STALIN EXPLAINS WHY THE
CHEKA IS NEEDED
His ideas are made even more explicit in an interview with the Foreign Workers'
Delegation on November 5, 1927. At that time he said:...
"The GPU or the Cheka is a punitive organ of the Soviet
government.... It punishes primarily spies, plotters, terrorists, bandits,
speculators, and forgers. The organ was created on the day after the
October revolution, after all kinds of plots, terrorist and spying
organizations financed by Russian and foreign capitalists were
discovered. This organ developed and became consolidated after a series
of terrorist acts had been perpetrated against leaders of the Soviet
government, after the murder of Comrade Uritsky, member of the revolutionary
committee of
"It is not surprising, therefore, that the bourgeoisie of all countries
hate the GPU. All sorts of legends have been invented about the
GPU.... The sworn enemies of the revolution curse the GPU. Hence it
follows that the GPU is doing the right thing.
"But this is not how the workers regard the GPU. You can go to the
workers' districts and ask the workers what they think of it. You'll find
they regard it with respect. Why? Because they see in it a loyal
defender of the Revolution....
"I do not mean to say by this that the internal situation of the country
is such as makes it necessary to have punitive organs of the Revolution.
From the point of view of the internal situation, the revolution is so firm and
unshakeable that we could do without the GPU. But the trouble is that the
enemies at home are not isolated individuals. They are all connected in a
thousand ways with the capitalists of all countries who support them by every
means and in every way. We are a country surrounded by capitalist
states. The internal enemies of our Revolution are the agents of the
capitalists of all countries. The capitalist states are the background
and basis for our internal enemies. In fighting against the enemies at
home we fight the counterrevolutionary elements of all countries. Judge
for yourselves whether under such conditions we can do without such punitive
organs as the GPU."
Davis, Jerome. Behind Soviet
Power. New York, N. Y.: The Readers' Press, Inc., c1946, p. 29
This Organ (Cheka) was created on the day after the October Revolution, after
all kinds of plots, terrorist and spying organizations financed by Russian and
foreign capitalists were discovered. This organ developed and became
consolidated after a series of terrorist acts had been perpetrated against the
leaders of the Soviet government, after the murder of Comrade Uritsky, member
of the Revolutionary Committee of Leningrad (he was killed by a
Socialist-Revolutionary), after the murder of Comrade Volodarsky, member of the
Revolutionary Committee of Leningrad (he was also killed by a
Socialist-Revolutionary), after the attempt on the life of Lenin (he was
wounded by a member of the Socialist-Revolutionary Party). It must be
admitted that the GPU aimed at the enemies of the revolution without
missing. By the way, this quality of the GPU still holds good. It
has been, ever since, the terror of the bourgeoisie, the indefatigable guard of
the revolution, the unsheathed sword of the proletariat.
It is not surprising, therefore, that the bourgeoisie of all countries hate the
GPU. All sorts of legends have been invented about the GPU.
The slander which has been circulated about the GPU knows no bounds. And
what does that mean? It means that the GPU is properly defending the
interests of the Revolution. The sworn enemies of the Revolution curse
the GPU. Hence, it follows that the GPU is doing the right thing.
Stalin, Joseph. Stalin's
Kampf. New York: Howell, Soskin & Company, c1940, p. 231
Stalin described the GPU's functions as the Communist Party sees them, in
response to an inquiry put to him by a visiting delegation in 1927. He
said: "...No, comrades, we do not want to fall into the same error
as the Parisian Communards fell into. They were all too mild toward the
Versaillers, and Karl Marx has accused them of this since.
From the internal standpoint the situation of the Revolution is so absolutely
firm and unshakeable that we could easily do without the State Political
Administration, but what internal enemies do exist are not isolated
individuals, they are connected with the capitalists abroad by a thousand
threads, and the latter support them with all means.... We do not want to
repeat the mistakes of the Parisian Communards. The State Political
Administration is necessary for the Revolution and will continue to exist to
the terror of the enemies of the proletariat."
Baldwin, Roger. Liberty Under
the Soviets,
Notwithstanding all the horrors associated with the name Cheka during the first
years of the Bolshevik Revolution, neither Dzerzhinsky himself nor the majority
of his trusted assistants were motivated by anything except fanatical zeal to
serve as the sword of the Revolution. Feared by people, the Secret Police
were not then feared by those who worked loyally for the
Krivitsky, Walter G. I was
Stalin's Agent,
(Foreign Delegation’s
Interview with Stalin on November 5, 1927)
QUESTION: Judicial powers of
the GPU, trial without witness, without defenders, secret arrests.
Considering that these measures are not approved of by French public opinion,
it would be interesting to hear their justification. Is it intended to
substitute or abolish them?
ANSWER: The GPU or the Cheka
is a retributive organ of the Soviet Government. It is more or less
similar to the Committee of Public Safety which existed during the Great French
Revolution. It punishes primarily spies, plotters, terrorists, bandits,
speculators, and forgers. It is something in the nature of a
military-political tribunal set up for the purpose of protecting the interests
of the Revolution from attacks on the part of the counter-revolutionary
bourgeoisie and their agents.
This organ was created on the day after the October Revolution, after all kinds
of plots, terrorist and spying organizations, financed by Russian and foreign
capitalists were discovered. This organ developed and became consolidated
after a series of terrorist acts perpetrated against the leaders of the Soviet
Government, after the murder of Comrade Uritsky, member of the Revolutionary
Committee of Leningrad (he was killed by a Social-Revolutionary), after the
murder of Comrade Volodarsky, member of the Revolutionary Committee of
Leningrad (he was also killed by a Social-Revolutionary), after the attempt on
Lenin (he was wounded by a member of the Social-Revolutionary Party). It
must be admitted that the GPU aimed at the enemies of the Revolution without
missing. By the way, this quality of the GPU still holds good. It
has become the scare of the bourgeoisie, the indefatigable guard of the
Revolution, the unsheathed sword of the proletariat.
It is not surprising, therefore, that the bourgeoisie of all countries have
such hatred for the GPU. There is no legend which has not been invented
in connection with the GPU. There is no such slander which has not been
circulated about the GPU. And what does that mean? It means that
the GPU is properly defending the interests of the Revolution. The sworn
enemies of the Revolution curse the GPU. Hence, it follows that the GPU
is doing the right thing....
But this is not how the workers regard the GPU. You go to the workers'
quarters and ask the workers what they think of it. You'll find that they
regard it with great respect. Why? Because they see in it a loyal
defender of the Revolution.
I understand the hatred and distrust of the bourgeoisie for the GPU. I
understand the various bourgeois tourists who, on coming to the
They advocate a maximum of leniency, they advise the dissolution of the
GPU.... But can anyone guarantee that the capitalists of all countries will
abandon the idea of organizing and financing counter-revolutionary plotters,
terrorists, incendiaries, and bomb-throwers after the liquidation of the
GPU? To disarm the Revolution without having any guarantees that the
enemies of the Revolution will be disarmed--would not that be folly, would not
that be a crime against the working class? No, comrades, we did not want
to repeat the errors of the Paris Communards. The Communards of Paris
were too lenient in dealing with
I do not mean to say by this that the internal situation of the country is such
as makes it necessary to have a retributive organ of the Revolution. From
the point of view of the internal situation, the Revolution is so firm and
unshakable that we could do without the GPU. But the trouble is that the
enemies at home are not isolated individuals. They are connected in
a thousand ways with the capitalists of all countries who support them by
every means and in every way. We are a country surrounded by capitalist
states. The internal enemies of our Revolution are the agents of the
capitalists of all countries. The capitalist states are the background
and basis for the internal enemies of our Revolution. Fighting against
the enemies at home we therefore fight the counter-revolutionary elements of
all countries. Judge for yourselves whether under such conditions we can
do without such retributive organs as the GPU.
No, comrades, we do not want to repeat the mistakes of the Paris
Communards. The GPU is necessary for the Revolution and it will continue
to live and strike terror into the heart of the enemies of the proletariat.
Stalin, Joseph. The
Worker’s State.
ZINOVIEV CONFESSED TO PLANNING
KIROV’S MURDER
The evidence brought out at the trials seemed almost fantastic--yet all
confessed. Zinoviev in his confession frankly stated, "I plead
guilty to having been the principal organizer of the murder of
Davis, Jerome. Behind Soviet
Power. New York, N. Y.: The Readers' Press, Inc., c1946, p. 29
[July 29th, 1936 secret Central Committee letter concerning the terroristic
activity of the Trotskyist-Zinovievist counter-revolutionary bloc]
On the basis of new materials gathered by the NKVD in 1936, it can be
considered an established fact that Zinoviev and Kamenev were not only the
fomenters of terroristic activity against the leaders of our party and
government but also the authors of direct instructions regarding the murder of
Kirov as well as preparations for attempts on the lives of other leaders of our
party and, first and foremost, on the life of Comrade Stalin....
Similarly, it can be considered an established fact that Zinovievists carried
out their terroristic practices in a solid bloc with Trotsky and Trotskyists.
THE FACTS
1. During 1936, after the murder of
The overwhelming majority of members of these terroristic groups admitted under
investigation that they considered the preparation of terroristic acts against
the leaders of the party and government to be their fundamental task.
2. The Trotskyist and Zinovievist groups that have been exposed and all
of their terroristic activity in the
The bloc consisting of the Trotskyist group and the Zinovievist-Kamenevist
group was formed at the end of 1932 after negotiations carried out among
leaders of counter-revolutionary groups. As a result, a united center
came into being made up of the Zinoviev camp (Zinoviev, Kamenev, Bakaev,
Yevdokimov, Kuklin) and the Trotsky camp (Smirnov, Mrachkovsky, and
Ter-Vaganian)....
So, for instance, Zinoviev, when interrogated in connection with the exposure
of terroristic groups, admitted the following at the investigation conducted on
July 23-25, 1936:
"I was indeed a member of the united Trotskyist-Zinovievist center
organized in 1932.
"The Trotskyist-Zinovievist center considered as its chief task the murder
of leaders of the All-Union Communist Party and, first and foremost, the murder
of Stalin and Kirov. The center was connected with Trotsky through its
members Smirnov and Mrachkovsky. Direct instructions from Trotsky for the
preparation of Stalin's murder were received by Smirnov."
3.
The entire practical work of organizing the assassination attempt was placed on
the shoulders of Bakaev, member of the united center. To assist Bakaev,
the center assigned Karev, the notorious Zinovievist working in
As a result of the decision of the united center, several Trotskyist and
Zinovievist terroristic groups were organized in
As for the fact that the murder of
Thus, for example, Zinoviev testified as follows at the investigation:
"I also confess that Bakaev and Karev, members of the organization, were
entrusted by me, in the name of the united center, with the organization of
terroristic acts against Stalin in Moscow and Kirov in Leningrad. These
instructions by me were given in the fall of 1932."
(Zinoviev. Minutes of the interrogation of July 23-25, 1936)
Getty & Naumov, The Road
to Terror.
4. The united center of the Trotskyist-Zinovievist counter-revolutionary
bloc considered as its fundamental and primary task the murder of Comrades
Stalin, Voroshilov, Kaganovich,
Getty & Naumov, The Road
to Terror.
His [Zinoviev] confession was complete, involving him not only in the
Zinovievite terrorist groups, but also with M. Lurye, allegedly sent by
Trotsky. He invoked Tomsky's name unambiguously, and also named Smilga,
the veteran member of Lenin's Central Committee who had led the Baltic Fleet in
the seizure of power. He asserted that he was in constant communication
with Smirnov, adding:
"... In this situation I had meetings with Smirnov who has accused me here
of frequently telling untruths. Yes, I often told untruths. I
started doing that from the moment I began fighting the Bolshevik Party.
Insofar as Smirnov took the road of fighting the Party, he too is telling
untruths. But it seems, the difference between him and myself is that I
have decided firmly and irrevocably to tell at this last moment the truth,
whereas he, it seems, has adopted a different decision."
Conquest, Robert. The Great
Terror.
For example, Zinoviev, who was examined in connection with the unmasked
terrorist groupings, admitted the following during the July 23-25, 1936
interrogation:
"I definitely was a member of the united Trotskyite-Zinovievite center
organized in 1932.
'The Trotskyite-Zinovievite center set as its principal task the killing of the
communist party leaders, primarily comrades Stalin and Kirov. Center
members, Smirnov and Mrachkovsky, served as the connection with Trotsky who
gave direct instructions to Smirnov to prepare to kill Stalin.' (Zinoviev,
Record of Interrogation, July 23-25, 1936)
McNeal, Robert. Resolutions
and Decisions of the CPSU--The Stalin Years: 1929-1953. Vol. 3.
3.
As a result of the decision of the united center, several Trotskyite and
Zinovievite terrorist groups were organized in
In the investigation the majority of the active participants in the terrorist
groups, including Zinoviev, Kamenev, Bakayev, Karev, and others, testified that
For example, Zinoviev testified as follows under examination:
"I also admit to have entrusted the organization's members, Bakayev and
Karev, in the name of the united center, with the organization of terrorist
acts against Stalin in
I assigned this mission in Ilinsk in the autumn of 1932."
(Zinoviev, Record of Interrogation, July 23-25, 1936)
McNeal, Robert. Resolutions
and Decisions of the CPSU--The Stalin Years: 1929-1953. Vol. 3. Toronto,
Buffalo: University of Toronto Press, 1974, p. 172
RADEK IMPLICATES TUKHASHEVSKY
AND IMPLIES HE WORKS WITH TROTSKY
... Radek in his testimony hinted that a conspiracy existed within the Red Army
which involved Marshall Tukhachevsky, a high commander. I had personal
reasons for feeling no surprise when Radek pled guilty. I had interviewed
him in his apartment in
Davis, Jerome. Behind Soviet
Power.
While the other accused spoke flatly and drearily, he [Radek] put real feeling
into his evidence. He developed the post-1927 history of Trotskyism, and
the complex links between those now accused and the Zinoviev group. He
then listed a number of fresh terrorist bands, implicated Bukharin, spoke of
the "Bonapartist" regime Trotsky intended, which would in fact be
under fascist control, and added that Trotsky was already prepared to sacrifice
the Ukraine and the Far East to the aggressors.
On the whole, Radek was a most co-operative and convincing defendant.
Conquest, Robert. The Great
Terror.
DEFENDANTS IN THE TRIALS HAD
HIGH POSITIONS DESPITE LONG HISTORY OF OPPOSING STALIN
In 1938 the last major treason trial occurred. Defendants included
Bukharin, ex-editor of Pravda; Rykov; former under Secretary of State
Krestinsky; former Commissar of Trade Rosengoltz; former Secretary of the
Treasury Grinko; Yagoda, former head of the GPU and the Kremlin physician Dr.
Levin. Although most of these men had been involved in opposition
politics for nearly two decades, the positions which they held indicates the
leniency which existed and the opportunities they were given to make good--or
commit sabotage.
Davis, Jerome. Behind Soviet
Power. New York, N. Y.: The Readers' Press, Inc., c1946, p. 30
Almost all those in the group now coming to trial had held, until shortly
before their arrests, posts as People's Commissars, Assistant People's
Commissars, leaders of industrial complexes, engineers, and so forth.
Conquest, Robert. The Great
Terror. New York: Oxford University Press, 1990, p. 141
A group of the most senior officials of the Stalinist state who had for many
years served it uncritically formed the bulk of the accused: Rosengoltz, Ivanov,
Chernov, and Grinko--all People's Commissar's until the previous year;
Zelensky, Head of the Cooperatives; and Sharangovich, First Secretary in
Byelorussia.
Conquest, Robert. The Great
Terror. New York: Oxford University Press, 1990, p. 342
Shestov: head of Schachtstoj in the Kustnesk tank;
Livshitz: head of the railway
line in Ukraine;
Kartsev: chief engineer of the
Kemerovo-Combine;
Drobnis: deputy head of the
construction work at the Kemerovo-combine,
Kolegayev: head of Uralsredmed
the copper works of mid Urals;
Rataitjak: head of the
Glavhimprom the main board of the chemical industry;
Maryasin: head of construction
of the railways in Urals, and others.
The purges of the CPSU and the political trials. Mario Sousa, 2001.
Pyatakov, who was expelled from the party at its Fifteenth Congress, then
"exiled" to the Soviet Foreign Trade Office in
Nekrich and Heller. Utopia in
Power. New York: Summit Books, c1986, p. 289
Sokolnikov, who had announced his break with the united opposition at the
Fifteenth Party Congress and had been chosen a member of the Central Committee
(at the Sixteenth and Seventeenth Congresses he was chosen a candidate member
of the Central Committee), and Pyatakov, who had been elected a member of the
Central Committee at the Sixteenth and Seventeenth Congresses.
Rogovin, Vadim. 1937: Year of
Terror. Oak Park, Michigan: Labor Publications, 1998, p. 68
After he was removed from the Politburo in 1926, Kamenev was posted by Stalin
to various outposts of "socialist construction": People's Commissar
for Trade, envoy to Japan, then to Italy, and then member of the board of the
Lenin Institute. He was the first person to see Lenin's personal archive,
which formed the nucleus of the Lenin Institute's collection, and his
appointment as director was a sensible one. As editor of the first
edition of Lenin's works, he had already "weeded" a good deal of
material that did not accord with the canon of Leninism, in effect establishing
the Bolshevik tradition of showing only what portrayed Lenin in a positive
light. In 1934 he was appointed Director of the
Volkogonov, Dmitrii. Lenin: A
New Biography.
Lenin and Stalin were opposed by Pyatakov, who, together with Bukharin, had
already during the war taken up a national-chauvinist stand on the national
question. Pyatakov and Bukharin were opposed to the right of nations to
self-determination.
Commission of the Central
Committee of the C.P.S.U. (B.), Ed. History of the CPSU (Bolsheviks): Short
Course.
It was on the 15th of August that a press-release from the Procuracy announced
charges against 16 people,... They had all been leaders and well-known
personalities from the Left Opposition in the 1920s, and were accused of taking
part in a terrorist conspiracy.
Rittersporn, Gabor. Stalinist
Simplifications and Soviet Complications, 1933-1953. New York: Harwood Academic
Publishers, c1991, p. 78
TRIALS ACTUALLY INVOLVE ON A
VERY SMALL PART OF THE PEOPLE
To the rest of the world it seemed at the time that Russia was enveloped in a
smothering atmosphere of plots, murders, and purges. Actually this was a
superficial view since, although the rest of the world was morbidly interested
in the trials to the exclusion of anything else about
Davis, Jerome. Behind Soviet
Power.
It was easy, reading our newspapers, to believe that the whole of
Davis, Jerome. Behind Soviet
Power. New York, N. Y.: The Readers' Press, Inc., c1946, p. 31
Reading this tedious catalog of never-ending arrests and trials, we are bound
to imagine that the country's state of mind in that terrible year 1937 was one
of deep depression. Not a bit of it! The great majority of the
population woke up happily to the relentless blare of loudspeakers, sped
eagerly to work, participated enthusiastically in the daily public meetings at
which their enemies were anathematized, and read skimpy newspaper reports of
the trials which showed how very reliable the secret police were.
Radzinsky, Edvard.
Stalin.
In the so called
Sousa, Mario. The Class
Struggle During the Thirties in the
CONFESSIONS WERE GENUINE AND
NO COERCION WAS INVOLVED
There have been many in the West who hint at something sinister about the
confessions. Normally, people don't confess, it is said. They
charge that either the defendants were tortured or they confessed hoping to
save their lives or those of their families.
The evidence is all against either hypothesis. The accused were tried in
open court with representatives of the whole world listening in. There
was not then and is not now a scintilla of evidence that any of them had been
tortured. They knew they were facing death, and yet did not protest
innocence, although the world would have been prone to believe them. The
defendants were ex-revolutionists who had never confessed under the Tsar's
regime to save their lives or their families. Further, both Mr. Pritt
from England and Ambassador Davies from the United States say that it would
have been absolutely impossible for the defendants to prepare fake confessions
which would square with the rest of the evidence and all other testimony.
They claim that 14 defendants could not rehearse their parts in advance and
stick to their roles in the rapid give-and-take of Russian trial procedure,
even if they had decided, for some unknown reason, to take part in such a farce.
Again it is said, why should guilt make people confess? It so happens
that I was chairman of the Legislative Commission on Jails in the state of
The fact is that all the allegedly sinister reasons for confessions do not
agree with the evidence.
Davis, Jerome. Behind Soviet
Power. New York, N. Y.: The Readers' Press, Inc., c1946, p. 31
...No one, however, who watched the bearing and heard the statements of such
men as Pyatakov, former Vice Commissar of heavy industry, and Muralov, who had
led the Reds to triumph in Moscow at the time of the revolution, could think
for a moment that they were either terrorized or drugged. Pyatakov showed
the utmost self-possession throughout, and spoke with the calm clarity and
dispassionate logic of a college professor addressing a class of
students. He gave no sign of weakness or hesitation, either in tone or
appearance, and his whole attitude was that of one who had abandoned hope of
life but wished, it might be said, to discharge a load from his conscience, to
get the record clear, before the end. It seemed absurd, too, that
Muralov, a big two-fisted soldier with a 20 years' career of desperate hazards
and hairbreath escapes as an underground revolutionary, should cringe at the
thought of death or yield to any pressure. Even more striking was the
conduct of Bukharin, once Lenin's closest friend and the chief exponent of
Bolshevik doctrine. Bukharin's "last words," as the final
statements of the accused were ominously termed, proved a masterpiece of
eloquence. In a clear, unfaltering voice he reviewed the series of
ideological errors and divergencies which gradually led him to the evil
fullness of treason and conspiracy. Firmly he repudiated the suggestion
that his attitude or confession had been influenced in any way by drugs or
threats or torture, either physical or moral. He went so far as to disavow
another suggestion which had been put forward by foreigners familiar with the
works of Dostoyevsky, that there was a peculiar characteristic of the
"Russian soul" which inclined Russians to the depths of
self-abnegation, a sort of martyr complex, when they knew that all was
lost. Like Pyatakov, Bukharin gave the impression of a man who had made
his peace with the world and wished only to cleanse and satisfy his own
conscience by revealing all the motives of his thought and action.
Duranty, Walter. Story of
Soviet
In the Moscow [1936] trial the accused were offered the right to a defense
counsel, and refused. They themselves pleaded guilty, and explained their
crimes, because they had no better way of conducting themselves.
Pritt, Denis Nowell. The
Moscow Trial was Fair.
The confessions to monstrous crimes were so unbelievable that they fostered
many versions about the reasons behind them. One of these was the version
according to which "doubles" to the defendants--actors wearing
makeup--sat in the courtroom. We can read about this, for example, in the
memoirs of A. Larina, N. Joffe, and K. Ikramov. Legends and apocryphal stories
of this type made their rounds for decades among circles of the Soviet
intelligentsia.
Rogovin, Vadim. 1937: Year of
Terror. Oak Park, Michigan: Labor Publications, 1998, p. 164
Returning to the events of the 1930s, let us name one more attempt at an
explanation-- the version of trial "rehearsals," at which the
defendants supposedly denied the charges made against ‘them, but then
became convinced of the uselessness of the gesture, since the hall was filled
exclusively with NKVD operatives. This version, which served as the basis
for the poorly concocted film, "Enemy of the People Bukharin," which
appeared during the years of "perestroika," has no foundation in
fact. The defendants at the show trials couldn't help but see in the courtroom
well-known political figures, journalists, writers, and so forth, as well as
famous foreign diplomats and journalists. Thus, they could be certain
that if they told the truth, it could not fail to penetrate the walls of the
courtroom.
Rogovin, Vadim. 1937: Year of
Terror.
However, he [Trotsky] had at his disposal no direct evidence that
"measures of physical coercion" have been applied to the victims of
the
Rogovin, Vadim. 1937: Year of
Terror.
Eventually Rights and Lefts were mingled in the dock as conspiring together
against Stalin. Nearly all of them admitted having done so, and on this
point it is not necessary that we should doubt them, in whatever way their
evidence was originally obtained. The bulky verbatim reports were in any
case impressive. The most illuminating feature was the discrimination
made by some of the more independent of the accused, as, for instance, the
famous Bukharin, author of the ABC of communism: "I did this, but I would
never have done that" (he admitted plotting against Stalin's life, which
was after all the main point), or again Radek: "I did so at that time, but
I did the opposite at this."
... It seems that there was really a plot to eliminate, and of course to kill,
Stalin: after all, Stalin was killing his enemies....
Pares, Bernard.
The 16 accused men had all confessed their guilt, and the Prosecution was in
possession of signed confessions when the hearing was commenced. It has
been stated, without a tittle of evidence, that these confessions had been
obtained by methods of terror, or alternatively by a promise that sentence of
death would not be carried out if they confessed. But anyone who reads
the detailed report of the trial will see that the confessions arose from the
weight of evidence, and that even to the last several of the accused were
trying to evade full responsibility. Smirnov, for example, repeatedly
denied that he had personally conveyed Trotsky's instructions to murder Stalin
and other Soviet leaders to the "
Shepherd, W. G. The
Now to get back to the Russian conspirators who have, during the decade
1927-1937, been convicted on their own confessions of attempts to create a
counter-evolution. Are not such attempts at a counter-revolution
exactly what was to be expected? Has there ever been a great and
successful revolution without attempts at a counter-revolution? The
Stalin group, who now constitute the government, have had immense difficulties
to face in their fight against famine, and in their effort to raise to a higher
level of efficiency and civilization what is reputed to have been the worst
peasantry in the world.
Webb, S. Soviet Communism: A
New Civilisation.
...It was hard to believe that old revolutionaries, who had proved their
courage and devotion to a lifetime of work in struggle, could have become
traitors. But it was even harder to believe that the same persons would
not proclaim their innocence before all the world, given a chance to do so in a
public trial. I read the verbatim transcripts of their trials; their
confessions were very characteristic personal statements....
Blumenfeld, Hans. Life Begins
at 65.
WORKERS ARE EXPERIENCED FROM 3
REVOLUTIONS
Stalin stated, "The workers in the
Davis, Jerome. Behind Soviet
Power.
SPIES WERE EVERYWHERE UNDER
THE CZARS
People talk about personally conducted tours under the Bolsheviks, but under
Tsarism the secret police trailed me twenty-four hours a day, using three
shifts.
Davis, Jerome. Behind Soviet
Power.
SUMMARY OF THE 1936
CONSTITUTION
In 1935 Stalin was made chairman of a commission to draft a new
constitution. When the draft was completed it was distributed for popular
analysis and discussion. Sixty million copies in leaflet form were
printed. These were issued in every one of the many languages spoken in
the
The Constitution provides for a federation of 16
The Constitution guarantees certain fundamental rights to the citizens:
The right to work with payment according to quality and quantity.
The right to leisure--a seven hour working day "for the overwhelming
majority of the workers" and "vacations with full pay."
The right to security in old age and sickness; free medicine.
The right to free education.
Equal rights to all citizens irrespective of race.
Freedom of religious worship.
Freedom of organization--the Constitution specifies trade unions, cooperative
organizations, youth organizations, sport and defense organizations, cultural,
technical and scientific societies, as well as the All-Union Communist Party.
Freedom from arrest "except by order of the court or with the sanction of
a state-attorney."
Inviolability of the homes of citizens and privacy of correspondence are
protected by law.
Freedom of speech, of the press, of assembly and of street demonstrations are
guaranteed by law, but only "to strengthen the socialist system."
Davis, Jerome. Behind Soviet
Power.
WEAKNESSES OF SOME TOP LEADERS
Zinoviev could make a good speech and talk about world revolution by the hour
but when it came to doing anything practical he was hopeless. Another
example can be found in Radek--a superb writer and orator but a man who could
not be depended upon. Similarly Bukharin was a spinner of wonderful
theories but could not analyze a situation coolly and wisely and then act
strongly.
Davis, Jerome. Behind Soviet
Power.
If we had not supported Stalin those years, I don't know what might have
happened. But Brezhnev pinned medals on everyone, and persons who cannot
be trusted on any account have wormed their way into leading positions.
[3-9-86]
Chuev, Feliks. Molotov
Remembers.
CHUEV: Forty years have
passed since World War II. I believe the Brezhnev period slowed us down
terribly.
MOLOTOV: He did slow us
down, no question about that. Khrushchevism was repeated in the Brezhnev
period. This is so. This speaks to the fact that we have many
rotten apples within the party itself and much backwardness, ignorance, and
undereducation in the country.
Chuev, Feliks. Molotov
Remembers.
Sudoplatov remains a believer in the dream of communism and attributes its fall
to the lesser men who followed Stalin.
Sudoplatov, Pavel. Special
Tasks. Boston: Little, Brown, c1993, p. xiii
STALIN DEMANDS POLITICAL
COMMISSARS BE ATTACHED TO MILITARY UNITS
Voroshilov recalls that Stalin was very insistent on political work in the
Army, believing that soldiers would fight well only if they knew what they were
fighting for.... He demanded that the most able Communists be
attached to regiments as political commissars, and once sent a telegram to
Lenin reading, "Military Commissars should be the soul of military action,
giving a lead to the experts." Apparently the method worked, for
troops that had been retreating in confusion before Stalin took charge, were,
soon after, on the offensive and winning victories.
Davis, Jerome. Behind Soviet
Power. New York, N. Y.: The Readers' Press, Inc., c1946, p. 49
STALIN MADE HARD MILITARY
DECISIONS
I once talked with a Red Army Colonel who, during the civil war, had, with
great difficulty, collected food for some of the hungry cities along the
Volga. It had only been prepared for shipment when Stalin's lieutenants
confiscated it for the front. The Colonel went to Tsaritsyn to
protest. He found Stalin in a hotel room, pacing up and down like a caged
animal. The Colonel, pointing out the desperate plight of the city
populations, demanded release of the food. Stalin brushed every argument
aside: "It can't be helped, if we lose those cities it is only an incident.
We will recapture them, but if our Army doesn't have food the Revolution
is lost!"
Davis, Jerome. Behind Soviet
Power.
In
On March 6 the Germans attacked with "exceptional ferocity."
Grey, Ian. Stalin, Man of
History. London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1979, p. 415
STALIN ARGUES FOR
COLLECTIVIZATION AND CONTENDS IT WAS NECESSARY
In Stalin’s words: "The way out is to turn the small and scattered
peasant farms into large united farms based on common cultivation of the soil,
to introduce collective cultivation of the soil on the basis of new and higher
technique. The way out is to unite the small and dwarf peasant farms
gradually but surely, not by pressure, but by example and persuasion, into
large farms based on common, cooperative, collective cultivation of the soil
with the use of agricultural machines and tractors and scientific methods of
intensive agriculture."
Davis, Jerome. Behind Soviet
Power. New York, N. Y.: The Readers' Press, Inc., c1946, p. 59
"Tell me," Churchill inquired, "for you personally is this war
as much of a stress as was the burden of collectivization?"
"Oh, no," the "father of the people's" replied.
"The campaign of collectivization was a terrible struggle."
"I thought you would have found it rough going. You were not dealing
with a few score thousands of aristocrats or big landlords, but rather with
millions of small landholders."
"Ten million!" Stalin exclaimed, raising his hands.
"It was fearful! For four years it went on. But it was
absolutely necessary for
Stalin's figure for the number of farmers repressed during collectivization
roughly tallies with the one recently published in the Soviet press. If
we assume that about half of the uprooted villagers, after drifting around the
country, eventually joined the kolkhozes or ended up working at construction
projects, then about 5 million people perished or were purged, a number close
to the 6 million that is a figure accepted by most researchers.
"Were they all kulaks?" Churchill asked.
"Yes," Stalin replied, and after a pause repeated: "It was very
hard, but necessary."
Berezhkov, Valentin. At
Stalin's Side.
A conversation about the kulaks which Stalin had with Churchill on Aug. 14,
1942 is instructive. The talks had come to an end and Stalin had invited
the British leader to dine with him in his Kremlin apartment. Molotov and
an interpreter were present during the long conversation. Churchill
reproduces the occasion in his memoirs thus:
"Tell me," [he asked Stalin], "have the stresses of this war
been as bad to you personally as carrying through the policy of the Collective
Farms?"
This subject immediately aroused the Marshal.
"Oh, no," he said, "the Collective Farm policy was a terrible
struggle."
"I thought you would have found it bad," said I, "because you
were not dealing with a few score thousands of aristocrats or big landowners,
but with millions of small men."
"Ten millions," he said, holding up his hands. "It was
fearful. Four years it lasted. It was absolutely necessary for
"These were what you call kulaks?"
"Yes," he said, but he did not repeat the word. After a pause,
"It was all very bad and difficult--but necessary."
"What happened?"
"Well," he said, "many of them agreed to come in with us.
Some of them were given land of their own to cultivate in the province of Tomsk
or the province of Irkutsk or farther north, but the great bulk were very
unpopular and were wiped out by their laborers."
Volkogonov, Dmitri. Stalin:
Triumph and Tragedy. New York: Grove Weidenfeld, 1991, p. 167
As Stalin looked back in his later years at collectivization and the record of
the collective farms, he might well have groaned as he groaned to
Churchill. But he might also have had much cause for satisfaction.
The agricultural settlement had been difficult, but it did work. The
countryside was socialist, the threat of counter-revolution was gone, the
regime was getting the lion's share of the crops. Production was now more
scientific, and it was rising, even if it did not outstrip the rise in
population. The agrarian surplus appropriated by the regime had proved
sufficient to support the new industrial plant that had made the defeat of
Hitler possible. Stalin had in the long run secured the essentials of
what he wanted from the peasants. The only sufferers were the peasants themselves.
Yet theirs was the glory of having toiled and suffered for the benefit of
posterity, which would be appropriately grateful to them. In the last
analysis, Stalin thought the sufferings of his peasants were unfortunate, but
that they were more than justified by the record of his industry, which the
sufferings of the peasants had made possible.
Randall, Francis. Stalin's
WORKERS ARE BABIED BY THE
TRADE UNIONS
The peculiar characteristics of the Russian trade unions led some Western
leaders to charge that they are not independent and are mere creatures of the
state. On the other hand, Colonel Cooper, builder of the Dnieper River
Dam, complained to me that the trade unions had too much power.
"They babied the workers," he said. "In
Davis, Jerome. Behind Soviet
Power. New York, N. Y.: The Readers' Press, Inc., c1946, p. 65
STALIN CONTENDS ECONOMIC
DEMOCRACY PREVAILS IN THE SU
Stalin believes that inasmuch as all the basic means of production and
distribution are owned by the nation, and that unemployment has been abolished,
there is more genuine economic democracy than in the West."
Stalin expressed this to me in the following words: "The fact that the
factories and workshops of the USSR belong to the whole people and not to
capitalists, that the factories and workshops are managed not by the appointees
of capitalists, but by representatives of the working-class; the consciousness
that the workers work, not for the capitalists, but for their own state, for
their own class, represents an enormous driving force in the development and
perfection of industry. It must be observed that the overwhelming
majority of the factory and works managers in Russia are workingmen, appointed by
the Supreme Economic Council in agreement with the trade unions and that not a
single factory manager can remain at his post contrary to the will of the
workers or the particular trade union.
Davis, Jerome. Behind Soviet
Power.
On the level of the workplace democracy did function during my years in the
Blumenfeld, Hans. Life Begins
at 65. Montreal, Canada: Harvest House, c1987, p. 151
CZAR USED NATIONAL SUPPRESSION
AND OPPRESSION
The contrast between what I witnessed under the rule of Tsar Nicholas II in
1916 and what I saw nearly 30 years later was as that between total darkness
and sunlight. The Empire was rightly called the prisonhouse of
nations. Everywhere was illiteracy, abject poverty, disease, and
exploitation. It was illegal for the various nationalities to have
schools in their own language. The wealth of the land was sucked away
while industry was kept in a primitive state. The richest agricultural
lands were taken over by the Russian nobility. The dissolute rulers lived
in great pomp and luxury, protected by Tsarist troops. National enmities
and prejudices were deliberately fostered by Tsarist officials as a weapon
against movements for freedom. One national group was sent to police
another, and boundary lines were often arranged to cut nations in two.
Davis, Jerome. Behind Soviet
Power. New York, N. Y.: The Readers' Press, Inc., c1946, p. 71
Much later Djugashvili himself thus recalled the motives of his adherence to
socialism: 'I became a Marxist because of my social position (my father was a
worker in a shoe factory and my mother was also a working woman), but also...
because of the harsh intolerance and Jesuitical discipline that crushed me so
mercilessly at the Seminary.... The atmosphere in which I lived was
saturated with hatred against Tsarist oppression.'
Deutscher, Isaac. Stalin; A
Political Biography.
Between 1905 and 1914 the numbers sentenced to hard labor (katorga) rose
fivefold as the political authority of the Tsarist regime began to crumble.
Overy, R. J. Russia's War:
Blood Upon the Snow. New York: TV Books, c1997, p. 16
Between January, 1905, and the convocation of the First Duma on the 27th of
April, 1906, the Tzarist government, according to approximate calculations, had
killed more than 14,000 people, had executed more than 1000, had wounded
20,000, had arrested, exiled and imprisoned about 70,000.
IGNORANCE, PREJUDICE AND
ILLITERACY WERE FOSTERED BY CZAR
Illiteracy was not the only factor in maintaining backwardness under the
Tsar. All students were indoctrinated to unquestioning obedience to
Throne, Altar, and Empire. Prejudice and superstition were
fostered. Contemporary social problems and modern science were prohibited
subjects. History bore little relation to reality. For instance,
after the war with
Davis, Jerome. Behind Soviet
Power.
At the end of the dinner, I asked how
Davis, Jerome. Behind Soviet
Power. New York, N. Y.: The Readers' Press, Inc., c1946, p. 99
The Home Army's policy was thus the military reflection of the London Polish
Government's political strategy, which continued to the last to refuse to
recognize one basic and inescapable fact about the nation's destiny. It
was simply that
Snow, Edgar. The Pattern of
Soviet Power,
Before the Polish government could move its seat from
Suddenly an uprising broke out in the city [
Ever since the Soviet army began its advance into
Talbott, Strobe, Trans. and
Ed. Khrushchev Remembers. Boston: Little Brown, c1970, p. 187
GERMANS COMMITTED THE KATYN
FOREST MASSACRE
All the evidence I secured showed that the Polish group in London was more
interested in doing something against Russia than in doing anything for
Poland. This made it easy to understand why they accepted and spread the
Goebbels story about the murder of 10,000 Poles in
I visited the
The Russians found letters on the bodies dated after the Germans occupied the
city, thus proving that the victims could not had been killed at the time
alleged. We talked with a Russian priest whose parish was in the
Davis, Jerome. Behind Soviet
Power.
In 1943, near the railway station of Katyn, in the forest near the
Volkogonov, Dmitri. Stalin:
Triumph and Tragedy.
Each one of them [Polish officers] had been shot in the back of the neck with a
German bullet.
Nekrich and Heller. Utopia in
Power.
KATYN GRAVES STORY
DECLARED GRIM FRAUD
The story of the mass graves at Katyn, which caused a world sensation two years
ago, was a propaganda stunt staged by Goebbels and Ribbentrop to cause a split
between
Tonight a corroborative report was received from
Johansen says a special section of the concentration camp was completely
isolated and strongly guarded by SS men, whereupon forty to sixty Jewish
prisoners were picked out to forge the documents. They received the best
optical instruments obtainable so the work could be done to perfection.
They made passports, letters, etc. and even wallets, which were treated with a
special chemical fluid to make them look worn.
Before the German capitulation all machines, instruments and material used were
destroyed and the Jewish specialists were killed to prevent the secret from
getting out, he said.
New York Times, June 29, 1945 p. 2
Katyn
from Military-Historical
Journal, 1991
by Romyald Sviatec
Who gained more from the murder of the Polish officers?
In order to answer this question, it is necessary to, at least sketchily,
clarify the relations of the Germans and the Russians toward the Poles.
It is known that the Germans started the war with
With this, the agreements that had been concluded between the
In view of such a situation, the Soviet government gave an order to the High
Command of the Red Army that the army should cross the frontier and take under
protection the life and property of the population of Western Ukraine and
The situation with the Germans was exactly the opposite. In spite of the
fact that the German armies were occupying
Lucas and Ukas. Trans. and Ed.
Secret Documents.
Being in Varkut, Camp No. 10, [Romyald Sviatec] met a Major of the German Army
who, from 1941, found himself in
He was sincerely surprised that the Polish officials were blaming the
Russians. The Major stated that a good soldier, especially an officer,
must die, if his Motherland is perishing. He stated that after he had
fallen to the Russians as a prisoner, he understood very well that he might
die, and if that would be his fate, he would accept that as a good German
soldier. He also knew the attempt by General Sikorski in
In Camp No. 11 in Varkut, I met Vlodzhimir Mandryk, who, before the war and
during the period of occupation, worked in the main post office in
By his account of the period between August and October of 1941, letters to
Polish prisoners of war ceased to arrive and be processed by the post
office. Any letters that kept on coming to the prisoners, the Germans
gave the post office orders to destroy all these letters. Also, at this
time, Mandryk recalls the Germans told everyone in
...Amongst the many recollections which I read about Katyn, there was a book by
Stanislaw Svjanevich by the name of "In the Shadow of Katyn," and
also in the book by Joseph Chapskov, "Upon the Inhuman Earth."
I learned that Polish war prisoners were treated very well by the
Russians. In 1940, there were three Polish generals in POW
camps--Minkewich, Smorovinsly and Bakhaterebur. When these prisoners were
departing the camps, the Soviet authorities gave them a farewell banquet,
especially for the higher officer corps. The Russians wanted to show the
Germans that they are civilized and knew how to treat prisoners. This
might be looked upon as having little meaning, but if you lived with the
Russians during those hard times of war, you would appreciate the real meaning
of that gesture.
The Russians wanted to show the Polish officers that they, the Russians and
Poles have one common enemy, therefore, uniting together would be in the
interests of everyone. No one can convince me that it was the Russians
who murdered these Polish officers. [This was also shown by] the
Polish-Russian agreement of 1941 when thousands of Polish prisoners of war were
freed from the camps, and the formation on Soviet territory of the Polish army
took place.
In July 1952, together with a group of invalids, I was directed into the region
of
Lucas and Ukas. Trans. and Ed.
Secret Documents. Toronto, Canada: Northstar Compass, 1996, p. 206-209
...Altogether, I spent nine years in the Soviet Union--two years in exile and
seven years in camps. During that time, I went through much, met
thousands of interesting people, but I also know that if the Soviets had wanted
to get rid of the Polish officers, they would have sent them to the "
I am far from praising the Soviet system.... I also do not pretend that I
am not guilty of many things. There were people that got into the NKVD
and the party who were real enemies of the system. They got rid of many
dedicated people. But I cannot keep quiet on this Katyn event. I
must defend the Russian people, if only to correct the existing lie that is
being nurtured and promoted to this day about the Katyn massacre.
Even though I do not like the communist system, I must admit that this system
has shown decency and follows the established law and order of the system....
With all the documentation that I have in my hands, I state categorically that
the accusations by the Polish government in
Lucas and Ukas. Trans. and Ed.
Secret Documents. Toronto, Canada: Northstar Compass, 1996, p. 206-211
Katyn Forest Massacre--
Conclusion of Romyald Sviatec
In conclusion of this sad history, I would like to advise the Poles that they
once-and-for-all discontinue and stop the insults regarding their Eastern
neighbor, since the borders of Poland have been enlarged as the result of the
Second World War, for the benefit of Poland.
Every true Pole must not only be satisfied with this, but also appreciate the
country which was responsible for saving
For all those who still stubbornly dream about
Lucas and Ukas. Trans. and Ed.
Secret Documents.
[In a November 7, 1944 letter
Churchill stated:]
1.
...
2.
...
3.
Moreover, without the Russian army,
4.
I don’t think that we can be asked to give any further assurances and
promises to
Those Poles that are now vying for leadership in
Lucas and Ukas. Trans. and Ed.
Secret Documents.
SU DID WHAT IT COULD TO HELP
THE
Another charge circulated by the
In
Rola-Zymierski said that it would have been impossible for the Russians to have
taken
The evidence does show that Bor had more confidence in the Nazis than in the
Russians. General Tarnova, who commanded Bor's Home Army Security Troops,
told me that he knew when the uprising started that the Red Army would be
unable to help. He went on to say that the Red Army had done everything
possible to save the Polish forces in
All the time I was in
Davis, Jerome. Behind Soviet
Power.
...Here also I met General Boni Rola-Zimerski head of the new Polish Army.
Rola-Zimerski gave a long detailed account of Red Army operations in which he
had taken part, leading up to the capture of Praga, a suburb of Warsaw on the east
bank of the wide Vistula River. He stated categorically that the
...Looking back now on the London Poles' fierce outcry that the Russians had
"betrayed" them by not storming Warsaw and bringing salvation to
General Bor, who had given the signal for a rising without even consulting our
own chiefs-of-staff liaison in Britain, it seems clear that their own
ineptitude of leadership and their fatally misguided sense of diplomacy were
chiefly to blame.
In
"We are deeply convinced that Bor's order was given purely for political
reasons.... The plan of the Home Army all along has been to appear
suddenly in cities being occupied by the Red Army and only at the last moment,
in order to assume power. Their mistake was that they thought they could
operate in
Snow, Edgar. The Pattern of
Soviet Power,
Stalin considered the uprising ill timed and misconceived. He was opposed
to co-operation with Bor-Komorowski and the underground, whose hatred of the
Russians was well-known. He appreciated Rokossovsky's military
difficulties....
Soon after the start of the uprising, Churchill, misinterpreting Russian
inactivity at the
Grey, Ian. Stalin, Man of
History. London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1979, p. 399
Rokossovsky in his memoirs suggests that as commander of the 1st Belorussian
Front he was responsible for the decision not to attempt to go to the aid
of the Poles in Warsaw. Further he states that "Stalin wanted to
give all possible help to the insurgents and to ease their plight."
Zhukov wrote later that he himself had ascertained that the Red Army had done
all it could to help the insurgents "although the uprising had not been in
any way coordinated with the Soviet command. At that time--both before
and after our forced withdrawal from
Grey, Ian. Stalin, Man of
History. London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1979, p. 506
First of all I wished to find out how things were in Warsaw itself where the
German command was dealing ruthlessly with the organizers of an uprising in the
city. The population was subjected to brutal reprisals. The city
was razed to the ground. Thousands of peaceful civilians perished under
the wreckage.
As was established later neither the command of the front nor that of
On instructions by the Supreme Commander, two paratroops officers were sent to
Bor-Komorowski for liaison and co-ordination of actions. However,
Bor-Komorowski refused to receive the officers, nor did we hear from them ever
again.
In order to assist the insurgents in
I have ascertained that our troops had done all they could to help the
insurgents, although the uprising had not been in any way coordinated with the
Soviet Command.
All that time--both before and after our forced withdrawal from
Zhukov, Georgii. Memoirs of
Marshal Zhukov.
When I met Rokossovsky I asked him if he had been ordered to halt before
Beria, Sergo. Beria, My
Father: Inside Stalin's Kremlin. London: Duckworth, 2001, p. 99
I have ascertained that our troops did everything they possibly could to help
the insurgents, although the uprising had not been in any way coordinated with
the Soviet Command....
All that time--both before and after our troops' forced withdrawal--the First
Byelorussian Front continued to furnish assistance to the insurgents by
air-dropping provisions, medicines, and ammunition. I remember there were
many false reports on the matter in the Western press which could have misled
public opinion.
Zhukov, Georgi. Reminiscences
and Reflections Vol. 2. Moscow: Progress Pub., c1985, p. 302
On 2 August 1944 our intelligence agencies received information that an
uprising against the Nazi occupation had started in Warsaw. Startled by
the news, the Front HQ immediately went hunting for information to assess the
scale and nature of the uprising. It was so sudden that we were quite at
a loss, and at first we thought that the Germans might have spread the rumor,
though we could not understand its purpose. Frankly speaking, the timing
of the uprising was just about the worst possible in the circumstances.
It was as though its leaders had deliberately chosen a time that would ensure
defeat. These were the thoughts that involuntarily came to my mind....
Certain carping critics in the Western press did at one time charge the First
Byelorussian Front and, of course, me as its Commander, with deliberately
failing to support the Warsaw insurgents, thereby condemning them to death and
destruction....
The fact of the matter is that those who had instigated the people of Warsaw to
rise had had no intention of joining forces with the approaching Soviet and
Polish armies. On the contrary, they had feared this. They had been
concerned with other things. For them the uprising had been a political
move with the objective of assuming power in the Polish capital before the
Soviet troops entered it. These had been their orders from the people in
Rokossovsky, K., Ed. by Bob
Daglish A Soldier's Duty.
...The Chief of the General Staff, Antonov, established contact between us and
the insurgents immediately on receiving the message of request.... Soviet
planes were continuously dropping arms, ammunition and food for them.
Rokossovsky, K., Ed. by Bob
Daglish A Soldier's Duty. Moscow: Progress Pub., 1985, p. 257
The tragedy of Warsaw kept worrying me, and the realization that it was
impossible to launch a major rescue operation was agonizing....
I spoke with Stalin over the telephone, reporting the situation at the front
and everything relevant to Warsaw. Stalin asked whether the Front was
capable of immediately launching an operation with the object of liberating
I have mentioned that, starting with 13 September 1944 we had begun to supply
the insurgents by air with weapons, ammunition, food and medical
supplies. This was affected by our Po-2 bombers, which dropped their
loads from low altitudes at points indicated by the insurgents.
Rokossovsky, K., Ed. by Bob
Daglish A Soldier's Duty.
The approximately 40,000 insurgents went into action with less than 10,000
weapons (including rifles, machine-guns and pistols) and less than five day's
supply of ammunition. Nevertheless, the fighting lasted two months.
To be fair, the Russians did make efforts to assist the Poles. Some aid
supplies were airdropped, and small groups of Russian liaison officers were parachuted
into
...Marshal Rokossovsky makes this comment on the tragedy in
An official military history published in
Axell, Albert. Stalin's War:
Through the Eyes of His Commanders.
When Winston Churchill, asked his military staff in August why the Soviet
offensive on Warsaw had halted and whether this had been prompted by political
considerations, British General staff officers gave this reply: 'The Germans
are making great efforts to hold this nodal point in their communications and
they have surrounded and annihilated Russian armored forces which were
advancing on the city.' Russian historian Lev Bezymensky comments: 'You
can't help admiring the insight and honesty of these British General Staff
officers.'
Axell, Albert. Stalin's War:
Through the Eyes of His Commanders.
STALIN WAS AN ATHEIST
G.Glurdjidze, a boyhood friend of Stalin's relates:
"I began to speak of God. Joseph heard me out, and after a moment's
silence said:
"'You know, they are fooling us, there is no God....
I'll lend you a book to read; it will show you that the world and all living
things are quite different from what you imagine, and all this talk about God
is sheer nonsense,'" Joseph said.
Yaroslavsky, Emelian.
Landmarks in the Life of Stalin.
"Comrade Stalin brought these books to our notice. The first thing
we had to do, he would say, was to become atheists.
Yaroslavsky, Emelian.
Landmarks in the Life of Stalin.
It must be noted that Stalin was not a member of the "League of Militant
Atheists." He was, of course, first and foremost a revolutionary,
and he continued Lenin's anticlerical line.
Chuev, Feliks. Molotov
Remembers.
I once asked him [Stalin] if he believed in luck. I didn't put the
question very seriously, but thought it would be a sort of human interest touch
at the end of an interview. To my dismay he became indignant and replied
sharply, "Do you think I'm an old Georgian granny to believe in things
like that? I'm a Bolshevik, and I don't believe in gods or devils or any
form of obsolete superstition."
Duranty, Walter. Story of
Soviet
Glurdzhidze recalls in his turn that the 13-year-old Joseph told him once:
"You know, they are deceiving us. There is no God...." In
reply to the amazed cry of his interlocutor, Joseph suggested that he read a
book from which it was evident that "the talk of God is empty
chatter." What book was that? "
STALIN EXPELLED FROM SEMINARY
FOR HIS POLITICAL ACTIONS
But the real reason for his expulsion was his political activities. He
was expelled from the seminary as a person who harbored views dangerous to
Tsardom.
Yaroslavsky, Emelian.
Landmarks in the Life of Stalin. Moscow: FLPH, 1940, p. 17
STALIN HELD LENIN IN THE
HIGHEST REGARD
When I compared him with the other leaders of our party, it always seemed to me
that he was head and shoulders above his colleagues--Plekhanov, Martov, Axelrod
and the others; that, compared with them, Lenin was not just one of the
leaders, but a leader of the highest rank, a mountain eagle, who knew no fear
in the struggle,.... This simple and bold letter strengthened my opinion
that Lenin was the mountain eagle of our Party. I cannot forgive myself
for having, from the habit of an old underground worker, consigned this letter
of Lenin's, like many other letters, to the flames.
Yaroslavsky, Emelian.
Landmarks in the Life of Stalin. Moscow: FLPH, 1940, p. 30
STALIN WAS AN EXCELLENT
ORGANIZER OF THE PROLETARIAT
Working in Baku in this difficult period of reaction, Comrade Stalin displayed
his talents as an organizer and propagandist to a greater degree than
ever. He literally won
Yaroslavsky, Emelian.
Landmarks in the Life of Stalin.
Somebody had to look after that vast mass of agitators, shop-stewards, and
members of the Soviets. Somebody had to keep in touch with them from day
to day, convey to them the decisions of the Central Committee and instruct them
how to vote in the Soviets and behave vis-a-vis the other parties. This
arduous job was carried out by Stalin and Sverdlov.
Deutscher, Isaac. Stalin; A
Political Biography.
As an organizer, he was supreme. He was a stickler for details that were
undertaken to be done, and if they were not done, he made certain that they
were done.
Rybin, Aleksei. Next to
Stalin: Notes of a Bodyguard.
LENIN COMPLIMENTS AND CARES
FOR STALIN
In a letter to Gorky, Lenin referred affectionately to Stalin and to this work:
"A wonderful Georgian here," he said....
Yaroslavsky, Emelian.
Landmarks in the Life of Stalin. Moscow: FLPH, 1940, p. 75
First, it should not be forgotten that even before the Revolution Lenin praised
Stalin for his work on the national question and called him "the wonderful
Georgian."
Chuev, Feliks. Molotov
Remembers. Chicago: I. R. Dee, 1993, p. 198
After completing his work on the national question, Comrade Stalin returned to
St. Petersburg. Not having heard anything from him for some time, Lenin,
in a letter dated March 8, 1913, inquired: "That is there no news of Vasily
(Stalin--E.Y.)? What is wrong with him? We are worried."
Two days later, he again writes: "Take good care of him" (Stalin),
"he is very sick."
Yaroslavsky, Emelian.
Landmarks in the Life of Stalin. Moscow: FLPH, 1940, p. 76
STALIN OFTEN OPPOSED KAMENEV
IN THE PAST
In the summer of 1915 Comrade Stalin managed to attend a large meeting of
exiled Bolsheviks in the village of Monastyrskoye in Turukhansk....
Comrade Stalin at this meeting denounced Kamenev's despicable conduct at the
trial of the Bolshevik Duma group.
Yaroslavsky, Emelian.
Landmarks in the Life of Stalin.
RUMANIA CAUSED A LOT OF
TROUBLE FOR THE SU
Romania occupied Bessarabia after the October Revolution and behaved in a
hostile and provocative manner toward the
Schecter, Jerrold. Trans &
Ed. Khrushchev Remembers: the Glasnost Tapes.
CHURCHILL DID EVERYTHING HE
COULD TO DESTROY SOCIALISM
Churchill was socialism's most outspoken opponent. He took such a dislike
to communism that he did everything he could to set up barricades around the
capitalist world, to organize it, and to position it against communism in hopes
of reining in the socialist countries.
He did not just want to prevent the development of socialism; he did all he
could to destroy it. Dulles picked up where Churchill left off.
Schecter, Jerrold. Trans &
Ed. Khrushchev Remembers: the Glasnost Tapes.
... in the days when the country was invaded by the armies of "14
states." You will recall the threat of the notorious Churchill of an
invasion by 14 states.
Stalin, Joseph. Stalin's
Kampf.
... the inveterate Bolshevik-hater Winston Churchill (Chancellor of the Exchequer),
was mounting a war against the
Ulam, Adam. Stalin; The Man
and his Era.
Churchill had been the world’s loudest advocate of a crusade against
Soviet Russia in the Civil War. He had referred to the Bolsheviks as
baboons and had called for the October Revolution to be “strangled”
in its cradle.
Service, Robert. Stalin.
SU BUILT UP AUSTRIAN ECONOMY
AFTER THE WAR
Like Germany,
We owned things in
Schecter, Jerrold. Trans &
Ed. Khrushchev Remembers: the Glasnost Tapes. Boston: Little, Brown, c1990, p.
73
Austria was a first step for us, a demonstration that we could conduct
negotiations and conduct them well....
So we celebrated a great international victory. It was the European debut
for a country bumpkin, and it did us a lot of good. The bumpkin had
learned a thing or two. We could orient ourselves without directives from
Stalin.
Schecter, Jerrold. Trans &
Ed. Khrushchev Remembers: the Glasnost Tapes. Boston: Little, Brown, c1990, p.
80
STALIN WAS NOT RESPONSIBLE FOR
GOMULKA’S IMPRISONMENT
In connection with Gomulka's imprisonment, I cannot agree that Stalin was
responsible. I knew for a fact, I heard it from Stalin, that he did not
order Gomulka's arrest; on the contrary, he even voiced doubts about the
arrest. He trusted Gomulka.
After Gomulka was restored to power, relations between our two countries
improved. Anti-Soviet slander began to die out, and for this Gomulka
needs to be recognized. He was in a very good position; you might say, he
had suffered. He had been in prison several years and people said it was
at Stalin's request, although I categorically deny that in this case.
Schecter, Jerrold. Trans &
Ed. Khrushchev Remembers: the Glasnost Tapes.
KHRUSHCHOV DEMEANS AND
DEGRADES GYPSIES
It's like with gypsies: if you ask a gypsy what he'd do if he were king, he'll
answer, "Steal a couple of horses and run away." How's
that for a kingly wish! What more does a gypsy need?
Schecter, Jerrold. Trans &
Ed. Khrushchev Remembers: the Glasnost Tapes.
STALIN KNOWS THERE ARE ALWAYS
ENEMIES INSIDE THE PARTY
Stalin was aggravated by such talk [Gottwald’s contention that the Czech
CP had no internal enemies]. Inside our own circle, behind Gottwald's
back, Stalin called him "a blind man, a pussycat. Gottwald, what
does he know? He argues that there are no enemies inside his party.
That cannot be!"
Schecter, Jerrold. Trans &
Ed. Khrushchev Remembers: the Glasnost Tapes. Boston: Little, Brown, c1990, p.
132
As soon as our advisers arrived in Czechoslovakia, we started to get material
on individual leaders....
Then material started to come in on Rudolf Slansky and other leaders of the
Czech Communist party. They turned him into an enemy of the people.
I do know how long it took, but not long, once Stalin got negative material on
him. Stalin was triumphant because he had been proven right. He
said he had sensed Slansky's real nature all along. Gottwald, who had
assured Stalin that he had no enemies within the party leadership, really had
turned out to be a pussycat, and a blind man who could not see what his enemies
were doing right under his nose. Gottwald, as they say, threw in the
towel.
Schecter, Jerrold. Trans &
Ed. Khrushchev Remembers: the Glasnost Tapes.
Yes, Gorbachev would spit on Stalin--but carefully.
Remnick, David. Lenin's Tomb.
New York: Random House, c1993, p. 49
====================
[PUT THE 1938 TRIAL HERE
=======================
SOVIET GOVT OPPOSED BUREAUCRACY
The Communist party has launched one campaign after another against
bureaucratism and is making heroic efforts to overcome it, chiefly by drawing
the workers and peasants more actively into all public functions, and by
cutting out red tape.
Baldwin, Roger. Liberty Under
the Soviets, New York: Vanguard Press, 1928, p. 46
A number of criticisms can be made of Trotsky's line of argument, including its
ignoring of other possible sources of Stalinism and its characterization of the
bureaucracy as conservative when it was under the auspices of this group that
the 'revolution from above' was carried out.
Gill, Graeme. Stalinism.
The party was obliged to evaluate the party- and social work of old and
new members and expel or purge those who did not attain a good enough level for
communists. This process did not have a given end. The struggle
against bureaucracy, corruption, opportunism and abuse of power within the
party and state was carried out in many different ways during the thirties, and
it was not always successful or devoid of errors.
Sousa, Mario. The Class
Struggle During the Thirties in the
NO SOVIET PRIVILEGED CLASS
The question is often raised as to whether or not Party members occupy a
privileged position in
But the picture so often painted of a ruling political class above and over the
people of Russia, enjoying the privileges of greater wealth and position, is
pure invention, originating probably in a comparatively few exceptions, some of
them, it is true, flagrant enough to arouse public scandal. But the Party
is severe on all those who seek personal privilege in goods or position out of
office or Party membership. The Party constantly cleanses its membership
by expulsion, getting rid of those who are not devoted, or who try to use the
Party for their private interests, or whose "ideology" is not
Communist. The Communist Party is hard to get into and easy to get out of.
Baldwin, Roger. Liberty Under
the Soviets,
When I first went to
After 1930, this system was gradually changed, and managers of all kinds,
including Communists, were paid according to their position, with about the
same relative differences as in this country. Some people in
Littlepage, John D. In Search
of Soviet Gold.
The communists except nominal managerial salaries for their labor. These
salaries are minuscule. Communists, as a rule, get much less than
non-communist technicians whom they hire. The theory is that all fruits
of production are pooled for redistribution to the common good.
Gunther, John. Inside
VERY LITTLE PARTY CORRUPTION
The scores of Communists I met all over Russia, from secretaries in the small
towns and villages to the heads of departments in Moscow, struck me with few
exceptions as extraordinarily able and astute men--on the whole abler, more
alert, and more devoted than any official class I ever met. This youth,
enthusiasm, and faith in what they are doing stand out in marked contrast to
the routineers so common in most government service.
It should be noted that the Party, unlike political parties in other countries,
is not subject to any outside economic pressure or control. Every other
dictatorship depends for its support on some propertied class--in most cases on
the great landlords, as in
Baldwin, Roger. Liberty Under
the Soviets, New York: Vanguard Press, 1928, p. 60
WORKERS AND PEASANTS DO NOT
MAKE UP MOST OF THE CRITICS
...Indeed, the charge is made by some of the emigre anarchist and socialist
opponents of the Bolshevik regime that most of the political exiles and
prisoners are workers and peasants--a charge which seems without basis in the
light of much dispassionate evidence given me in Russia. It is doubtless
true that peasants are the largest group among the several hundred Left Social
Revolutionist exiles and prisoners, and workers among some hundreds of
anarchists. But in the total of exiles and prisoners peasants and workers
constitute a small number among the thousands, mostly from the old bourgeoisie.
Baldwin, Roger. Liberty Under
the Soviets,
Equally difficult as to estimate the number of exiles is to gauge their
economic class origins. The socialist and anarchist committees abroad
allege that the great majority are workers or peasants. But their
incomplete lists do not bear out that contention. My informants in
Russia, both officials and others, stated with remarkable unanimity, whatever
their political views, that the proportion of factory workers and peasants is
small; that most of the political exiles are ex-aristocrats or intellectuals,
students, or office employees.
Baldwin, Roger. Liberty Under
the Soviets,
Under the system of secrecy maintained by the GPU it is impossible to answer
with evidence the allegation that the majority of the exiles are workers and
peasants. But it does not square with the interests of the Soviet regime,
nor with what one sees and hears all over
Baldwin, Roger. Liberty Under
the Soviets, New York: Vanguard Press, 1928, p. 231
TORTURE NOT USED DURING QUESTIONING
...Reports of brutality by the GPU, particularly of beating and third-degree
methods are current, but the evidence to sustain them seems mostly to date back
to the days of the Cheka. I have talked with many ex-prisoners in Russia
and abroad, and have read also all the published accounts of the prison
experiences of others, and from all of them I gathered that police brutality
such as we know it in America is now rare in Russia. Long-continued
grillings, isolation, and wretched physical conditions are the worst of the
evils of preliminary detention. Only in
Baldwin, Roger. Liberty Under
the Soviets,
What than made the prisoners confess? The indictment says that they had
long ago lost all shame and conscience, had become hired assassins and
diversionists and could hope for no mercy. Almost all of them declared
that they had not been tortured or coerced....
Medvedev, Roy. Let History
Judge. New York: Columbia University Press, 1989, p. 362
The first and most reasonable supposition is, of course, that the confessions
were extracted from the prisoners by torture and by the threat of still worse
tortures. Yet this first conjecture was refuted by the obvious freshness
and vitality of the prisoners, by their whole physical and mental aspect.
Thus in order to explain the "impossible" confessions, the skeptics
had to grope around for other causes. The prisoners, they proclaimed, had
been given all sorts of poisons; they had been hypnotized and drugged. If
this be true, then no one else in the world has ever succeeded in obtaining
such powerful and lasting results, and the scientist who did succeed would
hardly be satisfied with acting as the mysterious handy-man of police forces.
He would presumably use his methods with a view to increasing his scientific
prestige. But those who take exception to the conduct of the trial prefer
to clutch at the most absurd backstair hypotheses rather than believe what is
under their noses--that the prisoners were properly convicted and that their
confessions were founded on fact.
When one speaks to the Soviet people of hypotheses such is these, they merely
shrug their shoulders and smile. Why should we, they say, if we wanted to
falsify the facts, resort to such difficult and dangerous expedients as
spurious confessions? Would it not have been simpler to forge
documents? Do you think that, instead of letting Trotsky make highly
treasonable speeches through the mouths of Pyatakov and Radek, we could not
much more easily have brought before the eyes of the world highly treasonable
letters of his and documents which would have proved his association with the
Fascists much more directly? You have seen and heard the accused: did you
get the impression that their confessions had been extorted?
Indeed I did not. The men who stood before the court were not tortured
and desperate people before their executioner. There was no justification
of any sort for imagining that there was anything manufactured, artificial, or
even awe-inspiring or emotional about these proceedings.
Feuchtwanger, Lion.
The stories that they [the defendants] were hypnotized or given mysterious
drugs may be safely dismissed.
Deutscher, Isaac. Stalin; A
Political Biography. New York: Oxford Univ. Press, 1967, p. 374
But critics were right in saying that torture alone could probably not have
produced the public self-humiliation of a whole series of Stalin's enemies,
when returned to health and given a platform.
Conquest, Robert. The Great
Terror.
Please do not think that these confessions were taken under brutal force on the
guilty persons. There was nothing of that sort at all. I myself was
always present at these processes. Alexiev was also present, keeping a
close watch on these culprits and every day, brought these people fresh newspapers.
They were held in jail cells with all the necessary conveniences and got fed
really well. Even Bukharin in his trial stated this, with foreign
correspondents present.
Rybin, Aleksei. Next to
Stalin: Notes of a Bodyguard.
Let us dismiss at the outset some of the fairy tales. Stalin, some
whisperers had it, was mortally ill, and was extirpating the last remnants of
opposition while he was still alive; according to other "reports" he
had suddenly gone "insane." It was said that the prisoners were
tortured, hypnotized, drugged (in order to make them give false confessions)
and--a choice detail-- impersonated by actors of the Moscow Art theater!
But the trials occurred soon after the preliminary investigations were
concluded, and they took place before hundreds of witnesses, many of them
experienced correspondents, in open court. The prisoners testified that
they were well-treated during the investigation. Radek, indeed, says that
it was he who tortured the prosecutor, by refusing to confess month after
month. Pressure there certainly was, in the manner of police
investigation all over the world, but no evidence of torture.
The trials, the Trotskyists assert, were a colossal frame up. The prisoners
were induced to confess, they say, on a promise of immunity and a pardon after
the trial--if they talked freely--and then double-crossed and shot. This
is hardly conceivable from a close reading of the testimony. It could not
easily have occurred in the second trial, when the defendants must of known
that the first batch, despite their confessions, were sentenced to death and
duly executed.
Gunther, John. Inside
In one of my articles I myself repeated the story that Zinoviev and Kamenev
were tortured, and also that Stalin sent for them and used persuasion on
them. I got one curious response: a letter amusingly signed NKVD: You are
mistaken, Comrade. No torture was used on Zinoviev.
[the same letter says]...Zinoviev was, then, treated throughout with the
greatest respect.... There was no torture. The setup was, I repeat,
quite different. The prison was more like a clinic. The whole
atmosphere suggested that they would surely be pardoned.
Radzinsky, Edvard.
Stalin. New York: Doubleday, c1996, p. 339-340
For, unlike the soldiers, who were tried in camera, Bukharin was to be granted
the favor of a magnificent public trial. There are many legends about the
tortures which induced him to take part in this ignominious farce. It is
a pity to debunk a good legend, but let Bukharin's letters speak for
themselves....
[His letter states] "As it is I am perishing here [in prison]. The
rules are very strict, you can't even talk loudly in your cell, or play
checkers or chess, when you go out into the corridor you aren't allowed
to talk at all, you can't feed the pigeons at your window, can't do anything at
all. On the other hand, the warders, even the very junior ones, are
always polite, reserved, correct. We are well fed. But the cells
are dark. Yet the lights are on day and night. I swab floors, clean
my slop pail. Nothing new in that."
Radzinsky, Edvard.
Stalin.
So the prison regimen was strict, but they were perfectly polite, and the food
was good. No, there was no torture. And it seems unlikely that the
delicate and hysterical Bukharin would have written so many literary works in
the intervals of torture. He tortured himself--with his despair, his fear
of being shot, the anguish he felt for his family. He was too delicate an
organism for prison life. He was a poet, not a politician.
Radzinsky, Edvard.
Stalin.
Even though they were not physically tortured [in prison], the regime of
threats and sleeplessness demoralized Zinoviev, suffering from asthma, and
Kamenev.
Montefiore, Sebag. Stalin: The
Court of the Red Tsar.
On the question of whether torture was used to gain confessions, remarkably,
Western diplomats and journalists attending the open trials, said of the
prisoners that they saw no haggard faces, no twitching hands, no dazed
expressions, and no bandaged heads.
Axell, Albert. Stalin's War:
Through the Eyes of His Commanders.
SECRET POLICE ARE FAIR TOWARD
PRISONERS
All the British subjects at
the Metro Vickers trial, however, subsequently revealed that they had been
treated with great politeness and consideration by the Soviet
authorities. None of them had been subjected to any form of coercion, 3d
agree methods or force.
Alan Monkhouse declared of his OGPU examiners in a statement in the London
Dispatch on March 15th: "they were extraordinarily nice to me and
exceedingly reasonable in their questioning. My examiners seemed
first-rate men who knew their job. The OGPU prison is the last word in
efficiency, entirely clean, orderly and well-organized. This is the first
time that I have ever been arrested, but I have visited English prisons and can
attest that the OGPU quarters are much superior. OGPU officials showed every
concern for my comfort.
Sayers and Kahn. The Great
Conspiracy. Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1946, p. 175
But it is said by those who have dealt constantly with the GPU in behalf of
prisoners, that the heads, when they can be reached, are solicitous to correct
the injustices or abuses of their subordinates. Even Dzerzhinsky, head of
the old Cheka, was scrupulous in such cases, though severe--and he was fairly
accessible.
While the GPU is the strong arm of the Soviet state for the protection of the
Revolution and to keep the way clear of obstructions to the State's program, it
is essentially an organ of the Communist Party under the control of the Central
Committee, as its creator, Dzerzhinsky, insisted it should be. It does
not get out of hand, as do the secret services in some other countries--as, for
instance, in the
To the minds of opponents of the Soviet regime the GPU bulks big. It is
to them the Red Terror, supreme, lawless, all-powerful, ruthless, shooting at
will on suspicion. But to any sober student of the political phenomena of
Soviet Russia the GPU must appear as an exceedingly well-organized and
efficient military police, with the function of combating all opposition, but
working within definite bounds under the central political authority--to all
appearances quietly, almost invisibly.
Baldwin, Roger. Liberty Under
the Soviets,
Concentration camps and temporary prisons for political prisoners or hostages
were established in Soviet Russia during the civil war that followed the
revolution. But it was not until the early 20s that a more or less
regular penitentiary system began to be introduced and laws elaborated to apply
to it. The regimen for political prisoners in the '20s was relatively
lenient. They received extra food, were exempt from forced labor, and
were not subjected to humiliating inspections. In political jails
self-government was allowed; the politicals elected "elders," who
dealt with the prison administration. They kept their clothes, books,
writing materials, pocket knives; they could subscribe to newspapers and
magazines. Their imprisonment was regarded as temporary isolation during
a national emergency.
For example, on December 30, 1920, when the civil war had barely ended, the
Cheka issued a special order;
"Information received by the Cheka establishes that members of various
anti-Soviet parties arrested in political cases are being kept in very bad
conditions.... The Cheka points out that the above-listed categories of
people must not be regarded as undergoing punishment, but as temporarily
isolated from society in the interests of the revolution. The conditions
of their detention must not have a punitive character."
One incident highlights the prison customs of the time. When Kropotkin,
the Anarchist patriarch, died in his home near
Of course, in the early 20s there were quite a few instances that could be
classified as insulting treatment of prisoners by the GPU. Still, this
was the exception, not the rule. The Corrective Labor Code of 1924, which
regulated conditions for all prisoners, including criminals and
"counter-revolutionaries," stated:
"The regimen should be devoid of any trace of cruel or abusive treatment,
the following by no means being permitted: handcuffs, punishment cells,
solitary confinement, denial of food, keeping prisoners behind bars during
conversations with visitors."
In most cases this code was observed at the time.
In the early 20s Commissar of Health Semashko pointed with pride to the
establishment of a humane prison regime, which could not exist in capitalist
countries. To be sure, some deterioration can be noted even in the
'20s. At the end of 1923, for example, the exercise period was cut down,
which provoked a much publicized crash between Social Revolutionaries and guards
at Solovketskaia prison. There were other "excesses," but at
the time they were exceptions rather than the rule.
Medvedev, Roy. Let History
Judge. New York: Columbia University Press, 1989, p. 501-502
The difficulty of correctly appreciating the treatment of political prisoners
in the Soviet Union, due primarily to the lack of factual evidence, is
increased by those who, wishing to make obscurance doubly sure, have created
OGPU legends which one could describe as entirely fictitious were they not sometimes
based on the fiction of others. It is unnecessary to recapitulate them:
they are widely held as the truth about the GPU.
The narrative which follows, written from the notes of Peter Kleist, a German
engineer accused of espionage and held in prison by the GPU for examination,
should destroy at least the more fantastic of these inventions and illuminate
the obscurities of the remand period before the "Moscow
Trials." Kleist, whom I know intimately, is a person whose profoundest
interests are his work and scientific truth. In the Lubyanka and Butirki
prisons he observed the system and experienced the methods of the GPU; and
without the passion either of resentment (he is disposed to objective thinking)
or of partisanship (he is by no means a Communist) he has noted his experiences
and observations. Apart from the changing of some names, necessary in
order not to compromise certain individuals, the narrative faithfully adheres
to Kleist's notes. If it is unsensational, it is because the truth of his
imprisonment is unsensational. For that reason, I consider Kleist's
narrative an important testimony in judging the GPU even for those who without
wishing to surrender their prejudices, may yet wish to correct their
misconceptions.
Edelman, Maurice. G.P.U.
Justice.
The warders at the Lubyanka alternated constantly and it was never possible to
enter into their intimacy. The precise routine regulations prevented any
great variation in the way in which they treated the prisoners. For the
most part the behavior of the guards was unobjectionable. Prison
regulations required that they should treat the prisoners courteously although
they were not allowed to enter into general conversation with them.
Edelman, Maurice. G.P.U.
Justice.
[As Kleist crossed the Soviet border into
"I'm quite well."
"I understand that you didn't confess."
"No. I had nothing to confess."
"Tell that to your grandmother. Did they torture you?"
"No," I snapped at him. "It was a Russian prison not a
Polish one."
He was unruffled. "Our prisons are quite humane," he
said. "Were you brutally treated?"
"No. I was treated as considerately as prison existence permits."
Edelman, Maurice. G.P.U.
Justice.
[When I got off the train in
"Polska Gazeta!" the other young man introduced himself
briefly, speaking German. "Largest circulation in
"What do you want to know?" I asked, looking over his head for
my mother.
"Well, for a start-- what tortures did they give you?"
"None."
"Oh, come on, what tortures did they give you--did they keep you on bread
and water, did they have a tom-tom beating day and night outside your cell, was
your cell so small that you couldn't stretch your legs out, did they shoot
Trotskyists in front of your eyes? That's the sort of stuff we
want. Let it rip!"
He waited with his pencil poised.
"There's nothing haggard I can tell you," I answered, "that will
interest you in that way. I was examined under as good circumstances as
the situation allowed. I admitted anything that I had done and denied
what I hadn't done."
He looked disappointed.
"H'm! What about your talking drug? Were you drugged at all?"
"Not to my knowledge."
"Well, you'd know if you were drugged."
"Exactly."
"Well, I'm afraid your story's not much use. Have to do something
about it. Let's see." He started writing rapidly in shorthand,
muttering as he wrote: "Kleist looked haggard and worn after his three
months' imprisonment in the Lubyanka...refused to speak. His senses
seemed to have been numbed by his experiences. He could not remember his
sufferings and seemed unable to think coherently. He refused to speak of
the tortures of the GPU and cast hunted looks about the platform.
Apparently he had friends still in the Lubyanka held as hostages for his
silence. How's that?"
I shrugged my shoulders.
"You're a lickspittle, my dear fellow. Your bosses ask you for
this. You've got to give it. Don't expect any from me."
Unabashed he folded his pocket-book, raised his fawn hat, and rushed away.
APPENDIX I
(Kleist on the
Edelman, Maurice. G.P.U.
Justice. London: G. Allen & Unwin, ltd.,1938, p. 203
The NKVD hit lists [in the Baltic states] were very similar to those of the SS
and the Gestapo: all members of parliament and senators, local mayors and heads
of district administrations, landowners and businessmen, lawyers, priests,
policemen, non-Marxist intellectuals and so on. In short, anyone who
might possibly cause trouble was arrested and shipped out to the wastes of
Read, Anthony and David
Fisher. The Deadly Embrace.
Surprisingly, I was never actually beaten....
Kuusinen, Aino. The Rings of
Destiny. New York: Morrow, 1974, p. 147
I should also record that, long and exhausting as the interrogations were, I
myself was never treated with physical cruelty, though I had to listen to
plenty of threats and insults during both periods of questioning, month after
month.
Kuusinen, Aino. The Rings of
Destiny.
My experience was not really one of a "police state." The GPU
was as much respected and trusted as feared, in my time. The ordinary
urban police was neither respected nor feared, but rather pitied. Twice I
witnessed the same scene: a civilian knocked down a policeman; bystanders came
to his aid and held the attacker until a second policeman showed up; the two
law officers then took the culprit to the station, without twisting his
arms. Another time when a policeman admonished two young drunks, one of
them, imitating the gestures of regulating traffic, shouted, "You, comrade
regulator, just regulate traffic, and don't hassle us!" The cop just
replied, amid general laughter, "All right, boys, go home and sleep it
off."
...Subsequently, however, I was shocked on occasion to see large groups of men
and women being roughly herded through the streets by soldiers. I found
it hard to believe that they were all criminals. But I could not then,
and for many years thereafter, believe that people were physically mistreated,
beaten, or tortured in the
Blumenfeld, Hans. Life Begins
at 65. Montreal, Canada: Harvest House, c1987, p. 167
GREATER FREEDOM AND MORE
LENIENCY ALLOWED WHEN THREATS ARE LESS SERIOUS
...The tendency since the abolition of the Cheka has, however, been toward
restricted powers and activity--a tendency broken now and then by the pressure
of some foreign threat of attack on the Soviet regime, or some internal
crisis....
...The terror in Russia is and has been almost directly in proportion to
hostile foreign movements against the Soviet state. Fear of intervention
from without or of counter-revolutionary activity within have dictated its
severity.
Baldwin, Roger. Liberty Under
the Soviets, New York: Vanguard Press, 1928, p. 195
But it is most probable also that terrorism by the Soviet political police
would in the absence of foreign pressure have been vastly reduced--certainly to
a point at which the word "terror" could not fairly be applied.
Baldwin, Roger. Liberty Under
the Soviets,
To be sure, some signs of political liberalization did appear in the mid-1930s.
Siegelbaum and Sokolov.
Stalinism As a Way of Life. New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, c2000, p.
101
[When] the level of tolerance and repression of those who oppose the Soviet
socialist system is carefully compared with the history of repression of those who
have opposed the dominant institutions of U.S. society over the 200 years of
U.S. history, ...[one] concludes that there is no qualitative difference
between the two types of societies in this respect. The states of both
the
Szymanski, Albert. Human
Rights in the
POLICE HAVE BROAD POWERS AS IF
IN WARTIME
To sum up, the whole system of dealing with political opposition in Russia rests
on extraordinarily broad foundations--broader than elsewhere in the
world. It rests first on the loose and inclusive legal definitions of
political offenses, and second on the extraordinary powers of the GPU in
arrests, prosecution, "trial," imprisonment, and exile. Both
the conception of political crime and the discretion of the political police
are wider either than under the czar, or than in other countries. They
are analogous to other countries in a state of war, in which Soviet Russia
regards herself.
Baldwin, Roger. Liberty Under
the Soviets, New York: Vanguard Press, 1928, p. 208
Given the conditions out of which this stern discipline of the country grew,
together with the inherited habits of government and the continuous struggle
against enemies abroad and within, its excesses are understandable. They
yield to a far more natural explanation than the romantic interpretation of
"Asiatic cruelty" often attached to them.
Baldwin, Roger. Liberty Under
the Soviets,
...The 20 members of the old bourgeoisie shot in June, 1927, in reprisal for
the assassination of the Soviet ambassador at
Baldwin, Roger. Liberty Under
the Soviets,
The effect of these summary executions in arousing a storm of protest in the
foreign press surprised the Soviet officials.... Even Russians used to
the severity of the regime spoke bitterly of it. But the reaction
probably typical of the masses was voiced by the peasant president of a village
Soviet way out in
Baldwin, Roger. Liberty Under
the Soviets,
PUNISHMENTS OF POLITICAL
OPPONENTS ARE RELATIVELY LIGHT
By far the largest number of political opponents of the Soviet regime against
whom action is taken are exiled. Comparatively few are shot; more are
imprisoned; most exiled...
Baldwin, Roger. Liberty Under
the Soviets,
Until 1937, the regime in the labor re-education camps was, usually, relatively
liberal and humane. Political prisoners had a privileged status with many
special rights denied to ordinary criminals. The workday during the
winter was from four to six hours, and in summer ten. Generous pay was
provided which allowed prisoners to send money to their families and to return
home with money. Goods and clothing was adequate and serious attempts
were made to re-educate the prisoners.
Szymanski, Albert. Human
Rights in the
SOVIET PRISONS ARE DECENT FOR
LIVING
Some of the bitterest stories of prison experiences under the Soviets have been
written about these preliminary detention prisons. While these stories
constitute a fair indictment of certain methods of the GPU, they are not a fair
basis for judging the Russian political prison system. All such temporary
jails the world over tend to be far below the average prison standard.
Even the larger detention prisons in
Baldwin, Roger. Liberty Under
the Soviets, New York: Vanguard Press, 1928, p. 241
I went into about a dozen prisons of all types, from Georgia to Leningrad, and
had no difficulty getting in--and out--except for the political isolators and
the detention prisons in Moscow, all of which were closed to foreign visitors
because of the excitement at the time over the break with England. They
differed greatly in cleanliness and arrangement, just as they do in the
Baldwin, Roger. Liberty Under
the Soviets, New York: Vanguard Press, 1928, p. 244
...The whole system is operated on elastic lines in order to move prisoners
about easily from one type of institution to another according to the
authorities' judgment of their ability to stand more or less liberty. A
prisoner may progress from an isolator--the severest type, where the regime is
like that of prisons anywhere--to a house of correction, where he is
freer. That freer regime is marked by one of the most amazing privileges
of Soviet prisons, a two-weeks' vacation each year with pay for every
well-behaved prisoner, and for those whose conduct is not first-class,
proportionately less time off. Prisoners may take their two weeks all at
one time, or divide it into short periods, or even into "weekends in town."
Baldwin, Roger. Liberty Under
the Soviets, New York: Vanguard Press, 1928, p. 245
Peasant prisoners get three months' vacation in the summer--without prison
pay--to help with the crops if their village Soviet does not object to their
return home. The approval of the home-town soviet is now required in order
to avoid trouble with the neighbors, following early incidents in which some
prisoners were beaten, even killed, by indignant villagers. The officials
say that very few prisoners fail to return from vacation. Those who do
not return and who are caught suffer no additions to their sentences, but they
get no more vacations and may be sent back to prisons of more restricted
liberty.
Baldwin, Roger. Liberty Under
the Soviets, New York: Vanguard Press, 1928, p. 246
In "intermediate" houses of correction located usually in cities,
prisoners have still more liberty, as they are free to go to work outside, only
coming back to sleep in them. Some work in the shops inside; but even
they are allowed to go out. I heard envious comment in
Baldwin, Roger. Liberty Under
the Soviets,
Within the prisons the relations between the keepers and inmates are unusually
democratic, as prisons go. The prisoners share actively in running prison
life, though thorough-going self government experiments are still in their
infancy. The prisoners share in self government is so far confined to
organizing education and recreation and conducting the prison cooperative
stores.
...Most of the wardens struck me as more alert, less officious, and with a
closer man-to-man relation to the prisoners, than any wardens I have had the
privilege of meeting elsewhere--and I have met a good many, in one capacity or
another.
Baldwin, Roger. Liberty Under
the Soviets,
One of the great improvements in Russian prisons is that work is available to
almost all prisoners. There is no forced labor, no contract labor, as in
the
In several prisons where the men--common offenders--crowded around me with
curiosity as to my mission, I asked for those who had served time also in
Czarist prisons. Each time a few spoke up. In response to inquiry
as to what improvements they noted, if any, under the Soviets, they usually
laughed at the idea of asking such a question. "Of course this
regime is better," said one, "we can smoke, we don't have to go to
church, we can see the warden any time we ask, and we get pay and vacations."
Baldwin, Roger. Liberty Under
the Soviets,
...There is, however, no solitary confinement in
Baldwin, Roger. Liberty Under
the Soviets, New York: Vanguard Press, 1928, p. 249
The Soviet regime, while pursuing its policy of severity toward political or
economic opposition, has made marked advances over the Czarist system in
abolishing solitary confinement in single cells, the dungeons of military
fortresses, and the brutalities of flogging and forced labor.... While
the exile system remains quite as bad, possibly even worse, than under the
Czar, the lot of political prisoners, bad as it is, has undoubtedly
improved. In comparison with other countries, it is in many respects
better--better, for instance, in relation to the lot of ordinary criminals than
in the
Baldwin, Roger. Liberty Under
the Soviets, New York: Vanguard Press, 1928, p. 252
[March 3, 1937 resolution of the February-March 1937 Central Committee Plenum
on "Lessons of the wrecking, diversionary, and espionage activities of the
Japanese-German-Trotskyist agents"]
Even more intolerable are the prison procedures established by the NKVD of the
USSR as it pertains to Trotskyists, Zinovievists, rightists,
Socialist-Revolutionaries, and other thoroughly vicious enemies of Soviet power
who have been convicted.
All of these enemies of the people were as a rule assigned to so-called
political isolation prisons, which were placed under the command of the NKVD of
the
In these political isolation prisons, inmates were afforded the opportunity of
associating closely with each other, of discussing all political matters taking
place in the country, of working out plans for anti-Soviet operations to be
carried out by their organizations, and of maintaining relationships with
people on the outside. The convicts were granted the right to
unrestricted use of literature, paper, and writing instruments, the right to
receive an unlimited number of letters and telegrams, to acquire their own
personal effects and keep them in their cells, and to receive, along with their
official rations, packages from the outside in any number and containing any
type of goods.
Getty & Naumov, The Road
to Terror. New Haven, Conn.: Yale Univ. Press, c1999, p. 423
[Extract from protocol #3 of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the
Communist Party of June 10, 1939 regarding NKVD camps]
2. The main incentives for increasing productivity in the camps shall be
an improvement in provisions and nutrition for good production workers who
demonstrate high productivity, financial bonuses for this category of
prisoners, and a lightened camp regime, with general improvement in their
living conditions.
Probationary release may be granted by the Collegium of the NKVD or the Special
Board of the NKVD at the special petition of the camp supervisor and the
supervisor of the political department of the camp to certain prisoners who
have proven themselves to be exemplary workers and who have shown, over a long
period of time, a high level of work....
4. The work force at camp should be equipped with foodstuffs and work
clothes calculated in such a way that the physical strength of the camp work
force may be utilized to the maximum at any productive task.
Getty & Naumov, The Road
to Terror.
Harsh as nature was in the
Medvedev, Roy. Let History
Judge. New York: Columbia University Press, 1989, p. 508
I do not exaggerate if I say that my cell in the Lubyanka was one of the
cleanest and freshest rooms that I lived in during my whole stay in the USSR.
Edelman, Maurice. G.P.U.
Justice.
We rarely complained of the treatment re-received. The food was
monotonous--a rotation of peas and cabbage, or potatoes, meatloaf or
fishloaf--but there was always enough to satisfy one's hunger. The tea
was sometimes not hot but this was remedied on our objecting. The cell
was adequately warm and in addition we were supplied with four thinnish
blankets.
Edelman, Maurice. G.P.U.
Justice.
Medical inspection in the Butirki was as systematic as in the Lubyanka.
Each day at about 9:30, the doctor went the rounds of the cells with two
orderlies, prisoners from the penal section of the prison who were training as
male nurses. The doctor's stock question was, "Any
patients?" There would be an immediate rush from all sides of the
cell. Some prisoners complained of headaches, others of constipation;
some of diarrhea and a dozen valetudinarian afflictions. The doctor, who
wore civilian clothes, took it all good-humouredly, never charged anybody with
malingering, although would-be malingerers were habitual, and rapidly and
accurately dispensed diagnosis and advice. He was never deceived by
malingerers nor did he ever reject a complaint of anybody genuinely ill.
Edelman, Maurice. G.P.U.
Justice.
...It is curious that despite the relative amount of freedom allowed within the
prison, attempts to escape were negligible. A more effective deterrent
than bars is the certainty of apprehension. There is also in Soviet
prisons a sense of being on parole. This discourages that resentment
which drives prisoners elsewhere to escape at any cost.
Edelman, Maurice. G.P.U.
Justice. London: G. Allen & Unwin, ltd.,1938, p. 165
The company [in prison], apart from a plague of stool pigeons, was usually
good, especially in Moscow, and innumerable cases are given of kindness and
self-sacrifice--as when (a Hungarian Communist reports) a prisoner, back from
even worse conditions, was allowed a bed to himself for a whole day by the 275
men crammed into a 25-man cell, and was given extra sugar from their rations....
All prisoners report cases of Party officials who remained loyal, and held
either that Stalin and the Politburo knew nothing of what was happening or,
alternatively, that they themselves were not qualified to judge these
decisions, and simply had the duty of obeying Party rules, including
confession....
Smoking was permitted. All games were forbidden....
Books are reported as available in two
Conquest, Robert. The Great
Terror.
A special category of prison consisted of the half-dozen "political
isolators," notably those at Suzdal, Verkhne-Uralsk,
The Lubyanka was free of bugs, and the same is reported of some of the
The corridors of the Lubyanka were clean, smelling of carbolic and disinfectant.
Conquest, Robert. The Great
Terror.
And, indeed, there had long been an alternative Soviet story. There were,
it is true, corrective labor establishments of a highly beneficent type.
Their operation could be seen in such works as Pogodin's play The Aristocrats,
which showed how prisoners were reclaimed at labor on the White Sea Canal and
elsewhere. Pogodin represents bandits, thieves, and even
"wrecker" engineers being reformed by labor. A re-generated
engineer, now working enthusiastically at a project, has his old mother visit
him. The kindly camp chief puts his car at her disposal, and she is
delighted at her son's healthy physical appearance. "How beautifully
you have re-educated me," a thief remarks, while another sings, "I am
reborn, I want to live and sing."
Conquest, Robert. The Great
Terror.
In the penal camps proper, however, there was considerable freedom of speech:
[A prisoner in Solzhenitsyn’s A Day in the Life of Ivan Denisovich says,
"...The great thing about a penal camp was you had a hell of a lot of
freedom. Back in Ust-Izhma if you said they couldn't get matches
"outside" they put you in the can and slapped on another 10
years. But here you could yell your head off about anything you liked and
the squealers didn't even bother to tell on you. The security fellows
couldn't care less.
The only trouble was you didn't have much time to talk about anything."
Conquest, Robert. The Great
Terror. New York: Oxford University Press, 1990, p. 318
A meeting [during glasnost] took place between members of the local branch of
Memorial [a group collecting signatures to establish a monument to honor the
victims of Stalinism] and veteran members of the organs of the MVD (Ministry of
Internal Affairs), who had done guard duty in the camps in the 1930s and
1940s. One of the latter shouted that writers of defamatory articles on
the camps should be shot, and there was some applause. Others claimed
that the inmates of the camps had been criminals and not political
victims. No one remembered cases of inhumane treatment, food had been
plentiful, medical care excellent. If one believed these witnesses,
conditions had been similar to those of a holiday resort. True, some
people had died, but then, others had died outside the camps.
Laqueur, Walter. Stalin: The
Glasnost Revelations.
[On May 6, 1936 Zinoviev said in prison] I am treated humanely in prison
here. I get medical attention etc. But I am old and badly shaken.
Radzinsky, Edvard.
Stalin.
Thus, those who, in the late 1930s, actually died in the camps of various
causes were very few, probably a matter of not more than 10,000.
According to the great anti-Soviet mythology especially after the war,
the Soviet labor camps were almost exactly the same as Hitler's extermination
camps: in the Soviet camps people "died like flies." In
reality they were like the camp described by Solzhenitsyn in Ivan
Denisovich. This, in recent years (when one could, at
last, at least privately talk to those who had been in camps), was confirmed to
me by a very large number of Russians.... In addition, most, though not all of
the people I interviewed confirmed that until the war prisoners could--and
did--receive letters and food-parcels from home.
Werth, Alexander.
The prisoners went for their walks twice daily and these lasted one hour in
winter, an hour and a half in summer. Four to five wards, that is to say
from 25 to 35 prisoners, went at a time, and were allowed to do what they
liked: walk, hold meetings, take exercise (football, tennis or gorodki, a
Russian game of ninepins). In summer they were allowed to grow flowers or
vegetables. Twice a month the prisoners went to the baths, and on those
occasions sheets would be changed and body linen taken to the laundry.
The prison possessed a considerable library, the nucleus of which consisted of
the books inherited from the Czarist prison (works from Russian, German, French
and English literature). Many volumes, especially works on sociology,
politics and history, were gifts made by prisoners at the time of their
release; moreover, the administration would occasionally buy books. Thus
I was able to read some very new books: Andre Gide's Voyage au
Under such conditions, having enough reading material was not much physical
occupation, the prisoners, who were mainly educated people, spent all their
energy on the political life of the prison: the editing and publishing of news
sheets, articles, the holding of meetings and debates. It is no
exaggeration to say that the political isolator of Verkhne-Uralsk, with its 250
political prisoners, constituted a veritable university of social and political
sciences--the only independent university in the
An important question was that of the communications between the
prisoners. These communications, though prohibited, were actually
tolerated to a certain extent by the prison authorities. There was a
constant struggle concerning the "internal postal service," but both
parties played this game according to certain accepted rules. Communications
between the four or five wards of each floor were naturally easy. Less
easy were "vertical" relations between wards on different
floors. But they took place all the same: at a given signal a bag would
be lowered from the higher floor in which the "mail" was
placed. The warders had long polls with which they tried to intercept the
bags. They succeeded on very rare occasions only, for it was impossible
constantly to watch all windows, especially as there were prisoners brave
enough to fend off the warders' poles with sticks. The rules of the game
demanded that a victory was won as soon as the bag had been taken or raised
again. The bars, with which the windows were provided, were far enough
apart to allow all of these manifestations.
Ciliga, Ante, The Russian
Enigma. London: Ink Links, 1979, p. 202-203
A peculiarity of our barrack-prison was the fact that one could sit for hours
at a time with a considerable number of the inmates of the various blocks,
talking as though one were at liberty--no, even more frankly than one would
have done if free, since in the USSR free men are more afraid of
frankness. Our talks took place in the two gardens and the 3 yards.
One could also drop into a neighboring cell, visit the hospital, the rooms
housing the cultural institutions, and stroll through the various coridors.
Looking into the prison library one was sure to encounter from five to ten
readers and two or three assistants, all "our" people, that is,
prisoners. There one could stay and browse....
Library regulations allowed two books a week to each cell. During the
week books could be exchanged between cells. Those who were at liberty to
circulate within the prison could go to the library and take out books....
Several courses were organized in the library. The illiterate were taught
to read and write, and for the literate there were courses in arithmetic,
geography, the natural sciences. Textbooks especially published for this
purpose were used. I had a look at them. Some were graphically and
interestingly written. Both pupils and teachers were prisoners.
Arithmetic was taught by a little old man, a former merchant from the
We had also a drama circle, an orchestra, and a weekly cinema show. For
all these "cultural activities," as one calls them in the
Ciliga, Ante, The Russian
Enigma.
My many meetings and long talks in
Even direct contact with the outside world was not lacking. There were
among us not a few who worked individually in some outside institution or who
were permitted visits from relatives. Since they were subjected to hardly
any searching when they returned to prison, it was possible to receive and send
letters. There was also an authorized correspondence. There was
even a post office within the prison, next to the administration office, and it
was open to all of us for normal postal transactions. Censorship was more
a matter of form than of reality. This was not a GPU prison, that is, a
political prison with its draconic severity, but a common "criminal"
prison belonging to the People's Commissariat of Justice, with almost the
atmosphere of 1917....
Ciliga, Ante, The Russian
Enigma. London: Ink Links, 1979, p. 357
But during my time in this "blessed" criminal prison one could write
openly to friends abroad, just as one could from any part of Russia. I
then and there wrote several letters to my friends in
Ciliga, Ante, The Russian
Enigma.
In spite of hunger and overcrowding, the prison was a beehive of activity:
courses, lectures and propaganda. The illiterate were taught the alphabet;
courses in mathematics, geography, physics and so on were organized for those
who had a modicum of instruction. There were orchestras and a theater,
the musicians and actors being recruited from among the prisoners. Films
were shown. The prison library provided books and newspapers for every
cell. I was asked to give a course of Latin classes to the infirmary
staff. The young people followed all these classes with avidity and
showed no despair at all.
Ciliga, Ante, The Russian
Enigma.
“For the moment you will go into the political section, corridor nine;
you'll find a couple of your comrades there. Your cell will be open all
day. You will be able to walk around freely and do some sunbathing.
You'll receive “political’ rations; you've got nothing to complain
about. Better than in
I did indeed find two political prisoners there.... They took me for a
walk in the garden and acquainted me with the general lay-out of the
prison. We politicals were given free run of the yards and some of the
buildings. The same privilege was also permitted those who
"worked" and in general to all who were well-dressed and looked like
"intelligentsia."
Ciliga, Ante, The Russian
Enigma.
The organization of the Trotskyist prisoners called itself the "Collective
of the Verkhne-Uralsk Leninist Bolsheviks." It was divided into
Left-wing, Center, and Right-wing. This division into three sections
persisted during the three years of my stay, although the composition of the
sections and even their ideologies were subject to certain fluctuations.
Upon my arrival at Verkhne-Uralsk I found three programs and two Trotskyist
newspapers....
Right-wing and Center, between them, published Pravda in Prison (Truth in
Prison), the Left-wing The Militant Bolshevik. These newspapers appeared
either once a month or every two months. Each copy contained 10 to 20
articles in the form of separate writing books. The "copy",
’.e. the packet of 10 to 20 writing books, circulated from ward to ward
and the prisoners read the notebooks in turn. The papers appeared in
three copies, one copy for each prison-wing.
Ciliga, Ante, The Russian
Enigma.
All these preoccupations of the Trotskyist majority left me indifferent.
Their outlook was not very different from that of the Stalinist bureaucracy;
they were slightly more polite and human, that was all.
Ciliga, Ante, The Russian
Enigma.
It should also be mentioned that all of Trotsky's works, and those of
socialists and anarchists that had lawfully been published in the
Ciliga, Ante, The Russian
Enigma.
The great mass of the prison population, the plebians as it were of that world,
was made up of the most varied categories. In the first place there was a
group of 200 employed on all sorts of work inside the prison; attending to and
supervising the other prisoners, looking after the bath-house, working in the
hospital, running the ambulance service, working in the kitchen, the
store-rooms, the barbershop, in the prison office and the various
"cultural" departments, cleaning the cells and doing internal guard
duties. There were only a very few paid workers from the outside--in
fact, only the Governor, the heads of the various departments, and the doctors.
Ciliga, Ante, The Russian
Enigma.
One of the big differences between the Hitler and the Stalin systems was the
treatment of the weak and sick. A man who fell sick in
Berger, Joseph. Nothing but
the Truth. New York, John Day Co. 1971, p. 197
SOVIET AND ITALIAN
DICTATORSHIPS ARE TOTALLY DIFFERENT
...The comparison of
Baldwin, Roger. Liberty Under
the Soviets,
WWII PRISONERS OF WAR WERE
TREATED HUMANELY
"In Siberia now," a Russian friend of mine returned from there told me,
"whole industries are operated by German prisoners, including foreman and
skilled technicians. Some of them make higher pay than Soviet
workers. Our workers are beginning to complain about it."
Free Germans confirmed this. They also said that a German factory worker
got the same bread allowance, in accordance with work performed, as a
Russian. Ordinary German prisoners near the front to whom I spoke said
that they got 400 grams--.88 pounds--of daily bread, which is what a Russian
housewife or a dependent gets. Those I saw in
"But after a man has qualified for factory work," one Free German
said, "he can earn as much as 1200 grams (2.6 pounds) of bread a
day. It is true, this is more than many first-class Russian workers
make. The German has to exceed his norm [basic production unit] in order
to earn that much, but I know of a number who are doing it."
The energetic Stakhanovite Fritz could win extra allowances of certain foods,
better quarters, clothing, and special privileges. Excellent workers were
promised eventual freedom--the right to go home. It was stated that some
of them became "real enthusiasts." And top workers were almost
invariably the quickest students at the political lectures delivered to them by
Free German indoctrinators.
Snow, Edgar. The Pattern of
Soviet Power,
First, they didn't think Stalin intended to force ten to twenty million Germans
to spend their lives on Russian rock piles. They didn't think he planned
to condemn the entire German people to slave labor. They said that this
is the "Ehrenburg line"--Ilya Ehrenburg was the most fanatical and
prolific of the Soviet eye-for-eye school of publicists--and asserted that it
was not the party line.
Snow, Edgar. The Pattern of
Soviet Power,
I found all those considerations quite reasonable. The problem of the
POWs, for instance, was ripe for solution. Over 10 years had gone by
since they had been captured [in World War II]. Recently, I had had
occasion to meet many of them. In the
On the whole, the life of the POWs wasn't too bad. They could practice
their trades and seemed to be doing it with inspiration. Their village of
small cottages was kept in excellent condition; it had a community center,
sports grounds, flower beds, and yellow sandstrewn paths planted with young
trees on both sides. Compared to the inhuman conditions of the Soviet
POWs who had been captured by
Berezhkov, Valentin. At
Stalin's Side.
SU SLOWLY MOVED FROM BEING
NEUTRAL TO SUPPORTING COMMUNISTS IN CHINA
In 1945 a significant strain became apparent in Sino-Soviet relations, and the
Crimean conference did nothing to alleviate it, as many had hoped it
might. In general the Soviet attitude had shifted from one of formal
"neutrality" in the internal quarrel between the Kungchantang, or
Communist Party, and the Kuomintang, the nationalist party of the
Generalissimo, to one of openly expressed repugnance for the "ruling
circles" of the Kuomintang's government at
Snow, Edgar. The Pattern of
Soviet Power,
...Today (1945)
Snow, Edgar. The Pattern of
Soviet Power, New York: Random House, 1945, p. 122
CHINESE COMMUNISTS ARE REAL
MARXISTS
Thus, it is misleading to contend that Chinese Communists are not Marxists, or
that they do not hope, ultimately, to build up a classless, socialist state in
China, or that they are not very close to the Soviet Union in their
sympathies. People who try to persuade Americans to accept them on the
ground that they are not "real Communists"--in the foregoing
sense--are either misinformed or deliberately dishonest.
Snow, Edgar. The Pattern of
Soviet Power,
The Chinese further deepened the rift because they are semi-Marxists rather
than true Marxists.
Chuev, Feliks. Molotov
Remembers. Chicago: I. R. Dee, 1993, p. 386
STALIN NOT TO BLAME FOR YAGODA
AND YEZHOV CRIMES
The sadistic Yagoda and Yezhov, who for a time ruled a state within a
state--the GPU, were chiefly responsible for these outrages. By Yagoda's
own account his hirelings faked thousands of documents and so mixed up the
records that it was impossible to tell a genuine dossier from a bogus
one. Curiously the public does not seem to blame Stalin for having
permitted such a Frankenstein to develop, but instead gives him credit for
having cleaned up the Yagoda gang and brought the secret police back under full
control of the Politburo--which he did when the GPU was crushed.
Snow, Edgar. The Pattern of
Soviet Power, New York: Random House, 1945, p. 148
How can anyone now allow himself the stupidity of criticizing Stalin for
repression and crimes? This was a psychosis that was cleverly instituted
by Yezhov and other enemies of the State... this psychosis took over the minds
of millions of people. Practically all were involved in looking for
"enemies." The Central Committee ACP[B] was against this,
fought this tooth and nail---Stalin in particular. People got involved in
this, and friends were "drowning" friends in the name of getting rid
of "enemies." Of course, this cannot all be explained as a mass
psychosis! In all the examinations that were conducted into this period,
we had 30-40 people going over the same documents, but NOWHERE did we EVER find
the name of Stalin, or the command of Stalin, or the resolution to do these
things which were undertaken by the REAL ENEMIES of the Soviet people. No
directives either of Stalin, Molotov, or Voroshilov were to be found in all of
these documents.
According to my way of thinking, Stalin also bears some blame because he was
the Head of the Motherland. His fault was that he was always favoring
"collective decisions" and thus was fooled by his
"comrades-in-arms." Yagoda, Malenkov, Khrushchev, Beria, and
others. Yezhov, Stalin spotted from the start and took steps to stop him
and get rid of him.
Rybin, Aleksei. Next to
Stalin: Notes of a Bodyguard. Toronto: Northstar Compass Journal, 1996, p. 80
ANTI-SOVIET ELEMENTS WORMED
THEIR WAY INTO THE PARTY
[Zhdanov] frankly declared "...There were numerous cases of hostile
elements who had wormed their way into the party, taking advantage of the
purges to persecute and ruin honest people. There is no necessity for the
method of the mass purge."
Snow, Edgar. The Pattern of
Soviet Power, New York: Random House, 1945, p. 179
FASCISTS WERE REJECTED BY THE
UKRAINIANS
The real reason for the Germans failure apparently was that in the beginning
they were confident they would be in the Ukraine forever and they didn't care what
the people thought. In this period their greed and arrogance were
excessive. They took the best land for German settlers and robbed other
farms of their best cattle, their machinery, and their surplus and reserves.
Snow, Edgar. The Pattern of
Soviet Power,
BOLSHEVIK LEADERS COME FROM
THE WORKING CLASS AND PEASANTRY
All these men of the Kremlin have a common background. They are almost
without exception the sons of peasants or workers whose parents could not read
or write. Out of their bitter impoverished youth came early revolutionary
activity. Many of them spent years in political imprisonment or
exile. Mastery of the science of revolution, and of the manipulation of
revolutionary power, has been their goal all their lives. To that they
have subordinated everything--absolutely everything.
Snow, Edgar. The Pattern of
Soviet Power,
No member of the Politburo had an extensive formal education.
Snow, Edgar. The Pattern of
Soviet Power,
There is a widespread assumption in
The fact is, however, that public opinion does exist in
Secondly, there is, or at least is encouraged to be, a great deal of freedom of
expression in local affairs. Collective farm villages do elect their own
officers, and unpopular ones can be so easily sabotaged and ruined by the
peasants that a party-dictated choice can seldom "stick."
Snow, Edgar. The Pattern of
Soviet Power, New York: Random House, 1945, p. 204
...The aim of the October Revolution had been to put the proletariat in power,
and by 1939 most of the positions of authority in the USSR were filled by those
whose social origins were either working-class or peasant.
Gill, Graeme. Stalinism.
All the Soviet leaders lived pretty much like this at that time. No one
cared about luxury or possessions, though they did try to give a good education
to their children. They hired good governesses of the old,
prerevolutionary school, mainly to teach their children German. All the
wives had jobs and read all they could in their spare time. Sports had
just come into style. All of them played tennis, and they had tennis
courts and croquet lawns at their dachas. The women paid no attention to
make up or clothes, but they looked nice just the same.
...During my mother's lifetime we had a normal, modest life.
Alliluyeva, Svetlana. Twenty
Letters to a Friend.
Many of these men--who rule 1/6 the land surface of the globe--were workmen
with their hands, manual laborers, 15 or 20 years ago.... Even so, a
neutral diplomat in
The lives of most of Stalin's men follow a similar pattern. They were
workmen who turned revolutionary, and all but the youngest of them have a
history, like Stalin, of underground political activity. The most
important fact in their lives was the date when they entered the communist
party; as a rule, their hierarchical position depends on this. Several
have been imprisoned, and their prison sentences are proud badges of
distinction.
Gunther, John. Inside
It [the Communist Party] is not an antagonistic group set over against the
masses, "3 million people ruling a recalcitrant 160,000,000," as is
often pictured abroad. It is rather the most energetic part of 160 million,
the ones who pledge their time to the public task of creating a new social and
economic system, and who make this the continuing and dominant effort of their
lives.
Strong, Anna Louise.
Dictatorship and Democracy in the
PEOPLE WORKED OVERTIME AND
HARD FOR THE SYSTEM
...Many willingly worked overtime, throwing all their energies into the effort
to create a new society.
Gill, Graeme. Stalinism.
CENTRALIZATION SAVED THE
NATION, ESPECIALLY REGARDING INDUSTRIALIZATION
The Stalinist economic system was one well suited to the war effort.
Indeed, the economies of many of the other combatants moved in the direction of
greater central coordination and planning, like that associated with the Soviet
economic structure created during the 1930s. The centralization of
control meant that the economy could quickly move onto a full war footing,
particularly since the last years of the 1930s had seen an increasing emphasis
placed upon the production of weapons and war material in general. In
this sense, the general priority on heavy industry evident in the earlier
decade was also useful for the war effort because it facilitated the move to
wartime production much more than would have been the case had a focus on light
industry and consumer goods production been characteristic of the Soviet
development pattern.
Gill, Graeme. Stalinism.
Atlantic Highlands, N.J.: Humanities Press International, 1990, p. 35
...Victory had been very expensive for the USSR; some 20 million Soviet
soldiers and civilians were killed or incapacitated during the war. Many
towns and cities lay in ruins, with almost half of all urban living space in
occupied territory destroyed. Large numbers of factories were left in
ruins, while much of the agricultural infrastructure was destroyed. The
transport network in the occupied areas had to be almost totally rebuilt.
But ultimately, the
Gill, Graeme. Stalinism.
This new appreciation of Stalin's role did not spring only from afterthoughts
borne in the flush of victory. The truth was that the war could not have
been won without the intensive industrialization of
Against this we must set the price Russia had paid for victory: the 7 million
dead, officially counted--the losses may in fact have been much larger; the
uncounted millions of cripples; the devastation of most cities and towns, and
of much of the country-side in European Russia; the destruction of industry,
exemplified by the total flooding of the coal-mines of the Donetz; the complete
homelessness of 25 million people, living in caves, trenches, and mud huts, not
to speak of the latent homelessness of many more millions of evacuees in the
Urals and beyond. Last but not least, the cost of victory included the
utter weariness of a people that had, in the interests of industrialization and
rearmament, for many years been denied the most essential necessities of life.
[Footnote]: Incidentally, collectivization had made it easier for the
Government to build up stocks of food and raw materials, by which the
townspeople were saved from famine, and industry from paralysis, when the
country was cut off from its granaries and transport was disrupted.
Deutscher, Isaac. Stalin; A
Political Biography.
[In a speech delivered at the First All-Union Conference of Leading Personnel
of Socialist Industry on February 4, 1931 Stalin stated] We are 50 or 100 years
behind the advanced countries. We must make good this distance in 10
years. Either we do it, or we shall go under.
Stalin, Joseph. Works.
UPWARD SOCIAL MOBILITY UNDER
STALIN
The chief characteristic of the social face of Stalinism during the 1930s was
very high levels of social mobility. ...the 1930s witnessed a real social
revolution in the
Gill, Graeme. Stalinism.
The dimensions of this change are unprecedented within such a short space of 35
years.
Gill, Graeme. Stalinism.
MOLOTOV TOLD HISTORY AS IT
REALLY WAS
Molotov refused to publish an anodyne, sanitized version of his memoirs
tailored to fit the current line, of the sort Gromyko & Mikoyan had
published.
Chuev, Feliks. Molotov
Remembers.
MOLOTOV CORRECTLY PREDICTED
GORBACHOV WAS A BUKHARIN
Molotov in his last days proved to be a prophet. He predicted the triumph
of the Bukharinist "right" in the
Only 700 of the more than 5000 typewritten pages of this diary went into this
book.
Chuev, Feliks. Molotov
Remembers.
MOLOTOV SAYS TAKING PART OF
POLAND WAS NECESSARY TO KEEP NAZIS AWAY
MOLOTOV: We negotiated
with the British and French before talking to the Germans. If the West
had permitted our troops in
If we hadn't moved toward the Germans in 1939, they would have invaded all
Chuev, Feliks. Molotov
Remembers.
IT IS BETTER TO BE CURSED THAN
PRAISED BY CAPITALISTS
CHUEV: Western
broadcasters talk a lot about you, curse you and Stalin.
MOLOTOV: It would have
been worse if they had praised us.
Chuev, Feliks. Molotov
Remembers.
HITLER WAS AN EXTREME
ANTI-COMMUNIST NATIONALIST
MOLOTOV: Hitler was an
extreme nationalist. A blinded and stupid anti-communist.
Chuev, Feliks. Molotov
Remembers.
MOLOTOV FEELS THERE ARE STILL
HITLERS TODAY
CHUEV: Did Stalin meet
him?
MOLOTOV: No, I was the
only one to have such a pleasure. There are people of that kind now,
too. That's why we must pursue a vigilant and firm policy.
Chuev, Feliks. Molotov
Remembers.
HITLER WAS SMART AND NARROW
BUT NOT A MANIAC
MOLOTOV: Hitler... there
was nothing remarkable in his appearance. But he was a very smug, and, if
I may say so, vain person. He wasn't at all the same as he is portrayed
in movies and books. They focus attention on his appearance, depict him
as a madman, a maniac, but that's not true. He was very smart, though
narrow-minded and obtuse at the same time because of his egotism....
Chuev, Feliks. Molotov
Remembers.
HITLER ADMIRED STALIN’S
PERSONALITY
MOLOTOV: I sensed he
[Hitler] was not only afraid of our power but that he also stood in awe of
Stalin's personality.
Chuev, Feliks. Molotov
Remembers.
MOLOTOV SAYS HITLER WANTED TO
DIVIDE THE WORLD
MOLOTOV: I said. What do
you want? What are your proposals? "Let's divide the whole
world," he [Hitler] said. "You need the South, to get to the
warm waters."
...We had agreed to observe
the treaty--they were not doing so. We saw they didn't want to observe it.
Chuev, Feliks. Molotov
Remembers.
MOLOTOV SAYS HITLER MET HIM TO
GET THE SU TO ATTACK
CHUEV: Was there any
point for the Germans to meet with you in 1940?
MOLOTOV: They wanted to
fool us and draw us into a war with
Chuev, Feliks. Molotov
Remembers.
MOLOTOV SHOWS NAZIS
DON’T HAVE A PROGRAM, PARTY RULES OR A CONSTITUTION
MOLOTOV: Do you have a
party program? I asked Hess. I knew they didn't. How could it
be, a party without a program?
Do you have party rules? I knew they didn't have party rules. But I
decided to feel him out anyway. Hess was Hitler's first party deputy, a
party secretary. Bormann was his deputy.
I went on tripping him up. And do you have a constitution? They
didn't have that either. What a high level of organization!
Chuev, Feliks. Molotov
Remembers.
STALIN WAS A GREAT POLITICAL
TACTICIAN
MOLOTOV: Stalin was the
greatest tactician. Hitler, after all, signed the nonaggression pact with
us without the acquiescence of
Chuev, Feliks. Molotov
Remembers.
MOLOTOV AND STALIN DID NOT
EXPECT AN ATTACK UNTIL
CHUEV: And maybe Stalin
overestimated Hitler? Maybe he thought Hitler was smart enough not to
attack us until he finished the war with
MOLOTOV: That's right,
that's right. Not only Stalin had this feeling but I and others did,
too. On the other hand, there was nothing left for Hitler to do but
attack us. He would never have finished his war with
Chuev, Feliks. Molotov
Remembers. Chicago: I. R. Dee, 1993, p. 23
Zhukov said that 'most of the people around him supported Stalin in the
political judgments he made before the war, especially the notion that, as long
as we did not rise to any provocation, or make any false step, then Hitler
would not break the pact and attack us. This line was most ardently
advocated by Molotov who, after his trip to
Volkogonov, Dmitri. Stalin:
Triumph and Tragedy. New York: Grove Weidenfeld, 1991, p. 371
The wily Boss, a leader whose first rule was "trust no one," whose
whole strategy consisted in misleading the enemy, suddenly proves gullible in
his dealings with the archenemy, is suddenly himself so easily gulled that he
pays not the slightest attention to repeated warnings, but puts implicit trust
in the liar Hitler, who has betrayed so many and broken his word so
often....
It would be believable if it were talking about a different man, and not our
Stalin. He had proved conclusively in the 60 years of his life that he
was not a bit like that.
What, then, did happen?
As early as March 1941 his intelligence service had supplied him in effect with
the full details of Barbarossa. The date set for the German invasion was somewhere
between May 15 and June 15. But the Boss was a pragmatist and expected
people to behave rationally. Hitler simply could not afford such a risky
venture. As a Marxist, Stalin respected economic realities. It
seemed incredible to him that Hitler would wage war simultaneously on several
countries whose combined resources were incomparably greater than those of
Radzinsky, Edvard.
Stalin.
EVERYTHING WAS DONE TO DELAY
OR PREVENT WAR COMING
CHUEV: They write now
that Stalin trusted Hitler, that Hitler deceived him with the pact of 1939,
lulled his vigilance. Stalin trusted him....
MOLOTOV: Such a naive
Stalin. No. Stalin saw through it all. Stalin trusted
Hitler? He didn't trust all his own people! And there were reasons
for that. Hitler fooled Stalin? As a result of such deception
Hitler had to poison himself, and Stalin became the head of half the world!
We had to delay
No one trusted Hitler, but Stalin was so credulous!... He wanted to delay
the war for at least another half a year, or longer. Everyone wanted this
delay, everyone who was close to the concerns of the time.
A mistake was made, but of minor importance, I would say, because we were
afraid to get ourselves drawn into the war to give the Germans a pretext for
attack. That's how everything got started, I assure you.
Chuev, Feliks. Molotov Remembers.
MOLOTOV: To me, these
were not our mistakes but our weaknesses. Weaknesses because I think
psychologically it was almost impossible for us to be completely ready for
war. We felt we were not yet ready, so it was quite natural for us to
overdo it.... I personally don't see any mistakes in that. In order
to delay the war everything was done to avoid giving the Germans a pretext to
start it.
Chuev, Feliks. Molotov
Remembers.
"You [Zhukov and Timoshenko] propose carrying out mobilizations, alerting
the troops, and moving them to the western borders?" He [Stalin]
wailed. "That means war! Do you understand that or not?"
Read, Anthony and David
Fisher. The Deadly Embrace. New York: Norton, 1988, p. 615
Since the war's end, the press would come out with the version that we had had
knowledge of Plan Barbarossa before the war broke out, and that we knew the
direction of the main strikes, the deployment frontage of the German troops,
their strength and equipment. In so doing, the press referred to
well-known Soviet intelligence agents--Richard Sorge, for one, and many others
in
I take full responsibility for saying that this is pure fiction. As far
as I know, neither the Soviet Government, nor the People's Commissariat for
Defence, nor the General Staff had any such information.
On June 13, Timoshenko phoned Stalin in my presence and asked permission to
alert the troops of the border districts, and to deploy the first echelons
according to the cover plans.
"We will think it over," Stalin replied.
The next day we visited Stalin and informed him of the general anxiety and the
necessity of alerting the troops.
"You propose carrying out a mobilization, alerting the troops and moving
them to the western borders? But that means war! Don't you two
understand that?"
On June 21, in the evening, Lieutenant-General Purkayev, Chief of Staff of the
Kiev Military District, telephoned to inform me that a German sergeant-major
had come to our frontier guards and said that German troops were moving to
jumping-off areas and that the attack would begin in the morning of June 22.
I at once informed the Defense Commissar and Stalin of what Lieutenant-General
Purkayev had reported. Stalin said to come to the Kremlin with the
People's Commissar.
Taking with me a draft of the directive for the troops I went to the Kremlin
along with the Commissar and Lieutenant-General Vatutin. On the way we
agreed that at all cost we must get permission to alert the troops.
Stalin was alone when he received us. He was plainly worried.
"The German generals may have sent this turncoat to provoke a
conflict," he said.
"No," Timoshenko replied. "We think he is telling the
truth."
At that moment members of the Politburo came in.
"What are we to do?" Stalin asked.
No one answered.
"A directive must immediately be given to alert all troops in the border
districts," Timoshenko said....
"Read it!" Stalin replied.
I read the draft directive.
Stalin said: "It's too early to issue such a directive--perhaps the
question can still be settled peacefully. We must give a short directive
stating that an attack may begin with provocative actions by the German
forces. The troops of the border districts must not fall for any provocation,
and avoid complications."
Vatutin and I went into the next room and quickly drew up a draft of the
directive to be sent by the People's Commissar.
We then returned to the office and asked for permission to read the directive.
Stalin listened to it then read it over again making amendments, and finally
gave it to the People's Commissar to sign.
At about midnight Commander of the Kiev District Kirponos reported over the
high-frequency telephone from his command post at Ternopol that another German
soldier had appeared in our lines besides the turncoat previously mentioned by
General Purkayev. He was from the 222nd Infantry Regiment of the 74th
infantry Division. Having swum the river, he presented himself to our
border guards, and told them the German troops were going to mount an offensive
at 4 A. M. Kirponos was ordered to speed up transmission of the alert
directive to all units....
Various stories were circulated after Stalin's death that on the night of June
21-22 some commanders and their staffs were either peacefully asleep or making
merry without a suspicion that anything was amiss. This is not
true. The last night of peace was quite different. As I have
already said, on our return from the Kremlin, the Commissar for Defense and I
spoke over the high-frequency telephone with District commanders Kuznetsov,
Pavlov, Kirponos, and their chiefs of staff, and all of them were at their
command posts....
The Defense Commissar said I should phone Stalin. I started
calling. No one answered. I kept calling. Finally, I heard
the sleep-laden voice of the general on duty at the security section. I
asked him to call Stalin to the phone.
"What? Now?, and Stalin is asleep."
"Wake him at once. The Germans are bombing our towns!"
About three minutes later Stalin picked up the receiver.
I reported the situation and requested permission to start retaliatory
action. Stalin was silent. I heard the sound of his
breathing.
"Did you hear me?"
Silence again.
At last Stalin asked:
"Where Is the Defense Commissar?"
"Talking with the Kiev District on the high-frequency phone."
"You and him come to the Kremlin. Tell Poskrebyshev to summon all
Politburo members."
Zhukov, Georgi. Reminiscences
and Reflections Vol. 1. Moscow: Progress Pub., c1985, p. 274-281
It is fair to ask why Stalin, knowing of the clear indications that Germany was
ready to make war on us, still withheld his consent for the troops in the
border military districts to stand alert well in advance....
The state of alert in a border area is in itself an extreme development not to
be viewed as an ordinary occurence in the life of the country and its
international relations. Some people, however, overlook the circumstance
and believe that the earlier the armed forces were put on the alert the better
it would have been for us....
Without dwelling on the extreme points I shall just indicate that the premature
alert of the troops may be just as dangerous as the delay in giving it.
Quite often there is still a long distance from hostile policies of a
neighbor-country to a real war. But let us discuss the case where Stalin
was obviously late with the decision for the army and the country to go over to
the war footing...
Here my opinion is that although we were not quite ready for war yet, which I
have already spoken about, when the time for it had really come we should have
had the nerve to step over the threshold. Stalin did not venture to do
so, acting, of course, with the best of intentions....
The political and state leaders in the country saw war coming and exerted
maximum efforts to delay the
Stalin was unable to make that decision at the right time, and that remains his
most serious political mistake....
What caused this experienced and far-sided statesman to make such a gross
error? Above all it was because Soviet intelligence agencies, as Zhukov
justly notes in his memoirs, failed to evaluate fully and objectively the
information they were receiving on the war preparations of Nazi Germany and
report it frankly to Stalin. I shall not touch upon every aspect of the
situation; it is basically well-known. I shall only mention the fact that
the isolation of the intelligence agency from the General Staff apparently
played a part here. The head of intelligence, being also Deputy Defense
Commissar, preferred to make his reports directly to Stalin without conferring
with the Chief of General Staff. If Zhukov had been conversant with all
the vital intelligence information, knowing his position and character, I am
sure he could have made more precise conclusions from it and put them to Stalin
in a more authoritative way; he would surely have shaken Stalin’s
conviction that we could further delay the start of the war and that Germany
would not venture to fight on two fronts,the West and the East....
We must also bear in mind that Stalin, in trying to defer the outbreak of war,
overestimated the possibilities of diplomacy in resolving the issue. Had
he felt doubtful about the wisdom of this policy he would have agreed to every
possible measure for mobilization, since he was a man of firm resolve and
decision.
Vasilevskii, Aleksandr
M. A Lifelong Cause. Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1981, p. 83-85
KHRUSHCHOV AND BERIA WERE
SECRET RIGHTISTS
MOLOTOV: There was only
a thin layer of party leadership in the 1920s, and there were always fissures
in this thin layer--now right-wingers, then nationalists, then workers’
opposition.... How Lenin managed to bear this is amazing. Lenin
died, but they all lived on, and Stalin had to pass through very tough
times. Khrushchev is proof of that. He turned out to be a
right-winger, though he was pretending to be for Stalin, for Lenin....
Only when Stalin's power weakened did the conspirator in him surface....
Chuev, Feliks. Molotov
Remembers.
No, Khrushchev wasn't such a dullard. He was culturally deprived.
Chuev, Feliks. Molotov
Remembers.
Khrushchov reminded me of a livestock dealer. A small-time livestock
dealer. A man of little culture, certainly. A regular livestock
trader, a man who deals in cattle.
Chuev, Feliks. Molotov
Remembers.
Khrushchev? A person like him could have switched sides in a flash.
Chuev, Feliks. Molotov
Remembers.
CHUEV: Then Khrushchev
distorted your words?
MOLOTOV:
Definitely. He was never dependable. He was a man without
scruples. Slapdash. Very primitive.
CHUEV: Kaganovich told
me nearly the same story.
Chuev, Feliks. Molotov
Remembers.
...Khrushchev, Mikoyan, rightists, they sat on the Politburo where they
pretended to be Stalin's greatest champions.
Chuev, Feliks. Molotov
Remembers.
...But as a matter of fact, Mikoyan is a Rykovist, a rightist, and a
Khrushchevite. I see no great difference between Khrushchev and
Rykov. And I have never supported Khrushchev.
Chuev, Feliks. Molotov
Remembers.
What Beria proposed would never have come up for discussion in Stalin's
time. Stalin made a public statement when the GDR was created, that this
was a new stage in the development of
I objected that there could not be a peaceful
I consider Khrushchev a rightist, and Beria was even further right. We
had the evidence. Both of them were rightists. Mikoyan too.
...Being a rightist, Khrushchev was rotten through and through. Beria was
even more of a rightist and even more rotten.
Chuev, Feliks. Molotov
Remembers.
He (Beria) was unprincipled. He was not even a communist. I
consider him a parasite on the party.
Chuev, Feliks. Molotov
Remembers.
I regard Beria as an agent of imperialism. Agent does not mean spy.
He had to have some support--either in the working class or in
imperialism. He had no support among the people, and he enjoyed no
prestige. Even had he succeeded in seizing power, he would not have
lasted long.
...a big scum.
Chuev, Feliks. Molotov Remembers.
He was a good organizer, a good administrator--and a born security operative,
of course. But quite without principles.
I had a sharp clash with Beria the first week after Stalin's death. It is
quite possible that I was not the one to meet either his or Khrushchev's
requirements. Their policies would not have differed greatly.
Chuev, Feliks. Molotov
Remembers.
...he (Beria) was, in any event, a dangerous character.
Chuev, Feliks. Molotov
Remembers.
CHUEV: Beria is called a
diehard enemy of Soviet power.
MOLOTOV: I don't know
whether he was a diehard or some other kind of enemy, but I do know he was an enemy.
Chuev, Feliks. Molotov
Remembers.
CHUEV: Was Khrushchev
adept in matters of theory?
MOLOTOV: No. He
was extremely weak in that regard. We were all "practicals,"
all practitioners. Before the Revolution we read all the books and
newspapers, now we read nothing.
Chuev, Feliks. Molotov
Remembers.
The trouble, I say, is that in the present situation it is impossible to offer
a definition of socialism. There is no complete clarity on this
question. One can only depict distinct stages, fundamental phases.
Chuev, Feliks. Molotov
Remembers.
CHUEV: Why did
Khrushchev come out against Stalin so drastically?
MOLOTOV: Because he
pursued a different policy. He is a rightist.... The rightist and
the Trotskyist extremes come together. The main threat in the 1930s came
from the rightists rather than from the Trotskyists. They had close ties
with the village. Their social base was the kulak class. That's
where Khrushchev had his roots....
Deep down Khrushchev was an enemy of Stalin. On the surface Stalin was
the be-all and end-all, but deep down it was another matter.... His bitterness
toward Stalin stemmed from the fact that Khrushchev's eldest son got himself
shot. Driven by such bitterness, Khrushchev would balk at nothing to
besmirch the name Stalin.
CHUEV: Nikita disowned his
son, didn’t he?
MOLOTOV: Yes. His
son was something of a traitor, which also reflects on Khrushchev. A good
political leader with a son like that?...
Stalin didn't want to pardon Khrushchev's son. And Khrushchev personally
hated Stalin. Of course, that added to his animosity, but that was not
the main thing about him. He was not a revolutionary. He didn't
join the party until 1918--some militant! Ordinary workers had joined the
party earlier. Some leader of our party he turned out to be! It was
absurd, absurd.
Khrushchev opposed Stalin and Leninist policy.... The rightists wanted to
block us from pressing for the liquidation of the kulaks; they were
champions of a pro-kulak policy.... We saw this in Khrushchev and spoke
about it,...
Chuev, Feliks. Molotov
Remembers. Chicago: I. R. Dee, 1993, p. 351-352
...Initially the three of us were labeled "the antiparty
group"--Malenkov, Kaganovich, Molotov--then they also added Shepilov who
had joined us. And after a while they included Bulganin and Voroshilov.
...The "antiparty" group had to be removed, and four of us were
expelled.
Chuev, Feliks. Molotov
Remembers.
He [Khrushchev] had no serious interest in ideology.
Chuev, Feliks. Molotov
Remembers.
...Stalin's supporters would hew to the party line, but Khrushchev was always
clever enough to adapt to that line. He was quite a capable man.
You can't say he had been merely a lucky fellow. He could very well have
become a Bukharinite, but he moved in the opposite direction. He sensed
it would be more secure that way. Khrushchev in essence was a
Bukharinite, but under Stalin he was not a Bukharinite.
Chuev, Feliks. Molotov
Remembers.
Khrushchev was for Soviet power but against the Revolution. This is his
distinguishing feature: he was against everything revolutionary.... to
him, of course, collectivization--which in our country was carried out by
Stalinist methods--was impermissible. Yes, impermissible. But no
alternative was proposed.
He is against collectivization. He is without a doubt a Bukharinite.
Chuev, Feliks. Molotov
Remembers.
...He was never seriously interested in or thought about the meaning of
Leninism or of Marxism.... Khrushchev wanted to rehabilitate everyone,
but everyone.
Khrushchev and Mikoyan posed as arch-Stalinists, but deep down they were not.
Chuev, Feliks. Molotov Remembers.
He [Khrushchev] was a half-educated man, alien to the party. Alien,
absolutely alien. He couldn't stay at the top for long. You see,
his former supporters finally got rid of him and had him quietly buried at
Novodevichy cemetery. Now they all behave as if they had had nothing to
do with him.
Chuev, Feliks. Molotov
Remembers.
You can't say he [Khrushchev] was unintelligent; he was very shrewd....
Since Khrushchev himself was not a communist, how could he judge whether Stalin
was a communist?
Chuev, Feliks. Molotov
Remembers.
Khrushchev knew as much about matters of theory as a shoemaker. He was a
real foe of Marxism-Leninism, a real enemy of communist revolution, a covert,
cunning, skillfully camouflaged enemy.... The thing is that he reflected
the spirit of the overwhelming majority.
Chuev, Feliks. Molotov
Remembers.
...But Khrushchevism is the bourgeois spirit.
I told Khrushchev this straight to his face,... We have very many
"Khrushchevs" in our country; indeed, they are the overwhelming
majority.... It would have been so easy to kick him out. But we are
surrounded by little "Khrushchev's," and they keep mum....
Chuev, Feliks. Molotov
Remembers.
Molotov and Kaganovich could not prevent the reform projects of Malenkov,
Beria, and Khrushchev. Malenkov wanted to increase payments to collective
farms so as to boost agricultural production; he also favored giving priority
to light-industrial investment. Khrushchev wished to plough up virgin
lands in the
Service, Robert. Stalin.
SU SHOULD HAVE KNOWN JUNE WAS
THE BEST MONTH FOR AN ATTACK
MOLOTOV: ...We should
have kept in mind that the best time for an attack on
CHUEV: That was a
mistake.
MOLOTOV: Yes, a
mistake. But one June had already passed. June of 1940 had passed,
and that suggested that June 1941 would pass, too. This was a
miscalculation, I suppose.
Chuev, Feliks. Molotov
Remembers.
...we [Molotov and Khruschov] had different outlooks. He desperately
wanted to build his reputation, primarily by means of releasing inmates from
the camps. I particularly disagreed with him, of course, when he began to
rehabilitate avowed enemies.... The main drawback is that he was not a
revolutionary, that was the core of the problem. From my point of view,
his attempts to besmirch everything connected with the name of Stalin shows
that he was not a revolutionary, though I would not go so far as to say he was
a counter-revolutionary. While Stalin was a revolutionary, Khrushchev
proceeded from an alien ideology.
Chuev, Feliks. Molotov
Remembers.
LACK OF BEING SUFFICIENTLY
READY FOR NAZI ATTACK WAS NOT DECISIVE
MOLOTOV” But
already in May we had been under colossal pressure with no chance to let off
steam. Even if a higher alert had been ordered in June, there would still
have been need for a respite. Why was
Chuev, Feliks. Molotov
Remembers.
CHUEV: But anyway,
objectively, it turned out that Hitler outwitted you.
MOLOTOV: No. No, I
don't agree with this. Yes, he had his own calculations. There
couldn't have been a better time chosen for the attack. But to demand a
greater effort from us than in May... there was the danger of a
breakdown. Everything was stretched, stretched to the limit, and there
wasn't all that much to eat. A mistake in timing is an unjust accusation,
quite wrong. There was a miscalculation of some sort, certainly.
But this was more a misfortune than a mistake or a fault.
Chuev, Feliks. Molotov
Remembers.
SOURCES SAYING AN ATTACK WAS
COMING COULD NOT BE TRUSTED
CHUEV: But Churchill
didn't have anything against us at that period....
MOLOTOV: Yes, but could
Churchill be trusted in this matter? He was interested in pushing us into
a conflict with the Germans as quickly as possible, how could it be otherwise?
Chuev, Feliks. Molotov
Remembers. Chicago: I. R. Dee, 1993, p. 28
There was no shortage of genuine and often accurate warnings of Hitler's
intentions - some historical analysts have since identified and documented at
least 84. With all the rumors and German-inspired "noise" and
disinformation, it must have seemed to Stalin that the whole world was crying
wolf as messages flooded in from friend and foe alike. They came, indeed,
from all quarters: from Soviet spy rings in Western Europe and Japan; from
Soviet embassies and consulates in many different countries; from naval and
military field intelligence; from the Poles, Czechs, Yugoslavs, Swedes, Americans,
and British; even from Germans.
Read, Anthony and David
Fisher. The Deadly Embrace. New York: Norton, 1988, p. 602
As for Churchill, he made a comic error with one of his predictions. He
had warned Stalin of a possible German attack in May 1941, but in that month
the Germans attacked the British on the island of Crete instead. The Boss
could ask with his quiet smile why British intelligence, which showed such
concern for the Soviet Union, was unable to help itself. The answer, as
he saw it, was easy: Britain was losing too much blood in an unequal fight, and
Churchill wanted to push Stalin into the war at any price. He could not,
then, believe Churchill. Nor could he believe his own agent Sorge.
Sorge had refused to return to the Soviet Union. How could the Boss
believe a defector?...
When Hitler began his Balkan campaign early in 1941, Stalin had reason to feel
reassured. The Yugoslavs capitulated in April, and Hitler moved against
Greece. Hitler's objective now seemed clear to the Boss: once he had
seized Greece he would be able to destroy the British in Egypt and take
Suez. Churchill, incidentally, was thinking along the same lines when he
pleaded with the United States to come into the war....
Radzinsky, Edvard. Stalin.
New York: Doubleday, c1996, p. 450
All in all, Stalin was entitled to conclude that Churchill was determined to
draw the United States into the war by supplication, and Russia by false
information.
Radzinsky, Edvard.
Stalin. New York: Doubleday, c1996, p. 451
STALIN WAS NOT AS REPRESSIVE
TOWARD SUBVERSIVES AS SOME OTHERS
At every step of the way, there were constituencies both within and outside the
elite that supported repression of various groups, sometimes with greater
vehemence than Stalin did. The terror was a series of group efforts
(though the groups changed frequently) rather than a matter of one man
intimidating everyone else. This finding by no means takes Stalin off the
hook or lessens his guilt. But it does mean that the picture is more
complex.
Getty & Naumov, The Road
to Terror. New Haven, Conn.: Yale Univ. Press, c1999, p. xiv
[Footnote]: Even on the
subject of repression, Stalin sometimes seemed unsure. Although he took a
hard-line toward Trotskyists and Zinovievists, he was for a long time undecided
on Bukharin and Pyatakov. In the summer of 1936, he actually appointed
Pyatakov to be a witness at the first show trials. But less than two
weeks before the trial, Pyatakov was removed and himself arrested based on
evidence suddenly produced by Yezhov and Yagoda. After receiving for five
months Yezhov's written "evidence" denouncing Bukharin, Stalin
declined to sanction his arrest. Even at the notorious February Plenum of
1937, photostatic evidence shows that Stalin's first impulse was to simply
exile Bukharin, without sending him to trial. Of course, in the end, both
Pyatakov and Bukharin were killed, but the road to their demise was not a
straight one.
Nove, Alec, Ed. The Stalin
Phenomenon. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1993, p. 150
On December 30, 1934, during the examination, Khriukin, a member of the
Komsomol and a third-year student in the History Department at the Rostov
Pedagogical Institute, openly defended Zinoviev and Kamenev. He declared
that Zinoviev and Kamenev rendered enormous services to the revolution, were
friends of Lenin, and that now all this was being obliterated. Khriukin
further declared that Zinoviev had no tie with the terrorists who killed Comrade
Kirov, that in general members of the opposition cannot be champions of terror,
and that the judicial procedure used to establish an ideological tie between
the terrorists and the Zinoviev-Kamenev group was improper.
On Jan. 3, 1935, a Komsomol meeting took place in which Khriukin was admitted
even though he had already been expelled from the Komsomol and the
institute. The meeting's presidium afforded Khriukin the opportunity to
present his counter-revolutionary views despite protests from the Komsomol
members present.
After Khriukin's arrest, in the process of the investigation, it was determined
that Khriukin was closely connected with the following group of students at the
pedagogical institute: Yelin, Chalov, Ustimenko, Gavrilov, and Khriukin.
All these individuals (not bona fide party members), the investigation
determined, got in the institute by means of forged documents. In 1932,
on Elin's and Khriukin's initiative, the individuals named stole from the party
committee of the "Comintern" Mine (Shakhty Raion) a large quality of
blank associate party member and registration cards, filled them out in their
own names and, having prepared false documents about graduating from nine-year
schools, gained admission to the institute.
In the Rostov Financial and Economics Institute on January 1, 1935 at a
conference of party and Komsomol organizers and individuals assigned by the
party, student Kondeev (a Komsomol member) declared: "One must also pay
attention to the contributions of Zinoviev and others. Why do you only
consider their faults? Zinoviev is a great leader. He was president
of the Comintern." Having said this, he left the meeting. The
same day Kondeev assembled groups of students and passionately defended
Zinoviev, Nikolayev [assassin of Kirov, Leningrad party secretary, on December
1, 1934] and other counter-revolutionaries.
In the evening at a meeting of the Komsomol group the question of excluding
Kondeev from the Komsomol in the Institute was raised. In spite of the
fact that Kondeev's counter-revolutionary position was quite clear, he was
afforded the opportunity of delivering an unabashedly counter-revolutionary
sermon. At the end he said straight out that the purpose of his remarks
was "to show the students that the party and government and our party
committee in particular had wrongly judged the members of the
opposition." After his expulsion from the Komsomol and from the
Institute, Kondeev immediately when underground, disappeared. [Accounts
follow of "counter-revolutionary agitation" at several Novocherkassk
institutes.]
Siegelbaum and Sokolov.
Stalinism As a Way of Life. New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, c2000, p.
135
NUMBERS GIVEN FOR THE NUMBER
OF PEOPLE REPRESSED ARE FAR TOO HIGH
...For one thing, the archival evidence from the secret police rejects the
astronomically high estimates often given for the number of terror victims.
Getty & Naumov, The Road
to Terror. New Haven, Conn.: Yale Univ. Press, c1999, p. xiv
In any event, the data available at this point make it clear that the number
shot in the two worst purge years [1937-38] was more likely in the hundreds of
thousands than in the millions.
Getty & Naumov, The Road
to Terror. New Haven, Conn.: Yale Univ. Press, c1999, p. 591
Because of these uncertainties, there is still controversy about the accuracy
of these data, and no reason to believe them to be final or exact. One
cannot stress enough that with our current documentation, we can posit little
more than general, though narrow, ranges. Still, these are the only data
currently available from police archives. Moreover, there are good
reasons for assuming that they are not wildly wrong because of the consistent
way numbers from different sources compare with one another.
Getty & Naumov, The Road
to Terror. New Haven, Conn.: Yale Univ. Press, c1999, p. 593
...That right-wing opposition was and is even today extremely hard to
fight. But no one writes about this or tries to explain it.
Of course we committed a number of grave errors in the matter. But in
fact those errors were many fewer in numbers than people think today.
Chuev, Feliks. Molotov
Remembers. Chicago: I. R. Dee, 1993, p. 258
The charge against me [Molotov] is the same: abuse of power. The report
written by that commission member...says that 1,370,000 arrests were made in
the 1930s. That's too many. I responded that the figures should be
thoroughly reviewed and that unwarranted arrests did occur, but that we
couldn't have survived without resorting to stern measures.
Chuev, Feliks. Molotov
Remembers. Chicago: I. R. Dee, 1993, p. 285
During the years 1930-1935, the Soviet Union was short of labor, especially in
newly developed regions. The regime tried to use all available
forces. It is difficult to see why it would have `killed' men who had
been working the land in Siberia or Kazakhstan for the previous year or two.
Nevertheless, Merl estimates that the 100,000 heads of family of the first
category, sent to the Gulag system, are all dead. But the Party only
placed 63,000 kulaks in the first category and only those guilty of terrorist
and counter-revolutionary acts should be executed. Merl continues:
`Another 100,000 persons probably lost their lives, at the beginning of 1930,
due to expulsion from their houses, deportation towards the North and
executions'. Then he adjusts the number by another 100,000 persons, `dead
in the deportation regions at the end of the thirties'. Once again, no
precision or indication.
Martens, Ludo. Another
View of Stalin. Antwerp, Belgium: EPO, Lange Pastoorstraat 25-27 2600, p.
96-97 [pp. 80-81 on the NET]
(Arch Getty and William Chase)
In the former USSR, several new studies have sharply narrowed the range of
estimates of the aggregate numbers of victims and generally invalidated the
highest Western guesses.
Getty and Manning. Stalinist
Terror. Cambridge, NY: Cambridge University Press, 1993, p. 225
Without denying that many individual members of the Soviet elite were victims
of the terror during the Ezhovshchina, the fact remains that to date no one has
systematically studied the fate of the elite's members; our understanding of
the impact on the elite remains imprecise and anecdotal.
Getty and Manning. Stalinist
Terror. Cambridge, NY: Cambridge University Press, 1993, p. 228
The true number of those falsely accused of counter-revolutionary activities
who were executed in the 1936-38 period, is probably between 20,000 and
100,000. Both George Kennan and Jerry Hough concur that the likely number
of executions was closer to the former than the latter figure. During the
French Revolution about 17,000 people were executed for counter-revolutionary
activity in the 1793-94 period of Jacobin Terror, representing about .065% of
the French population at the time. If the figure of 20,000 for the
1936-38 Red Terror is accurate, this represents .01% of the Soviet population;
if the 100,000 figure is correct, this represents.05%. Any reasonable
estimate of executions in the 1936-38 period of the Great Purge indicates that,
in relative terms, at most they did not exceed those of the Jacobin Terror, and
were probably fewer. Clearly the popular conception of the bloodiness of
the Great Purge is a gross exaggeration cultivated by those concerned to
discredit developments in the Soviet Union in the 1930s and since, as well as
the contemporary or revolutionary process in other countries.
Szymanski, Albert. Human
Rights in the Soviet Union. London: Zed Books, 1984, p. 243
...To say that all the repressions were unwarranted is, I consider,
incorrect. There was a sufficiently high number of enemies in the country
after the revolution, dissatisfied people--political criminals as well as
ordinary criminals. There was also a good deal of banditry going on in
the country; on the collective farms they had to put up with murders of
activists and people taking up arms. There were victims, of course.
The repressions about which so much is written and talked about today were not
at all on the scale that is stated now. "Hundreds of millions of
repressed", they say. Nonsense! All this idiotic propaganda
has brought our country to where it is today, to the lowest level"
Richardson, Rosamond.
Stalin’s Shadow. New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1994, p. 277
Some Russian anti-communist writers such as Solzhenitsyn and Sakharov, and many
US anti-communist liberals, maintained that the gulag existed right down to the
last days of communism. If so, where did it disappear to? After
Stalin's death in 1953, more than half of the gulag inmates were freed,
according to the study of the NKVD files previously cited. But if so many
others remained incarcerated, why have they not materialized? When the
communist states were overthrown, where were the half-starved hordes pouring
out of the internment camps with their tales of travail?...
What of the supposedly vast numbers of political prisoners said to exist in the
other "communist totalitarian police states" of Eastern
Europe? Why no evidence of their mass release in the postcommunist
era? And where are the mass of political prisoners in Cuba?
If there were mass atrocities right down to the last days of communism, why did
not the newly installed anti-communist regimes seize the opportunity to bring
erstwhile communist rulers to justice? Why no Nuremberg-style public
trials documenting widespread atrocities? Why were not hundreds of party
leaders and security officials and thousands of camp guards rounded up and
tried for the millions they supposedly exterminated? The best the West
Germans could do was charge East German leader Eric Honecker, several other
officials, and seven border guards with shooting people who tried to escape
over the Berlin Wall, a serious charge but hardly indicative of a gulag....
Most of those incarcerated in the gulag were not political prisoners, and the
same appears to be true of inmates in the other communist states.
Parenti, Michael.
Blackshirts and Reds, San Francisco: City Light Books, 1997, p. 81-83
RADEK ATTACKED STALIN A LOT
Karl Radek, a well-known and bitingly sarcastic critic of Stalin in the 1920s.
Getty & Naumov, The Road
to Terror. New Haven, Conn.: Yale Univ. Press, c1999, p. 3
Blumkin is a typical intellectual anarchist.... After he killed Mirbach
he began to regard himself as an historic figure. I don't know why he had
such admiration for Trotsky.... At any rate, so shrewd a scoundrel as
Radek could not have found it very difficult to provoke so impetuous a
revolutionary fool as Blumkin.... He must have put into his head the idea
of some act of terrorism. After Mirbach, Stalin. Not a bad
formula....
[That's Stalin's Foreign Minister?]
Litvinov, Maksim Maksimovich.
Notes for a Journal. New York: Morrow, 1955, p. 246
OTHER GROUPS SUPPORTED THE
BOLSHEVIKS STRINGENT METHODS
Behind and around them [a small number of authoritative persons], though, were
other groups and constituencies--among them, members of religious and political
hierarchies, policeman of various kinds, and ordinary citizen-members of
"the crowd"--who abetted the proceedings, acquiesced in the process,
or simply looked on, conceding that such ruthlessness was necessary,
reasonable, or at least acceptable.
Getty & Naumov, The Road
to Terror. New Haven, Conn.: Yale Univ. Press, c1999, p. 7
LARGE NUMBERS OF IMPRISONED
PEOPLE CONTINUED TO SUPPORT STALIN & STRONG METHODS
Why did large numbers of regime supporters continue to believe in Stalin, the
Bolshevik Party, and the necessity for repression even after they themselves
had spent years in labor camps as victims of that very system?
Getty & Naumov, The Road
to Terror. New Haven, Conn.: Yale Univ. Press, c1999, p. 9
In the face of Hitler's all too real conspiracy, the bogus conspiracies of
previous years were as if forgotten. Survivors of the crushed
oppositions, who could be useful in the war effort, were brought out of
concentration camps and assigned to important national work.
Tukhachevsky's disciples, who had been cashiered and deported, were rushed back
to military headquarters. Among them, according to one reliable report,
was Rokossovsky, the victor of Stalingrad, a former Polish Communist, who had
served as liaison officer between Tukhachevsky's staff and the Comintern.
Professor Ramzin, the head of the 'Industrial Party', who, in the early 30s had
been charged with conspiracy and compact with a foreign power, was released,
acclaimed for his services, and awarded the highest prizes and metals.
Professor Ustrialov, who had in fact advocated the transformation of the
Soviets into a nationalist-bourgeois republic, reappeared as a contributor to
leading Moscow newspapers.
Deutscher, Isaac. Stalin; A
Political Biography. New York: Oxford Univ. Press, 1967, p. 486
Galina Serebryakova, who spent nearly 20 years in Siberia from this time, had
been married to two leading victims, Serebryakov and Sokolnikov. Through
all this, she retained her Party-mindedness, and after her rehabilitation spoke
up warmly at writers meetings in 1962 and 1963 against the liberalizing trends.
Conquest, Robert. The Great
Terror. New York: Oxford University Press, 1990, p. 165
Most of the close relations of those accused had been arrested, but more of the
descendants of the second and third trial survived than had been assumed.
The most prominent of the survivors was Galina Serebryakova, who was best known
as an author of children's books and who had been married first to Serebryakov
later to Sokolnikov; she had returned to Moscow under Khrushchev. Like
some other prominent figures, such as Mrs. Karp-Molotov, her faith in the party
was unbroken; she remained a conservative figure opposed to the anti-Stalinist
thaw.
Laqueur, Walter. Stalin: The
Glasnost Revelations. New York: Scribner's, c1990, p. 81
No wonder so many people were delighted at the harsh sentences passed on most
of the Old Bolsheviks. One sometimes heard a prisoner say that he would now
willingly accept whatever fate was in store for him-it was enough for him to
have lived to see this day.
Berger, Joseph. Nothing but
the Truth. New York, John Day Co. 1971, p. 157
One day a very young, disheveled man was dragged in, resisting violently; he
started hammering on the cell door as soon as it closed. and walked straight up
to Dubinsky and Ivanov... He sat down on Ivanov's bed, and began to curse
as I had rarely heard anyone curse before.
The terrifying thing was that he cursed the Government, the leaders and even
Stalin himself by name. It was dangerous for all who listened.
Ivanov reminded him that he might be overheard by spies.
'Let them listen,' said the boy. 'What have I got to lose?'
He told us that he too had belonged to the Opposition-'and don't we see just
how right we were!'...
We listened, too astonished to say anything. Then the door opened, the
boy was removed and we never heard of him again.
The reaction of the prisoners was characteristic. Some remained
silent. Others whispered: 'Poor chap! What he must have been
through!' But nearly all said loudly: 'There's a really dangerous
counter-revolutionary for you.' A former lawyer even made a speech, justifying
the Government's repressive measures by its need to 'defend itself against such
desperate criminals.' Had the unfortunate stranger been tried, not by a
special court but by the inmates of this cell, all of them accused of
counter-revolutionary activity, they would undoubtedly have condemned him to be
shot. In other words, they might well have judged him more severely than
the court.
Berger, Joseph. Nothing but
the Truth. New York, John Day Co. 1971, p. 158
___STALIN WAS LESS STRINGENT
TOWARD THOSE OPPOSED TO DEKULAKIZATION THAN OTHERS
In some cases, local militants' zeal outstripped the plans of the center, and
Moscow often had to rein in excessive dekulakizations, forcible
collectivization, and ultraleftist zeal in persecuting religion.
Getty & Naumov, The Road
to Terror. New Haven, Conn.: Yale Univ. Press, c1999, p. 43
Kuibyshev's terms were tough. Indeed, there is reason to believe that
Stalin's lieutenants took a more aggressive stance toward the opposition than
he did. One month before Bukharin and Kuibyshev spoke, a Politburo
meeting had considered punishments for two high-ranking Central Committee
Members (Syrtsov and Lominadze) who had taken a "right-opportunist"
line against the excesses of collectivization. In the Politburo, Stalin
proposed demoting them to the status of candidate members of the Central
Committee. The majority, however, "strongly" disagreed and
voted to expel them from the Central Committee.
Getty & Naumov, The Road
to Terror. New Haven, Conn.: Yale Univ. Press, c1999, p. 52
SUBVERSIVES PLANNED TO
“DISMISS” STALIN
Shkiriatov said at the Central Committee plenum of Jan. 7-12, 1933,
"Regarding the leader of our party, Comrade Stalin--what means did they
employ in their struggle against Comrade Stalin? According to Comrade
Nikolsky's statement, they said that they were prepared to remove Comrade
Stalin, whereas in their testimony, Eismont and others tried to replace one
word with another: they had spoken not of "removing" but of
"dismissing" him. But we know what a discussion about
"dismissing" the leader of the party could mean. We hold
congresses, we hold plenum sessions, but as you can see, there is no question
here of "dismissal" at a congress. Instead, discussions are
carried on about "dismissal" in other ways. Anyone who has the
slightest understanding in this matter knows by what methods Smirnov and others
had planned to attempt this "dismissal." And indeed Eismont
doesn't deny in his testimony that he had spoken with Smirnov about this.
He said that "he must be dismissed." We, on the other hand,
consider, that all of these words--change, dismiss, remove--are one and the
same thing, that there is no difference whatsoever between them. In our opinion
it all amounts to violent dismissal.
Getty & Naumov, The Road
to Terror. New Haven, Conn.: Yale Univ. Press, c1999, p. 84
Rudzutak said the following at the Central Committee plenum of Jan. 7-12 1933,
"Smirnov...maintains that he never said that it was necessary to remove
Stalin while all his friends in the group assert that these discussions did
take place."
"In the materials given to you there is testimony by Poponin, whom Eismont
had tried to recruit, seeking to convince him that the present leadership is
leading the party and country to ruin, that it was necessary to replace the
leadership, to replace General Secretary Stalin. In this exchange of
theirs, they discussed and "selected" possible candidates who might
be able to replace Comrade Stalin. Moreover, Eismont asked Poponin:
"Couldn't you, as a former military man, be of some use to us?"
What does it mean when the question of replacing the leadership is discussed,
when the question of electing candidates is discussed? What does it mean
when the question "Couldn't you, as a former military man, be of some use
to us?" is posed? Does this not testify to the fact that this is a
real organization, openly set against the party and calculating on the use of
violent measures, an organization that had been checking up on the sentiments
of military officials toward Comrade Stalin? In any case, we can consider
it an established fact that the preparation for the implementation of this
counter-revolutionary venture had commenced, and that Eismont had begun to seek
out military officials appropriate for it....
Getty & Naumov, The Road
to Terror. New Haven, Conn.: Yale Univ. Press, c1999, p. 91
At the January 1933 plenum, too, the last of the new cycle of plots was
exposed. The distinguished Old Bolshevik A.P. Smirnov, Party member since
1896 and formerly member of the Central Committee's "Orgburo," was
charged with two other Old Bolsheviks, Eismont and Tolmachev (members since
1907 and 1904, respectively), with forming an anti-Party group.
A. P. Smirnov's group is said to have had contact with Old Bolshevik workers,
mainly in the trade unions, in Moscow, Leningrad, and other cities.
Realizing that no legal methods could break Stalin's grip, they had to a large
degree gone underground, with a view to organizing for a struggle. Their
programs seems to have covered the revision of the unbalanced industrial
schemes, the dissolution of most of the kolkhozes, the subjection of the OGPU
to Party control, and the independence of the trade unions. Above all,
they had discussed the removal of Stalin. When taxed at the plenum
Eismont said, "Yes, there were such conversations among us. A. P.
Smirnov started them." Unlike Ryutin and his friends, none of the
three had had any connection with the Trotskyite or Rightist oppositions.
The exposure of this plot was described in the Khrushchev era as "the
beginning of reprisals against the old Leninist cadres."
Conquest, Robert. The Great
Terror. New York: Oxford University Press, 1990, p. 26
MEMBERS VOTED FOR STALIN
BECAUSE THEY WANT HIM, NOT OUT OF FEAR
RUDZUTAK: Comrades, can
one utter a greater slander against the members of the Central Committee,
against the Old Bolsheviks, the majority of whom served years at hard
labor? These, the finest people of the party, did not fear many years in
prison and in exile, and now these revolutionaries, who devoted themselves to
the victory of the revolution, these old revolutionary warriors, according to Smirnov,
are afraid to vote against Comrade Stalin. Can be that they vote for
Stalin from a fear for authority while, behind his back, they prepare--if
anything comes up--to change the leadership? You are slandering the
members of the party, you're slandering the members of the Central Committee,
and you are also slandering Comrade Stalin. We, as members of the Central
Committee, vote for Stalin because he is ours...."
RUDZUTAK: "You
won't find a single instance where Stalin was not in the front rank during periods
of the most active, most fierce battle for socialism and against the class
enemy. You won't find a single instance where Comrade Stalin has
hesitated or retreated. That is why we are with him. Yes, he
vigorously chops off that which is rotten, he chops off that which is slated
for destruction. If he didn't do this, he would not be a Leninist.
He would not be a Communist fighter. In this lies his chief and finest
and fundamental merit and quality as a leader-fighter who leads our party."
Getty & Naumov, The Road
to Terror. New Haven, Conn.: Yale Univ. Press, c1999, p. 93
BUKHARIN DENOUNCES HIS PAST
ACTS AND ALL FACTIONS
Bukharin stated at the Central Committee plenum of Jan. 7-12, 1933, "Both
our internal and external situation is such that this iron discipline must not
under any circumstances be relaxed.... That is why such factions must be
hacked off without the slightest mercy, without being in the slightest troubled
by any sentimental considerations concerning the past, concerning personal
friendships, relationships, concerning respect for person as such, and so
forth. These are all totally abstract formulations, which cannot serve
the interests of an army that is storming the fortress of the enemy."
...He continues, "I do not want to hide in the bushes and I shall
not. If one were to analyze the source of all those divergent views that
have led to serious incidents within the party, and if one were to speak of the
degree of guilt, then my guilt before the party, before its leaders, its
Central Committee, before the working-class, and before the country--this guilt
of mine is heavier than that of any of my former like-minded comrades, for I
was to a large extent the ideological purveyor of a host of formulations which
gradually gave birth to a definite rightist-opportunistic conception.
This responsibility, comrades, I shall not shirk. I shall not shift my
responsibility onto someone else,..."
He concludes, "This is how the matter stands: we must march onward,
shoulder to shoulder, in battle formation, sweeping aside all vacillations with
the utmost Bolshevik ruthlessness, hacking off all factions, which can only
serve to reflect vacillations within the country--because our party is one and
indivisible....
Getty & Naumov, The Road
to Terror. New Haven, Conn.: Yale Univ. Press, c1999, p. 96
RADEK SAYS ZINOVIEV TOLD THE
TROTS SMIRNOV WAS PROPOSING AN ANTI-STALIN GROUP
Radek states in his Jan. 1933 letter to Rudzutak, "In 1927, sometime
during the summer, Zinoviev notified those who were then the leaders of the
Trotskyist opposition of a proposal made to him--Zinoviev--by Smirnov for the
formation of a bloc against Comrade Stalin."
Getty & Naumov, The Road
to Terror. New Haven, Conn.: Yale Univ. Press, c1999, p. 98
SMIRNOV EXPELLED FROM KEY
POSITIONS BUT NOT PARTY
In the end, Smirnov was expelled from the Central Committee and Orgburo but was
allowed to remain in the party, with the warning that his continued membership
depended on his future behavior.
Getty & Naumov, The Road
to Terror. New Haven, Conn.: Yale Univ. Press, c1999, p. 101
ARRESTS BEING MADE BY PEOPLE
UNQUALIFIED TO DO SO
Anyone who feels like arresting does so, including those who have, properly
speaking, no right whatsoever to make arrests. It is no wonder,
therefore, that with such an orgy of arrests, the organs [of state] having the
right to make arrests, including the organs of the OGPU and especially of the
police, have lost all sense of proportion--Central Committee circular, 1933
Getty & Naumov, The Road
to Terror. New Haven, Conn.: Yale Univ. Press, c1999, p. 103
[May 8, 1933 Central Committee
decree]
To all party-Soviet officials and to all organs of the OGPU, the courts, and
the procuracy.
The desperate resistance of the kulaks in the kolkhoz movement and of the
toiling peasants, already in full swing at the end of 1929 and taking the form
of arson and terror against kolkhoz officials, has made it necessary for Soviet
authorities to resort to mass arrests and harsh measures of repression in the
form of mass expulsions of kulaks and their henchman to northern and remote
regions.
The continued resistance by kulak elements--taking the form of sabotage within
the kolkhozy and sovkhozy, a fact brought to light in 1932, the mass plundering
of kolkhoz and sovkhoz property--have made necessary the further
intensification of repressive measures against kulak elements, against thieves
and saboteurs of every stripe.
True, demands for mass expulsions from the countryside and for the use of harsh
forms of repression continue to come in from a number of regions, while
petitions by others for the expulsions of 100,000 families from their regions
and territories are presently in the possession of the Central Committee and
the Council of People's Commissars. Information has been received by the
Central Committee and the Council of People's Commissars that makes it evident
that disorderly arrests on a massive scale are being carried out by our
officials in the countryside. Arrests or being carried out by chairmen of
kolkhozy, by members of the governing boards of kolkhozy, by chairmen of
village soviets, by the secretaries of cells and by district and territorial
commissioners. Anyone who feels like arresting does so, including those
who have, properly speaking, no right whatsoever to make arrests. It is
no wonder, therefore, that with such an orgy of arrests, the organs [of state]
having the right to make arrests, including the organs of the OGPU and
especially of the police, have lost all sense of proportion. More often
than not, they will arrest people for no reason at all, acting in accordance
with the principle: "Arrest first, ask questions later!"
Getty & Naumov, The Road
to Terror. New Haven, Conn.: Yale Univ. Press, c1999, p. 114
These comrades apparently do not understand that these tactics of massive
deportation of the peasants outside their region has, in the new circumstances,
already outlived itself, that such deportation can only be applied on an
individual and partial basis and then applied only to the leaders and
organizers of the struggle against the kolkhozy.
These comrades do not understand that the method of mass, disorderly
arrests--if this can be considered a method--represents, in light of the new
situation, only liabilities, which diminish the authority of Soviet
power. They do not understand that making arrests ought to be limited and
carried out under the strict control of the appropriate organs. They do
not understand that the arrests must be directed solely against active enemies
of Soviet power.
The Central Committee and the Council of People's Commissars do not doubt but
that all these errors and deviations from the party line and others like them
will be eliminated as soon as possible.
Getty & Naumov, The Road
to Terror. New Haven, Conn.: Yale Univ. Press, c1999, p. 115
...In Byelorussia, for example, party regional secretaries had sought to
control railroad personnel through mass arrests. One Control Commission
representative said that "Tens, hundreds were arrested by anybody and they
sit in jail." In the Briansk railroad line, 75 percent of
administrative-technical personnel had been sentenced to some kind of
"corrective behavior." In Sverdlovsk and Saratov, Control
Commission inspectors sent from Moscow reported that locals had
"completely baselessly arrested and convicted people and undertaken mass
repressions for minor problems, sometimes for ineffective leadership, and in
the majority of cases arrested and convicted workers who merely needed
educational work." By insisting on the procurator's permission in
order to make an arrest, the Central Committee was taking unlimited arrest
powers out of the hands of regional party leaders.
Getty & Naumov, The Road
to Terror. New Haven, Conn.: Yale Univ. Press, c1999, p. 188
STALIN PROCLAIMS VICTORY AT
THE 1934 CONGRESS
At this Congress, however, there is nothing to prove and, it seems, no one to
fight. Everyone sees that the line of the party has triumphed--Stalin,
1934.
Getty & Naumov, The Road
to Terror. New Haven, Conn.: Yale Univ. Press, c1999, p. 103
...Indeed, former oppositionists Bukharin, Rykov, Tomsky, and others were
allowed to speak to the Congress of 1934 in order to demonstrate a new party
unity that Stalin proclaimed.
Getty & Naumov, The Road
to Terror. New Haven, Conn.: Yale Univ. Press, c1999, p. 128
Stalin said in his speech to the 17th Party Congress on Jan. 28, 1934, "At
this Congress, however, there is nothing to prove and, it seems, no one to
fight. Everyone sees that the line of the party has triumphed.
Getty & Naumov, The Road
to Terror. New Haven, Conn.: Yale Univ. Press, c1999, p. 130
In consequence the 17th Congress of the Communist Party, held in January 1934
with 2000 delegates representing almost 3 million members and candidates, was
an all-round triumph for Stalin. With the exception of Trotsky, impotent
in exile, all the old Oppositionists had now returned to the Party fold, and to
make the occasion complete, the later Opposition Troika--Bukharin, Rykov, and
Tomsky-- ate humble pie once more in the most abject terms. The Congress
was informed that the gap between the First and Second Plans had been bridged,
and that it was now proposed to make a capital investment of 133 billion
rubles--as compared with 60 billion for the First Plan--in the Second Five-Year
program. Small wonder that the Moscow press called this the
"Congress of Victors" and proudly proclaimed that the Soviet ship of
state had come at last to fair water after many perils and storms.
Duranty, Walter. Story of
Soviet Russia. Philadelphia, N. Y.: JB Lippincott Co. 1944, p. 208
The Congress that took place in February 1934 became known... as the
"Congress of Victors"....
He [Stalin] laid special emphasis on the fact that, in the three years or so
since the previous congress, industrial output had doubled. New branches
of industry had been created: machine-tool construction, automobiles, tractors,
chemicals. Engines, aircraft, combines, synthetic rubber, nitrate,
artificial fibers were now being manufactured in the USSR. He announced
proudly that thousands of new enterprises had been commissioned, including such
to gigantic projects as the Dnieper Hydroelectric project, the Magnitogorsk and
Kuznets sites, the Urals truck-building plant, the Chelyabinsk tractor plant,
the Kramatorsk auto plant and so on. No previous report of his had ever
contained so many facts and figures, tables and plans. He had something
to tell the Congress.
Volkogonov, Dmitri. Stalin:
Triumph and Tragedy. New York: Grove Weidenfeld, 1991, p. 193
The 17th Party Congress is known in history as the "Congress of Victors."
Commission of the Central
Committee of the C.P.S.U. (B.), Ed. History of the CPSU (Bolsheviks): Short
Course. Moscow: FLPH, 1939, p. 320
LIBRARY CENSORSHIP WAS REDUCED
IN EARLY 1930’S
Despite the general tightening of literary "discipline," the policy
of censorship in the 1932-34 period was uneven. In June 1933 a circular
letter from the Central Committee formally prescribed policies for
"purging of libraries." Back in 1930, during the ultra-Left
upsurge of the "cultural revolution," the party had insisted on
removing literary and historical works by "bourgeois" and
oppositionist authors from all libraries. The June 1933 circular, while
approving the removal of "counter-revolutionary and religious
literature," along with the works of Trotsky and Zinoviev, took a
relatively moderate line on library holdings in general. Works representing
"historical interest" were to remain in the libraries of the larger
towns, and closed or "special" collections were forbidden, as were
mass purges of libraries.
Getty & Naumov, The Road
to Terror. New Haven, Conn.: Yale Univ. Press, c1999, p. 106
[Central Committee letter on purging of libraries, 13 June 1933]
In spite of the decision of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist
Party [Bolshevik], categorically prohibiting mass purges of libraries, in many
regions, territories, and republics, this decree is not being carried
out. Departments of culture and propaganda have not drawn the necessary
lesson from those distortions which have occurred. Instances of mass
purges of libraries continue to take place right to the present day....
A] The removal of books from libraries is to be permitted only in accordance
with special instructions from the Central Commission.
B] Under the leadership of the territorial commission, openly counter-revolutionary
and religious literature [gospels, lives of the saints, sermons, etc.] shall be
withdrawn, while literature having a historical interest shall be permitted in
the large central city libraries....
D] The organization of "special" or "closed" stacks in
libraries is hereby prohibited. Existing "closed" and special
stacks are to be immediately abolished by entering all [works of] literature
into the catalog of the libraries.
Getty & Naumov, The Road
to Terror. New Haven, Conn.: Yale Univ. Press, c1999, p. 107
Even here, the Politburo had difficulty taking control of the situation.
The June 13th order was ignored by hot headed local activists, who continued to
strip the libraries of books they considered counter-revolutionary.
Yaroslavsky and other party leaders complained about this to the Politburo,
prompting Molotov and Stalin to issue stronger strictures that characterized
the purging of the libraries as "anti-Soviet" and again ordering it
stopped.
Getty & Naumov, The Road
to Terror. New Haven, Conn.: Yale Univ. Press, c1999, p. 108
[October 16, 1932 Memorandum of Malstev to Rudzutak and Yaroslavski on purging
the libraries]
Libraries have been purged of pernicious and outdated literature by the
People's Commissariat of Education without adequate instructions and control.
Siegelbaum and Sokolov.
Stalinism As a Way of Life. New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, c2000, p.
77
STALIN WANTS INTELLIGENTSIA
AND SPECIALISTS TREATED EASIER
In June 1931 Stalin's "New Conditions, New Tasks" speech seemed to
call a halt to the radical, class-based persecution of members of the old
intelligentsia. The party's policy should be "enlisting them and
taking care of them," Stalin said. It would be stupid and unwise to
regard practically every expert and engineer of the old school as an undetected
criminal and wrecker." The following month, the Politburo forbade
arrests of specialists without high-level permission. In the subsequent
period, the Politburo intervened on several occasions to protect persecuted
members of the intelligentsia and to rein in the activities of secret police
officials persecuting them:...
Getty & Naumov, The Road
to Terror. New Haven, Conn.: Yale Univ. Press, c1999, p. 109
TOUGH LAWS PASSED AGAINST
DESTROYING KULAKS ARE WEAKLY ENFORCED
[Decree of the Central Executive Committee and the Council of People's
Commissars of the USSR on August 7, 1932]
...The number of complaints concerning violence and threats directed by kulak
elements at kolkhoz members who do not wish to leave the kolkhozy and who are
working honestly and selflessly for the consolidation of these kolkhozy has
similarly increased....
Based on these considerations and in order to meet the demands of workers and
kolkhoz members, the Central Executive Committee and the Council of People's
Commissars of the USSR decree:
...2. To apply as a measure of judicial punishment for the plundering of
rail and border transport cargo the highest measure of social protection,
namely, execution with confiscation of all property, with computation of
execution under extenuating circumstances to deprivation of freedom for a term
of not less than ten years with confiscation of all property.
...2. To apply as a measure of judicial punishment for the plundering
(theft) of property belonging to kolkhozy and cooperative societies the highest
measure of social protection, namely, execution with confiscation of all
property, with computation of execution under extenuating circumstances to
deprivation of freedom for a term of not less than 10 years with confiscation
of all property.
...1. To wage a resolute struggle against those antisocial,
kulak-capitalistic elements which apply violence and threats [of violence] or
preach the use of violence and threats against kolkhoz members for the purpose
of forcing the latter to leave the kolkhozy, for the purpose of bringing about
the violent destruction of the kolkhozy. These criminal acts are to be
put on a footing equal to crimes against the state.
2. To apply as a measure of judicial punishment in matters concerned with
the protection of kolkhozy and kolkhoz members against violence and the threats
on the part of kulak and other antisocial elements, the deprivation of freedom
with imprisonment in a concentration camp for a term ranging from 5 to 10 years.
Despite the Draconian nature of this law, its application was uneven and
confused. The following month, September 1932, the Politburo ordered
death sentences mandated by law to be carried out immediately.
Nevertheless, of those convicted under the law by the end of 1933, only 4%
received death sentences, about 1000 persons were actually executed. In
Siberia, property was confiscated from only five percent of those convicted
under the law.
Getty & Naumov, The Road
to Terror. New Haven, Conn.: Yale Univ. Press, c1999, p. 110
In spite of Stalin's strictures in the original decree against leniency, by
August 1936 a secret decree had ordered the review of all sentences under the
law of August 7th 1932. Four-fifths of those convicted had their
sentences reduced, and more than 40,000 of these were freed at that time.
Getty & Naumov, The Road
to Terror. New Haven, Conn.: Yale Univ. Press, c1999, p. 110
STALIN HAD TO REIGN IN POLICE
EXCESSES
...The vast majority of those executed during the storm of dekulakization and
collectivization were victims of police "troikas." On May 7,
1933 the Politburo ordered the troikas to stop pronouncing death sentences.
The next day a document carrying the signatures of Stalin for the Central
Committee and Molotov for the government ordered a drastic curtailment of
arrests and a sharp reduction in the prison population. Half of all
prisoners in jails...were to be released. The power to arrest was sharply
restricted to police organs, and all arrests had to be sanctioned by the appropriate
judicial procurator.
Getty & Naumov, The Road
to Terror. New Haven, Conn.: Yale Univ. Press, c1999, p. 113
The Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party and the Council of
People's Commissars decree:
I. ON DISCONTINUING THE MASS EXPULSIONS OF PEASANTS
All mass expulsions of peasants are to cease at once. Expulsions are to
be permitted only on a case-by-case and partial basis and only with respect to
those households whose heads are waging an active struggle against the kolkhozy
and are organizing opposition against the sowing of crops and their purchase by
the state.
II. ON REGULATING THE MAKING OF ARRESTS
1) All persons who are not fully authorized by law to make arrests, namely, the
chairmen of District Executive Committees, district and territorial
commissioners, chairmen of village soviets, chairmen of kolkhozy and kolkhoz
associations, secretaries of cells, and others, are prohibited from doing so.
Arrests carried out by heads of police are to be sanctioned or revoked by the
district commissioners of the OGPU or by the corresponding procuracy within 48
hours after said arrest.
2)... Only persons accused of counterrevolution, terroristic acts, sabotage,
gangsterism, robbery, espionage, border crossing and smuggling of contraband,
murder, grave bodily injury, grand larceny, embezzlement, professional
speculation in goods, speculation in foreign exchange, counterfeiting,
malicious hooliganism, and professional recidivism may be taken into preventive
custody.
Getty & Naumov, The Road
to Terror. New Haven, Conn.: Yale Univ. Press, c1999, p. 116
3) The organs of the OGPU are to obtain the prior consent of the directorate of
the procuracy in making arrests, except in cases involving terroristic acts,
explosions, arson, espionage, defection, political gangsterism, and
counter-revolutionary, antiparty groups....
Getty & Naumov, The Road
to Terror. New Haven, Conn.: Yale Univ. Press, c1999, p. 117
3. ...Permission to arrest leading officials of the People's
Commissariats of the [Soviet] Union and Union republics and of the central
institutions corresponding to them [heads of administration and directors of
departments, managers of trusts and their deputies, directors and deputies of
industrial enterprises, sovkhozy, and so on], as well as permission to arrest
engineers, agronomists, professors, and physicians employed by a variety of
institutions and directors of scholarly, educational, and scientific-research
institutions is granted with the consent of the appropriate people's commissars.
4. Permission to arrest members and candidate members of the All-Union
Communist Party is granted with the consent of the secretaries of the district,
territorial, and regional committees of the All-Union Communist Party, the
central committees of the national Communist parties, through the proper
channels. Arrests of Communists occupying leading posts in the People's Commissariats
of the [Soviet] Union and in central institutions of equivalent rank are to be
granted upon receipt of consent by the chairman of the Commission of Party
Control.
Signed: Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars of the Soviet Union,
Molotov, and Secretary of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist
Party, Stalin.
Getty & Naumov, The Road
to Terror. New Haven, Conn.: Yale Univ. Press, c1999, p. 188
BOLSHEVIKS BECAME MORE LENIENT
AND LESSENED CONTROLS AROUND 1934
Of course, no one in the Politburo was advocating abandonment of the
party-state dictatorship. As Stalin had said at the 17th Party Congress,
"we cannot say that the fight is ended and that there is no longer any
need for the policy of the socialist offensive." On the other hand,
Stalin explicitly joined other Politburo members in proposing some kind of
relaxation of that dictatorship, at least experimentally. The increased
repression in later years "should not cast doubt on the intentions of
Stalin and his colleagues in 1934."
Getty & Naumov, The Road
to Terror. New Haven, Conn.: Yale Univ. Press, c1999, p. 138
Internally, too, there developed a new policy of conciliation with
ex-Oppositionists and even with former class enemies, based on a theory that
bygones should be bygones, that henceforth all Russians might unite in support
of the Soviet government, now firmly and successfully established at home and
abroad.
Duranty, Walter. Story of
Soviet Russia. Philadelphia, N. Y.: JB Lippincott Co. 1944, p. 209
From 1933 on, the leadership thought that the hardest battles for
industrialization and collectivization were behind them. In May 1933, Stalin
and Molotov signed a decision to liberate 50 per cent of the people sent to
work camps during the collectivization....
The social and economic atmosphere relaxed throughout the country.
The general direction of the Party had proven correct. Kamenev, Zinoviev,
Bukharin and a number of Trotskyists recognized that they had erred. The
Party leadership thought that the striking victories in building socialism
would encourage these former opposition leaders to criticize their wrong ideas
and to accept Leninist ones. It hoped that all the leading cadres would
apply Leninist principles of criticism and self-criticism, the materialist and
dialectical method that allows each Communist to improve their political
education and to assess their understanding, in order to reinforce the
political unity of the Party. For that reason, almost all the leaders of
the three opportunist movements, the Trotskyists Pyatakov, Radek, Smirnov and
Preobrazhensky, as well as Zinoviev and Kamenev and Bukharin, who in fact had
remained in an important position, were invited to the 17th Congress, where
they made speeches.
That Congress was the congress of victory and unity.
Martens, Ludo. Another
View of Stalin. Antwerp, Belgium: EPO, Lange Pastoorstraat 25-27 2600, p.
136 [p. 117 on the NET]
This event [the assassination of Kirov] came as a tremendous shock to the
Russian people, in a manner difficult for outsiders to understand....
When this assassination occurred, in December, 1934, the country had just begun
to settle down fairly comfortably after the painful years which followed the
Second Communist Revolution. The authorities had won out in the
knock-down and drag-out fight with the groups which they thought stood in the
path of socialist development.... Having proved that they were masters in
all parts of the country, the Communists had begun to compromise....
The legalizing of prospectors and lessees in the gold industry in the spring of
1933 was the first of a series of compromises. By the beginning of 1934,
the small farmers who had thus far resisted attempts to drive them into
collective farms were told that they could stay as they were. Those who
had joined collective farms were given certain privileges which might have
persuaded a lot of the others to join without the use of force if those
privileges had been handed out a little sooner. Even the nomads were
given the right to own herds again, although not quite so large as those they
had previously held.
The country was getting calm again, and the people were losing much of their
sense of bewilderment. The police were still busy arranging how to
utilize the labor of hundreds of thousands of kulaks, ex--priests, and the
like. But they had stopped rounding up others, and those who had escaped
liquidation began to feel safe.
Then this assassination came along. Kirov, as the people knew, had been
Stalin's right-hand man. The news of his assassination created
consternation even in such remote mining settlements as that where I was staying
in Kazakhstan.
Littlepage, John D. In Search
of Soviet Gold. New York: Harcourt, Brace, c1938, p. 194
In the summer of 1934, the Government had announced with a great air of
kindness that the federal police powers were to be reduced, that they would no
longer have the power to arrest people right and left and send them off into
exile for five years without open trial. Now the Government announced the
old powers were restored to the police, and the latter began to exercise them
with the greatest vigor and enthusiasm....
I can testify that the Russians were terribly disturbed over this Kirov
assassination.... conditions had begun to get back to normal, and this
assassination had to happen.
Littlepage, John D. In Search
of Soviet Gold. New York: Harcourt, Brace, c1938, p. 196
If we look at the political history of the early 1930s, we find that the
Stalinist leadership frequently pursued initiatives that seemed to run counter
to a repressive policy. Beginning with Stalin's 1931 speech
rehabilitating the old intelligentsia, a "moderate line" extended
into 1933 with a Stalin/Molotov telegram releasing large numbers of prisoners
and with a decision to reduce planned industrial targets in the Second Five-Year
Plan. It continued in 1934 with the readmission and rehabilitation of
former oppositionists at the 17th Party Congress and the abolition of bread
rationing at the end of that year. Indeed, at Stalin's initiative a
special commission of the Politburo was formed in 1934 to look into excessive
arrests and other misdeeds of the secret police. Among other things, the
commission, of which Stalin and Yezhov were members, drafted a policy statement
limiting the punitive rights of the dreaded Special Conferences of the
NKVD. The commission's work was abruptly terminated by the assassination
of Kirov at the end of the year.
[Footnote: Within the Russian Federation the number of criminal sentences in
1934 was more than 25 percent lower than the previous year. Verdicts
against "counter-revolutionaries" numbered some 4,300 in 1934, a drop
of over 50 percent from the previous year.
Getty and Manning. Stalinist
Terror. Cambridge, NY: Cambridge University Press, 1993, p. 50
The pattern of arrests and executions from 1930 to 1936 supports the picture of
increasing tolerance. After 1930 the number of executions fell in each of
the next six years, as did the number of convictions for all crimes for 1931
and 1932.
Thurston, Robert. Life and
Terror in Stalin's Russia, 1934-1941. New Haven: Yale University Press, c1996,
p. 9
The figures for police and judicial action continued to be high into 1936;
91,000 arrests for counter-revolutionary crimes is a great many. But the
key issue is how the country was ruled, and in that regard the overall trends
were definitely in the direction of less coercion.
Thurston, Robert. Life and
Terror in Stalin's Russia, 1934-1941. New Haven: Yale University Press, c1996,
p. 10
The data indicate that as time went on the authorities were less interested in
using the counter-revolutionary statutes, the legal weapon that allowed the
most scope for arbitrariness and reliance on administrative methods rather than
on evidence. There is no pattern here of increasing terror. During
1936 the whole picture of incarceration began a shift toward fewer political
and nonpolitical arrests.
In spite of the sharp increase of in the number of prisoners from 1934 to 1936,
judicial practice now became more humane and concerned for individuals'
rights. A first major step occurred in May 1933 when Stalin and Molotov
ordered the release of half of all labor-camp inmates whose sentences were
connected with collectivization. In January 1935, the Supreme Court of
the USSR exonerated a group of convicted kolkhoz officials because procurators
had mishandled the investigation and examination of evidence. The court
even considered criminal proceedings to punish lower judicial bodies for their
conduct. In February 1935 the official journal of the Commissariat of
Justice, published, with evident satisfaction, the story of eastern Siberian
courts that had quashed a series of cases initiated under Article 58. The
journal maintained that these cases should not have arisen in the first place.
In August 1935 the government declared an amnesty for all collective farmers
sentenced to less than five years if they were working "honorably and with
good conscience" on the kolkhozy. Presumably this decree applied to
those peasants punished but not sent into distant exile or prison. The
directive did not apply to recidivists or those convicted of
counter-revolutionary crimes, but sentences in such cases would have been
longer than five years.
Thurston, Robert. Life and
Terror in Stalin's Russia, 1934-1941. New Haven: Yale University Press, c1996,
p. 11
Yet by 1934 the Stalinist regime had begun to rein in the police and courts and
to institute substantial reforms within them, which changed and softened
punitive practices.
Thurston, Robert. Life and
Terror in Stalin's Russia, 1934-1941. New Haven: Yale University Press, c1996,
p. 15
In the spring [of 1934] he [Stalin] ordered a limited amnesty for rebellious
kulaks. In June, however, he authorized a decree which proclaimed the
collective responsibility of every family for treason committed by one of its
members. People who failed to denounce a disloyal relative to authority
were made liable to severe punishment. A month later he abolished the GPU
and replaced it by the Commissariat of Internal Affairs. The powers of
the political police were limited; and the Attorney-General--an ex-Menshevik
lawyer Andrei Vyshinsky was soon to be appointed to that post--was given the
right to supervise its activities and to veto them if they conflicted with the
law. The leaders of the oppositions were allowed to address public
meetings and to write for the press, although not to criticize the powers that
be. Hopes for further Liberal measures rose high. The idea of a
constitutional reform was vented in the Politburo; and the main leaders of the
opposition were invited to co-operate on the projects for a new constitution.
The quasi-Liberal spell was suddenly interrupted when, on December 1, 1934, a
young Communist, Nikolayev, assassinated Kirov in Leningrad. Stalin
rushed to Leningrad and personally interrogated the terrorist in the course of
many hours.... Nikolayev and his friends regarded themselves as followers of Zinoviev,
with whom, however, they had had no direct or indirect connection.
Probably it was Kirov's liberalism that enabled the terrorist to gain access to
his offices in the Smolny Institute, for Kirov had objected to being heavily
guarded by the political police. At any rate, the GPU of Leningrad had
known about the planned attempt and had done nothing to prevent it. Had
Stalin also known about it and connived? Nothing is certain; but he used
Kirov's death to justify his conclusion that the time for quasi-liberal
concessions was over.
Deutscher, Isaac. Stalin; A
Political Biography. New York: Oxford Univ. Press, 1967, p. 354-355
The Russians have, in fact, several times tried to introduce some measures of
real democracy, particularly during the period before the murder of Kirov.
Socialist Clarity Group. The
U. S. S. R., Its Significance for the West. London: V. Gollancz, 1942, p. 61
... deportation of rich peasants for actively resisting collectivization
stopped in May 1933. The liberal trend peaked in 1934. In this year
the security police (The State Political Directorate of the Commissariat of the
Interior), the GPU, was abolished and its functions restructured as part of a
re-organized People's Commissariat of internal affairs, which reflected a
curtailed role for the security police. In July, The Ministry of Justice
ordered a halt in the campaign of seeking out and prosecuting engineers and
enterprise directors for 'wrecking and sabotage.' In the spring a partial
amnesty was offered to rebellious kulaks, and in November the size of the
private plots for collective farm peasants was increased. Leaders of
oppositional tendencies in the Party were once again allowed to address public
meetings. Work began on drafting a new liberal constitution which, in
fact, culminated in 1936.
This relative relaxation between 1929-31 and 1932-34 was a result of an
improvement in both the industrial and the international situation of the
Soviet Union. The technical intelligentsias' resistance to the new rapid
industrialization policies decreased as: (1) the new policies proved to be
effective in producing rapid rates of industrialization; and (2) a rapidly
rising proportion of the technical intelligentsia were recruited from the
children of workers and peasants, and trained in socialist institutions....
Szymanski, Albert. Human
Rights in the Soviet Union. London: Zed Books, 1984, p. 227
Starting in February 1934, step followed step in a steady march of official
actions to better the lot of Soviet people. Some were gestures
toward the peasantry. A decree published over the signatures of
Stalin as Central Committee secretary and Molotov as head of the government
canceled unmet grain-delivery quotas for 1933 and spread out over three years
the repayment of government loans of grain for feed and food.
Pravda's 1st March editorial on this modest measure was blazoned:
"In What Other Country Does the Peasantry Receive Such Aid!" In
May local Soviet officials were authorized to restore to full citizenship
deported kulaks who had worked hard and proved loyal, especially the
young. In July Stalin and other Central Committee officials met
with a group of regional party secretaries to discuss problems of rural
policy. At that time about 70% of the peasant households were
collectivized. Speaking for the Central Committee, Stalin cautioned
against administrative coercion in collectivizing the remainder, and advocated
the subsequently taken steps to raise collective farmers' incomes, limit their
delivery quotas, and fix the size of their private plots. A
reported further topic of discussion at the July meeting was the dissolution of
the political departments that had been created in the machine-tractor stations
during collectivization. Kirov, who was present, is said to have
spoken strongly on this issue, proposing the revival of Soviet power in the
countryside. This proposal was within the frame of the policy
Stalin was now pursuing,...
Stalin's internal-detente policy took many other forms. In April
1934 the government issued a decree on the need to spur housing construction in
towns and worker settlements. More goods began to appear in the
shops, and people started to talk about the advent of a "little
NEP." The November plenum endorsed a Politburo decision--which
Molotov said had been proposed by Stalin-- to end bread rationing as of 1
January 1935.... Again in November 1935, speaking at the Stakhanovites'
congress in the Kremlin, Mikoyan told how Stalin had demanded of him that he
produce samples of the high-quality new toilet soap now being manufactured for
ordinary people at a Politburo meeting so that the members could look them
over--after which "we received a special Central Committee decision on the
assortment and composition of soap." Not all expressions of
Stalin's new populism were similarly publicized. Khrushchev, then
first secretary of the Moscow Party Committee, received a phone call from him
one day saying "rumors have reached me that you've let a very unfavorable
situation develop in Moscow as regards public toilets. Apparently
people hunt around desperately and can't find anywhere to relieve
themselves. This won't do. It puts the citizens in an
awkward position. Talk this matter over with Bulganin and do
something to improve these conditions."
...Measures to alleviate material hardship went along with moves to dispel the
piatiletka's (the First Five-year plan) atmosphere of austerity. A
lighthearted musical comedy, The Jolly Fellows, the first of a series of its
kind, appeared on Soviet screens during 1934. Popular dance halls
were opened in Moscow, Leningrad, and other big cities. There and
in worker clubs people danced the formerly frowned-upon foxtrot to tunes of
once tabooed American jazz. Tennis, previously decried as
bourgeois, became respectable. The dining rooms of Moscow hotels,
heretofore patronized almost exclusively by foreigners, filled up with decorously
dressed young men and women representing, the Times correspondent reported,
"all sections of Soviet business and industry."
...Another sphere of the detente policy was law enforcement. Stalin
wanted to give professional people and the ordinary man reassurance against
arbitrary mistreatment by lower-level authorities. The Procuracy,
which had been elevated to the rank of an all-union independent agency in 1933
and given power of supervision over the legality of acts by administrative
bodies, including the OGPU, was mobilized for the legality campaign.
Many persons convicted for trivial or inflated misdemeanors were
released; and the police reportedly received orders not to arrest any engineers
or Red Army personnel without a special warrant or consultation with the party
Central Committee. The Procuracy was headed then by an Old
Bolshevik, Ivan Akulov. He applied himself energetically to
exonerating specialists imprisoned on flimsy charges. His deputy,
who succeeded him as Procurator in 1935, was Stalin's man Andre
Vyshinsky. Stalin's personal backing of the reform policy was
clearly shown by Vyshinsky's championship of it. He took justice
officials to task for the "prosecutorial deviation" of assuming that
every court case must end in a conviction; and sternly lectured them against
harming the regime in the eyes of the people through unwarranted arrest,
improper confiscation of property, and violation of rights.
Perhaps the most adroit maneuver in the detente policy was a temporary show of
preparedness for reconciliation within the party.... some
well-known ex-oppositionists publicly recanted, declared fealty to Stalin and
the General Line, and petitioned for reinstatement in the party.
One was Christian Rakovsky, who had been living in internal exile since
1928 and whose prestige in Left opposition circles was second only to Trotsky's.
... Zinoviev contributed occasional articles to Pravda on international affairs
and for about three months, between April and July 1934, was listed in
successive issues of Bolshevik as a member of its editorial board.
Kamenev also appeared in Pravda and wrote the preface to a volume of
Machiavelli's writings published in November.
Tucker, Robert. Stalin in
Power: 1929-1941. New York: Norton, 1990, p. 283-287
In the first months of 1935,...Stalin tried to restore something of the liberal
atmosphere of mid-1934.
Medvedev, Roy & Zhores
Medvedev. The Unknown Stalin. NY, NY: Overlook Press, 2004, p. 284
For the outside world, the beginning of 1935 was the period of the real
"Soviet spring." On reform followed another, and they all
tended in one direction: reconciliation with the non-Party intelligentsia,
extension of the government's base by attracting all those who by their work in
any department of Soviet development gave practical proof of their abilities
and of their devotion to the Soviet state.
Nicolaevsky, Boris. Power and
the Soviet Elite; "The letter of an Old Bolshevik." New York:
Praeger, 1965, p. 59
It seems indisputable therefore that following collectivization there was a
movement towards measures which, though their efficacy left much to be desired,
were intended to put a limit on arbitrariness. There was a clear
intention in high places to break with the practices of those troubled
years. In fact, while two somewhat symbolic amnesties were granted in
1934 and 1935 to certain groups of peasants who had been convicted, officials
who had been found guilty themselves for refusing to use coercion enjoyed a
similar dispensation at the same time.
Rittersporn, Gabor. Stalinist
Simplifications and Soviet Complications, 1933-1953. New York: Harwood Academic
Publishers, c1991, p. 244
I must now mention an incident from that shadowy period of Bukharin's
life. It was during the brief period of the brightest 'liberalism' the
regime had known since the death of Lenin-between the Seventeenth Congress in
January and February 1934 and the murder of Kirov in December 1934.
Stalin was trying to convince the people that the regime had changed its
character and that his aim was now to unite all groups and sections of
society. One of his devices at this stage was to make use of people who
had differed from him in the past, giving them responsible Party jobs. At
the height of this 'liberal' period, in the summer of 1934, the first Writers'
Congress was held.
Berger, Joseph. Nothing but
the Truth. New York, John Day Co. 1971, p. 106
Later that year [1934], there was even a softening of policy toward
kulaks. In December 1934 a circular to all NKVD chiefs and procurators
allowed the employment of exiles in organizations not having a defense
character, and their children were permitted to enroll in educational institutions.
Local NKVD chiefs were specifically ordered to inform the exiles of their new
rights. A Politburo decree one week later abolished all restrictions on
admission to higher educational institutions for persons heretofore excluded
because of social origins or previous electoral disenfranchisement.
Getty, J. Arch.
"Excesses are not permitted, "Russian Review 61 (January 2002) p. 120.
NO EVIDENCE STALIN KILLED KIROV
...Beginning in the 1980s other Western and Soviet historians also questioned
the Stalin complicity theory [in the Kirov murder], the origins of the story,
and Stalin's motive and opportunity, as well as investigating the circumstances
surrounding the event. They noted that the sources for the theory derived
originally from memoirists, mostly Cold War-era Soviet defectors, whose
information was second- and thirdhand and who were in all cases far removed
from the event. These writers had generated a huge and sensational
literature that largely repeated and echoed itself while providing few
verifiable facts, and which sometimes seemed primarily designed to enhance the
status and importance of the author. Later historians noted that despite
at least two official Soviet investigations and the high-level political
advantages of accusing Stalin in the Khrushchev years, even the most
anti-Stalin Soviet administrations had never accused Stalin of the crime,...
Getty & Naumov, The Road
to Terror. New Haven, Conn.: Yale Univ. Press, c1999, p. 143
...In fact, Kirov seems to have been a staunch Stalinist....
The question of Leningrad police complicity also seems murky. Recent
evidence discounts the alleged connections between them and the assassin.
One implicated NKVD official was not even in the city during the months he was
supposed to have groomed the assassin. It is true that many Leningrad
police officials and party leaders were executed in the terror after the
assassination, but so were hundreds of thousands of others. There is no
compelling reason to believe that they were killed "to cover the
tracks" of the Kirov assassination, as Khrushchev put it. Moreover,
they were left alive and free to talk for three years following the
crime. Some historians have found it unlikely that Stalin would have used
these agents to arrange the killing and then given them so much opportunity to
betray the plot.
Getty & Naumov, The Road
to Terror. New Haven, Conn.: Yale Univ. Press, c1999, p. 144
Yagoda (through whom Stalin presumably worked to kill Kirov) was produced in
open court and in front of the world press before his execution in 1938.
Knowing that he was to be shot in any event, he could have brought Stalin's
entire house of cards down with a single remark about the Kirov killing.
Again, such a risk would appear to be unacceptable for a complicit Stalin.
The Stalinists seemed unprepared for the assassination and panicked by it.
Khrushchov hinted that Stalin had Kirov killed. There are some who still
believe that story. The seeds of suspicion were planted. A
commission was set up in 1956. Some 12 persons, from various backgrounds,
looked through a welter of documents but found nothing incriminating Stalin.
But these results have never been published.... The commission concluded
that Stalin was not implicated in Kirov's assassination. Khrushchev
refused to have the findings published since they didn't serve his purpose.
Chuev, Feliks. Molotov
Remembers. Chicago: I. R. Dee, 1993, p. 353
As to Khrushchev's charges, there are no documents implicating Stalin or NKVD
personnel in Kirov's murder.
Sudoplatov, Pavel. Special
Tasks. Boston: Little, Brown, c1993, p. 53
There is no evidence that Stalin ordered the murder of Kirov to eliminate him
as a rival center of power;...
Sudoplatov, Pavel. Special
Tasks. Boston: Little, Brown, c1993, p. 55
I'll tell you later how shattered he was by the death of both my mother and
Kirov. Maybe he never trusted people very much, but after their deaths he
stopped trusting them at all.
Alliluyeva, Svetlana. Twenty
Letters to a Friend. New York: Harper & Row, 1967, p. 77
Kirov spent his last summer, that of 1934, with us as in previous years.
Then, in December, Nikolayev shot him. Wouldn't it be more logical to
link his killing with the name of Beria than with that of my father, as is done
by transparent hints today?
I'll never believe my father was involved in this particular death. Kirov
was closer to him than the Svanidzes, the Redensest, his other relatives, or
most of his other colleagues. Kirov was close to my father and my father
needed him. I remember when we got the awful news that Kirov was dead,
and how shaken everybody was.
Alliluyeva, Svetlana. Twenty
Letters to a Friend. New York: Harper & Row, 1967, p. 139
Whether or not Yagoda was then trying to sow seeds of suspicion in Stalin's
mind, the fact remains that Stalin was deeply affected by Kirov's death.
Duranty, Walter. Story of
Soviet Russia. Philadelphia, N. Y.: JB Lippincott Co. 1944, p. 212
An extensive review of the evidence carried out in 1990 at the behest of
Gorbachev's advisor Yakovlev does not implicate Stalin [in the murder of
Kirov]. Another explanation for Stalin's assault on party cadres was the
rumor that the party faithful at the 17th Party Congress in 1934 had not voted
overwhelmingly to elect Stalin to the party's central committee. The
documents provided here show this not to be the case,...
Koenker and Bachman, Eds.
Revelations from the Russian Archives. Washington: Library of Congress, 1997,
p. 4
The question of who planned the murder of Kirov and why he was killed has
remained one of the great mysteries of Soviet history. Stalin ordered an
immediate investigation and traveled to Leningrad to direct the interrogations
personally.... [Some] gossip on the street in Leningrad linked Stalin with the
killing.... Nonetheless, Stalin's guilt has never been proven, although
the case has been revisited at the highest levels of the Soviet leadership
several times since the death of Stalin. Khrushchev, in his secret speech
to the 20th Party Congress in 1956, alleged that Stalin was responsible for
Kirov's murder, and several commissions were appointed to sift the evidence in
the following years. Their conclusion was that there was no conspiracy,
that Nikolayev, a disgruntled and unstable party member, had acted
alone:. Another Central Committee commission was appointed under
Gorbachev to investigate the affair, again, the direct hand of Stalin was not
found,...
Koenker and Bachman, Eds.
Revelations from the Russian Archives. Washington: Library of Congress, 1997,
p. 69
Affidavit
On Feb. 17, 1965, we (Klimov, Baturin, Zanaraev, Kuzmin) the undersigned
interviewed Comrade Vlasik, the former chief of Stalin's personal
bodyguard. During the interview Comrade Vlasik was very reticent and
hesitant to talk....
As Comrade Vlasik described it, Stalin and Kirov had a friendly
relationship. When Kirov came to Moscow, he would always go to Stalin's
home and would often send him fresh fish and game from Leningrad. Vlasik
also informed us that he personally never knew of anything and hadn't heard
anything from anyone else which would suggest that relations between Stalin and
Kirov were anything but friendly....
Comrade Vlasik refused to answer when we asked him whether he knew anything
about the circumstances of Kirov's murder. He was deeply upset by the
talk that Kirov's murder had been arranged by Stalin. As Comrade Vlasik
put it, such rumors were completely groundless. Although he considers
himself one of Stalin's victims, having been twice fired from his job and
placed under arrest in 1952, he, as a person who was in close contact with
Stalin and knew him personally for many years, refuses to entertain the notion
that Stalin had anything to do with this crime....
In his recollections of Stalin, Molotov, and Voroshilov's trip to Leningrad
after December 1, 1934, he said that after Stalin received the news about the
auto accident and the death of Operations Commissar Borisov, Stalin became
visibly upset in Molotov's presence and expressed extreme dissatisfaction with
the secret policemen who were unable to get Borisov to Smolny safely.
Koenker and Bachman, Eds.
Revelations from the Russian Archives. Washington: Library of Congress, 1997,
p. 77
Statement by Vlasik
With respect to the questions posed to me, I can provide the following
information:
... The relationship between Stalin and Kirov was a friendly one.
Whenever Kirov came to Moscow, he would always stay with Stalin in his
apartment in the Kremlin or at his dacha and would even go to Sochi for two or
three days if Stalin was vacationing there.
Koenker and Bachman, Eds.
Revelations from the Russian Archives. Washington: Library of Congress, 1997,
p. 78
It is widely asserted that Stalin conspired in the assassination of Kirov in
December 1934. Yet the evidence for Stalin's complicity is complicated
and at least secondhand. In fact, if one traces the assertion that Stalin
killed Kirov to its origins, one finds that, before the Cold War, no serious
authority argued that Stalin was behind the assassination. The KGB
defector Orlov was the first to make such a claim in his dubious 1953
account...and it has since been widely accepted in Western academic and Soviet
dissidents circles.
Equally interesting is a list of those who did not believe Stalin organized the
crime. Neither Nicolaevsky [in his Letter of an Old Bolshevik in 1936]
nor Khrushchev implicated Stalin. Khrushchev only said that there was
much that was "mysterious" about the incident. At the height of
his power, he could easily have charged Stalin with the crime had he wanted
to.... Trotsky, like Tokaev, believed that the assassination was really
the work of misguided young oppositionists. Liushkov, an NKVD defector
who outranked Orlov and Krivitsky, told his Japanese protectors that Stalin was
not involved. Most recently, Adam Ulam noted that Stalin had little to
gain from the killing.
...As Khrushchev noted, much in the situation suggested police complicity.
Neither his bodyguard nor anyone else was with Kirov at the time--a probable
breach of security rules. The bodyguard (Borisov) was killed in an
automobile accident before he could be questioned by Stalin and the Politburo,
who rushed to Leningrad to conduct the investigation. Finally, it seems
that the assassin (Nikolayev) had been previously detained by the local NKVD
and released, even though he carried a revolver and a map of Kirov's route to
work.
Although this evidence may implicate the police, it does not necessarily point
to higher involvement by Stalin or others. The NKVD officials in
Leningrad who had been responsible for Kirov's security received light
sentences in Siberia at the hands of their fellows on an NKVD board and
remained alive for a few years. They would hardly have survived at all if
they could have connected others with the crime. Similarly, the head of
the NKVD at the time, Yagoda (to whom Stalin allegedly gave instructions to
kill Kirov), confessed in open court in 1938 to having killed Kirov at the
instigation of the opposition. If Stalin had used Yagoda to assassinate
Kirov, it would have been very dangerous to allow him to appear later before
the microphones of the world press. Yagoda knew that he would be shot
anyway, and it would have been easy for him to let slip that Stalin had put him
up to it. Stalin would not have taken the risk of such a damaging
assertion's coming to light.
Many have commented on Stalin's unusually prompt reaction to the
shooting. As noted, he and other Politburo members rushed to Leningrad to
oversee the investigation.... The shooting was certainly an extraordinary
blow to the Soviet government, and the reactions suggest panic. The
killing was perceived as the first shot in a coup against the leadership.
Such wartime measures are not really surprising, and it would have seemed
incongruous that the leadership had not reacted in such a way....
Other circumstances surrounding the assassination point away from Stalin's
involvement. When the assassin was apprehended seconds after the
shooting, he was carrying a diary that incriminated no one and asserted that he
was acting alone. If Stalin had organized the assassination to blame the
opposition, an incriminating diary would have been priceless written evidence,
and, if Nikolayev had not kept one, an appropriate document could certainly
have been manufactured. If the assassination had been planned by Stalin
or one of his supporters, a diary implicating the opposition would have been
preferred. No diary at all would have been better than one exonerating
the opposition. Finally, if Stalin had planned these events, he would
hardly have allowed this "dead end" diary to be mentioned in the
press. It only weakened an accusation against the opposition.
Circumstances suggest that Stalin and his partisans were not in control of the
situation.
The immediate official response to the assassination was ad hoc and confused,
showing few signs of advance planning. In the days after the killing, the
government identified Nikolayev variously as a lone assassin, a tool of a White
Guard conspiracy, and finally a follower of the Zinoviev-Kamenev oppositions in
Moscow and Leningrad. It was not until December 18 that the regime hinted
that the Zinoviev opposition might be involved. Five days later, the
secret police announced that Zinoviev, Kamenev, and 13 of their associates had,
indeed, been arrested on Dec. 16. But "in the absence of sufficient
evidence to put them on trial," they were to be administratively exiled
within the USSR. It was not until a month later, on Jan. 16, 1935, that
an official announcement said that Zinoviev and Kamenev were to be tried for
maintaining a secret oppositionist "center" that had indirectly
influenced the assassin to commit the crime. The charges and
contradictions in the official characterization of the assassin suggest that no
story was ready to hand and that the authorities were reacting to events in a
confused way.
It is often thought that Stalin and company planned the crime to have a pretext
for crushing the opposition. Yet the aftermath of the crime suggests
confusion and mindless, unfocused rage. The repression directly following
the assassination was diffuse and spasmodic.
... It seemed that the regime, unprepared for the crime and unclear about who
should be punished, lashed out in a violent but ad hoc way at traditional
enemies of Soviet power.
... Stalin would not have needed the killing of Kirov to justify this type or
level of repression.
... Key leaders of the opposition (such as Pyatakov, Radek, Bukharin, and
Rykov) continued to work unmolested until 1936. No mention was made of
major opposition conspirators in the press after Jan. 18, 1935, and no campaign
followed. The Ezhovshchina, with its spy scare, fear of war, and campaign
to unmask traitors, was two years away; and the lull suggests that hard-liners
were politically unprepared to use the Kirov assassination. When they
finally were able to use the assassination against the opposition, it would be
on the basis of "new NKVD materials obtained in 1936." No one
was able to capitalize on the situation in 1934-35 by striking at the opposition
while the iron was hot.
Neither the sources, circumstances, nor consequences of the crime suggest
Stalin's complicity. The lack of any evidence of political dispute
between Stalin and Kirov, discussed earlier, would appear to refute any motive
for Stalin to kill his ally,... Based on the sources, there is no good
reason to believe that Stalin connived in Kirov's assassination, and all one
can say with any certainty is that Nikolayev, a rank-and-file dissident, pulled
the trigger.
Getty, A. Origins of the Great
Purges. Cambridge, N. Y.: Cambridge Univ. Press, 1985, p. 207-210
Second, Khrushchev's focus was actually quite limited. Nowhere did he say
that Stalin had a hand in Kirov's assassination.... he never accused Stalin,
although it would have been easy to do so...and, although he said that Kirov's
death was used as an excuse for stepping up repression, he did not really
explain why the repression resulting from the assassination was delayed until
1937.
Getty, A. Origins of the Great
Purges. Cambridge, N. Y.: Cambridge Univ. Press, 1985, p. 217
The latest attempt to come to grips with the Kirov assassination was the work
of Yakovlev's Politburo Commission, which in 1989 appointed an interagency
investigative team consisting of personnel from the USSR Procurator's Office,
the Military Procuracy, the KGB, and various archival administrations.
For two years, this team conducted interviews, reviewed thousands of documents,
and attempted to check all possible scenarios; their work has added another 15
volumes to the thirty-year-old efforts. Like all of the other research
efforts organized by the Politburo Commission to probe aspects of the
repression for publication in Izvestia, the team's charter was to show Stalin's
complicity in the repression. It had little political incentive to let
him off the hook; quite the contrary. Nevertheless, members of the
working team concluded that "in this affair, no materials objectively
support Stalin's participation or NKVD participation in the organization and
carrying out of Kirov's murder."
The team concludes that only "one-sided-superficial, unverified facts,
rumors and conjectures" support Stalin complicity. With the collapse
of Orlov's always improbable version, much of the folklore of the Kirov murder
falls apart.
Getty and Manning. Stalinist
Terror. Cambridge, NY: Cambridge University Press, 1993, p. 46-47
Of course, it may be that Stalin really instigated the murder. But the
two main written accounts of his supposed machinations, from which all the
other texts derive, have now been shown to be spurious. Their secondhand
stories are inconsistent with known facts about the circumstances of the
crime. There was always reasonable doubt about Stalin's participation,
and now there is more than before.
Getty and Manning. Stalinist
Terror. Cambridge, NY: Cambridge University Press, 1993, p. 49
But much of the new information seems to support revisionist doubts about older
interpretations and their source bases.... It may well be that Stalin
killed Kirov as part of a bloody long-term plan. On the other hand, the
documents we have today do not prove it and unavoidably provide details that
support alternative or revisionist views of events.
Getty and Manning. Stalinist
Terror. Cambridge, NY: Cambridge University Press, 1993, p. 60
But there are many problems with the idea that that he [Stalin] had Kirov
killed. Evidence recently released from Russia shows that, contrary to
many accounts, the police did not detain Nikolayev three times near Kirov, on
each occasion mysteriously releasing him despite the fact that he was carrying
a gun. He was stopped only once, and the circumstances were not
suspicious. He had not received the gun from a Leningrad NKVD officer, as
is typically claimed, but had owned it since 1918 and had registered it legally
in 1924 and 1930.
Nikolayev had a diary with him at Smolny, but instead of showing that the
party's enemies helped him in his attack, which would have been logical if
Stalin had planned the shooting, it indicated that he had acted alone.
Kirov's bodyguard was not present at the fatal moment because his boss had
called to say he would stay at home that day. Kirov went to his office
anyway, only to meet Nikolayev by chance. The latter, who had a party
card that would automatically admit him to the building, had gone there to ask
for a pass to an upcoming conference.
...And an even higher-ranking police defector, Liushkov, who was serving in
Leningrad at the time of the murder but fled to Japan in 1938, told his
handlers abroad that Stalin had nothing to do with the murder. Moreover,
the Gensec would have had to rely on Yagoda, then head of the NKVD, to carry out
his plan. Such involvement would have been far from safe, as Yagoda had
been a leading figure in the party for some time. He was later arrested
and tried in one of the Moscow show processes; it is unlikely that Stalin would
have allowed him to testify publicly with such a terrible secret.
Just after the murder, Stalin called in two top officials, Yezhov, a member of
the Central Committee, and Kosarev, chief of the Young Communist League
(Komsomol). He told them to "look for the killer among the
Zinovievites." Years later Yezhov told the Central Committee that at
first relations between himself and Kosarev, on one side, and the secret
police, on the other, were poor; the latter did not want to help. Finally
Stalin warned Yagoda that "we'll smash your mug [if you don't co-operate]."
One day after Kirov's death, his bodyguard, Borisov, died under mysterious
circumstances. Riding in the back of an NKVD truck on his way to see
Stalin, Borisov supposedly suffered fatal head injuries in an accident that
somehow hurt no one else. Various writers have seen this incident as an
indication of Stalin's desire to cover his tracks further by eliminating
another witness. But the Gensec's personal bodyguard reported that his
chief was upset at Borisov's death and expressed sharp dissatisfaction with the
policeman accompanying him.
No evidence has ever emerged to tie Stalin directly to the killing.
Generally the materials advanced to support this connection are on the order of
Orlov's: someone who supposedly knew about Stalin's role told someone else
about it, who wrote down the tale years or decades later.
Khrushchev, who had much to gain in the attacks he made on his predecessor in
the 1950s and 1960s by tying him to Kirov's death and who did not hesitate to
link him to other murders, never produced clear proof. In early 1991, six
years into glasnost, an important Soviet scholar and politician announced that,
judging from available archival materials, "Nikolayev planned and
perpetuated the murder alone." Files on the case "contain no
information implicating Stalin and agencies of the NKVD." Stalin did
not know of and had no relation to the organization of the attack on Kirov."
... But given the problems with the claim that he did [that Stalin murdered
Kirov], the simplest answer to the question of who killed Kirov is likely to be
the correct one: a disturbed man, Nikolayev, planned and carried out his act by
himself.
Thurston, Robert. Life and
Terror in Stalin's Russia, 1934-1941. New Haven: Yale University Press, c1996,
p. 20-22
The latest Soviet account concludes, "Stalin's participation in the murder
[of Kirov] is extremely probable, though there is no documentary
confirmation"; or, as Khrushchev put it in a section of his memoirs which
remained unpublished until mid-1989, "Yagoda could only have acted on
secret orders from Stalin."
Nikolayev had been out of work since March 1934, when he seems to have attacked
a decision sending him to work outside the city, which he believed to be a
piece of bureaucratic intrigue. He had been expelled from the Party for
this breach of discipline, but his membership had been restored two months
later on his making a declaration of repentance.
Conquest, Robert. The Great
Terror. New York: Oxford University Press, 1990, p. 43
Today, many people state: Stalin this, and Stalin that--killed Kirov!
Instead of yelling into a bell, look into history. You must remember that
Kirov criticized Trotsky since 1921, when Trotsky decided to give up Astrakhan
to the civil war enemy, in order to straighten the front lines. Trotsky
never forgave Kirov for this, since Lenin took the side of Kirov and thus, the
civil war enemies were defeated at that place. Social-revolutionary
Wasserman then started to spread gossips, lies, that Kirov was a
monarchist. Kirov at that time was arrested, but these enemies were not
able to liquidate him--the Tribunal exposed the provocation and sentenced
Wasserman to death. Kirov always opposed Trotsky, knowing full well what
Trotsky was capable of and what an enemy he was.
Rybin, Aleksei. Next to
Stalin: Notes of a Bodyguard. Toronto: Northstar Compass Journal, 1996, p. 16
The preliminary examination of Kirov's assassin was concluded in 27 days.
The findings were signed by the Assistant State Prosecutor, Andre Vyshinsky,
and L. Sheinin, an investigating officer in especially important cases.
...I [the author] talked to Sheinin in the seventies.... In retirement he had
started writing plays, so he was a colleague of sorts. He liked showing
off his knowledge of secrets, and was quite delighted when I asked him whether
Stalin had ordered Kirov's murder. He smiled, and answered amiably, "Stalin
was the Leader, not a thug, my dear fellow."
...During Khrushchev's Thaw a commission was set up to decide once and for all
whether Stalin really did order Yagoda to kill Kirov. They hoped to find
documents--and of course found none. Not because they had been
destroyed. I am convinced that they never existed. What Sheinin
said was not untrue:...
Radzinsky, Edvard.
Stalin. New York: Doubleday, c1996, p. 322
As to his [Stalin] feelings concerning Kirov, we cannot go beyond
conjecture.... That Kirov had been a leader of the "liberal
wing of the Politburo," that he was popular with the Party to the extent
that he aroused Stalin's jealousy--all these are later reconstructions with no
basis in an established fact. It is said that the ovation according
to Kirov at the 17th Congress rivaled Stalin's, but this is certainly not
supported by reading the report of the Congress. The average
delegates enthusiasm was rationed in accordance with the given notable’s
proximity to an assumed standing with the Leader, and so Kirov, just like
Voroshilov or Molotov, received the quota of Cheers prescribed for "a
close comrade-in-arms of Great Stalin"--"loud, long-lasting applause,
a warm ovation by the whole gathering, everybody stands up."
And it is extravagant to claim that assassination was the only means by
which Stalin could get rid of Kirov without encountering party
opposition.... Why, especially after he [Stalin] had been enthroned
as a Marxian divinity at the 17th Congress, should he have had trouble with
Kirov?
Ulam, Adam. Stalin; The Man
and his Era. New York: Viking Press, 1973, p. 385
Without their [the colleagues of Khrushchov] help, then, what can we say about
the background of the Kirov murder? The hypothesis of what might be
called the Renaissance type of crime cannot be supported by facts and
reasonable conjectures at our disposal.
Ulam, Adam. Stalin; The Man
and his Era. New York: Viking Press, 1973, p. 387
As for Kirov's assassination, the source material and the evidence we have
explain it so poorly that almost any hypothesis might be allowable.
Rittersporn, Gabor. Stalinist
Simplifications and Soviet Complications, 1933-1953. New York: Harwood Academic
Publishers, c1991, p. 6
Supposedly Stalin was behind the killing. In fact all the evidence is
circumstantial and no proof as ever been found.
Service, Robert. Stalin.
Cambridge, Mass.: Belknap Press of Harvard Univ. Press, 2005, p. 315
Volodya says, "There is a great deal written about how Stalin was involved
in the murder of Kirov. In fact he had nothing to do with it. My
mother, Anna, was with Stalin when they phoned him and informed him that Kirov
had been murdered. My mother said to me that neither before nor after has
she ever see Stalin in the state he was reduced to after that phone call.
...He had nothing to do with the murder."
Richardson, Rosamond.
Stalin’s Shadow. New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1994, p. 137
AGRANOV COULD NOT FIND
EVIDENCE ZINOVIEV DIRECTLY KILLED KIROV
...Deputy commissar of the secret police Agranov was brought in to supervise a
special investigation of the crime to be aimed at Zinoviev and his associate
Kamenev.... After one month of questioning, Agranov reported that he was
not able to prove that they had been directly involved in the
assassination. So in the middle of January 1935 they were tried and
convicted only for "moral complicity" in the crime. That is,
their opposition had created a climate in which others were incited to
violence. Zinoviev was sentenced to 10 years in prison, Kamenev to five.
Getty & Naumov, The Road
to Terror. New Haven, Conn.: Yale Univ. Press, c1999, p. 146
In the Kirov case itself 14 persons were executed, former members of the
"Zinoviev opposition," who confessed that they had in recent years
formed a "Leningrad Center" to assassinate Soviet leaders. They
connected abroad through the Latvian consul-general, who on evidence shown was
recalled by his government.... Zinoviev and Kamenev themselves, with a
small group of Moscow followers, were imprisoned on their own confession to
organizational connection with the Leningrad Center and knowledge of its terrorist
views. There was some popular demand for their execution, but it failed,
as nothing indicated direct participation in or knowledge of the actual murder.
Strong, Anna Louise.
“Searching Out the Soviets.” New Republic: August 7, 1935, p. 357
ZINOVIEV GROUP WAS THE FIRST
TO WORK SECRETLY AGAINST THE PARTY
[Jan. 18, 1935, secret Central Committee letter on the Kirov assassination]
I. THE FACTS
It is necessary, first and foremost, to make note of the following indisputable
facts as established by the investigation and by the trial:
1) The villainous murder was committed by the Leningrad group of Zinoviev
followers calling themselves the Leningrad Center.
II. POLITICAL ASSESSMENT
It ought to be born in mind that the Zinoviev counter-revolutionary group, in
the form in which it has been revealed as a result of the investigation and of
the trial, represents something entirely new for which there is no precedent in
the history of our party. There have been not a few factional groups in
the history of our party. These groups usually made an effort to oppose
their views to the party line and to defend them openly before the party.
But our party has not known of a single group throughout its history which has
made it its task to conceal its views and to hide its political face and which
has hypocritically declared its loyalty to the party line while simultaneously
preparing a terroristic attempt on the life of representatives of our
party. Zinoviev's group has turned out to be the only group in the
history of our party that has made double dealing its commandment and has
thereby slid down into the mire of counterrevolutionary terrorism, all the
while masking its dark deeds with repeated declarations of devotion to the
party in the press and at the party congress. It was difficult for the
party to suppose that party veterans like Zinoviev, Kamenev, Yevdokimov, or
Bakaev could fall so low and in the end get mixed up with the White Guard gang.
Getty & Naumov, The Road
to Terror. New Haven, Conn.: Yale Univ. Press, c1999, p. 148
...still the Zinoviev opposition had really fought Stalin by all the means at
its disposal, in a political fight in which almost all the present Committee
had been on Stalin's side. They had compromised themselves by lying their
way back into the Party, as was quite evident. And it was at least
possible that the assassination of Kirov was "objectively" Zinoviev's
responsibility.
Conquest, Robert. The Great
Terror. New York: Oxford University Press, 1990, p. 165
SENTENCING AND REPRESSION DID
NOT HARDEN AFTER KIROV KILLING
Sentencing policy in general did not harden following the Kirov assassination.
Getty & Naumov, The Road
to Terror. New Haven, Conn.: Yale Univ. Press, c1999, p. 157
What followed the Kirov assassination was not mass violence against the entire
opposition, but the Stalin constitution and a campaign for party democracy and
increased participation of the party rank-and-file.
Getty, A. Origins of the Great
Purges. Cambridge, N. Y.: Cambridge Univ. Press, 1985, p. 115
Whether Stalin ordered Kirov's murder or not, another issue remains, did he use
the event to frighten the populace? The answer is no, at least not
immediately.... Nothing in the press, the major speeches of the day, the
debates over judicial policy, or the overall atmosphere of 1934-35 suggested
that the regime intended to repress anyone but a relatively small number of
terrorists and former oppositionists.
Thurston, Robert. Life and
Terror in Stalin's Russia, 1934-1941. New Haven: Yale University Press, c1996,
p. 23
The internal party reviews of 1935-36 were not "blood purges" that
necessarily resulted in tragedy. Expulsion at this point did not always
mean arrest or even loss of one's job. The oblast committee in Smolensk
specifically directed lower organizations not to dismiss ousted members "wholesale"
from their work. They were to be removed from leading posts but otherwise
not touched unless they were discovered to be enemies of the people or
"socially dangerous elements," a phrase encompassing former priests,
kulaks, other former "exploiters," and ordinary criminals.
As shown in the previous chapter, arrests increased in 1935, but the number of
political cases declined. The press did not demand a heightened search
for enemies at this point. Instead, the policies of relaxation
continued. Schools and other organizations for children decreased their
emphasis on political education and awareness well into 1936. In short,
Kirov's death made little difference in policy and did not stop the trend
toward moderation.
Thurston, Robert. Life and
Terror in Stalin's Russia, 1934-1941. New Haven: Yale University Press, c1996,
p. 24
Any fear resulting from Kirov's murder was more often of internal enemies than
of the state. People had no more reason to be afraid of the regime after
the killing than they had earlier; as discussed above, it is unlikely that more
than several hundred arrests occurred in the aftermath of the murder, most of
them in Leningrad.
Thurston, Robert. Life and
Terror in Stalin's Russia, 1934-1941. New Haven: Yale University Press, c1996,
p. 143
The treatment of the political prisoners [after Kirov’s murder] underwent
a radical change. Hitherto it had not been different from that accorded
to them in Tsarist days. Political offenders had enjoyed certain
privileges and been allowed to engage in self-education and even in political
propaganda. Oppositional memoranda, pamphlets, and periodicals had
circulated half freely between prisons and had occasionally been smuggled
abroad.
Deutscher, Isaac. Stalin; A
Political Biography. New York: Oxford Univ. Press, 1967, p. 358
After the assassination of Kirov, terrorists had been deprived by decree of the
right of appeal; but, a few days before the opening of the trial of Zinoviev and
Kamenev, the right of appeal was restored,...
Deutscher, Isaac. Stalin; A
Political Biography. New York: Oxford Univ. Press, 1967, p. 375
In December 1934 a secret letter from the Central Committee, entitled
"Lessons of the Events Connected with the Evil Murder of Comrade
Kirov," was sent to all Party Committees. It amounted to a call to
them to hunt down, expel, and arrest all former oppositionists who remained in
the Party organizations and was followed by a storm of indiscriminate denunciations.
At this early phase in the purge, however, some discrimination was still shown
in the action taken on these. Friendship with an exposed
"Trotskyite" usually received a severe reprimand rather than
expulsion:...
Conquest, Robert. The Great Terror.
New York: Oxford University Press, 1990, p. 45
As yet, no NKVD announcement had directly blamed the assassination on anyone
but Nikolayev. The "White Guards" had been vaguely charged with
"terrorism." On December 21, 1934, it was at last officially
stated that Kirov had been murdered by a "Leningrad Center," headed
by Kotolynov, and consisting of him, Nikolayev, and six others--all of them
categorized as former members of the Zinoviev Opposition who had "at
various times been expelled from the Party," though mostly restored to
membership after statements of solidarity with the Party line. Six other
accomplices were also implicated.
On the following day, a list was given for the first time of the arrested
Zinovievite leaders, with a decision on the conduct of their cases.
There were distinguished names among them: Zinoviev and Kamenev, formerly
members of the Politburo; Evdokimov, formerly member of the Secretariat; other
former members and candidate members of the Central Committee--Zalutsky, who
had formed with Molotov and Shliapnikov the first Bolshevik Committee in
Petrograd after the February Revolution; Fedorov; Kuklin; Safarov. For
the moment, a partial accusation went forward. Regarding 7 of those arrested,
including Zinoviev, Kamenev, Zalutsky, and Safarov, it was announced that the
NKVD, "lacking sufficient data for bringing them before a court,"
would take them before a Special Board, with a view to sending them into
administrative exile. With the others, headed by Bakayev, "further
investigation" would take place.
Conquest, Robert. The Great
Terror. New York: Oxford University Press, 1990, p. 47
TRIAL OF LENINGRAD
ZINOVIEVISTS AFTER KIROV KILLING WAS RATHER LIGHT
On January 15 and 16, Zinoviev, Kamenev, Evdokimov, Bakayev, Kuklin, and 14
others were brought to trial in Leningrad as the "Moscow center."
... Zinoviev was reported as saying in court, "The former activity of the
former opposition could not, by the force of objective circumstances, but
stimulate the degeneration of those criminals."
Conquest, Robert. The Great
Terror. New York: Oxford University Press, 1990, p. 48
...The trial of the "Leningrad counterrevolutionary Zinovievist group of
Safarov, Zalutsky, and others" sentenced 77 defendants to camp and exile
terms of four to five years. Altogether in the 2 1/2 months following the
assassination, 843 former Zinovievists were arrested in Leningrad; most of them
were exiled to remote regions and not sentenced to camps.
Getty & Naumov, The Road
to Terror. New Haven, Conn.: Yale Univ. Press, c1999, p. 157
He [Zinoviev] took full responsibility for those he had misled, and summed up
by remarking that, "the task that I see confronting me on this subject is
to repent fully, frankly and sincerely, before the court of the working class,
for what I understand to be a mistake and a crime, and to say it in such a way
that it should all end, once and for all, for this group."
On January 16, 1935, Zinoviev was sentenced to 10 years' imprisonment,
Evdokimov to 8, Bakayev to 8, and Kamenev to 5. The other sentences
ranged from 10 years to five.
There was still one batch of prisoners from the Kirov case left to be dealt
with--the Leningrad NKVD leadership, whose forthcoming trial had been announced
on December 4. On January 23 they finally came before a court under, as
ever, Ulrich. Instead of the nine originally charged, there were now
12--and Zaporozhets was among them. Medved and Zaporozhets were charged
with failure to observe the basic requirements of State security, in that
"having received information about the preparations for the attempt on
Kirov... they failed to take the necessary measures to prevent the
assassination... although they had every possible means of arresting it."
The sentences were extremely light. One official, Baltesevich, got 10
years for--in addition to the main charge--unspecified wrongful acts during the
investigation. Medved got three years, and the others either two or
three....
These sentences struck observant NKVD officers as totally out of proportion to
the charges, especially as those sentenced for mere "negligence" got
two years, and those for "criminal negligence" (apart from
Baltesevich) three years--only one year more! Stalin's natural reaction
to a criminal failure to guard against a genuine assassination attempt--of the
sort which might strike him next--would have been the exemplary execution of
all the NKVD defaulters; in fact, they could scarcely have avoided a charge of
complicity in the actual crime. But the whole thing became even odder and
more sinister when it was discovered that Medved and Zaporozhets were being
treated as though the sentences were little more than a tedious formality.
Conquest, Robert. The Great
Terror. New York: Oxford University Press, 1990, p. 49
As was later said at the 1938 trial, Yagoda displayed "exceptional and
unusual solicitude" towards them. He had "entrusted the care of
the families of Zaporozhets & Medved" to his personal secretary,
Bulanov; he had "sent them for detention to the camp in an unusual
way--not in the car for prisoners, but in a special through car. Before
sending them, he had Zaporozhets & Medved brought to see him."
This is, of course, impossible to conceive as a personal initiative of
Yagoda's. A higher protection was being provided. Moreover, NKVD
officers learned that Pauker and Shanin (Head of the NKVD Transport Department)
were sending records and radio sets to Zaporozhets in exile--contrary to the
strict Stalinist rule of instantly breaking even with one's best friend, once
arrested.
A prisoner from the White Sea Canal camps reports that Medved appeared at the
headquarters of the camp complex, arriving by train in a special compartment
and being put up by the head of the project, Rappaport, in his own house, where
he gave a party for him. Medved was wearing an NKVD uniform without the insignia
of his rank. He then went on, in the same style, to Solvetsk.
When the ice of the Okhotsk Sea made the move possible, Medved, Zaporozhets,
and all the others we can trace were sent to Kolyma, where they were
technically prisoners, but in fact given high posts -- Zaporozhets as head of
the road-building administration in the Kolyma complex.
Conquest, Robert. The Great
Terror. New York: Oxford University Press, 1990, p. 50
At the same time the members of the Leningrad NKVD responsible for the failure
to protect Kirov were charged with criminal negligence leading to his
assassination. All pleaded guilty, but instead of the summary executions
that would normally have followed, all, with one exception, received a mild
sentence of two or three years imprisonment. Only one, who was found
guilty, in addition, of "illegal actions during the
investigation"--possibly the "accident" to Kirov's bodyguard,
Borisov--was given ten years. Contrary to all precedents, they were
treated with "exceptional and unusual solicitude" by Yagoda, the head
of the NKVD, and when they ended up in Kolyma, the most isolated of the islands
of the Gulag, were rapidly given responsible posts, with every privilege, in
the camp administration....
More came to light at the trial of Yagoda himself in March 1938. At the
time of Kirov's murder Yagoda was commissar-general of the NKVD and directly
responsible to Stalin for all the operations of the Security Police. At
this trial Yagoda confessed that he had then ordered the assistant chief of the
Leningrad NKVD, Zaporozhets, "not to place any obstacles in the way of the
terrorist act against Kirov," including the order to release Nikolayev
after he had been arrested with a revolver, cartridges, and a chart of the
route Kirov usually took, two months before the assassination.
Subsequently Yagoda admitted that he had taken care to see that Zaporozhets and
the other NKVD men were well looked after.
Bullock, Alan. Hitler and
Stalin: Parallel Lives. New York: Knopf, 1992, p. 468
Only on 16 January 1935 did Zinoviev, Kamenev and 17 others come to trial for
complicity in the Kirov murder. By this time a large number of lesser fry
who were in the hands of the police appeared to have testified against the main
figures, who were now found guilty of indirect responsibility for the
assassination. But the Court explicitly exonerated them of actually
planning the murder. Supposedly their worst crime was to have known of
the terrorist inclination of some of the oppositional youth groups called 'the
Leningrad Center'. It allegedly operated under the direction of a 'Moscow
Center' of Zinovievites, which did not know about the actual assassination plot
but only of the 'terrorist state of mind' of the youths, which the leaders
'inflamed'. For this Zinoviev was sentenced to 10 years imprisonment,
Kamenev five,...
McNeal, Robert, Stalin: Man
and Ruler. New York: New York University Press, 1988, p. 175
YEZHOV DESCRIBES THE DEGREE OF
SUBVERSIVE PENETRATION OF THE KREMLIN
[The June 6, 1935 speech of Yezhov to the Central Committee plenum]
For the party and country, the murder of Comrade Kirov is the most poignant
political event of the past decade.
...These facts show that during the investigation of the circumstances
surrounding the murder of Comrade Kirov in Leningrad, the role of Zinoviev,
Kamenev, and Trotsky in the preparation of terroristic acts against the leaders
of the party and Soviet state has not yet been fully revealed. The latest
events show that they were not only the instigators but in fact the active
organizers of the murder of Comrade Kirov, as well as of the attempt on the
life of Comrade Stalin that was being prepared within the Kremlin.
Soon after the murder of Comrade Kirov, a new network of Zinovievist-Kamenevist
and Trotskyist-white guard terrorist cells was uncovered.
What makes this so grave is that several of these terrorist groups were
uncovered in the Kremlin itself.
The entire country, all of us, considered the Kremlin to be the most well
defended, the most inaccessible and inviolate territory, where the protection
of our leaders is properly secured. But in fact the very opposite turned
out to be the case. Thanks to the total blunting of political and classic
vigilance of many Communists holding responsible positions in the Central
Executive Committee of the USSR and, first and foremost, Comrade Yenukidze, the
class enemy has succeeded in organizing terrorist cells within immediate range
of the headquarters of our revolution. As you will see from the facts
that shall be presented to you, this blunting of political and class vigilance
nearly cost Comrade Stalin his life and borders on treason against the
interests of party and country.
Getty & Naumov, The Road
to Terror. New Haven, Conn.: Yale Univ. Press, c1999, p. 162
...Comrade Yenukidze was in fact responsible for all order in the Kremlin,
including its security.
The investigation conducted by the NKVD revealed five terroristic groups that
were connected with one another yet acting independently of one another.
Two groups were organized within the Kremlin and three outside the
Kremlin. They all set as their chief task the murder of Comrade Stalin....
Utilizing their time-tested tactics of double dealing, Zinoviev and Kamenev
took all measures to evade responsibility for the murder of Comrade Kirov and
for preparations of an attempt on the life of Comrade Stalin.
Only under the pressure of absolutely indisputable facts, as expressed in the
depositions of dozens of their closest supporters, were they forced to
acknowledge their "political and moral" responsibility for this whole
affair. Nevertheless, they continue obstinately to deny their direct
participation in organizing these terroristic groups....
In his deposition, Kamenev says the following:
"My counter-revolutionary conversations with Zinoviev promoted the
creation of an atmosphere of embitterment against Stalin. Consequently,
this might have created a situation justifying terror as regards Stalin much as
Kerensky created a situation for carrying out violence against Lenin. I
confess that I have committed a grave crime against the party and against the
Soviet state. My counterrevolutionary actions and those of Zinoviev not
only created an atmosphere of malice and hatred toward Stalin. They also
served to incite the counter-revolutionaries to acts of terrorism. There
is no doubt now in my mind that Rosenfeld perceived our attacks and slander on
Stalin as a program of terror. I take responsibility for the fact that,
as a result of the situation created by Zinoviev and me and as a result of our
counter-revolutionary actions, a counter-revolutionary organization has arisen
whose participants were intent on perpetrating the vilest crime of all: the
murder of Stalin."
I believe that it is difficult to expect Kamenev, in his position, to confess
to any more than that. But there is no need for any more confessions on
his part. The investigators have at their disposal an absolutely
sufficient quality of facts that prove direct participation by Kamenev and
Zinoviev in the organizing of terroristic groups, facts that follow fully from
the policies of their own programs, which they issued to their supporters in
their struggle against the party and government.
Getty & Naumov, The Road
to Terror. New Haven, Conn.: Yale Univ. Press, c1999, p. 163
[Yezhov continues], These facts and ideological positions show that Zinoviev,
Kamenev, and Trotsky, embittered by the successes of the Revolution, have, in
their hopeless attempt to make their way into the leadership of the party and
country, slid down definitively into the mire of the White emigre world and
have advanced to the most extreme forms of struggle--namely, terror.
These facts now show that the murder of Comrade Kirov was organized by Zinoviev
and Kamenev and that it constitutes only one link in a chain of terroristic
plans of the Zinovievist-Kamenevist and Trotskyist groups.
Getty & Naumov, The Road
to Terror. New Haven, Conn.: Yale Univ. Press, c1999, p. 165
Making reference to a personal assignment from Stalin, Yezhov announced that he
would "get rid of all of that scum which the revolution and the Civil War
had sent sloshing into the organs of state security. People who have come
from the Central Committee Orgburo will sweep out all that grime with an iron
broom."
Getty and Manning. Stalinist
Terror. Cambridge, NY: Cambridge University Press, 1993, p. 30
Yezhov received me very courteously in his office. It was adorned with a
large Kherossan carpet... stained in places. Yezhov is said to have shot
several people in his office.... He shook my hand. He said Stalin
had confidence in me... then he added that there were "enemies of the
people" in the Narkomindel as well as in other Commissariats.... I tried
to find out who were these "enemies of the people".... He
smiled enigmatically and then said, "You know, even Stalin does not expect
to be notified of the names of persons to be arrested.... The technique
of our work does not permit this.... Complete and unconditional secrecy is
essential....
Litvinov, Maksim Maksimovich.
Notes for a Journal. New York: Morrow, 1955, p. 256
YENUKIDZE TRIES TO ACT
INNOCENT OF INTENTIONAL CRIMES
[June 6, 1935 speech of Yenukidze to the Central Committee plenum]
...In my attitude to the apparat and in my trust in it, I failed to guarantee
the security of the Kremlin and therefore it was necessary to remove me....
What was the most criminal thing I did? Confident of the reliability of
the apparat, I did not, for instance, immediately draw the appropriate
conclusion from the report given to me by the commandant of the Kremlin to the
effect that a certain cleaning woman was engaged in counter-revolutionary
conversations and, in particular, conversations directed against Comrade
Stalin. Instead of immediately arresting the cleaning woman and handing
her over to the NKVD, I said to Peterson [the commandant]: "Look into it
once again."
Of course, such a situation ought not to have been tolerated. Surely,
immediate action ought to have been taken. These instructions of mind to
the commandant of the Kremlin fell into the hands of the NKVD and then into the
hands of Comrade Stalin. Comrade Stalin was the first to call attention
to this, saying that this was no mere idle chatter, that it concealed very
grave counter-revolutionary activity. And in fact, that is the way it
turned out....
Getty & Naumov, The Road
to Terror. New Haven, Conn.: Yale Univ. Press, c1999, p. 169
Yenukidze: It's all true. Now I am even more indignant about it than
you. It's all true, comrades. I handed out a lot of money.
Perhaps there were swindlers, cheats among them.
...Measures ought to be taken in my case that will serve as a lesson in the
future for every Communist occupying this or that post in order to really
strengthen our vigilance....
Getty & Naumov, The Road
to Terror. New Haven, Conn.: Yale Univ. Press, c1999, p. 171
In 1937, together with Colonel General Gay, Yenukidze fled from Moscow to
Transcaucasia, where he proposed to establish an independent Soviet
Republic. However, he was captured near Baku by security officers and
shot.
Tokaev, Grigori. Betrayal of
an Ideal. Bloomington, Ind.: Indiana University Press, 1955, p. 248
SPEAKER AFTER SPEAKER
DENOUNCED YENUKIDZE
Speaker after speaker denounced Yenukidze's sins in a ritual display of
nomenklatura unity and anger.
Getty & Naumov, The Road
to Terror. New Haven, Conn.: Yale Univ. Press, c1999, p. 176
[In a letter to Kaganovich on 8 September 1935 Stalin stated] I am sending you
Agranov’s memorandum on Yenukidze’s group of "old
Bolsheviks" ("old farts" in Lenin's phrase). Yenukidze is
a person who is alien to us.
Shabad, Steven, trans. The
Stalin-Kaganovich Correspondence, 1931-1936. New Haven: Yale University Press,
c2003, p. 307
STALIN ADVOCATES GOING EASY ON
YENUKIDZE
There is some reason to suspect that in the end Yenukidze was punished rather
more harshly than Stalin had originally intended. At the first plausible
opportunity, two plenums later in June 1936, Stalin personally proposed that
Yenukidze be permitted to rejoin the party. At that time, Stalin
explained that this was the earliest moment Yenukidze's readmission could take
place: "It would have turned out then that he had been expelled at one
plenum and reinstated at the next."
Getty & Naumov, The Road
to Terror. New Haven, Conn.: Yale Univ. Press, c1999, p. 178
...Yenukidze's rehabilitation by Stalin in June 1936.
Getty & Naumov, The Road
to Terror. New Haven, Conn.: Yale Univ. Press, c1999, p. 179
...Stalin and his team seem rather to have been unprepared for this escalation
of the attack on Yenukidze. For his part, Stalin's comments on the
speeches were limited to criticizing Yenukidze's use of state funds to aid
exiles, noting that Yenukidze could have innocently used his own money for this
without censure. His interjections never touched on the political side of
the accusations, never supported Yezhov's terrorist characterization (or
Yagoda's strong remedies), and were, in general, not particularly
hostile. Kaganovich then recounted to the plenum the Politburo's
deliberations on proper punishment for Yenukidze. He noted that at first
Stalin had suggested only removing him from the national Central Executive
Committee and sending him to run the Central Executive Committee of the
Transcaucasus. Then, when the matter seemed more serious (possibly after
another Yezhov report to the Politburo), Stalin had agreed to remove Yenukidze
from the Central Executive Committee system altogether and to send him to run a
resort in Kislovodsk, concluding that expulsion from the Central Committee was
in fact warranted "to make an example."
Getty and Manning. Stalinist
Terror. Cambridge, NY: Cambridge University Press, 1993, p. 52
But, oddly enough, Yenukidze's surprise expulsion from the party was not the
end of the story. Exactly one year later, at the June 1936 Plenum of the
Central Committee, the Yenukidze affair resurfaced. Molotov, who was
chairing the meeting, said that at the beginning of 1936, Yenukidze had applied
for readmission to the party. That had been too soon for consideration (Stalin
interjected: "That would have been to expel him at one plenum and except
him at the next."). After Molotov observed that readmitting him
would make Yenukidze very happy, and after Stalin spoke in favor, the plenum
voted to approve his readmission.
Getty and Manning. Stalinist
Terror. Cambridge, NY: Cambridge University Press, 1993, p. 53
But there was no campaign by Stalin against Enukidze before his troubles began,
and he was at liberty long after his expulsion. Enukidze's story is too
full of twists, turns, and contradictions to suggest a plan to destroy him.
Thurston, Robert. Life and
Terror in Stalin's Russia, 1934-1941. New Haven: Yale University Press, c1996,
p. 43
THE LESSER PUNISHMENT FOR THE
FAMILIES OF KULAK SUBVERSIVES
[June 2nd, 1935 extract from Protocol No. 46 of the buro session of the
Azov-Black Sea Territorial Committee of the Communist Party]
2) Deporting from our territory 1500 kulaks, counter-revolutionaries who
continue to carry on their anti-Soviet, anti-kolkhoz activities and
sabotage. The members of their families, on the other hand, may, if they
so desire, remain in place.
Getty & Naumov, The Road
to Terror. New Haven, Conn.: Yale Univ. Press, c1999, p. 180
In many cases the kulak alone was arrested and sent to a labor camp or jailed
or shot, while his family was not touched at first. Agents only made an
inventory of the property, leaving it in the family care, as it were....
Medvedev, Roy. Let History Judge.
New York: Columbia University Press, 1989, p. 237
EXILES COULD WORK IN THEIR
TRADE IN EXILE AREAS
[December 23rd 1935 NKVD/Procuracy circular on employment of exiles]
1. Persons exiled or deported administratively on the basis of a decision
by the Special Board of the NKVD of the USSR as, for instance, engineers,
technicians, physicians, agronomists, bookkeepers, and skilled laborers, may be
employed in their specialties in institutions and enterprises in those localities
where they have been permitted to reside, with the exception of those persons
who have been deprived, by the decision of the special board, of the right to
engage in their occupation in their places of exile or deportation.
NOTE: Persons mentioned in the Item #1 above may not be employed in work of a
secret character or in institutions and enterprises pertaining to
defense. Exceptions to this rule may be made in individual cases with the
permission of the NKVD of the USSR.
Getty & Naumov, The Road
to Terror. New Haven, Conn.: Yale Univ. Press, c1999, p. 185
4. The children of persons mentioned in item #1 above, deported or exiled
as dependents of their parents, are permitted to transfer to educational
institutions in their places of exile or deportation.
5. In delivering the NKVD special board's decision to exiles or
deportees, the organs of the NKVD are obligated to explain to them their right
to work in their professional specialty in places of exile or deportation and
to issue them the appropriate certificates.
Signed: NKVD Commissar, Yagoda and Procurator of the USSR, Vyshinsky
Getty & Naumov, The Road
to Terror. New Haven, Conn.: Yale Univ. Press, c1999, p. 186
[Supplement to protocol #36]
1. Restrictions based on the social origin of the applicant or on the
disfranchisement of the applicant's parents as they pertain to admission to
institutions of higher education and technical colleges are to be abolished....
Getty & Naumov, The Road
to Terror. New Haven, Conn.: Yale Univ. Press, c1999, p. 186
YEZHOV ADVOCATES GETTING TOUGH
AND EVADING THE LAWS
On the other hand, a political hardening and a kind of legal nihilism in the
fall of 1935 contradicted many of 1934's initiatives that had seemed to augur
an era of legality and rule of law. In September 1935, Yezhov gave a
secret speech to a closed meeting of party personnel officials from the
regions. His remarks advised party officials sharply to restrict the
rights of expelled members to appeal, and not to be restrained by procurators'
insistence on procedural legality (both a which contradicted written party and
state texts). He also encouraged his audience to make use of extralegal
bodies to convict "dangerous elements" not guilty of specific
chargeable offenses.
Getty & Naumov, The Road
to Terror. New Haven, Conn.: Yale Univ. Press, c1999, p. 189
Yezhov's machine of terror interpreted Stalin's call of vigilance thus:
"Accuse one another, denounce one another, if you wish to remain among the
living."
Krivitsky, Walter G. I was
Stalin's Agent, London: H. Hamilton, 1939, p. 257
Russia has produced a number of monsters. The most primitive of them was
Yezhov;...
Tokaev, Grigori. Comrade X.
London: Harvill Press,1956, p. 158
Yezhov, for example, in a speech to NKVD executives, declared that the Soviet
Union was going through a dangerous period, that a war with fascism was imminent,
and that therefore the NKVD had to destroy all the nests of fascists in the
country. "Of course," Yezhov said,
"there will be some innocent victims in this fight against fascist
agents. We are launching a major attack on the enemy; let there be no
resentment if we bump someone with an elbow. Better that 10 innocent
people should suffer than one spy get away. When you cut down the forest,
wood chips fly."
Medvedev, Roy. Let History
Judge. New York: Columbia University Press, 1989, p. 603
(Boris Starkov)
Yezhov bears great personal responsibility for the destruction of legality, for
the falsification of investigative cases.
Getty and Manning. Stalinist
Terror. Cambridge, NY: Cambridge University Press, 1993, p. 29
While he was in the process of carrying out the purge, Yezhov was
simultaneously reorganizing the organs of the NKVD. Personnel increased
by almost four times. Between October 1936 and October 1937, the central
offices of the local organs of the NKVD were continuously restaffed with
Communists and Komsomol members who had to be "turned into model chekists
in the space to three to four months." These cadres frequently did
not have the slightest idea of the character and methods of the work they would
engage in. Frequently, far from the best representatives of the cadres of
chekists served as their instructors, which could not help but have an effect
on the quality of the new reinforcements. This took a particularly heavy
toll on the effectiveness of the investigative apparatus. In 1937 and
1938, almost the entire staff of the NKVD was engaged in investigative work,
including operational and office workers.
Frinovsky, who later landed in the dock himself, gave the following testimony:
"Yezhov demanded that I select investigators who would be completely bound
to him, who had some kind of sins in their past, and who would know that they
had these sins in their past, and then that I, on the basis of these sins, kept
them completely in line. In my opinion, I would be telling the truth, if,
generalizing, I said that often the investigators themselves gave the testimony
and not those under investigation. Did the leadership of the People's
Commissariat, that is, Yezhov and I, know about this? They knew and they
encouraged it. How did we react to it? I, honestly, didn't react
all, and Yezhov even encouraged it."
Schneidman, a former investigator in the central offices of the NKVD who was
called to account in the 1950s, gave the same kind of testimony:
"Yezhov's authority in the organs of the NKVD was so high that I, like the
other employees, did not doubt the guilt of individuals who were arrested on
his direct orders even when the investigator did not have any materials which
compromised the given individual. I was convinced of the guilt of such an
individual even before the interrogation and then, during the interrogation,
tried to obtain a confession from that individual using all possible means."
During Yezhov tenure, the use of convictions by list came into practice.
Getty and Manning. Stalinist
Terror. Cambridge, NY: Cambridge University Press, 1993, p. 32
Berman, the People's Commissar of Internal Affairs of Byelorussia, created a
terrifying reputation for himself. Every week, on Saturday, he organized
a review of the work that had been carried out. At these times, the
investigators who have brought in the largest number of death verdicts could
expect encouragement, whereas those who had completed fewer investigative cases
could expect disciplinary penalties and, not infrequently, arrest and
repression. Yezhov encouraged all of this.
Getty and Manning. Stalinist
Terror. Cambridge, NY: Cambridge University Press, 1993, p. 34
The political discrediting and then conviction of Bukharin and Rykov, prominent
figures in the Communist Party and the Soviet government, was something of a
high point of "the great terror, that Yezhov had organized. Bubnov,
Rudzutak, and Kossior were compromised and then repressed on the basis of
Yezhov's personal orders.
Getty and Manning. Stalinist
Terror. Cambridge, NY: Cambridge University Press, 1993, p. 35
Other opposition to Yezhov manifested itself at the beginning of 1938. At
that time, a large group of NKVD employees complained to the Central Committee
about Yezhov. They accused him of illegal use of government funds and
also of the secret execution of a number of prominent party members without
investigation or a court examination. In January 1938, the Central
Committee Plenum produced a resolution criticizing excessive vigilance.
Prominent in the movement to criticize Yezhov actions was Zhdanov, who played
an important role in drafting the January 1938 resolution.
Getty and Manning. Stalinist
Terror. Cambridge, NY: Cambridge University Press, 1993, p. 36
VYSHINSKY OBJECTS TO REDUCING
A DEATH SENTENCE TO 10 YEARS
[November 27th, 1935 Memorandum from Shkiriatov to Stalin on "crude
political errors" in the Gagarina case]
Concerning the crude political errors committed by the RSFSR Supreme Court
during its review of the case against former princess Gagarina, a
counter-revolutionary and terrorist, and her accomplices.
The procurator of the Soviet Union, Comrade Vyshinsky, has notified the
Commission of Party Control of the crude political error committed by the
Supreme Court of the RSFSR in wrongly commuting the sentence of death by
shooting meted out to Gagarina, a flagrant counter-revolutionary and terrorist,
to 10 years of imprisonment....
Getty & Naumov, The Road
to Terror. New Haven, Conn.: Yale Univ. Press, c1999, p. 193
Gagarina herself confessed to everything at the preliminary as well as at the
court investigations. Cynically and flagrantly, she told of her
counter-revolutionary activities and terroristic propaganda, declaring that,
should an opportunity ever present itself, she would commit any terroristic act
whatsoever.
In her last statement, she declared that "she did not intend to justify
her actions in any way," and after sentence was passed, she did not submit
an appeal to the Supreme Court.
All this attests to the fact that Gagarina is a sworn, irreconcilable enemy of
Soviet power, capable of committing any crime whatsoever.
Nevertheless, the Special Collegium of the RSFSR Supreme Court...did commute
Gagarina's sentence of death by shooting to 10 years of imprisonment. It
is obvious to everyone that the... comrades have committed a crude political
error.
Getty & Naumov, The Road
to Terror. New Haven, Conn.: Yale Univ. Press, c1999, p. 194
Those responsible for this decision have perverted the substance of the matter
with their formal and bureaucratic arguments. Was it not obvious to them
that they were dealing here with a sworn enemy, to whom no mercy should be
shown?
Getty & Naumov, The Road
to Terror. New Haven, Conn.: Yale Univ. Press, c1999, p. 195
YEZHOV DENOUNCES TROTSKYISTS
INTERNAL ORGANIZATION AND TACTICS
[From Yezhov's September 25th, 1935 report to a conference of regional party
secretaries]
Please permit me, comrades, at this time, to briefly dwell on certain matters
which have become very important today. The first matter concerns the
expulsion of Trotskyists.
One thing is clear beyond dispute: it seems to me that Trotskyists undoubtedly
have a center somewhere in the USSR. It is impossible for a Trotskyist
center from abroad, located relatively far from the USSR and poorly informed
about our conditions--it is impossible, I say, for it to direct with such
detail those Trotskyist organizations which have unfortunately held out in our
country and which, we believed, had been crushed.
Getty & Naumov, The Road
to Terror. New Haven, Conn.: Yale Univ. Press, c1999, p. 200
[Yezhov continues] Everywhere the same methods are practiced by Trotskyists who
have held out in our party. Trotskyists try at all costs to remain in the
party. They strive by every device to infiltrate the party. Their
first device is to remain at all costs in the party, to give voice everywhere
to the general line, to speak out everywhere in its favor while in fact
carrying on their subversive work. But nevertheless, it sometimes happens
that a Trotskyist slips up and is caught, is expelled from the party, in which
case he takes all measures to run off with his party card. He always has in
reserve a registration card, approaches another organization and is
registered. Such people are expelled three or four or even five times
each. They move from one organization to another--we have quite a few
people like that. Trotskyists try at all costs to keep their party
card....
Their second device is not to carry out their work in the party. They do
not, as a rule, carry on party work at all. They focus their attention on
working among nonparty people....
Above all, Trotskyists strive to infuse the nonparty people with the spirit of
Trotskyism....
Foreign intelligence officers, saboteurs, knew that there is no better cover
for their espionage and subversive operations than a party card, and they
relied on that fact. For this reason, it is necessary to hide behind a
party card at whatever cost. And they utilized every means of deception
in order to obtain a party card for a spy or for a saboteur. We can
assert firmly that Poles, Finns, Czechs, and Germans have been openly gambling
on this....
Getty & Naumov, The Road
to Terror. New Haven, Conn.: Yale Univ. Press, c1999, p. 201
PEOPLE ENGAGED IN SPYING AND
ESPIONAGE AGAINST THE SU
[Dec. 29, 1935 NKVD report on Trotskyists]
...Adhering to his Trotskyist convictions, Pukat attempted to leave the Soviet
Union with the assistance of the Latvian Embassy in Moscow in order to continue
his struggle against the party under the direct leadership of Trotsky.
According to his own testimony, Pukat was recruited in 1930 by the secretary of
the Latvian Embassy, who entrusted him on one of his visits to the embassy with
gathering material of an espionage character concerning enterprises in the city
of Kostroma....
"...I discussed my departure for Latvia with the secretary of the Latvian
mission, who, in the course of my conversation, inquired what kind of industry
was to be found in Kostroma. After my explanation, he proposed that I
prove my devotion to Latvia and earn my entry permit by gathering material of
an espionage character. I agreed to this and, upon returning to Kostroma,
I recruited my sister Anna Pukat, who joined me in my espionage activities at
the Banner of Labor factory, where she was working. I also recruited Emma
Mashen, who was working at the Lenta [machine-gun ribbon] factory as an
industrial quality inspector, as well as Marov, a metal worker at the Rabochy
metallist factory. I gave information to the Latvian mission concerning:
the quality of machine gun ribbons produced by the Lenta factory, concerning
the [energy] capacity of the boilers at the Znamia Truda factory, and the
blueprint of the Rabochy metallist factory, which I stole from Dadze, the head
of construction.
The information which I obtained was carried by my mother Anna Yanovna Pukat to
the Latvian mission. On the other hand, I myself carried the blueprint of
the Rabochy metallist factory [to the Latvian mission] in May of 1935."
Getty & Naumov, The Road
to Terror. New Haven, Conn.: Yale Univ. Press, c1999, p. 202
AS SU GETS STRONGER OPPOSITION
BECOME GREATER NOT SMALLER
[Plenum of the Azov-Black Sea Territorial Party Committee, "On the
verification of party documents"]
The Central Committee letter concerning the murder of Comrade Kirov was a most
important Party document in mobilizing Bolshevik vigilance:
"We must put an end to the opportunistic complacency that issues from a
mistaken assumption that, as our strength increases, the enemy grows more tame
and harmless.
"Such an assumption is fundamentally wrong. It is a throwback to the
rightist deviation, which had tried to assure one and all that our enemies will
crawl quietly into socialism, that in the end they will become true
socialists....
Getty & Naumov, The Road
to Terror. New Haven, Conn.: Yale Univ. Press, c1999, p. 208
Bukharin wanted us to act with greater determination. We were to snatch
the initiative from the hands of the Stalin-Molotov-Kirov triumvirate. We
should stimulate the younger generation of workers and peasants into a movement
of opposition.
Tokaev, Grigori. Betrayal of
an Ideal. Bloomington, Ind.: Indiana University Press, 1955, p. 2
In a word, things were going fine. The Soviet Union was building a new
life on its own surrounded by hostile capitalist states whose intelligence
services spared no means or effort to interfere with the Soviet people's
work. Our state and army were gathering strength from year to year; the
ways of economic and political progress were clearly defined,...
Zhukov, Georgii. Memoirs of
Marshal Zhukov. London: Cape, 1971, p. 142
SECRET POLICE SURVEILLANCE
COULD NOT BE AS GREAT AS ALLEGED
[Footnote: Khlevniuk has written (1937: Stalin, NKVD, Moscow, 1992) that
eventually more than 200,000 expelled party members were placed under NKVD
surveillance.... It is difficult to imagine how this was possible.]
Getty & Naumov, The Road
to Terror. New Haven, Conn.: Yale Univ. Press, c1999, p. 209
Evidence on police monitoring of the population as a whole suggests that it was
not nearly so extensive as many Western accounts have argued.
Thurston, Robert. Life and
Terror in Stalin's Russia, 1934-1941. New Haven: Yale University Press, c1996,
p. 71
PARTY LEADERS ADMIRED BY THE
MASSES
[Nov. 29, 1935 NKVD report on an anti-Stakhanovist leaflet--Part of the leaflet
said "Fight for a raise in your stipend!"]
We receive a stipend of 93 rubles [each]. If you wonder whether it is
possible to live on that, the answer is "NO. Our board alone costs
significantly more than that. First course--25 kopeks; second course--95
kopeks; bread--30 kopeks; for a total of one ruble, 50 kopeks; the total per
month equals 4.50 x 30 equals 135 rubles. You can't survive on
that. When, oh when, will our "wisest," "most
brilliant," "cherished" leaders understand this truism?!
Getty & Naumov, The Road
to Terror. New Haven, Conn.: Yale Univ. Press, c1999, p. 214
VYSHINSKY ARGUES FOR JUST
TREATMENT OF PRISONERS
In February 1936 USSR Procurator Vyshinsky had complained to Stalin that NKVD
officials were refusing to release prisoners whom procurators had ordered freed
for lack of evidence. NKVD chief Yagoda had replied that procurators and
courts were incompetent; procurators could "suggest" release of
prisoners, but the decision should remain in the hands of the NKVD. On
February 16th, Stalin wrote to Molotov, "Comrade Molotov: it seems to me
that Vyshinsky is right."
Getty & Naumov, The Road
to Terror. New Haven, Conn.: Yale Univ. Press, c1999, p. 219
Between 1932 in 1936, Vyshinsky stood for the opposite on each of these points,
advocating instead due process, careful judgments on the basis of evidence, a
strong role for defense lawyers in all cases, firm legal codes that applied
equally to the entire population, and a strengthening of law.
Thurston, Robert. Life and
Terror in Stalin's Russia, 1934-1941. New Haven: Yale University Press, c1996,
p. 6
In February 1936 Vyshinsky wrote to Molotov, Stalin's right-hand man in the
Politburo and chairman of the Sovnarkom (Council of Ministers), to call for a
reduction of the NKVD's administrative powers. The commissariat's Special
Session, its internal tribunal, deliberated without calling witnesses or the
accused, especially in cases of counter-revolutionary agitation and
"expression of terrorist intentions." In the process, serious mistakes
could occur. Vyshinsky wanted the "maximum limitation" placed
on the Special Session's right to hear cases; he believed they should go
instead through the regular courts, following normal judicial procedure.
For cases that continued in the Special Session, the Procuracy should be
allowed to make a "most careful check of investigative materials" and
to obtain the release of prisoners if it found no basis for further action.
... Instead he believed that attention should be paid to objective
evidence. He publicly attacked the NKVD's secret procedures, because,
unlike open show trials, they "served no educative or legitimating
functions." In an article published shortly thereafter, one of many
similar pieces, he warned against violations of law and poor investigative
procedures. He gave several examples of how not to operate,...
Thurston, Robert. Life and
Terror in Stalin's Russia, 1934-1941. New Haven: Yale University Press, c1996,
p. 7
In discussing Yezhov's report, only two contributions struck a highly
discordant note. One of them, no matter how strange this might seem at
first glance, belonged to Vyshinsky, who spoke about actual shortcomings in the
activity of the NKVD. First of all, he read several transcripts of
interrogations which were filled with vulgar abuse from the investigators and
which testified to their unconcealed application of pressure on the people
under arrest. After citing the words of one peripheral investigator which
were directed at a person under arrest: "Do not remain silent and do not
play games.... Prove that this is not so," Vyshinsky explained to
the plenum's participants that the accused should not have to prove his
innocence, but, on the contrary, the investigator has to prove the guilt of the
accused.
Rogovin, Vadim. 1937: Year of
Terror. Oak Park, Michigan: Labor Publications, 1998, p. 278
In July 1934, Vyshinsky, as Deputy State Prosecutor, even issued an order to
local prosecutors to cease making engineers and directors scapegoats for
administrative failures. He strongly deprecated indiscriminate
prosecutions. He stated that he had lately had to quash a large
number of sentences wrongly pronounced by Siberian courts. He
definitely forbade any further arrests of this kind.
Webb, S. Soviet Communism: A
New Civilisation. London, NY: Longmans, Green, 1947, p. 363
POLITBURO ORDERS THAT JUSTICE
BE DONE TO KOLKHOZ MEMBERS
[Protocol #39 of the Politburo on May 20th 1936]
The Procuracy and the Supreme Court of the USSR are instructed to verify the
correctness of rejections of requests to dismiss criminal cases against kolkhoz
members in the Ivanovo and Leningrad regions and in the Northern Caucasus
Region and to take all necessary measures to rectify any improper decisions
made locally....
Getty & Naumov, The Road
to Terror. New Haven, Conn.: Yale Univ. Press, c1999, p. 220
STALIN PROPOSES A JUST METHOD
TO REINSTATE EXPELLED PARTY MEMBERS
[From Stalin's comments on Yezhov's report at the Plenum of the Central
Committee on June 3rd, 1936....]
"I would like to say a few things concerning certain points which in my
opinion are especially important if we are to put the affairs of the party in
good order and direct the regulating of party membership properly.
First of all, let me say something concerning the matter of appeals.
Naturally, appeals must be handled in timely fashion, without dragging them
out. They must not be put on the shelf. This goes about
saying. But let me raise a question: Is it not possible for us to
reinstate some or many of the appellants as candidate members? We do not
allow, as you know, for a transitional category. Either you are a member
of the Party are you are not. Either you are nothing in the eyes of the
party are you are a party member with full rights. But there is a middle
ground.
Party rules do not provide direct instructions as to whether a party member who
has been expelled may be brought back into the party at least as a candidate
member. Such instructions are not mentioned in the party rules, but there
are no prohibitions against it, either. Insofar as these party expellees
cannot, as things stand, be reinstated as full members, why couldn't we
reinstate some of the appellants into the party as candidate members? Why
can't we do it?!
Voices: We can! We can!
Stalin: There are no
prohibitions in the party rules on this account, though there are no direct
instructions concerning this, either.
Voices: It is now being done.
Stalin: No, I don't think that
it is being done. To this day, a certain, if I may say so, wholesale
attitude toward party members has held sway among party leaders. They
expel you. You appeal. If they can reinstate you as a full member
of the party, fine. If they can't, then you remain outside the
party. All ties with the Party are severed. We have party
sympathizers, party candidate members, and party members, and they are
connected with each other. If party members are expelled and cannot be
reinstated as full party members, then they are not reinstated as sympathizers
or candidate party members. Is this practice right? In my opinion,
such a practice is not right.
For this reason, it would be a good idea if the Orgburo of the Central
Committee clarified this as soon as possible, if it explained that it doesn't
follow from the party rules, from the traditions of the Bolshevik party, that a
party member who has been expelled could not be reinstated as a candidate
member or a sympathizer. This, after all, will allow a man to retain
certain spiritual and organizational ties with the party. This opens up
real prospects for him.
Party organizations must learn well the following principle: they must
establish a gradation, whereby they can determine whom to reinstate as party
members--if the facts and materials available justify it--whom to reinstate as
candidate members, and whom perhaps to reinstate as sympathizers, so as to give
such comrades a real prospect, so as to help them rise and later become full
party members.
Getty & Naumov, The Road
to Terror. New Haven, Conn.: Yale Univ. Press, c1999, p. 233-234
...Stalin had personally intervened (textually, if not orally) and had
criticized the party secretaries and, implicitly, Yezhov. To those in the
senior nomenklatura and the Central Committee, Stalin had been sharply critical
of the entire screening process, suggesting it had targeted the wrong people.
Getty & Naumov, The Road
to Terror. New Haven, Conn.: Yale Univ. Press, c1999, p. 243
In several places, Andreev told Stalin that the former local party leadership,
through its control of the local NKVD, had arrested large numbers of innocent
people. In Saratov, Andreev reported that the former ruling group had
dictated false testimony for the signatures of those arrested, and he blamed it
on the "Agranov gang" within the NKVD. In Voronezh, Andreev
complained that "masses" of innocent people had been expelled and
arrested. With Stalin's approval, Andreev organized special troikas to
review these cases--600 in Voronezh alone--and release those arrested by the
now condemned former leadership.
Getty & Naumov, The Road
to Terror. New Haven, Conn.: Yale Univ. Press, c1999, p. 455
EARLY ON YAGODA TRIES TO
EXONERATE TROTSKY FROM ANY GUILT
...At one point, Yagoda had called the evidence that Trotsky was ordering
terrorism in the USSR "trifles" and "nonsense".
Getty & Naumov, The Road
to Terror. New Haven, Conn.: Yale Univ. Press, c1999, p. 248
After all, the NKVD was responsible for finding enemies, but in fact Yezhov did
more to undercover them in his capacity as director of the party purges.
Yagoda was also reportedly sympathetic to former oppositionists, something
Molotov believed into the 1980s. Although Yagoda participated in
preparing political trials through August 1936, he may also have tried to limit
the damage among the former party critics. On the investigation records
of some prisoners, he wrote comments like "nonsense" or
"impossible" next to several of the more lurid assertions. Such
remarks may well have made Stalin suspicious of him.
Thurston, Robert. Life and
Terror in Stalin's Russia, 1934-1941. New Haven: Yale University Press, c1996,
p. 34
Nevertheless, it does seem that Yagoda may have made some attempt to temper the
wind to the oppositionists. He was to be similarly accused of ordering
that Uglanov's testimony be kept "within certain limits." And
there are other reports of underground obstruction within the NKVD which took
the form of framing questions in such a way as to protect those interrogated....
For the moment, Bukharin and Rykov were safe. The former continued to hold
his position as editor of Izvestia, and both remained candidate members of the
Central Committee.
Conquest, Robert. The Great
Terror. New York: Oxford University Press, 1990, p. 138
Yagoda, however, felt that their testimony was a complete fabrication. On
the record of Dreitzer's interrogations, which contained passages speaking of
receiving terrorist directives from Trotsky, Yagoda wrote: "untrue,"
"nonsense," "rubbish," and "this cannot be."
Rogovin, Vadim. 1937: Year of
Terror. Oak Park, Michigan: Labor Publications, 1998, p. 5
NO PROOF EXISTS TO PROVE
ZINOVIEV AND KAMENEV CONFESSED TO AVOID EXECUTION
...There are persistent rumors that Zinoviev and Kamenev agreed to confess to
the scenario in return for promises that their lives would be spared, but no
documentary evidence or firsthand testimony has been found to support this.
Getty & Naumov, The Road
to Terror. New Haven, Conn.: Yale Univ. Press, c1999, p. 249
MRACHKOVSKY SAYS TROTSKY
AGREED TO UNITY IF KILLING STALIN WAS THE GOAL
Regarding Trotsky's attitude to the creation of a united Trotskyist-Zinovievist
bloc and regarding the conditions of unification, the notorious Trotskyist,
Mrachkovsky, one of Trotsky's closest comrades-in-arms, testified at the
investigation as follows:
"In the middle of 1932, Smirnov placed on the agenda of our ruling troika
the necessity of unifying our organization with the Zinoviev-Kamenev and
Shatskin-Lominadze groups. It was then that it was decided to inquire of
Trotsky concerning this matter and to receive new instructions from him.
Trotsky agreed to the creation of a bloc, on the condition that the united bloc
consider the necessity of a violent removal [from power] of the leaders of the
All-Union Communist Party and, first and foremost, of Stalin."
[Mrachkovsky. Minutes to the interrogation of July 19-20, 1936)
Getty & Naumov, The Road
to Terror. New Haven, Conn.: Yale Univ. Press, c1999, p. 252
Thus Zinoviev and Kamenev United with Trotsky, considered that the essential
element was unanimous recognition of the new factor, which distinguished their
newly created bloc from the preceding one. This new factor, from the
testimony of the Zinovievites--Kamenev, Reingold, Pikel, Bakayev--and
Trotskyites-- Mrachkovsky, Dreitzer and others--was recognition of the
advisability of the active use of terror against the party and governmental
leadership.
Trotsky not only agreed with this attitude of Zinoviev and Kamenev, but he in
turn considered the basic condition for unifying the Trotskyites and the
Zinovievites to be recognition by both groupings of the advisability of using
terror against the leaders of our party and government.
On Trotsky's attitude toward creating a unified Trotskyite-Zinovievite bloc and
the conditions of unification, Mrachkovsky--a well-known Trotskyite and one of
Trotsky's closest comrades-in-arms--testified as follows at the investigation:
"In the middle of 1932 Smirnov raised in our guiding triumvirate the
question of the necessity of unifying our organization and the Zinoviev-Kamenev
and the Shatskin-Lominadze groups. At that time it was decided to make
inquiries of Trotsky and obtain new instructions from him. Trotsky
answered by agreeing to the bloc, on the condition that the groups entering
into the bloc accept the necessity of the forcible elimination of the Communist
party leaders, and in the first place, Stalin."
[Mrachkovsky, Record of Interrogation, July 19-20, 1936)
McNeal, Robert. Resolutions
and Decisions of the CPSU--The Stalin Years: 1929-1953. Vol. 3. Toronto,
Buffalo: University of Toronto Press, 1974, p. 171
All of the other prominent Trotskyites and Zinovievites arrested, such as
Bakayev, Reingold, Safronov, Pikel, Dreitzer, and others also testified that
the principal task of the Trotskyites and Zinovievites was to conduct a
terrorist struggle against the leaders of the Communist Party and the
government.
McNeal, Robert. Resolutions
and Decisions of the CPSU--The Stalin Years: 1929-1953. Vol. 3. Toronto,
Buffalo: University of Toronto Press, 1974, p. 171
DREITZER SAYS TROTSKY DIRECTED
HIM TO KILL STALIN AND VOROSHILOV
The decision to murder Comrade Stalin was taken simultaneously with the
decision to murder Comrade Kirov. With this aim in mind, the center
organized a number of strictly conspiratorial, terroristic groups in
Moscow. In order to unify the activities of these groups, the All-Union
Trotskyist-Zinovievist center created the Moscow center comprising Bakaev,
Reingold, and Pikel (Zinovievist) and Mrachkovsky and Dreitzer
(Trotskyist). The immediate organization of the murder of Comrade Stalin
was entrusted to Bakaev. At the investigation, Bakaev confessed his role
as the direct organizer of terroristic acts....
From abroad, Trotsky who was directing the activities of the All-Union united
Trotskyist-Zinovievist center, has used every means at his disposal, especially
after the arrest of Kamenev and Zinoviev, to speed up the murder of comrades
Stalin and Voroshilov. He has been systematically sending directives and
practical instructions through his agents concerning the organizing of the
murder.
Dreitzer, a man close to Trotsky, formerly serving as his bodyguard, a member
of the Trotskyist-Zinovievist bloc, confessed at his investigation that in 1934
he had received a written directive from Trotsky regarding the preparation of a
terroristic act against Comrades Stalin and Voroshilov.
He reported the following:
"I received this directive through Stalovitskaya, my sister, a permanent
resident of Warsaw, who traveled to Moscow at the end of September 1934.
"The contents of Trotsky's letter were brief. It began with the
following words:
"My dear friend! Please pass on the information that the following
main tasks are on the next day's agenda:
"First task: the removal of Stalin and Voroshilov.
Second task: the organization of cells in the Army.
Third task: in case of war, to make use of confusion and failure of every sort
in order to seize power."
(Dreitzer. Minutes of the interrogation of July 23rd, 1936)
Getty & Naumov, The Road
to Terror. New Haven, Conn.: Yale Univ. Press, c1999, p. 253
Trotsky, being abroad, pressed in every way for the killing of comrades Stalin
and Voroshilov, especially after the arrest of Kamenev and Zinoviev, and directed
the activities of the all-union united Trotskyite-Zinovievite center.
Through his agents he systematically sent directives and practical instructions
for organizing the killing.
Dreitzer, a participant in the Trotskyite-Zinovievite bloc who was close to
Trotsky and was at one time his personal guard, admitted during the
investigation that in 1934 he received a written directive from Trotsky to
prepare a terrorist act against comrades Stalin and Voroshilov.
He stated:
"I received this directive through my sister, Stalovitsksaia, who resides
permanently in Warsaw and came to Moscow in the end of September, 1934.
"The content of Trotsky's letter was brief. It started with the
following words:
"Dear friend! Pass on that today we face the following basic tasks:
first--to get rid of Stalin and Voroshilov, second--to work on organizing cells
in the army, third--in case of war to exploit any setbacks and confusion to
seize the leadership."
(Dreitzer, Record of Interrogation, July 23, 1936)
The content of this directive was confirmed by yet another prominent
Trotskyite, Mrachkovsky, who testified as follows:
"Esterman handed me an envelope from Dreitzer. Opening it in
Esterman's presence, I saw a letter written by Trotsky to Dreitzer. In
this letter Trotsky gave instructions to kill Stalin and Voroshilov."
(Mrachkovsky, Record of Interrogation, July 4, 1936)
McNeal, Robert. Resolutions
and Decisions of the CPSU--The Stalin Years: 1929-1953. Vol. 3. Toronto,
Buffalo: University of Toronto Press, 1974, p. 173-174
ZINOVIEV SAYS HE ACCEPTS M.
LURYE’S TERRORIST GROUP WORKING WITH THE FASCISTS
5. Setting out on the path of individual White Guard terror, the
Trotskyist-Zinovievist bloc lost all feeling of squeamishness and in order to
carry out its criminal designs began to make use of the services not only of
the crushed remnants of the belated followers of the White Guard oppositionism
but also of the services of foreign intelligence services, foreign secret
police operators, spies, and provocateurs.
For example, the terroristic group headed by M. Lure, who arrived here from
Germany, was in fact organized by Franz Weitz, an active German fascist and
Himmler's representative (at the time leader of the fascist storm troop
detachments in Berlin, currently leader of the Gestapo, the German secret
police).
When visiting Zinoviev, M. Lure informed him that the members of his
terroristic group were organizationally connected with the fascist Franz Weitz
and the German secret police, the Gestapo, and asked Zinoviev for his attitude
to this.
Zinoviev replied:
"What you find so disturbing in this? After all, Moisey Ilich, you
are a historian. You know the case of Lassalle and Bismarck. When
Lasalle wanted to exploit Bismarck in the interests of revolution."
(M. Lure. Minutes of the interrogation of July 21st, 1936)
Konstant, a member of the terroristic group organized by M. Lure, in
speaking of the motivations for his connections with Franz Weitz, the
representative of the German secret police, testified as follows at the
investigation:
"Being extremely embittered at the policies of the All-Union Communist
Party and being personally bitter at Stalin, I gave in with relative ease to
the political working over directed at me by Franz Weitz. In his
conversations with me, Franz Weitz pointed out that the differences in our
political positions (I am a Trotskyite, he a fascist) may not exclude and, on
the contrary, ought to presuppose united action by Trotskyists and national
Socialists in their struggle against Stalin and his supporters. After
many doubts and hesitations, I agreed with Franz Weitz's conclusions and
remained the whole time in constant contact with him."
[Konstant. Minutes of the interrogation of July first, 1936]
Getty & Naumov, The Road
to Terror. New Haven, Conn.: Yale Univ. Press, c1999, p. 253-254
After the killing of Comrade Kirov and the consequent smashing of the
Trotskyite-Zinovievite center, Trotsky took upon himself complete guidance of
terrorist activity in the USSR. To restore the terrorist groups in the
USSR and activate them Trotsky dispatched his trusted agents across the border
with forged documents. Among such agents sent by him at various times
from Berlin to Moscow were Berman-Yurin, Olberg, Fritz David, Gorovich,
Gurevich, Bykhovsky, and others. They were all assigned the task of
killing Comrades Stalin, Voroshilov, Kaganovich, and other party leaders,
whatever the cost.
5.
Having set out on the path of individual, White-Guard terror, the Trotskyite-Zinovievite
bloc lost all scruples and, to carry out their criminal designs, began to use
the services not only of the defeated remnants of the White Guards but also the
services of foreign intelligence agencies, foreign secret police, spies, and
provocateurs.
Thus, for example, the terrorist group headed by M. Lurye, who came over from
Germany, was actually organized by the active German Fascist, Franz Weiss,
Himmler's representative (at that time the head of the Fascist storm-trooper
detachments in Berlin and now head of the German secret police--the GESTAPO).
While visiting Zinoviev, M. Lurye told him that the members of his terrorist
group had organizational ties with the Fascist, Franz Weiss, and with the
German secret police--the GESTAPO, and asked Zinoviev what were his relations
with the latter.
To this Zinoviev answered:
"What bothers you in this? You are an historian. You know the
story of Lassalle and Bismarck, when Lasalle wanted to utilize Bismarck in the
interests of the revolution."
(M. Lurye, Record of Interrogation, July 21, 1936)
McNeal, Robert. Resolutions
and Decisions of the CPSU--The Stalin Years: 1929-1953. Vol. 3. Toronto,
Buffalo: University of Toronto Press, 1974, p. 174
THE TROT-ZINOVIEVIST CENTER
STOLE GOVERNMENT MONEY
6. In order to acquire the necessary financial resources associated with
the preparation of terroristic acts, the Trotskyist-Zinovievist
counter-revolutionary bloc has resorted to the theft of state funds and to
direct plundering of money belonging to the people.
It was established at the investigation that at one of the sessions of the
united Trotskyist-Zinovievist center it was proposed to certain active
Zinovievists to make contact with secret Zinovievists working in the economic
sphere in order to obtain funds. In particular, Reingold was entrusted
with such a task. In accordance with a commission by Kamenev, Reingold
was supposed to make contact with Arkus, a secret double-dealer, who held the
post of deputy chairman of the State Bank of the USSR (Gosbank)....
CONCLUSIONS
The facts show that the Trotskyist-Zinovievist counter-revolutionary center and
its leaders--Trotsky, Zinoviev, and Kamenev--have slid definitively into the
mire of White Guard oppositionism, have merged with the most embittered,
inveterate enemies of Soviet power, and have become transformed into an
organizing force of the remnants of classes crushed in the USSR, which in their
desperation are resorting to the basest tool of the struggle against the Soviet
government--namely, the use of terror....
Getty & Naumov, The Road
to Terror. New Haven, Conn.: Yale Univ. Press, c1999, p. 254
6.
To obtain the funds needed to prepare terrorist acts, the
Trotskyite-Zinovievite counter-revolutionary bloc resorted to theft of state
funds and to outright robbery of the people's money.
The investigation has established that at one of the meetings of the united
Trotskyite-Zinovievite center certain active Trotskyites and Zinovievites were
ordered to enter into connections, for the sake of obtaining funds, with
concealed Trotskyites and Zinovievites in economic work. Specifically,
such an assignment was given to Reingold. By Kamenev's orders he was to
make contact with the secret double dealer, Arkus, who was deputy-chairman of
the USSR State Bank.
According to Reingold's testimony, Arkus gave systematic material support to
the Trotskyite-Zinovievite center. In particular, Reingold testified at
the investigation that in July or August 1933 Arkus withdrew 30,000 rubles from
Gosbank for the needs of the Trotskyite-Zinovievite center. He
transferred 15,000 to the Cartographic Trust which at the time was headed by
the active Zinovievite, Fedorov, and 15,000 to the Economic Trust which was
headed by the not unknown Evdokimov. The money was transferred in the
form of sums to pay for work on economic statistics, which is not regulated by
the state.
In a number of cases terrorist groups of Trotskyites and Zinovievites prepared
to commit outright robberies in order to secure funds and weapons for the
perpetration of terrorist acts. Thus, for example, a group of terrorists
in Gorky, headed by the Trotskyite, Popov, attempted to carry out a series of
robberies to obtain funds and weapons.
The Trotskyite, Lavrentev, who was an active member of this group, testified as
follows at the investigation:
"The plan of the terrorist counter-revolutionary Trotskyite group for
perpetrating a terrorist act against Comrade Stalin consisted of the following
component parts: (1) the obtaining of funds for the terrorist group by
committing 'expropriation's' of state institutions and banks; (2) the acquiring
of weapons for members of the terrorist group; (3) the direct preparation and
perpetration of a terrorist act against Stalin. At one meeting of the
terrorist group it was decided that Popov, Khramov, Pugachev, and
I--Lavrentev--must devote ourselves entirely to terrorist activity and resign
our jobs. On Popov's orders Khramov was the first to resign his job, and
on Popov's instructions Khramov moved to Ardatovsky raion to prepare an
'expropriation.' It was proposed to start by seizing the treasury of a
village soviet at a time when tax payments were at their maximum. Shortly
after Khramov's departure, Popov and Pugachev also resigned their jobs. I
myself was on leave. All three of us, and Pelevina with us, went out to
the village of Khokhlovo in Ardatovsky raion to carry out an 'expropriation' of
the village soviet's treasury. After we had reached the village of
Khokhlovo, Khramov told us that he had not succeeded in preparing the
'expropriation.' For two days Popov also tried to prepare an
'expropriation,' but he was not successful. In this connection
we--members of the terrorist group Popov, I (Lavrentev), Pugachev, and Pelevina
--went out to Arzamas. On Popov's prroposal we began to prepare to rob the
cashiers who were receiving large sums into the bank. Three persons were
appointed for the robbery. The robbery did not take place because the
conditions were not suitable."
(Lavrentev, Record of Interrogation, Nov. 9, 1935)
McNeal, Robert. Resolutions
and Decisions of the CPSU--The Stalin Years: 1929-1953. Vol. 3. Toronto,
Buffalo: University of Toronto Press, 1974, p. 175
CONCLUSIONS:
Confronted with the indisputable triumphs of socialist construction, they first
hoped that our party would be unable to cope with its difficulties, as a result
of which would be created the possible conditions for their emergence into the
open and their attainment of power. But, seeing that the party is
successfully overcoming its difficulties, they are wagering on the defeat of
the Soviet power in the forthcoming war, as a result of which they dream of
attaining power.
And, finally, seeing no prospects at all, in desperation they seize upon the
ultimate instrument of struggle--terror.
McNeal, Robert. Resolutions
and Decisions of the CPSU--The Stalin Years: 1929-1953. Vol. 3. Toronto,
Buffalo: University of Toronto Press, 1974, p. 176
TROTS AND ZINOVIEVISTS WORMED
THEIR WAY INTO GOVT FOR THEIR OWN AIMS
It is only the absence of proper Bolshevik vigilance that can explain the fact
that in certain district party committees in Leningrad, Trotskyists and
Zinovievists, expelled from the All-Union Communist Party, had already
succeeded in 1935 in being restored into the party, and in certain cases they
succeeded in making their way into the party apparat and exploiting it for
their own vile terroristic aims.
Getty & Naumov, The Road
to Terror. New Haven, Conn.: Yale Univ. Press, c1999, p. 255
AFTER ZINOVIEV TRIAL TROTS ARE
DEEMED NOT JUST POLITICAL OPPONENTS BUT SPIES
At the end of September 1936 the Politburo made a firm statement on the
matter. Trotskyists were no longer to be considered political opponents
on the left; now, as a category, they were defined as fascist spies and
saboteurs.
[From September 29th, 1936 Protocol #43 of the Politburo]
The following directive concerning our stance toward counter-revolutionary,
Trotskyist-Zinovievist elements is to be adopted:
a) Until very recently, the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party
considered the Trotskyist-Zinovievist scoundrels as the leading political and
organizational detachment of the international bourgeoisie.
The latest facts tell us that these gentlemen have slid even deeper into the
mire. They must therefore now be considered foreign agents, spies,
subversives, and wreckers representing the fascist bourgeoisie of Europe.
b) In connection with this, it is necessary for us to make short work of these
Trotskyist-Zinovievist scoundrels. This is to include not only those who
have been arrested and whose investigation has already been completed, and not
only those like Muralov, Pyatakov, Beloborodov, and others, who are currently
under investigation, but also those who had been exiled earlier.
[Footnote: Draft by Yezhov and later signed by Stalin, the politburo resolution
was approved by polling the members. Yezhov's draft originally included a
third point--removed by Stalin--calling for the summary shooting of several
thousand Trotskyists and the exile of thousands of others to Yakutia.]
Getty & Naumov, The Road
to Terror. New Haven, Conn.: Yale Univ. Press, c1999, p. 272-273
PYATAKOV’S TESTIMONY AS
TO SABOTAGE AND TERRORISM
In August, Yezhov interviewed him [Pyatakov].... Pyatakov protested his
innocence, claiming that his only sin was in not seeing the
counter-revolutionary activities of his wife. He offered to testify
against Zinoviev and Kamenev and even volunteered to execute them (and his
ex-wife) personally. (Yezhov declined the offer as
"absurd.") Pyatakov wrote to both Stalin and Ordjonikidze,
protesting his innocence and referring to Zinoviev, Kamenev, and Trotsky as
"rotten" and "base."
As Ordzhonikidze's deputy at heavy industry, Pyatakov was an important official
with overall supervision over mining, chemicals, and other industrial
operations. His arrest for sabotage and "terrorism" sent shock waves
through the industrial establishment. Ordjonikidze...tried to intercede
with Stalin to secure Pyatakov's freedom. But Stalin and Yezhov forwarded
to him transcripts of interrogations in which Pyatakov gradually confessed to
economic "wrecking," sabotage, and collaboration with Zinoviev and
Trotsky in a monstrous plot to overthrow the Bolshevik regime. According
to Bukharin, who was present, Ordjonikidze was invited to a
"confrontation" with the arrested Pyatakov, where he asked his deputy
if his confessions were coerced or voluntary. Pyatakov answered that they
were completely voluntary.
Getty & Naumov, The Road
to Terror. New Haven, Conn.: Yale Univ. Press, c1999, p. 283
[February 5th, 1937 speech by Ordjonikidze at a meeting of the heads of the
chief directorates of the Commissariat for Heavy Industry]
You think that a saboteur is someone who walks around with a revolver in his
pocket, someone who hides in some dark corner somewhere, waiting for his
victim? Who could imagine that Pyatakov could be a saboteur, and yet he
turned out to be a saboteur, and, more still, a fine talker. He told [the
investigators] how he did it.
Getty & Naumov, The Road
to Terror. New Haven, Conn.: Yale Univ. Press, c1999, p. 292
And his [Pyatakov] services to Stalin's Government were extremely
valuable. His energy and intelligence, probably unrivaled in the whole
leadership, had been channeled into carrying out Stalin's industrialization
plans.
What was there to be said against him? [JUST READ WHAT HE SAYS ABOUT
HIMSELF]
He had loyally accepted the Stalin leadership, but he would have accepted an
alternative leadership if Stalin could have been overthrown; he supported him
with reservations. He had been a major critic of Stalin's in the
1920s. He had made it clear that he regarded his rise to power as
unfortunate.
Conquest, Robert. The Great
Terror. New York: Oxford University Press, 1990, p. 140
ORDJONIKIDZE WANTS LOMINADZE
SHOT WHICH STALIN OPPOSES
In another case, Ordjonikidze had tried to shield another client, the former
dissident Lominadze, from arrest, by promising Stalin to bring Lominadze around
to a loyal position. But when Ordjonikidze became convinced that Lominadze
was a lost cause, he proposed having him shot, a solution that was at the time
too radical even for Stalin.
Getty & Naumov, The Road
to Terror. New Haven, Conn.: Yale Univ. Press, c1999, p. 284
YEZHOV SAYS ZINOVIEV SAID
THERE WAS A BACKUP GROUP
[December 4th, 1936 speech by Yezhov to the Central Committee plenum]
You know that already at the August trial Zinoviev testified that apart from
the main center of the Zinovievist-Trotskyist bloc, there existed also a backup
center. Zinoviev gave four surnames as members of the backup center:
Pyatakov, Sokolnikov, Radek, and Serebryakov. All of this has now been
fully confirmed by the testimony of the defendants themselves, who are now
under arrest: Pyatakov, Sokolnikov, Radek, and Serebryakov. All four
members of the backup center have testified that they were members of this
center....
Getty & Naumov, The Road
to Terror. New Haven, Conn.: Yale Univ. Press, c1999, p. 304
At another plenary session, called in December 1936, Yezhov once again held
center stage, launching a new series of dramatic charges that involved more
former opposition leaders. At the August trial, Zinoviev and Kamenev had
mentioned a "reserve center" of terrorists that existed in addition
to the "basic center" of the Zinovievite-Trotskyite block. In
the reserve group were Pyatakov; Radek, Sokolnikov, a former candidate member
of the Politburo; and Serebryakov, a former secretary of the Central
Committee. All had once been Trotsky's followers. Yezhov informed
the Center Committee that these men, now under arrest, had confirmed the
information given earlier by Zinoviev and Kamenev. The job of the
reserves had been to supply replacements for the basic center if its members
were discovered. But Pyatakov had begun his wrecking work even before
Zinoviev and Kamenev were arrested. He carried out his task more
effectively than the Zinovievite center had, because he enjoyed more trust from
the government and possessed more links with the periphery. Here Beria
interjected, "And foreign connections, too."
Thurston, Robert. Life and
Terror in Stalin's Russia, 1934-1941. New Haven: Yale University Press, c1996,
p. 36
TROTS ARE DIRECTED BY JAPANESE
INTELLIGENCE THROUGH KNYAZEV
We should add that the rather large group of Trotskyists in Sverdlovsk was in
fact directed by Japanese intelligence through Knyazev, formerly head of
Japanese intelligence [in Sverdlovsk]...
Getty & Naumov, The Road
to Terror. New Haven, Conn.: Yale Univ. Press, c1999, p. 305
BELOBORODOV GAVE INSTRUCTIONS
TO TROTSKYIST DUKAT TO KILL STALIN
At any rate, people not only discussed the question of terror. They also
concretely prepared for it. At any rate, many attempts were made to carry
out terrorist acts of assassination. In particular, the Azov-Black Sea
counter-revolutionary terrorist group headed by Beloborodov assigned a group
under the direction of a certain Dukat from the Trotskyists, who tried to hunt
down Comrade Stalin in Sochi. Beloborodov gave instructions to Dukat so
that the latter would take advantage of Comrade Stalin's stay in Sochi on his
vacation, so that he could find a propitious moment to carry out his
assassination. When Dukat failed in his attempt, Beloborodov vilified him
in every way possible for failing to organize this
business.
In Western Siberia, there were direct attempts to organize an assassination
attempt against Comrade Molotov, in the Urals against Comrade Kaganovich....
Getty & Naumov, The Road
to Terror. New Haven, Conn.: Yale Univ. Press, c1999, p. 305
HYPOCRITICAL, DECEPTIVE
BUKHARIN DENOUNCES SABOTAGE & OTHER ACTS OF SWINE
[December 4th, 1936 speech of Bukharin to a plenum of the Central Committee]
Comrades, it is very difficult for me to speak here today, because this may
well be the last time that I speak before you. I know that it is
especially difficult for me to speak now, because, in point of fact, it is
necessary for all members of the party from top to bottom to exercise extreme
vigilance and to help the appropriate [NKVD] organs utterly destroy those swine
who are engaged in acts of sabotage and so on.
It follows quite naturally from all this--and should serve as our point of
departure--that this is the main directive, that this is the main task before
our party. I am happy that this entire business has been brought to light
before war breaks out and that our [NKVD] organs have been in a position to
expose all of this rot before the war so that we can come out of war
victorious. Because if all of this had not been revealed before the war
but during it, it would have brought about absolutely extraordinary and
grievous defeats for the cause of socialism.
Getty & Naumov, The Road
to Terror. New Haven, Conn.: Yale Univ. Press, c1999, p. 309
BUKHARIN SAYS: KAMENEV AND
ZINOVIEV LUSTED FOR POWER
Bukharin says: Kamenev and Zinoviev lusted for power, they were reaching for
power.
Getty & Naumov, The Road
to Terror. New Haven, Conn.: Yale Univ. Press, c1999, p. 310
BUKHARIN SAYS PYATAKOV DOES
NOT KNOW WHEN HE IS SPEAKING THE TRUTH
Bukharin says: let me appeal to Comrade Ordzhonikidze.... I was at his
apartment when he asked me: "What is your opinion of Pyatakov?"
This is literally what I told him: "My impression of him is that he is the
sort of person who is so thoroughly ruined by his tactical approach to things
that he doesn't know when he is speaking the truth and when he is speaking from
tactical considerations."
Ordzhonikidze: That's true.
Getty & Naumov, The Road
to Terror. New Haven, Conn.: Yale Univ. Press, c1999, p. 311
STALIN DENOUNCES BUKHARIN FOR
DECEIVING WHEN HE SAID HE HAD CHANGED HIS VIEWS
[December 1936 speech by Stalin to the Central Committee plenum]
STALIN:...If a person says
openly that he adheres to the party line, then, in accordance with the
established, widely known traditions of Lenin's party, the party considers that
this person values his ideas and that he has genuinely renounced his former
errors and has adopted the positions of the party. We believed in you and
we were mistaken. We were mistaken, Comrade Bukharin.
BUKHARIN: Yes, yes.
STALIN:...We believed in you,
we decorated you with the Order of Lenin, we moved you up the ladder and we
were mistaken. Is it true, Comrade Bukharin?
BUKHARIN: It's true, it's
true, I have said the same myself.
Getty & Naumov, The Road
to Terror. New Haven, Conn.: Yale Univ. Press, c1999, p. 321
STALIN DEFENDS & DRAGS HIS
FEET AGAINST THOSE WHO WANT BUKHARIN’S HEAD
The stenographic notwithstanding, it is difficult to know exactly what happened
politically at the December 1936 plenum. No one spoke up to defend
Bukharin and Rykov. Nevertheless, the plenum did not expel Bukharin and
Rykov from the party, nor did it order their arrest, despite specific proposals
to that effect from some of the Central Committee members. This
inconclusive result was not for want of trying on Yezhov's part. His
speech was direct and unambiguously accusatory repeating the charges he had
been making against Bukharin for three months. Even while the plenum was
meeting, he was sending to Stalin, Molotov, and Kaganovich records of the
interrogation of rightist Kulikov, who testified that Bukharin had told him in
1932 of "directives" to kill Stalin....
Then Stalin did a strange thing. Despite Yezhov's strong report, the lack
of any support for Bukharin and Rykov from the plenum, and the damning
testimony of Kulikov and others, Stalin moved "to consider the matter of
Bukharin and Rykov unfinished" and suggested postponing a decision until
the next plenum. Once again Yezhov's proposals were not adopted.
Getty & Naumov, The Road
to Terror. New Haven, Conn.: Yale Univ. Press, c1999, p. 324
Although Ordjonikidze may have slowed down the attack on industrial leaders,
nobody seems to have opposed the crushing of Bukharin and it is difficult to
credit the delays to anyone but Stalin.
Bukharin had come under official suspicion in August 1936, when Yezhov
initiated the process in a letter to Stalin suggesting that former Rightists
were implicated in the Zinovievist-Trotskyist "plot." Yezhov
asked Stalin's permission to reinterrogate Uglanov, Ryutin, and other Rightists
already sentenced on other charges. Stalin agreed. During August
and September, Yezhov worked diligently to assemble "evidence"
against Bukharin by pressuring former Rightists Uglanov, Ryutin, Rovinsky, and
Kotov. The culmination of his effort was a dramatic confrontation between
Bukharin and the already arrested Sokolnikov on Sept. 8 in the presence of
Kaganovich, Vyshinsky, and Yezhov. The attempt failed, because at the
meeting Sokolnikov denied personal knowledge of Bukharin's participation in the
treasonous Opposition "bloc." The record of the confrontation
was sent to Stalin and two days later Vyshinsky announced that there was
insufficient evidence to proceed legally against Bukharin. Only Stalin
could have decided this, and we have no evidence that anyone was defending
Bukharin.
Getty and Manning. Stalinist
Terror. Cambridge, NY: Cambridge University Press, 1993, p. 56
Before, during, and after the December 1936 plenum, Bukharin denied his
guilt. Stalin debated Bukharin at the plenum, demanded explanations and
recantations from him, and even told the Central Committee members, "You
can shoot [him] if you want, it's up to you." None of the other
speakers questioned the case against Bukharin, and every single speaker accused
him. Nevertheless, Stalin ended the meeting by "abruptly"
suggesting only to continue "verification" and to postpone any
decision on Bukharin.
Getty and Manning. Stalinist
Terror. Cambridge, NY: Cambridge University Press, 1993, p. 57
A subcommission, shared by Mikoyan, was formed at the February 1937 plenum to
decide the fate of Bukharin. According to folklore, all the committee's
participants voted to "arrest, try, and shoot" Bukharin and
Rykov. Again, the lore is wrong; documents show that the event went quite
differently and showed continued indecision and confusion, even on Stalin's
part. The final protocol of the committee meeting shows that everyone
indeed voted to expel Bukharin and Rykov from the party. Yezhov, Budenny,
Manuilsky, Shvernik, Kosarev, and Iakir were for shooting them outright.
Postyshev, Shkiryatov, Kossior, Petrovsky, and Litvinov were for sending them
to trial but forbidding a death sentence. The rest voted "for the
suggestion of Comrade Stalin," which in the final text is given as:
"to expel from the party, not to send them to trial, and to refer the matter
to the in NKVD for further investigation."
Getty and Manning. Stalinist
Terror. Cambridge, NY: Cambridge University Press, 1993, p. 58
At the November 7th 'demonstration'--the 19th anniversary of the Revolution in
1936--a soldier came up to Bukharin in one of the minor stands. Bukharin
expected arrest, but it was instead an invitation from Stalin to come up and
join him at the main stand. Later NKVD officers arrived to search
Bukharin's flat. Stalin 'chanced' to telephone, and on hearing of it
ordered the NKVD men to leave at once.
In December 1936 the Central Committee, at its plenum, heard a series of
violent attacks by Yezhov and others against Bukharin and his rightist
plotters. Stalin intervened and suggested that the question should be
postponed until the next plenum.
Conquest, Robert. Stalin:
Breaker of Nations. New York, New York: Viking, 1991, p. 197
Many of the major Bolsheviks opposed Stalin, but never quite at the same
time. At a Party meeting in the late 1920s, Stalin said, "You demand
the blood of Bukharin? Well, you shall not get it." Then, in
1935, Stalin once more pledged his friendship to Bukharin at a banquet.
Raising a glass, he said, "Let's all drink to Nikolai Ivanovitch
[Bukharin]."
"It was strange," Anna Larina said, "As late as 1936, it looked
as if Bukharin's position was more stable. He was appointed editor of
Izvestia, he was on the constitutional commission, and it looked as if there
could be a democratization process going on in the country.
Remnick, David. Lenin's Tomb.
New York: Random House, c1993, p. 65
LITTLE PROOF STALIN WAS TRYING
TO KILL HIS OPPONENTS IN THE 1930’S
...If we set aside the notion of a grand Stalin plan to kill everyone--the
evidence for which, aside from our knowing the end and reading backward is
quite weak--it is possible to understand the politics of the 1930s as an
evolving political history in which self-interested persons and groups jockeyed
for position.
Getty & Naumov, The Road
to Terror. New Haven, Conn.: Yale Univ. Press, c1999, p. 330
Although the findings confirm Brzezinski's belief that the "major effort
of the purge was directed against the Communist Party itself," they
provide little support for Conquest's assertion that there was a "plan to
destroy Old Bolsheviks," or for Armstrong's claim that the "great
Purge almost eliminated from the apparatus the Old Bolsheviks, who entered the
party before the Revolution. In fact, among party members, the connection
between when one joined the party and one's subsequent fate in the purges is an
interesting but nonlinear one: Those with the longest party membership were not
necessarily the most vulnerable. Those who joined the party during the
1912-20., when party membership swelled, were purged more heavily than those
who joined before 1912 or after 1920.
Getty and Manning. Stalinist
Terror. Cambridge, NY: Cambridge University Press, 1993, p. 235
Old Bolsheviks did not suffer disproportionately in the Great Purges and there
is little reason to believe that they were singled out as the targets of the
Ezhovshchina.
Getty and Manning. Stalinist
Terror. Cambridge, NY: Cambridge University Press, 1993, p. 236
Old Bolsheviks in the present group suffered not because they were Old
Bolsheviks, but because they held prominent positions within the party,
economic, a military elite, positions they held because they were Old
Bolsheviks. When the party seized power in 1917, it placed its most
trusted members into the bureaucracy's most important positions. Although
the individuals may have changed, Old Bolsheviks as a group retained the most
privileged and powerful positions. When the terror erupted in 1936-37,
Old Bolsheviks were among the victims because of where they worked rather than
because they were Old Bolsheviks. In short, specialty or
"position" in 1936, rather than Old Bolshevik status, was the crucial
determinant of purge vulnerability.
...Those in the elite outside politics, for example, scientists, educational
administrators, and artists, regardless of their "alien" class
background, party status, age, or old regime education, were relatively safe
from arrest....
So it was neither the Older Bolsheviks nor the "new men," but rather
those members of the party, economic, and military elite who belonged to what
one might call the "class of 1912-20" who were most vulnerable.
Getty and Manning. Stalinist
Terror. Cambridge, NY: Cambridge University Press, 1993, p. 243
It is therefore hard to use the findings presented here and what we know about
the importance of Old Bolsheviks' credentials to support an interpretation that
posits that Stalin planned the terror to destroy the revolutionaries as such.
Certain groups within the Soviet elite--high-ranking party, economic, and
military officials, former oppositionists, and those who joined the Bolsheviks
between 1912 and 1920--were most vulnerable to repression. Other
groups--most notably Old Bolsheviks and the intelligentsia--long believed to
have been designated targets were not. By showing that Old Bolsheviks
were not repressed simply because they were Old Bolsheviks, this study cast
considerable doubt on the thesis that the terror's purpose was to destroy them
as a category because they collectively represented a threat to Stalin.
Getty and Manning. Stalinist
Terror. Cambridge, NY: Cambridge University Press, 1993, p. 244
If we look at the specific context of the acts of repression it becomes
apparent that police violence, rather than proceeding from the realization of
the single will and design of an omnipotent center of power by its invincible
armed forces, was in fact increasingly chaotic and out-of-control. This
violence resulted rather from the lack of any such center and institution,...
The planning and execution of police repression during the "Great
Purge" have traditionally been attributed to Stalin's vengeful
tyranny. This view does not stand up to examination of the sources....
Everything points to the conclusion that, far from illuminating the causes and
effects of the epoch’s historical events, the tendency to attribute all
things to Stalin's vengeful intentions is likely to obscure the real problems
of the period....
As for Stalin's dictatorial omnipotence, this chapter has shown the extent to
which the crisis of 1937 was dominated by the impossibility of controlling the
internal workings of the Soviet system, even by means of police terror.
Rittersporn, Gabor. Stalinist
Simplifications and Soviet Complications, 1933-1953. New York: Harwood Academic
Publishers, c1991, p. 170-171
It should be said straight away that Sovietologists are quite right to
emphasize the crucial impact that the events of 1936-1938 had, both on the
history of the USSR and on Stalin's career. However, they have generally
been so misled by the ritual invocation of Stalin's name to explain and justify
every political initiative, that they have rarely suspected that behind the
scenes there might be intentions and aims other than those of the supposed
despot. They have been too quick to identify the whole inner workings of
the regime with his irresistible will. In this way research into Soviet
history has commonly attributed to Stalin personally all the designs and
schemes that claimed him as their authority, without asking whether these fit
neatly into a homogeneous strategy.
Rittersporn, Gabor. Stalinist
Simplifications and Soviet Complications, 1933-1953. New York: Harwood Academic
Publishers, c1991, p. 183
However, one only needs to look closely at the source material to see that the
schemes--all without exception justified with obsequious references to the same
revered authority--do in fact present some notable incongruities. If we
look at the abundant and yet little-used material that researchers on this
subject might have referred to, we quickly realize that Stalin, for all
an important role he played, was in fact far from being always able to dictate
the course of the turbulent events of the 1930s and that in fact his personal
position on the top of the Party-State emerged shaken rather than strengthened
from the "Great Purge." What one might call in short a
"conflict-centered" reading of the available data would conclude that
the purges were in no way a punitive exercise delivered in triumph from above,
but rather a fierce internal battle within the state apparatus. This struggle
arose from the need to ensure regular functioning of the administrative,
economic, and political mechanisms, though they were by their very nature
uncontrollable, and it brought conflicting strategies into battle for control
of the apparatus, strategies of which Stalin's own--"real
Stalinism"--was only one variant and not in fact the one which finally
prevailed.
There is nothing easier than to misconstrue the true role played by Stalin in
the internal struggles of the apparatus. His name and his utterances were
invariably quoted throughout the country by everyone who took part in the
confrontations of the "Great Purge," in order to legitimize any kind
of tortuous maneuver, a fact that easily gives the impression that it was he
alone who initiated the majority of the actions. The impression is wrong,
however, as one discovers as soon as one examines closely the available
sources. From them it clearly emerges that, far from being the prime
mover of the process of civil war which was increasingly ravaging and
disrupting the Party-State, Stalin was merely the leader, and at times in a
quite disadvantageous position, of one of the loose factions that were warring
among themselves and against the rest of society.
Rittersporn, Gabor. Stalinist Simplifications
and Soviet Complications, 1933-1953. New York: Harwood Academic Publishers,
c1991, p. 184-185
SHEBOLDAEV SAYS HE CAUSED HARM
BECAUSE OF THE ACTIVITIES OF TROTSKYISTS
[Sheboldaev's Jan. 6, 1937 speech to the plenum of the Azov-Black Sea
Territorial Committee]
... Comrades, I consider the decision of the Central App to be absolutely
correct. I consider the criticism and the party sanctions levied against
me personally by the Central Committee to be, in my opinion, very
lenient--because of the enormous harm caused by me as a result of the
activities of these Trotskyists, who occupied the most critical posts, because
of the undermining of trust toward the territorial committee of the party
brought on by this entire affair. All of this has caused enormous damage
to the party organization.
Getty & Naumov, The Road
to Terror. New Haven, Conn.: Yale Univ. Press, c1999, p. 343
STALIN ATTACKS POSTYSHEV &
KOSIOR FOR COVERING FOR TROTS IN THE GOVT
[Jan. 13, 1937 telegram by Stalin removing Postyshev from Kiev]
On the unsatisfactory party leadership of the Kiev Regional Committee of the
Communist Party of the Ukraine and on deficiencies in the work of the Central
Committee of the Communist Party of the Ukraine.
Occupying the majority of leading posts in the apparat of the regional
committee, these Trotskyists selected for the apparat either their own people,
traitors just like themselves, or else people who, keeping silent, wouldn't
dare to say anything bad about their bosses. Whenever an official from
the lower ranks of the party organization complained about Radkov or any of the
other members of the Trotskyist group, he was transferred to another job.
...Comrades Postyshev and Ilin, leaders of the regional committee,
trusted Radkov with such blindness that they turned over to him the
verification of declarations entered into the record against Trotskyists, while
he in turn investigated them in such a manner that it was those who submitted
the declarations who turned out to be guilty.
Getty & Naumov, The Road
to Terror. New Haven, Conn.: Yale Univ. Press, c1999, p. 353
[Stalin continues]
First, Comrade Kosior, first secretary of the Central Committee of the
Communist Party of the Ukraine, is to be admonished for lack of vigilance, for
slackened attention paid to party work, and for failure to take measures
against contamination of the apparat of the Central Committee of the Communist Party
of the Ukraine....
Second, Comrade Postyshev, first secretary of the Kiev Regional Committee, is
to be reprimanded and furthermore is to be warned that in case such slackening
of party vigilance and failure to pay attention to party work or repeated,
harsher penalties will be taken against him.
Getty & Naumov, The Road
to Terror. New Haven, Conn.: Yale Univ. Press, c1999, p. 355
[Feb. 17-20, 1938 Central That decision "On Comrade Postyshev"]
During his tenure in Kuibyshev, Postyshev in essence not only did not unmask
any enemies of the people but, on the contrary, made it difficult, by his
antiparty actions, for party organizations and the NKVD to unmask such
enemies. Declaring that "he was surrounded everywhere by
enemies," he struck a blow against honest Communists loyal to the Party.
Getty & Naumov, The Road
to Terror. New Haven, Conn.: Yale Univ. Press, c1999, p. 514
STALIN ATTACKS BAD
EXPULSIONS AND DEMANDS THEY BE REINSTATED
The criticism of regional party chiefs in early 1937 also revisited the issue
of who had been wrongly expelled in the recently completed membership
screenings of 1935-36: the verification and exchange of party documents.
As we have seen, those operations had been under the control of the regional
chiefs themselves and had resulted in mass expulsions of rank-and-file party
members; only rarely were any full-time party officials expelled in these
screenings.
In June 1936, Stalin and others complained about this practice and ordered the
territorial leaders to "correct mistakes" by speeding up appeals and
readmissions of those who had been expelled for no good reason. At that
time, Stalin interrupted Yezhov's speech to note that the screenings were being
directed against the wrong targets. In early March 1937, top-level Moscow
leaders again denounced the "heartless and bureaucratic" repression
of "little people." Malenkov noted that more than 100,000 of
those expelled had been kicked out for little or no reason, while Trotskyists
who occupied party leadership posts had passed through the screenings with
little difficulty.
Getty & Naumov, The Road
to Terror. New Haven, Conn.: Yale Univ. Press, c1999, p. 358
Stalin echoed the theme in one of his speeches to the February-March 1937
plenum. According to him, by the most extravagant count the number of
Trotskyists, Zinovievists, and rightists could be no more than 30,000
persons. Yet in the membership screenings, more than 300,000 had been
expelled; some factories now contained more ex-members than members.
Stalin worried that this was creating large numbers of embittered former party
members, and he blamed the territorial chiefs for the problem: "All these
outrages that you have committed are water for the enemy's mill."...
On the other hand, even in the darkest days of the hysterical hunt for enemies
in 1937 and 1938, most of those expelled back in 1935 and 1936 who appealed to
Moscow were reinstated. Virtually all those expelled for
"passivity" were readmitted, and appellants charged with more serious
party offenses who appealed to the party control commission in Moscow...were
usually readmitted, the proportion of successful appeals reaching 63 percent by
1938.
Getty & Naumov, The Road
to Terror. New Haven, Conn.: Yale Univ. Press, c1999, p. 359
STALIN STIFLES RESOLUTION
CONDEMNING SHEBOLDAEV AND POSTYSHEV
The Politburo was at pains to show that Sheboldaev and Postyshev were not to be
considered enemies themselves; they had simply been negligent, even though
Sheboldaev's personal secretary and most of Postyshev's lieutenants in Kiev had
been arrested as Trotskyists.... Significantly, both secretaries were
transferred to lesser but important posts: Postyshev became first secretary of
Kuibyshev oblast, and Sheboldaev was sent to head the Kursk party
organization. Andreev, who had led the sacking of Sheboldaev, had
prepared a resolution for the February-March plenum linking Sheboldaev and Postyshev
and denouncing them in rather strong language. Apparently, though, Stalin
decided not to allow such a strong statement, and a resolution was never
introduced.
Getty & Naumov, The Road
to Terror. New Haven, Conn.: Yale Univ. Press, c1999, p. 360
Although Postyshev was to be sacked from his Kuibyshev position, he was not
expelled from the party, nor was he denounced as an enemy.
Getty & Naumov, The Road
to Terror. New Haven, Conn.: Yale Univ. Press, c1999, p. 502
ASTROV EXPOSES BUKHARIN IN
FRONT OF STALIN AND THE POLITBURO
Although there was a critical but generally conciliatory attitude toward the
regional secretaries at the February-March 1937 plenum, the official rhetoric
on former oppositionists was increasingly severe. Two months earlier, at
Stalin's suggestion, the previous plenum had not condemned Bukharin and Rykov
and had postponed consideration to the next meeting. In the interim,
Yezhov had been busy. He continued to interrogate former oppositionists
in order to get "evidence" incriminating the rightist leaders.
On Jan. 13, 1937, Bukharin participated in a "confrontation" with
Astrov, a former pupil of Bukharin's now arrested for treason. In the
presence of Stalin and other Politburo members, Astrov angrily accused Bukharin
of active participation in subversive conspiracies. Astrov alleged that
Bukharin had used his former students in the Institute of Red Professors (The
"Bukharin School) as the basis for an underground organization.
Bukharin denied everything.
Getty & Naumov, The Road
to Terror. New Haven, Conn.: Yale Univ. Press, c1999, p. 364
On January 13, 1937, Bukharin and Rykov were brought face-to-face with Astrov,
with Stalin and other members of the Politburo....
At the confrontation, Astrov said that in the spring of 1932 the
"center" of the illegal organization of Rightists decided to adopt
the tactic of terror. He confirmed Kulikov's testimony that the Ryutin
platform had been written by Bukharin, Rykov, Tomsky, and Uglanov, and claimed
that "Bukharin and Rykov continued to belong to the center of Rightists,
remaining at their earlier positions.
In preparing Astrov for the face-to-face encounter, the investigators were
particularly stubborn in extracting testimony from him about an illegal
conference of "Rightists" which occurred in August-September
1932. Such a conference actually did take place at that time, but Astrov
could say very little about it insofar as he participated in only one meeting
of former Bukharin supporters in 1932, a meeting which occurred at his
apartment. There, in response to a statement by several of his comrades
that Stalin should be "removed by force," Astrov declared that he had
no intention of participating in any struggle against Stalin. Once they
became convinced that this was indeed Astrov's position, the oppositionally
inclined "Young Rightists" apparently decided to not include him
anymore in such discussions which continued at other locations.
Rogovin, Vadim. 1937: Year of
Terror. Oak Park, Michigan: Labor Publications, 1998, p. 180
Astrov played a provocative role in the fate of Bukharin. In one
confrontation he affirmed his deposition on the terrorism of the
"right." Later he declared that in the spring of 1932 "the
center of the right resolved to turn to the tactics of terror," that
Bukharin had allegedly talked about "the necessity to kill Stalin,"
and that the principal authors of the so-called Ryutin platform were Bukharin,
Rykov, Tomsky, and Uglanov. He asserted that it was also personally known
to him that "Bukharin and Rykov continue to compose the center of the
right, having remained in their previous positions."
Laqueur, Walter. Stalin: The
Glasnost Revelations. New York: Scribner's, c1990, p. 327
STALIN TOLD BUKHARIN PEOPLE
SAID TESTIMONIES AGAINST HIM WERE FREELY GIVEN
STALIN: You [Bukharin] were at
the face-to-face confrontations on the premises of the Orgburo, and so were we,
members of the Politburo. Astrov was there and some of the others who
were arrested. Pyatakov was there, so were Radek and Sosnovsky and
Kulikov and others. When I or someone else asked each of these:
"Tell me honestly, have you given your testimony freely or was it squeezed
out of you?" Radek even burst out in tears when asked this question:
"Squeezed out of me? Are you kidding! Freely, completely
freely."
Getty & Naumov, The Road
to Terror. New Haven, Conn.: Yale Univ. Press, c1999, p. 370
RYKOV TELLS CC THAT HE
CAN’T BE HELD RESPONSIBLE FOR TRAITORS ADMIRING HIM
[February 24th, 1937 speech of Rykov to the February-March 1937 plenum of the
Central Committee]
Can a political leader disavow responsibility for the fact that many traitors,
criminals, and wreckers model themselves on him and think that he is their
instigator? I do not disavow responsibility for this. I had also
made other mistakes....
And there is no disgrace greater than the fact that many people perpetrated
these revolting deeds by modeling themselves on me--this is a horrible thing.
But it does not at all follow from this, it seems to me, that on the basis of
this one ought to accuse me of knowing that Trotskyists talk to Hess, that they
conceded the Ukraine to Germany, that they handed over the Baltic region [Rykov
apparently means Primorsky Krai on the Pacific Ocean] to the Japanese, that
they systematically practiced spying and sabotage on the widest possible scale.
Getty & Naumov, The Road
to Terror. New Haven, Conn.: Yale Univ. Press, c1999, p. 374
VOROSHILOV DENOUNCES BUKHARIN
AS A DECEPTIVE, VILE HYPOCRITE
[February 24th, 1937 speech by Voroshilov to the February-March 1937 Plenum of
the Central Committee]
...This is Bukharin's method. This method has been known to us for a long
time. Bukharin is a very peculiar person. He is capable of many
things. Vile, you know, as a mischievous cat and at once he starts
covering his tracks, he starts confusing things, he starts carrying out all
kinds of pranks, in order to come out of this filthy business clean, and he has
succeeded in this often thanks to the kindness of the Central Committee.
He has often succeeded in extricating himself with relative success from very
unpleasant incidents. And he's trying to do the same thing this time
around.
I believe that the guilt of this group, of Bukharin, of Rykov, and especially
of Tomsky, has been completely proven.
Getty & Naumov, The Road
to Terror. New Haven, Conn.: Yale Univ. Press, c1999, p. 376
ANDREEV SAYS TROTS AND
RIGHTISTS ARE THE SAME & STALIN WAS EXTREMELY PATIENT
[February 25th, 1937 speech by Andreev to the February-March 1937 Plenum of the
Central Committee]
...Meanwhile, what do the investigative materials afforded to plenum members
speak of? It seems to me that, first of all, they decisively unmask the
rightists, they unmask them in the sense that there was never any--now it is
clear--there was never any difference between the Trotskyists and
rightists. Such a difference never existed.
Getty & Naumov, The Road
to Terror. New Haven, Conn.: Yale Univ. Press, c1999, p. 377
[Andreev continues] All comparisons of the basic facts, of the testimony and of
their [Bukharin's and Rykov's] personal conduct has led me to the firm
conviction that Bukharin and Rykov knew of the treasonous work by the
Trotskyists.
They knew about it. They were linked with them. My conviction is
that Bukharin and Rykov not only knew of the activities of rightist elements,
but rather they continued, very cautiously and subtly, to serve as leaders of
these rightist elements; to the very last moment they served as their leaders
and maintained their link with them. They encouraged them in their
anti-Soviet activities and abetted their crimes, goaded these people to commit
their crimes--I am convinced of this, no matter how much Bukharin and Rykov
might deny it. What, we may wonder, is the value of statements and
intimations by Bukharin and Rykov--namely, "that we are not allowed to
prove our innocence, that they do not believe our vows and so on"?
...the Party and the Central Committee have given you [Bukharin and Rykov]
sufficient time, more than enough time and means to disarm yourselves and prove
yourselves innocent. No one else from the ranks of the oppositionists and
enemies has been afforded such a period of time, the party has not afforded
such a period of time to anyone other than you. The party did the maximum
to keep you in its ranks. How much effort has been expended, how much
patience has been shown to you by the party and especially, I must say, by
Comrade Stalin
Yes, precisely, by Comrade Stalin, who always urged us, who constantly warned us,
whenever comrades here or there, whenever local organizations here or there
raised the issue "point-blank," as it is said, in reference to the
rightists, and whenever the question would arise in the Central Committee,
Comrade Stalin would caution them against excessive haste; he always warned
us. Nevertheless, you abused the party's trust.
Getty & Naumov, The Road
to Terror. New Haven, Conn.: Yale Univ. Press, c1999, p. 378
KABAKOV DENOUNCES BUKHARIN
[From Kabakov's speech to the February-March 1937 Plenum of the Central
Committee on February 25th 1937]
...yet every terroristic group created under your [Bukharin] leadership was
familiar with and felt your daily influence and said that "we were
preparing to carry out terror, we were engaged in sabotage, we were fulfilling
the will of Rykov, Bukharin, and Tomsky."
Getty & Naumov, The Road
to Terror. New Haven, Conn.: Yale Univ. Press, c1999, p. 379
MAKAROV SAYS MANY PERSONS
TESTIFIED TO THE TROT-RIGHTIST-ZINOVIEV UNITY
[From Makarov's speech to the February-March 1937 Plenum of the Central
Committee on February 25th 1937]
The materials reported by Yezhov are characterized by the fact that not only do
numerous persons corroborate the fact that the leaders of the rightist
opposition knew about the existence of a Trotskyite-Zinovievist center, the
fact that they themselves had direct contact with it, but also that they took
part in it. What characterizes the numerous persons who testified is the
fact that, while residing all over our Union, they each gave his or her own
distinct testimony, yet the essence of their testimony remains the same, their
reply to these two questions is in the affirmative, that they knew of the
existence of a Trotskyist-Zinovievist center and that they themselves were
directly involved in all the counter-revolutionary activities which had been
carried out both by so-called leftists and rightists and by the
Trotskyist-Zinovievist center.
Getty & Naumov, The Road
to Terror. New Haven, Conn.: Yale Univ. Press, c1999, p. 379
KOSAREV DENOUNCES BUKHARIN AS
A CRIMINAL CAUGHT RED-HANDED
[From Kosarev's speech to the February-March 1937 Plenum of the Central
Committee on February 25th 1937]
...We cannot even call Bukharin's speech an ambiguous one. This is the
speech of an embittered enemy, who, being surrounded on all sides by the
incontrovertible facts of his vile crimes, will stop and nothing, will, as a
last resort, slander the investigation and our investigative organs.
Bukharin wants to create the impression that the Central Committee seeks his
innocent blood and that he is prepared to give it. Only an enemy could
speak like this--an enemy, moreover, caught red-handed and refusing to acknowledge
is crimes....
Getty & Naumov, The Road
to Terror. New Haven, Conn.: Yale Univ. Press, c1999, p. 380
MOLOTOV READS
VOROSHILOV’S ATTACK ON BUKHARIN
[Molotov's speech to the February-March 1937 Plenum of the Central Committee on
February 25th 1937]
Already at the last plenum we had sufficient evidence, and yet we postponed
this case once again. We decided to give this man [Bukharin] the
opportunity to extricate himself if he is in trouble. If he is guilty, we
will give him time to admit his mistakes, to turn aside from it, to repent of
it, to put an end to it. We have sought to bring this about in every way
possible....
STALIN: What was Voroshilov's
reply?
MOLOTOV: Voroshilov's reply
was a good one. I must read Voroshilov's reply to you:
"To Comrade Bukharin: I am returning your letter, in which you have
permitted yourself to make vile attacks on our party leadership. If your
wish was to convince me by this letter of your complete innocence, then you
have succeeded in convincing me of only one thing--namely, that in the future I
should place an even greater distance between us, regardless of the results of
the investigation into your case. And if you do not recant your vile
epithets against the party leadership, then I shall consider you, in addition,
a scoundrel."
Getty & Naumov, The Road
to Terror. New Haven, Conn.: Yale Univ. Press, c1999, p. 382
KALININ ATTACKS
BUKHARIN’S DEFENSE
[Kalinin's speech to the February-March 1937 Plenum of the Central Committee on
February 25th 1937]
And when some people shouted at Bukharin during his speech that, namely, you
are acting like a lawyer, Bukharin replied: "Well, what of it? My
situation is such that I must defend myself." I think, and those
comrades who shouted at him also probably think, when they speak of
"acting like a lawyer," that it doesn't mean that Bukharin should not
defend himself. That's not the point. What it means, instead, is
that, in defending himself, he is employing the methods of a lawyer who wants,
at whatever cost, to defend the accused, even when the latter's case is
completely hopeless.
Getty & Naumov, The Road
to Terror. New Haven, Conn.: Yale Univ. Press, c1999, p. 383
UGAROV DENOUNCES BUKHARIN AND
RYKOV AS LEADERS OF COUNTER-REV RIGHTISTS
[From Ugarov's speech to the February-March 1937 Plenum of the Central
Committee on February 25th 1937]
...The main thing is obvious: The cadres of terrorists and wreckers from the
ranks of the rightists looked upon Bukharin as their leader--directing all of
the center's work.... One thing is absolutely clear, namely, that
Bukharin, Rykov, Tomsky, Uglanov, and Schmidt formed the leading group of
rightists, a real center, which directed all the counter-revolutionary activity
of the rightists,... It is obvious to all of us that Bukharin and Rykov
are waging a struggle against the party, against the Soviet state, that they
have gone over to the camp of our worst enemies, that they have broken off
completely with the party. They are the instigators of the
counter-revolutionary activity of the rightists, of acts of terror and sabotage
unmasked by the organs of the NKVD.
Getty & Naumov, The Road
to Terror. New Haven, Conn.: Yale Univ. Press, c1999, p. 386
ZHUKOV SAYS THE RIGHTIST
LEADERS LIKE BUKHARIN SHOULD BE SHOT
[Zhukov's speech to the February-March 1937 Plenum of the Central Committee on
February 25th, 1937]
...In vain do we bother with this counter-revolutionary gang. In vain do
we try to persuade them. It's hopeless. You'll never succeed in
persuading them. They will be able to [repudiate it] not only here but in
any place, wherever they will be given opportunity to speak. They will repudiate
it a hundred times. Lying and swindling has entered their blood and
accompanies them at every step. They carried out their
counter-revolutionary acts to the best of their ability. For this reason
I am not sure there is any need for us to go on debating this matter. In
my opinion, the matter is so clear after all of these incredible, murderous
testimonies against them....
I end this by saying that these people need to be judged in accordance with all
the principles of our legality. These people must be shot just as [other]
scoundrels were shot.
Getty & Naumov, The Road
to Terror. New Haven, Conn.: Yale Univ. Press, c1999, p. 387
MEZHLAUK SAID THEY WOULD HAVE
TORN BUKHARIN APART WITHOUT STALIN’S PATIENCE
[Mezhlauk's speech to the February-March 1937 Plenum of the Central Committee
on February 25th 1937]
You have been tormenting the party over many, many years, and IT IS ONLY THANKS
TO THE ANGELIC PATIENCE OF COMRADE STALIN THAT WE HAVE NOT TORN YOU POLITICALLY
TO PIECES FOR YOUR VILE, TERRORISTIC WORK. We would have done this long
ago, two months ago, were it not for Comrade Stalin, were it not that policy
dictated by the interests of the working-class predominates in Stalin over his
just sense of indignation, were it not that he can see farther and better than
any of us....
Getty & Naumov, The Road
to Terror. New Haven, Conn.: Yale Univ. Press, c1999, p. 387
KAGANOVICH GETS KULIKOV TO
ADMIT HE WAS TRYING TO KILL STALIN AND HIMSELF
[Kaganovich's speech to the February-March 1937 Plenum of the Central Committee
on February 25th 1937]
I asked Kulikov [when the latter was under arrest]: "You were at my place
in 1932 and apologized then. Does that mean that you were already
engaging in duplicity then?" "Yes, I was, I was even guilty of
duplicity in my relations with you," said Kulikov. Voroshilov then
asked him: "And why did you want to kill Kaganovich?" Kulikov
replied: "[We] wanted to kill him for the same reason we wanted to kill
Stalin--namely, in order to decapitate the leadership."
...We never imagined before 1936 to what depths Zinoviev and Kamenev, who we
had expelled several times from the party, could have sunk, nor to what depths
Pyatakov, Livshits, and others could sink. To what depths they are
capable of sinking--we see this in 1936 in a different light. This is why
we must no longer, in my opinion, continue this magnanimous [policy] of
ours. Our party must be purged of these people.
Getty & Naumov, The Road
to Terror. New Haven, Conn.: Yale Univ. Press, c1999, p. 388
OSINSKY SAYS THE GUILT OF
BUKHARIN AND RYKOV IS OBVIOUS
[Osinsky's speech to the February-March 1937 Plenum of the Central Committee on
February 26, 1937]
...Bukharin and Rykov refute essentially secondary points. They do not
refute the essentials, and the basic accusations against them still
stand.... On the whole, all of their defense is completely inconsistent,
poorly constructed, and spineless. And it is spineless not because
Bukharin and Rykov lack capability but because on all main points they have
nothing to say. In sum, it behooves us to establish the fact that the
situation is extremely clear. The conclusions are also very clear.
Like many other comrades who feel this, I too am baffled why we, in fact, are
continuing this discussion.
Getty & Naumov, The Road
to Terror. New Haven, Conn.: Yale Univ. Press, c1999, p. 390
YAROSLAVSKY SAYS PROOF OF THE
GUILT OF BUKHARIN AND RYKOV IS CLEAR
[Yaroslavsky's speech to the February-March 1937 Plenum of the Central
Committee on February 26, 1937]
Comrades, let's hope that this is the last time that we'll discuss the question
of treasonable members and candidates of the Central Committee in the Central
Committee of our Party. The charge that Bukharin and Rykov have betrayed
our Bolshevik Party is, in my opinion, totally proven. It has been proven
by the investigative materials....
...Any further postponement of this case can only cause us great harm because,
otherwise, the younger members of the party will begin wondering whether we
have solid facts against Bukharin and Rykov. And we do have very solid
facts, incontrovertible facts, proving their guilt. We should keep in
mind the upbringing of our younger generation.
Getty & Naumov, The Road
to Terror. New Haven, Conn.: Yale Univ. Press, c1999, p. 391
BUKHARIN & RYKOV WERE
FAIRLY ALLOWED TO SPEAK 2ND TIME IN THEIR DEFENSE
Allowing those accused of party crimes to speak a second time in rebuttal was a
fairly unusual procedure and was cited by some speakers as proof that the
Central Committee was willing to give the two accused [Bukharin and Rykov]
every fair chance to defend themselves.
Getty & Naumov, The Road
to Terror. New Haven, Conn.: Yale Univ. Press, c1999, p. 392
BUKHARIN CONFESSES HE
COMMITTED MANY POLITICAL SINS AND CRIMES
My [Bukharin] sins before the party have been very grave. My sins were especially
grave during the period of the decisive onslaught of socialism, when, in fact,
our group, serving as an enormous break to the Socialist offensive, caused it
great harm. I've confessed to the sins. I confessed that from 1930
to 1932 I committed many political sins.
Getty & Naumov, The Road
to Terror. New Haven, Conn.: Yale Univ. Press, c1999, p. 399
Arrested in March 1937 for espionage and wrecking, for three months Bukharin
refused to provide the evidence needed to prove the existence of a
conspiracy. Finally, in June, he was forced to make the following
statement:
"After prolonged hesitation I have come to the conclusion that I must
fully confess my guilt before the Party, the working-class, and the country and
finish once and for all with my counter-revolutionary past. I confess
that until recently I took part in an organization of Rights and was, with
Rykov and Tomsky, a member of the organization's center, that this organization
aimed at the violent overthrow of the Soviet regime (by coup d'etat, uprising,
terror), and that it was part of a bloc with the Trotskyite-Zinovievite
organization. I will give details about this."
He began with theoretical confessions, which ought to have shown him that his
fate, like that of millions, was not an accident, but was profoundly
systematic, and prompted by Marxism-Leninism, which grounded his crimes in
theory. Bukharin's "personal evidence" makes astonishing
reading as a human document. He was prepared to confess to anything under
the interrogation of State Security Captain Kogan. As the Chekists were
themselves incapable of penetrating Bukharin's theoretical "errors,"
they told him to write them down himself. He did so in the form of a
philosophical treatise: "1. My general theoretical anti-Leninist
views; 2. The theory of the state and the theory of the dictatorship;
3. The theory of class struggle in conditions of the proletarian
dictatorship; 4. The theory of organized capitalism...." Only
at the end of this "treatise," composed in an NKVD prison, did he
speak of political issues: his struggle against the Party, the origins of his
"school" with its counter-revolutionary aims and so on.
Bukharin's voluminous "theoretical evidence," is perhaps unique as an
occasion when an accused man assisted his interrogators by writing in his own
hand a deposition that sought to trace the sins of his own theoretical
views. "As is known," he began, "Lenin's
"testament" indicates that I did not understand dialectics and had
never studied it seriously. This was entirely true.... [My]
abstract schematism strove to keep up with the "latest
generalizations," detaching them from multi-form, rapidly moving life, and
in this moribund approach to the processes of history and historical life lies
the root of my huge political mistakes, becoming under certain circumstances
political crimes." Bukharin confessed to being not merely
"scholastic," but also anti-Leninist. "As is known, Lenin
accused me of concentrating all my attention on the destruction of the
bourgeois state, on the one hand, and on the classless society, on the
other.... It was precisely here that lay one of the roots of the recent
ideology of the Rights.... The might of the state apparatus of the
nascent and strengthening dictatorship of the proletariat was underrated.
Volkogonov, Dmitrii. Lenin: A
New Biography. New York: Free Press, 1994, p. 292
He [Bukharin] had been true to himself then, as he wrote to Stalin from prison
on 15 April 1937: "I sincerely thought that Brest [would cause] the
greatest harm. I sincerely thought that your policy of '28-'29 was
dangerous in the extreme. I proceeded from the policy to the person, not
the other way round. But what did I do wrong, what let me down?
Anti-dialectical thinking, schematism, striving for literary effect,
abstraction, bookishness."
Volkogonov, Dmitrii. Lenin: A
New Biography. New York: Free Press, 1994, p. 294
The finale of the Bukharin drama was his letter, dated 13 March 1938 and
addressed to the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet, from "Bukharin,
sentenced to death." It was a plea for clemency:
"I regard the sentence of the court as just retribution for the heavy
crimes I have committed against the Socialist motherland, her people, Party and
government. There is not a single word of protest in my soul. I
should be shot 10 times over for my crimes...."
Volkogonov, Dmitrii. Lenin: A
New Biography. New York: Free Press, 1994, p. 302
RYKOV DECIDES HE WILL BE
TREATED BETTER IF HE CONFESSES
[Rykov's second speech to the February-March 1937 Plenum of the Central
Committee on February 26, 1937]
It is now absolutely clear to me that I will be better treated if I confess.
This is absolutely clear to me--and many of my torments will also come to an
end, at whatever price, just so long as it comes to some end.
Getty & Naumov, The Road
to Terror. New Haven, Conn.: Yale Univ. Press, c1999, p. 401
SUMMARY OF FACTS PROVING
BUKHARIN AND RYKOV DESERVED TO BE TRIED
[Resolution of the February-March 1937 Central Committee Plenum on the affair
of Bukharin and Rykov]
1. On the basis of investigative materials furnished by the NKVD, on the
basis of the face-to-face confrontation between Comrade Bukharin & Radek,
Pyatakov, Sosnovsky, and Sokolnikov, as well as on the basis of a thorough and
detailed discussion of the matter at the Plenum, the Plenum of the Central
Committee of the All-Union Communist Party has established that, at a minimum,
Comrades Bukharin and Rykov knew of the criminal, terrorist, espionage, and
sabotage-wrecking activities of the Trotskyist center, and that they not only
did not combat these activities but in fact helped these activities along by
concealing them from the party and not reporting them to the Central Committee.
2. On the basis of investigative materials furnished by the NKVD, on the
basis of Comrade Bukharin's face-to-face confrontation with the rightists--with
Kulikov and Astrov --in the presence of members of the Politburo of the Central
Committee and Comrade Rykov's face-to-face confrontation with Kotov, Schmidt,
Nesterov, and Radin, as well as on the basis of a detailed and thorough
discussion of the matter at the Plenum of the Central Committee, the Plenum of
the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party has established that
comrades Bukharin and Rykov, at a minimum, knew from their followers and
supporters, that is, from Slepkov, Tsetlin, Astrov, Maretsky, Nesterov, Radin,
Kulikov, Kotov, Uglanov, Zaitsev, Kuzmin, Sapozhnikov, and others, that
criminal terrorist groups had been organized, and they not only did not resist
them but in fact encouraged them.
Bearing in mind the above and taking into account the fact that even while
Lenin was alive Comrade Bukharin waged a campaign against the party and against
Lenin himself both before the October Revolution (concerning the dictatorship
of the proletariat) and after the October Revolution (concerning the
Brest-Litovsk peace treaty, the party's program, the nationalities question,
and the role of the trade unions) and the fact that Comrade Rykov also waged a
campaign against the party and against Lenin himself both before the October Revolution
and at the time of the October uprising (he was against the October
Revolution), as well as after the October coup d'etat (he demanded a coalition
with the Mensheviks and Socialist-Revolutionaries, and, as a sign of protest,
he quit his post of commissar for foreign affairs, for which he received from
Lenin the nickname of "strikebreaker"), and that all this speaks
indubitably of the fact that the political fall of comrades Bukharin and Rykov
is not merely fortuitous or unexpected--taking into account all this, the
Plenum of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party considers that
Comrades Bukharin and Rykov deserve to be immediately expelled from the party
and brought to trial before the military tribunal.
Getty & Naumov, The Road
to Terror. New Haven, Conn.: Yale Univ. Press, c1999, p. 408
[Stalin said in a June 1937 speech], Rykov. We have no proof that
he himself gave secrets to the Germans, but he instigated and got that
information through his own people, while others gave the secrets to the
Germans. Enukidze and Karakhan worked with him very closely--both became
spies; Karakhan from 1927, as also Enukidze from the same year. We know
through whom these messages and secrets were given, through whom they exported
their messages and by what routes --this was through a person working in the
German Embassy in Moscow. We know. Rykov knew that also. We
have no proof that he himself was a spy, but he was the courier, tied in to
German fascists.
Lucas and Ukas. Trans. and Ed.
Secret Documents. Toronto, Canada: Northstar Compass, 1996, p. 109
STALIN LISTS OPTIONS OF WHAT
TO DO WITH BUKHARIN AND RYKOV
[Stalin's February 27th 1937 report to the February-March 1937 Central
Committee Plenum on the commission on the affair of Bukharin and Rykov]
Comrades, the commission of the Central Committee plenum has entrusted me with
the task of reporting to you the results of its work. Permit me to read
you the report. The members of the commission were all in accord that, at
a minimum, Bukharin and Rykov should be punished by being expelled from the
list of candidate members of the Central Committee and from the ranks of the
All-Union Communist Party. There was not a single person on the commission
who expressed himself against this proposal. There were differences of
opinion as to whether they should be handed over for trial or not handed over
for trial, and if not, then as to what we should confine ourselves to.
Part of the commission expressed itself in favor of handing them over to a
military tribunal and having them executed. Another part of the
commission expressed itself in favor of handing them over for trial and having
them receive a sentence of ten years in prison. A third part expressed itself
in favor of having them handed over for trial without a preliminary decision as
to what should be their sentence. And, finally, a fourth part of the
commission expressed itself in favor of not handing them over for trial but
instead referring the matter of Bukharin and Rykov to the NKVD. The last
named proposal won out....
If we look at the Trotskyists and Zinovievists, we see that they were expelled
from the party, then restored, then expelled again. If we look at
Bukharin and Rykov, we see that they had never been expelled. We should
not equate the Trotskyists and Zinovievists, who once, as you well know, staged
an anti-Soviet demonstration 1927, with Rykov and Bukharin. There are no
such sins in their past.
Getty & Naumov, The Road
to Terror. New Haven, Conn.: Yale Univ. Press, c1999, p. 409-410
FOUR OPTIONS AND THE DECISION
AS TO WHAT TO DO WITH BUKHARIN AND RYKOV
[Protocol of the February 27th, 1937 meeting of the Commission of the Central
Committee on the matter of Bukharin and Rykov]
Discussion: of the suggestions of members of the commission.
1. Yezhov-- to expel
Bukharin and Rykov as candidate members of the Central Committee and members of
the All-Union Communist Party and to transfer them to the military tribunal
with application of the highest measure of punishment--shooting.
2. Postyshev,
Shkiriatov, Antipov, Khrushchev, Nikolaeva, Kosior, Petrovsky, Litvinov, --to
expel from the ranks of candidate members of the Central Committee and as
members of the All-Union Communist Party, to transfer them to court without
application of the death
penalty.
3. Budenny, Manuilsky,
Shvernik, Kosarev, Yakir --to expel from the ranks of candidate members of the
Central Committee and as members of the All-Union Communist Party, to transfer
them to court with application of the death penalty.
4. Stalin, Ulianova,
Krupskaya, Vareikis, Molotov, Voroshilov --to expel from the ranks of candidate
members of the Central Committee and as members of the All-Union Communist
Party, not to send them to court but rather transfer their case to the NKVD.
DECISION:
1. To expel from the
ranks of candidate members of the Central Committee and as members of the
All-Union Communist Party, not to send them to court but rather transfer the
case of Bukharin and Rykov to the NKVD (adopted unanimously).
Getty & Naumov, The Road
to Terror. New Haven, Conn.: Yale Univ. Press, c1999, p. 412
The plenum appointed a commission of 36 members, with Mikoyan in the chair (and
not voting), to report on the question. Twenty spoke. Yezhov,
supported by five others, proposed the expulsion of Bukharin and Rykov from the
Central Committee and the Party, trial before the Military Collegium, and
execution. Postyshev, supported by seven others, including Petrovsky and
Kossior, proposed the same, without the application of execution. Stalin,
supported by five others, proposed merely sending them to the NKVD for further
investigation. Stalin's proposal was eventually accepted unanimously.
Conquest, Robert. The Great
Terror. New York: Oxford University Press, 1990, p. 174
STALIN WAS LEADING THE LENIENT
GROUP
Following Bukharin's exoneration in September 1936 and Stalin's move to delay
proceedings against him at the December 1936 plenum, this was the third time
that Stalin had personally intervened to avoid unambiguously condemning
Bukharin....
We can now finally rule out the notion, so often found in the literature, that
Stalin in the period was backing down before an anti-terror "liberal"
coalition of senior Bolsheviks. Of those often mentioned in such a role
(Kuibyshev, Kirov, Ordjonikidze, and others), none were alive at the time of
the plenum. On the contrary; according to the documents, once again only
Stalin was resisting application of either a prison or death sentence.
Getty & Naumov, The Road
to Terror. New Haven, Conn.: Yale Univ. Press, 1999, p. 416
...Even after Bukharin began to "confess" to the charges against him
(later in June 1937), it would be half a year before Stalin brought him to the
dock.
...certainly treatment of no other repressed oppositionist was moderated so
many times at Stalin's initiative. Even after Bukharin's arrest, his wife
was allowed to live in her apartment in the Kremlin for several months.
Stalin personally intervened to prevent her eviction. About the time
Bukharin began to confess in the summer of 1937, his wife was given the option
to live in any of five cities outside Moscow; she picked Astrakhan.
Although Yezhov wanted to have her shot along with other "wives of enemies
of the people" (according to Beria), Stalin refused.
Getty & Naumov, The Road to
Terror. New Haven, Conn.: Yale Univ. Press, c1999, p. 418
Stalin's position also maintained maximum flexibility. He had not
publicly or wholeheartedly associated himself with Yezhov's charges and had
taken an almost neutral stance at the plenum; he gave Bukharin and Rykov
unprecedented time to answer the charges and in comparison with the other
speakers his demeanor seemed balanced and evenhanded.
Getty & Naumov, The Road
to Terror. New Haven, Conn.: Yale Univ. Press, c1999, p. 418
STALIN REMOVED YEZHOV AND HAD
MANY PURGERS ARRESTED
...Indeed, at the end of 1938 Stalin removed Yezhov, disavowed the latter's
excesses, ordered the arrest of the purgers, and released a number of those
"falsely arrested."
Getty & Naumov, The Road
to Terror. New Haven, Conn.: Yale Univ. Press, c1999, p. 419
You could say he [Yezhov] overreached himself and committed all kinds of
follies. When a man is afraid of losing his job and turns
overzealous...that is called careerism. It is tremendously important
because it keeps growing and is one of the main defects of our time.
By that time Yezhov had sunk to a point of degeneration.... They started
to accuse Yezhov when he began to set arrest quotas by regions, on down to
districts. No fewer than 2000 must be liquidated in such and such region,
no fewer than 50 in such and such district.... That's the reason why he
was shot. His official conduct, of course, had not been subjected to
oversight.... Closer oversight was needed. Oversight was inadequate.
Chuev, Feliks. Molotov
Remembers. Chicago: I. R. Dee, 1993, p. 262
The lack of clarity in the limit approval process is one of the important
lacunae in our knowledge of the mass operations. Was Ezhov authorized to
approve increases without the Politburo’s or Stalin’s
confirmation? Why were some increases run through the Politburo and
others not? Getty, J. Arch. "Excesses are not permitted,
"Russian Review 61 (January 2002) p. 131.
Plans and "control figures" for arrests actually did exist.
Local areas received their arrest plans from Moscow. Telegrams in code
reported that "in your oblast, according to the information of the central
investigating agencies, there were so many terrorists or anti-Soviet
agitators. Find them and try them." The NKVD agencies had to
fulfill these quotas and wait for a new quota the next month or quarter.
One day in 1937 the chief editor of a Ukrainian newspaper, Babinets, was
summoned to the NKVD. He was told to edit the introductory part of an
indictment of "a kulak terrorist center." Working at night in
the NKVD director's office, Babinets heard the director calling the regional
offices of the NKVD, demanding increases in the "index figures" of
the fight against "enemies of the people." "How many did
you take today?" He would shout. "Twelve! Not
enough, far from enough." "And you?" He would say to
another raion. "Sixty? Good, great work. Only watch you
don't drop off at the end of the month." To a third:
"What! You arrested only five people? Have you already built
complete communism in your raion, or what?" And then, turning to
Babinets, he said, "I have to put pressure on. Soon they'll phone
from Moscow, and then what could I tell them, what sort of report could I make?"
Medvedev, Roy. Let History
Judge. New York: Columbia University Press, 1989, p. 515
CHUEV: Did Stalin
himself have any doubts about 1937? Did he speak of any extremes or
excesses?
MOLOTOV: How could he
not have had doubts? And not just doubts. Yezhov, chief of state
security, was executed by firing squad.
Chuev, Feliks. Molotov
Remembers. Chicago: I. R. Dee, 1993, p. 264
IVANOVICH, SHOTA:
Solzhenitsyn writes that Stalin himself placed Yezhov in that job and made him
slaughter the party's key workers.
MOLOTOV: That's not
so. Yezhov was a rather prominent worker who had been promoted
accordingly. Short in stature, slightly built, he was nevertheless a
highly energetic, outstanding worker. But when he was placed in a
position of enormous power and given sweeping directives, it put a strain on
him, and he began to carry out repressions according to a production
plan. Before him, Yagoda had paid for this. But overnight a man
does not show himself in everything. The trees were felled, the chips
began to fly, so to speak.
Chuev, Feliks. Molotov
Remembers. Chicago: I. R. Dee, 1993, p. 294-295
Yezhov had been a rather fine fellow, too. But power intoxicated him and
swept him off his feet. He tried to show off and curry favor.
That's when careerism begins. False evidence, previously set quotas of
enemies: "The numbers of repressed persons are not high
enough!" So everyone tries harder. And what kind of work is
that?
Chuev, Feliks. Molotov
Remembers. Chicago: I. R. Dee, 1993, p. 340
In November 1937, after the celebrations of the October Revolution, I was
summoned to the office of Yezhov, head of the NKVD, accompanied by
Slansky. It was my first meeting with Yezhov, and I was shocked by his
unimpressive appearance. He asked incompetent questions about elementary
matters of intelligence trade-craft. He didn't know basic techniques of
working with a source of information. Moreover, he did not seem to care
about splits in the Ukrainian emigre organization. Yezhov was both
people's commissar of internal affairs and a secretary of the Central
Committee. I sincerely believed I was incapable of understanding the
intellectual qualities that had placed him in such high positions.
Although a tested professional, I remain naive about what to expect from the
leadership, because the ones I had met, Kossior and Petrovsky, Communist party
leaders of the Ukraine, were intelligent and sophisticated.
Sudoplatov, Pavel. Special
Tasks. Boston: Little, Brown, c1993, p. 22
I still regard Yezhov as responsible for grave crimes, but even worse, he was
an incompetent criminal. I am sure that the crimes of Stalinism acquired
such mad dimensions at least in part due to Yezhov's professional incompetence
in intelligence and police matters.
Sudoplatov, Pavel. Special
Tasks. Boston: Little, Brown, c1993, p. 63
Beria boldly told Stalin that Yezhov, who had succeeded Yagoda the year before
as Chief of the Commissariat of the Interior...had passed all bounds of reason
and discrimination in his conduct of the Purge;...
Duranty, Walter. Story of
Soviet Russia. Philadelphia, N. Y.: JB Lippincott Co. 1944, p. 229
In charge of this stage were young, rough, and ignorant examining
prosecutors. These were the Yezhov boys.
Krivitsky, Walter G. I was
Stalin's Agent, London: H. Hamilton, 1939, p. 207
Early in 1938, however, Stalin became disturbed by the mounting fury of the
Ezhovshchina. His purpose of liquidating the old Bolsheviks and the
veterans of the Revolution and the Civil War, and other sources of opposition,
had been achieved. But under Yezhov the purge had spread like a malignant
plague. Everywhere people were spying and informing against each other
and everywhere arrests were on the increase. Terror was raging out of
control. Stalin saw the need to call a halt. He showed the same
sense of timing and the same authority, which he had displayed nearly eight
years earlier with his article "Dizziness From Success."
In January 1938 a central committee passed a resolution which heralded what was
to be called the "Great Change." The title of the resolution
was "Concerning the Mistakes of Party Organizations in Excluding
Communists from the Party, Concerning Formal-Bureaucratic Attitudes Towards the
Appeals of Excluded Members of the Bolshevik Party, and Concerning Measures to
Eliminate These Deficiencies." The new orders were passed quickly to
the party secretaries at every level and to the command points of the NKVD, and
emanating from the Kremlin in Moscow. They were promptly obeyed.
The new enemy was identified now as the Communist-careerist. He had taken
advantage of the purge to denounce his superiors and to gain promotion.
He was guilty of spreading suspicion and of undermining the party. A
purge of careerists was launched. At the same time mass repressions
diminished and the rehabilitation of victimized party members began.
The real halt to the great purge came, however, in July 1938, when Beria was
appointed Yezhov's deputy. He took charge of the NKVD at once, although
Yezhov was not removed until December 1938, when he was made Commissar for
Inland Water Transport. Soon afterwards he was shot.
Many NKVD officers were tried and executed for extracting confessions from
innocent people, while others were relegated to labor camps. Loyal party
members, emerging from the long nightmare, were relieved by the purging of the
NKVD. It confirmed their belief that fascists had insinuated themselves
into the security forces and the government and that they were responsible for
the cruel persecutions and injustices of the Ezhovshchina. This
explanation was encouraged officially, and it absolved Stalin and the Politburo
of responsibility.
Directly controlling every branch of Soviet society and deeply involved in the
buildup of the armed forces and conduct of foreign policy, Stalin could not
maintain detailed control over the purge. He was aware that the NKVD had
arrested many who were not guilty and that of the 7 to 14 million people
serving sentences of forced labor in the GULAG camps many were innocent of any
taint of disloyalty.... He resented this waste of human material.
The aircraft designer Yakovlev recorded a conversation with him in 1940, in
which Stalin exclaimed: "Yezhov was a rat; in 1938 he killed many innocent
people. We shot him for that!"
Grey, Ian. Stalin, Man of
History. London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1979, p. 288
Gulag (an acronym for State Administration of Camps).
McNeal, Robert, Stalin: Man
and Ruler. New York: New York University Press, 1988, p. 142
In 1939 Garanin, like Kashketin, was shot on charges of "espionage"
and "wrecking." Many prison camp directors were removed and
even shot. This was a result of Yezhov's ouster from the leadership of
the NKVD.
Medvedev, Roy. Let History
Judge. New York: Columbia University Press, 1989, p. 512
Many of Yezhov's and Beria's torturers were destroyed in the Stalin era,...
Medvedev, Roy. Let History
Judge. New York: Columbia University Press, 1989, p. 518
Yagoda and Yezhov were both "scum," thought Stalin.
Yezhov was "a rat who killed many innocent people,"
Stalin told Yakovlev, the aircraft designer. "We had to
shoot him," he confided to Kavtaradze. After the war, Stalin
admitted: "One can't believe a lot of the evidence from 1937.
Yezhov couldn't run the NKVD properly and anti-Soviet elements penetrated
it. They destroyed some honest people, our best cadres."
Montefiore, Sebag. Stalin: The
Court of the Red Tsar. New York: Knopf, 2004, p. 324
Isolated, and with many of his former subordinates arrested in a purge of the
NKVD, Yezhov crumbled without a struggle. A few years later Stalin told
the aircraft designer Yakovlev that Yezhov stopped showing up for work and was
at home, drunk, all day. 'The wretch, he killed many innocent people in
1938,' said Stalin, 'for that we shot him',...
McNeal, Robert, Stalin: Man
and Ruler. New York: New York University Press, 1988, p. 212
Beginning in the summer of 1938 a coalition of Politburo members, reportedly
consisting of Zhdanov, Andreev, Kaganovich, Mikoyan, and Molotov, worked to
limit Yezhov’s and the NKVD's powers. In August, Beria was
appointed Deputy People's Commissar of the NKVD without Yezhov's consent.
During the fall, the Politburo restricted the NKVD's power somewhat and appointed
a series of commissions to investigate NKVD operations, arrest procedures, and
Yezhov's performance. The most dramatic move came on 17 November 1938,
when it criticized aspects of the NKVD's work, abolished its troikas that had
summarily sentenced so many to death or hard labor, and condemned its
excesses. On 23 November 1938, Yezhov submitted his resignation as NKVD
chief to Stalin. The Politburo accepted it and replaced him with
Beria. Yezhov retained his other party and state positions until he was
arrested in April 1939. He was executed on 4 February 1940.
Chase, William J., Enemies
Within the Gates?, translated by Vadim A. Staklo, New Haven: Yale University
Press, c2001, p. 306.
BUKHARIN DEFENDS HIMSELF POORLY
His [Bukharin] attempt at defense [at the December 1936 plenum of the Central
Committee] could not have helped him much and probably strengthened Stalin's
hand vis-a-vis the great majority of the Central Committee members.
Bukharin had offered nothing concrete in his favor except his denunciation of
Yakovlev --but that could have been interpreted as a smokescreen. The
point about speaking to Pavlov and Rolland [in which he allegedly defended the
government's policies] was worthless. All that Bukharin really counted on
was his long service in the party and his personal honor; he asked people to
take his word about his honesty over the testimony of numerous others.
And he himself said that he had struggled in the late 1920s against pressure on
the peasants. But by 1936 it appeared, correctly or not, that that
policy, culminating in collectivization, had enabled industrialization to take
off.
More important for understanding his [Bukharin] fate and the course of the
Terror was his admission that some sort of "conference" of his young
followers had occurred in 1932. Apparently one of them had said in
Bukharin's presence that he wished to kill Stalin. Bukharin now
acknowledged that he had been "two-faced" about his followers and had
not informed the authorities of their discussions. He had believed at the
time, he claimed, that he could lead them back to the party. As for the
accusations that he was linked to foreign espionage services and had fostered
terrorism, all that was false. But by this time Bukharin had lied
repeatedly to Stalin and the whole Central Committee.
Thurston, Robert. Life and
Terror in Stalin's Russia, 1934-1941. New Haven: Yale University Press, c1996,
p. 41-42
[Yevdokimov's report to the Azov-Black Sea Territorial Party Committee on the
February-March 1937 Central Committee Plenum]
Bukharin addressed the Central Committee and the members of the plenum.
He called his speech "Against the slanderers" and accused all of his
friends and all of his underlings of slander. Moreover, he analyzed his
case in a manner that made it appear that all of this had been contrived by the
NKVD, and he attacked the Central Committee. The following legitimate
question was posed to him: "All Right. You have been slandered, but
why then has the man closest to you, Tseitlin, your secretary, slandered you;
why have your followers, whom you have trained and brought up, why have they
slandered you?" Bukharin explained that he had had a quarrel with
Tseitlin. But what about the others? The others--he doesn't know
why. If they had slandered you, then why are they slandering themselves
by confessing to their own counter-revolutionary actions, such as preparations
for terror, etc.? Why? He is at a loss.
Getty & Naumov, The Road
to Terror. New Haven, Conn.: Yale Univ. Press, c1999, p. 440
CCCP DISMISSES SHARANGOVICH
FOR SABOTAGE AND SENDS HIS CASE TO THE NKVD
[Politburo resolution "On the leadership of the Central Committee of the
Communist Party of Byelorussia"]
More than two months ago, the Central Committee of the Communist Party
instructed the new leadership of the Central Committee of the Communist Party
of Byelorussia (Sharangovich) to liquidate the effects of sabotage committed by
Polish spies--namely, Cherviakov, Goloded, Benek, and their fascist-espionage
gang.
In particular, the Central Committee of the Communist Party instructed the new
leadership to liquidate the sovkhozy created by the wreckers on peasant lands at
the order of Polish intelligence and to grant to the kolkhoz members the
personal plots due to them by law.
Sharangovich, first Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party
of Byelorussia; Deniskevich, second secretary; and Nizovtsev, people's
commissar for agriculture of Byelorussia, not only failed to carry out this
assignment of the Central Committee of the Communist Party but did not even set
out to do so. Furthermore, by their acts of sabotage, Sharangovich and
Deniskevich artificially created breadlines throughout Byelorussia.
Instead of turning to the Central Committee of the Communist Party for help,
they concealed this fact from the Central Committee of the Communist Party,
even though the Central Committee of the Communist Party had never refused such
help to Belorussia in the past.
The Central Committee of the Communist Party considers the actions of
Sharangovich, Deniskevich, and Nizovtsev as sabotage, as hostile acts toward
Soviet power and the people of Byelorussia. The Central committee hereby
decrees:
1. That Sharangovich, first Secretary of the Central Committee of the
Congress Party of Byelorussia, be dismissed from his post as an enemy of the
people and that his case, like that of Deniskevich and Nizovtsev, [also]
enemies of the people, be referred to the NKVD.
Getty & Naumov, The Road
to Terror. New Haven, Conn.: Yale Univ. Press, c1999, p. 453
PARTY LEADERSHIP IN THE
ENEMIES HANDS
[Letter from Shcherbakov in Irkutsk to Zhdanov on June 18th 1937]
I consider it necessary to inform you of the following fact:.... The
united Trotskyist-"rightist," counter-revolutionary organization has
been in existence here since 1930-31. At first this organization was led
by Leonov, then by Razumov, so that, notwithstanding further materials, Snegov
ought to be removed from his post because Murmansk is too crucial an
area. The situation in East Siberia appears to be the same as in
Sverdlovsk or in Rostov or perhaps even worse. The party and soviet
leadership was entirely in the hands of enemies.
Getty & Naumov, The Road
to Terror. New Haven, Conn.: Yale Univ. Press, c1999, p. 456
[Aug. 3d 1937 letter by Stalin on agricultural trials]
The Central Committee of the Communist Party orders the regional committees,
the territorial committees, and the central committees of the national
Communist parties to organize, in each district of each region, two or three
public show trials of enemies of the people--agricultural saboteurs who have
wormed their way into district party, soviet, and agricultural organs.
These trials should be covered in their entirety by the local press.
Getty & Naumov, The Road
to Terror. New Haven, Conn.: Yale Univ. Press, c1999, p. 457
[Postyshev's speech to the January 1938 Central Committee plenum]
POSTYSHEV:...The Soviet and
Party leadership were in enemy hands, from the regional leadership at the top
to the district leadership at the bottom.
MIKOYAN: All of it? From
top to bottom?
POSTYSHEV: The entire district
leadership.... According to my count, [the regional leadership] was
riddled with enemies for 12 years. The same holds true for the Soviet
leadership--it too was in enemy hands. These leaders selected their own
cadres. For example, our regional executive committee was infiltrated
right down to the level of technicians by the most inveterate enemies, who had
confessed their sabotage and who conduct themselves [even now] in a brazen
manner. Everyone, from the chairman of the regional executive committee
down, including his deputy, his consultants, and his secretaries--all of them
are enemies. All of the departments of the executive committee were
contaminated by enemies.... Now look at the departments having to do with
trade: There were enemies there, too, who promoted their supporters, who
appointed them to positions everywhere.
BULGANIN: Weren't there any
honest people there?!
POSTYSHEV: Of course there
were.
BULGANIN: It looks like there wasn't
a single honest person there.
POSTYSHEV: I'm speaking of the
top leadership. There was hardly a single honest man, as it turned out,
among the top leaders, which includes the secretaries of the district
committees and the chairmen of the district executive committees. What's
so amazing about it?
MOLOTOV: Aren't you
exaggerating, Comrade Postyshev?
POSTYSHEV: No, I'm not
exaggerating. Take, for example, the leadership of the regional executive
committee. The evidence is there, these people are under arrest, and they
have confessed. They themselves have given testimony of their activities
as spies and enemies.
MOLOTOV: This evidence must be
checked and verified.
POSTYSHEV: This happened quite
simply as follows: Shubrikov and Levin planted many of the enemy cadres from
the center. Just look around you and see how many of our people turned
out to be enemies. Levin promoted all the heads of the political sections
to the positions of secretaries. And the majority of them turned out to
be enemies. Take the secretary of the Ulianovsk City Committee, a Red
professor, an inveterate enemy. The same for the secretary of the Syzran
City Committee, a Red professor, also an inveterate enemy....
KAGANOVICH: You shouldn't
justify yourself by saying that they were all scoundrels.
POSTYSHEV: I never said all of
them; I'm not so completely insane as to call everyone an enemy of the
people. I never said that, I spoke only of the leadership of many of the
district committees....
I repeat, I'm speaking of the
leadership. The regional leadership turned out to be all in enemy
hands--both the soviet and party leadership....
I ask you to check and verify
whether the secretaries of the district committees were rightly or wrongly
expelled. It is possible that there are mistakes here, but it seemed to
us that they were rightfully expelled. The majority of them turned out to
be enemies. This can be verified. They have confessed....
MALENKOV: What right did you
have, Comrade Postyshev, to place the entire membership of the district
committees of the party under the shadow of suspicion and political doubt?...
Getty & Naumov, The Road
to Terror. New Haven, Conn.: Yale Univ. Press, c1999, p. 503-506
POLITBURO ORDERS SHOW TRIALS
TO EXPOSE MASS FARMING SABOTAGE
[Oct. second 1937 Politburo decision on sabotage of livestock]
On the basis of investigative materials furnished by the NKVD of the USSR, it
has been established that the subversive actions of enemies of the people in
regions have taken an especially vicious form of sabotage and wrecking as it
pertains to the development of animal husbandry. These actions have taken
the form:
a) Of carrying on acts of bacteriological subversion by infecting cattle,
horses, herds of sheep, and swine with plague, foot-and-mouth disease, anthrax,
brucellosis, anemia, and other epidemic diseases.
b) Of undermining the work of supplying districts afflicted by epizootic with medications
and disinfectants and by sabotage of biological factories producing serum.
c) Of sabotaging by contracting the sowing acreage of fodder cultures with the
aim of narrowing the food base.
A significant number of veterinarians, zoological technicians, laboratory
assistants of biological factories have been arrested for sabotage in the field
of animal husbandry. As a matter of fact, it was they who organized the
dissemination of infectious diseases leading to the death en mass of the
livestock.
As a result of sabotage carried out in the sphere of animal husbandry, members
of kolkhozy lost several hundred thousand head of cattle and horses this past
year, not to mention small livestock.
With the aim of protecting the kolkhozy and sovkhozy from the sabotage of
enemies of the people, the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR and the
Central Committee of the Communist Party have decided to crush and annihilate
the cadres of wreckers in the field of animal husbandry.
The Council of People's Commissars of the USSR and the Central Committee of the
Communist Party place all secretaries of regional committees, the Central
Committees of the national Communist parties, all republic chairmen of councils
of people's commissars, and all chairmen of executive committees of regions
under the obligation of organizing forthwith show trials for saboteurs in the
sphere of animal husbandry, keeping in mind both unmasked veterinarians,
zoological technicians, and laboratory assistants of biological factories, as
well as officials of local land and sovkhoz departments.
With this aim in mind the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR and the
Central Committee of the Communist Party propose that 3 to 6 open show trials
be organized in each republic and region, that the broad masses of peasants be
involved in them, and that the trials be widely covered in the press.
Getty & Naumov, The Road
to Terror. New Haven, Conn.: Yale Univ. Press, c1999, p. 459
TROIKAS SENTENCED PEOPLE TO BE
SHOT, NOT STALIN
According to official figures released by the Russian government in 1995, of
the 681,000 people sentenced to be shot in 1937-38, 92.6% were sentenced by
troikas. [It's not Stalin]
Getty & Naumov, The Road
to Terror. New Haven, Conn.: Yale Univ. Press, c1999, p. 470
As had often been the case in the past, local repression outdistanced that
envisioned by the center. It is interesting that in nearly all regions,
the precise local numbers proposed to be shot after Stalin's telegram at the
beginning of July were higher than the round-number quotas later approved by
Moscow at the end of the month.
Getty & Naumov, The Road
to Terror. New Haven, Conn.: Yale Univ. Press, c1999, p. 471
CC ATTACKS PEOPLE UNJUSTLY
REPRESSING OTHERS TO LOOK GOOD
The Central Committee resolution of January 1938 provided such a
formulation. It attacked the "false vigilance" of certain
careerist Communists who are striving to...insure themselves against possible
charges of inadequate vigilance through the indiscriminate repression of party
members." Such a leader "indiscriminately spreads panic about
enemies of the people" and "is willing to expel dozens of members
from the party on false grounds just to appear vigilant himself."
"It is time to understand," the resolution asserted, "that
Bolshevik vigilance consists essentially in the ability to unmask an enemy
regardless of how clever and artful he may be, regardless of how he decks
himself out, and not in indiscriminate or "on the off-chance"
expulsions, by the tens of thousands, of everyone who comes within
reach."
Thus the mass depredations in the party were to be blamed (not without some
justification) on former parties secretaries who for the most part had already
been removed.
Getty & Naumov, The Road
to Terror. New Haven, Conn.: Yale Univ. Press, c1999, p. 496
STALIN AND POSTYSHEV WERE NOT
ENEMIES
The documents show that Postyshev had enemies and critics in the party for
years.... But it is hard to avoid the impression that Stalin was not
among Postyshev's longtime enemies.
Getty & Naumov, The Road
to Terror. New Haven, Conn.: Yale Univ. Press, c1999, p. 513
YEGOROV WAS HIDING THE ACTIONS
OF THE GENERALS
[February 9th, 1938 Politburo decision "On Comrade Yegorov"]
a) Comrade Yegorov, first deputy of the people's commissar for defense of the
USSR had acquitted himself very unsatisfactorily during his tenure as chief of
staff of the Workers'-Peasants' Red Army, throwing the work of the general
staff into disarray by delegating power to Levichev and Mezheninov, inveterate
spies working for the Polish, German, and Italian Intelligence agencies.
b)...As is evident from the testimonies of Belov, Grinko, Orlov, and others,
all spies now under arrest, Comrade Yegorov obviously knew something concerning
the existence of an army plot headed by the spies Tukhachevsky, Gamarnik, and
other scoundrels who were formerly Trotskyists, right
Socialist-Revolutionaries, White officers, and so on.
Judging by these materials, Comrade Yegorov attempted to establish contact with
conspirators through Tukhachevsky, a fact mentioned by the spy Bepov, a former
socialist-Revolutionary, in his testimony.
c) Comrade Yegorov, unjustifiably dissatisfied with his position in the Red
Army and knowing something concerning the existence of conspiratorial groups in
the army, decided to organize his own antiparty group, into which he inveigled
Comrade Dybenko and tried to inveigle Comrade Budenny.
Getty & Naumov, The Road
to Terror. New Haven, Conn.: Yale Univ. Press, c1999, p. 521-522
YEZHNOV ADMITS MANY
SUBVERSIVES WERE IN THE GOVT
[Yezhov's November 23rd, 1938 letter of resignation to Stalin]
Investigative work has also suffered from a host of major deficiencies.
The main thing is that investigations of the most important detainees were
conducted by conspirators in the NKVD who had not as yet been unmasked and who
succeeded thereby in putting a stop to the development of the investigative
case, in strangling it at the outset, and, most importantly, in concealing
their co-conspirators in the Cheka.
The area in the NKVD that was most neglected turned out to be that dealing with
the cadres. Instead of taking into consideration that the conspirators in
the NKVD and the foreign intelligence agencies connected with them had
succeeded in recruiting during the past decade--at a minimum--not only the
upper echelons of the Cheka but also the middle echelons and often also
officials on the lower echelons, I was content with the fact that I had crushed
the upper echelons and some of the most compromised officials of the middle
echelons. Many of those who were recently promoted, as has now become
clear, are also secret agents and conspirators.
It is clear that I must bear responsibility for all this.
3. My most serious neglect had to do with the situation, now brought to
light, in the department responsible for the security of members of the Central
Committee and the Politburo.
First of all, a significant number of as yet unmasked conspirators and vile
people who had worked under Pauker are still there.
Second, Kursky, who replaced Pauker and who shot himself to death afterward,
and Dagin, who is now under arrest, have also turned out to be conspirators and
have planted more than a few of their own people in the security service.
I believed in the last two chiefs of the security service. I believed
that they were honest people. I was mistaken and I must bear
responsibility for this....
Third,...I was often mistaken in [my choice of] many employees. I
recommended them to important posts, and now they have been exposed as spies.
Fourth, I am to blame for the fact that I manifested a careless attitude,
totally unacceptable for a chekist, in the way I pursued the task of resolutely
purging the department responsible for the security of members of the Central
Committee and the Politburo. This carelessness is especially unforgivable
as it applies to my dragging out the arrest of the conspirators in the Kremlin
(Briukhanov and others).
Fifth, I am to blame for the fact that, being suspicious of the political
integrity of such people as that traitor Liushkov, former head of the NKVD
board for the Far Eastern region, and, recently, the traitor Uspensky, the
people's commissar of the Ukrainian SSR, I did not take sufficient, chekist
preventive measures. I thereby made it possible for Liushkov to escape to
Japan and for Uspensky to escape who knows where, and the search for him is
still going on.
...Yet, despite all these great deficiencies and blunders in my work, I must
say that, thanks to the leadership exercised daily by the Central Committee,
the NKVD inflicted a crushing blow on its enemies.
Getty & Naumov, The Road
to Terror. New Haven, Conn.: Yale Univ. Press, c1999, p. 539
BUKHARIN TELLS STALIN HE WILL
NOT TAKE BACK ANY OF HIS CONFESSION
[Dec. 10, 1937 letter of Bukharin to Stalin]
...In order to avoid any misunderstandings, I will say to you from the outset
that, as far as the world at large (society) is concerned: a) I have no
intention of recanting anything I've written down [confessed];
Getty & Naumov, The Road
to Terror. New Haven, Conn.: Yale Univ. Press, c1999, p. 556
[Bukharin continues] My head is giddy with confusion, and I feel like yelling
at the top of my voice. I feel like pounding my head against the wall....
I bear not one iota of malice toward anyone, nor am I bitter. I'm not a
Christian. But I do have my quirks....
When I was hallucinating, I saw you several times and once I saw Nadezhda
Sergeevna [Stalin's late wife]. She approached me and said: "What
have they done with you, Nikolai? I'll tell Joseph to bail you
out." This was so real that I was about to jump and write a letter
to you and ask you to...bail me out! Reality had become totally mixed up
in my mind with delusion....
...I have done all this in advance, since I have no idea at all what condition
I shall be in tomorrow and the day after tomorrow, etc.. Being a
neurasthenic, I shall perhaps feel such universal apathy that I won't be able
even so much as to move my finger.
Getty & Naumov, The Road
to Terror. New Haven, Conn.: Yale Univ. Press, c1999, p. 558
...Yezhov admitted to nothing in connection with the charges against him.
In his statement, however, Bukharin admitted to a bit more than he had at the
February 1937 Central Committee plenum. There he had denied any knowledge
of the activities, conspiratorial or otherwise, of his former followers after
1930. In this letter, however, he admitted to knowing that they were up
to something as late as 1932 and not telling Stalin about it out of pity or a
belief that he could reform them: "I once heard someone say that someone
had yelled out something...or something of the sort. And, yes, I
concealed this fact, feeling pity for the 'gang.'... I was also guilty of
engaging in duplicity in 1932 in my relations with my 'followers,' believing
sincerely that I would thereby win them back wholly to the party."
It is difficult to see how such an admission could have done anything other
than destroy any credibility Bukharin may have still had. Along with his
testimony at the last two plena he attended, it represented another in a series
of incremental concessions, each more damning than the last. Stalin might
thus have legitimately wondered at what point Bukharin was telling (or would
tell) the whole truth about his connections and knowledge of others' activities.
Getty & Naumov, The Road
to Terror. New Haven, Conn.: Yale Univ. Press, c1999, p. 563
THERE IS NO SOFT LIBERAL GROUP
OPPOSING STALIN AND KEEPING HIM IN CHECK
In order to explain some of these zigzags it is also sometimes suggested that
Stalin liked to play a sadistic cat-and-mouse game with his victims.
Aside from the fact that there are no sources supporting this conjecture, the
basic notion is nonsense. It arose as a kind of post hoc explanation of contradictory
initiatives that did not fit scholars' assumptions about Stalin's plans.
No one can read the discourse of the Stalinists throughout the 1930s without
sensing their nervousness, even frequent panic. This was not a time for
play; these were serious matters in which lives were sacrificed to save a
regime its leaders felt was hanging by a thread. Stalin evidently
distrusted the NKVD until late 1936 and the army until mid-1937. It would
have been insufferably stupid of him to play with elite lives in such circumstances,
and no one has ever accused him of being stupid.
Alternatively, it is suggested that there was a group within the Stalinist
elite who attempted to block Stalin's plans for terror. This group is
variously said to have included Kirov, Kuibyshev, Ordjonikidze, and Postyshev,
and it has been claimed that their resistance to Stalin's plan for terror
forced the dictator to zig and zag to appease or fool them. We have
already noted the lack of any documentary evidence for such a group.
Rather we have seen time and again how the nomenklatura "we" closed
ranks against "them" as soon as doubts arose about potential
enemies. They voted as a unit without dissent. Kirov was certainly
no softy in Leningrad, and we have texts from Kuibyshev that are equally firm
against the opposition. Now that we have considerable evidence on
Postyshev's conduct and discourse, he becomes practically the last candidate
for "rotten liberalism." According to the leading expert, the
rumored attempts by Ordzhonikidze to save his deputy Pyatakov still lack
documentary support. There was no moderate block.
By accepting a priori that Stalin planned everything and that social and
political relations played no role in the 1930s, even scholars who work very
closely with documents have no choice but to explain zigzags as Stalinist game
playing. Such an explanation is based on no documentary evidence and is
weakened by the inability to find any traces of an anti-Stalin moderate faction.
...Stalin certainly had a drive constantly to prepare his positions and to
increase his personal power and authority. But there is precious little
evidence for a plan for terror.... We have seen several instances in
which Stalin does not seem to have had the most radical or harsh attitude
toward persecuting oppositionists.... On the other hand, Stalin's
"angelic patience" with the opposition (to use Mezhlauk's words) can
be explained in other ways. It could reflect genuine indecision at
various points about how far and when to move against his purported opponents
and threats.
Getty & Naumov, The Road
to Terror. New Haven, Conn.: Yale Univ. Press, c1999, p. 580-581
Ordjonikidze, the commissar of heavy industry after 1932, is often regarded as
a moderate who was opposed to Stalin. Indeed, most of his public
statements after 1932 were moderate in tone--as were Stalin's.... He was
in complete charge of heavy industry--the most important branch of the national
economy--and it is inconceivable that Stalin would leave an opponent in such a
position.
Getty, A. Origins of the Great
Purges. Cambridge, N. Y.: Cambridge Univ. Press, 1985, p. 128
On the one hand, Stalin and his closest associates may already have been
preparing for a major purge and attempting to set in place a series of
decisions, personnel, and practices designed to facilitate a subsequent
unleashing of terror. According to this explanation, the countervailing
soft-line measures were the result of a liberal faction within the leadership
that tried to block Stalin's plans. Said to consist of Kirov, Kuibyshev,
or Ordjonikidze, and others, this group would have favored a general relaxation
of the dictatorship; now that capitalism and the hostile class forces had been
defeated, there was no reason to maintain a high level of repression.
But the documents now available make this view untenable. There is little
evidence for such a plan on Stalin's part nor of the existence of a liberal
faction within the Politburo. Above and beyond routine squabbles over
turf or the technicalities of implementation, neither the public statements nor
the documentary record shows any serious political disagreement within the
Stalin group at this time.
Getty & Naumov, The Road
to Terror. New Haven, Conn.: Yale Univ. Press, c1999, p. 102
Kirov's speech to the 1934 party congress, often taken as a sign of his
liberalism, actually praised the secret police's use of forced labor and
ridiculed the opposition. The thunderous applause Kirov received is
sometimes used to show that he was more popular than Stalin. But Kirov
was identified with Stalin, and the parts of his speech producing general
ovations were the parts in which he praised Stalin and abused the opposition.
Applause for him and his accomplishments in Leningrad was rare and only
polite. Careful scrutiny of Kirov's speeches and writings reveals little
difference between them and Stalin's utterances, and Soviet scholars familiar
with closed party archives scoff at the notion that Kirov was a moderate, an
opponent of Stalin, or the leader of any bloc.
[Footnote: The memoir of one of Kirov's Leningrad co-workers can remember
nothing from his experience with Kirov that suggests "liberal"
opposition to Stalin.]
Getty and Manning. Stalinist
Terror. Cambridge, NY: Cambridge University Press, 1993, p. 45
STALIN WAS PREPARED FOR THE
ATTACK WHEN IT CAME
CHUEV: But if you had
ordered the army...
MOLOTOV: That's what a
provocation is.
CHUEV: Why would it be a
provocation? Better to let them attack the unarmed? To give
military men leave?...
MOLOTOV: We were not
unarmed, we were on alert. And no one would work for a year without a
vacation. To my mind it was impossible to insure against a surprise
attack in our condition....
Stalin is portrayed as vain and willful, as though everything would be as he
wished.... This is wrong and slanderous. But as to the surprise
that unfortunately happened, it couldn't have happened differently....
No one could have done more than Stalin in that situation--not only during the
war but before the war and after it.
Chuev, Feliks. Molotov
Remembers. Chicago: I. R. Dee, 1993, p. 29
MOLOTOV: But if Stalin
is to blame for everything, then he built socialism alone and won the war
alone. Even Lenin didn't rule alone, and Stalin wasn't the only one in
the Politburo. Everyone bore responsibility. Of course, Stalin's
situation then wasn't easy. It's not true that we didn't know. After
all, Kirponos and Kuznetsov put their troops on alert but Pavlov
didn't.... The military men, as always, turned out to be helpless.
But military men blame everything on Stalin--that he hobbled initiative, that
they had to wait for his orders.
Everyone wants to pass responsibility to someone else....
I read the beginning of Berezhkov's book.... I've read only the first
hundred pages, and I've noticed two things with which I cannot agree. One
is that Stalin thought that Hitler wouldn't attack the USSR that year.
How could he put such words into Stalin's mouth, especially now when you can
accuse him of anything? And he cannot defend himself, and no one can do
it for him. All the more, "Stalin believed, Stalin thought..."
as if anyone knew exactly what Stalin thought of the war! ... in my
opinion there are no grounds to assert that Stalin believed the war wouldn't
come that year. No one can say that about another person. That's
the first thing.
Second, he mentions a TASS report. A week or so before the war it was
announced in a TASS bulletin that the Germans were taking no actions against
us, that we were maintaining normal relations. It was, I think, Stalin's
idea. Berezhkov reproaches Stalin, saying there was no ground for such a
report. This was a diplomatic game. A game, of course. And it
didn't work. Not every attempt yields good results, but the attempt
itself was not a bad idea. Berezhkov writes that it was patently
naive. It wasn't naivete but a diplomatic move, a political move.
In this case it didn't work, but there was nothing unacceptable or
impermissible about it. And it wasn't stupid but, so to speak, an attempt
to clear up the situation.... But Berezhkov describes it as an obviously
wrong move, as naive. There was nothing naive about it. It was a
highly responsible action. The move was aimed at depriving the Germans of
any excuse for an attack. If we had moved our troops out just a bit,
Hitler would have declared, "You see, over there they have moved their
troops forward! Here are the photographs, here are the
activities!" They say we had insufficient troop strength at the
border, but had we started moving troops to the border, we would have given
Hitler an excuse! Meanwhile, we were preparing at full speed.
We had no other way out. So I consider it vile to reproach us for
this. The TASS bulletin was necessary as a last resort.
Chuev, Feliks. Molotov
Remembers. Chicago: I. R. Dee, 1993, p. 30-31
CHUEV: In a way, Stalin
distinguished Hitler from the German military, believing that the war might
begin as a result of their provocations, but that Hitler himself wouldn't have
broken the pact. I don't think Stalin believed that.
MOLOTOV: I don't think
so either. These are very wild speculations aimed to cast doubt upon
Stalin. He wasn't a naive person, he wasn't such a good-natured
simpleton....
Chuev, Feliks. Molotov
Remembers. Chicago: I. R. Dee, 1993, p. 32
Under the German threat, Stalin was swinging towards nationalism, trying to
build, and succeeding to build, a strong power to meet the invasion which he
foresaw.
Duranty, Walter. Story of
Soviet Russia. Philadelphia, N. Y.: JB Lippincott Co. 1944, p. 176
It is a moot point to what extent the USSR and the Red Army were surprised by
Hitler's sudden attack. Powerful Red forces had undoubtedly been
concentrated in the western regions of the USSR, along a vast arc from the
Black Sea to Lake Ladoga, north of Leningrad, and for some months there had
been a steady westward flow of troops and military supplies from Siberia into
European Russia.... The invaders held the advantage of initiative and
broke through the defense by greater weight of manpower and material.
Their advance was rapid, especially across the open plains of the Southern
Ukraine, but never from the outset was there any rout or debacle of the
Russians, such as had occurred in Poland or France.
Duranty, Walter. Story of
Soviet Russia. Philadelphia, N. Y.: JB Lippincott Co. 1944, p. 265
At the time I could not detect in Khrushchev any disapproval of Stalin or
Molotov. Whenever there was talk of Stalin, he spoke of him with respect
and stressed their closeness. He recounted how, on the eve of the German
attack, Stalin had phoned him from Moscow warning him to be on the alert, for
he had information that the Germans might begin operations the next day-- June
22. I offer this as a fact, and not in order to refute Khrushchev's
charges against Stalin concerning the unexpectedness of the German attack.
Djilas, Milovan. Conversations
with Stalin. New York: Harcourt, Brace & World, 1962, p. 123
Despite continuing to hold, with Molotov, to the myth that Hitler would stick
to the Pact and avoid fighting on two fronts, Stalin set about intensifying the
country's defenses. The potential was there. The country now had
one of the mightiest industrial bases in the world, however low its quality,
and it was managed by strong commissars such as Tevosyan, Malyshev, Shakhurin,
Likhachev, Ustinov and Vannikov.
Industrial leaders had been found who could work together with the party
organizations to achieve the impossible at critical moments, to produce
military hardware at fantastically short notice. Stalin knew all his
commissars and many factory managers personally and frequently called them in
for consultation.
Volkogonov, Dmitri. Stalin:
Triumph and Tragedy. New York: Grove Weidenfeld, 1991, p. 373
... in early June he [Stalin] ordered the reinforcement of the Southwestern
sector with a further 25 divisions.
Volkogonov, Dmitri. Stalin:
Triumph and Tragedy. New York: Grove Weidenfeld, 1991, p. 398
The shock was deep but not long-lasting. Before it struck, he [Stalin]
had attempted to do something, issued some orders and tried to inspire the
government agencies to show energy. On June 23, during a discussion on
the creation of a Chief of Staff Headquarters, he surprised everyone by
suddenly interrupting the debate to propose: 'An Institute of permanent
advisers to be created in association with Headquarters....
Volkogonov, Dmitri. Stalin:
Triumph and Tragedy. New York: Grove Weidenfeld, 1991, p. 410
MOLOTOV DENIES ASKING GERMANS
WHY SU DESERVED TO BE ATTACKED
CHUEV: I don't know
whether it's true or not, but who can I ask but you? Allegedly you said
to the Ambassador, "How did we deserve this?"
MOLOTOV: That's an
invented story if you got it from Werth's book. He wasn't there, so how was
he to know? That's pure fabrication. I surely couldn't have said
such a stupid thing. Nonsense. Absurd. Who could he have
gotten it from?
Chuev, Feliks. Molotov
Remembers. Chicago: I. R. Dee, 1993, p. 37
STALIN DID NOT FALL APART
AFTER THE ATTACK BUT WAS VERY DEPRESSED
CHUEV: It is written
that Stalin lost his head and lost the ability to speak in the first days of
the war.
MOLOTOV: I wouldn't say
he lost his head. He suffered, but he didn't show any signs of
this. Undoubtedly he had his rough moments. It's nonsense to say he
didn't suffer. But he is not portrayed as he really was. They show
him as a repenting sinner! Well, that's absurd, of course. As
usual, he worked day and night and never lost his head or his gift of speech....
Stalin said, "We blew it." This referred to all of us. I
remember it well; he simply said, "We blew it." Yes, we blew
it. Such a troubled state Stalin was in then.
Chuev, Feliks. Molotov
Remembers. Chicago: I. R. Dee, 1993, p. 39
MOLOTOV SAYS CHURCHILL WAS THE
SMARTEST 100% IMPERIALIST
MOLOTOV: I knew them
all, the capitalists, but Churchill was the strongest, the smartest among
them. Of course he was a 100 percent imperialist.
Chuev, Feliks. Molotov
Remembers. Chicago: I. R. Dee, 1993, p. 45
To my mind, Churchill, as an imperialist, was the cleverest among them.
Chuev, Feliks. Molotov
Remembers. Chicago: I. R. Dee, 1993, p. 47
"...And Churchill? Churchill is the kind who, if you don't watch him,
will slip a kopeck out of your pocket. Yes, a kopeck out of your
pocket! By God, a kopeck out of your pocket! And Roosevelt?
Roosevelt is not like that. He dips in his hand only for bigger
coins. But Churchill? Churchill--even for kopeks."
He underscored several times that we ought to beware of the Intelligence
Service and of English duplicity, especially with regard to Tito's life.
"They were the ones who killed General Sikorski in a plane and then neatly
shot down the plane--no proof, no witnesses."
Djilas, Milovan. Conversations
with Stalin. New York: Harcourt, Brace & World, 1962, p. 73
Churchill was an imperialist to the core.
Goebbels was the first one to use the "iron curtain." It was
often used by Churchill, that's for sure.
Chuev, Feliks. Molotov
Remembers. Chicago: I. R. Dee, 1993, p. 59
The overriding truth is that Churchill is an imperialist to the core of his
being--which indeed Churchill was, unabashedly so--and could never understand
how important it is for me, Roosevelt, to respect Stalin's wishes and views
wherever possible because of the need of the U.S. and the USSR to co-operate in
the postwar world to wipe out imperialism, colonialism, and other forces
antagonistic to democracy.
Nisbet, Robert A. Roosevelt
and Stalin. Washington, D.C. : Regnery Gateway, c1988, p. 67
MOLOTOV DESCRIBES THE DULLES
BROTHERS
These were brothers [the Dulles brothers] who would pick your pocket and cut
your head off at the same time.
Chuev, Feliks. Molotov
Remembers. Chicago: I. R. Dee, 1993, p. 52
STALIN WANTS SAFE, SENSIBLE
BORDER WITH POLAND
But we, Stalin and I, insisted on having at our border an independent but not
hostile Poland. At the negotiations and even before, disputes raged over
borders--the Curzon Line, the Ribbentrop-Molotov Line. Stalin said,
"Call it what you please, but our border will be here!"
Churchill objected, "But Lvov was never a Russian city!"
"But Warsaw was," Stalin calmly replied.
Chuev, Feliks. Molotov
Remembers. Chicago: I. R. Dee, 1993, p. 53
We cannot lose Poland.
If this line is crossed they will grab us too.
Chuev, Feliks. Molotov
Remembers. Chicago: I. R. Dee, 1993, p. 54
"Churchill wants the Soviet Union to border with a bourgeois Poland, alien
to us, while we cannot allow this to happen," Stalin said. "We
want to have, once and for all, a friendly Poland as our neighbor, and that's
what the Polish people want too."
Zhukov, Georgii. Memoirs of
Marshal Zhukov. London: Cape, 1971, p. 583
Now, Stalin had already insisted that the future government of Poland, which
would be subject to the Soviet government, should accept as the eastern
frontier the Curzon line, leaving the territories which were ethnically
Ukrainian and White Russian to the USSR. The Poles installed in
London would not agree to this, and finally created a situation which
threatened the normal relations between Stalin, Roosevelt, and Churchill.
Delbars, Yves. The Real
Stalin. London, Allen & Unwin, 1951, p. 366
Before a further meeting with the President of the USA Stalin accordingly tried
to enlarge the future Government of Lublin by accepting representatives of the
London Government and of the Polish resistance groups, on condition that all
should solemnly recognize the Curzon line. In exchange, he promised
Poland the territories to the West which she had lost during the centuries of
German pressure. This compensation was economically greater than
the value of the territories lost in the east. He was evidently
seeking to make the new Poland, by gifts bestowed at the expense of the Reich,
a friendly country.... The London Poles proclaimed that those who
accepted the Curzon line were " traitors to their country."
Delbars, Yves. The Real
Stalin. London, Allen & Unwin, 1951, p. 367
THE MAIN ISSUE AT POTSDAM WAS
REPARATIONS
The main question at Potsdam was about reparations....
Chuev, Feliks. Molotov
Remembers. Chicago: I. R. Dee, 1993, p. 53
We took reparations after the war, but these were trifles. Our state was
huge. And these reparations were of old, obsolete equipment. But
there was no other way out. Even if it offered only minor alleviation, it
had to be used.
Chuev, Feliks. Molotov
Remembers. Chicago: I. R. Dee, 1993, p. 60
Although the reparations the Soviet Union was demanding from the satellites
were only a small fraction of the damage they had caused her, there were still
some who thought her "grasping."
Werth, Alexander. Russia; The
Post-War Years. New York: Taplinger Pub. Co.,1971, p. 138
In particular, he [Stalin] demanded reparations to the value of $20 billion
from Germany. This was controversial, but the Western leaders conceded it
to Stalin. More hotly debated was the treatment of Poland.
Service, Robert. Stalin.
Cambridge, Mass.: Belknap Press of Harvard Univ. Press, 2005, p. 465
STALIN AND MOLOTOV SAID FRANCE
SHOULD GET ITS LAND FROM US-BRIT AREA
Then, when the allies suggested giving a zone to France, we said, "Give it
to them from your share--they didn't take part in the fighting."
Well, they allotted it, but our zone remained untouched.
Chuev, Feliks. Molotov
Remembers. Chicago: I. R. Dee, 1993, p. 55
When Churchill and Roosevelt proposed that France be given a share in the
control of Germany he [Stalin] objected, because 'France had opened the gates
to the enemy'. It was his stock argument that the place any nation was to
be allowed to keep in peace should be proportionate to the strength it had
shown and the sacrifices it had borne in war. That the principal favored
Russia more than any other nation goes without saying, for no other nation had
borne sacrifices comparable to hers.
Deutscher, Isaac. Stalin; A
Political Biography. New York: Oxford Univ. Press, 1967, p. 526
SU PAID BACK LEND-LEASE IN PART
We were not repaying in full [Lend Lease]. But we did not renege, we did
not default.
Chuev, Feliks. Molotov
Remembers. Chicago: I. R. Dee, 1993, p. 61
MOLOTOV JUSTIFIES DECLINING
MARSHALL PLAN AID
There was much turmoil. But if Western writers believe we were wrong to
refuse the Marshall Plan, we must have done the right thing.
Absolutely. We can prove it now as easily as two times two is four.
At first we decided in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to propose to all the
socialist countries that they participate; but we quickly realized that was
wrong. The imperialists were drawing us into their company, but as
subordinates. We would have been absolutely dependent on them....
Chuev, Feliks. Molotov
Remembers. Chicago: I. R. Dee, 1993, p. 62
MOLOTOV AND STALIN SUPPORT THE
CREATION OF ISRAEL
MIKHAILOVICH: One point
is not clear to me.... In the formation of the state of Israel, the
Americans were opposed.
MOLOTOV: Everyone
objected but us--me and Stalin. Some asked me why we favored it. We
are supporters of international freedom. Why should we be opposed if,
strictly speaking, that meant pursuing a hostile nationalist policy? In
our time, it's true, the Bolsheviks were and remained anti-Zionist. We
were even against the Bund, though it was considered to be a socialist
organization. Yet it's one thing to be anti-Zionist and antibourgeois,
and quite another to be against the Jewish people.... Otherwise we
favored a separate Israeli state. But we remained anti-Zionist.
Chuev, Feliks. Molotov
Remembers. Chicago: I. R. Dee, 1993, p. 65
Israel has turned out badly. But Lord Almighty! That's American
imperialism for you.
Chuev, Feliks. Molotov
Remembers. Chicago: I. R. Dee, 1993, p. 66
This seems mainly to have been due in part at least to his current maneuvers to
use Israel, whose statehood he had been the first to recognize, against the
West.
Conquest, Robert. Stalin:
Breaker of Nations. New York, New York: Viking, 1991, p. 291
I have met Israelis who received military training in the Soviet Union,
certainly with Stalin's approval. But Stalin later abandoned the
Jewish policy advocated by my father [Beria], which he had supported at the
outset.
Beria, Sergo. Beria, My
Father: Inside Stalin's Kremlin. London: Duckworth, 2001, p. 208
The Jewish Committee continued [after the death of Mikhoels], and Stalin would
be the first to recognize Israel.
Montefiore, Sebag. Stalin: The
Court of the Red Tsar. New York: Knopf, 2004, p. 574
As Israel defended itself against an invasion by five Arab armies, Stalin
authorized arms supplies through Czechoslovakia, an infusion of substantial
support that proved essential to Israel's success in the war.
Naumov & Teptsov. Stalin's
Secret Pogrom. New Haven, London: Yale Univ. Press, 2001, p. 40
STALIN HELPED OTHERS AND
PEOPLE GRUMBLED
CHUEV: Many people are
displeased that we help others too much. They say it's time to take care
of ourselves....
MOLOTOV: In Stalin's
time we helped, too, though we had less wherewithal. Then people
grumbled, too....
If tiny Vietnam, with help from friends, can stand up to American imperialism,
what does the Soviet Union have to fear? Only its own helplessness,
faintheartedness, slackness of discipline.
Chuev, Feliks. Molotov
Remembers. Chicago: I. R. Dee, 1993, p. 66
MOLOTOV’S VIEW OF
PEACEFUL COEXISTENCE
With Brezhnev, in my opinion, the direction is fundamentally weak.
Everything is staked on peaceful coexistence. Of course we need peaceful
coexistence, but you have to remember that is not guaranteed us.
Chuev, Feliks. Molotov
Remembers. Chicago: I. R. Dee, 1993, p. 67
STALIN AND MOLOTOV KEPT CLOSE
CHECKS ON ALL DIPLOMATS
...But we had honest, prudent, competent, and well-read diplomats. I
think it was hard to fool us because Stalin and I kept a tight hold on
everything--we couldn't do it any other way at the time.
Chuev, Feliks. Molotov
Remembers. Chicago: I. R. Dee, 1993, p. 69
I don't recall our ever being cheated by foreign diplomacy. Of course, in
some cases we acted more skillfully, and others less. We were always
careful and didn't pull any big blunders, to my mind. But there were
small mistakes, of course.
Chuev, Feliks. Molotov
Remembers. Chicago: I. R. Dee, 1993, p. 70
But it seems that diplomats
need special training. They're not just party
workers.
I personally was never specially trained. My experience was party work
and party polemics....
Chuev, Feliks. Molotov
Remembers. Chicago: I. R. Dee, 1993, p. 76
PARTY WORKERS AVOID DEBATES
AND FOCUS NOWADAYS ON PETTY ISSUES
CHUEV: Party workers
don't have such experience nowadays.
MOLOTOV: No they don't.
They would prefer to argue about how much production has increased, or the
productivity of collective farmers. This too is important and
interesting, but it is not polemics, not fighting with the opposition.
Chuev, Feliks. Molotov
Remembers. Chicago: I. R. Dee, 1993, p. 76
MOLOTOV SAYS MAO WAS NEVER A
MARXIST AND HAD IMPRACTICAL IDEAS
I talked with Mao and then suggested to Stalin that he receive him. He
was a clever man, a peasant leader, a kind of Chinese Pugachev. He was far
from a Marxist, of course--he confessed to me that he had never read Marx's Das
Kapital....
When I was in Mongolia talking with the Chinese ambassador--he was nice to
me--I said, "You want to create a metals industry quickly, but the measures
you have planned--backyard blast furnaces--are improbable and won't
work." I criticized the Chinese, and our people reproved me
later. But it was such obvious stupidity!... Backyard blast furnaces to
produce worthless metals--nonsense.
Chuev, Feliks. Molotov
Remembers. Chicago: I. R. Dee, 1993, p. 81
CHOU EN-LAI WAS PRACTICAL AND
CLEVER BUT NO THEORIST
I had to deal with Chou En-lai. He was a courteous, well-read man, a
practical worker rather than a theorist. But very clever.
Chuev, Feliks. Molotov
Remembers. Chicago: I. R. Dee, 1993, p. 82
MOLOTOV SPOKE AGAINST TITO BUT
NO ONE SUPPORTED HIM
In 1953-54 I spoke out [against reconciliation with Tito's] Yugoslavia at the
Politburo. No one supported me, neither Malenkov nor even Kaganovich,
though he was a Stalinist! Khrushchev was not alone. There were
hundreds and thousands like him, otherwise on his own he would not have gotten
very far. He simply pandered to the state of mind of the people.
But where did that lead? Even now there are lots of Khrushchev's....
Chuev, Feliks. Molotov
Remembers. Chicago: I. R. Dee, 1993, p. 83
MOLOTOV SAYS KHRUSHCHOV IS A
NATIONALIST BUT SUPPORTS NATIONALISM
Nationalism is causing him to howl in pain, yet he himself is a nationalist,
and that is his main defect as a communist. He is a nationalist; that is,
he is infected with the bourgeois spirit. He is now cursing and
criticizing his own people for nationalism. This means that the Yugoslav multinational
state is breaking up along national lines. It is composed of Serbs,
Croatians, Slovenes, and so forth.
Chuev, Feliks. Molotov
Remembers. Chicago: I. R. Dee, 1993, p. 83
MOLOTOV SAYS TITO IS A
PETTY-BOURGEOIS OPPOSED TO SOCIALISM
Tito is not an imperialist, he is a petty bourgeois, an opponent of socialism.
Chuev, Feliks. Molotov
Remembers. Chicago: I. R. Dee, 1993, p. 84
MOLOTOV SAYS LENIN WANTED TO
GO PAST A BOURGEOIS GOVT TO SOCIALISM
While we opposed Kerensky's bourgeois government as counter-revolutionary, we
had not yet arrived at the conclusion drawn by Lenin: a Soviet government,
Soviet power based on the Soviets. Nothing of the kind. I defended
the democratic revolution and did not dream of a socialist revolution.
Chuev, Feliks. Molotov
Remembers. Chicago: I. R. Dee, 1993, p. 91
MOLOTOV SAYS STALIN ERRED BY
SUPPORTING THE BOURGEOIS GOVT
It was after I had been removed from the editorial staff [of Pravda] that the
notorious editorial "A Bullet for a Bullet!" written by Kamenev
appeared in Pravda. Answer the Germans bullet for bullet, he wrote.
This was the defensist line. Yet Stalin was on the editorial board at the
time. Herein lies the source of the error. As long as I was on the
board, such things did not happen. This was Stalin's mistake.
And here is another one of his mistakes from this period--an article later
printed in his collected works. I am still surprised that he concluded it
there. Take 1917. There is an article on the question of the
war. It follows the line of reasoning that held it necessary to struggle
for peace and take advantage of whatever the Provisional Government was doing
for peace. This, of course, was not at all the essence of Lenin's
line. But this article was published. It is precisely analogous
with Kamenev's editorial "A Bullet for a Bullet!" Because it
too held that the Provisional Government must be supported "to the extent
and so long as" it seeks peace. Perhaps I am exaggerating, but just
read it. Why did Stalin include it in his collected works? After
all, Stalin mastered the exceptional language of the propagandist--classical
language, precise, terse, and clear. Yet he got this notion into his head.
But he made a mistake.
Chuev, Feliks. Molotov
Remembers. Chicago: I. R. Dee, 1993, p. 92
MOLOTOV SAYS TROTSKY WAS AN
ORGANIZER NOT AN AGITATOR
Did Trotsky play a large role?
Big, but only as an agitator. He took only a small part in matters of
organization....
Chuev, Feliks. Molotov
Remembers. Chicago: I. R. Dee, 1993, p. 95
Trotsky himself learned a lot and transformed himself from propagandist to
organizer. But he was still unable to reach great heights in this
arena. Without taking the transport scandal into account, he created
nothing effective when it came to fighting for power. In the field of
organization, mediocrities like Molotov beat him all along the line.
Bazhanov, Boris. Bazhanov and
the Damnation of Stalin. Athens, Ohio: Ohio University Press, c1990, p. 116
LENIN PROPOSED CALLING IT THE
COUNCIL OF COMMISSARS NOT MINISTERS
"What shall we call the government?" Lenin asked us. It
was decided that "Council of Ministers" smacked bourgeois. Someone
proposed “Council of People's Commissars." In France the term
"commissar" was widely used. Commissars of police, municipal,
and so forth. At the time France was closer to us in spirit than
Germany,...
Chuev, Feliks. Molotov
Remembers. Chicago: I. R. Dee, 1993, p. 95
TROTSKY’S ROLE JUST
AFTER THE REVOLUTION STARTED WAS COMMENDABLE
This was the only time Trotsky acquitted himself quite well. He was an
excellent speaker, and oratorical skill is important in holding an
audience. And he had that skill. He was a spellbinder, and that is
why later on the fight against him was difficult.
Chuev, Feliks. Molotov
Remembers. Chicago: I. R. Dee, 1993, p. 97
LENIN RELEGATED BUKHARIN TO
OBSCURE ROLE IN FIRST POLITBURO
I was chosen as the first alternate to the Politburo so that I could replace
the first absent member of the body. Kalinin was second, and Bukharin was
third. Since there were five members, Bukharin never actually had the
opportunity to replace anyone. Lenin had decided this.
Chuev, Feliks. Molotov
Remembers. Chicago: I. R. Dee, 1993, p. 99
CRITICS DON’T UNDERSTAND
THE ACCURACY OF LENIN
When you read our contemporary economists and philosophers...it is evident they
are spinning incredible tales as regards foreign policy. The main error,
of course, is that they do not understand the kernel, so to speak, of the
Leninist approach. Lenin consistently and pointedly undermines capitalism
and bourgeois ideology from the most diverse angles. Take Lenin--his
every work, every line is a bomb thrown at imperialism. That's the main
thing in Lenin.
Chuev, Feliks. Molotov
Remembers. Chicago: I. R. Dee, 1993, p. 101
IT WAS HARD FOR LENIN TO
BELIEVE MALINOVSKY WAS A POLICE AGENT
...When Malinovsky--a deputy of the state Duma, a Bolshevik, a member of the
central committee of the Russian Social Democratic Labor Party, the best
Bolshevik speaker--was exposed as a police agent, Lenin did not believe
it. Malinovsky was a lively, resourceful fellow.... But he became
unpleasant when you discovered he was a scum.
Chuev, Feliks. Molotov
Remembers. Chicago: I. R. Dee, 1993, p. 101
LENIN KEPT BOLSHEVIK SPIRITS
HIGH
Lenin wasn't one to be downcast, and he knew how to make use of
everyone--Bolsheviks, half-Bolsheviks, and quarter-Bolsheviks alike, but only
literate ones. They were few.
Chuev, Feliks. Molotov
Remembers. Chicago: I. R. Dee, 1993, p. 102
LENIN PRACTICED SOME
REALPOLITIK FACTIONALISM OF HIS OWN
But at the 11th Congress there appeared a "list of 10," the names of
the members of the Central Committee, backers of Lenin, slated for election to
the Politburo as members and candidate members. And alongside Stalin's
name "General Secretary" was written, in Lenin's handwriting.
Lenin had organized a factional meeting of "the 10.." He had
found a room somewhere near Sverdlov Hall in the Kremlin. It had been
agreed that this was to be a factional meeting, that the Trotskyists, the
Workers' Opposition, and the Democratic Centralists should not be
invited. Only the supporters of "the ten," the Leninists, were
to be present. Before the voting Lenin had assembled, as I recall, some
twenty people from the larger organization. Stalin, it is said, even
reproached Lenin for holding a secret or semi secret conference during the
Congress, because it looked like a faction, and Lenin responded, "Comrade
Stalin, you are an old, experienced factionist yourself! Don't
worry. At present we cannot do this any other way. I want everyone
to be well-prepared for the vote, and the comrades must be told that they are
to vote firmly for the list without any amendments! This list, as it
stands, must be passed as a bloc....”
Chuev, Feliks. Molotov
Remembers. Chicago: I. R. Dee, 1993, p. 104
ZINOVIEV WAS COWARDLY AND HIS
SUBORDINATE KAMENEV ACTUALLY GUIDED HIM
Zinoviev was cowardly; Kamenev had character. He actually guided
Zinoviev. But Zinoviev was considered superior to Kamenev, who was merely
his assistant or adviser. Zinoviev was the chief.
Chuev, Feliks. Molotov
Remembers. Chicago: I. R. Dee, 1993, p. 106
LENIN KEPT DZERZHINSKY OFF THE
POLITBURO
But Lenin did not admit Dzerzhinsky into the Politburo. Lenin could not
forgive Dzerzhinsky for his lack of support in the Brest peace talks and in the
trade union discussions.
Chuev, Feliks. Molotov
Remembers. Chicago: I. R. Dee, 1993, p. 107
LENIN WAS MORE SEVERE AND LESS
LENIENT THAN STALIN
CHUEV: Who was more
severe, Lenin or Stalin?
MOLOTOV: Lenin, of
course. He was severe. In some cases he was harsher than
Stalin. Read his messages to Dzerzhinsky. He often resorted to
extreme measures when necessary. He ordered the suppression of the Tambov
uprising, that everything be burned to the ground. I was present at the
discussion. He would not have tolerated any opposition, even had it
appeared. I recall how he reproached Stalin for his softness and
liberalism. "What kind of a dictatorship do we have? We have a
milk-and-honey power, and not a dictatorship!"
CHUEV: Where is it
written that he reproached Stalin?
MOLOTOV: It was in a
small circle among us.
Here is a telegram from Lenin to a provincial food commissar in his native
Simbirsk in 1919: "The starving workers of Petrograd and Moscow are
complaining about your inefficient management.... I demand from you
maximum energy, a no-holds-barred attitude to the job, and thorough assistance
to the starving workers. If you fail, I will be forced to arrest the
entire staff of your institutions and to bring them to trial.... You must
immediately load and send off two trains of 30 cars each. Send a telegram
when this is complete. If it is confirmed that, by four clock, you did
not send the grain and made the peasants wait until morning, you will be
shot. Sovnarkom Chairman, Lenin."
I remember another case. Lenin had received a letter from a poor peasant
of Rostov province saying that things were bad with them, that no one paid any
attention to them, the poor peasants, that there was no help for them and that,
on the contrary, they were oppressed. Lenin proposed the formation of a
group of "Sverdlovers [adults from Sverdlov University]...."
Lenin directed this group to go to the place in question and, if the report was
confirmed, to shoot guilty parties right then and there and to rectify the
situation.
What could be more concrete? Shoot on the spot and that's that!
Such things happened. It was outside the law, but we had to do
it.... Lenin was a strong character. If necessary, he seized people
by the scruff of their necks.
CHUEV: They say that
Lenin had nothing to do with the execution of the tsar’s family in 1918,
that it was a decision of the local authorities following Kolchak’s
attack.... But some people say it was revenge for Lenin’s brother.
MOLOTOV: They make Lenin
out to be a crank. They are small-fry philistines who think this.
Don’t be naive.
I think that, without Lenin, no one would have dared to make such a
decision. Lenin was implacable when the Revolution, Soviet power, and
communism were at stake. Indeed, had we implemented democratic solutions
to all problems, this would surely have damaged the state and the party.
Issues would have dragged on for too long and nothing good would have come of
this sort of formal democracy. Lenin often resolved critical problems by
himself, on his own authority.
Chuev, Feliks. Molotov
Remembers. Chicago: I. R. Dee, 1993, p. 107-109
I understand the feelings of those who wrote about rural life. They took
pity on the muzhik. But what could you do? Sacrifices were
unavoidable. Some argue that Lenin would have never pursued that kind of
policy. But in matters like that Lenin was more severe than Stalin.
Many suggest that Lenin would have reexamined his stand on the proletarian
dictatorship, that he wasn't a dogmatist, and so on. But this is said by
people who very much would have liked him to revise his views!
Chuev, Feliks. Molotov
Remembers. Chicago: I. R. Dee, 1993, p. 251
Of course Lenin displayed more flexibility in certain cases. Stalin was
less tolerant. But, on the other hand, Lenin demanded that Zinoviev and
Kamenev be expelled from the party in the days of the October Revolution, and
Stalin defended them. It could go either way depending on the case.
But it cannot be said that Lenin was soft. He didn't spend his time
wiping children's snotty noses. Lenin should not be portrayed like that.
Chuev, Feliks. Molotov
Remembers. Chicago: I. R. Dee, 1993, p. 270
Lenin started the concentration camps, established the Cheka. Stalin just
continued them.
Chuev, Feliks. Molotov
Remembers. Chicago: I. R. Dee, 1993, p. 411
... Moreover, it was he [Lenin] who fostered the terror, forced labor camps,
suppression of all opposition, monolithic organization of party and state, and
other aspects of the Soviet system, which are anathema to Western liberal
opinion and which are popularly attributed to Stalin.
Grey, Ian. Stalin, Man of
History. London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1979, p. xii
A friend of mine met Molotov before his death and he told Molotov, "You
know, it's a pity that Lenin died so early. If he had lived longer,
everything would have been normal." But Molotov said, "Why do
you say that?" My friend said, "Because Stalin was a
bloodsucker and Lenin was a noble person." Molotov smiled, and then
he said, "Compared to Lenin, Stalin was a mere lamb."
Remnick, David. Lenin's Tomb.
New York: Random House, c1993, p. 45
...there has grown up in the United States a curious and inaccurate distinction
between Lenin and Stalin. Lenin has been presented as a kind-hearted
idealist--almost a democrat in our sense--whereas Stalin has been pictured as a
ruthless Asiatic dictator.... But Lenin's actions and speeches against
the opposition of the kulaks, the clergy, the bourgeois, landlords, and
generals were just as harsh as anything we know of Stalin. Both men were
agreed in showing no mercy to their enemies, but Lenin's enemies, for the most
part, were outsiders, the foes of the Revolution. Against them he showed
no mercy. By the time Stalin came to power non-Party opposition in the
USSR had been thoroughly defeated.
...That, in short, was the difference--a difference of time and a
personality. In Lenin's day the prime struggle was against the
anti-Bolshevik elements in Russia and outside Russia, the counterrevolution of
Denikin, Kolchak, and Yudenich, supported by the invasion, or intervention, of
French, British, Czechs, Japanese, and Americans. In addition, Lenin's
personal authority was so great that he had no real or prolonged difficulty
with opponents inside the Communist Party. Stalin's situation was
otherwise. Since, by 1924, when Lenin died, internal and external
non-communist enemies had been defeated, Stalin's conflict was within the Party.
Duranty, Walter. Stalin &
Co. New York: W. Sloane Associates, 1949, p. 20
[In a speech delivered to the Political Bureau of the Central Committee of the
Presidium of the Central Control Commission of the CPSU in early 1929 Stalin
stated] It is said that Lenin would certainly have acted more mildly than the
Central Committee is now acting towards Tomsky and Bukharin. That is
absolutely untrue. The situation now is that two members of the Political
Bureau systematically violate Central Committee decisions, stubbornly refuse to
remain in posts assigned to them by the Party, yet, instead of punishing them,
the Central Committee of the Party has for two months already been trying to
persuade them to remain in their posts. And--just recall--how did Lenin
act in such cases? You surely remember that just for one small error
committed by Tomsky, Comrade Lenin packed him off to Turkestan.
TOMSKY: With Zinoviev’s
benevolent assistance, and partly yours.
STALIN: If what you mean to
say is that Lenin could be persuaded to do anything of which he was not himself
convinced, that can only arouse laughter.... Recall another fact, for
example, the case of Shlyapnikov, whose expulsion from the Central Committee
Lenin recommended because he had criticized some draft decision of the Supreme
Council of National Economy in the Party unit of that body.
Who can deny that Bukharin's and Tomsky's present crimes in grossly violating
Central Committee decisions and openly creating a new opportunist platform
against the Party are far graver than were the offenses of Tomsky and
Shlyapnikov in the cases mentioned? Yet, not only is the Central
Committee not demanding that either of them should be excluded from the Central
Committee or be assigned to somewhere in Turkestan, but it is confining itself
to attempts to persuade them to remain in their posts, while at the same time,
of course, exposing their non-Party, and at times downright anti-Party,
line. What greater mildness do you want?
Would it not be truer to say that we, the Central Committee majority, are
treating the Bukharinites too liberally and tolerably, and that we are thereby,
perhaps, involuntarily encouraging their factional anti-party "work"?
Stalin, Joseph. Works. Moscow:
Foreign Languages Pub. House, 1952, Vol. 11, p. 338-340
LENIN FELT PUTTING CAPITALISTS
AND PRIESTS IN THE GOVT WAS INSANITY
...Chicherin wanted NEPmen, priests, and the like to be represented in the
Soviets. This would have pleased the Americans. Lenin underlined
the words "would be possible" and wrote, "Insanity."
Chuev, Feliks. Molotov
Remembers. Chicago: I. R. Dee, 1993, p. 109
LENIN DEMANDS A STATE MONOPOLY
OF FOREIGN TRADE
I recall a deputy chairman of the People's Commissariat of Georgia, Mdivani, an
opportunist. He allowed the import of foreign goods to Batumi. I
was present at the Politburo when Lenin asked him, "What is your
reason?" Mdivani answered, "My reason is cheap
goods." Some Marxist--"for cheap goods"!
Lenin was opposed to any weakening of the monopoly on foreign trade.
Chuev, Feliks. Molotov
Remembers. Chicago: I. R. Dee, 1993, p. 110
But Lenin saw this as a major error, an inadmissible infringement of the
country's interests. In his opinion, it was not only unwise but probably
harmful to allow foreign exporters to enter into direct contact with private
businessmen inside the country, the nepmany, for then "the foreigners will
buy up and take home with them everything of any value."
Lewin, Moshe. Lenin's Last
Struggle. New York: Pantheon Books. C1968, p. 35
Lenin added proof upon proof in an attempt to persuade the Central Committee of
the correctness of his views. Only the strict maintenance of the [trade]
monopoly would remedy the economic weakness of the country. One had to
consider the ability of foreigners to offer special prices, not to mention
conditions in the international market that were in themselves very
advantageous for the Russian agricultural producer. The slightest breach
in the defenses would end by destroying the already weak national industries,
and help to forge an alliance between the forces of international capitalism
and the Russian businessmen on the one hand and the mass of the Russian peasantry
on the other against the power of the Soviets.
Lewin, Moshe. Lenin's Last
Struggle. New York: Pantheon Books. C1968, p. 36
MOLOTOV SAYS KOLLONTAI IS NOT
A REAL REVOLUTIONARY
What did you think of the film
about Kollontai --"The Ambassador of the Soviet Union"?
Kollontai won the war? That's naive.... I knew her well. We
had rather good relations, but she was not a true revolutionary. She came
from the margin. But an honest person. A beautiful woman....
Lenin really took her down a peg. Read his speech at the 10th Party
Congress, where he speaks against the workers' opposition. An opposition
of Shliapnikov and Kollontai, as Lenin derided it, embraced "class-welded
followers."
Chuev, Feliks. Molotov
Remembers. Chicago: I. R. Dee, 1993, p. 111
LENIN SUPERIOR TO STALIN BUT
NOT IN PRACTICAL POLITICS
Of course, Lenin was superior to Stalin. I always thought so. He
was superior in the theoretical sense, superior in his personal
qualities. But no one could surpass Stalin as a practical worker.
Chuev, Feliks. Molotov
Remembers. Chicago: I. R. Dee, 1993, p. 112
Sometimes Stalin would insist that the unity of the party was the supreme good
and that for its sake even principles had to be sacrificed. At other
times he would argue that if necessary to uphold principals a split should not
be avoided. He would resort now to this, now to that argument, depending
on which happened to suit him at a given moment. In disputes his was
always the voice of reason, striving to reconcile lofty standards with
expediency, a model of moderation and a threat to no one. He had no
enemies, except possibly Trotsky, and even him he sought to befriend until
rebuffed:...
Pipes, Richard. Russia Under
the Bolshevik Regime. New York: A.A. Knopf, 1993, p. 466
And Koba after all is a realist. One must give him credit for that....
Litvinov, Maksim Maksimovich.
Notes for a Journal. New York: Morrow, 1955, p. 34
The outstanding talent of Stalin is his ability to tell the executive, the
experts, the groups what is next to be done and how to set about it. He
has been stronger than Lenin but he has added nothing to Leninism except
tactics; add of course will, vigilance, and judgment of character. He is
a general of the economic and political revolution.
Graham, Stephen. Stalin. Port
Washington, New York: Kennikat Press, 1970, p. 140
Historians have long been aware of the disagreement between Lenin and Stalin
over the first constitution of the USSR, but the dispute needs to be freshly
examined because recent events have made it possible for us to assess the
details more objectively. Most previous accounts of this conflict have
questioned Stalin's skepticism about the durability of a "union"
based on the "solidarity of the workers" (i.e. Party discipline), and
various authors have argued that his insistence on the need for tough central
power to hold the entire structure together was wrong. Today, a decade
after the surprisingly rapid collapse ofthe Soviet Union, it can be argued that
Lenin was the one who was politically shortsighted when he proposed a less
restrictive first constitution for the Soviet Union.
Medvedev, Roy & Zhores
Medvedev. The Unknown Stalin. NY, NY: Overlook Press, 2004, p. 263
Analyzing the events of the pre-war period today, it does seem clear that the
strictly centralized economy, which played such a crucial role in the rapid
industrialization of the country, would never have been possible if Lenin's
model for the Union had been adopted. Lenin even went so far as to oppose
a centrally directed general transport system. And if instead of the USSR
with its "autonomous" and "Union" republics (the latter
distinguished by a formal right to secede), an extended Russian Federation had
been established as originally envisaged by Stalin, this certainly would have
led to an even more rapid economic, political, and ethnic integration of the
country. Along with an accelerated process of Russification, there could
have been the genuine birth of a "Soviet people" that paid much less
heed to ethnicity, rather like the experience of the United States.
Medvedev, Roy & Zhores
Medvedev. The Unknown Stalin. NY, NY: Overlook Press, 2004, p. 268
LENIN SAYS BOLSHEVIKS MUST NOT
BE CONCEITED
A 1920 Lenin was forced to celebrate his birthday. He said the main thing
was for communists not to become conceited. Revolutionaries could win if
they did not put on airs.
Chuev, Feliks. Molotov
Remembers. Chicago: I. R. Dee, 1993, p. 113
PREOBRAZHENSKY WANTS STALIN
DISMISSED AS GEN. SEC. BECAUSE HE HAS TOO MANY JOBS
Preobrazhensky was later among the opposition, a Trotskyist. He proposed
that Stalin be dismissed from the position of general secretary on the grounds
that he held too many offices. At the time Lenin strongly defended
Stalin...."
Chuev, Feliks. Molotov
Remembers. Chicago: I. R. Dee, 1993, p. 113
At the Eighth Congress Stalin was re-elected to the Central Committee.
Although the Central Committee was not very large then, a decision was made to
establish a smaller direct body within it--a Political Bureau (Politburo),
which would decide important political issues on a day-to-day basis. The
first Politburo consisted of Lenin, Kamenev, Krestinsky, Stalin, and
Trotsky. The candidate members were Bukharin, Kalinin, and
Zinoviev. An Organizational Bureau (Orgburo) was also established for the
first time to direct the ongoing organizational work of the party. It
consisted of five members: Beloborodov, Krestinsky, Serebryakov, Stalin, and
Stasova. A few days later a decree of the Central Executive Committee
appointed Stalin peoples commissar of state control.
Medvedev, Roy. Let History
Judge. New York: Columbia University Press, 1989, p. 59
At the 11th Party Congress Preobrazhensky proposed that Stalin's powers be
somewhat curtailed. He said in his speech:
"Take Comrade Stalin, for example, a member of the Politburo who is, at
the same time, peoples commissar of two commissariats. Is it conceivable
that a person could be responsible for the work of two commissariats, and in
addition work in the Politburo, the Orgburo, and a dozen Central Committee subcommissions?"
Lenin answered Preobrazhensky as follows:
"Preobrazhensky comes along and airily says that Stalin is involved in two
different commissariats. Who among us has not sinned in this way?
Which of us has not taken on several responsibilities at once? And how
could we do otherwise? What can we do now to maintain the existing
situation in the Commissariat of Nationalities, in order to sort out all the
Turkestan, Caucasian, and other questions? After all, these are political
questions! And these questions have to be answered. They are
questions such as European states have occupied themselves with for hundreds of
years, and only an insignificant portion of such problems have been solved in
the democratic republics. We are working to resolve them and we need a
man to whom representatives of any of our different nations can go and discuss
their difficulties in full detail. Where are we to find such a
person? I think that even Preobrazhensky would be unable to name another
candidate besides Comrade Stalin.
The same thing applies to the Workers' and Peasants' Inspection. This is
a vast business; but to be able to handle investigations we must have someone
in charge who has authority. Otherwise we'll get bogged down in petty
intrigues."
Medvedev, Roy. Let History
Judge. New York: Columbia University Press, 1989, p. 66
At the end of March 1919 Yelena Stasova was elected as chief secretary for the
Central Committee. She encountered difficulties, and in November of the
same year a Central Committee plenum elected Krestinsky to be second secretary
of the Central Committee. In April 1920 a Secretariat consisting of three
people--Krestinsky, Preobrazhensky, and Serebryakov--was elected. The
leading figure in the Secretariat became Krestinsky, who also belonged to the
Orgburo & Politburo. However, during the "trade union
discussion," all the Central Committee secretaries supported Trotsky's or
Bukharin's platform and none of them were re-elected at the Central Committee
plenum following the Tenth Party Congress. Instead Molotov, Yaroslavski,
and Mikhailov were elected to the Secretariat. They were all members of
the Orgburo as well.
Lenin, however, was displeased with the work of these party centers, accusing
them of inadmissible red tape, delay, and bureaucratism. It was assumed,
therefore, that the election of Stalin, whose organizational abilities and
abrupt manner were well known in party circles, would bring order into the
working bodies of the Central Committee.
The situation changed as Lenin's illness grew worse, removing him more and more
often from the administration of the country and direction of the party.
Stalin was not only general secretary; he belonged to the Orgburo, the
Politburo, and the Presidium of the Central Executive Committee, as well as
heading two commissariats. Stalin had become a key figure in the party
apparatus.
Medvedev, Roy. Let History
Judge. New York: Columbia University Press, 1989, p. 69
On May 8, 18-23, 1919 he [Stalin] attended the 8th Congress of the party was
elected to the two new bodies--the Politburo (henceforth the central organ of
power) and the Orgburo, which at this time was supposed to be a subcommittee of
the Central Committee concerned with party organization. When it was
suggested (at the 11th Party Congress in 1922) that no one could carry out all
Stalin's party responsibilities and at the same time administer two People's
Commissariats, Lenin replied that no one could name another suitable candidate
for the high political responsibilities of the Nationalities Commissariat
'other than Comrade Stalin' and, 'the same applied to the Workers' and
Peasants' Inspectorate. A gigantic job...you have to have at the head of
it a man with authority.' This shows how Lenin now judged Stalin, and the
extent to which the latter's reputation had grown, regardless of particular
errors and insubordinations.
Conquest, Robert. Stalin:
Breaker of Nations. New York, New York: Viking, 1991, p. 91
When at the Eleventh Party Congress Preobrazhensky listed all of Stalin's
duties and questioned whether it was possible for one man to handle this vast
amount of work on the Politburo, the Orgburo, two commissariats, and a dozen
subcommittees of the Central Committee, Lenin immediately spoke up in Stalin's
defense, calling him irreplaceable as commissar of nationalities and adding:
"The same thing applies to the Workers' and Peasants' Inspectorate.
This is a vast business; but to be able to handle investigations we must have
at the head of it a man who enjoys high prestige."...
Nekrich and Heller. Utopia in
Power. New York: Summit Books, c1986, p. 162
At the 11th Congress in 1922 one prominent Bolshevik, Preobrazhensky, would
note with astonishment the vast authority which Lenin had concentrated in
Koba's hands. "Take Stalin, for instance.... Is it conceivable
that one man can take responsibility for the work of two commissariats, while
simultaneously working in the Politburo, the Orgbureau, and a dozen
commissions?” But Lenin would not surrender his favorite: "We
need a man whom any representative of any national group can approach, a man to
whom he can speak in detail. Where can we find such a man? I don't
think Comrade Preobrazhensky could name
any candidate other than
Comrade Stalin....
Radzinsky, Edvard.
Stalin. New York: Doubleday, c1996, p. 163
The conventional image of Stalin’s ascent to supreme power does not
convince. He did not really spend most of his time in offices in the
Civil War period and consolidate his position as the pre-eminent bureaucrat of
the Soviet state. Certainly he held membership in the Party Central
Committee; he was also People’s Commissar for Nationalities’
Affairs. In neither role were his responsibilities restricted to mere
administration. As the complications of public affairs increased, he was
given further high postings. He chaired the commission drafting the RSFSR
Constitution. He became the leading political commissar on a succession
of military fronts in 1918-19. He was regularly involved in decisions on
relations with Britain, Germany, Turkey, and other powers; and he dealt with
plans for the establishment of new Soviet republics in Estonia, Latvia, and
Lithuania. He conducted the inquiry into the Red Army’s collapse at
Perm. When the Party Central Committee set up its own inner subcommittees
in 1919, he was chosen for both the Political Bureau (Politburo) and the Organizational
Bureau (or Orgburo). He was asked to head the Workers’ and
Peasants’ inspectorate at its creation in February 1920.
Service, Robert. Stalin.
Cambridge, Mass.: Belknap Press of Harvard Univ. Press, 2005, p. 173
ORDJONIKIDZE WAS UNSTABLE, SPINELESS
AND OPPOSED THE PARTY LINE
You can find a range of opinions about Ordjonikidze. But I think the
intellectuals praised him too highly. By his last act he proved that
ultimately he was unstable. He had opposed Stalin, of course, and the
party line. Yes, the party line.
Chuev, Feliks. Molotov
Remembers. Chicago: I. R. Dee, 1993, p. 114
Ordjonikidze was a good Bolshevik but spineless, especially in matters of
principle.
Chuev, Feliks. Molotov
Remembers. Chicago: I. R. Dee, 1993, p. 115
ORDJONIKIDZE’S FAMILY
BLAMES STALIN FOR HIS SUICIDE
CHUEV: Ordjonikidze's
family considers Stalin responsible for his death.
MOLOTOV: They will
always say that. If the final push toward his suicide was the repression
of his brother, they can say this. They can heap blame on Stalin.
But if my brother was to conduct anti-Soviet agitation, what could I say if he
was arrested? I can say nothing.
Chuev, Feliks. Molotov
Remembers. Chicago: I. R. Dee, 1993, p. 114
SOME TROTS WERE GOOD AND HAD
TO BE USED
Trotskyists were good people. It is unfortunate there were differences of
opinion. Some corrected themselves, others were for the time being
irreplaceable. We had to use everyone. If Trotsky said something
good, then Kuibyshev thought Trotsky himself was good. That was his
fundamental weakness.
Chuev, Feliks. Molotov
Remembers. Chicago: I. R. Dee, 1993, p. 115
DZERZHINSKY FOLLOWED TROTSKY
EARLY ON
MOLOTOV: Dzerzhinsky was
a more straightforward fellow, but even he followed Trotsky in 1920.
CHUEV: But at any rate
he was a true Bolshevik.
MOLOTOV: Real!
Without a doubt. He followed Trotsky because of his desire to be a
Bolshevik. Trotsky was very left-wing then.
Chuev, Feliks. Molotov Remembers.
Chicago: I. R. Dee, 1993, p. 115
LENIN WAS CLOSE TO STALIN AND
MADE HIM HIGHER THAN BUKHARIN
Lenin's relations with Stalin were close, but they were mainly
businesslike. He elevated Stalin far higher than Bukharin! And he
didn't simply elevate him but made him his mainstay in the Central
Committee. He trusted him.
Chuev, Feliks. Molotov
Remembers. Chicago: I. R. Dee, 1993, p. 116
To this day I recall the first party congress in Petrograd in April, after the
February Revolution, when Rykov expressed his rightist sentiments.
Kamenev, too, showed this true colors. Zinoviev was still considered to
be close to Lenin. Before the elections of members to the Central
Committee, Lenin spoke for Stalin's candidacy. He said Stalin had to be
in the Central Committee without fail. He spoke up for Stalin in
particular, saying he was such a fine party member, such a commanding figure,
and you could assign him any task. He was the most trustworthy in
adhering to the party line. That's the sort of speech it was.
Chuev, Feliks. Molotov
Remembers. Chicago: I. R. Dee, 1993, p. 137
STALIN VOLUNTEERED TO RESIGN
SEVERAL TIMES
They [Lenin and Stalin] were very close in Lenin's final days. Probably
it was only Stalin's apartment that Lenin visited. Several times Stalin
sought to resign from the post of general secretary, but each time his request
was denied by the Central Committee of the party. The struggle raged, and
it was necessary that Stalin remain in that position.
Chuev, Feliks. Molotov
Remembers. Chicago: I. R. Dee, 1993, p. 116
CHUEV: Avtorkhanov
writes that after the 19th Congress, at the Presidium of the Central Committee,
Stalin asked to be relieved of the responsibilities of General Secretary....
MOLOTOV: Correct.
That did occur.
Chuev, Feliks. Molotov
Remembers. Chicago: I. R. Dee, 1993, p. 234
[In a footnote] After the 19th
party congress in October, 1952, he twice informed the Central Committee that
he wished to retire. It was probably because he was ill. In any
case the fact that he wanted to retire is known to everyone who belonged to the
Central Committee at that time.
Alliluyeva, Svetlana. Twenty
Letters to a Friend. New York: Harper & Row, 1967, p. 206
...Lenin added, "He [Stalin] is too avid for power and his ambition is
dangerous." Stalin repeated this himself in open Congress of the
Communist Party, and said quietly: "I told you then I repeat it now, that
I am ready to retire if you wish it."
Duranty, Walter. Story of
Soviet Russia. Philadelphia, N. Y.: JB Lippincott Co. 1944, p. 170
"A year later [1925] I [Stalin] again put in a request to the plenum to
release me, but I was again obliged to remain at my post."
Brar, Harpal. Trotskyism or
Leninism. 1993, p. 616
At the meeting of a group of party leaders in the Caucasus Zinoviev spoke of
the need to guard against the Secretariat becoming too powerful. When
Stalin learned of this speech he at once offered to resign. The offer was
refused, for they could not manage without him.
Grey, Ian. Stalin, Man of
History. London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1979, p. 185
...Stalin's criticism of Kamenev [at the central Committee plenum of January
1924] was condemned at a Politburo meeting as uncomradely and inaccurate about
Kamenev's true position. Stalin at once offered to resign. This was
the second time he had done so as General Secretary, though it would not be the
last. Again his offer was turned down, and by none other than Kamenev,
supported by Zinoviev.
Volkogonov, Dmitri. Stalin:
Triumph and Tragedy. New York: Grove Weidenfeld, 1991, p. 106
Stalin reminded them that he had put in his resignation, and that all the
delegates, Trotsky, Zinoviev, and Kamenev among them, had voted for him to
remain as General Secretary. It was not in his character, he added, to
abandon his post, so he had continued to serve.
Conquest, Robert. Stalin:
Breaker of Nations. New York, New York: Viking, 1991, p. 138
The [Nineteenth Party] Congress was more interesting on other grounds.
Stalin made a short speech, later saying proudly that he was still up to the
job. At the plenum of the new Central Committee which followed, he
offered his resignation as General Secretary, saying he was too old and tired
to hold both that post and chairmanship of the Council of Ministers.
This... was rejected in a spate of fulsome appeals to stay on.
Conquest, Robert. Stalin:
Breaker of Nations. New York, New York: Viking, 1991, p. 307
According to his former interpreter, Pavlov, elected a member of the Central
Committee at the Nineteenth Congress, my father at the end of 1952 had twice
asked the new membership of the Committee to sanction his retirement.
Every member, as one, said that it was impossible.
Alliluyeva, Svetlana. Only One
Year. New York: Harper & Row, 1969, p. 393
[From Serge In Portrait of Stalin]: There was the man of steel, as he had
called himself,...face to face with that corpse [his wife's body]. It was
about that time that he rose one day at the Politburo to tender his resignation
to his colleagues. 'Maybe I have, indeed, become an obstacle to the
party's unity. If so, comrades, I'm ready to efface myself....' The
members of the Politburo--the body had already been purged of its right-wing--
glanced at one another in embarrassment.... Nobody stirred.... At
last Molotov said: 'Stop it, stop it. You have the party's
confidence....' The incident was closed.
Deutscher, Isaac. Stalin; A
Political Biography. New York: Oxford Univ. Press, 1967, p. 334
When the Supreme Soviet met for the first time after the war, Stalin decided to
teach Molotov and his followers a lesson. He submitted his own resignation
and that of his entire Commissariat, to prove his power and popularity.
He was certain he would be returned to office by an overwhelming majority vote,
and he was not mistaken.
Fishman and Hutton. The
Private Life of Josif Stalin. London: W. H. Allen, 1962, p. 168
It is a well-known fact, that Stalin had many times (starting with the 1920s)
raised the question of resignation from the heavy workload of his
responsibilities in the party and government. His requests were always
not accepted and he was urged unanimously by all to stay in his position as
head of the party and his post as the leader of the Soviet Union.
Lucas and Ukas. Trans. and Ed.
Secret Documents. Toronto, Canada: Northstar Compass, 1996, p. 7
Moreover, at the first organizational plenum of the Central Committee following
the 19th Party Congress, Stalin unexpectedly asked to be relieved of his
duties, pleading his advancing years. But the plenum...refused to accept
Stalin's resignation.... Members of the Central Committee seated in the
first rows fell on their knees, imploring Stalin to remain at his post.
Stalin agreed to do so, at the same time expressing his dissatisfaction with
certain members of the old Politburo. But it was not Malenkov or Beria
but Stalin himself who drew up the slate for election to the Central Committee
Presidium, and it contained the names of almost all the members of the former
Politburo (including those who had just been the objects of his critical
remarks) along with a number of others who until then had not been influential
in the Party in any way.
Medvedev, Roy. On Stalin and
Stalinism. New York: Oxford University Press, 1979, p. 157
Zinoviev called an informal meeting of a number of colleagues on holiday, in
the conspiratorial setting of a cave near the Caucasian spa of Kislovodsk, and
secured agreement to a plan to curb Stalin's powers.
When the letter setting out their proposals reached Stalin, he reacted by going
to Kislovodsk in person and proposing that Zinoviev, Trotsky, and Bukharin as
members of the Politburo should be given seats on the Orgburo and see the
"Stalin machine" from the inside. At the same time, he offered
to resign: "If the comrades were to persist in their plan, I was prepared
to clear out without any fuss and without any discussion, be it open or
secret." Zinoviev, however, took advantage of Stalin's offer to
attend Orgburo meetings only once or twice, while Trotsky and Bukharin failed
to put in an appearance at all. As to his offer of resignation, Stalin
well knew that, if he did reside, it would leave the way clear for Trotsky to
claim the succession to Lenin, a prospect that was quite enough to stop
Zinoviev and company from pressing their differences with him further.
Bullock, Alan. Hitler and
Stalin: Parallel Lives. New York: Knopf, 1992, p. 128
[In 1952] Stalin unexpectedly asked the Plenum to accept his resignation as
general secretary, citing his age and the disloyalty of Molotov, Mikoyan, and
several others. Whether this was meant to be taken seriously or not, the
Plenum refused and begged him to stay. Having agreed, he then produced a
paper out of his pocket and read out a list of the new members he proposed for
the new Presidium, which was accepted without comment. The list included
10 of the 11 members of the existing Politburo, but an even larger number of
younger and less well-known figures.
Bullock, Alan. Hitler and
Stalin: Parallel Lives. New York: Knopf, 1992, p. 964
On 15 March, 1946, at the time of the first meeting of the Supreme Council
after the war, a sensational item of news was broadcast throughout the
world. Stalin had presented his resignation, and that of his entire
ministry. But a few hours later he was restored to office; and the
brief excitement of the foreign commentators abated.
Delbars, Yves. The Real
Stalin. London, Allen & Unwin, 1951, p. 400
Just occasionally he allowed his resentment to show. In November 1919 he tried
to resign his job as Chairman of the Revolutionary-Military Council of the
Southern Front. Lenin, alarmed, rushed to get a Politburo decision to
implore him to reconsider. Stalin was too useful to be discarded.
Service, Robert. Stalin.
Cambridge, Mass.: Belknap Press of Harvard Univ. Press, 2005, p. 174
On 27 Dec 1926 he [Stalin] wrote to Sovnarkom Chairman Rykov saying: “I
ask you to release me from the post of Central Committee General
Secretary. I affirm that I can no longer work at this post, that
I’m in no condition to work any longer at this post.” He made
a similar attempt at resignation on 19 Dec 1927.
Service, Robert. Stalin.
Cambridge, Mass.: Belknap Press of Harvard Univ. Press, 2005, p. 247
According to Kaganovich, he [Stalin] also expressed a wish to retire.
Molotov was his intended replacement; “Let Vyacheslav do the
work.” This caused consternation: Kaganovich did not like the
prospect of yielding to Molotov.
Service, Robert. Stalin.
Cambridge, Mass.: Belknap Press of Harvard Univ. Press, 2005, p. 573
STALIN--"Comrade
Molotov--the most dedicated to our cause. He should give his life for the
cause of the party."
MOLOTOV--Coming to the
speaker's tribune completely admits his mistakes before the Central Committee,
but he stated that he is and will always be a faithful disciple of Stalin.
STALIN--(interrupting
Molotov). This is nonsense. I have no students at all. We are
all students of the great Lenin.
VOICE FROM THE FLOOR--We need
to elect Comrade Stalin as the General Secretary of the Central Committee of
the CPSU and Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR.
STALIN--No! I am asking
that you relieve me of the two posts!
Speech by Stalin at the Plenum of the Central Committee, CPSU, October 16, 1952.
BUKHARIN SOUGHT UNITY WITH THE
SR’S
Bukharin was looking for a union with the Socialist-Revolutionaries. He
was drawn in this direction. He maintained personal contacts with them
after the revolution.
Chuev, Feliks. Molotov
Remembers. Chicago: I. R. Dee, 1993, p. 117
BUKHARIN WAS DANGEROUS AND
LENIN SPOKE OUT AGAINST HIM
CHUEV: Does he
[Bukharin] deserve respect?
MOLOTOV: As a person,
yes. But he was dangerous in politics. He ran to extremes in
life. I can't say that it has been fully proven, at least to my
satisfaction, but he joined in a conspiracy with the Socialist-Revolutionaries
to assassinate Lenin. He supported arresting Lenin....
Bukharin spoke against Lenin more than once. He called him a
utopian. What's more, he called him a traitor!
Chuev, Feliks. Molotov
Remembers. Chicago: I. R. Dee, 1993, p. 118
TROTSKY WAS A BETTER SPEAKER
THAN BUKHARIN, LENIN AND STALIN
Trotsky spoke eloquently with fine diction.... He was a better speaker
than Bukharin. First-class, of course.... He could influence
politically naive people. Bukharin was an effective speaker. Lenin
was a bit weaker. As a speaker Stalin was unique. He spoke in a low
voice, but people always listened to him, even before the Revolution.
Chuev, Feliks. Molotov
Remembers. Chicago: I. R. Dee, 1993, p. 121
CHUEV: Stalin spoke good
Russian, didn't he?
MOLOTOV: Yes. He
gave very good speeches. He read a great deal and had an artistic
sense....
He wrote everything himself. The staff never wrote for him.... Back
then we all did our own writing.
Chuev, Feliks. Molotov
Remembers. Chicago: I. R. Dee, 1993, p. 168
That, then, is how Stalin speaks to his people. It can be seen that his
speeches are circumstantial and somewhat elementary; but you must speak very
loudly and clearly in Moscow if you want to be understood as far as
Vladivostock. So Stalin speaks loudly and clearly, and everyone understands
his words and enjoys them, and his speeches establish a feeling of kinship
between the people who hear them and the man who makes them.
Feuchtwanger, Lion. Moscow,
1937. New York: The Viking Press, 1937, p. 74
His speeches are lengthy but not verbose. The wording is succinct and
direct. They make better reading than the speeches of Lenin and Trotsky
because they are informed more by purpose than by theory.
Graham, Stephen. Stalin. Port
Washington, New York: Kennikat Press, 1970, p. 121
SOME POLIBURO MEMBERS WERE
KEPT OUT OF THE LOOP
As far as I know, no one has written about this, but in fact each member of the
Politburo was backed by his own coterie. Even under Lenin. Lenin
suggested convening Politburo meetings without Trotsky. We reached an
agreement against Trotsky. And a year or two later we were meeting
without Zinoviev and Kamenev. Later without Bukharin, Tomsky, and
Rykov. They remained in the Politburo, but we didn't keep them informed, of
course.
Chuev, Feliks. Molotov
Remembers. Chicago: I. R. Dee, 1993, p. 121
MANY TURNED IN THEIR PARTY
CARDS WHEN LENIN SET UP NEP
Many followed Lenin until the New Economic Policy, but when we made this
transition a lot of people were displeased and could no longer be relied
on. They used to say, "Communism is due tomorrow, but we have
switched to capitalism and private enterprises!" They were
disillusioned and were giving back their party cards; they turned to drink....
but Lenin was always an optimist.
Chuev, Feliks. Molotov
Remembers. Chicago: I. R. Dee, 1993, p. 122
LENIN WANTED SILENCE DURING
MEETINGS AND NO SMOKING
...Lenin disliked conversations during meetings.... But Lenin very much
disliked it when people whispered during the sessions. He could not stand
smoking at all. He himself didn't smoke. He was annoyed by
whispering, all kinds of talking....
Chuev, Feliks. Molotov
Remembers. Chicago: I. R. Dee, 1993, p. 124
LEADERS CAN’T BE RUDE OR
ABUSE SUBORDINATES
...Rudeness cannot be justified. It cannot be turned into a special
issue, but it also cannot be justified. If you get to the top, you must
behave properly. You must be patient. Otherwise, what kind of a
leader are you? That's an elementary obligation. As for a
subordinate, if you abuse him, it's no life: its prison. It's already
hard enough for him without that....
Chuev, Feliks. Molotov
Remembers. Chicago: I. R. Dee, 1993, p. 124
This attention to us [some generals] touched us deeply. I have already
mentioned how Stalin could be very irascible and abrasive; but even more
striking was this concern for his subordinates at such a grave time.
Vasilevskii, Aleksandr
M. A Lifelong Cause. Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1981, p. 118
Throughout my entire work with Stalin, especially during the Great Patriotic
War, I had invariably felt his attention. I would even say excessive
concern, that I seemingly did not merit .
Vasilevskii, Aleksandr M.
A Lifelong Cause. Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1981, p. 285
LENIN HAD DOUBTS THE
REVOLUTION WOULD OCCUR
I recently read some memoirs about Lenin. Krupskaya writes that, before
the Revolution, Lenin used to ask her, "Will we live to see
it?" He too had doubts....
In 1917 Lenin did not yet know how things would turn out. It is
impossible for a person even of his stature to judge historic events in precise
detail. It is impossible.
Chuev, Feliks. Molotov
Remembers. Chicago: I. R. Dee, 1993, p. 125
PARTY PLAGUED BY FACTIONS
WITHIN
At a Politburo meeting Trotsky declared--this was in my presence--that our time
was up, that we could no longer retain state power.... It was one of the
most critical moments in our history. It was a turning point. We
somehow had to make the transition to a new policy, but how were we to do
it? We had little economic experience. And the political enemy was
within the party. There was not simply one faction, there was Trotskyism,
the Workers' Opposition, Democratic Centralism, and all kinds of national
groupings. Stalin played an outstanding role in their defeat.
A dangerous situation was developing in the party. There were two
extremes: Trotsky at one end and right-wingers at the other.
Bukharin was promoting a different ideology, one that had nothing to do with
looking after the people. He thought that since we had given land to the
kulaks, if we now gave land to the middle peasants they too would be
revived. But with what could we revive them?
Chuev, Feliks. Molotov
Remembers. Chicago: I. R. Dee, 1993, p. 126
MOLOTOV SAYS TROTSKY ADMITS HE
WAS NO BOLSHEVIK & PREDICTED THE PARTY’S DEFEAT
Trotsky put it more slyly, more cautiously. His purport was: our time is
up. I have always opposed you Bolsheviks but joined you, changed to the
Bolshevik party before the Revolution. But nothing came of it. The
international proletariat did not support us. This means you have failed,
you have no future!
Chuev, Feliks. Molotov
Remembers. Chicago: I. R. Dee, 1993, p. 127
FROM DIFFERENT PERSPECTIVES
BUKHARIN AND TROTSKY KEEP PREDICTING DEFEAT
And Bukharin said, "Enrich yourselves!" ...He was just a
windbag. According to him, the people were in a situation in which they
could do nothing without cooperatives, without collective farms, without
industry. How could collective farms operate without machinery and
without tractors? Where were the means to enable us to take the levers in
hand and raise up the people? There was no machinery; factories had to be
built. For some time they would turn out a small number of
machines. Many people would lose faith, nothing would come of it!
Bukharin said that in one way, and Trotsky said it in another. As for
talks with imperialists, I think it was proven beyond a doubt that these
occurred....
Trotsky himself was making speeches saying, "Nothing is
working!" I really wondered, how could Lenin endure it?
Chuev, Feliks. Molotov
Remembers. Chicago: I. R. Dee, 1993, p. 127
...[as post-Lenin changes were instituted] the Trotskyist and Bukharinites lost
their heads and started to scream "All is lost" or "Save the
ship by sailing it into an enemy port."
Campbell, J. R. Soviet Policy
and Its Critics. London: V. Gollancz, ltd., 1939, p. 236
LENIN SAYS THE CHURCHES SHOULD
GIVE UP MONEY TO HELP BEAT THE FAMINE
In 1921, at the beginning of the NEP, there was famine. People began saying
that grain should be imported. We needed resources for this. Lenin
said the churchmen must help. If we confiscate church valuables, the
priests well acquiesce. If they start to resist, this too would benefit
us. Clinging to their wealth while the people are starving will undermine
their authority.
Chuev, Feliks. Molotov
Remembers. Chicago: I. R. Dee, 1993, p. 130
KRUPSKAYA EVENTUALLY SUPPORTED
THE PARTY LINE AFTER LENIN’S DEATH
These remarks [by Krupskaya] were made from the floor. Krupskaya was
becoming Trotsky's comrade-in-arms; she was switching to Trotskyist
rails.... After Lenin's death she in fact spoke out briefly against him
[Bukharin]. But later she began supporting the party line and the trials
of the Trotskyists and right-wingers as well. Krupskaya followed Lenin
all her life, before and after the Revolution. But she understood nothing
about politics. Nothing. In 1925 she became confused and followed
Zinoviev. And Zinoviev took an anti-Leninist position.
Chuev, Feliks. Molotov
Remembers. Chicago: I. R. Dee, 1993, p. 131
WHY STALIN AND KRUPSKAYA
ARGUED AND LENIN’S HEALTH CARE
MOLOTOV: ...My attitude
toward Krupskaya was more or less positive in our personal relations. But
Stalin regarded her unfavorably.
CHUEV: He had
reasons. She made a poor showing at the 14th Party Congress.
MOLOTOV: Very bad.
She turned out to be a bad communist. She didn't know what the devil she
was doing.
CHUEV: Anyway, what
caused the conflict between Stalin and Krupskaya?
MOLOTOV: Krupskaya acted
badly after Lenin's death. She supported Zinoviev and obviously was
confused by Zinoviev's line.
Doctors forbade visits to Lenin during his illness, once his condition grew
worse. But Krupskaya allowed them. And this brought on the conflict
between Krupskaya and Stalin. Stalin supported the Central Committee's
decision not to let any visitors see Lenin. Stalin was right in this case.
What Lenin wrote about Stalin's rudeness was not without Krupskaya's
influence. She disliked Stalin because he had treated her quite
tactlessly. Stalin implemented the decision of the secretariat and did
not permit Zinoviev and Kamenev to visit Lenin once this was prohibited by the
doctors. Zinoviev and Kamenev complained to Krupskaya. Outraged,
she told off Stalin. He responded, "Lenin should not have
visitors." Krupskaya responded by saying, "But Lenin himself wants
it!" Stalin then replied: "If the Central Committee says so, we
might not let you see him either."
Stalin was irritated: "Why should I get up on my hind legs for her?
To sleep with Lenin does not necessarily mean to understand Leninism!"
Stalin told me something like this: "Just because she uses the same
bathroom as Lenin, do I have to appreciate and respect her as if she were
Lenin?"
He was too coarse and rude.
Chuev, Feliks. Molotov
Remembers. Chicago: I. R. Dee, 1993, p. 132
Krupskaya had a big grudge against Stalin. But he had a grudge against
her, too, because Lenin's signature to his testament was supposedly affixed
under Krupskaya's influence. Or so Stalin believed.
Chuev, Feliks. Molotov
Remembers. Chicago: I. R. Dee, 1993, p. 135
On December 18, 1922, the Central Committee made Stalin responsible for his
medical supervision.
On Dec. 22, Stalin learned that Lenin had just written to Trotsky
congratulating him on their victory over the trade monopoly. Stalin
telephoned Lenin's wife, Krupskaya, and abused her in terms both vulgar and
violent for having let Lenin write in his state of health.... Stalin had
threatened to take her before the Party Control Commission, and she said she
had no doubt that if it came to that she would be unanimously supported there,...
Lenin had another stroke that very day (Dec. 22), but over the next two days
recovered enough to refuse treatment unless he was allowed to dictate some
notes. The Politburo granted this, and the next few days were spent in
writing what came to be called his Testament.
In this well-known document, suppressed for 33 years,...
Conquest, Robert. Stalin:
Breaker of Nations. New York, New York: Viking, 1991, p. 99
He [Lenin] now learned of Stalin's violent attack on Krupskaya, and he wrote
Stalin as follows (with copies to Kamenev and Zinoviev):
'Very respectable comrade Stalin,
You allowed yourself to be so ill-mannered as to call my wife on the telephone
and to abuse her. She has agreed to forget what you said.
Nevertheless she has told Zinoviev and Kamenev about the incident. I have
no intention of forgetting what has been done against me, and it goes without
saying that what was done against my wife I also consider to have been directed
against myself. Consequently, I must ask you to consider whether you
would be inclined to withdraw what you said and to apologize, or whether you
prefer to break off relations between us.
Respectfully yours, Lenin
Conquest, Robert. Stalin:
Breaker of Nations. New York, New York: Viking, 1991, p. 103
One of Lenin's secretaries, Maria Volodicheva, gave Stalin the letter
personally. He remained calm and said slowly, 'It is not Lenin speaking,
it is his illness. I'm not a doctor. I'm a politician. I'm
Stalin. If my wife, a member of the party, acted wrongly and they
punished her, I would not assume the right to interfere in the matter.
But Krupskaya is a party member. If Lenin insists I am ready to apologize
to Krupskaya for rudeness.' Volodicheva returned with the oral apology.
Stalin immediately wrote a reply (which, like some of the rest of the
information about the episode, has only just been published in the Soviet
Union). In effect, he brazened it out. He said he had spoken to
Krupskaya 'approximately as follows, "The doctors forbid giving Lenin
political information, believing this regime the best way of treating him, but
you Nadezhda Konstantinovna, it seems, have broken this regime. Do not
play with Ilyich's health,"' and so on. This could not, he said, be
regarded as rude, impermissible, or directed 'against' Lenin. He had done
his duty, though there seemed to have been a misunderstanding. If 'to
preserve "relationships" I have to "withdraw" the words
mentioned above, I can withdraw them, but I cannot understand in this business,
where my "guilt" is, and what exactly is wanted of me.'
Conquest, Robert. Stalin:
Breaker of Nations. New York, New York: Viking, 1991, p. 103
The ambiguity of the situation was further increased by the fact that the man
chosen to make sure the doctors' orders were scrupulously carried out was none
other than Stalin. The actual orders were given by the doctors, but in
close consultation with the supervisor [Stalin] appointed by the Central
Committee. Stalin was officially instructed to keep himself informed of
everything that happened at Lenin's bedside. He applied himself zealously
to the task.
Lewin, Moshe. Lenin's Last
Struggle. New York: Pantheon Books. C1968, p. 70
Lenin's sister Maria described that occasion in her notes: "Stalin called
her [Krupskaya] on the phone and, apparently counting on it not getting to
Lenin, started telling her, in a pretty sharp way, that she shouldn't talk
business with Lenin, or he'd drag her before the Party's Control
Commission. Krupskaya was terribly upset by the conversation; she was
quite beside herself, sobbing and rolling on the floor and so on."
Lenin was up in arms when he heard about this incident. Ignoring
Krupskaya's entreaties, apparently that day he dictated a letter which
indicated exactly what he thought about Stalin. The letter, which opens
with an uncomradely formal address, was marked "Top secret" and
"Personal," but copies were sent to Kamenev and Zinoviev.
Respected Comrade Stalin,
You had the gall to call my wife to the telephone and abuse her. Although
she agreed to forget what was said, she nevertheless told Zinoviev and
Kamenev.... I have no intention of forgetting what has been done against
me, as it goes without saying that what was done against my wife was done
against me. Therefore I must ask you to consider whether you are prepared
to take back what you said and apologize, or whether you would rather break off
relations between us.
With respect,
Lenin
[Stalin replied]
Five weeks ago I had a conversation with Comrade Nadejda Konstantinova, whom I
regard not only as your wife but as my old Party comrade, and I said roughly
the following to her (on the telephone): "the doctors have forbidden [us]
to give Ilich political information, as they regard this as the most important
way of curing him. It turns out, Krupskaya, that you are not observing
this regimen. We must not play with Ilich's life," and so on.
I do not regard anything I said as crude or impermissible, or aimed against
you, for I had no other purpose than your earliest recovery. Moreover, I
regarded it as my duty to see that the regimen was observed. My
conversation with Krupskaya confirmed that my suspicions were groundless, nor
could they be otherwise. Still, if you think that to maintain our
"relations" I should take my words back, then I can take them back,
though I refuse to understand what the problem was, where my fault lay and what
it is people want of me."
Stalin
Volkogonov, Dmitrii. Lenin: A
New Biography. New York: Free Press, 1994, p. 422-423
A recent discovery has produced a note from Stalin to Lenin in which he wrote:
"If you consider that I must take back my words, I can take them back, but
I fail to understand what the issue is, where my guilt is."
Bullock, Alan. Hitler and
Stalin: Parallel Lives. New York: Knopf, 1992, p. 123
To the Joint Plenum of the CC
and CCC
From: Maria Ulyanova
No. 1
The oppositional minority in the CC in the recent period has carried out a
systematic attack on Comrade Stalin not even stopping at affirming as though
there had been a rupture between Lenin and Stalin in the last months of the
life of V.I. With the objective of re-establishing the truth I consider
it my obligation to inform comrades briefly about the relations of Lenin
towards Stalin in the period of the illness of V.I. (I am not here
concerned with the period prior to his illness about which I have wide-ranging
evidences of the most touching relations between V.I. and Stalin of which CC
members know no less than I) when I was continually present with him and fulfilled
a number of charges.
Vladimir Ilyich really appreciated Stalin. For example, in the spring of
1922 when V. Ilyich had his first attack, and also at the time of his second
attack in December 1922, he invited Stalin and addressed him with the most
intimate tasks. The type of tasks with which one can address a person on
whom one has total faith, whom you know as a dedicated revolutionist, and as a
intimate comrade. Moreover Ilyich insisted, that he wanted to talk only
with Stalin and nobody else. In general, in the entire period of his
illness, till he had the opportunity to associate with his comrades, he invited
comrade Stalin the maximum. And during the most serious period of the
illness, he invited not a single member of the Politbureau except Stalin.
There was an incident between Lenin and Stalin which comrade Zinoviev mentions
in his speech and which took place not long before Ilyich lost his power of
speech (March, 1923) but it was completely personal and had nothing to do with
politics. Comrade Zinoviev knew this very well and to quote it was
absolutely unnecessary. This incident took place because on the demand of
the doctors the Central Committee gave Stalin the charge of keeping a watch so
that no political news reached Lenin during this period of serious
illness. This was done so as not to upset him and so that his condition
did not deteriorate, he (Stalin) even scolded his family for conveying this
type of information. Ilyich, who accidentally came to know about this and
who was also always worried about such a strong regime of protection, in turn
scolded Stalin. Stalin apologized and with this the incident was
settled. What is there to be said during this period, as I had indicated,
if Lenin had not been so seriously ill then he would have reacted to the
incident differently. There are documents regarding this incident and on
the first demand from the Central Committee I can present them.
This way, I affirm that all the talk of the opposition about Lenin’s
relation towards Stalin does not correspond to reality. These relations
were most intimate and friendly and remained so.
No. 2.
M.I. Ulyanova on Vladimir Ilyich Lenin’s relation towards J. Stalin:
In my application to the Central Committee plenum I wrote that V. Ilyich
appreciated Stalin. This is of course right. Stalin is a major
worker and a good organiser. But it is also without doubt, that in this
application, I did not say the whole truth about Lenin’s attitude towards
Stalin. The aim of the application, which was written at the request of
Bukharin and Stalin, was to refer to Ilyich’s relation towards him.
This would have guarded him a little from the opposition attack. This
speculation was based on the last letter by V. Ilyich to Stalin where the
question of breaking this relationship was posed. The immediate reason
for this was personal V. Ilyich’s outrage that Stalin allowed himself to
be rude towards Nadezhda Konstantinovna. At that time it seemed to me that
this very personal matter was used by Zinoviev, Kamenev and others for
political objectives and the purpose of factionalism. Further weighing
this fact with other statements of V. Ilyich, his political testament and also
Stalin’s behaviour after Lenin’s death, his “political’
line, I all the more started explaining to myself the real relation Lenin had
with Stalin towards the end of his life. Even if briefly I think that it
is my duty to talk about it.
V. Ilyich had a lot of control. He was very good in concealing. For
whatever reasons whenever he thought it necessary he would not reveal his
relations to other people .
He controlled himself even more in his relations towards the comrades with whom
he worked. For him work was the first priority. He subjugated the
personal in the interests of work. Never did the personal protrude or
prevail.
A distinct example of this type of relation was the incident with
Trotsky. In one Politbureau meeting Trotsky called Ilyich “a
hooligan’. V. Ilyich turned as pale as chalk, but he controlled
himself. “It seems some people are losing their
nerves’. He said something like this in reply to Trotsky’s
rudeness. This is what the comrades told me while retelling the incident.
He never had any sympathy for Trotsky. This person had so many
characteristics which made it extremely difficult to work with him in a
collective fashion. But he was a great worker and a talented person and I
repeat for V. Ilyich work was the first priority and that is why he tried to
retain him for the job and tried to work with him jointly in the
future .
In the summer of 1922, during the first illness of V. Ilyich, when I was
staying with him constantly almost without absences, I was able to closely
observe his relation with the comrades with whom he worked closely and with the
members of the Politbureau.
By this time I have heard something about V. Ilyich’s dissatisfaction
with Stalin. I was told that when V. Ilyich came to know about
Martov’s illness, he requested Stalin to send him some money. In
reply Stalin told him “I should spend money on the enemy of the
workers! Find yourself another secretary for this’. V. Ilyich
was very disappointed and angry with Stalin .
In the winter of 20-21, 21-22 V. Ilyich was feeling sick. He had
headaches and was unable to work Lenin was deeply disturbed. I
exactly do not know when, but somehow during this period V. Ilyich told Stalin
that he would probably be stricken with paralysis and made Stalin promise that
in this event he would help V. Ilyich to obtain potassium cyanide. Stalin
promised. Why did he appeal to Stalin with this request? Because he
knew him to be an extremely strong man devoid of any sentimentality. V.
Ilyich had nobody else but Stalin to approach with this type of request.
In May 1922 after his first attack he appealed to Stalin with the same
request. V. Ilyich had then decided that everything was finished for him
and demanded that Stalin should be brought to him immediately. This
request was so insistent that nobody could gainsay it. Stalin was with V.
Ilyich within 5 minutes and not more. When Stalin came out he told
Bukharin and me that V. Ilyich had asked him to obtain poison. The time
had come to fulfil his earlier promise. Stalin promised. V. Ilyich
and Stalin kissed each other and Stalin left the room.
But later on after discussing the matter together we decided that V.
Ilyich’s spirits should be raised. Stalin returned to Lenin and
told him that after talking it over with the doctors he was convinced that
everything was not yet lost and therefore the time for fulfilling his promise
had not come. V. Ilyich noticeably cheered up and agreed. He said
to Stalin, “you are being cunning?’ In reply Stalin said
“when did you ever know me to be cunning?’ They parted and
did not see each other till V. Ilyich’s condition improved. He was
not allowed to meet his comrades.
During this period Stalin was a more frequent visitor in comparison to
others. He was the first to come to V. Ilyich. Ilyich met him
amicably, joked, laughed and demanded that I should treat Stalin with wine and
so on. In this and in other meetings they discussed Trotsky and from
their talk in front of me it was clear that here Ilyich was with Stalin against
Trotsky .
V. Ilyich was most annoyed with Stalin regarding the national, Caucasus
question. This is known from his correspondence with Trotsky regarding
this matter. It is clear that V. Ilyich was completely outraged with
Stalin, Ordjonikidze and Dzerzhinsky. During the period of his further
illness, this question would strongly torture him.
To this the other conflict was also added, and which was brought about by V.
Ilyich’s letter to Stalin on 5.3.23 and which I am going to quote
below. It was like this. The doctors insisted that V. Ilyich should
not be informed anything about work. The maximum fear was of Nadezhda
Konstantinovna discussing anything with V. Ilyich. She was so used to
discussing everything with him that sometimes completely unintentionally and
unwillingly she might blurt things out. The Politbureau gave Stalin the
charge of keeping watch so that the doctors’ instructions were
maintained. It seems, one day coming to know about certain conversations
between N.K. and V.I., Stalin called her to the telephone and spoke to her
quite sharply thinking this would not reach V. Ilyich. He warned her that
she should not discuss work with V.I. or this may drag her to the Central
Control Commission of the party. This discussion deeply disturbed
N.K. She completely lost control of herself she sobbed and rolled
on the floor. After a few days she told V.I. about this incident and
added that they had already reconciled. Before this it seems Stalin had
actually called her to smooth over the negative reaction his threat and warning
had created upon her. She told Kamenev and Zinoviev that Stalin had
shouted at her on the phone and it seems she mentioned the Caucasus matter.
Next morning Stalin invited me to V. Ilyich’s office. He looked
upset and offended. He told me “I did not sleep the whole
night. Who does Ilyich think I am, how he regards me, as towards a
traitor, I love him with all my heart. Please, somehow tell him
this.’ I felt sorry for Stalin. It seemed to me that he was
sincerely distressed. Ilyich called me for something and in between I
told him that the comrades were sending him regards “Ah’
objected V.I. “And Stalin has requested me to tell you, that he
loves you’. Ilyich frowned and kept quiet. “Then
what’ I asked “should I convey your greetings to
him?’ “Convey them’ answered Ilyich quite coldly.
But I continued “Volodia he is still the intelligent Stalin’.
“He is absolutely not intelligent’ frowning Ilyich answered
resolutely.
I did not continue the discussion and after a few days. V.I. came to know that
Stalin had been rude with N. K. and Kamenev and Zinoviev knew about it.
In the morning very distressed Lenin asked for the stenographer to be sent to
him. Before this he asked whether N.K. had already left for Narkompros
(People’s Commissariat of Enlightenment ed. R.D.) to which he
received a positive answer. When Volodicheva came V.I. dictated the
following letter to Stalin:
“Absolutely secret. Personal. Respected Comrade Stalin!
You were rude enough to call my wife to the telephone and insult her.
Even though she has expressed to you her willingness to forget the incident,
but even then this fact came to be known through her by Zinoviev and
Kamenev. I am not ready to forget so easily what has been done against me
and what is done against my wife I consider as having been done against
me. Therefore I ask you to inform me whether you are ready to take back
what you said and apologise or whether you prefer to break off our
relationship. With respect Lenin. Written by M.V. 5/III-23’.
V.I. asked Volodicheva to send it to Stalin without telling N.K. and to put a
copy of the letter in a sealed envelope and give it to me.
After returning home and seeing V.I. distressed N.K. understood that something
had happened. She requested Volidicheva not to send the letter. She
would personally talk to Stalin and ask him to apologize. That is what
N.K. is saying now, but I feel that she did not see this letter and it was sent
to Stalin as V.I. had wanted. The reply of Stalin was not handed over
immediately and then it was decided probably by the doctors and N.K. not to
give it to V.I. as his condition had worsened. And so V.I. did not come
to know about the reply of Stalin in which he apologised.
But howsoever irritated Lenin was with Stalin there is one thing I can say with
complete conviction, his words that Stalin was “not at all
intelligent’ were said without any irritation. This was his opinion
about him decided and complex and which he told me. This opinion
did not refute the fact that V.I. valued Stalin as a practical worker. He
considered it absolutely essential that there should be some initial control
over his ways and peculiarities, on the force of which V.I. considered that
Stalin should be removed from the post of general secretary. He spoke
about this very decisively in his political will, in his description of a group
of comrades which he gave before his death. But these documents never reached
the party. But about this some other time.
Appendix
Letter of Joseph Stalin to Vladimir Ilyich Lenin, 7th March, 1923.
To Comrade. Lenin from Stalin
Personal
Comrade Lenin!
Five weeks ago I had a discussion with Nadezhda Konstantinovna whom I consider
not only your wife, but also my senior party comrade. I told her on the
telephone something very close to the following :
“The doctors have forbidden any political information to be given to
Ilyich. They consider this routine the most effective method to cure him,
whereas you Nadezhda Konstantinovna are violating this routine. To play
with the life of Ilyich is not allowed’.
I do not think that these words can be seen as anything rude or impermissible
directed “against’ you nor I did I proceed from any other purposes
other than your quick recovery. Moreover, I think it my duty to see that
this routine is maintained. My explanation to Nadezhda Konstantinovna
confirms that there was nothing except a simple misunderstanding.
If you think that to maintain the “relationship’ I must “take
back’ the above-mentioned words, then I can take them back but I do not
understand where is my “fault’ and what exactly is wanted from me.
I. Stalin.
[Lenin’s letter and Stalin’s answer were kept in an official envelope
in the department of administrative matters of Sovnarkom on which it was
written “Letter from Lenin dated 5/III-23 (2 copies) and reply from
Stalin not read by Lenin. Single copy’. Stalin’s
reply was written on 7th March immediately after receiving Lenin’s letter
from M.A. Volodicheva editor].
M.I. Ulyanova to the Presidium of the Joint Plenum of the CC and CCC of the
RCP(b), 26th July, 1926
ONLY LIARS CLAIM LENIN TOOK
GERMAN MONEY
Rutich writes that Lenin was
getting German money for the Bolsheviks, that he came back to Russia in April
1917....
That's pure provocation. Everything about Lenin was spotless. He
thundered against German imperialism openly, unceasingly, mercilessly.
Chuev, Feliks. Molotov Remembers.
Chicago: I. R. Dee, 1993, p. 132
MOLOTOV DISTRUSTS ANY
CRITICISM OF MARX AND ENGELS
...Keep in mind that I regard with extreme caution any attempts to criticize
Marx and Engels. These were real people, and there is much to learn from
them.
Chuev, Feliks. Molotov
Remembers. Chicago: I. R. Dee, 1993, p. 135
EARLY ON THE PARTY TRIED NOT
TO EXPEL TROTSKY
MOLOTOV: In 1924
discussion against Trotsky was proceeding full tilt. Suddenly a statement
bearing all our signatures--Stalin, Zinoviev, Kamenev, Rykov, Bukharin, and
mine too was published to the effect that we could not conceive of the
Politburo without Trotsky! Everyone had signed. It was as if,
despite our quarrels with him, he was such a figure that we could not imagine
the Politburo without him. It was politics, the times, whatever you
will. We were engaged in a very serious ideological struggle yet, at one
and the same time, we valued Trotsky so highly!
The time was not yet ripe for an open break. It couldn't be done.
Once the ideological fight was in the open, it was possible to consider how to
get rid of Trotsky.
We sent him into exile. And even then we had a lot of trouble with
him. While living abroad he actually called for terror.... As long
as imperialism's alive, there will be many such swine.
IVANOVICH, SHOTA:
"We shouldn't have any!"
What do you mean, we shouldn't have any? It's absolutely unavoidable,
inescapable.
IVANOVICH, SHOTA:
"Well then, we're fighting badly against them."
That's true.... We should be considered guilty insofar as we fought
badly. You see, we didn't put an end to all these swine.
Chuev, Feliks. Molotov
Remembers. Chicago: I. R. Dee, 1993, p. 136
STALIN COMPLIMENTED TROTSKY
FOR HIS CIVIL WAR RECORD
John Reed rather glorified Trotsky in his book Ten Days That Shook the
World. But Trotsky must be given his due, for he was good in those
days. He behaved badly in Brest, of course. And in the civil war he
displayed good and bad qualities. Without a doubt he fought for Soviet
power. How else could he have become head of the Red Army?...
Trotsky had planted his people everywhere, especially in the Army.
Chuev, Feliks. Molotov
Remembers. Chicago: I. R. Dee, 1993, p. 136
[Stalin states]: As to Trotsky, he had “played no special role” in
the October revolution. True, he “did fight well,” but only
as an agent of the Central Committee; and, incidentally, even the left Social
Revolutionaries, who later on turned against the revolution, had fought well
then. The actual leadership of the rising belonged to a “party
center,” of which Trotsky was not even a member.
Deutscher, Isaac. Stalin; A
Political Biography. New York: Oxford Univ. Press, 1967, p. 281
SVERDLOV LEFT NOTHING BUT WAS
PRAISED BY LENIN
IVANOVICH, SHOTA:
"Did Lenin praise Sverdlov on the day of his funeral?"
Yes, far too much. He was an organizer, a party man, but he left nothing
to distinguish himself. Nothing. I don't remember a single article
by him.
Chuev, Feliks. Molotov
Remembers. Chicago: I. R. Dee, 1993, p. 141
DZERZHINSKY DENOUNCED ZINOVIEV
AND KAMENEV AS KRONSTADTERS
...Dzerzhinsky had certainly become a member of our group, and said,
"Zinoviev and Kamenev, where are you leading us? You are just
Kronstadtsy!" He was outraged. Dzerzhinsky had a sincere,
expansive nature, but he was hot-blooded. Already in 1925 he called
Zinoviev and Kamenev "Kronstadtsy."...
Chuev, Feliks. Molotov
Remembers. Chicago: I. R. Dee, 1993, p. 143
LENIN MADE MISTAKES
Did Lenin make any mistakes?
Certainly.
Chuev, Feliks. Molotov
Remembers. Chicago: I. R. Dee, 1993, p. 144
LENIN CRITICIZED ZINOVIEV AND
BUKHARIN IN THE END
Zinoviev deviated from Lenin after 1925. Krupskaya also moved away from
Lenin, but in truth she didn't meddle in big politics.
So Lenin lived in such circumstances. And he was, after all, a man who
could cut right through any obstacle. How irreconcilable he was with the
right and the left! Bukharin and Zinoviev were closest to him, but he
criticized them too, especially in the end.
Chuev, Feliks. Molotov
Remembers. Chicago: I. R. Dee, 1993, p. 146
LENIN REALIZED STALIN AND
TROTSKY WERE THE TWO MAIN LEADERS
CHUEV: Lenin attributed
such dreadful qualities to everyone, without exception!
MOLOTOV:
Certainly. But he gave very accurate descriptions. He could not
come to run-of-the-mill conclusions. It was not without reason that Lenin
distinguished Stalin and Trotsky as leaders, as the two who stood apart from
the rest, as the most talented.
Chuev, Feliks. Molotov
Remembers. Chicago: I. R. Dee, 1993, p. 148
WHEN NEP FORMED LENIN’S
3 SECRETARIES WERE ALL TROTS WHO WERE LATER EXPELLED
...It was the beginning of the NEP. Lenin's secretariat was formed--three
secretaries, and all three were Trotskyists! Devil take it, all
three--Krestinsky, Serebryakov, and Preobrazhensky. They formed a tight
ring around Lenin. All of them were kicked out at the 11th congress.
Chuev, Feliks. Molotov
Remembers. Chicago: I. R. Dee, 1993, p. 148
WAR COMMUNISM WAS NECESSARY
The civil war was preventing us from switching over to normal methods of
work. That's why we had the so-called food requisitioning system.
Balking at nothing, the state took from the peasants what it needed. If
you had more, the state would take more from you; if someone else had a great deal,
the state would take everything; if another had nothing, the state would take
nothing. There was no other way out.
Chuev, Feliks. Molotov
Remembers. Chicago: I. R. Dee, 1993, p. 151
There were, however, other reasons for the breach between the countryside and
the Bolsheviks. First of all, the cities and towns had to be fed, but
they were unable to provide goods for the peasants in return for their
produce. The peasants declined to accept paper money, which they found
worthless, and this led to a system of unpopular food requisitions. The
Bolsheviks seem to have done their utmost to supply the peasants with goods,
but the shortages in the cities were already so great that little could be
done. They also tried to institute a rationing system of food and
commodities in the urban centers, but "speculation" and black markets
were so rife that in March, 1918, Lenin founded the Extraordinary Commission
(Cheka). Its chief function was at first to combat speculation, but
growing clouds in town & country alike dictated its use as an instrument
against counter-revolution, which soon became its principal task....
Duranty, Walter. Story of
Soviet Russia. Philadelphia, N. Y.: JB Lippincott Co. 1944, p. 46
STALIN CRITICIZED LENIN FOR
HIS STRONG ATTACKS AGAINST LIBERALS
Stalin once took a dig at Lenin about his fanatical anti-liberalism.
Lenin preferred to fight liberals rather than the Black Hundreds, the extreme
reactionaries, about whom everything was clear.
Chuev, Feliks. Molotov Remembers.
Chicago: I. R. Dee, 1993, p. 155
MOLOTOV SAYS REPRESSIONS WERE
TOO LIGHT AND MISSED SOME KEY PEOPLE
EDITOR: Molotov
complained that the terror and not gone far enough. After all, it failed
to purge incipient or covert right-wingers such as Khrushchev & Mikoyan.
Chuev, Feliks. Molotov
Remembers. Chicago: I. R. Dee, 1993, p. 160
BERIA HELPED KILL STALIN
ACCORDING TO SOME
EDITOR: Molotov wonders
with good reason whether Stalin really died a natural death. Shortly
before Beria was liquidated by his fearful colleagues, he took credit for
Stalin's death. He confided to Molotov that he had "saved them
all," implying that he had killed Stalin or at least seen to it that the
stricken Stalin did not receive adequate and timely medical attention.
Chuev, Feliks. Molotov
Remembers. Chicago: I. R. Dee, 1993, p. 161
...He [Beria] was a talented organizer but a cruel, merciless man.
Chuev, Feliks. Molotov
Remembers. Chicago: I. R. Dee, 1993, p. 177
Beria strained might and main to grab leading positions. Among the
reactionary elements he was the activist. That's why he strove to clear
the way for a return of private property. Anything else lay outside his
field of vision. He did not avow socialism. He thought he was
leading us forward, but in fact he was pulling us back, back to the worst.
Chuev, Feliks. Molotov
Remembers. Chicago: I. R. Dee, 1993, p. 232
Some people believe that Beria killed Stalin. I believe this possibility
cannot be excluded.... Beria was treacherous and unreliable. He
could have done the deed just to save his own skin.... I too am of the
opinion that Stalin did not die a natural death. He wasn't seriously
ill. He was working steadily... And he remained very spry.
Chuev, Feliks. Molotov
Remembers. Chicago: I. R. Dee, 1993, p. 326
There is undocumented testimony that Beria intended to usurp power as Stalin
grew older. Stalin may have known this, as their relations grew noticeably
cooler in the last year and a half of his life. Among the many witnesses
who have told me about this, most interesting was the testimony of M. S.
Vlasik, wife of Lt. Gen. Vlasik, former chief of the Main Administration of the
Ministry of State Security (the KGB). For more than 25 years, Vlasik had
been Stalin's chief of personal security: he knew much and was trusted by the
boss. Beria hated him, but Stalin would not allow him to be
touched. A few months before Stalin died, however, Beria managed to
compromise Vlasik, as well as Poskrebyshev, and to have them removed from
Stalin's entourage. Vlasik was arrested and given 10 years' prison and
exile. When he returned after Stalin's death, he said he was totally
convinced that Beria had 'helped' Stalin to die after first removing his
physicians.
Volkogonov, Dmitri. Stalin:
Triumph and Tragedy. New York: Grove Weidenfeld, 1991, p. 333
Stalin began to decline more rapidly after his 70th birthday. His blood
pressure was continually high, but he did not want doctors, he did not trust
them. He still listened half-heartedly to Academician Vinogradov, but
gradually Beria convinced him that 'the old man [Vinogradov], was suspect' and
tried to foist other doctors on to him. Stalin, however, would have no
one new. When he heard that Vinogradov had been arrested, he cursed
ominously but did nothing about it. He now finally stopped smoking, but
continued his unhealthy life-style in all other respects, rising late and
working into the night.... he would not entrust himself to doctors.
...His old belief in Georgian longevity was shaken by a series of dizzy spells
which knocked him off balance.
Volkogonov, Dmitri. Stalin:
Triumph and Tragedy. New York: Grove Weidenfeld, 1991, p. 529
Beria would not call the doctors and instead turned on the servants: 'Why did
you panic? Can't you see Comrade Stalin is sound asleep? All of you
get out and leave our leader in peace, I shall deal with you in due course!'
Malenkov gave Beria some half-hearted support. According to Rybin, there
seemed to be no intention at all of getting medical help for Stalin, who must
have had the stroke some six to eight hours before. Everyone seemed to be
following a scenario that best suited Beria.
Volkogonov, Dmitri. Stalin:
Triumph and Tragedy. New York: Grove Weidenfeld, 1991, p. 572
Beria did not hide his look of triumph. All the other members of
the Politburo, including Malenkov, were afraid of this monster. The death
of one tyrant promised a new orgy of bloodletting by his successor.
Exhausted by all his exertions, and now sure that Stalin had crossed the
dividing line between life and death, Beria dashed away to the Kremlin for some
hours, leaving the other leaders at Stalin's deathbed. I have already
outlined the version of Beria, as first deputy chairman of the Council of
Ministers, now forcing the great political game that he had long planned.
His hasty departure for the Kremlin was possibly connected with his effort to
remove from Stalin's safe documents which might contain instructions about how
to deal with him, a last will that might not be so easy to contest, made while
Stalin was in full control of his faculties.
He returned to the dacha in a mood of self-confidence and proceeded to dictate
to his crestfallen colleagues that they must prepare a government statement to
the effect that Stalin was ill and also publish a bulletin on the state of his
health.
Meanwhile the last act of the drama was being played out. Stalin's son,
Vasili, kept coming in and shouting in a drunken voice, 'They've killed
my father, the bastards!'... Voroshilov, Kaganovich, Khrushchev and some others
were weeping openly.
...On her knees, her head on his chest and wailing like a peasant, was
Istomina, Stalin's housekeeper who for some 20 years had looked after him,
accompanied him on all his trips to the south and even on two of the three
international wartime conferences.
Volkogonov, Dmitri. Stalin:
Triumph and Tragedy. New York: Grove Weidenfeld, 1991, p. 573-574
Stalin could not be permitted to live, I believe, due to the risk that he would
attempt a countercoup. The Politburo, therefore, overthrew Stalin in
February 1953 to avert a purge. Stalin's timely death was the solution--
Beria's, Malenkov's, and possibly others'--to the problem of disposing of the
deposed Stalin. Discounting the information from official Soviet sources,
I conclude that Beria was responsible for the death of Stalin, Malenkov was his
accomplice, and Khrushchev & Bulganin were accessories after the fact.
Deriabin, Peter. Inside
Stalin's Kremlin. Washington [D.C.]: Brassey's, c1998, p. 131
Melodramatic accounts of Stalin's death, of which there is no shortage, claim
that Stalin was murdered. It is most likely that the denial of
medical care made not the slightest difference. But Beria clearly
thought it had: " I did him in!" he later boasted to
Molotov and Kaganovich. "I saved you all!"
Montefiore, Sebag. Stalin: The
Court of the Red Tsar. New York: Knopf, 2004, p. 641
So the staff rang through to Malenkov to alert the politburo of what had
happened [to Stalin], but they could do nothing without Beria. Beria could
not be found, he was out carousing with women. After finally being
tracked down he marched in drunk at around 3 a.m. Looking triumphant,
according to the assembled group, he glanced at the comatose Stalin and
summarily dismissed their fears telling them to leave him to sleep in
peace. He forbade anyone to use the telephone, ordered the politburo to
reconvene in the morning, and went away. He returned at 9 a.m., again
with members of the politburo, to take another look.
Stalin had lain untreated for over 24 hours; it was 10 hours since he had been
found. Beria now ordered doctors to be summoned from the Academy of
Medical Sciences, choosing intellectuals rather than practitioners presumably
since the latter were mostly behind bars, but possibly also for his own
reasons. The doctors nervously applied leeches to the back of Stalin's
neck and head, took cardiograms, X-rayed his lungs and administered a series of
injections. Meanwhile Beria dashed off to the Kremlin and spent some time
in Stalin's study, his inner sanctuary, presumably removing from the safe
documents that only she would have known about, which in his own interests
should not be found. Instructions as to the political succession were
never found, nor was a personal diary of Stalin's, a black exercise book in
which the leader recorded his personal thoughts and plans....
Svetlana by this time had been summoned and stood immobilized amidst the
frantic scene beside her father's bed. She is convinced that there was
more to Stalin's stroke than met the eye.
"Beria finally plotted to murder my father. I don't know how he
plotted it, and there is a lot of folklore about it. But they withdrew
medical help for at least 12 hours; the whole politburo, Beria among them,
arrived at the scene instead of the doctors. He was the one who had said
hours earlier, "Nothing has happened. You are panicking. The
man is sleeping." And then turned around and walked away.
Richardson, Rosamond.
Stalin’s Shadow. New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1994, p. 248
"Beria certainly was very happy when my father died; he had always worked
towards that. He had removed my father's whole entourage, starting with
Vlasik, who had been there 30 years. The doctor was arrested, the
personal secretary was arrested, so something had been brewing there. I
hate folklore and making guesses, but something was up."
"One of the guards attended the autopsy, Vlasik's successor, a man named
Krustalyov. They could not permit a post-mortem to go ahead unsupervised
because by this time nobody trusted anybody. He sat there, and it made
such an impression on him that afterwards he collapsed completely and drank
heavily, and of course he was fired. He said that what hit him was when
they opened the head, and he saw the brain. One of the medics said,
"This is obviously a very fine brain, quite out of the
ordinary." Krustalyov never got over it."
Richardson, Rosamond.
Stalin’s Shadow. New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1994, p. 252-253
The question as to whether those close to him plotted Stalin's death remains
unanswered, although Svetlana is convinced of Beria's complicity, and by
implication of others' too.
Richardson, Rosamond.
Stalin’s Shadow. New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1994, p. 255
STALIN WORKED HIS WAY TO THE
TOP BY EARNING IT
CHUEV: And how did
Stalin rise so high?
MOLOTOV: Thank
God. It was the whole story of his life, the Revolution, the Civil
War.... Of course, he deserved it....
How did he work his way up? Look, he wrote a very good book on the
national question.... He edited the first issue of Pravda.
Chuev, Feliks. Molotov
Remembers. Chicago: I. R. Dee, 1993, p. 165
Stalin will be rehabilitated, needless to say.
Stalin had an astounding capacity for work.... I know this for a fact.
Chuev, Feliks. Molotov
Remembers. Chicago: I. R. Dee, 1993, p. 179
Stalin's usual routine is to work hard for about a week or longer, then go to
the dacha for two or three days to rest. He has few relaxations, but he
likes opera and ballet, and attends the Bolshoi Theatre often; sometimes a
movie catches his fancy, and he saw Chapayev, a film of the civil wars, four
times. He reads a great deal, and plays chess occasionally. He
smokes incessantly, and always a pipe; the gossip in Moscow is that he likes
Edgeworth tobacco, but is a little hesitant to smoke publicly this non-Soviet
product. At dinner he keeps his pipe lit next to his plate, puffs between
courses....
Gunther, John. Inside Europe.
New York, London: Harper & Brothers, c1940, p. 532
LENIN WAS THE ONLY PARTY GENIUS
...He [Stalin] was close to a genius in tactics; in theory and strategy he was
weaker. In our party I consider Lenin alone to be a genius.
Chuev, Feliks. Molotov
Remembers. Chicago: I. R. Dee, 1993, p. 166
Stalin was an incarnation of his epoch, a different period from that of Lenin
or Marx.... At a discrete stage Stalin achieved what had not--could not
have--been achieved by anyone else.
Speaking of Lenin and Stalin, I would say this: the former was a genius, the
latter was talented.
Chuev, Feliks. Molotov
Remembers. Chicago: I. R. Dee, 1993, p. 230
STALIN WAS THE BEST MAN TO
REPLACE LENIN
CHUEV: They say that
Stalin replaced the Central Committee with a bureaucratic apparatus, and that
after Lenin's death he won power with the help of this apparatus.
MOLOTOV: But who could
have led better?
Chuev, Feliks. Molotov
Remembers. Chicago: I. R. Dee, 1993, p. 166
Whoever will read this book, will think that I am a die-hard Stalinist. I
do not absolve Stalin of everything, but I know his character and I also know
the circumstances and the bunch of opportunists that were surrounding him in
the Politburo. History now has shown us the conditions under which Stalin
had to work, think, and lead our country then, during the hectic events,
enemies internally and externally doing everything possible to steer the
country away from the socialist path.... Could Stalin have known
everything that was going on inside the country?
Rybin, Aleksei. Next to
Stalin: Notes of a Bodyguard. Toronto: Northstar Compass Journal, 1996, p. 107
INDUSTRIALIZATION HAD TO BE DONE
AT THE RIGHT TIME NOT WHEN TROTSKY WANTED IT
Only after we had laid the foundation did we step up the pace of
industrialization. Lenin directed our policy in the same way. He
used to say that Trotsky held an absurd position--without a czar and under a
workers' government. What kind of revolution was this? To overthrow
Czarism and shift immediately to a proletarian revolution? To Lenin that
was nonsense and sure to fail. Instead we had to pass through all the stages
of the democratic path to arrive at socialist revolution. He proposed
that we form a revolutionary democratic government with the participation of
the peasantry and only when it no longer moved forward, had exhausted its
revolutionary potential, would we move on to proletarian revolution.
Stalin proceeded in just that way. He believed that if you began instant
industrialization without preparations, it would fail.
Superindustrialization is just babbling. In fact you, the Trotskyist, are
not for industrialization because you do not believe in the possibility of
alliance with the peasantry. You believe only in the revolutionary
potential of the Western worker; but he is in no hurry. You do not
believe in the revolutionary potential of our people and so ruch us into risky
adventurism, the pernicious policy of superindustrialization.
But when we prepared and got started, they found themselves overtaken by
events: you're doing it the wrong way, making mistakes, you’re pushing
too hard. Then right-wingers began to accuse us of following a policy of
superindustrialization. Both Trotskyists and right-wingers were of course
wrong.
Chuev, Feliks. Molotov
Remembers. Chicago: I. R. Dee, 1993, p. 170
A brief recapitulation of his crucial statements on industrialization reveals
equally striking contradictions. In the middle '20s Russian industry,
recovering to its pre-war condition, increased its output by 20 to 30 percent
per year. The Politburo argued over the rate at which output could be
expanded after all the existing plants and factories had been made to operate
at full capacity. Everybody agreed that once this point had been reached,
the annual increases would be smaller. Zinoviev, Trotsky, and Kamenev
thought that it would still be possible to raise output by somewhat less than
20 percent a year. Stalin dubbed them 'super-industrializers'. When
his opponents advanced the project for the Dnieprostroy, the great
hydro-electrical power station on the Dnieper, he shelved it, allegedly saying
that for Russia to build the Dnieprostroy would be the same as for a muzhik to
buy a gramophone instead of a cow. His report to the 15th Congress, in
December 1927, was full of contentment with the industrial condition of the
country; but he already took a leaf from the opposition's book--and suggested
that in the next few years industrial output should be increased at the annual
rate of 15 percent.
Deutscher, Isaac. Stalin; A
Political Biography. New York: Oxford Univ. Press, 1967, p. 320
Trotsky advocated super-industrialization in the manner of the Five-Year plan
as far back as 1921, and he wanted to expel the kulaks (rich farmers) in 1925,
a task which Stalin did not set himself till almost five years later. But
that was the trouble. Trotsky, impulsive, demanded these things
prematurely, at the wrong time; Stalin had the strength to wait.
Gunther, John. Inside Europe.
New York, London: Harper & Brothers, c1940, p. 526
STALIN AND ZHUKOV SAY THE
RUSSIAN PEOPLE BROKE THE BACK OF FASCISM
...the Russian people, whom Stalin called the most outstanding of all the
nations making up the Soviet Union.... He was correct in calling the
Russian people the decisive force that broke the back of fascism....
Chuev, Feliks. Molotov
Remembers. Chicago: I. R. Dee, 1993, p. 188
It was neither rain nor snow that stopped the fascist troops near Moscow.
The grouping of picked Nazi troops, over one million strong, was routed by the
courage, iron staunchness and valour of the Soviet troops which had the people,
Moscow and their country behind them.
Zhukov, Georgi. Reminiscences
and Reflections Vol. 2. Moscow: Progress Pub., c1985, p. 41
STALIN SHOULD NOT HAVE RETIRED
AFTER THE WAR
CHUEV: Do you think
Stalin ought to have retired after the war?
MOLOTOV: No, I do
not. But he was, in my opinion, overexhausted. Some took advantage
of this. They slipped things over on him and buttered him up.
That's why he trusted Khrushchev and distrusted me.
Chuev, Feliks. Molotov
Remembers. Chicago: I. R. Dee, 1993, p. 190
LENIN WANTS JEWS ON
COMMISSIONS TO ASSURE PROGRESS
Stalin recounted that he went to Lenin and said, "I'm setting up a
commission of inquiry. I am appointing so and so to it." Lenin
said the him, "Not a single Jew? No, nothing will come of it!"
Chuev, Feliks. Molotov
Remembers. Chicago: I. R. Dee, 1993, p. 192
DEPORTATION OF NATIONALITIES
DURING THE WAR WAS NECESSARY AND JUSTIFIED
CHUEV: How do you
explain the forced resettlement of entire ethnic groups during the war?
MOLOTOV: ...The fact is
that during the war we received reports about mass treason. Battalions of
Caucasians opposed us at the fronts and attacked us from the rear. It was
a matter of life and death; there was no time to investigate the details.
Of course innocents suffered. But I hold that given the circumstances, we
acted correctly.
Chuev, Feliks. Molotov
Remembers. Chicago: I. R. Dee, 1993, p. 195
CHUEV: Why were the
Kalmyks deported during the war?
MOLOTOV: They helped the
Germans.
Chuev, Feliks. Molotov
Remembers. Chicago: I. R. Dee, 1993, p. 195
There have been many and varied oppositionist groupings. The first was
that of Yenukidze, Sheboldayev and Metelyov.... In 1934 there was a plot
to start a revolution by arresting the whole of the...17th Congress of the
Party. In 1942 there was the armed uprising of the North Caucasian
peoples, more especially of the Chechen nation, who tried to establish their
independence against both Stalin and Hitler. These are representative
instances of opposition.
Tokaev, Grigori. Comrade X.
London: Harvill Press,1956, p. 37
By the autumn of 1942 the axis forces had reached those districts of the
Northern Caucasus which were least loyal of all to Stalin--Checheno-Ingushetia,
Dagestan, Dzaudzhikau and Grozny.
Tokaev, Grigori. Comrade X.
London: Harvill Press,1956, p. 237
... A number of Caucasian and near-Caucasian people had shown themselves
disloyal. The Chechens, Ingushes, the Balkarians, the people of Karachay,
the Tatars of Crimea and the Kalmyks had indeed fought equally against the
Nazis and the Soviet 'imperialisms'. The Karachay people had openly
welcomed the Germans under General Kleist and the prime mover in this
astonishing act had been none other than the Chairman of the Provincial
Executive Committee of the Soviets of the Karachay Autonomous Province.
The Crimean Tatars were still working together with the Germans exterminating all
the Russians they could, especially the Party members. There was an
anti-Soviet partisan war in progress.
Tokaev, Grigori. Comrade X.
London: Harvill Press,1956, p. 245
... It was not till June 28, 1946, nearly three years later, that they [the
Russian people] learned about it.... The Secretary of the Presidium of
the Supreme Soviet of the Russian Socialist Federal Republic, then Bakhmurov,
[made] the announcement.
“Comrades,” he said, “the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of
the RSFSR places before you for confirmation the draft of a law to abolish the
Chechen-Ingush ASSR and for the transformation of the Crimean ASSR into the
Crimean province.... During the Great Fatherland War, when the peoples of
the USSR were heroically defending the honor and independence of their
Fatherland in the struggle against the German-Fascists conquerors, many
Chechens and Crimean Tatars, giving ear to German agents, entered volunteer
units organized by the Germans and together with the German armies fought
against units of the Red Army. On German instructions, they set up
saboteur bands for the struggle against the Soviet regime in the rear.
The main body of the population of the Chechen-Ingush and Crimean Tatar ASSR's
offered no resistance to these traitors to the Fatherland. For this
reason the Chechens and Crimean Tatars have been transported to other parts of
the Soviet Union. In the new regions they have been given land as well as
the requisite state assistance for their economic establishment....”
Tokaev, Grigori. Comrade X.
London: Harvill Press,1956, p. 268
Towards the Moslem peoples, the Germans pursued a benign, almost paternalistic
policy. The Karachai, Balkars, Ingush, Chechen, Kalmucks, and Tatars of
the Crimea all displayed pro-German sympathies in some degree. It was
only the hurried withdrawal of the Germans from the Caucasus after the battle
of Stalingrad that prevented their organizing the Moslem people for effective
anti-Soviet action. The Germans boasted loudly, however, that they had
left a strong "fifth column" behind them in the Caucasus.
Grey, Ian. Stalin, Man of
History. London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1979, p. 373
Remembering the response of the Sudeten Germans to Nazi appeals, Stalin considered
them [the Volga Germans] a risk and ordered their removal, but as a precaution
rather than a punishment. They were nevertheless treated harshly.
NKVD troops descended suddenly on the Volga German Republic, and gave the
people only a few hours in which to get ready for the long journey by cattle
truck. Many died of hunger and hardship on the way. On arrival at
their destination in uninhabited regions of Kazakhstan in Siberia, the
survivors were given agricultural tools and left to build a new life.
[From Conquest]
After Stalin's death five of the Moslem peoples were allowed to return to their
homes. The Crimean Tatars and Volga Germans were not permitted to
return. [Werth page 581]
Grey, Ian. Stalin, Man of
History. London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1979, p. 504
As a result of these three operations, some 650,000 Chechens, Ingushes,
Kalmucks and Karachays have been deported to the eastern regions of the USSR.
Volkogonov, Dmitri. Stalin:
Triumph and Tragedy. New York: Grove Weidenfeld, 1991, p. 445
Early in 1943 Stalin had taken a decision on an operation against a section
of...his own citizens. In this case it was the smaller nationalities of
the Caucasus and the Crimea who had, in Stalin's view, either welcomed or not
opposed the Germans.
Conquest, Robert. Stalin:
Breaker of Nations. New York, New York: Viking, 1991, p. 258
German attempts to play off Caucasian nationalities and tribes against one
another and to recruit collaborators among them were not without success--the
fact was to be officially admitted after the war, when several hundred thousand
Chechens and Ingushes, as well as Crimean Tartars, charged with helping the
enemy, were punished with deportation to Siberia.
Deutscher, Isaac. Stalin; A
Political Biography. New York: Oxford Univ. Press, 1967, p. 480
Others, such as mass collaboration with the enemy, especially in the Ukraine
and Caucasus, resulted from grievances and resentments lingering on since the
'30s....
Deutscher, Isaac. Stalin; A
Political Biography. New York: Oxford Univ. Press, 1967, p. 485
But the real story of Sevastopol was of how the Soviet authorities treated
collaborators. The Crimean Tartars had welcomed the arrival of the
Germans. They had hunted down Russian soldiers in disguise, had formed a
police force under German control, had been active in the Gestapo, and had
supplied the Wehrmacht with soldiers. Now the moment of reckoning had
arrived. The whole Crimean tartar community of something between 300,000
and 500,000 men, women, and children was rounded up and sent into exile in
Central Asia, and they have never been allowed to return.
Knightley, Phillip. The First
Casualty. New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1975, p. 263
Only in the North Caucasus, in the Chechen-Ingush and Kabarda-Balkar
"autonomous republics" did Hitler obtain some semblance of
collaboration by exploiting the hatred of Moslems for Russians.
Radzinsky, Edvard.
Stalin. New York: Doubleday, c1996, p. 481
During their occupation of the Caucasus the Germans had promised independence
to the Chechens, the Ingush, the Balkars, and the Kalmyks. Members of
these ethnic groups did sometimes collaborate with the Germans. The same
was true of the Crimean Tartars.
Radzinsky, Edvard.
Stalin. New York: Doubleday, c1996, p. 502
As regards collaborators sent to camps during and after the war, no reliable
figures are available either. During the war, a number of
"disloyal" nationalities-- Volga Germans, Crimean Tartars, Kalmuks
and several Caucasian Moslem nationalities--had been deported en masse to
Siberia, including all the women, children and even communists and
Komsomols. The operation was in the nature of a resettlement, and
if some were sent to actual forced labor camps, they were in a small
minority....
But the vast majority in the three Baltic States were bourgeois kulak and,
therefore, pro-German and often pro-Nazi and savagely anti-Semitic....
Since the great majority of the population is [in the Baltics] (apart from the
Jews) could be said to have "collaborated" in some measure with the
Germans after having been re-incorporated by Russia for only a year, no
particular loyalty to the latter could in fact have been expected, and the
Baltic deportees, though numerous, did not apparently run into more than 10,000
or 20,000--fewer than had been deported during the first Russian takeover in
1940. Moreover, the most violently anti-Soviet people had fled in
very large numbers to Germany when, in the summer and autumn of 1944, the
Russians were about to overrun or had already overrun the Baltic states.
Werth, Alexander. Russia; The
Post-War Years. New York: Taplinger Pub. Co.,1971, p. 26
Proportionately to their numbers, very many more people were deported from the
Western Ukraine than from the Baltic states. Cities like Lvov were
hotbeds of the most extreme Ukrainian nationalism, fascism, and anti-semitism ;
and the Western Ukraine was by far the most pro-Nazi part of the Soviet Union
to have been occupied by the Germans. For at least two years after
the war a savage guerrilla war was waged by Ukrainian nationals, with Nazi
officers, against the Russians.
Werth, Alexander. Russia; The
Post-War Years. New York: Taplinger Pub. Co.,1971, p. 27
One disturbing fact revealed a new and terrible danger and threw a fresh light
on the state of mind prevailing in the south: on 10 August 1942 Mannstein's
advanced guard of armored cars was welcomed with enthusiastic cheers from a
portion of the inhabitants of Vorochilovsk, whose recollections of
collectivization were only too painful. It was the same at
Ordzhonikidze. This made it possible for the Germans to begin to
form regiments from the Cossack's of the Terek and the natives, who enlisted in
their thousands. This was the prodrome of a separatist rot,
although for the present it was local. In vain did Stalin send into
the Caucasus plenipotentiaries whose duty it was to inquire into the situation.
Delbars, Yves. The Real
Stalin. London, Allen & Unwin, 1951, p. 322
This danger was revealed in all its amplitude in the Northern Caucasus.
Despite the capture of Rostov on the Don, Mannstein, cut off from the
bulk of the Wehrmacht, was still holding the Northern Caucasus. His
army was revictualled by way of the Straits of Kertch; and he was able to form
more and more numerous detachments of Cossacks from Terek and Kuban, of Tartars
from the Crimea, of native Caucasians and of volunteers. When these
troops withdrew they were followed by a great proportion of the population.
Delbars, Yves. The Real
Stalin. London, Allen & Unwin, 1951, p. 332
LENIN FAVORED CENTRALISM
Lenin had opposed the federal principle, federalism, because he favored
centralism.
Chuev, Feliks. Molotov
Remembers. Chicago: I. R. Dee, 1993, p. 196
HIGH TAXES WERE NEEDED TO
RAISE MONEY
Stalin's last minister of finance was Zverev.... Sholokhov called him
"our iron minister of finance."... He was derided for levying
high taxes on everyone. But who to tax? Of course there were no
bourgeoisie. He had to extract heavy taxes from our own, from peasants
and workers. They say that orchards were destroyed--they were taxed only
because fruit orchards near cities yielded supplementary incomes. You can
get something out of them, so on went the tax. But just find another way.
The state had to live somehow. No one would give us any money. What
to do? In this matter, they say, Stalin acted badly--indeed, crudely,
savagely, barbarically. But just put these "non-barbarians" in
those conditions, let them ensure the life of the state and prevent its
breakdown. Just find the means. They were simpletons who did not
understand the most elementary things! But Zverev was stalwart. I
value him for this.
Chuev, Feliks. Molotov
Remembers. Chicago: I. R. Dee, 1993, p. 207
STALIN WOULD NOT EXCHANGE HIS
SON FOR A NAZI GENERAL
Svetlana writes that Stalin
did not get along with his son Jakov.
He [Jakov] served in the artillery. As a prisoner of war of the Germans,
he bore up bravely and nobly. He perished, a hero. Stalin would not
exchange a captured German General for Jakov. He said, "All of them
are my sons."
Chuev, Feliks. Molotov
Remembers. Chicago: I. R. Dee, 1993, p. 209
STALIN GAVE HIS CHILDREN NO
SPECIAL PRIVILEGES AND DID NOT PLAY FAVORITES
CHUEV: Artem Fedorovich
told me: "...Once he [Stalin] gathered his sons together: Jakov, Vasily,
and me. 'Boys, war is coming. You will have to become soldiers.'
"Jakov and me," said Artem, "joined the artillery, and Vasily
became a pilot. All of us went to the front--from the first day; Stalin
telephoned to have us taken there immediately. It was the only privilege
we got from him as a father. There remain several letters from Vasily to
his father. In one of them from the front, he asked his father to send
him money. A snack bar had opened in his detachment and he wanted a new
officer's uniform. His father replied: '1. As far as I know, the
rations in the air force are quite sufficient. 2. A special uniform
for Stalin's son is not on the agenda.' Vasily didn't get the
money."
Chuev, Feliks. Molotov
Remembers. Chicago: I. R. Dee, 1993, p. 210
...Even my wife was arrested when I was a Politburo member.
Chuev, Feliks. Molotov
Remembers. Chicago: I. R. Dee, 1993, p. 282
She (my wife, Polina) was in prison for a year and in exile more than three
years.
Chuev, Feliks. Molotov
Remembers. Chicago: I. R. Dee, 1993, p. 323
"How are you [Svetlana] getting on there? Have you made friends with
anybody in Kuibyshev?" he [my father] asked casually.
"No," I said. "They've set up a special school there for
children who've been evacuated, and there's a whole lot of them." It
never occurred to me that this remark might cause any special reaction.
My father suddenly turned a pair of darting eyes on me as he always did when
something made him mad. "What? A special school?" I
saw that he was getting angrier by the minute. "Ah, you--" he
was trying to find a word that wasn't too improper--" Ah, you dammed caste!
Just think! The government and the people from Moscow come and they give
them their own school. That scoundrel Vlasik-- I bet he's behind
it!" By this time he was furious and was distracted only because
there were pressing matters to attend to and other people in the room.
He was quite right. It was a caste, a caste of bigwigs from the capital
that had come to Kuibyshev. Half the population had to be evicted to make
room for all these families, who were used to a comfortable life and felt
cramped in modest provincial apartments.
But it was too late to do anything about it. The caste was already in
existence, and it lived by laws of its own.
I visited Moscow in November, 1941, and in January, 1942, for a day or two each
time, to see my father. He was just as irritable and busy as on my first
visit and had absolutely no time for me and my foolish, domestic concerns.
Alliluyeva, Svetlana. Twenty
Letters to a Friend. New York: Harper & Row, 1967, p. 166
My father didn't object when I told him I was leaving the Zhdanovs'.
"Do as you like," was all he said. Still, he was unhappy about
the divorce and didn't like it.
...He was pleased when I moved into an apartment of my own; he felt I'd been
provided for long enough. No one tried harder than he to imbue his
children with the idea that they had to support themselves.
"Apartments, dachas, cars--don't think they're yours. It doesn't any
of it belong to you," he said to me again and again.
Alliluyeva, Svetlana. Twenty
Letters to a Friend. New York: Harper & Row, 1967, p. 211
My father saw the state he [Vasily] was in. He scolded him
unmercifully. He humiliated him and browbeat him like a little boy in
front of everyone, but of course it did no good. Vasily was ill, and what
he needed was to be cured. But he didn't want to be cured and nobody
dared suggest it.
Alliluyeva, Svetlana. Twenty
Letters to a Friend. New York: Harper & Row, 1967, p. 213
My father was the one who signed the order removing Vasily as chief aviation
officer of the Moscow Military District.
..."I'm 70 years old," my father used to say to him [Vasily],
pointing to the books he was reading on history, literature, and military
affairs, "yet I still go on learning."
Alliluyeva, Svetlana. Twenty
Letters to a Friend. New York: Harper & Row, 1967, p. 214
It is sometimes said that Stalin was harsh, but fair. The case is cited
of his treatment of his younger son, Vasili, whom he mercilessly removed from
his post because he was not doing his job, but in fact because Vasili had
discredited his father. Stalin fired his son both during and after the
war. On May 26,1943 Beria reported to Stalin that Vasili's drunkenness
was causing trouble again. Vasili had by now become commanding officer of
an air regiment. Furious, Stalin at once dictated the following order to
Marshal of the Air Force Novikov:
1. Vasily Stalin is to be removed at once from the post of commanding
officer of his air regiment and be given no other command post without my
orders.
2. Both the regiment and its former commander, Col. Stalin, are to be
told that Col. Stalin is being removed from his post as regimental commander
for drunkenness and debauchery and because he is ruining and perverting the
regiment.
3. You are to inform me that these orders have been carried out.
Volkogonov, Dmitri. Stalin:
Triumph and Tragedy. New York: Grove Weidenfeld, 1991, p. 468
As for Stalin's younger son Vasily, he continued to get undeserved promotion in
the Air Force, becoming a lieutenant general at the age of 29--all this not
because Stalin intervened for him, which he seems not to have done, but because
it was seldom that anyone dared do otherwise. Bulganin, Malenkov, Beria
and Kaganovich did him favors.
Conquest, Robert. Stalin:
Breaker of Nations. New York, New York: Viking, 1991, p. 293
[Footnote] Yasha was killed by the Germans in a camp of Russian prisoners of
war in 1944. Stalin offered a reward of one million rubles to anyone who
could locate his grave.
Svanidze, Budu. My Uncle,
Joseph Stalin. New York: Putnam, c1953, p. 100
I was obliged to admit that Aunt Rosa was at least a well educated person.
"I don't think we adults want to stay for the play," Rosa said,
"but I'll leave my son Basil with you. Will you keep an eye on
him? I'm going with my friends for a walk in the Gorky Culture and Rest
Park. I'll, back for Basil in about three hours."
"Have you a car?" Rosanelle asked.
"No. We'll take a taxi."
"I'll let you have mine," the theater manageress said.
I was somewhat surprised that Stalin's wife had no car, while all the other
women of her circle seemed to be provided with one. I learned afterward
that my uncle forbade her to use official cars for private purposes.
Apparently he was the only beneficiary of official cars who had such scruples.
Svanidze, Budu. My Uncle,
Joseph Stalin. New York: Putnam, c1953, p. 112
Vasily was transferred to Moscow, and for while my father was pleased to hear
his son being praised as "very capable." But pretty soon he
became convinced that alcoholism had destroyed the thirty year old general, and
in 1952 he was obliged to discharge Vasily from his high military post.
His sons had not brought any glory to his name, either in the army or in
politics.
Alliluyeva, Svetlana. Only One
Year. New York: Harper & Row, 1969, p. 371
But Stalin finally removed Vasili from his command for drunken
incompetence. And it does not seem that he ever intervened directly to
advance his career.
Conquest, Robert. The Great
Terror. New York: Oxford University Press, 1990, p. 58
In the course of the East Pomeranian operation, I think it was on March 7 or 8,
1945, I had to make an urgent flight to the General Headquarters on an order
from the Supreme Commander.
Straight from the airfield I went to Stalin's country house where he was
staying. He was not quite well.
Stalin asked me a few questions about the situation in Pomerania and on the
0der, heard out my answers, then said: "Let's stretch our legs a little, I
feel sort of limp."
From the way he looked, talked, and moved you could tell that he was greatly
fatigued. After four war years he was badly overworked. He had
worked too much and slept too little all that time, taking reverses, particularly
those of 1941-42, close to heart. All of that could not but tell on his
health and his nervous system.
On our way back I said:
"I've been meaning to ask you for a long time about your son Yakov, have
you heard anything about his fate?"
Stalin did not answer at once. We had made a good hundred steps before he
said in a kind of subdued voice:
"Yakov won't be able to get out of captivity. They'll shoot him, the
killers. From what we know, they are keeping him separately from the
other POWs and are persuading him to betray his country."
Stalin was silent for a minute, then he said: "No, Yakov will prefer any
kind of death to betrayal."
It was obvious that he was worrying about his son. At the table, Stalin
sat silent for a long time, not touching food.
Then, as though continuing his thoughts aloud, he said bitterly:
"What a terrible war. How many lives of our people it has carried
away. They'll probably be very few families left who haven't lost a
relative."
Stalin then told me about the Yalta Conference. I understood that he was
pleased with the results, and thought highly of Roosevelt.
Zhukov, Georgii. Memoirs of
Marshal Zhukov. London: Cape, 1971, p. 582
He also took to task the first husband of his daughter, Svetlana, whose husband
took advantage of a tailor enterprise, getting his suits sewn... but not only
his own, but with the gang of friends which began to have loose morals and
behavioral problems. When Stalin found this out, he called Svetlana on
the carpet and stated:
You are still a student, he is also a student, both of you are married.
Do both of you think that you will take advantage of your father and of the
State? This will not happen!
After that, the whole gang was thrown out and none of them were allowed to
receive any sort of privileges.
The counter-revolutionary assassin of Lenin, Kaplan, was in jail, but it was
found out that she had her garden and land near Solovkah. When she died
in prison and Stalin was told about this, he said:
Everything has it's time.
Rybin, Aleksei. Next to
Stalin: Notes of a Bodyguard. Toronto: Northstar Compass Journal, 1996, p. 54
It is needed to be said that Stalin's son Vasily was also captured by German
fascists who wanted him exchanged for Von Paulus, the Marshal that was captured
in Stalingrad. Stalin would not concur in this.
This act alone showed the courage, the dedication of Stalin who said, "All
Red Army soldiers are my sons, I cannot choose one over the others!"
Lucas and Ukas. Trans. and Ed.
Secret Documents. Toronto, Canada: Northstar Compass, 1996, p. 187
His [Yasha] entire short life shows that he stayed loyal to his father.
When the Germans took him prisoner in July 1941 they wanted to make use
of him, but Yasha was inflexible. They offered to exchange him for
Paulus. Stalin refused, saying that mere officers were not
exchanged against Field Marshals. Svetlana told me how her father
felt when he took that decision. He was in such anguish that he
asked her to stay with him in his bedroom several nights in succession, something
he had never done when she was small. He couldn't sleep, talked to
her about his youth, his first marriage, Yasha's childhood. He also
recalled her childhood. "I felt then that he did love us, in
his own way," she told me. He aged a lot in that period.
Later I asked my father how he thought Stalin should have acted when
faced with such a dilemma. "You know, he could not have acted
otherwise," he replied.
On two occasions Stalin opposed a promotion for Vasili and refused to let him
be given command of a division, giving as his reason that the young man lacked
the necessary experience. He gave in, though, when it was pointed
out to him that men less gifted and less deserving had obtained higher
appointments than this.
Beria, Sergo. Beria, My Father:
Inside Stalin's Kremlin. London: Duckworth, 2001, p. 154
Soon afterwards, Vasily entered an artillery school, along with other
leaders’ children including Stepan Mikoyan; his teacher also wrote to
Stalin to complain of Vasily's suicide threats: "I received your letter
about Vasily's tricks," wrote Stalin to Martyshin [his son’s
teacher]. "I'm answering very late because I'm so busy.
Vasily is a spoilt boy of average abilities, savage (a type of Scythian),
not always honest, uses blackmail against weak 'rules,' is often impudent with
the weak.... He's spoilt by different patrons who remind him at
every step that he's 'Stalin's son.' I'm happy to see you're a good
teacher who treats Vasily like other children and demands he obey the school
regime.... If Vasily has not ruined himself until now, it's because
in our country there are teachers who give no quarter to this capricious son of
a baron. My advice is: treat Vasily MORE STRICTLY and don't be
afraid of this child's false blackmailing threats of 'suicide.'
I'll support you...."
Montefiore, Sebag. Stalin: The
Court of the Red Tsar. New York: Knopf, 2004, p. 180
The refusal to swap Yakov has been treated as evidence of Stalin's loveless
cruelty but this is unfair.... it is hard to imagine that either
Churchill or Roosevelt would have swapped their sons if they had been
captured--when thousands of ordinary men were being killed or captured.
After the war, a Georgian confidant plucked up the courage to ask Stalin
if the Paulus offer was a myth.
He "hung his head," answering "in a sad, piercing voice":
"Not a myth... Just think how many sons ended in camps! Who
would swap them for Paulus? Were they worse than Yakov? I had
to refuse.... What would they have said of me, our millions of
Party fathers, if having forgotten about them, I had agreed to swapping
Yakov? No, I had no right...." Then he again
showed the struggle between the nervy, angry, tormented man within and the
persona he had become: "Otherwise, I’d no longer be
Stalin." He added: "I so pitied Yasha!"
Montefiore, Sebag. Stalin: The
Court of the Red Tsar. New York: Knopf, 2004, p. 445-446
On May 26, Stalin ordered air-force Commander Novikov to "1.
dismiss Col. VJ Stalin immediately from...command of air
regiment; 2. announce to the regimental officers and VJ Stalin that
Col. Stalin is dismissed for hard drinking, debauchery, and corrupting the
regiment."
Montefiore, Sebag. Stalin: The
Court of the Red Tsar. New York: Knopf, 2004, p. 451
Zhenya Alliluyeva was sentenced to 10 years, her daughter Kira to five years,
"for supplying information about the personal life of [Stalin's] family to
the American Embassy." Anna Redens also got five years.
Montefiore, Sebag. Stalin: The
Court of the Red Tsar. New York: Knopf, 2004, p. 574
In the course of the East Pomeranian operation, most likely on March 7 or 8, I
had to urgently fly to the General Headquarters on order from the Supreme
Commander.
Straight from the airfield I went to Stalin's country house where he was
staying. He was not in the best of health.
Stalin asked me a few questions about the situation in Pomerania and on the
Oder, heard out my answers, then said: "Let's stretch our legs a little, I
feel sort of limp."
From the way he looked, talked, and moved you could tell that he was extremely
fatigued. After four years of war he was utterly overworked. He had
worked overly hard and slept too little all that time, taking reverses,
particularly those of 1941-1942 close to heart. All was bound to tell on
his health and nervous system.
As we were strolling through the park, Stalin unexpectedly began telling me
about his childhood....
On our way back I said: "Comrade Stalin, I've been meaning to ask you for
a long time about your son Yakov. Have you heard anything about him?"
Stalin did not answer at once. We took a good hundred steps before he
said in a kind of subdued voice:
"Yakov won't be let free. The fascists will shoot him first.
From what we know, they are keeping him separate from the other POWs, and are
putting pressure on him to betray his country."
Stalin was silent for a minute, then said firmly: "No, Yakov will prefer
any kind of death to betrayal."
It was obvious that he was deeply worried about his son. At the table,
Stalin sat silent for a long time, not touching his food.
Then, as though continuing his thoughts aloud, he said bitterly:
"What a terrible war. How many lives of our people it has carried
away. There are probably very few families of us left who haven't lost
someone near to them.... Only the Soviet people, tempered in battle, and
imbued with great spirit by the Communist Party, could endure trials and
tribulations of this magnitude."
Zhukov, Georgi. Reminiscences
and Reflections Vol. 2. Moscow: Progress Pub., c1985, p. 339=340
MOLOTOV AGREES WITH
LENIN’S TESTAMENT ON STALIN
I think Lenin was right in his evaluation of Stalin. I said it myself
right after Lenin’s death, at the Politburo. I think Stalin
remembered it because after Lenin’s death we got together at
Zinoviev’s in the Kremlin, about five of us, including Stalin and me, and
talked about the “testament.” Isaid I considered all of
Lenin's evaluation of Stalin to have been right. Stalin, of course,
didn’t like this. Despite this we remained close for many
years. I think he appreciated me because I spoke out about certain
matters in a way others hypocritically avoided, and he saw that I addressed the
matter of the “testament” forthrightly.
Chuev, Feliks. Molotov
Remembers. Chicago: I. R. Dee, 1993, p. 212
TERRORISM STARTED EARLY-ON BY
COUNTER-REVOLUTIONARIES
But fresh terrorist attempts resumed in 1928. Terrorists armed with bombs
were apprehended at the border. Terrorists of the socialist-Revolutionary
type. They were audacious....
Chuev, Feliks. Molotov
Remembers. Chicago: I. R. Dee, 1993, p. 214
In Tsarist days the question of individual assassination had been a matter of
more than academic discussion between the Bolsheviks and other revolutionary
groups. It was practiced consistently by the Socialist-Revolutionaries
and the anarchists, but the Bolsheviks had always condemned it, not from
humanitarian motives but as ineffective and likely to provoke costly
reprisals. Lenin also made it clear that he preferred mass action to individual
action, and thought that time and energy were better spent in mass education
and preparation for action than in isolated terrorist blows. The
Socialist-Revolutionaries, however, thought differently, and on the night of
August 30th, 1918, a Socialist-Revolutionary girl named Fannie (or Dora) Kaplan
seriously wounded Lenin as he was leaving a factory meeting in Moscow.
The next day Uritsky, head of the Petrograd Cheka, was shot dead by another
Socialist-Revolutionary assassin. These two acts unleashed the celebrated
"Red Terror," which for once required no exaggeration by the Soviet's
enemies abroad.
Duranty, Walter. Story of
Soviet Russia. Philadelphia, N. Y.: JB Lippincott Co. 1944, p. 51
[Excerpts from the Cheka weekly of 1918 concerning the response of the Cheka to
an attempt on Lenin's life and the murder of Uritsky]
You, Comrade workers and rural poor, do not be afraid. View the red
terror as a necessity to force the bourgeoisie and its lackeys to be
quiet. Furthermore, be aware that the capitalist rulers in the Ukraine,
on the Don, are shooting workers and peasants, the number of victims reaching
20,000. They are not standing on ceremony in Finland either, and the
jails are full; they are packing our brothers in where there are already as
many as 80,000 incarcerated. Remember that we will not move them with our
softness and good and will toward them, because they are acting with a purpose,
striving to extinguish and deny the rights of the workers and peasants.
Thus we answer and we must answer a blow with a blow 10 times stronger.
Koenker and Bachman, Eds.
Revelations from the Russian Archives. Washington: Library of Congress, 1997,
p. 14
In periods of intense revolutionary conflict tsarist officials and members of
the Black Hundreds used the most refined tortures on many revolutionaries,
including women. Many embittered counter-revolutionaries revived torture
on a mass scale during the civil war. The Bolsheviks, for their part, often
shot captives but rarely resorted to other forms of violence.
Medvedev, Roy. Let History
Judge. New York: Columbia University Press, 1989, p. 487
The exact number of people destroyed by the Cheka during the civil war will
probably never be known, but there can be no doubt that the Whites killed many
more Communists, Komsomol members, captured Red Army men, and ordinary workers
and peasants. The White armies rarely took prisoners or established
concentration camps. The very first campaigns of the Volunteer Army, led
by Generals Kornilov and Denikin and resulting in the occupation of most of the
Northern Caucasus in 1918, were accompanied by the execution of thousands and
thousands of Red Army men, not to mention civilians active in support of the
Soviets.
Medvedev, Roy. Let History
Judge. New York: Columbia University Press, 1989, p. 655
The proposition "but in end justifies the means" was devised, not by
revolutionaries, but by their opponents.
Medvedev, Roy. Let History
Judge. New York: Columbia University Press, 1989, p. 661
"But the Red Terror!" someone interjects. That was to
come later when the Allied armies were to come to Russia, and under their
protecting wing the Czarists and Black Hundreds were to loose upon peasants and
workers the White Terror of the Counter-Revolution-- a hideous orgy of butchery
and lust in which helpless women and children were to be massacred in droves.
Then in defense the workers, goaded to desperation, were to strike back with
the Red Terror of the Revolution. Then capital punishment was to be
restored and the White conspirators were to feel the swift chastising hand of
the Revolution.
There are furious charges and counter charges about Red and White
Terrors. Out of the controversy four facts emerge and may be stated here.
The Red Terror was a distinctly later phase of the Revolution. It was a
defensive measure, a direct reply to the White Terror of the
Counter-Revolution. Both in number and fiendishness the outrages of the
Reds pale before the atrocities committed by the Whites. Had not the
Allies intervened in Russia and again stirred up civil war against the Soviets,
in all probability there would have been no Red Terror and the Revolution would
have continued as it began--practically a "bloodless revolution."
Williams, Albert. Through the
Russian Revolution. Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1967, p. 161-162
I should like to speak here with meticulous objectivity. I do not know
how the White Guards behaved elsewhere--perhaps in some places they acted nobly
as knights, or at least human beings. All I can record is that those I
saw behaved like a horde of savages devoid of any ethical sense, plundering,
terrorizing, and "punishing" wherever they went. In no sense
were they even an army. I have read much about the Tsarist army and
believe that there was much that was worthy of respect and praise in its
history; but the White Guards I saw merely sullied its name.
They took revenge. They took revenge for our nationalist aspirations, for
the coming of the Red Army, for the fall of Tzarism, for their own loss of
privileges. They took revenge for it all. The population of Ekazhevskoye
and Surkhokhi in Ingushetia was completely wiped out. Scores of places in
Ossetia and Kabardia were barbarously pillaged. Local Quislings appeared,
betraying those who loved their country. Law and decency vanished.
Women were raped, men faced firing squads, innocent civilians were subjected to
all manner of degradation. Those who called themselves the White Army in
fact did everything they could to make us loathe them with every fiber of our
being, and to long for the Red Army.
Tokaev, Grigori. Betrayal of
an Ideal. Bloomington, Ind.: Indiana University Press, 1955, p. 13
In the torrent of
violence unleashed by the revolution and it's inevitable companion, civil war,
it was natural that the enemies of the regime should identify Lenin as the
author of their misfortunes. The SR's were conspicuous in this regard,
and they were also accustomed to the use of terror as a means of settling
political problems. Kaplan's attempt on Lenin's life was not the
first. On 14 January 1918, in Petrograd, his car was fired on as he was
driving to Bolshevik headquarters at the Smolny Institute with his sister Maria
and the Swiss socialist Fritz Platten, having given a speech in the
Mikhailovsky riding school to troops leaving for the front. "They
had gone only a few hundred yards," an anniversary number of Pravda
recalled, "when bullets started peppering the back of the car."
Platten grabbed Lenin by the head and pushed him down. When the car was
examined at the Smolny, it was found to have been holed in several places, a
number of bullets having shattered the windscreen. Platten's hand was
covered in blood, having been grazed by a bullet as he was shielding Lenin.
A year later, Lenin had another close call, this time at the hands of
gangsters. On the evening of 19 January 1919, Lenin, his sister, and his
bodyguard Chabanov were driving out of Moscow to a forest school at Sokolniki,
where Krupskaya was living on her doctor's advice. As they approached a
railway bridge, the car was stopped by three armed men. Lenin and his
companions thought it was no more than a routine identity check, but, as Maria
recorded, "we were amazed when the people who had stopped the car made us
get out right away and, ignoring the pass he showed them, started going through
Ilyich's pockets, holding a revolver to his temple and taking his Browning and
Kremlin pass."
"What are you doing?" Maria cried. "This is Comrade
Lenin! Who are you? Show us your permits!"
"Criminals don't need permits." And with this, they leapt into
the car, keeping their revolvers pointed at us, and gave it full throttle in
the direction of Sokolniki."
Lenin was obviously satisfied with the deal he had made with the gangsters,
since he referred to it as the precedent for successful compromise.
"Imagine," he wrote in an article entitled “Left-wing
Communism, an Infantile Disease,’ "that your car has been stopped by
armed bandits. You give them your money, your identity papers, your
revolver, and the car itself. In exchange you are excused their pleasant
company.... Our compromise with the bandits of German imperialism was
just such a compromise. Brest-Litovsk, in other words, was a case of
“your money or your life’."
Volkogonov, Dmitrii. Lenin: A
New Biography. New York: Free Press, 1994, p. 229