, since there were no other former members of
Stalin's secretariat in exile. Reading
the book, a specialist in Soviet affairs could be led to believe I was the
source of Bessedovsky's documents.
I requested an explanation. He didn't deny having written it all and
having mocked his readers. When I
threatened to denounce his fabrications in the press, he replied that the book
was signed by Delbar, and Bessedovsky was not officially involved: if I
attacked him, I could be charged with defamation.
Bazhanov,
Boris. Bazhanov and the Damnation of Stalin.
[At the 28th Party Congress in the
summer of 1990] I was a candidate for the program commission of that Congress,
but I was voted out by the orthodox Bolsheviks.
Volkogonov,
Dmitrii. Autopsy for an Empire.
I first met Yeltsin in 1989, and had
many private conversations with him.
After I was sacked from the Main Political Administration and, in June
1991, from the
Volkogonov,
Dmitrii. Autopsy for an Empire.
Not everything written in the
Laqueur,
Walter. Stalin: The Glasnost Revelations.
According to the new mythology that
made its appearance under glasnost, much of the blame for the terror, the show
trials, and the purges has to go to Trotsky because he called for the physical
elimination of Stalin. Thus, Volkogonov:
Trotsky's book The Revolution Betrayed, which was handed to Stalin in early 1937,
was one of the last straws that broke the camel's back. An earlier version of this farfetched theory
can be found in Roy Medvedev's Let History Judge, published in the
What should one make of assertions
of this kind? To begin with, the
chronology does not fit. The first
copies of The Revolution Betrayed appeared in May 1937, and even if the NKVD
had worked day and night translating the book, they could not possibly have
handed it to Stalin in 1936 at the time of the first trials. Indeed, in an earlier publication, Volkogonov
had written that Stalin had received the translated manuscript only in late
1937.
We do not know what made him change
the chronology; but whatever the reason, Trotsky's book could not possibly had
driven Stalin to his "desperate decision."
Laqueur,
Walter. Stalin: The Glasnost Revelations.
Biographers of Stalin, Trotsky, and
other political leaders are frequently tempted to engage in descriptions and
explanations beyond what the evidence will bear out. Doing so is sometimes inevitable in view of
the lack of evidence, and a good case can be made for informed guesses, as long
as they are not presented as fact and certitude.
Laqueur,
Walter. Stalin: The Glasnost Revelations.
Stalin might have said in a small
circle that it had been a mistake to let Trotsky go in 1929 in the first place,
even though there is no evidence to this effect.
But even now, after all the
revelations, we cannot possibly know what Stalin thought when he read Trotsky's
books or articles or when he received reports about Trotsky's activities in
exile, for there is no evidence.
... If Stalin really believed that
Trotsky was a deadly threat, there would have been a change in his behavior
once Trotsky had been killed. But that
did not transpire; Stalin's behavior in 1950 was essentially the same as it had
been in the 1930s.
Laqueur,
Walter. Stalin: The Glasnost Revelations.
We owe the revelations under
glasnost about the arrests, interrogations, and the executions to a small
number of indefatigable investigators....
Like Solzhenitsyn, they [Medvedev and Antonov-Ovseenko] relied almost
entirely on oral history, that is, the recollections of prominent and not so
prominent survivors.
The greatest single quantitative
contribution to our knowledge was made, however, by a student in his 20s,
Dmitri Yurasov.... At the age of 16 (in
1981), he installed himself in the state archives as a "palaeographer,
second rank."
Laqueur,
Walter. Stalin: The Glasnost Revelations.
A retired
Shekhovtsov was a member of the
legal profession, and as far as he was concerned, only documents counted; all
the rest was hearsay.
Laqueur,
Walter. Stalin: The Glasnost Revelations.
Is it possible that this Volkogonov
did not know or hear about this speech [complementing Stalin] by
Churchill? It would really be
strange. But his main task was to heap
abuse and calumny on Stalin and thus on the
Rybin,
Aleksei. Next to Stalin: Notes of a Bodyguard.
Those who now accuse Stalin of this and
that, absolutely did not know him, did not see him personally--only saw him in
photographs or in films, or they read about him from writers who also never saw
him or met him, and wrote as they liked, made of him a person who was nowhere
recognizable by people like me.
Rybin,
Aleksei. Next to Stalin: Notes of a Bodyguard.
But today, numerous books are
written about this--all historical facts are turned topsy turvy, inside out and
upside down. They describe him
[Bukharin] as the theoretician of the party.
Khrushchev, Gorbachev, and Yeltsin all rehabilitated these enemies.
Rybin,
Aleksei. Next to Stalin: Notes of a Bodyguard.
In the last 30 years in the press,
there were hundreds of articles and many versions of attempts on Stalin's
life. These so-called "truths"
are nothing but fairy tales. I and my
comrades who were the bodyguards of Stalin know what happened and this will be
history.
Rybin,
Aleksei. Next to Stalin: Notes of a Bodyguard.
After the liquidation of the
assassins 'corps,' Trotsky then did not constitute any danger to Stalin or the
Soviet Government. But today's press is
full of all versions as to the assassination plots against Stalin. For example, "Pravda" (whose
current owner is a Greek millionaire), writes that Kavtaradze tried to place a
bomb in the Bolshoi Theatre where Stalin was sitting in the theater box. I was then the commandant of Bolshoi Theatre
security and there was absolutely no such attempt. Not Rakov, or Tukov, or Krutashev [Stalin's
bodyguards] ever heard of such an attempt.
The newspaper
"Niedelia-Sunday," in an article about Beria, wrote that in the
Rybin,
Aleksei. Next to Stalin: Notes of a Bodyguard.
The novel by Rybakov, "Children
of the Arbat," stated that Stalin was afraid of people. That is why Rybakov states when Stalin was
walking on the Arbat, the security closed all the entrances to the street. This is stupid and impossible to
accomplish! It is physically impossible
to close all the entrances since these are thoroughfares. Stalin's car never exceeded 30 kilometers an
hour and often, went as slow as 10 kilometers an hour. Stalin was never afraid of people or of the
dark, as I have already written.
Rybin,
Aleksei. Next to Stalin: Notes of a Bodyguard.
The following point is more
serious. The modern "democratic
journalists" have a field day with the personal life of Stalin, thinking
up all sorts of stories, innuendos, and absolute falsifications.
The "Komsomolskaya Pravda"
newspaper... basing itself on the dossier of J. Edgar Hoover, chief of the FBI in
the USA, printed the item that on Oct. 17, 1938, in Lvov, there took place a
meeting of Stalin and Hitler. At that
time, I was head of the group that traveled with Stalin in
Rybin,
Aleksei. Next to Stalin: Notes of a Bodyguard.
The magazine "Ogonyok"
printed fragments from the book of Alexander Orlov "Secret History of
Stalin's Crimes." Who is this
Alexander Orlov? This is Lev Feldbin,
twice in Lubyanka jail. He came from the
He was never close to Stalin. He only met some of the heads of the OGPU
such as Commissar Pauker. He is simply a
complete liar. Is it at all possible for
him to see Stalin meeting Hitler, while we, his personal bodyguards, were
sleeping? Stalin never carried any
pistols. He always wore his army
clothes, plain and simple with no braids or medals or other decorations.
Feldbin states that a bodyguard of
Stalin, Evdokimov, was a Trotskyite.
This is an outright fabrication!
From 1930, the personal guards of Stalin were Vlasik, Rumyantsev, and
Bogdanov. Regarding Evdokimov, he was
only a secretary in the North Caucasus Party demanding of Stalin that he give
him permission to arrest Sholokhov.
Stalin put him in his place.
This same Feldman writes that Stalin
asked Pauker to gather for him pornographic photographs. We, his personal guards, living with him 24
hours a day, never ever saw any such trash.
In his study, the only photographs that were seen were of Bedny,
Sholokov, Gorky, and Mayakovsky. The
other walls were practically bare. He
lived very modestly.
This Feldbin states that on the road
to his Dacha, Stalin had commanded that all house-cottages on the route be
demolished. Anyone who knows the
reconstruction of
"Stalin was guarded at his
Dacha by over 1200 guards"! This is
so ridiculous that anyone with a single brain cell would know that it's a lie.
I cannot continue to list the lies
by this enemy, Feldbin.
Now, to touch upon the "new
sensation" that Stalin always had a "double." The newspapers "Evening Donetsk"
and "Crimean Pravda" went wild with the sensation that Stalin had a
double--Evsei Liubitsky. After that,
"Pravda" continued to spread this lie. Why was it necessary for these newspapers to
spread such terrible lies? I do not
understand. The Chief Editor of these
newspapers, before printing such trash, should have looked into the archives of
the Central Committee ACP[B], interview former members of the Central Committee
CPSU.. But that was not in the interest
of the newspaper "Pravda" as we mentioned before, now owned by a
foreign millionaire.
My colleagues and I, being with
Stalin practically 24 hours a day, years on end, surely, we would have noticed
something if there really was a "double Stalin"!
For a "Stalin's double" to
be in existence, you would need to have another auto, the exact kind Stalin
rode in, the same chauffeur, the same bodyguards, the same timetable, the same
conference materials, the same answers, and the same mannerisms! This is absolute rubbish!
Or how could you fool the top actors
of the Bolshoi Theatre, like Reizen, Lisitsian, Golovanov, Samosud, or Barsov
who would have immediately noticed a double, since they were in constant
contacts and meetings with Stalin?
Here are the statements of
bodyguards such as Starostin who stated: "Stalin never had a double. Never did I, through 1937-1953, ever see any
'double' or anyone that I did not recognize.
I was with Stalin every day going to and from the Kremlin, his Dacha,
Government's Dacha in the
The same was stated by another
bodyguard, Orlov.
Stalin looked after himself, never
asked anyone to shave him and dressed himself and did all the other necessary
things that a person does when performing his day to day work. After the death of
During the Great Patriotic War,
Marshal Zhukov was his constant adviser, whom he respected very highly for his
bravery, honesty, and forthright nature.
He had members of the Politburo to consult with, he did not have to have
any "special consultants" since Stalin was a genius in tactics and
had a phenomenal memory.... He was
always rational, did not use words that had no meaning or reason to be
said. He could be very funny, but never
liked "yes men" and people with no thoughts of their own.
When discussing things with me,
Stalin would think a moment and say: "Maybe you are correct. I'll think about it."
The nurse living in the nearest
dacha, Valentina Istomina, former Commandant of the guards, Semenov, Captain of
the first echelon of bodyguards, Krutashev--they all state that there was
absolutely no truth to these lies that enemies of the
If the late Goebbels would now hear
all these tales and lies, he would turn over in his grave from envy! He, throughout the war, was not able to come
up with such a fantastic tale. But
history will surely sweep all the dirt off the grave of Stalin.
Rybin,
Aleksei. Next to Stalin: Notes of a Bodyguard.
As is known, Khrushchev, at the 20th
Congress, from the tribunal, stated that Stalin was always sitting, scared, in
his iron cage. Since that time, the
doors of lies have been blown open along with all sorts of fantasies that have
been heaped up and said about Stalin.
There is even a version that the Dacha where he worked, had iron bars on
the windows, bullet-proof glass--a virtual castle.
There is also a version now that
Stalin secluded himself in his fortress, that members of the Politburo decided
by themselves that they would have to use flame throwers in order to get Stalin
out of there! That they finally got
inside this fortress and found Stalin dead!
I again repeat, there were no iron
doors, double doors, all doors were made of wood, his doors were never closed,
since he wanted fresh air and needed this circulation of air to help him
breathe better. When they had to be
locked, the keys were always in the hands of the Commandant of security of the
Dacha. There were no other keys, no
secret doors, no iron doors or other hiding places, as the present falsifiers
try to invent today.
I again and again strongly state
this, since Khrushchev tells the world things that he absolutely has no idea
about, no way of proving these accusations and outright falsehoods. Khrushchev said: "I was an eyewitness
when Stalin went into the toilet where there were no doors and after that, he
came out in order to berate his bodyguard about how he was guarding him, his
place was to be near him all the time, etc., etc.!
This is absolutely absurd that we,
his bodyguards, would be requested by Stalin to go right into the toilet to be
with him while he was sitting on the toilet!
That Stalin would be afraid to go into the toilet himself--these are
thoughts of the very sick mind!
This is absolutely the thought of a
sick mind--yes, of Khrushchev's very sick mind!
Rybin,
Aleksei. Next to Stalin: Notes of a Bodyguard.
Let us be truthful, at last!
This was the task that I placed
before myself when I started to write this book. I did not embellish anything, did not try to
color anything--I tried to tell the absolute truth about Stalin, with whom I
was for more than 25 years.
You can judge for yourself the
humility of Stalin and the opportunism, lies, sensationalism, and traitorous
acts of the present "democrats" and former "Bolsheviks" who
now write and write and still cannot dislodge the genius of Stalin, even after
43 years of trying.
This is why we, people who spent the
best years of our lives working together with Stalin, write and struggle
against the so-called "learned" who are trying to settle old scores
or, if that is not possible, of trying to rewrite history irrespective of the
time that was, or write according to the present weather that is blowing an ill
wind. That is why we, together, are
demonstrating and fighting against those who believe the thought-up
sensationalism.
Dear readers, please, be vigilant!
Rybin,
Aleksei. Next to Stalin: Notes of a Bodyguard.
In further discussion of the way that
the plans for 1942 came to be formulated, Blumentritt [Chief of the German
General Staff on the Western Front and Rundstedt's assistant] made some general
observations that are worth inclusion as a sidelight. "My experience on the higher staffs
showed me that the vital issues of war tended to be decided by political rather
than by a strategical factors, and by mental tussles in the rear rather than by
the fighting on the battlefield.
Moreover, those tussles are not reflected in the operation orders. Documents are no safe guide for history--the
men who sign orders often think quite differently from what they put on
paper. It would be foolish to take
documents that historians find in the archives as a reliable indication of what
particular officers really thought.
Hart,
Liddell. The German Generals Talk.
While the average person might
understandably despair at this confusing tangle of documenting evidence, one
justifiably expects historians to verify and authenticate source material.
Tottle,
Douglas. Fraud, Famine, and Fascism.
American historian Arch Getty has
observed that for no other period or subject, except the study of the
"Grand analytical
generalizations have come from second-hand bits of overheard corridor
gossip. Prison camp stories ("My
friend met Bukharin's wife in a camp and she said...") have become primary
sources on (Soviet) central political decision-making...the need to generalize
from isolated and unverified particulars has transformed rumors into sources
and has equated repetition of stories with confirmation."
Tottle,
Douglas. Fraud, Famine, and Fascism.
It is a revealing characteristic of
Conquest's methodology pertaining to the
Having baptized hearsay and rumor
into the realm of historical evidence in The Great Terror (the subject of
Getty's criticism), Conquest proceeds to bestow upon them the rights of
confirmation in Harvest of Sorrow.
Tottle,
Douglas. Fraud, Famine, and Fascism.
A vast lot of nonsense has been
written about the GPU.
Gunther,
John. Inside Europe.
Written stories, biographies of people
who were close to Stalin in his last days, do not agree with each other.
Lucas
and Ukas. Trans. and Ed. Secret Documents.
Ligachev, a conservative figure in
the Politburo until his forced retirement in 1990, told me ruefully that when
history was taken out of the hands of the Communist Party, when scholars,
journalists, and witnesses began publishing and broadcasting their own version
of the past, "it created a gloomy atmosphere in the country. It affected the emotions of the people, their
mood, their work efficiency. From
morning to night, everything negative from the past is being dumped on
them. Patriotic topics have been squeezed
out, shunted aside. People are longing
for something positive, something shining, and yet our own cultural figures
have published more lies and anti-Soviet things than our Western enemies ever
did in the last 70 years combined."
Remnick,
David. Lenin's Tomb.
Afanasyev was determined to use his
new post to help open up the study of the Soviet past. Exploiting his new access to at least some
Party archives, he reviewed the letters of Olga Shatunovskaya, a woman who had
been a member of the Communist Party Control Committee under Khrushchev. In those letters Shatunovskaya wrote that she
had collected 64 folders of documents saying that according to KGB and Party
data, between January 1935 and 1941 19,800,000 people have been arrested; and
of these, 7 million were executed in prisons.
Her statement was supported by specific data describing how many were
shot and where and when. But the files
Shatunovskaya described were declared "missing."
Remnick,
David. Lenin's Tomb.
He [
Overy,
R. J. Russia's War: Blood Upon the Snow.
Extravagant invention of all kinds
can be found in the essay "Flight Out Of the Night" by the
76-year-old Boris Bazhanov.... At
present Bazhanov is working on a new book, and from the extracts that have
already been published fact seems to be combined with fiction in and extremely
whimsical manner.
Medvedev,
Roy. On Stalin and Stalinism.
Towards the end of his [Volkogonov]
life, seriously ill but possessing full access to the archives, Volkogonov was
hastening to complete biographies of all seven Soviet leaders from Lenin to
Gorbachev. However, his outlook had
shifted considerably, and he was now mainly concentrating on the exposure of
negative material, without aspiring to objectivity or analysis.
Medvedev,
Roy & Zhores Medvedev. The Unknown Stalin.
A more detailed, although one-sided,
negative biography of Stalin has been attempted by the well-known Soviet
playwright Edward Radzinsky.... In
short, the book does not contain any fundamentally new material.
Medvedev,
Roy & Zhores Medvedev. The Unknown Stalin.
But some former prisoners began to
write memoirs or works of fiction about the camps and the repressions. The first were Solzhenitsyn in
Medvedev,
Roy & Zhores Medvedev. The Unknown Stalin.
According to the historian
Antonov-Ovseenko, author of, Stalin and his Time, Stalin was coarse and cynical
about his mother and gave orders for her to be constantly watched, assigning
that task to two trusted female communists.
Although he refers to the testimony of several Georgian Bolsheviks and
their relatives, this is nevertheless a perfect example of pure invention.
Medvedev,
Roy & Zhores Medvedev. The Unknown Stalin.
The vast majority of books on
Werth,
Alexander.
... he [Stalin] continually revised
the basic elements of the "plot" until he found the right combination
of elements to suit his political needs.
[Look who's talking]
Naumov
and Brent. Stalin's Last Crime.
Vaksberg has written that the trial
of the doctors was planned for March 1953.....
Like Sheinis, Vaksberg has produced no evidence to support the date of
the trial, the reported barracks in Birobizhan, or the alleged reallocation of
railroad facilities around
Naumov
and Brent. Stalin's Last Crime.
No one knows exactly how Stalin
died....
In this vacuum of information and
consistency rumors and myths have abounded for the last 50 years.
Naumov
and Brent. Stalin's Last Crime.
Americans have been subjected to
widespread propaganda, both red and white.
On no subject in the world has this been so prolific as about communism
and the
Davis,
Jerome. The New Russia.
It is difficult to escape the
impression that close reading and in some cases the taking account of easily
available sources do not necessarily characterize the researches of authors who
present the "traditional" version....
This
is the "secret report" presented by Khrushchev at the 20th Congress
of the CPSU, which has been widely drawn on in the literature. And yet the possibility has never been taken
seriously into account that its contents might have more to do with the
political issues at the time it was compiled and the tactical objectives of its
authors, rather than the realities of Soviet history....
All the indications are that it was
based on rumors which were current in the
It would certainly be na•ve to imagine
that even the most attentive reading of original source material could bring to
light everything that happened during that troubled period of Soviet history,
when the most important events took place far from the public eye. But it would be equally alien to the
professional ethic of historians to refrain from examining the available
documents and to rely only on those witnesses that are the most accessible, and
the most likely to confirm one preconception or another. For instance we shall see how much precious
information can be gleaned from the documentation of the February-March 1937
Plenary Session of the Central Committee and from analyzing how and when it was
published. That being the case, nothing
can justify the author of the lengthiest work on the "Great Purge",
which is based mainly on sources like the "secret report" and
emigres' memoirs, for only quoting the testimony of a Soviet refugee. All the more so when the refugee was not present
at the crucial session and the tale he relates is one he heard in a
concentration camp in 1940 from another detainee who was not there either but
had been told about it at the time....
True, it would be unfair to claim
that earlier writers have completely failed to analyze original sources. But it must be noted that when they have done
so they have become engrossed in the intentions of the leaders of the
Party-State and their supposed prime mover, uncertain and at times downright
unfathomable though these may be. So much
so that their tendency to seek irrefutable proof for these intentions has
brought them close to arbitrariness and tendentiousness in their choice and
interpretation of the documents. Thus
for example one of the favorite sources for historians: a decree in March 1935
forbidding the possession of knives and other edged weapons, which is
frequently presented as a harbinger of the intensification of the terror. The authors seem unaware that other measures
were being taken at about the same period to combat brigandage, armed attacks,
brawls and “hooliganism," phenomena which were all apparently on the
increase at the time. Nor do they ever
point out that the decree in question gave exemption from the ban to ethnic
groups whose traditional livelihood or national costume entailed the carrying
of knives. Furthermore one should add
that another decree, only a few months afterwards, made it easier for private
citizens to acquire small caliber weapons which could be bought without special
license until February 1938....
The need to take into account the
historical and documentary context of the sources quotes does not seem to be a
strong point with some writers....
Although very keen to track down
documents with which to demonstrate the escalation of terror and Stalin's
murderous schemes, the authors of the "traditional" version are far
less ready to take account of sources which do not tend to support their
theses. However, when they do do so, the
conclusions they draw reveal very clearly the preconceptions that govern their
approach....
In fact it is this burying of heads
in the sand which is largely responsible for the tendentious quotation of
source material and the ease with which authors have brought practically
everything back to one single cause: Stalin.
After all there's nothing easier than to attribute to him the design of
virtually everything that happened over 20 years in a country covering a sixth
of the earth's land-mass and home to 100 different ethnic groups. All one has to do is to set aside any
possibility of a thorough examination of the social, political, and
institutional context within which the regime operated and concentrate solely
on the putative prime mover, refusing to touch the quite abundant material
which would enable one to see the inner workings of the system.
This style of approach, instead of
casting light on the origins, nature, and consequences of historical phenomena
in all their complex variety, tends rather to put forward one-dimensional
interpretations and over-simplified explanations which even at best have no more
than a superficial documentary basis. At
the same time it raises hypotheses which are really unverified, and at times
frankly unverifiable, to the status of articles of faith. Thus, for example, the victims in high office
who were dismissed and cruelly punished during this period: authors never tire
of listing them at length and concluding from the mere fact of their fall that
Stalin's murderous machinations were at work, without showing the slightest
interest in what the people in question were doing, how the organizations they
controlled were being run, or what disagreements they might have had with their
superiors, colleagues, or subordinates....
This same very simplistic logic is
in many ways what perpetuates the idea that almost all the old guard of
Bolsheviks were exterminated during the "Great Purge," an allegation
which is hardly borne out by the statistical facts. Certainly, since a large number of the
victims of these turbulent years were officials of the Party and the state,
they inevitably included a good many of the old elite who formed the backbone
of the apparatus. But we should be aware
that of the 24,000 party members in 1917 and the 430,000 or so militants at the
beginning of 1920, there only remained 8000 and 135,000 respectively by 1927;
this is but a small minority of the total membership which was estimated at
over 1,200,000 by 1927 and at over 2,700,000 in 1934.... Out of more than
700,000 Party activists at the end of the Civil War there remained about
180,000 by 1934 and 125,000 at the beginning of 1939.
It therefore becomes somewhat
difficult to state that the old guard of the Party had been reduced to naught,
or that they were even the principal victims of the tumultuous events of
1934-1938,... As for the number of expulsions from the Party, it has been known
for more than 20 years that this stood at nearly 279,000 in 1937-38 at the
height of the "Great Purge."
In 1933, however, more than 854,000 activists had been expelled, over
342,000 in 1934 and nearly 282,000 in 1935; these figures are all higher than
in the years of the "Great Terror."
...Essentially he [Conquest] bases
this on the memoirs of ex-prisoners who assert that between 4 and 5.5% of the
Soviet population were incarcerated or deported during those years.
It seems improbable that men who are
inside penal institutions would be able to form any exact idea either of the
proportion of the population which is still at liberty or the numbers recently
arrived in all the other camps and prisons, which they are not personally
familiar with even though they had come to know a few by being moved around.
Rittersporn,
Gabor. Stalinist Simplifications and Soviet Complications, 1933-1953.
In fact there is scarcely one of the
writers of memoirs who can report from first-hand knowledge of affairs in the
higher ranks of the Party-State, and yet it is these accounts that historians
of the
Rittersporn,
Gabor. Stalinist Simplifications and Soviet Complications, 1933-1953.
In fact even the most cursory
reading of the "classic" [anti-Stalin] works makes it hard to avoid
the impression that in many respects these are often inspired more by the state
of mind prevailing in some circles in the West, than by the reality of Soviet life
under Stalin.
Rittersporn,
Gabor. Stalinist Simplifications and Soviet Complications, 1933-1953.
(Solzhenitsyn’s
lies)
We may gain some idea of
Solzhenitsyn’s approach by checking how he uses some of the documents he refers
to. He quotes for instance a decree from
the Central Executive Committee and the Council of People's Commissars on 7
April 1935 which, he says, "made children criminally responsible for any
crime from the age of 12." It is
interesting to note that he is not alone in giving an erroneous interpretation
of this law, and that others too have been led to believe that it allowed
children to be found guilty of political crimes; this was the general view of
writers on the subject even before The
Gulag Archipelago was published. A
mere glance at the text in question, however, reveals that the power ofinvoking
"all penal sanctions" related only to children guilty of "theft,
violence, bodily harm, mutilation, murder, and attempted murder."
Solzhenitsyn is scarcely any more
rigorous when he writes that the amnesty on 7 July 1945 freed "all those
who had burgled apartments, stolen the clothes of passers-by, raped girls,
corrupted minors, given consumers short weight, played the hoodlum, disfigured
the defenseless, plundered forests and waters, committed bigamy, practiced
extortion and blackmail, taken bribes, swindled, slandered, filed false enunciations...pimped or forced women into
prostitution, whose carelessness or ignorance resulted in the loss of human
life."... Apart from the fact that
the amnesty decree expressly ruled out anyone who had been "convicted on
more than one occasion of embezzlement, theft, robbery and
hooliganism"
and all those guilty of "counter-revolutionary" crimes, appropriation
of public property, organized crime, premeditated murder and armed robbery, in
most of the cases listed by the author the clauses cited laid down penalties of
more than three years imprisonment,... Similarly the terms of the amnesty of 27
March 1953, which according to Solzhenitsyn "submerged the whole country
in a wave of murderers, bandits and thieves," actually did not permit the
immediate release of the majority of thieves, and forbade that of almost all
gangsters and murderers....
Solzhenitsyn is notorious for not
liking thieves. It is no doubt this
dislike which leads to his indignation at the pardon granted to those who
plundered forests--mostly peasants who in certain circumstances could be sentenced
to 10 years or more. This attitude also
leads him to say that the penalty for stealing private property was not severe
enough, when the minimum sentence from 1947 onwards was five years hard
labor. He habitually contrasts political
prisoners with common criminals to the point where he is prepared to state
that, whereas the aggravating circumstance of having formed a
"counter-revolutionary organization" was often used against
"politicals," there were no special penalties for offenses committed
by groups of common criminals. This view
does not bear comparison with the penal code.
One might dwell at length on the
inaccuracies discernible in Solzhenitsyn's work, many of which concern the fate
of the leading actors in his Gulag. Thus
for instance, the writer is unjust in accusing generals Egorov and Turovskii of
being among the judges of the leaders of the Red Army at the famous secret
trial in June 1937; their names do not appear on the list of tribunal members
published at the time. But he is even
more unjust when he makes people disappear in captivity and we find that,
arrested though they may have been and sent to a prison camp, they sometimes
did not stay there long. Thus he cites
the arrest of Kuskova, Prokopovich and Kishkin, members of a famine relief
committee in 1921. However, he omits to
say that Kuskova and Prokopovich were expelled from the country in 1922 and
Kishkin, who had already been tried on charges of conspiracy in 1919 and
subsequently pardoned, benefited from a further amnesty and worked from 1923
until his death in the Commissariat of Health of the
Our author [Solzhenitsyn] is equally
mistaken in asserting that the biologist Lorkh was "dispatched" to
Elsewhere Solzhenitsyn talks of five
historians arrested in 1929. Now the biographies
of four of them are known, and we find that three of them had been exiled to
work in far-away provincial institutions and the two others were free during
most of the 1930s. One of the latter,
Gote, was elected to the
...But we should not forget that all
the while attaching little importance to faithfulness to source documents where
Solzhenitsyn asserts he has consulted them--or else where he could have done
so--the heart of his narrative is based on the evidence, often oral, of 227
people. Now it is by no means certain
that he was more meticulous in checking them than he was in reading easily available
material....
Obviously it is difficult to check
the accuracy of the eye-witness accounts from which Solzhenitsyn draws so many
details and conclusions.
It would be clearly unfair to jump
to the conclusion that the whole Gulag Archipelago is merely a collection of
legends arising from the bitter reality of a national tragedy, and from the
collective struggle to resist ruthless efforts to suppress its memory by the
very instigators of this catastrophe.
But it would be difficult to avoid the impression that Solzhenitsyn's
work is by no means an historical source unarguably exact in its every detail,
but rather a mixture--and often an inextricable one--of indisputable facts and
of their trace, sometimes very imprecise or distorted, preserved by a collective
memory that has been more concerned about elevating a memorial to the martyrdom
of its guardians than with the authenticity of its traditions. It is striking how many of Solzhenitsyn's
errors support this hypothesis. Indeed
every inaccuracy that we have traced shows how far he is inclined to give
priority to vague reminiscences and hearsay, even when he might have checked
his sources, and how far his narrative obeys the rules inherent in all oral
tradition, the impulse that collective memory inevitably has towards selective
bias.
Rittersporn,
Gabor. Stalinist Simplifications and Soviet Complications, 1933-1953.
Thus even though one might say that
the number of detainees committed for political reasons was considerable,
Solzhenitsyn's assertion that half of the population of the camps and prisons
was made up of people convicted under laws against
"counter-revolutionary" crimes does not seem consistent with what we
can discover from the development of penal policy and popular reactions.
Rittersporn,
Gabor. Stalinist Simplifications and Soviet Complications, 1933-1953.
...the Gulag, while overestimating
the number of those arrested as "counter-revolutionaries," retains
very little trace of the actual reasons for their arrests or convictions but
concentrates on the circumstances of their detention, on police brutality, or
on the hardships of life inside the camps.
Rittersporn,
Gabor. Stalinist Simplifications and Soviet Complications, 1933-1953.
Nicolas Werth, a well-regarded
French specialist on the Soviet Union whose sections in the Black Book on the
Soviet communists are sober and damning, told Le Monde, "Death camps did
not exist in the
The
Future Did Not Work by J. Arch Getty, Book Review of The Passing of an Illusion
by Franois Furet [March 2000
...it is understandable that those
who safeguarded the memory of repression concentrated their efforts on
compiling a full inventory of affronts and cruelties, down to the finest
detail. But we should not lose sight of
the fact that they collected evidence that is often extremely hard to
verify....
It is worth noting that as the
witnesses of the camps in the 1930s gradually became fewer, stories began to
circulate which are uncorroborated by the known accounts of their experiences,
let alone what can be gleaned from consulting other sources.
Rittersporn,
Gabor. Stalinist Simplifications and Soviet Complications, 1933-1953.
The equation "concentration
camps = Gulag = Soviet regime" cannot be accepted therefore as an
explanatory model for the highly complex realities of the
Rittersporn,
Gabor. Stalinist Simplifications and Soviet Complications, 1933-1953.
What our experiences show is above
all the extremely precarious state of almost all our knowledge of the
social-political history of these years, as soon as we set it against a
systematic and critical study of the original sources which until recent years
have been greatly neglected by research.
Rittersporn,
Gabor. Stalinist Simplifications and Soviet Complications, 1933-1953.
(Robert
Service’s many unproven accusations)
He [Stalin] ordered the systematic
killing of people on a massive scale
Service,
Robert. Stalin.
In applying physical and mental
torment to his victims, he degraded them in the most humiliating fashion. He derived a deep satisfaction from this.
Service,
Robert. Stalin.
Stalin had a gross personality
disorder.
Service,
Robert. Stalin.
In fact he was very far from being
'normal.' He had a vast desire to
dominate, punish, and butcher.
Service,
Robert. Stalin.
He had killed innumerable innocents
in the Civil War.
Service,
Robert. Stalin.
But his sense of traditional honor
was non-existent.
Service,
Robert. Stalin.
The Party General Secretary ordered the
arrested individuals [engineers and industrial specialists] to be beaten into
confessing to imaginary crimes.
Service,
Robert. Stalin.
A succession of such trials occurred
in 1929-30 Outside the RSFSR. there were
trials of nationalists Torture,
outlandish charges and learned-by-rote confessions became the norm. Hundreds of defendants were either shot or
sentenced to lengthy terms of imprisonment.
[This is one of those statements
which has a source but how do you know the source has any validity]
Service,
Robert. Stalin.
He demanded complete obedience and
often interfered in their private lives.
Service,
Robert. Stalin.
His [Vyshinsky] basic proposition
that confession (which could be obtained by torture) was the queen of the
modalities of judicial proof was music to Stalin’s ears.
Service,
Robert. Stalin.
His memory was extraordinary, and he
had his future victims marked down in a very long list.
Service,
Robert. Stalin.
Yet his maladjusted personality was
not the only factor at work.
Service,
Robert. Stalin.
Quite possibly Stalin continued to
have the odd fling with young communists; and, even if he was faithful to
Nadya, she did not always believe him and was driven mad with jealousy.
Service,
Robert. Stalin.
Stalin’s cultural program was an
unstable mixture. He could kill artists
at will and yet his policies were incapable of producing great art
Service,
Robert. Stalin.
At a time when peasants in several
regions were so desperate that some turn to cannibalism,
Service,
Robert. Stalin.
They eat berries, fungi, rats and
mice; and, when these had been consumed, peasants ate grass and bark.
Service,
Robert. Stalin.
The verdict was execution by
shooting. Zinoviev and Kamenev had been
told that, if they confessed to involvement in the
Service,
Robert. Stalin.
He never got over them: the beatings
in his childhood,
Service,
Robert. Stalin.
Solitary again, Stalin had no peace
of mind. He was a human explosion
waiting to happen.
Service,
Robert. Stalin.
His was a mind that found terror on
a grand scale deeply congenial.
Service,
Robert. Stalin.
Meanwhile Ordjonikidze’s brother had
been shot on Stalin’s instructions.
Service,
Robert. Stalin.
Tukhachevsky was shot on 11 June; he
had signed a confession with a bloodstained hand after a horrific beating.
Service,
Robert. Stalin.
Nearly all the accused [at the
Bukharin trial] had been savagely beaten.
Service,
Robert. Stalin.
Two days later [after the Bukharin
trial] Stalin approved a further operation to purge “anti-Soviet elements.’ This time he wanted 57,200 people to be
arrested across the
Service,
Robert. Stalin.
He [Stalin] had killed Kaganovich’s
brother Moisei
Service,
Robert. Stalin.
Stalin the Leader was
multifaceted. He was a mass killer with
psychological obsessions.
Service,
Robert. Stalin.
Stalin had Maria Svanidze arrested
in 1939 and sent to a labor camp. Her
husband Alexander Svanidze also fell victim to the NKVD: he had been arrested
in 1937 and was shot in 1941. Alexander
behaved with extraordinary courage under torture and refused to confess or beg
for mercy.
Service,
Robert. Stalin.
Tortures previously reserved for
non-communists were applied to Rajk, Pauker, and Slansky. The beatings were horrific.
Service,
Robert. Stalin.
An administrative behemoth ran the
Service,
Robert. Stalin.
Mikhoels was killed in a car crash
on Stalin’s orders in 1948.
Service,
Robert. Stalin.
As is not unusual in such a
situation, proof is lacking; but circumstantial evidence filled the gap for the
gossip-mongers.
Service,
Robert. Stalin.
There is hardly any possibility of
verifying that story, which comes, we must not forget, from Stalin's bitterest
opponents.
[Footnote]: In general, the testimony
of this police defector [Orlov] should be treated with reserve. He was out of the
McNeal,
Robert, Stalin: Man and Ruler.
STALIN
DENOUNCED OPPOSITIONISTS BUT THEY REMAINED IN HIGH POSITIONS
In this dispute [over
collectivization], which Stalin won, he denounced Bukharin and Rykov as leaders
of a "right deviation." But
even after their political defeat Bukharin and Rykov continued to hold responsible
positions and were still members of the party's Central Committee.
Medvedev,
Roy. Let History Judge.
Nevertheless, until the fall of1936
most of the former oppositionists remained free and even held responsible
positions in the commissariats, in publishing, and in educational
institutions. Bukharin, for example, was
editor of Izvestia and was allowed to travel abroad to negotiate purchases from
the archives of the German Social Democratic Party for the Marx-Engels-Lenin
Institute. Pyatakov was exerting himself
intensely as first deputy people's commissar for heavy industry, and articles
by Radek appeared almost daily in the central papers and magazines.
Medvedev,
Roy. Let History Judge.
But it is perfectly consistent with
the fact that there was a widespread plot, the full extent of which was only
gradually discovered. The people
concerned were old revolutionaries who knew how to build an illegal organization
and to conceal its workings from the authorities. They were people who had been in conflict
with the Party but had publicly made their peace with it and were given
responsible work. Pyatakov became
vice-commissar for Heavy Industry; Zinoviev commenced to write articles for the
leading Party organ, the Bolshevik (which incidentally bore the stigmata of his
previously incorrect political attitude); Bukharin became active on scientific
and cultural questions. The Party took
their adherence to the Party line at its face value, welcomed them back to the
ranks and gave them important and congenial work to do. And therefore when the shooting of
The same applies to Bukharin and
Rykov. They were mentioned by defendants
in the first trial but denied complicity, and their denial was for the time
being believed.
Campbell,
J. R. Soviet Policy and Its Critics.
Trotsky was sent into exile. At that time [1929], it was unthinkable that
anyone should be killed. Several of
Stalin's opponents were given good jobs and were close to the government.
Snow,
Charles Percy. Variety of Men.
Given Bukharin's continuing access
to higher circles through his work on the constitutional commission, his post
as Izvestia editor, his Central Committee status, Kremlin apartment and many
friends, he may have got wind of the coming trial period
Tucker,
Robert. Stalin in Power: 1929-1941.
[In the Introduction Stephen Cohen
states]: As readers will learn, he [Bukharin] continued to play significant
political roles, especially during a short-lived thaw in Stalin's policies from
1934 to mid-1936, as editor of the government newspaper Izvestiya, author of
sections of a new Soviet constitution, and advocate of pro-Western alliances
against the growing threat of Nazi Germany.
Larina,
Anna. This I Cannot Forget.
BREZHNEV
SOUGHT TO REHABILITATE STALIN RATHER THAN FORGET OR IGNORE HIM
Not everyone believed these confessions,
either in the
... As for Brezhnev, during his time
in power he was more concerned with trying to rehabilitate--Stalin. He wished to reverse the decisions of the 20th
and 22nd congresses rather than carry them through consistently.
Medvedev,
Roy. Let History Judge.
BOLSHEVIKS
SUPPORT NATIONAL
The Bolsheviks advocated the self-determination
of nations up to and including their complete governmental separation from
Medvedev,
Roy. Let History Judge.
Bukharin dissented from Lenin on
crucial points of Marxist theory and politics, among others on
nationalities. While Lenin advocated
their right to self-determination and interpreted that right in the sense that
Poles, Ukrainians, Letts, and so on were entitled to secede from the Russian
empire and constitute themselves as independent nations, Bukharin disputed that
view and saw in it a superfluous concession to Polish, Ukrainian, and other
nationalisms. He believed that the
revolution would cut across existing national divisions. Bukharin's argument left no mark on Stalin's
essay, which was consistently Leninist.
Deutscher,
Isaac. Stalin; A Political Biography.
OPPOSITION
PRESS SHUT DOWN IN SUMMER OF 1918 BECAUSE OF RUMOR-MONGERING & LYING
In the spring of 1918 the Bolsheviks
were fighting fairly energetically against the entire opposition press. In May and June alone approximately 60
bourgeois, social revolutionary, and Menshevik publications were shut down,...
The main reason for closing Martov's paper, Vperyod, was not so much his
polemic against Stalin as a number of false reports it had carried, which under
the existing conditions could cause panic.
Sverdlov spoke at a session of the Central Executive Committee on May 9,
1918, demanding that publication of Vperyod be stopped. On May 11 the Presidium of the Central
Executive Committee, on motion by Sverdlov, decreed that "all newspapers
printing false rumors and absurdly untrue reports be immediately shut down
until this question has been reviewed by a tribunal on the press.
Medvedev,
Roy. Let History Judge.
The Capitalist press was not
destroyed until 1918. The Socialist
newspapers and magazines languished until the spring of 1919.
Levine,
Isaac Don. Stalin.
LENIN
ADMITS HE WAS WRONG AND STALIN WAS RIGHT
... The main disagreement [between
Stalin and Trotsky] was over the use of military specialists in the Red
Army. It can be assumed that Lenin
persuaded Stalin not to speak out against Trotsky, and in return Lenin
refrained from criticizing Stalin, even approving the executions carried out in
Tsaritsyn. "We have had
disagreements and made mistakes," said Lenin. "No one denies this. When Stalin had people shot in Tsaritsyn I
thought it was a mistake, I thought that the shootings were incorrect, but the
documents Voroshilov has quoted revealed our error. My error was revealed, but still I had
telegraphed: Be careful. I made a
mistake. We're all human."
Medvedev,
Roy. Let History Judge.
TROTSKY
SAYS LENIN LIKED STALIN’S FIRMNESS & CHARACTER NOT HIS CREATIVITY &
IDEAS
As Trotsky wrote later:
"...What Lenin valued in Stalin
was his character, firmness, tenacity, insistence, and partly also his
craftiness. He valued these as
indispensable qualities in a fight. Independent
ideas, political initiative, or creative imagination he did not expect or
demand of Stalin."
Medvedev,
Roy. Let History Judge.
Undoubtedly he [Lenin] valued
certain of Stalin's traits very highly, his firmness of character, his
persistence, even his ruthlessness and conniving, attributes indispensable in
struggle and consequently at Party Headquarters.
LENIN
WAS VERY WORRIED ABOUT STALIN’S HEALTH
Lenin's attitude toward Stalin was
so benevolent in the years 1918-1921 that he personally concerned himself with
finding a quiet apartment for him in the Kremlin. He reprimanded Ordjonikidze for disturbing
Stalin while the latter was on vacation in the
Medvedev,
Roy. Let History Judge.
SVERDLOV
WAS THE ORIGINAL LEADER UNDER LENIN
At plenary sessions of the Central
Committee all appointments of personnel are made by open voting, not by secret
ballot, and there is no indication that Lenin, or even Trotsky, abstained when
the slate of the new Secretariat was submitted for approval....
Until the spring of 1919 the
functions that later were carried out by the Orgburo & Secretariat were
actually performed by Sverdlov, who had been assigned to head the Secretariat
as early as the Sixth Congress. It was
Sverdlov, and not Trotsky or Stalin, who was second in authority and importance
as a leader of the Bolshevik party.
After his death in March 1919 Lenin said:
"That work he performed as an
organizer, in choosing men and appointing them to responsible posts in all the
various departments, will be performed in the future only if we appoint whole
groups of men to handle the different major departments that he had sole charge
of, and if these men, following in his footsteps, come near to doing what this
one man did alone."
Medvedev,
Roy. Let History Judge.
LENIN
PROPOSED THAT STALIN BE TRANSFERRED FROM GEN. SEC. NOT REMOVED
Lenin proposed in his letter that
Stalin be removed from his post as general secretary but did not question the
possibility and necessity of keeping Stalin in the leadership. That is why the word "transfer" was
used, rather than "remove".
Lenin did not propose any specific person to replace Stalin as general
secretary.
Medvedev,
Roy. Let History Judge.
TROTSKY
WAS A MILITARY BUNGLER AND INCOMPETENT
For example, the old Bolshevik
Trifonov, who was assigned to military duties, wrote the following to his
friend Solts:
"In the South, the most
shocking outrages have been and are being committed, as well as crimes, about
which we should shout from the rooftops and cry out in the city squares at the
top of our voice. Unfortunately, for the
time being I can't do that. Given the
customs that have been established here, we will never end this war but will
meet our own end very quickly--from exhaustion.
The Southern Front is Trotsky's "favored child," and flesh of
the flesh... of this extremely untalented organizer.... It was not Trotsky who
built the army but we, the rank-and-file army workers. Wherever Trotsky has tried to work, the most
tremendous confusion has immediately arisen.
There is no place for a muddlehead in an organism that must operate
precisely and efficiently, and the military machine is such an organism."
Medvedev,
Roy. Let History Judge.
"Something unbelievable, something
bordering on betrayal.... Where in the world is order, discipline, and
Trotsky's regular army? How in the world
could he have let things fall apart so badly?
It is absolutely incomprehensible."
Medvedev,
Roy. Let History Judge.
With us, the problem was to make a
clean sweep of the remains of the old army, and in its place to build, under
fire, a new army, whose plan was not to be discovered in any book. This explains sufficiently why I felt uncertain
about my military work, and consented to take it over only because there was no
one else to do it.
I did not think of myself as in any sense a
strategist, and had little patience with the sort of strategist-dilettantism
that flooded the Party as a result of the revolution.
TROTSKY
REFUSES TO TAKE A LEADING ROLE WHILE LENIN IS INCAPACITATED
The 12th Party Congress was to be
held at the end of April 1923. Lenin was
recovering with difficulty from the effects of his third stroke, and it was
obvious that he would not be able to take part in the work of the
congress. The question arose as to who
would give the report in the name of the Central Committee. The most authoritative figure in the Central
Committee was still Trotsky. Therefore,
it was completely natural that at a meeting of the Politburo Stalin proposed
that Trotsky prepare the report. Stalin
was supported by Kalinin, Rykov, and even Kamenev. But Trotsky again declined, falling into
confused rationalizations to the effect that "the party will be ill at
ease if any one of us should attempt, as it were personally, to take the place
of the sick Lenin." Trotsky proposed
instead that the Congress proceed without a main political report. This was an absurd proposal, and was, of
course, voted down. At one of the next
meetings of the Politburo a decision was made-- to assign Zinoviev, who had just
returned from vacation, to prepare the political report....
Medvedev,
Roy. Let History Judge.
If Trotsky was so sure that he was
Lenin's desired successor; if Trotsky saw that Lenin was not simply ill but
paralyzed and unable to speak and write; if Trotsky also saw that Zinoviev and
Stalin aspired to Lenin's place in the party and considered this dangerous to
the party; then it is quite impossible to consider his conduct in March and
April 1923 correct for a political person.
Medvedev,
Roy. Let History Judge.
In the struggle within the Politburo
in the spring of 1923 (a struggle imperceptible to the outside observer)
Trotsky displayed complete passivity and in so doing condemned himself to
defeat.
Medvedev,
Roy. Let History Judge.
And when the last crisis came, when
Lenin fell sick and was compelled to withdrawal from the Government, he turned
again to Trotsky and asked him to take his place as President of the Soviet of
People's Commissars and of the Council of Labor and Defense. And, moreover, when Trotsky declined, Lenin
did not turn to any other strong man; he passed over the heads of those who
might conceivably imagine themselves to be rivals of Trotsky, and divided the
position among three men who are obviously not leaders [Rykov, Tzuryupov, and
Kamenev].
Eastman,
Max. Since Lenin Died.
The next Party Congress,the 12th,was
scheduled for April 1923. The Politburo
aimed to show that the regime could function effectively in Lenin’s
absence. Trotsky was offered the honor
of delivering the political report on behalf of the Central Committee, but
refused.
Service,
Robert. Stalin.
[Nevertheless Zinoviev was foolhardy
enough to insist on taking Lenin's place at the Twelfth Congress and assumed
the role of Lenin's successor by delivering the Political Report at its opening
session. During the preparations for the
Congress, with Lenin ill and unable to attend,] the most ticklish question was
who should deliver this keynote address, which since the founding of the Party
had always been Lenin's prerogative.
When the subject was broached in the Politburo, Stalin was the first to
say, "The Political Report will of course be made by Comrade
Trotsky."
I did not want that, since it seemed
to me equivalent to announcing my candidacy for the role of Lenin's successor
at a time when Lenin was fighting a grave illness. I replied approximately as follows:
"This is an interim. Let us hope
that Lenin will soon get well. In the
meantime the report should be made, in keeping with his office, by the General
Secretary....
I continued to insist on Stalin
making the report.
"Under no circumstances,"
he replied with demonstrative modesty.
"The Party will not understand it.
The report must be made by the most popular member of the Central
Committee.
TROTSKY
REFUSES TO HELP LENIN CRITICIZE STALIN ON THE GEORGIAN QUESTION
I have discussed above the extremely
harsh statements and letters in which Lenin condemned Stalin's position on the
national question in general and, more specifically, in regard to
Trotsky admits, and most historians
agree with him, that had he fulfilled Lenin's request and spoken at the
congress on the national question, making public all of Lenin's documents and
letters, including those which Lenin had planned to give him through Fotieva,
then any discussion on this question would have ended in Stalin's political
defeat, and Stalin's election as general secretary would have become very
difficult. Nevertheless, Trotsky refused
to fulfill Lenin's request, leaving the Georgian delegation without any
support. Lenin's last written document
concerned solidarity with this delegation.
Trotsky called Lenin's secretariat
and refused to fulfill Lenin's request, pleading illness.
Trotsky voluntarily let pass an
important and, as later became evident, the most realistic chance to weaken
Stalin's position and that of the triumph over it as a whole. Of course, Kamenev, Zinoviev, and Stalin were
satisfied.
Medvedev,
Roy. Let History Judge.
When on 5 March 1923 Lenin asked him
[Trotsky] to "take on the defense of the Georgian affair at the Central
Committee," since he could not rely on the impartiality of Stalin and
Dzerzhinsky, Trotsky refused on the grounds of ill health. Perhaps he wanted to avoid worsening his
relations with Stalin, or already regarded Lenin's wishes as whims. In either case, he would not carry out the
last wish of his leader.
Volkogonov,
Dmitrii. Lenin: A New Biography.
TROTSKY
SAYS THE PARTY IS ALWAYS RIGHT AND MUST ALWAYS BE SUPPORTED
Trotsky did take part in the work of
the Thirteenth Congress. His appearance
on the speaker's platform was greeted with applause almost as lengthy as it had
been at the Twelfth Congress. Trotsky's
speech was conciliatory rather than aggressive.
He defended himself and the Opposition as a whole rather weakly. It was in this speech that he uttered his
famous remark that "the party is always right," a statement hardly
consistent with his actual activity and with the positions he had previously
taken. In particular he said:
"None of us wants to be or can
be right against his own party. The
party in the last analysis is always right, because the party is the only
historical instrument given to the proletariat to resolve its fundamental
tasks.... I know that it is impossible
to be right against the party. One can
be right only with the party and through the party, for history has not created
any other way of determining what is right.
The English have a saying: My country, right or wrong. With much more historical justification we
can say: Right or wrong on any particular, specific question at any particular
moment, this is still my party."
This was empty rhetoric, and
Trotsky's opponents did not consider it satisfactory. Even Krupskaya, who had sent Trotsky a warm
letter when he was in Sukhumi a short time before, saying that Lenin had
remembered him during the last days of his life, said in her speech at the
congress that if the party is always right, Trotsky should not have started the
discussion. Zinoviev remarked rather
passively that "the party has no need of bitter-sweet compliments." Stalin rejected Trotsky's rhetoric even more
emphatically. He said that in the given
instance Trotsky had once again made an assertion that was incorrect in
principle:
"The party often makes
mistakes. Lenin taught us to teach the
party the art of correct leadership on the basis of its own mistakes. If the party made no mistakes, there would be
nothing with which to teach the party.
Our task is to catch these errors, reveal their roots, and show the
party and the working class how we erred and how we are going to correct these
errors in the future. Without this,
progress would be impossible for the party.
Without this, the forming of party leaders and cadres would be
impossible, because they are formed and trained through the struggle against
their own errors, by overcoming those errors.
I think that a statement like Trotsky's is somewhat of a compliment with
somewhat of an attempt at mockery--an attempt, of course, that failed."
Medvedev,
Roy. Let History Judge.
OPPOSITION
EXAGGERATED THE POWER OF THE CAPITALISTS UNDER NEP
The opposition accused the majority
of a "kulak deviation" and called for more pressure to be applied to
the capitalist elements in city and country, in contradiction to the basic
principles of
Medvedev,
Roy. Let History Judge.
In the heat of polemics the
opposition leaders greatly exaggerated the shortcomings that really existed,
thus causing party cadres to protest.
Something that existed as a tendency or trend was portrayed as an
already completed process.
Also untrue was the opposition's
assertion that the private sector was accumulating at a faster rate than the
public sector. In general, the
opposition, for obviously demagogic reasons, exaggerated the extent and danger
of capitalist development in the
It is true that the Soviet state was
obtaining increased quantities of raw materials and exportable products from
the rural areas, but that was beneficial not only to the well-to-do sections in
the countryside but to the society as a whole.
Another untrue Opposition claim was
that representatives of the bourgeois and non-Communist intelligentsia, who had
been drawn into the work of Soviet economic management as specialists,
controlled industry and finance to a greater degree than the Bolshevik Party.
...Needless to say, no such process
was underway in 1926. The upper strata
of Nepman bourgeoisie were not growing together with the top echelons of the
party and government. The danger of a
transfer of power to the bourgeoisie or kulaks was insignificant.
Medvedev,
Roy. Let History Judge.
TROTSKY
WAS UNPOPULAR BUT WAS ALLOWED FREEDOM TO PUBLISH
A heated discussion again erupted in
the fall of 1924 in connection with certain questions of party history. Despite the struggle against
"Trotskyism" that had been proclaimed, the State Publishing House was
issuing the collected works of Trotsky as well as those of Lenin. The volume of Trotsky's works being prepared
for publication in the fall of 1924 contained his writings and speeches of
1917.
The Central Committee voted to
withdraw Trotsky's pamphlet [Lessons of October] from circulation, although
publication of his Works continued [17 volumes of Trotsky's works appeared
before publication was discontinued in 1927].
Resolutions against Trotsky and the Left Opposition were adopted by
virtually all party organizations. The
Medvedev,
Roy. Let History Judge.
TROTSKY
WAS RELIEVED OF MANY POSITIONS BUT REMAINED ON THE POLITBURO
Without waiting for the plenum,
Trotsky sent a long statement to the Central Committee asking to be relieved of
his duties as commissar of war and chairman of the Revolutionary Military
Council of the Republic....
Trotsky was allowed to remain on the
Politburo, however. After a short time
he was given new assignments as a member of the Presidium of the Supreme
Economic Council, chairman of the scientific and technical division of the
Supreme Economic Council, head of the electrical engineering board, and
chairman of a Chief Concessions Committee.
Medvedev,
Roy. Let History Judge.
ZINOVIEV
AND KAMENEV BEGIN LEFT OPPOSITION AGAINST STALIN AFTER TROTSKY’S DEFEAT
Almost immediately after the defeat
of the Trotskyist Left Opposition there arose a "new," or "
Medvedev,
Roy. Let History Judge.
LENIN
WAS HARSH IN DEBATES WITH OPPONENTS
This is what Yakubovich says about
him [Lenin] in his memoirs;
"Lenin was harsh in his polemics
with ideological opponents; he never liked to use a conciliatory tone or to
gloss over conflicts; he made a definite point of any disagreements he had with
other party figures.
Medvedev,
Roy. Let History Judge.
DURING
AN EARLY TRIAL KAMENEV DENOUNCED PART OF LENIN’S PROGRAM
In 1914 Kamenev was assigned by the
party to return to
Medvedev,
Roy. Let History Judge.
ZINOVIEV
AND KAMENEV TRY TO TAKE OVER THE PARTY AFTER
The majority of the Politburo did
not support Zinoviev and Kamenev.
Nevertheless, they continued to argue their views, mainly in the
The Fourteenth Party Congress was
held at the end of December 1925. Before
the Congress Stalin proposed a compromise to Zinoviev but on the condition that
the
As was expected, the New Opposition
suffered a complete defeat at the congress.
The resolution based on Stalin's report for the Central Committee was
adopted by 559 votes to 65. In 1925 the
party rejected Zinoviev and Kamenev's claims to leadership of the Central
Committee just as it had rejected similar attempts by Trotsky in 1924.
Medvedev,
Roy. Let History Judge.
TROTSKY
AND ZINOVIEV UNITE AND FORGIVE EACH OTHER
Not surprisingly the unification of
these two groups [the Trotskyites and Zinovievites] in the party was
accompanied by a mutual pardoning of sins.
Medvedev,
Roy. Let History Judge.
In May 1931 Sedov met in
Holtzman also brought Sedov a
proposal from Smirnov. Supposedly
Smirnov had broken with Trotsky in the late 1920s, but he now proposed that a
united opposition, to include Trotskyites, Zinovievites, and others, be formed
inside the
Thurston,
Robert. Life and Terror in Stalin's
UNITED
OPPOSITION IS REJECTED BY THE PARTY’S MAJORITY
It is true that in the spring and
early summer of 1926 the opposition leaders campaigned quite energetically,
using conspiratorial methods for the most part.
Representatives of the bloc were sent to dozens of cities to acquaint
their supporters with the platform of the opposition, while illegal meetings of
Opposition supporters were held in many local areas, with new members being
recruited to the opposition faction. One
such illegal meeting, at which Lashevich spoke, was held secretly in the woods
outside
The first open confrontation between
the Opposition and majority of the Central Committee took place at a joint
plenum of the Central Committee and the Central Control Commission in July
1926. Trotsky spoke for the Opposition
bloc. Now the party saw Trotsky,
Zinoviev, and Kamenev on the same platform but hardly anyone said "Here is
our true Central Committee." The
overwhelming majority of the Central Committee condemned the opposition. Zinoviev was removed from the Politburo, on
which Trotsky remained as the sole oppositionist.
Medvedev,
Roy. Let History Judge.
OPPOSITION
LIED WHEN IT SAID IT WOULD END FACTIONALISM
Although the opposition statement of
October 16, 1926, spoke of an end to all factional activity, the Opposition was
unable to refrain from renewed factionalism....
On June 9, 1927, a gathering to bid
farewell to Smilga developed into an Opposition demonstration of sorts.... Stalin and the Politburo judged the
demonstration at the Yaroslavl Station to be a factional move and a violation
of the promises made in the opposition's statement of October 16, 1926.
Medvedev,
Roy. Let History Judge.
It must be admitted, that from the point
of view of political morals, the conduct of the majority of the Oppositionists
was by no means of high quality.... We
are all obliged to lie; it is impossible to manage otherwise. Nevertheless, there are limits that should
not be exceeded even in lying.
Unfortunately, the Oppositionists, and particularly their leaders, often
went beyond these limits.
Nicolaevsky,
Boris. Power and the Soviet Elite; "The letter of an Old Bolshevik."
In former times we
"politicals" [unknown author representing the Old Bolsheviks] used to
observe a definite moral code in our relations with the rulers. It was regarded as a crime to petition for
clemency. Anyone who did this was
finished politically. When we were in
jail or in exile, we refrained from giving the authorities any promise not to
attempt to escape. We always adhered to
this rule, even in instances where to have given such a pledge would have meant
alleviation of our lot. We were their
prisoners. It was their business to guard
us, ours to try to escape....
There is quite a different
psychology nowadays. To plead for pardon
has become a common phenomenon, on the assumption that since the party in power
was "my party," the rules which applied in the Czarist days are no
longer valid. One hears this argument
everywhere. At the same time, it is
considered quite proper to consistently deceive "my party,"... This has given rise to a special type of
morality, which allows one to accept any conditions, to sign any undertakings,
with the premeditated intention not to observe them. This morality is particularly widespread
among the representatives of the older generation of Party comrades....
This new morality has had a very
demoralizing effect inside the ranks of the Oppositionists. The borderline between what is and what is
not admissible has become completely obliterated, and many have fallen to
downright treachery and disloyalty. At
the same time, the new morality has furnished a convincing argument to those
opposed to any rapprochement with the former Oppositionists, the argument being
that it is impossible to believe them because they recognize in principle the
permissibility of telling lies. How is
one to determine when they speak the truth and when they lie?
Nicolaevsky,
Boris. Power and the Soviet Elite; "The letter of an Old Bolshevik."
1927
TROTSKY DEMONSTRATIONS FAILED BADLY
In reply to the decision to expel
Trotsky, Zinoviev, and Kamenev from the Central Committee, the opposition attempted
to organize its own demonstration to mark the 10th anniversary of the October
Revolution. This proved, however, to be
not so much a demonstration of strength as of weakness. There were hardly any workers in this
"parallel" demonstration; student youth and office workers from
various institutions predominated....
During this demonstration of the
opposition leaders gave speeches from the balcony of a house on the corner of
Vozdvizhenka and Mokhovaya streets, but compared with the official demonstration
of
On November 14 a plenum of the
Central Committee and Central Control Commission expelled Trotsky and Zinoviev
from the party....
Yakubovich, an eyewitness to the
funeral [of Joffe] describes it in his memoirs:
"... It must have been obvious
for those watching this scene that Trotsky's cause was hopelessly lost. The new generation of Red Army soldiers did not
know him, had not taken part in the civil war, were raised in a new
spirit. The name of Trotsky meant little
or nothing to them. The composition of
the funeral demonstration also made one stop and think, for there were no
workers in it. The United Opposition had
no proletarian support."
In December 1927 the 15th Congress
confirmed the expulsion of Trotsky and Zinoviev and resolved to expel 75
additional members of the opposition, including Kamenev, Pyatakov, Radek,
Rakovsky, Smilga, Lashevich, Safarov, and Smirnov.
Medvedev,
Roy. Let History Judge.
Rykov, chairman of the Council of
People's Commissars, even said:
"Despite the situation the
opposition has tried to create, there are only a few in prison. I do not think I can give assurances that the
prison population won't have to be increased somewhat in the near future. (Voices from the floor: "Right!")
Medvedev,
Roy. Let History Judge.
Trotsky gave his last speech as a
party figure at the plenum of October 1927.
It was confused but passionate.... he provided no convincing arguments
or clear socialist ideas. His hatred of
the Central Committee and of Stalin were plain to see, but this was not echoed
among the participants of the plenum, nor among Communists who would read the
speech in the documents of the 15th Congress.
On the occasion of the 10th
anniversary of the October Revolution, Trotsky's followers decided they would
join the celebrations as a procession, forming their own columns and carrying
banners with such unexceptional slogans as 'Down with the kulak, the Nepman,
and the bureaucrat!'.... Zinoviev, who
had gone to
Volkogonov,
Dmitri. Stalin: Triumph and Tragedy.
The
Graham,
Stephen. Stalin.
TROTSKY
CONTENDS THE OPPOSITION IS STRONG AND GROWING WHEN IT ISN’T
In 1929 a decision was made to
deport Trotsky... A few months later
Trotsky continued to assert that the Left Opposition was growing stronger and
increasing its numbers. He stated,
"In spite of all the lies of
the official press, the Left Opposition is growing and fortifying itself
ideologically throughout the world.
Progress has been especially great during this past year."
These were illusions, and they were
very soon dispelled.
Medvedev,
Roy. Let History Judge.
RADEK
AND OTHERS BREAK WITH TROTSKY IN 1929
In June 1929 Radek was on his way
back to
Toward the end of 1929 Rakovsky and
his group (Sosnovsky, Muralov, Mdivani, etc.) wrote an "Open Letter to the
Central Committee," which although it contained criticism of Stalin's
policies and demanded the return of Trotsky to the
Medvedev,
Roy. Let History Judge.
TROTSKY
DID NOT UNDERSTAND THE SU OR WHAT WAS GOING ON
... Trotsky remained in his own mind
a revolutionary and not "a counter-revolutionary heading toward
fascism," as Stalin declared.
However, because of his inherent dogmatism, his tendentiousness, and his
lack of information Trotsky could not understand or properly evaluate the
complex processes taking place in the
Medvedev,
Roy. Let History Judge.
BUKHARIN
GIVES THE MEMORIAL
It is true that at the end of
January 1929 Bukharin was asked to give the speech at the memorial meeting
marking the fifth anniversary of Lenin's death.
Medvedev,
Roy. Let History Judge.
IN
DIZZY WITH SUCCESS STALIN CRITICIZES THOSE CLOSING CHURCHES
In his article "Dizzy with
Success," published in Pravda on March 2, 1930, Stalin wrote:
"And what about those
"revolutionaries," if one may call them that, who begin the job of
organizing collective farms by taking the bells from the churches. To take a bell--just think--how
r-r-revolutionary!"
On March 15, 1930 Soviet newspapers
published the decree on "distortions" of the party line in the
cooperative movement. This decree
referred to the administrative closing of churches as an error committed by
local officials and threatened severe punishment for anyone offending the
feelings of believers.... By the end of
1930 roughly 80 percent of the village churches had been closed and among the
"dispossessed kulaks" there were a substantial number of clergymen.
Medvedev,
Roy. Let History Judge.
KULAKS
IN EXILE SETTLEMENTS WERE GIVEN FREEDOM BECAUSE THEY FOUGHT IN THE WAR
Thousands of kulak special
supplements were established in these remote regions. The inhabitants of these exile colonies were
denied freedom of movement. The exiles
situation changed in 1942, when young men from the special settlements began to
be drafted into the Red Army because of the Soviet army's severe losses in the
war. At the end of the war the
commandants' offices for supervising these colonies were closed, and the
residents of the former special settlements obtained relative freedom of
movement.
Medvedev,
Roy. Let History Judge.
POOR
LEADERS OF EARLY STATE FARMS WERE FIRED OR BROUGHT TO TRIAL
The newly formed state farms also
experienced repression. A typical
example was a decree "On the work of livestock state farms,"
published in the spring of 1932 and signed by Stalin, Molotov, and Yakovlev,
people's commissar of agriculture. The
decree named 34 directors of state farms who had tried "to gloss over
shortcomings resulting from their own poor leadership by referring to the fact
that livestock state farms are in the early stages of construction." The decree "proposed" that these 34
be fired and brought to trial; it also listed 92 other directors, who were only
to be fired.
Medvedev,
Roy. Let History Judge.
BOLSHEVIKS
PARDON FORMER ENEMIES AND WORK WITH THEM
It is well known that during the
civil war in
Medvedev,
Roy. Let History Judge.
RADEK
PRAISES STALIN FOR BEING LENIENT AND NOT TAKING REVENGE
To his former associates in the
Opposition Radek offered the following explanation of the praise he had
lavished on Stalin: "We should be grateful to Stalin. If we [the Opposition] had lived at the time
of the French Revolution, we would long ago have been shorter by a head."
Medvedev,
Roy. Let History Judge.
BUKHARIN
MAKES A COMPLETE CAPITULATION AT THE 17TH PARTY CONGRESS
In January 1934 the 17th Party
Congress was held in
"It is clear that the
"Rights," of whom I was one, had a different political line, a line
opposed to the all-out socialist offensive, opposed to the attack by storm on
the capitalist elements that our party was beginning. It is clear that this line proposed a
different pace of development, that it was in fact opposed to accelerated
industrialization, that it was opposed to...the liquidation of the kulaks as a
class, that it was opposed to the reorganization of small peasant
agriculture...that it was opposed to the entire new stage of a broad socialist
offensive, completely failing to understand the historical necessity of that
offensive and drawing political conclusions that could not have been
interpreted in any way other than as anti-Leninist.... It is clear, further, that the victory of
this deviation inevitably would have unleashed a third force and that it would
have weakened the position of the working-class.... It would have led to intervention before we
were ready...and, consequently, to the restoration of capitalism as the
combined result of the aggravated domestic and international situation, with
the forces of the proletariat weakened and the unleashing of anti-proletarian,
counter-revolutionary forces.... It is
clear, further, that Comrade Stalin was completely right when he brilliantly
applied Marxist-Leninist dialectics to thoroughly smash a whole series of
theoretical postulates advanced by the right deviation and formulated mostly by
myself."
This capitulation did not go
unnoticed. Although Bukharin was chosen
at the Congress only as a candidate member of the Central Committee, this
demotion was accompanied by a return to active political and journalistic
activity. In February 1934 Bukharin was
appointed editor-in-chief of Izvestia, the second most important Soviet
newspaper.
Medvedev,
Roy. Let History Judge.
TROTSKY
SAYS THE TRIAL RESULTS AGAINST A COUPLE OF PARTIES WERE TOO LENIENT
But at the same time Trotsky took at
face value the trials against "wreckers" from the bourgeois
intelligentsia. He even criticized the
sentences against leaders of the "Industrial Party" as too lenient.
Medvedev,
Roy. Let History Judge.
...When in 1931 the show trial of
the "Union Bureau" was staged in Moscow Trotsky would not credit the
convincing arguments of the emigre Menshevik leadership.... Although there was no evidence except
confessions by the defendants, Trotsky wrote that the guilt of the defendants
had been "irrefutably established."
Medvedev,
Roy. Let History Judge.
DEFENDANTS
AT THE ZINOVIEV TRIAL IMPLICATED MANY OTHERS NOT YET ARRESTED
Some of the defendants in the trial
of the "
On September 10, 1936, Vyshinsky
published a report: "The investigation has not established a juridical
basis for legal proceedings against Bukharin and Rykov, as a result of which
the present case is discontinued."
Thus Bukharin, Rykov, and the majority of the former "right"
oppositionists remained free.
Medvedev,
Roy. Let History Judge.
RADEK
AND OTHERS INCRIMINATE BUKHARIN AFTER THE ZINOVIEV TRIAL
Explicit accusations were made
against Bukharin and Rykov. Radek, for
example, said that friendship had long prevented him from implicating
Bukharin. He had very much wanted to
give his friend the chance to disarm himself by volunteering honest
testimony. But now, Radek said, he had
decided that he could not enter the court hiding another terrorist
organization. He and others offered
detailed stories about their counter-revolutionary "connections" with
the Bukharin-Rykov group. Radek and
other members of the "
...According to Anna Larina, on Nov.
7, 1936, Bukharin decided to celebrate the holiday at Red Square--not, as
usual, on the top of Lenin's tomb, but in the stands with his wife. But Stalin saw him there and had him invited
up.
After the holiday, however, the most
painful phase of Bukharin's life began.
He was not summoned to the Lubyanka, but personal confrontations between
him and arrested "leftists" and members of the "Bukharin
school"--that is, his closest disciples--were arranged in the Kremlin
itself. After a face-to-face encounter
with Radek he had another with Sokolnikov and one with Serebryakov, then one
with Tseitlin, one of his closest followers.
They all told of their alleged criminal ties with Bukharin, of the
existence of another counter-revolutionary terrorist center headed by Bukharin
and Yagoda. For example, in Bukharin's
presence Tseitlin alleged that Bukharin had given him a revolver and placed him
on the corner of a street down which Stalin was supposed to travel that day but
that Stalin's car had taken a different route so that the assassination attempt
failed.
Medvedev,
Roy. Let History Judge.
STALIN
CALLS AND TELLS BUKHARIN TO CHASE THE CHEKISTS OUT OF HIS APARTMENT
At the
Conquest,
Robert. The Great Terror.
In early December 1936 a group of
chekists came to Bukharin's apartment in the Kremlin and served him notice of
his eviction from the apartment.
Bukharin panicked. He was
especially concerned over the fate of his huge library and archive. Where could they be moved to? Suddenly the internal Kremlin phone
rang. It was Stalin.
"How are things with you,
Nikolai?" he asked as though
everything were perfectly normal. Bukharin
lost his presence of mind; still, he did manage to say that he was being served
an eviction notice. Without asking
anything further, Stalin roared, "Chase them the hell out of there!" The uninvited guests left immediately.
Medvedev,
Roy. Let History Judge.
Unlike Rykov, who at the end of 1936
had been moved out of the Kremlin, Bukharin and his family continued to live in
their Kremlin apartment. A few days
before the plenum was to begin, three Chekists appeared at this apartment with
an order to evict Bukharin. Immediately
after they arrived, the telephone rang: for the first time in several months,
Stalin was calling Bukharin to find out about how he was feeling. Bukharin, who was quite distraught, told
Stalin that they were getting ready to evict him. In reply, Stalin advised him to tell his
visitors to "go to hell."
Understanding from Bukharin's responses who was on the other end of the
line, the Chekists immediately disappeared.
Bukharin unexpectedly received one more ray of hope.
Rogovin,
Vadim. 1937: Year of Terror.
At the end of November 1936 a group
of strangers arrived at his door from the housekeeping department of the
Kremlin. Bukharin was sure that they had
come to do a search, which in those months would not have been unusual, even in
a Kremlin apartment. But in fact it was
worse; they had brought Bukharin an order to vacate the Kremlin. He got extremely upset and was at a total
loss to know what to do. He immediately
started thinking about his enormous collection of books and personal
papers. How could he transport them and
where? At that moment the internal
Kremlin telephone suddenly rang. It was
Stalin. "So, how are things with
you, Nikolai?" as though everything were perfectly normal. Bukharin did not know how to reply, and after
a pause said that he was being served an eviction notice. Without asking anything further, Stalin
exclaimed in a loud voice, "Tell them all to go to the devil." Hearing that, the uninvited guests beat a
hasty retreat.
Medvedev,
Roy & Zhores Medvedev. The Unknown Stalin.
Suddenly, while we were sitting
together in the study, three men walked in.
We had not heard the doorbell; Ivan Gavrilovich [Bukharin's father] had
let them in. They abruptly informed
"Comrade Bukharin" that he was about to be moved out of the Kremlin. Before Nikolai could react, the telephone
rang. Stalin was on the line.
"What's with you there,
Nikolai?" asked Koba.
"They've just come to move me
out of the Kremlin. I don't care about
the Kremlin, but I do want to ask that a place be found to hold my
library."
"You just send them to the
devil’s mother!" said Stalin and hung up.
Standing beside the telephone, the
three unknown men heard the Boss clearly.
They packed off immediately to "the devil’s mother."
Larina,
Anna. This I Cannot Forget.
BUKHARIN
IS ATTACKED BY ALL AT THE FEB. 1937 PLENUM
No one opposed the overall policy of
Stalin and the NKVD; the condemnation and denunciation of Bukharin and Rykov
was unanimous. Everyone demanded that
they be called to account.
The atmosphere at the February 1937
plenum was already quite heated when Bukharin was given the floor.... he
declared, "I am not Zinoviev or Kamenev, and I will not tell lies against
myself." To this Molotov replied
from the floor: "If you don't confess, that will prove you're a fascist
hireling. Their press is saying that our
trials are provocations. We'll arrest
you and you'll confess!"
Medvedev,
Roy. Let History Judge.
STALIN
DID NOT WANT TO SHOOT BUKHARIN WHEN THE OTHERS DID
The commission established to decide
Bukharin and Rykov fate met under the chairmanship of Mikoyan.... To reach a decision, the vote was taken by
alphabetical order. One after another
the Central Committee members rose-- Andreev, Bubnov, Voroshilov, Kaganovich,
Molotov--and uttered three words: "Arrest, try, shoot." When Stalin's turn came he said: "Let
the NKVD handle the case," and several other people then repeated this
formula,....
Medvedev,
Roy. Let History Judge.
KRESTINSKY
IS THE ONLY ONE TO DENY GUILT AND CRIMINAL INVOLVEMENT
But when it was Krestinsky's turn,
he unexpectedly answered:
"I do not admit my guilt. I am not a Trotskyite. I never took part in the
"Right-Trotskyite Bloc" and wasn't aware of its existence. I never committed a single one of the crimes
imputed to me, and in particular I do not confess myself guilty of contacts
with German intelligence."
Medvedev,
Roy. Let History Judge.
EHRENBURG
SAYS IT WAS NOT BOGUS PEOPLE IN THE DOCK AND THERE WAS NO TORTURE
It has been said that Bukharin,
Kamenev, Rakovsky, and the others did not really appear in court; skillfully
made-up and specially trained NKVD agents supposedly took their place. But some
who attended the trials and who knew many of the defendants well, including
Ehrenburg, and others whom I personally interviewed in the '60s denied this
supposition.
Ehrenburg expressed his confidence
to me in a conversation that it really was Bukharin, Rykov, Krestinsky,
Rosengoltz, and Rakovsky who sat on the defendants' bench.... At the same time
they did not give the impression of people who had been recently subjected to
prolong torture.
Medvedev,
Roy. Let History Judge.
STALIN
SAYS ONLY CURRENT TROTS SHOULD BE PUNISHED NOT FORMER ONES
On March 5, 1937, Stalin told the
Central Committee that only active Trotskyists still loyal to their exiled
leader had to be repressed. "Among
our comrades," he said, "are a certain number of former Trotskyites
who abandoned Trotskyism a long time ago and are fighting against it. It would be stupid to defame these comrades.
Medvedev,
Roy. Let History Judge.
ORDJONIKIDZE
COULD NOT HAVE BEEN MURDERED BY AN ASSASSIN
His [Ordjonikidze] wife [Gavrilovna]
was extremely worried and phoned her sister, asking her to come over. February days are short, and as it began to
grow dark, just after five, Gavrilovna decided to go into her husband's room,
but while she was on her way, turning on the light in the living room, a shot
exploded in his bedroom. Running in, she
saw her husband lying on the bed, dead, the bedclothes stained with blood.
According to Gavrilovna, the
apartment had a side entrance, which everyone used, and a main entrance that
was always closed, with bookshelves against it.
Moreover, the main entrance led into the living room, where Gavrilovna
was at the moment the shot was fired; so it could not have been used by an
assassin.
Medvedev,
Roy. Let History Judge.
The arrest of various subordinates
of Ordjonikidze's before and after his death does not prove that Stalin was
conducting a campaign against him, for the same thing occurred around men like
Kaganovich and Shvernik, the national trade union leader, whom Stalin continued
to trust and employ. Just before
Ordjonikidze killed himself, he had several long conversations with
Stalin. Why the Vozhd would have devoted
so much time to someone he planned to destroy is curious; perhaps Stalin
recognized his old friend's disturbed state of mind and tried to calm him
down. In any event, the suicide had to
be hushed up. But the available evidence
is not convincing that Stalin planned to liquidate someone who had served him
loyally, had not been in the opposition, and still held key assignments.
Thurston,
Robert. Life and Terror in Stalin's
STALIN
WANTED CRIMINAL ACTIVITY OF THE INTELLIGENCE AGENCIES INVESTIGATED
On his [Stalin] suggestion the
Central Committee unexpectedly appointed a special commission to investigate
NKVD activity; it included, among others, Beria & Malenkov. During the discussion of this matter in the
Politburo, Kaganovich suggested that Beria be appointed deputy people's
commissar of internal affairs in order to "facilitate his access to all
the materials of the NKVD." This
proposal was accepted.
Medvedev,
Roy. Let History Judge.
MANY
INTELLIGENCE AGENTS WERE KILLED FOR COMMITTING CRIMINAL ACTS
Hardly anyone paid attention to this
appointment either within the
Medvedev,
Roy. Let History Judge.
STALIN
COMES DOWN HARD ON THE CRIMINAL YEZHOV
In late 1938 and the first part of
1939 Feldman acted as first secretary of the party's
"When the Congress was ending,
the Council of Elders gathered in one of the halls of the Kremlin. In front of the elders at a long table, as if
on a stage, sat Andreev, Molotov, & Malenkov. Behind them, far to the rear, in a corner to
the left sat Stalin, puffing away at his pipe.
Andreev stated that since the congress was finishing its work, it was
necessary to nominate candidates for the Central Committee that was to be newly
elected. The first to be named were
members of the previous Central Committee, except of course for those who had
fallen. They came to Yezhov. Andreev asked, "What do you
think?" After a short silence
someone said that Yezhov was one of Stalin's people's commissars, everyone knew
him, he should be kept. "Any
objections?" Everyone was
silent. Then Stalin took the floor. He got up, walked to the front table, and,
still smoking his pipe, called out:
"Yezhov! Where are you? Come up here!"
From one of the back rows Yezhov
came up to the table.
"Well! What do you think of yourself? Are you capable of being a member of the
Central Committee?"
Yezhov turned pale and in a broken
voice answered that his whole life had been devoted to the party and to Stalin,
that he loved Stalin more than his own life and didn't know anything he had
done wrong that could provoke such a question.
"Is that so?" Stalin asked ironically. "And who was Frinovsky? Did you know him?"
"Yes, of course I knew
him," answered Yezhov.
"Frinovsky was my deputy.
He---"
Stalin cut Yezhov short, asking who
Shapiro was, what Ryzhova had been (Yezhov's secretary), who Fyodorov was, and
who others were. (By this time all these
people had been arrested.)
"Joseph Vissarionovich! You know it was I--I myself!--who disclosed
their conspiracy! I came to you and
reported it...."
Stalin didn't let him continue. "Yes, yes, yes! When you felt you were about to be caught,
then you came in a hurry. But what about
before that? Were you organizing a
conspiracy? Do you want to kill
Stalin? Top officials of the NKVD are
plotting, but you, supposedly aren't involved.
You think I don't see anything?!
Do you remember who you sent on a certain date for duty with
Stalin? Who? With revolvers? Why revolvers near Stalin? Why?
To kill Stalin? And if I hadn't
noticed? What then?!"
Stalin went on to accuse Yezhov of
working too feverishly, arresting many people who were innocent and covering up
for others.
"Well? Go on, get out of here! I don't know, comrades, is it possible to
keep him as a member of the Central Committee?
I doubt it. Of course, think
about it.... As you wish.... But I doubt it!"
Yezhov, of course, was unanimously
struck from the list; after a recess he did not return to the hall and was not
seen again at the Congress....
Yezhov was not arrested right away,
however. He continued to appear at the
offices of the Commissariat of Water Transport.
His behavior showed evidence of severe depression and even psychological
disorder. While attending meetings of
the collegium of the Commissariat, Yezhov remained silent and did not intervene
in any way. Sometimes he made doves and
airplanes out of paper, sailed them, and went after them, at times even
crawling under the tables and chairs.
All this in silence. A few days
after the Congress, when a group of NKVD operatives entered the conference room
of the collegium, Yezhov rose and said, with his face almost aglow, "How
long I have waited for this!" He
put his gun on the table and they led him away....
Yezhov's arrest was not reported in
the press. The man whom Pravda had
called "the nation's favorite," who possessed "the greatest
vigilance, a will of iron, a fine proletarian sensitivity, enormous organizational
talent, and exceptional intelligence" was not mentioned again in any
newspaper.
Yezhov was not shot right after his
arrest. A long investigation was
conducted in connection with his case.
He was not tortured, since he readily confessed to all charges, changing
or correcting them when necessary and, in general, calmly acceeding to all the
demands of the investigators. The old
Bolshevik Shabalkin, who died in 1965, gave me the following account of
Yezhov's subsequent fate:
"When they took me from the
Medvedev,
Roy. Let History Judge.
The airplane designer Yakovlev
recalls the following in his memoirs:
"In the summer of 1940 Stalin
said these precise words in a conversation with me:
"Yezhov is a rat; in 1938 he killed
many innocent people. We shot him for
that."
I wrote these words down immediately
after returning from the Kremlin."
Medvedev,
Roy. Let History Judge.
Here is one such document, read to
the 22nd Congress by Serdyuk:
"Comrade Stalin:
I am sending for confirmation four
lists of people whose cases are before the Military Collegium:
(1) List No. 1 (general)
(2) List No. 2 (former military
personnel)
(3) List No. 3 (former NKVD
personnel)
(4) List No. 4 (wives of enemies of
the people)
I request approval for first-degree
condemnation of all these people.
Signed Yezhov
Condemnation in the first-degree
meant shooting.
Medvedev,
Roy. Let History Judge.
Over the autumn of 1938 Stalin set
up a commission to investigate the NKVD.
It reported adversely, as was no doubt intended. In December Yezhov was replaced by Beria. Over the next few months many of Yezhov's men
were shot. But Yezhov still remained in
at least one of his various posts--People's Commissar of Water Transport. And he appeared on the platform at Lenin's
birthday celebrations in February 1939. [LENIN’S BIRTHDAY IS IN APRIL STUPID] At the informal Council of Elders which met
before the 18th Party Congress in March to decide on a new Central Committee,
he was present as a current member of that body. When his name was suggested from the chair,
there was at first no objection, and in fact speakers noted his loyal service,
until Stalin, puffing his pipe, walked from the corner where he was sitting to
the front table and called Yezhov forward:
'Well! What do you think of yourself? Are you capable of being a member of the
Central Committee?'
Yezhov turned pale and in a broken
voice answered that his whole life had been devoted to the party and to Stalin,
that he loved Stalin more than his own life and didn't know anything he had
done wrong that could revoke such a question.
'Is that so?' Stalin asked
ironically. 'And who was Frinovsky? Did you know him?'
'Yes, of course a do him,' answered
Yezhov. 'Frinovsky was my deputy. He--'
Stalin cut Yezhov short, asking who
Shapiro was, what Ryzhova had been (Yezhov's secretary), who Fyodorov was, and
who others were.
'Joseph Vissarionovich! You know it was I--I myself!--who disclosed
their conspiracy! I came to you and
reported it...'
Stalin didn't let him continue. 'Yes, yes, yes! When you felt you were about to be caught,
then you came in a hurry. But what about
before that? Were you organizing a
conspiracy? Did you want to kill
Stalin? Top officials of the NKVD are
plotting, but you, supposedly are not involved.
You think I didn't see anything?
Do you remember who you sent on a certain date for duty with
Stalin? Who? With revolvers? Why revolvers near Stalin? Why?
To kill Stalin? And if I hadn't
noticed? What then?'
Stalin went on to accuse Yezhov of
working too feverishly, arresting many people who were innocent and covering up
for others.
'Well? Go on, get out of here! I don't know comrades, is a possible to keep
him as a member of the Central Committee?
I doubt it. Of course, think
about it.... As you wish... But I doubt
it!'
and that was the end of Yezhov. Arrested a few days later, he was shot on 4
February 1940 [approximately a year later].
Conquest,
Robert. Stalin: Breaker of Nations.
"It's high time to do something
about the NKVD," he [Stalin] said.
"If that madman of a Yezhov keeps on the way he's going, he'll
arrest me yet for plotting against Stalin.
It can't go on! But just now I
can't do anything about your engineers.
Beria is coming here the day after tomorrow, and I think I'm going to
name him the head of a committee to re-organize the NKVD completely. I'll ask him to make an investigation into
the case of your engineers."
I left
Svanidze,
Budu. My Uncle, Joseph Stalin.
Although not a delegate to the 18th
Party Congress, in March 1939, he [Yezhov] was present as a member of the
outgoing Central Committee. And when the
Congress's "Senioren Konvent," or informal Council of Elders, met to
consider names for the new Central Committee, Yezhov's went forward. There were no objections until Stalin said he
thought him unsuitable, since he was involved in a plot with Frinovsky and
others to use Stalin's own bodyguard to assassinate him. Yezhov answered that it had been he who had
exposed this plot. But Stalin retorted
that this was only to cover himself; moreover, he had arrested many innocent
people while protecting the guilty.
Stalin ended by telling those present that in his opinion Yezhov was
unfit to serve on the Central Committee, though it was, of course, up to them
to decide.
Conquest,
Robert. The Great Terror.
The only epitaph that Stalin left to
his faithful servant [Yezhov] was recorded in a private conversation. Over a luncheon with a young protege Stalin
confided, "Yezhov was a scoundrel.
He killed our best people. The
man went to the dogs. You call him at
the Ministry, they say he has gone to the Central Committee. Call him there, they say he is at work. You send after him to his house, he is lying
in bed dead drunk. How many innocent
people he destroyed! For that we had
him shot."
Ulam,
Adam. Stalin; The Man and his Era.
STALIN
SET UP COMMISSION TO INVESTIGATE SECRET POLICE CORRUPTION
The special commission appointed to
investigate NKVD activity continued its work, with Andreev as its new
chairman. Andreev himself had been very
active during 1937-1938 in the assault on "enemies of people," and
this was Stalin's chief consideration in selecting him to head the commission.
Medvedev,
Roy. Let History Judge.
On 11 September 1934, Stalin
complained to
Montefiore,
Sebag. Stalin: The Court of the Red Tsar.
THOUSANDS
OF ARMY COMMANDERS WERE REHABILITATED AND SERVED IN WWII
In late 1939 and early 1940 several
thousand Red Army commanders were rehabilitated because of the extreme shortage
of officers and the incompetence demonstrated during the Soviet-Finnish
war. Generally officers up to the level
of divisional commanders were rehabilitated.
The rehabilitated included many future heroes of the Great Patriotic
War, such as: Rokossovsky, future marshall; Meretskov, future marshall;
Gorbatov, future army general; Bogdanov, future commander of the Second Tank
Army; Kholostyakov, future vice-admiral; Rudnev, future commissar of partisan
units in Ukraine--all of whom were later named Heroes of the Soviet Union. Also, 0zeryansky, hero of the defense of
Leningrad, awarded two Orders of Lenin and three Orders of the Red Banner;...
Medvedev,
Roy. Let History Judge.
A few survivors were released from
the camps; serveral had already been freed in 1940-41, such as Gorbatov, Rokossovsky,
and Meretskov, who rose to fame during the war.
Laqueur,
Walter. Stalin: The Glasnost Revelations.
ONLY
A MINORITY OF CHEKISTS USED EXTREME METHODS AND DESERVED TO BE SHOT
One of the memoirs I have is by a
former high official in the NKVD, who wrote:
"We declare, with full
responsibility, that only individual, morally unstable, and unprincipled
chekists went so far as to apply physical torture and torment, for which they
were shot in 1939, following the November [1938] letter to the Politburo on
excesses in investigation."
Medvedev,
Roy. Let History Judge.
MANY
TIMES STALIN SEEMED TO NOT KNOW WHAT SUBVERSION WAS HAPPENING
Moreover, many of his [Stalin] speeches
gave the impression that he was not well-informed about the repression. For example, at the February-March plenum of
the Central Committee in 1937 he demanded that there be no arrests of
Trotskyists and Zinovievists who had broken all ties with Trotsky and ended
oppositional activity. At that very time
thousands of such people were being arrested.
Stalin also rebuked those who considered it a trifle to expel tens of
thousands of the party. At that very
time not tens but hundreds of thousands were being expelled and arrested.
Shortly before the arrest of the
civil war hero Serdich, Stalin toasted him at a reception, suggesting that they
drink to "Bruderschaft." Just
a few days before Blyukher's destruction, Stalin spoke of him warmly at a
meeting. When an Armenian delegation
came to him, Stalin asked about the poet Charents and said that he should not
be touched, but a few months later Charents was arrested and killed. The wife of Serebrovsky, a deputy people's
commissar of Ordjonikidze's, tells of an unexpected phone call from Stalin one
evening in 1937. "I hear you are
going about on foot," Stalin said.
"That's no good. People
might think what they shouldn't. I'll
send you a car if yours is being repaired." And the next morning a car from the Kremlin
arrived for Mrs. Serebrovsky's use. But
two days later her husband was arrested, taken right from the hospital.
Alikhanova tells about the case of
Broido, one of Stalin's former aides in the Commissariat of Nationalities. When NKVD men came to his door late at night,
rather than let them in he rushed to the internal Kremlin telephone and called
Stalin. "Koba, they've come for
me," said Broido. "Foolishness,"
Stalin replied. "Who could bring
charges against you? Go calmly to the
NKVD and help them establish the truth."
Still, Broido was lucky. After
only two years in prison he was freed in 1940.
The famous historian and publicist
Steklov, disturbed by all the arrests, phoned Stalin and asked for an
appointment. "Of course, come on
over," Stalin said, and reassured him when they met: "What's the
matter with you? The party knows and
trusts you; you have nothing to worry about." Steklov returned to his friends and family,
and that very evening the NKVD came for him.
Naturally the first thought of his friends and family was to appeal to
Stalin, who seemed unaware of what was going on....
In 1938 Akulov, onetime procurator
of the
In 1937 Milchakov, who was working
in the administration of the gold mining industry, was suddenly removed from
his job and expelled from the party. But
a few days later the party organizer of the administration searched him out and
said anxiously, "Let's go to the Kremlin; Stalin's asking for
you." In the Kremlin office were
Stalin and Kaganovich. "What have
things come to," said Stalin, "if they're expelling people like Milchakov?" Then he said to Milchakov: "We're
appointing you deputy chief of Glavzoloto (the Chief Administration for Gold
Mining). Go and carry out your
duties." Two or three weeks later
Milchakov became the head of Glavzoloto, after the arrest of Serebrovsky. After another two months, however, Milchakov
was arrested and did not see
Medvedev,
Roy. Let History Judge.
Of course Stalin did not and could
not know about every instance of lawlessness.
Medvedev,
Roy. Let History Judge.
STALIN
SOMETIMES PROTECTED PEOPLE AGAINST THE SECRET POLICE
It is also instructive to observe
how Stalin frequently limited himself, at first, to shifting a major figure
without arresting him, although the NKVD already had fabricated testimony
against him. The man would be
transferred to a less important or sometimes a more important post;...
Medvedev,
Roy. Let History Judge.
STALIN
COMPLIMENTED PEOPLE EXECUTED FOR THEIR CRIMES
Stalin spoke respectfully of some of
his victims even after he had destroyed them.
According to Todorsky, at a Politburo meeting in 1938 Stalin
unexpectedly began to praise Tukhachevsky, who had already been shot. Stalin noted Tukhachevsky's unquestioned
military talent, his great sense of responsibility when given a job, and his
striving to keep abreast of the fast-changing theory, technology, and practice
of military affairs. And after
Uborevitch had been shot, Stalin said to Meretskov: "Train our troops the
same way you trained them under Uborevitch."
Medvedev,
Roy. Let History Judge.
STALIN
WAS THOROUGHLY ANTI-CAPITALIST
I am profoundly convinced that
Stalin never sought to restore capitalism.
Medvedev,
Roy. Let History Judge.
SOME
LOCAL LEADERS ABUSED PEOPLE AND BECAME A LAW UNTO THEMSELVES
If many ordinary citizens took
advantage of the terror to pursue their own despicable aims, what could be expected
from the leaders on all the various levels, including Stalin's closest aides?
... The newly appointed people's
commissars, directors of major enterprises and institutions, obkom and raikom
secretaries, and state security officials were given the right to decide the
fate of Soviet citizens. Each of them
was virtually the master of his domain, and many of them abused this power,
forming cliques of hangers-on and unprincipled careerists around themselves. Thus a basis was created for ceaseless mass repression.
Medvedev,
Roy. Let History Judge.
A great deal of work has been done
in the West on the relative power and influence of
Local proizvol (arbitrary
misconduct) and disobedience of central directives were endemic, particularly
in collectivization and in the purges of the 1930s.
Nove,
Alec, Ed. The Stalin Phenomenon.
...the
state played a major role. At the same
time, the vitally important specific and personal decisions of life and death
for most of the population were made locally.
How many "kulaks" were to be deported from which
villages? Who had the power to arrest
them? Whose name appeared on the purge
list? Which local faction controlled the
NKVD? If one is interested in either a
social history of the common folk or in "total history," one should
look less at those at the pinnacle, who tried to push the tides one way or
another, and more at the forces that were really important to the fates of most
people.
... If, for example, implementation
of political, judicial, and agricultural policies in the country was so
dependent on local conditions and alignments, how can one be certain that the
actual results, on the ground, were an accurate reflection of Stalin's
wishes? Even if one assumes Stalin's
personality was the only or main factor in the initiation of policies, one must
still explain the obvious disparities between central orders and local
outcomes: for example the failure of local agencies to adhere to Moscow's
collectivization (and later, purge) targets.
Why was it that during the
membership chistki (purges) of 1933-36, local leaders expelled so many more
members than
The complex political sociology of
the system involved kolkhozniki, factory workers, rank-and-file party
activists, local party apparatchiki, regional first secretaries, and several
factions in
Consider the party membership purges
(chistki) of 1933-6. At the lowest
level, that of party cells, the membership targeted the peasantry's traditional
class enemies as well as those with dubious Civil War pasts. This included former tsarist policeman,
wealthy peasants, former noble landowners and their associates, White Army
participants, locally known crooks, members of the intelligentsia and generally
unpopular types who had entered the party.
As the Smolensk Archive transcripts of these grass-roots chistka
meetings show, this process victimized innocent bystanders, relatives and even
past associates of the above categories: the "genetic" peasant
approach again. Local party secretaries
tried to protect their political machines by defending those of their number
who work targets of rank-and-file wrath and by running up the purge score. These secretaries expelled "passive"
(non-participating or non-dues paying) members, those who could be tripped up
on ideological questions and particular members who had made trouble for the
machine.
[Footnote]: "Passives were not
mentioned or targeted in the instructions for the 1933 Chistka, but were
nonetheless the largest single group expelled in the operation itself.--Page
149
This was not at all what the
Stalinist center had in mind, as its subsequent furious reaction showed.
[Footnote]: From the
"outside," though, it was and is easy to mistake this mass purging at
the hands of local secretaries for a Stalin plan to terrorize everyone.--Page
149
Indeed, the
When the Yezhov vigilance campaign
began in mid-1936, local party secretaries were happy to direct the enemy
accusation against has-been ex-oppositionists.
When Stalin and the
In
Nove,
Alec, Ed. The Stalin Phenomenon.
Peasants and rank-and-file party
members accused and purged each other, accusing each other of being byvshie
liudi (former people) from the old regime, such as kulaks, former gendarmes and
White Army soldiers. Relatives of
enemies of the people were also swept away as common folk used familiar
genealogical and kin categories as their reference points in defining
enemies. Blind and pitiless peasants and
others also lashed out at the local intelligentsia in traditional assertions of
cultural and social resentment....
Peasants naturally jumped to the conclusion that "our" dead
livestock had been poisoned by "them"--the educated
specialists.... In some collective
farms, "one half expelled the other half."
...Before the mid-1930s, the
"enemy," in both official Soviet and customary peasant usages,
referred to the traditional social enemy: the kulak, the nobleman, the White
Army officer, and so forth. By 1937,
though, Stalin had identified "enemies with party cards," suggesting
that the bureaucrat was the class enemy.
Rank-and-file party members lashed
out at their secretarial leaders, accusing them of bureaucratism, corruption,
and dictatorial methods. Factory workers
attacked their managers with the same kind of populist anger. Even the newly prompted Red Specialists came
under fire in the pitiless assertion of radicalism. In response, the threatened official strata
fought back by blaming their subordinates.
Party secretaries expelled huge numbers of rank-and-file members in
order to protect themselves and display their vigilance. Collective farm chairmen desperately ejected
troublesome peasants from the kolkhozy for the same reasons. It was a war of all against all and the
battle lines reflected social conflicts, some of them decades or even centuries
old.
...
Party secretaries, anxious to feed their industrial workers, extend
their own rural powers and increase their budget allocations truly became
"dizzy with success." For
their own reasons, and encouraged by
Again at the micro level, local
peasants and party activists dekulakized unpopular "outsiders": those
who had violated communal traditions by getting ahead, members of the rural
intelligentsia, and other traditional enemies.
Things were out of control; everyone was arresting everyone. Of course, Stalin and his clique share ultimate
responsibility for these "excesses."
Their strident rhetoric and sloganeering had sparked the fire in the
first place and in their attempts to build momentum for dekulakization and
collectivization they had (until March 1930) encouraged "energetic"
measures.
As they would do five years later
during the chistki, the Stalinist center intervened during collectivization in
an attempt to control the process.
Stalin's March 1930 "Dizzy With Success" article was the best
known such attempt. Sending in the supposedly
disciplined and tempered proletarian 25,000ers was another and the
Stalin-Molotov May 1933 decree limiting arrests and detentions was a third.
In the collectivization, chistki,
and Ezhovshchina phenomena we find the same dynamics at work: the anatomy of a
radical Stalinist transformation. First,
the leadership announces the campaign, pressure for which had been developing
in the party. The announcement is vague
and confused and the documents show signs of poor planning and internal
conflict. Nevertheless, in order to
overcome traditional inertia of local interests, enthusiastic measures are
demanded in strident language as the party is shoved to the left.
Second, the decision percolates
down, local officials at all levels variously delay, speed up, re-interpret, or
twist the idea to suit both local conditions and their own interests. Implementation of the campaign, quite
regardless of Stalin's presumed intentions, alternatively reflects historical
class hatreds, Civil War legacies, zealotry, personal rivalry, and the needs of
official "family circle" cliques.
Third, things rapidly get out of
control. Insofar as anyone is directing
events, it is the local party secretary.
But much is beyond his power, not to mention Stalin's. The Stalinist center intervenes through
jawboning speeches, exemplary indictments of particular organizations and
individuals, an official decrees. More
often than not, the intervention is on the side of restraining local chaos and
enhancing
Finally, the central leadership
decides to attenuate the campaign or end it altogether. Once again, this requires multiple statements
and interventions. Halting a campaign
was much more difficult than starting it precisely because of the strong
influence of local attitudes, multiple actors, and omnipresent confusion. The entire process is characterized by
zig-zag pushes of the political/social leviathan to the left and right in an
attempt to direct it.
Several times
Nove,
Alec, Ed. The Stalin Phenomenon.
Collectivization and collective
farming were shaped less by Stalin and the central authorities than by the
undisciplined and irresponsible activity of rural officials, the
experimentation of collective farm leaders left to fend for themselves, and the
realities of a backward countryside and a traditional peasantry which defied
Bolshevik fortress storming.
...The center never managed to exert
its control over the countryside as it had intended in the schema of revolution
from above.
Viola,
Lynne. The Best Sons of the Fatherland.
POSITIVE
CHANGES FAR EXCEEDED THE NEGATIVE SIDE EFFECTS OF SOCIAL CHANGE
It was known that party and state
leaders were being arrested as "enemies of the people," but at the
same time new schools, factories, and palaces of culture were rising
everywhere. Military leaders were being
arrested as spies, but the party was building a strong, modern army. Scientists were being arrested as wreckers,
but Soviet science developed rapidly with the party's support. Writers were being arrested as "Trotskyites
and counter-revolutionaries," but some literary works appeared that were real
masterpieces. Leaders in the union
republics were being arrested as nationalists, but the formerly oppressed
nationalities were improving their lot, and friendship among the peoples of the
Medvedev,
Roy. Let History Judge.
Finally, the whole structure of Russian
society has undergone a change so profound and so many sided that it cannot
really be reversed. It is possible to
imagine a violent reaction of the Russian people itself against the state of
siege in which it has been living so long.
It is even possible to imagine something like a political
restoration. But it is certain that even
such a restoration would touch merely the surface of Russian society and that
it would demonstrate its impotence vis-a-vis the work done by the revolution
even more thoroughly than the Stuart and the Bourbon restorations had
done. For of Stalinist Russia it is even
truer than of any other revolutionary nation that '20 years have done the work
of 20 generations'.
For all these reasons Stalin cannot
be classed with Hitler, among the tyrants whose record is one of absolute
worthlessness and futility. Hitler was
the leader of a sterile counter-revolution, while Stalin has been both the
leader and the exploiter of a tragic, self-contradictory but creative
revolution.
The better part of Stalin's work is
as certain to outlast Stalin himself as the better parts of the work of
Cromwell & Napoleon have outlasted them.
Deutscher,
Isaac. Stalin; A Political Biography.
Summing up Stalin's rule in 1948 I
said that' Stalin cannot be classed with Hitler, among the tyrants whose record
is one of absolute worthlessness and futility.
Hitler was the leader of a sterile counter-revolution, while Stalin has
been both the leader and the exploiter of a tragic, self-contradictory, but
creative revolution.' This remains true if the whole of Stalin's career is
assessed.
Deutscher,
Isaac. Stalin; A Political Biography.
IN
1918 OTHER PARTIES EXPELLED FROM THE ASSEMBLY BUT REMAIN LEGAL & LATER
ALLIES
On June 14, 1918, citing Right
Social Revolutionary and Menshevik participation in the fight against the
Soviet regime, the Central Executive Committee decreed the expulsion of the
Right Social Revolutionaries and Mensheviks from all Soviets. Earlier, in April 1918, all Anarchist groups
had been expelled from the Soviets. In
July 1918, after the rising of the left Socialist-Revolutionaries, the same
decree was issued for them. But even
after their expulsion from the Soviets, the Socialist-Revolutionary and
Menshevik parties continued to exist as legal, active political
organizations. Moreover, when the
Menshevik Central Committee at the end of 1918 opposed foreign intervention and
collaboration with the bourgeoisie and rejected the proposal for a Constituent
Assembly, the Central Executive Committee rescinded the decree of June 14 with
respect to the Mensheviks. In February
1919 the same was done with respect to those Right Socialist-Revolutionary
groups that took a position against foreign intervention. Some anarcho-syndicalist groups also existed
legally.
In the summer and fall of 1918 the
main forces opposing the Bolsheviks in the incipient civil war were the left
"petty bourgeois" parties--the Socialist-Revolutionaries, Mensheviks,
Anarchists, various nationalist groups--in alliance with the Czech Legion. By the end of 1918 the monarchist generals
supported by armed units from
Medvedev,
Roy. Let History Judge.
SU
INTELLIGENCE MISLED STALIN ON PROSPECTS FOR WAR
Marshall Zhukov, in his
Reminiscences and Reflections, confirms the fact that the General Staff and
military intelligence were informed of Hitler's plans. According to Zhukov, General Golikov, chief
of the Soviet army's Intelligence Division, presented Stalin with a report on
March 20, 1941, containing information of exceptional significance. Zhukov quotes in part from the report:
"1. On the basis of all the aforesaid statements
and possible variants of operations this spring I consider that the most
probable time operations will begin against the
2.
Rumors and documents to the effect that war against the
Zhukov reports that Admiral
Kuznetsov, people's commissar of the Soviet navy, attached a similar comment to
his report.
Medvedev,
Roy. Let History Judge.
KHRUSHCHOV
LIED WHEN HE SAID STALIN WENT INTO SECLUSION WHEN WWII STARTED
In the attempts to refurbish Stalin's
reputation in the years after Khrushchev's removal some authors disputed the
very fact of Stalin's shameful desertion during the first days of the war. For example, Kuznetsov's memoirs assert that
on June 23 Stalin "was working energetically" and that on June 24
Kuznetsov saw Stalin holding an important conference in his office at the
Kremlin. Zhukov's memoirs refer to
meetings with Stalin on June 26 and 29.
In some other memoirs the authors claim, if not to have met with Stalin,
at least to have talked with him on the phone between June 23 and June 30.
Medvedev,
Roy. Let History Judge.
It was Khrushchev in his February
1956 "secret speech" at the 20th Party Congress who first told the
story of Stalin's sudden depression during the first days of the war, claiming
that he had relinquished the leadership of the country....
Khrushchev himself was in
This story--that Stalin gave up the
leadership during the first days of the war--has been repeated by quite a few
reputable authors, citing Khrushchev as their source. The power crisis in the Kremlin during the
first week of the war also became the subject of several works of fiction. Biographies of Stalin published in the West
have repeated the tale, often with additional embellishment. In the well-illustrated biography of Stalin
by Jonathan Lewis and Philip Whitehead, published in
"Stalin himself was
prostrate. For a week he rarely emerged
from his villa at Kuntsevo. His name
disappeared from newspapers. For 10 days
the
Alan Bullock, in his dual biography
of Hitler and Stalin published in 1991, also asserts as fact the allegation
that Stalin "suffered some kind of breakdown" and that there are
"no orders or other documents signed by Stalin from 23 to 30
June." Bullock also repeats the
story that members of the Politburo discussed the possibility of arresting
Stalin. Even though the whole episode is
a complete fabrication, it nevertheless has appeared in encyclopedias and even
in such an authoritative work as the, Oxford Encyclopedia of the Second World
War published in 1995. But one has only
to read the memoirs of Marshal Zhukov, where Stalin's activities, orders, and
directives during the first days of the war are well documented, in order to
become convinced that the story is false....
At the beginning of the 1990s the
visitors' book from Stalin's Kremlin office covering the years 1924-53 was
discovered in the Politburo archive.
These records were kept by Stalin's junior secretaries in Stalin's
office. These rather dry documents are
of enormous interest to students of Soviet history, and were published in,
chronological order with commentaries and explanatory notes by the journal
Istorichesky Arkhiv during the years 1994-97....
The visitors' book makes it clear
that on 22 June, the day that the war began, the first to appear in Stalin's
office at 5:45 a.m. were Molotov, Beria, Timoshenko, Mekhlis, and Zhukov. About two hours later the gathering was
joined by Malenkov, Mikoyan, Kaganovich, Voroshilov, and Vyshinsky. In the course of the day a large number of
senior military, state and Party figures came and went. Meetings went on without interruption for 11
hours. It is known that more than 20
different decrees and orders were issued that day, including the text of the
appeal to the Soviet people, drafted collectively and read out on the radio by
Molotov. Stalin, who had not slept the
night before, left earlier in the evening to have a short rest at the Kuntsevo
dacha, only 15 minutes' drive from the Kremlin.
But he was unable to sleep and returned to the Kremlin at 3 a.m. on 23
June in order to consult with military leaders and members of the
Politburo. Meetings continued in the
afternoon. Voroshilov, Merkulov, Beria,
and General Vatutin (deputizing for Zhukov who had flown to the southern front)
finally left Stalin's office at 1:45 a.m. on 24 June....
Activity during the next days was
just as strenuous. On 26th June Stalin
worked in the Kremlin from midday to midnight and received 28 visitors, mainly
military leaders and members of the government.
The largest number of meetings took place on Friday 27 June with 30
people coming into the office. The
following day, 28 June, was similar, with the final meetings coming to an end
after midnight. Stalin did not go to his
Kremlin office on the Sunday; however, the assertion by two biographers, Radzinsky
and Volkogonov, that this was the day Stalin fled and shut himself up in the
dacha hardly corresponds to what actually happened. Both authors have rather unreliably based
their conclusions on the fact that there are no entries in the Kremlin office visitors'
book for 29 and 30 June. But according
to Marshal Zhukov, "on the 29th Stalin came to the Stavka at the
Commissariat for Defense twice and on both occasions was scathing about the
strategic situation that was unfolding in the west." On 30 June Stalin convoked a meeting of the
Politburo at the dacha at which it was decided to set up the State Defense
Committee (GKO)....
Thus Stalin did not abandon the
leadership of the country during the first days of the war, although he did
push aside a large number of his Party colleagues, convinced that collective
Party leadership would only have been a hindrance in wartime conditions....
If one looks at all Stalin's actions
and the military decisions that were taken during the first days of the war,
with hindsight it is perfectly possible to come to the conclusion that given
the intensity and the power of the blow inflicted on the USSR by the German
army and its allies, whose forces taken together amounted to almost 200
divisions, the tactical decision to keep the main forces of the Soviet army
200-300 kilometers from the border was absolutely correct. It was this that made it possible to carry
out local counterattacks and on 26th June, on Stalin's orders, to create a new
reserve front using the 5th Army. Soon
after that a new third defense line was established. The German army continued to advance but only
at the price of very heavy losses.
Medvedev,
Roy & Zhores Medvedev. The Unknown Stalin.
IN
1943 MUCH OF THE ANTI-RELIGION ACTIVITIES WERE ENDED
There is an element of truth in
these assertions. Certainly in 1943 much
of the previous persecution of the church was ended, many bishops and other
clergy were released from confinement, hundreds of previously closed churches
were opened, seminaries and an Orthodox Academy were allowed to open, and a
Patriarchate was established.
Medvedev,
Roy. Let History Judge.
On Sept. 4, 1943, Stalin startled
the world by his sudden rehabilitation of the Greek Orthodox Church, which,
identified with the ancien regime, had been half-suppressed since the
revolution. Stalin received the
Metropolitan Sergius, the actual head of the Church, and after a long and
friendly interview with him, decreed the restoration of the Holy Synod. The reason he gave for this act was that the
Church had co-operated in the war effort and thereby proved its loyal devotion
to the fatherland.
[Footnote]: 'It is very fortunate
for
Deutscher,
Isaac. Stalin; A Political Biography.
On 14 September 1943 Stalin met with
Metropolitan Sergei and two other hierarchs and granted them permission to
convene a sobor (assembly) of the church to elect a patriarch, which had not
been allowed since the death of Patriarch Tikhon in 1925. Following this reconciliation the church was
granted a synod for administration, a regular publication, theological
academies and religious instruction for children. The clerics gratefully hailed Stalin as 'the
Supreme Leader of the Russian People', among other accolades. Thus it was appropriate that Stalin invited
Metropolitan Nikolai to join him in celebrating the victory over the Germans at
a reception in the Kremlin.
McNeal,
Robert, Stalin: Man and Ruler.
INCOMPETENCE
RATHER THAN WRECKING WAS OFTEN THE PROBLEM
But gradually a real
"wrecker" psychosis has grown up amongst the people. They have come to interpret everything that goes
wrong as sabotage, whilst most certainly a great part of the defects are
traceable to incompetence pure and simple.
Feuchtwanger,
Lion.
THE
SOVIET PEOPLE WERE UNITED AND OPTIMISTIC FOR SEVERAL REASONS
Closer examination reveals that this
notorious "conformism" can be reduced to three main features:
uniformity of opinion in regard to the fundamental principles of communism,
common love of the Soviet Union, and the confidence shared by all that in the
near future the
Feuchtwanger,
Lion.
RISING
STANDARD OF LIVING GENERATES GREATER PATRIOTISM
One difference there certainly is between
the patriotism of the Soviet people and that of other countries. The patriotism of the
Feuchtwanger,
Lion.
INTELLECTUALS,
ARTISTS AND WRITERS ARE PAMPERED AND GIVEN FUNDS
Savants, writers, artists, and
actors enjoy definite advantages in the
Feuchtwanger,
Lion.
THE
DIFFERENCES BETWEEN SOVIET DICTATORSHIP AND FASCIST DICTATORSHIP
But carping, whining, and alarming
are pursuits which many hold almost as dear as life itself. Every language contains a host of words for
them, and I can well imagine that to many the restriction of the right to abuse
must seem sheer despotism. For this
reason many people say that the Soviet Union is the very opposite of a
democracy, and some, indeed, go so far as to maintain there is no difference
between the
Feuchtwanger,
Lion.
THE
PEOPLE PRAISE STALIN WHETHER HE WANTS IT OR NOT BECAUSE THEY ARE THANKFUL
There can be no question that in the
great majority of cases this exaggerated veneration [of Stalin] is
genuine. The people feel the need to
express their gratitude, their infinite admiration. They do in truth believe that they owe to
Stalin all they are and have, and however incongruous and at times distasteful
this idolatry may seem to us of the West, nowhere have I found anything to
indicate that it is in the least artificial or ready-made. Rather it has grown up organically,
side-by-side with the results achieved in the economic reconstruction. The people are grateful to Stalin for their
bread and meat, their order, their education, and for the creation of the Red
Army to safeguard their new well-being.
They must be able to show gratitude to someone for the manifest
improvement in conditions, and no mere abstraction will suffice; they are not
grateful to an abstract" Communism," but to a tangible man, which is
Stalin. The Russian is inclined to
exuberance in his speech and his gestures, and he is glad to have the
opportunity of pouring out his heart.
This excessive homage is perhaps intended not so much for Stalin, the
individual, as for the representative of this visibly successful economic
construction. When the people say
"Stalin," they have in the back of their minds increasing prosperity
and increasing culture. When the people
say: "We love Stalin," it is because this is the simplest and most
natural form of expression they can give to their willing acceptance of their
economic circumstances, of socialism, and of the regime.
Moreover, Stalin is flesh of the
people's flesh. He is the son of a
peasant cobbler and has preserved his kinship with the workers and
peasants. Of him it can be said, more
truly than of any other statesman I know, that he speaks the people's
language. He is definitely not what one
would call a great orator. He speaks
hesitatingly, not at all brilliantly, and rather tonelessly, as if he found it
difficult. His arguments come slowly:
they appeal to the sound common sense of people who grasp a thing thoroughly,
but not quickly. But above all, Stalin
has a sense of humor, a circumstantial, sly, comfortable, often cruel peasants
sense of humor. In his speeches he likes
to quote humorous anecdotes from popular Russian writers; he thoroughly enjoys
these anecdotes and points out the practical application. In parts, his speeches read like
old-fashioned calendar inscriptions.
When Stalin speaks with his knowing, comfortable smile, pointing with
his forefinger, he does not, like other orators, make a breach between himself
and his audience; he does not stand commandingly on the platform while they sit
below him, but very soon an alliance, an intimacy is established between him
and his listeners. They, being made of
the same stuff, are susceptible to the arguments, and both laugh merrily at the
same simple stories.
Feuchtwanger,
Lion.
He will not allow public celebration
of his birthday, and if homage is paid to him in public, he emphasizes that
such homage applies exclusively to his policy, not to him personally. When, for instance, the Congress had carried
the acceptance of the constitution proposed and in the end edited by him, and
gave him an uproarious ovation, he himself joined in the applause to show that
he did not accept this homage as arising from appreciation of him personally,
but solely of his policy.
Feuchtwanger,
Lion.
JEWISH
CULTURE AND YIDDISH ARE FOSTERED IN THE SU
Yiddish, like all national
languages, is carefully fostered in the
The establishment of the national
Jewish state of Biro-Bidjan at first encountered almost insuperable
difficulties,...
Feuchtwanger,
Lion.
With the establishment of the Soviet
regime [in the
Berezhkov,
Valentin. At Stalin's Side.
In special places [in the
predominantly Jewish neighborhood of Podol in
Berezhkov,
Valentin. At Stalin's Side.
In 1919, a Jewish State Theatre was
established in
Many anti-Soviets in the West,
especially Zionists, had argued that the 1948-53 campaign against
'cosmopolitanism' and 'Zionism' was really a manifestation of anti-Semitism
(analogous to that of Hitler's) but a realistic assessment demonstrates that
this argument functioned to serve the interests of Western and Israeli Zionists
in their long-term battle with Jewish Marxists for hegemony in the Jewish
community, as well as to strengthen Western imperialist support for Israel.
Professionally and economically the
Jewish people have fared extremely well in the period of Soviet power. They are, for example, far more highly
educated than any other nationality in the
Szymanski,
Albert. Human Rights in the Soviet Union.
SOVIET
MASSES COULD SEE WWII COMING
In the
Feuchtwanger,
Lion.
But the Soviet citizens know too
that malicious fools are lying in wait outside their frontiers ready to attack
them, and that these frontiers must be effectively protected. Therefore they go about the work of
establishing their socialist economy...and they speak of the war, no longer as
of a more or less probable event of the distant future, but as a very real
imminent thing.
Feuchtwanger,
Lion.
To tell the truth, none of us
believed that
Rokossovsky,
K., Ed. by Bob Daglish A Soldier's Duty.
SU
TRYING TO POSTPONE THE WAR AS LONG AS POSSIBLE TO BUILD ITS STRENGTH
Nevertheless, everything is, of
course, being done to postpone the outbreak of the war as long as possible, or
even, contrary to all probability, to avoid it altogether....but it [the Union]
knows too that the longer it can postpone the outbreak of the war, the stronger
it will be and the smaller will be the sacrifice which the ultimate victory
will cost.
But, having decided that this war is
coming in spite of everything, indeed, that it will be there tomorrow, they are
adjusting themselves to it, and this war mentality explains, as I have said,
many things which would otherwise be incomprehensible.
Feuchtwanger,
Lion.
When Churchill visited
Axell,
Albert. Stalin's War: Through the Eyes of His Commanders.
LACK
OF WRITTEN DOCUMENTS DOES NOT SHOW THE DEFENDANTS ARE INNOCENT
I referred again to the harmful
effect which the all too simple conduct of the Zinoviev trial had had abroad,
even amongst the well-wishers. Stalin
laughed a little at those who demanded many written documents before they could
bring themselves to believe in a conspiracy; practiced conspirators, he said,
were not in the habit of leaving their documents lying around for all to see.
Feuchtwanger,
Lion.
STALIN
TRIED FOR YEARS TO WIN OVER TROTSKYISTS RATHER THAN ELIMINATE THEM
He [Stalin] is supposed to be ruthless,
but for many years he has been striving to win over competent Trotskyists
rather than destroy them, and it is in a way affecting to see how doggedly he
is endeavoring to use them for his work.
Feuchtwanger,
Lion.
1937
TRIAL TESTIMONY REGARDING TROTSKY IS BELIEVABLE AND VERY UNDERSTANDABLE
And to me also, as long as I was in
But when I attended the second trial
in
So I took up the records of the
trials, reflected on what I had seen with my own eyes and heard with my own
years, and considered once more the pros and cons of the charge.
Fundamentally, the proceedings were
directed above all against the great Trotsky, indicted and absent, and the
principal objection is the alleged unauthenticity of the charge brought against
him. "This man Trotsky,"
opponents cry, "one of the founders of the
That may be, but closer examination
reveals that the conduct of which the charge accuses Trotsky, far from being
incredible, is the only conduct which can be expected from Trotsky's state of
mind.
Imagine this man Trotsky, condemned
as he was to inactivity, compelled to look on idly, whilst the noble experiment
which Lenin and he had begun was transformed into a sort of gigantic petty
bourgeois allotment. For to him, who
wanted to steep the terrestrial globe in socialism, the "
It also seems to me to be
conceivable that a man who, blinded by hate, refused to admit to himself the
generally acknowledged facts of the accomplished economic construction of the
What, then, must have been Trotsky's
principal goal during all the years of exile, and what must be his principal
goal today? To get back into the country
at any price and reassume power.
Feuchtwanger,
Lion.
At 3:30 a.m. the Chief of Staff of
the Western District reported a German air raid on towns in
The Commissar for Defense ordered me
to phone Stalin. I started calling. No one answers. I keep calling. Finally I hear the sleep-dulled voice of the
general on duty of the security section.
I ask him to call Stalin to the phone.