GOOD JOB UNITING MANY NATIONALITIES
 
            The greatness of this achievement in human association can hardly be exaggerated.  To bring into being a multinational State uniting races which for centuries had been at each other’s throats, inflicting pogroms and enslaving each other; races which were largely illiterate, steeped in superstition, and engulfed in abysmal ignorance, was daring in the extreme.  Every nation became free to speak it's own language, have its own schools, form its own government, and exercise its own clearly-defined right to federate or withdraw from the federation....  The boundaries of the republics and other autonomous regions are but the demarcation lines of authority in essentially national matters.....  And as class oppression vanishes, national oppression vanishes also.  Every nation has the "right" to separate itself from the Union, but none is likely to wish to exercise that "right" when it's economic and social existence and national freedom are tightly bound up with union.
Murphy, John Thomas. Stalin, London, John Lane, 1945, p. 147
 
Every nationality in the union was allowed full linguistic autonomy and what might have seemed a dangerously lavish degree of cultural and political autonomy.  Thus the Jews, who had remained alien expatriates under Tsardom, received a small autonomous area with the promise of an independent Republic if and when the number of the population concentrated at any one point should justify the augmented status.
Duranty, Walter.  Duranty Reports Russia. New York: The Viking Press, 1934, p. 215
 
For in practice 2 rules are followed in regard to the Soviet national system.  First, the power is progressively restricted to "proletarian elements" of the population--the workers and poor peasants, whether industrialized or not.  Second, 95 percent of the political leaders are communists, and what is more, it is an almost invariable rule that the national Communist Party secretaries and their most important district subordinates are either Russians or members of a different nationality from the people around them.
            It must be admitted also that the Bolsheviks adhere with remarkable steadiness to their creed of communist equality irrespective of race or color, which assures the members of former "subject" people's opportunities to rise to the highest central positions and removes any feeling of racial inferiority.
Duranty, Walter.  Duranty Reports Russia. New York: The Viking Press, 1934, p. 215
 
            Stalin's thesis began by demonstrating the already proven fact that the misrule of the Czars and their treatment of the subject peoples as inferior beings, had been one of the main factors in the rapid disintegration of the old Empire.  "If we fall into this error of Great Russian superiority, we shall suffer a similar fate," insisted Stalin, "but if we go to the other extremes advocated by the Mensheviks and certain European Socialist parties, and divide the new State into a number of separate entities on an ethnological basis only, we shall weaken ourselves vis-a-vis the capitalist states of Europe and eventually be defeated piecemeal in a future war."  Between these twin dangers Stalin steered the Soviet ship on a middle course.
            In his suggested plan the right of secession from the Soviet republic was granted to each one of the Constituent States should its people prefer to rule themselves rather than live under the aegis of the Bolshevik party.  While it remained part of the USSR, each nation was to have its own elected assembly, which would exercise complete authority in the local concerns of the population; only in decisions as to foreign policy were the Assemblies subordinate to the Central Authority.  No attempt was made to Russianize the peoples of the different nations, cultural traditions were to be perpetuated in the new schools, already spreading into the most backward provinces.
            By these means Stalin confidently maintained that the centuries-old antipathy between the subject peoples and their Russian oppressors could eventually be destroyed.
            The wisdom of this fundamental contribution to the creation of the USSR has now been proved to the hilt.  Whereas in the half-century before October, 1917, national uprisings against the Central Government had occurred with unfailing regularity, under Bolshevik rule not one widespread effort has been made by any one of the peoples to escape from the Federation of Soviet Republics.  This is in itself a great achievement and will in the future be recognized as one of Stalin's most far-reaching contributions to world progress, as each succeeding year piles proof on proof of the sound foundation upon which the Soviet State has been constructed. 
            Without Stalin's foresight, Japan would unquestionably have established a puppet kingdom in Eastern Russia at the same time as she annexed Manchukuo; but for the solidarity of the Stalin constitution Hitler might have found support among the Ukrainian people such as he found among the rabid nationalist minorities which brought Austria, Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia, and France under a foreign domination.  Perhaps even these misbegotten offspring of the Versailles agreement would have achieved a lasting stability, if they had originated in the same free choice which created the Soviet state.
Cole, David M.  Josef Stalin; Man of Steel. London, New York: Rich & Cowan, 1942, p. 56
 
            This federation at first was loosely organized.  Regional autonomy expressed itself in a variety of flexible forms.  Some of these local governments retained their own foreign offices; others issued their own money.  Each nationality received the amount of freedom which its workers and peasants demanded.  The Communists relied on the pressure of mutual economic interests to bring and hold these peoples together, once capitalist exploitation, the source of their bitterness, was removed.
Strong, Anna Louise.  This Soviet World. New York, N. Y: H. Holt and company, c1936, p. 80
 
            In the West it is not realized that after the Bolshevik Revolution, the Ukraine received a certain autonomy within the Soviet Union that went further than any sovereignty it had ever enjoyed under Austrian, Polish, or Tsarist rule.  Unlike those in other republics, Ukrainian Communist rulers were always regarded in Moscow as influential junior partners, and cooperation with the enormous republic was considered crucial to the stability of the entire state.  That is why the Ukraine retained all the attributes of an independent state: education in the native language, traditional arts and literature, its own Politburo (which was enjoyed by no other republic), its own membership in the United Nations, all of which were unthinkable under other dominations.
Sudoplatov, Pavel. Special Tasks. Boston: Little, Brown, c1993, p. 259
 
            But a Georgian is a Georgian.  A Ukrainian is a Ukrainian.  They are no more Russians than you or I are.
Barbusse, Henri. Stalin. New York: The Macmillan company, 1935, p. 89
 
            This dogma of racial liberation, this unfettering, combining with that of social liberation, with the slogans of peace, land, and the control of production by labor, and welding together national aspirations and Socialism, had the effect of giving considerable impetus to the preparations for the October Revolution.  The attitude taken up by the Bolsheviks with regard to the problems of nationalities brought them the sympathy of everyone, without bringing about the national secessions that some people expected.  And there, once again, far-seeing wisdom, in its intrepid thoroughness, completely triumphed.  "If Kolchak and Denikin were beaten," wrote Stalin, "it is because we have had the sympathy of oppressed nations."
Barbusse, Henri. Stalin. New York: The Macmillan company, 1935, p. 93
 
            Soviet Russia is performing an experiment without parallel anywhere in the world in organizing the co-existence of a number of nations and tribes within a single proletarian state on a basis of mutual confidence and voluntary and fraternal goodwill.  Three years of Revolution show that this experiment has every chance of success.
Stalin, Joseph. Stalin's Kampf. New York: Howell, Soskin & Company, c1940, p. 204
 
            Perhaps Stalin and the rest of us exaggerate the degree to which he succeeded in taming the national minorities with his compromise, but he seems to a gotten what he wanted, and so have his successors.  So far [1965], there has been no Yugoslavia, Poland, or Hungary within the USSR.  Stalin certainly believed that the creation of the new Soviet brotherhood and supra-national patriotism in a giant industrial state was better than the murderous communal strife of Tsarist days, or the establishment of dozens of squabbling, economically impotent, little new countries.  And the strength of the national minorities, nearly half the population of the USSR, had been harnessed, without crippling concessions to any nationalism, to his real purpose--the industrial and military drive for power.
Randall, Francis. Stalin's Russia. New York: Free Press,1965, p. 233
 
            Stalin's own contributions to the whole discussion [of keeping the nationalities together] have never been made public and still remain inaccessible in a secret Stalin fond in the Presidential Archive.  Particularly after 1991 there has apparently been a reluctance to reveal how well Stalin understood the potential danger of disintegration, given certain constitutional preconditions.  He was less optimistic than others about the spread of revolution in the West, believing on the contrary that there was a need to make preparations in order to be in a position to repel aggression.
Medvedev, Roy & Zhores. The Unknown Stalin. NY, NY: Overlook Press, 2004, p. 267
 
            Every nationality in the union was allowed full linguistic autonomy and what might have seemed a dangerously lavish degree of cultural and political autonomy.  Thus, the Jews, who had remained alien expatriates under Czardom, received a small autonomous area with the promise of an independent republic if and when the number of the population concentrated at any one point should justify the augmented status.
            At first sight such an arrangement might seem to foster a spirit of petty nationalist and racial antagonism and universal disintegration--that is the exact opposite of what the Bolsheviki are trying to achieve.  In a heterogeneous capitalist State--the British Empire, for instance--liberty given minor nationalities must have had a centrifugal effect, but in the USSR the Communist party acts as a cement to bind the whole mass together and permit the facile exercise of central control.
            ...The strictness of the party discipline does the rest, and, although there have been cases of regional friction and sporadic difficulty, the system on the whole seems to work more smoothly than any organization of a heterogeneous State yet devised by man.
            ...It must be admitted also that the Bolsheviki adhere with remarkable steadiness to their creed of Communist equality irrespective of race or color, which assures the members of former “subject” peoples opportunities to rise to the highest central positions and removes any feeling of racial inferiority.
            Stalin is a Georgian, Trotsky a Jew, Rudzutak a Lett, Dzershinsky was a Pole.  These men offer salient examples for Communists of every nationality in the USSR.  It is thus clear that the Soviet federal system, while reinforcing nationalism, did not sacrifice cohesion and centralized direction.
            Duranty, Walter.  “Stalinism Solving Minorities Problem” New York Times, June 26, 1931.
 
BUKHARIN AND TROTSKY OUTSIDE THE MAINSTREAM
 
Once more Bucharin, Trotsky, and others reflected the doubts and fears concerning the new era.  Bucharin wanted to dispose of the state monopoly of foreign trade and to allow Western capitalism to satisfy the demand for consumer and industrial goods more freely.  Trotsky was in favor of starting an economic drive against the peasants as a means of ending what was called the "scissors crisis" -- the widening gap between industrial and agricultural prices.
Murphy, John Thomas. Stalin, London, John Lane, 1945, p. 149
 
STALIN REJECTS TURNING PEASANTS AGAINST PROLETARIAT AND FIGHTS TROTSKY INSTEAD
 
This [Trotsky’s New Course] Stalin dealt with, rejecting the proposal for a class war of the proletariat against the peasantry, and instead, at the Party Congress of December 1923 raising the cry of a fight against "Trotskyism."
Murphy, John Thomas. Stalin, London, John Lane, 1945, p. 150
 
            In any case, it was impossible to accomplish anything without the peasants.  But Trotsky did not simply propose to build socialism at the expense of the peasant.  The essence of his view is that he did not believe in the possibility of an alliance with the peasantry, a worker-peasant alliance, for the building of socialism.  That's the main thing....  Trotsky did not believe in the possibility of a worker-peasant alliance in order to move forward.  But we believed in it.
            ...Lenin was right.  We couldn't do without the peasant.
Chuev, Feliks. Molotov Remembers. Chicago: I. R. Dee, 1993, p. 171
 
            Trotsky did not believe the peasantry could follow our lead.  That was his most flagrant error.
Chuev, Feliks. Molotov Remembers. Chicago: I. R. Dee, 1993, p. 375
 
            The revolutions in France in 1848 and 1871 were crushed chiefly because the peasant reserves turned out to be on the side of the bourgeoisie.  The October Revolution was victorious because it succeeded in depriving the bourgeoisie of its peasant reserves, because it was able to win over these reserves to the side of the proletariat, because in that revolution the proletariat proved to be the only guiding force for the millions of toiling masses in town and country....
            The dictatorship of the proletariat is a class alliance between the proletariat and the toiling masses of the peasantry, for the purpose of overthrowing capital, for bringing about the final victory of socialism, an alliance based on the condition that its leading force is the proletariat.
Stalin, Joseph. Stalin's Kampf. New York: Howell, Soskin & Company, c1940, p. 41
 
            Where does the danger of the "Left" (Trotskyist) deviation in our Party lie?  In the fact that it over-estimates the strength of our enemies, the strength of capitalism; that it can see only the possibility of the restoration of capitalism, but cannot see the possibility of constructing socialism with the resources of our country; that it gives way to despair and is obliged to console itself with nonsensical talk about Thermidorism in our Party.  From the words of Lenin "as long as we live in a petty -peasant country there will be a more solid basis in Russia for capitalism than for communism," the "Left" deviation draws the false conclusion that it is impossible to construct socialism in the USSR at all; that nothing can be done with the peasantry; that the idea of a union between the working-class and the peasantry is antiquated; that unless aid is forthcoming in the shape of the triumph of the revolution in the West, the dictatorship of the proletariat in the USSR is doomed to failure, or to degeneration, and that unless we adopt the fantastic plan of super-industrialization, even at the cost of a rupture with the peasantry, the cause of socialism in the USSR must be regarded as lost.
Stalin, Joseph. Stalin's Kampf. New York: Howell, Soskin & Company, c1940, p. 147
 
 
STALIN’S PATIENCE WITH TROTSKY WAS TREMENDOUS
 
Stalin has never been a man to shoot first and argue afterwards.  In fact, I venture to assert that at no time in the political history of any country has there been so lengthy a warfare of words, and only words, between leading members of a political party; and I would add that no leader with such power in his hands as that possessed by Stalin, ever showed such patience with an opponent.  I write as one who was a witness on the spot, and even a not infrequent participant in the long controversy extending from December 1923 to January 1929 when Trotsky was banished from the Soviet Union.
Murphy, John Thomas. Stalin, London, John Lane, 1945, p. 153
 
Trotsky too, was never in doubt: he did not believe it possible to advance to socialism without a European Revolution....  But let it be clearly understood that Trotsky's position, however it might be decorated with revolutionary phrases, meant a return to capitalism.
            Of course Trotsky had others with him besides Zinoviev and Kamenev and Radek.  There were Rakovsky, Pyatakov, and a number of other able men.  I knew these leaders and many of their supporters personally.  I had listened to their arguments in commissions, in conferences, in public and private conversations.  I had heard them time and again declare that they were wrong and Stalin right.  I had seen Stalin agree to their reinstatement in leading positions, only to witness them renew their attacks on him and his policy.  On the Tenth Anniversary of the Revolution I saw and heard Radek, from the balcony of the Bristol hotel, harangue the crowd as it marched to the Red Square.  I watched Trotsky attempting the same thing further along Mockavia.  And still after four years of public debating nothing more serious had happened to them than their expulsion from the ranks of Bolshevism.
Murphy, John Thomas. Stalin, London, John Lane, 1945, p. 160
 
            Stalin has been widely attacked by political adversaries, Russian and foreign, as a cruel and heartless man, but in point of fact he was remarkably long-suffering in his treatment of the various oppositions.  This statement may sound surprising, but it is true, as the record shows.  The Kremlin's struggle with the Oppositionists began before Lenin's death, and again and again one or another of the Opposition leaders admitted his faults and beat his breast and cried "Mea maxima culpa," and the Kremlin forgave him.  I say this is all on the record, whatever the Trotskyists may claim.  Until the murder of Kirov, which hardened Stalin's steel into knives for his enemies’ throats.
Duranty, Walter. The Kremlin and the People. New York: Reynal & Hitchcock, 1941, p. 116
 
            The reports of the meetings of the Party bear witness to the fact that it acted with a great deal of circumspection and of patience towards Trotsky.  In 1923, during Lenin's illness, Trotsky was again the head of the Political Bureau, the supreme executive organization.  The Party endeavored to influence Trotsky by every means in its power, whilst he himself was notoriously striving to turn to his own advantage the discontent which cropped up here and there, to make a group of the discontents and to be their leader.  This vague group hostile to the Party refused to criticize Trotskyism and adopted Trotsky's divergent line.
            When, after Lenin's death, Stalin resumed the struggle, he began, in dealing with Lenin's old adversary, to employ the pedagogic method instead of taking repressive measures (Jaroslavsky).  These attempts at persuasion came to nothing and the question arose as to whether Trotsky could still remain in the leadership of the Party, or even in the Party all.
Barbusse, Henri. Stalin. New York: The Macmillan company, 1935, p. 178-179
 
            On the evening of December 8, at a meeting of party activists of the Krasnaya Presnya district in Moscow, a letter by Trotsky, addressed to party meetings and entitled "The New Course," was ready....  According to Trotsky, there were many in the party apparatus who gave a hostile reception to the "new course."  He therefore called for a purge of all bureaucratic elements in the apparatus and their replacement by "fresh" cadres.  Above all, Trotsky argued, the leading posts in the party "must be cleared of those who, at the first words of criticism, of objection, or of protest, brandish the thunderbolts of penalties at the critic.  The 'new course' must begin by making everyone feel that from now on nobody will dare to terrorize the party."  These hints were understood by everyone at the time.
            Trotsky's letter received a hostile reception not only from the triumvirs but from the majority of the party apparatus as well.  Nevertheless, it was published in Pravda on Dec. 11 with a number of additions and annotations by Trotsky himself....  In reply to reproaches by some activists Stalin stated:
            "They say that the Central Committee should have banned publication of Trotsky's article.  That is wrong, comrades.  That would have been a very dangerous step on the part of the Central Committee....
Medvedev, Roy. Let History Judge. New York: Columbia University Press, 1989, p. 123-124
 
 
STALIN AND LENIN OPPOSE TROTSKY
 
In the final analysis the whole dispute, from the first clash at the formation of the Russian Social Democratic Labor Party to the purge of the Red Army in 1938, resolve's itself into a prolonged struggle between revolution and counter-revolution, although it is not thought of in those terms until the final stages.  At the outset Lenin and Stalin stood together against Trotsky and his colleagues on the question of which class was to lead the Revolution.  After the conquest of power Lenin and Stalin stood firmly for the signing of the Brest-Litovsk Peace Treaty: Trotsky vacillated between "No War and No Peace" and a revolutionary war, when the Soviet Government had no arms with which to fight.  Stalin demanded that the Red Army be led by leaders who were Bolsheviks: Trotsky handed over the army staff positions to recruited officers of the Czarist Army.  Trotsky proposed the militarization of Labor, with the Trade Unions as compulsory State institutions: Lenin and Stalin stood firmly for the Trade Unions as voluntary organizations and against Labor militarization.  Lenin and Stalin declared that Socialism can be built-in one country: Trotsky insisted that the Russian Revolution must fail unless it was immediately supported by a pan-European revolution.
            It is impossible to view these issues in sequence without observing that Trotsky's practical proposals were disastrous and his opinions defeatist.
Murphy, John Thomas. Stalin, London, John Lane, 1945, p. 156
 
            Trotsky was always in opposition.  He would demand this or the other measure at a time when the rest of the party leaders thought that it would be dangerous.  The Trotskyist theory at time may, however, be defined fairly clearly.  Trotsky's fundamental contention was that there was an unbridgeable conflict of interest between the industrial workers and the peasantry.  He regarded Communism as the representative of the interests only of the industrial workers.  He wanted a dictatorship of the proletariat that was directed also against the peasantry.  In this he was diametrically opposed to the views of Lenin, and therefore also of Stalin; for Lenin saw the basis of the regime of the dictatorship of the proletariat in a political and social alliance between the working-class and the peasantry--under the lead, of course, of the workers.
Basseches, Nikolaus. Stalin. London, New York: Staples Press, 1952, p. 132
 
Stalin set the issue "Leninism vs. Trotskyism."
            Stalin wrote, "Lenin speaks of the alliance of the proletariat and the toiling strata of the peasantry as the foundation of the dictatorship of the proletariat.  In Trotsky we find the "hostile collision" of the "proletarian Vanguard" with "the broad masses of the peasantry."
            Lenin speaks of the leadership of the toiling and exploited masses by the proletariat.  In Trotsky we find "contradictions in the situation of the workers' government in a backward country with an overwhelming majority of peasants."
            According to Lenin, the Revolution draws its forces chiefly from among the workers and peasants of Russia itself.  According to Trotsky, the necessary forces can be found only "on the arena of the world proletarian Revolution."
            But what is to happen if the world Revolution is fated to arrive with some delay?  Is there any ray of hope for our Revolution?  Trotsky does not admit any ray of hope, for "the contradictions in the situation of the workers' government...can be solved only...on the arena of the world Revolution."  According to this there is but one prospect for our Revolution: to vegetate in its own contradictions and decay to its roots while waiting for the world Revolution.
Murphy, John Thomas. Stalin, London, John Lane, 1945, p. 157
 
            From the welter of words, two main divisions crystallized; on one side Lenin and Plekhanov, on the other Martov, Axelrod, and the 24 year old Trotsky.
Cole, David M.  Josef Stalin; Man of Steel. London, New York: Rich & Cowan, 1942, p. 19
 
            The Jews, I think, are the most active people.  You see, Lenin assembled the Politburo: he was a Russian himself, Stalin was a Georgian, and there were three Jews--Trotsky, Zinoviev, and Kamenev.  Furthermore, Trotsky was a continual opponent of Lenin on all major issues both before and after the Revolution.  Still, Lenin included him in the Politburo.
            Already in 1921 it had become impossible to work with Trotsky.
Chuev, Feliks. Molotov Remembers. Chicago: I. R. Dee, 1993, p. 126
 
            Trotsky was a crook, a 100 percent crook,...
Chuev, Feliks. Molotov Remembers. Chicago: I. R. Dee, 1993, p. 377
 
            There was never, at any time, any difference of opinion between Lenin and Stalin.
            On the other hand, they both had bitter opponents in the Party itself, especially Trotsky, an obstinate and verbose Menshevik, who considered that the inflexibility of the Bolsheviks afflicted the Party with sterility.
Barbusse, Henri. Stalin. New York: The Macmillan company, 1935, p. 30
 
            Lenin added: "Trotsky and his like are worst than all the liquidators who express their thoughts openly--for Trotsky & Co. deceive the workers, conceal the malady, and make its discovery and cure impossible.  All those who support the Trotsky group are supporting the policy of lies and deception towards the workers, the policy which consists in masking the policy of liquidation."
Barbusse, Henri. Stalin. New York: The Macmillan company, 1935, p. 45
 
            Lenin wanted to be certain of having a majority.  He saw Trotsky as the only possible threat to his preponderance.  At the end of 1920, during the debate on the trade unions, he endeavored to enfeeble Trotsky and reduce his influence.  He went so far as to place Trotsky in a ridiculous position on the transportation problem.  It was urgently necessary to put the ruined railroads back into working order.  Lenin knew perfectly well that Trotsky had no aptitude for this task and had no appropriate talent to accomplish it.  Nevertheless Trotsky was appointed people's commissar for transport.  He brought to the task his enthusiasm, his zeal, his eloquence, and his leadership methods, but the only result was confusion.  Trotsky, conscious of his failure, resigned from the job.
Bazhanov, Boris.  Bazhanov and the Damnation of Stalin. Athens, Ohio: Ohio University Press, c1990, p. 26
 
PERMANENT REVOLUTION THEORY IS BOGUS AND OPPOSED BY STALIN
 
In what respect does this "theory of the permanent Revolution" differ from the well-known theory of Menshevism which repudiates the concept: dictatorship of a proletariat?  In substance there is no difference.
Murphy, John Thomas. Stalin, London, John Lane, 1945, p. 158
 
            The Russian Mensheviks said: "Russia is a backward country, and therefore the sole possibility is a bourgeois revolution which will give an impetus to the development of capitalism in Russia."  Trotsky said: "No.  A. proletarian revolution is possible, but unless this is speedily followed by a proletarian revolution in Europe, it is doomed to collapse."  The basic agreement in these two standpoints is clear.  Russia cannot on the basis of its own resources build up a Socialist order of society.
Campbell, J. R. Soviet Policy and Its Critics. London: V. Gollancz, ltd., 1939, p. 46
 
            One of the most remarkable of the Trotskyists myths--which has found ready acceptance among capitalist and Right-Wing Socialist publicists--is that the essence of the controversy between Trotsky and the Bolshevik Party was around the question of whether the world revolution should be abandoned or not--the world revolution being in the estimation of these people a kind of missionary enterprise to which one gives or withholds donations.  A reference to the documents of the controversy will show that no such question was ever under discussion.  The Russian workers and their Communist Party have always recognized the need for rendering fraternal assistance to the workers of other countries engaged in decisive struggles.  It is true that with regard to events in England and China in the years 1927-28, the Trotskyists propounded policies of incredible naivete.  Later, they were to propound policies of warlike adventurism, but discussions on international affairs were subordinate to the main controversy, as to the possibility of building Socialism; and even as far as they were concerned, it was two conceptions as to what international policy should be that were in conflict, and not an internationalist conception in conflict with a nationalist conception.
Campbell, J. R. Soviet Policy and Its Critics. London: V. Gollancz, ltd., 1939, p. 49
 
            There was no controversy therefore as to whether the Soviet proletariat should aid the revolutionary struggle of the workers in other countries.  There was no controversy as to the danger of capitalist restoration arising from a successful intervention.  The controversy was: could the Soviet Union, by its own unaided resources, establish a fully Socialist society in its own territory?  That was the essence of the dispute between Trotsky and the Bolshevik Party, and from this dispute there arose two different policies within the Soviet Union--a Bolshevik policy of Socialist construction, and a Trotsky policy of surrender and fright in face of the capitalist elements-- varied from time to time by the advocacy of adventurist leaps in the dark.
Campbell, J. R. Soviet Policy and Its Critics. London: V. Gollancz, ltd., 1939, p. 50
 
            The crucial point of Trotsky's argument is never proved.  It is merely asserted.
Campbell, J. R. Soviet Policy and Its Critics. London: V. Gollancz, ltd., 1939, p. 153
 
            Where did Stalin stand in this dramatic controversy?  He was unmoved by the exhortations of the left Communists and by their preachings on revolutionary morality.  The idea that the Russian revolution should sacrifice itself for the sake of European revolution was completely alien to him, even though Lenin, for all his realism, was chary of dismissing it lightly.  To the man who had spent most of his active career in Baku and Tiflis, European revolution was a concept too hazy and remote to influence his thinking on matters which might determine the life and death of the Soviet Republic, that same republic whose still feeble but tangible reality he himself had helped to create.... He voted with Lenin and his tiny fraction for peace.
Deutscher, Isaac. Stalin; A Political Biography. New York: Oxford Univ. Press, 1967, p. 186
 
            Stalin was not prominent in the debates which raged for the next two months in the Central Committee, the Government, at the fourth Congress of the Soviets, and at the seventh Congress of the party.  (He was, incidentally, rather inconspicuous at any of the great debates, the true trumpets of ideas, which the party periodically indulged during Lenin's lifetime.) But he said enough at a session of the Central Committee to show which way his mind worked: 'In accepting the slogan of revolutionary war we play into the hands of imperialism.  Trotsky's attitude is no attitude at all.  There is no revolutionary movement in the west, there are no facts [indicating the existence] of a revolutionary movement, there is only a potentiality; and we in our work cannot base ourselves on a mere potentiality....'  Though he voted with Lenin there was a subtle difference in the emphasis of their arguments.  Lenin, as usual, kept his eye on the facts and the potentialities of the situation and spoke about the delay in the development of the revolutionary movement in the west.  Stalin grasped the facts and dismissed the potentialities--'there is no revolutionary movement in the west'.
Deutscher, Isaac. Stalin; A Political Biography. New York: Oxford Univ. Press, 1967, p. 189
 
            Trotsky was much more clever and had read many more books, but, unlike Stalin, he failed to understand certain simple truths--for example, the fact that once the world revolution had not come, building socialism in Russia was the only possible alternative.
Laqueur, Walter. Stalin: The Glasnost Revelations. New York: Scribner's, c1990, p. 13
 
            Almost alone, Stalin doubted all this [the necessity of permanent revolution].  He doubted it before the Revolution, and he doubted it more sardonically afterwards.  He didn't know Western Europe as well as the others; his visits, added together, amounted to only a few weeks: but all his hard suspiciousness was at work.  He was also, as usual, more harshly realistic than his colleagues.  He understood better than they did the power concentrated in the authorities of a highly organized state....  He didn't believe that the German proletariat would ever fight against that power.  He knew Russia as the emigres didn't: he had no illusions: he knew how backward it was.
Snow, Charles Percy. Variety of Men. New York: Scribner, 1966, p. 252
 
STALIN SUPERIOR TO TROTSKY
 
            Thus the ideological battle opened.  Stalin was not only a debater of some power, but as an organizer and tactician he left Trotsky standing.
Murphy, John Thomas. Stalin, London, John Lane, 1945, p. 158
 
            ...when I talked with leading Party members in Russia after Lenin's death they said to me, "Supposing we had a free election in Russia and the choice were between Stalin and Trotsky, how would any intelligently informed man vote?  It is obvious that Stalin would build the Soviet state better, and would not stake everything on foreign revolutions.  Furthermore, we can talk with Stalin.  He will listen to reason, but if Trotsky once has an idea nothing can sway him."
            ...Behind the personal antagonism between Trotsky and Stalin there were many substantial theoretical differences.  Trotsky believed that it was impossible to build socialism in Russia without world, or at least European, revolution.  Stalin felt that socialism could be built in Russia alone and that dependence on outside help would be fatal.
Davis, Jerome. Behind Soviet Power. New York, N. Y.: The Readers' Press, Inc., c1946, p. 25
 
            Certainly this autobiography [of Trotsky] is the work of a great writer and even, perhaps, of a tragic personality.  But the self-portrait does not reflect a great statesman.  The subject lacks moderation, strength of character, and an eye for reality.  Unparalleled arrogance constantly makes him blind to the bounds of possibility, and however much we are attracted by a writer straining after the impossible, his lack of moderation must be prejudicial to our conception of him as a statesman.  The castles of Trotsky's logic seem built in the air instead of on the solid earth of that knowledge of the human soul and of human affairs which alone insures lasting political results.  Trotsky's book is full of hatred, subjective from the first line to the last, passionately unjust.  It is always a jumble of truth and fiction, which gives the book charm but betrays a mentality hardly likely to establish him as a politician.
            To me one small but illuminating detail makes manifest Stalin's superiority over Trotsky: Stalin gave instructions that a portrait of Trotsky was to be included in the big official History of the Civil War, edited by Gorky; Trotsky's book, on the other hand, has only hatred and contempt for Stalin and maliciously perverts his merits.
Feuchtwanger, Lion. Moscow, 1937. New York: The Viking Press, 1937, p. 96
 
            Stalin's pragmatic approach gave the impression of a sounder man, and in a sense this was a true impression.  He was always capable of retreat--from the calling off of the disastrous collectivization wave in March 1930 to the ending of the Berlin Blockade in 1949.  Stalin's skills in Soviet political methods make Trotsky look superficial, and the conclusion seems inevitable that he had far more to him than his rival.  A mind may be intelligent, abilities may be brilliant; yet there are other qualities less apparent to the observer, without which such gifts have a certain slightness to them.  Trotsky was a polished zircon; Stalin was a rough diamond.
Conquest, Robert. The Great Terror. New York: Oxford University Press, 1990, p. 413
 
            His judgment of men was profound.  He early saw through the flamboyance and exhibitionism of Trotsky, who fooled the world, and especially America.  The whole ill-bread and insulting attitude of liberals in the U.S. today began with our naive acceptance of Trotsky's magnificent lying propaganda, which he carried around the  world.  Against it, Stalin stood like a rock and moved neither right nor left, as he continued to advance toward a real socialism instead of the sham Trotsky offered.
Statement by W.E.B DuBois regarding COMRADE STALIN on March 16, 1953
 
            In Lenin's time and under what was called the New Political Economy, the peasants were called upon to make the most of their opportunity and pile up their possessions.  "Get rich quick," was the cry.  After this had been enthusiastically responded to and the kulak had extended his holdings at the cost of the poorer peasant, Trotsky challenged Stalin and said: "We have not made a revolution in the towns for the purpose of creating a new kind of capitalist in the country.  The Revolution is permanent.  Who now holds back is a Thermidorian."  Stalin replied that the ends of the Revolution could not be gained in a moment, that there had to be transitional solutions, that Lenin himself had to allow a temporary return to Free Trade and that Trotsky in his unreasonable hurry was like a foolish gardener who pulls up the root in his anxiety to see the budding plant.
            As a matter of fact both men wanted the same thing; but impetuosity and patience, fire and foresight, can never go hand-in-hand with one another.
Ludwig, Emil. Leaders of Europe. London: I. Nicholson and Watson Ltd., 1934, p. 366
 
            Stalin's capacity to learn was one of the advantages he had over Trotsky.  It appears, for example...in the ability he showed, given time, to adsorb and internalize them [the boldness of both Lenin's reversals of policy in April and July.]  These were qualities Lenin could appreciate and use.  They were enough to secure Stalin a place in the Council of People's Commissars....
Bullock, Alan. Hitler and Stalin: Parallel Lives. New York: Knopf, 1992, p. 57
 
            Chosen originally because he [Stalin] was thought more stable in judgment than Trotsky, who might, it was felt, precipitate the state into war, Stalin is not universally considered to have justified his leadership by success; first in overcoming the very real difficulties of 1925; then in surmounting the obstacle of the peasant recalcitrance in 1930-1933; and finally in the successive triumphs of the Five-Year Plan.   For him to be dismissed from office, or expelled from the Party, as Trotsky and so many others have been, could not be explained to the people.   He will therefore remain in his great position of leadership so long as he wishes to do so.
Webb, S. Soviet Communism: A New Civilization. London, NY: Longmans, Green, 1947, p. 340
 
            Stalin was willful, Trotsky was overbearing.  Stalin was wily, Trotsky was unambiguous.  Yet Stalin's line of conduct was consistently for the good of the revolution.  This Lenin fully realized.
Levine, Isaac Don.  Stalin.  New York: Cosmopolitan Book Corporation, c1931, p. 190
 
            We naturally spoke much of Trotsky.  I shall quote two opinions.  Elias Sokolovsky unsettled me by declaring that Stalin was a better man than Trotsky.  "Stalin is a realist, Trotsky a fanatic.  Stalin pursues his intentions until they lead him to the brink of a precipice; then he makes good his retreat.  As to Trotsky, he goes on to the bitter end, though the whole world perish.  He has too much vanity to take anything into account.  I know him well; we are related."
Ciliga, Ante, The Russian Enigma. London: Ink Links, 1979, p. 196
 
STALIN DENOUNCED FOR RECRUITING
 
            Stalin's enemies angrily refer to this recruitment [Stalin’s bringing in 200,000 new Party members] as the "mobilization of the mob" into the "Party of yes-men."  In politics, when people in the mass do things of which we disapprove or support someone whom we dislike, they become automatically "the mob," generally the "hysterical mob."  When the same mass of people do what we approve, we refer to the "voice of the awakened people "or" the dignified expression of democracy at its best."
Murphy, John Thomas. Stalin, London, John Lane, 1945, p. 158
 
TROTSKY DROVE ZINOVIEV AND KAMENEV TO STALIN
 
But one thing is certain -- that Trotsky drove Zinoviev and Kamenev onto the side of Stalin by the publication of his book entitled the Lessons of October.  When this appeared both men were infuriated by Trotsky's references to their opposition to the insurrection of 1917.
Murphy, John Thomas. Stalin, London, John Lane, 1945, p. 159
 
Immediately after Lenin's death Trotsky went into clearly defined opposition, at least in articles in the press, to the majority of the Politbureau.
Basseches, Nikolaus. Stalin. London, New York: Staples Press, 1952, p. 130
 
            ... The idea of a military solution to the internal party conflict occurred to some members of the Trotskyist opposition.  Zinoviev, Kamenev, and Stalin had some apprehensions in this regard, which explains the changes made on the Revolutionary Military Council as early as 1924 and the removal of Antonov-Ovseyenko as head of the Political Directorate of the Red Army and his replacement by Bubnov.
            It must be said quite emphatically, however, that at the time of the discussion in the party there was never any real threat of a military coup, if only because the Red Army was never just a "docile" instrument in Trotsky's hands.  Trotsky could rely fully on the soldiers of the Red Army when he gave the order to march on Warsaw, but he could not have raised the Red Army against the Central Committee and the Politburo.
            Victor Serge, a well-known revolutionary internationalist who had taken part and left-wing movements in many countries, was working in the Soviet Union in the mid-20s.  He joined the Trotskyists and... claimed that Trotsky could have easily defeated Stalin in 1924 if he had relied on the army.
            But a military ouster of the triumvirate and the party apparatus loyal to it would have been an extremely difficult and uncertain undertaking--an adventure with very little chance of success.  If Trotsky refrained from such a step, one can assume that what held him back was not concern over Bonapartism but uncertainty of his control over the Red Army.
            The German edition of Serge's memoirs contains a foreword by the prominent German revolutionary Wollenberg, who went to live in the Soviet Union after the failure of the German revolution....  Wollenberg convincingly disputes the version of events presented by Serge:
            "What a colossal mistake in assessing the concrete situation that had arisen in the land of the Soviets within a few months after Lenin's death!  I must add that at the time Lenin died I was still on military duty in Germany.  As a specialist in civil war I held a prominent post in the German Communist Party.  At that time I thought along more or less the same lines as Serge and as Trotsky apparently thought about all these matters for another decade or more.
            But when I moved to Moscow, I saw my error.  In Moscow I was forced to realize that the leading figures on the Red Army general staff, such as Tukhachevsky, with whom I became friends, admired Trotsky greatly as the organizer of the Red Army, as a man and a revolutionary, but at the same time they took a critical attitude toward his general political position....  There could be no doubt that the top military command had full confidence in the party leadership....  And in the entire party there was an unquestionable majority in favor of the triumvirate, that is, the leading threesome formed after Lenin's death: Zinoviev, Kamenev, and Stalin.
            If the Soviet constitution could have been changed for a plebiscite to be held, it is impossible to say which of Lenin's successors would have gathered the most votes.  But it can be said for certain that, given the hostility of the peasants and the middle class (which was reappearing in the first half of the 1920s) in relation to Trotsky, who was considered an "enemy of NEP," the outcome would have been rather unfavorable for him.
            It is necessary to state this with full clarity because to this day Trotskyists of all varieties, as well as Soviet experts in West Germany and other countries, continue to spread the tale in speech, in print, on radio and on television that after Lenin's death Trotsky supposedly missed a "sure bet."
Medvedev, Roy. Let History Judge. New York: Columbia University Press, 1989, p. 133-135
 
BUKHARIN, RYKOV, AND TOMSKY WENT TO TROTSKY’S SIDE
 
The Bolsheviks set a tremendous pace.  Soon it proved too much for Rykov, Bucharin, Tomsky, and others, and they passed into Trotsky's camp.  New leaders came up to the side of Stalin, leaders of a new type: Kaganovich, Kubishev, Kirov, all most able organizers and administrators, all passionately convinced that socialism in one country was possible.
Murphy, John Thomas. Stalin, London, John Lane, 1945, p. 161
 
            The Buryto group was formed because Bukharin, Rykov, and Tomsky were the only members of the Politburo to vote against Trotsky's banishment in 1928.
Tokaev, Grigori. Comrade X. London: Harvill Press,1956, p. 85
 
            Trotsky was assisted in his fight against Lenin and the Party by Bukharin.  With Preobrazhensky, Serebryakov and Sokolnikov, Bukharin formed a "buffer" group.  This group defended and shielded the Trotskyites, the most vicious of all factionalists.  Lenin said that Bukharin's behavior was the "acme of ideological depravity."
Commission of the Central Committee of the C.P.S.U. (B.), Ed. History of the CPSU (Bolsheviks): Short Course. Moscow: FLPH, 1939, p. 253
 
SEVERAL EARLY SABOTAGE TRIALS LISTED
 
The Shakti trial of wreckers in 1928 was the forerunner of events which soon followed one another in rapid sequence.  Who were the wreckers?  They were counter-revolutionaries intent on fomenting revolt by creating an impression of "Bolshevik inefficiency" through the derailment of train's and the blowing up of factories.  In 1930 a group of professional engineers known as "The Industrial Party" were put on trial for sabotage of industrial construction.  1931 was noticeable for the Trial of the Mensheviks on charges of counter-revolutionary activity.  In 1933 came the famous trial of the Metro -- Vickers engineers who had become involved in conspiracies to impede construction.
Murphy, John Thomas. Stalin, London, John Lane, 1945, p. 162
 
ZINOVIEV/KAMENEV TRIALS BRIEFLY OUTLINED
 
            For the investigations set on foot by the Kirov murder led to the unraveling of a conspiracy the like of which it would be difficult to find anywhere in history.  Zinoviev, Kamenev, and 11 others were brought to trial and accused of forming a counter-revolutionary terrorist organization....  They were found guilty of associating with Trotsky and with foreign powers, and were sentenced to varying terms of imprisonment.  Later, in 1936, when the investigations had gone further, Zinoviev, Kamenev, and 14 others were charged with treason and organized terrorism under Trotsky's leadership.  All confessed their guilt and were shot.
Murphy, John Thomas. Stalin, London, John Lane, 1945, p. 162
 
            ...Stalin had re-opened the investigation into the Kirov assassination more than a year after he had pronounced it closed and several months after Yezhov's failed attempt to reopen it in June 1935.  Zinoviev and Kamenev, who had been in prison since early 1935, were re-interrogated.
Getty & Naumov, The Road to Terror. New Haven, Conn.: Yale Univ. Press, c1999, p. 248
 
            Although Zinoviev and Kamenev did not actually order the killing, according to the official formulation, they had encouraged and misled followers who had carried out the assassination.
Getty, A.  Origins of the Great Purges. Cambridge, N. Y.: Cambridge Univ. Press, 1985, p. 114
 
 
KIROV’S KILLING WAS FIRST SINCE 1918
 
            Kirov's assassination by Nikolaev was the first murder of a leading member of the party in Soviet Russia since Uritsky had been killed in 1918.
Murphy, John Thomas. Stalin, London, John Lane, 1945, p. 162
 
 
THE TRIALS WERE JUSTIFIED, GENUINE AND WHAT HAPPENED AT THEM
 
            Whatever criticism may be made of the mode of operations, of the trials, terror, bureaucracy, fanaticism, and injustices of the period, they must be seen against the background of this fact: that all the trials--Schacti, Menshevik, Industrial Party, Metro Vickers, Tukashevsky--and the terror against the NEP men and kulaks represent in common the struggle between revolution and counter revolution in a country surrounded by hostile governments and beset by perils which would allow no time for pleasantries or refinement of procedure.  To ignore this is to distort everything.  Civil war is not pleasant.  It is waged by masses who are not always discriminating, either in the means they use or in their choice of victims.  And the whole period from the Schacti trial to the final bloody purge of the Red Army was one of civil war.
            The struggle shocked the world because the world did not think in terms of civil war, but judged the events from the standpoint of a State's relations with its citizens in a period of peace.  Journalists, frequently working themselves into a state of hysteria, suggested the most sinister means of extracting confessions from the prisoners in the trials--drugs, false promises of leniency, third degree, all manner of threats--and continually saw, behind the screen of the courts...Joseph Stalin waiting for the right moment to dip his pen in blood and sign another death warrant.  On the other hand it should not be overlooked that some lawyers, some journalists, some ambassadors, watching the proceedings with more impartial eyes, had no complaints to make of the proceedings of the courts, and while still amazed with the confessions of the prisoners, believed them to be true.
Murphy, John Thomas. Stalin, London, John Lane, 1945, p. 163-64
 
On the other hand, there seems to be little doubt that the accused in these Trials were guilty of treason according to article 58 of the Soviet penal code.
Duranty, Walter. The Kremlin and the People. New York: Reynal & Hitchcock, Inc., 1941, p. 42
 
            These activities and methods [Fifth Columnists and internal aggression], apparently, existed in Russia, as part of the German plan against the Soviets, as long ago as 1935.
            It was in 1936 that Hitler made his now famous Nuremberg speech, in which he clearly indicated his designs upon the Ukraine.
            The Soviet government, it now appears, was even then acutely aware of the plans of the German high military and political commands and of the "inside work" being done in Russia, preparatory to German attack upon Russia.
            As I ruminated over this situation, I suddenly saw the picture as I should have seen it at the time.  The story had been told in the so-called treason or purge trials of 1937 and 1938 which I had attended and listened to.  In reexamining the record of these cases and also what I had written at the time from this new angle, I found that practically every device of German Fifth Columnists activity, as we now know it, was disclosed and laid bare by the confessions and testimony elicited at these trials of self confessed "Quislings" in Russia.
            It was clear that the Soviet government believed that these activities existed, was thoroughly alarmed, and had proceeded to crush them vigorously.  By 1941, when the German invasion came, they had wiped out any Fifth Column which had been organized.
Davies, Joseph E. Mission to Moscow. New York, N. Y.: Simon and Schuster, c1941, p. 274
 
For those who attended the trial, as for those of us who can read the trial proceedings, it is clear that the “show trial” theory, widely diffused by anti-Communists, is unrealistic.
Martens, Ludo.  Another View of Stalin. Antwerp, Belgium: EPO, Lange Pastoorstraat 25-27  2600, p. 161 [p. 142 on the NET]
 
            I studied the legal procedure in criminal cases in Soviet Russia somewhat carefully in 1932, and concluded (as published at the time in "Twelve Studies in Soviet Russia") that the procedure gave the ordinary accused a very fair trial.
            Their purpose, it seemed, was merely to seize power for themselves, without any pretense that they had any substantial following in the country and without any real policy or philosophy to replace the existing Soviet Socialism.
Pritt, Denis Nowell. The Moscow Trial was Fair. London: "Russia To-day," 1937, p. 5
 
            And the charge against the men was not merely made.  It was admitted, admitted by men the majority of whom were shown by their records to be possessed of physical and moral courage well adapted to protect them from confessing under pressure.  And at no stage was any suggestion made by any of them that any sort of improper treatment had been used to persuade them to confess.
            The first thing that struck me, as an English lawyer, was the almost free-and-easy demeanor of the prisoners.  They all looked well; they all got up and spoke, even at length, whenever they wanted to do so (for the matter of that, they strolled out, with a guard, when they wanted to).
            The one or two witnesses who were called by the prosecution were cross-examined by the prisoners who were affected by their evidence, with the same freedom as would have been the case in England.
            The prisoners voluntarily renounced counsel; they could have had counsel without fee had they wished, but they preferred to dispense with them.  And having regard to their pleas of guilty and to their own ability to speak, amounting in most cases to real eloquence, they probably did not suffer by their decision, able as some of my Moscow colleagues are.
            The most striking novelty, perhaps, to an English lawyer, was the easy way in which first one and then another prisoner would intervene in the course of the examination of one of their co-defendants, without any objection from the Court or from the prosecutor, so that one got the impression of a quick and vivid debate between four people, the prosecutor and three prisoners, all talking together, if not actually at the same moment--a method which, whilst impossible with a jury, is certainly conducive to clearing up disputes of fact with some rapidity.
            Far more important, however, if less striking, were the final speeches.
            In accordance with Soviet law, the prisoners had the last word--15 speeches after the last chance of the prosecutor to say anything.
            The Public Prosecutor, Vyshinsky, spoke first.  He spoke for four or five hours.  He looked like a very intelligent and rather mild-mannered English businessmen.
            He spoke with vigor and clarity.  He seldom raised his voice.  He never ranted, or shouted, or thumped the table.  He rarely looked at the public or played for effect.  He said strong things; he called the defendants bandits, and mad dogs, and suggested that they ought to be exterminated...  in many cases less grave many English prosecuting counsel have used much harsher words.
Pritt, Denis Nowell. The Moscow Trial was Fair. London: "Russia To-day," 1937, p. 6
 
By the way, there are increasing signs that the Russian trials are not faked, but that there is a plot among those who look upon Stalin as a stupid reactionary who has betrayed the ideas of the Revolution.  Though we find it difficult to imagine this kind of internal thing, those who know Russia best are all more or less of the same opinion.  I was firmly convinced to begin with that it was a case of a dictator's despotic acts, based on lies and deception, but this was a delusion.
Born, Max.  The Born-Einstein Letters. New York: Walker and Company, 1971, page 130
 
By PAT SLOAN
(Recently Returned after Five Years in the USSR)
            As in all previous big Soviet trials, this one has been declared a "frame up."  But just as Monkhouse's outburst in court, during the famous Metro-Vickers trial, that the trial was a "frame up," was never supported by one iota of evidence; so, today, the allegation of "frame up" remains unsupported in the slightest agree.
Pritt, Denis Nowell. The Moscow Trial was Fair. London: "Russia To-day," 1937, p. 8
 
            They were granted every possibility of saying whatever they liked.   They were granted the right to choose their defending counsel, to call witnesses, to demand examination of the evidence, etc.   But they renounced the right of choosing defending counsel, to call any witnesses and to deliver speeches in their defense, for the chain of their crimes was too obvious and indisputably proved.   Their crimes were proved before the world in public trial by documents, facts, material evidence.
            The criminal conspirators were caught red-handed with weapons in hand, with passports in their possession, which they had received from the agents of Hitler and of the Gestapo, with explosives.  Documentary proof was adduced before the court regarding the personal leadership of the terrorists by Trotsky, who had sent them to the Soviet Union to murder Stalin, to organize terroristic acts against the leaders of the socialist state.  Overwhelming proof of the guilt of the Trotsky-Zinoviev terrorists was produced at an open trial.  It was proved beyond dispute that Trotsky, Zinoviev and their gang stood on the other side of the barricades, in the same camp as those who are fighting against the Spanish people, sending airplanes, weapons, and munitions to the rebel generals, who are waging a counter-revolutionary civil war in Spain.
Dimitrov. To Defend Assassins is to Help Fascism. NY: Workers Library Pub., 1937, p. 7-8
 
            The Bukharin-Rykov trial was public and was eagerly monitored by the diplomatic corps and the world press.  As usual at Soviet trials all the accused were present during the whole trial seated side by side.  During the whole trial they were fully free to talk at any time and to comment on the accounts of the others and even to pose questions to the other accused when they deemed it necessary.  More than ever it is important today to have knowledge of this trial, the accusations of the attorney and the responses of the accused as well the possibilities to defense and freedom to speak.  Knowing the facts is the best way to fight the smear campaign of the right against the Soviet Union and Socialism.
Sousa, Mario.  The Class Struggle During the Thirties in the Soviet Union, 2001.
 
NOT JUST RUSSIANS CONFESSED AT THE TRIALS
 
The idea that only Russians confessed in such circumstances is quite erroneous--the British engineers in the Metro Vickers trial long ago proved that.
Murphy, John Thomas. Stalin, London, John Lane, 1945, p. 165
 
ALL THE CONSPIRATORS PUT TOGETHER FORMED A SMALL PART OF THE POPULATION
 
            For much as these events preoccupied the press of the outside world, the fact remains that all the elements of the counter Revolution--Trotsky supporters, NEP men, and kulak's--together formed a comparatively small proportion of the vast population of the Soviet Union.
Murphy, John Thomas. Stalin, London, John Lane, 1945, p. 165
 
            Who was under investigation?  We know comparatively few names but Medvedev notes the following groups: "jurists," "educational administrators," "scholars," "biologists," "technical intelligentsia," "designers in the garments industry," "executives, chief engineers, plant managers," "painters, actors, musicians, architects, film people," "military commanders."  If to these we add kulaks, largely engaged in agricultural sabotage, it appears that the opposition to the dictatorship of the proletariat came, as we might expect, primarily from the upper professionals and the wealthier peasants.  This group of professionals engaged in sabotage--economic, political, or cultural--and other anti-socialist activities, may have been large, but apparently, from the continuing efficient functioning of the nation, they constituted but a small proportion of the population or of the professional class.
Cameron, Kenneth Neill. Stalin, Man of Contradiction. Toronto: NC Press, c1987, p. 130
 
            The anti-Soviet commentators and Khrushchev give the impression of an all-encompassing "terror" which virtually paralyzed Soviet life.  But this was clearly false.  Industrial production increased at a rapid rate between 1936 and 1940, the life of the average Soviet citizen went on much as before, for some it even took a special swing upward:
Cameron, Kenneth Neill. Stalin, Man of Contradiction. Toronto: NC Press, c1987, p. 132
 
DEMOCRATIC CENTRALISM AND THE POLITBURO
 
The Bolshevik Party is built up on what are called the principles of democratic centralism, whereby authority for direction is vested by the membership and the members voluntarily accept the discipline of their chosen leader to ensure unity in action....  All lower organs of the party carry out the decisions of the higher.  The Political Bureau is therefore the most important body, carrying the authority of the Congress, and in short actually leads the Party.
Murphy, John Thomas. Stalin, London, John Lane, 1945, p. 169
 
I knew that the Bolsheviks allowed themselves freedom of argument about measures and policies prior to their adoption; it was only when a decision had been reached and a majority vote cast that the rigid discipline of the party compelled the defeated minority to accept that decision without reserve or qualification.
Duranty, Walter. I Write as I Please. New York: Simon and Schuster, 1935, p. 215
 
            As a first step in this tremendous programme Lenin laid down certain rules which were to govern the internal affairs of the party, the system which he was later to describe as "Democratic Centralism."  In preliminary discussions on policy, complete freedom and expression was to be permitted, but when once a course of action had been decided by a majority every member of the organization must obey that decision without question.
Cole, David M.  Josef Stalin; Man of Steel.  London, New York: Rich & Cowan, 1942, p. 25
 
            On new issues, and, in fact, in all matters not yet authoritatively decided on, there is, even for the Party member, complete freedom of thought and full liberty of discussion and controversy, private or public, which may continue, as in the series of Trotsky debates in 1925-1927, even for years.   But once any issue is authoritatively decided by the Party, in the All-Union Party Congress or its Central Committee, all argument and all public criticism, as well as all opposition, must cease; and the Party decision must be loyally accepted and acted upon without obstruction or resistance, on pain of expulsion; and, if made necessary by action punishable by law, also of prosecution, deportation, or exile.
Webb, S. Soviet Communism: A New Civilization. London, NY: Longmans, Green, 1947, p. 268
 
STALIN SAYS IRON DISCIPLINE AND UNITY DOES NOT EXCLUDE CRITICISM
 
Stalin says, it is impossible to win and maintain the dictatorship of proletariat without a party made strong by its cohesion and discipline.  But iron discipline cannot be thought out without unity of will and absolutely united action on the part of the members of the party.  This does not mean that the possibility of a conflict of opinion within the party is excluded.  Discipline, indeed, far from excluding criticism and conflict of opinion, presupposes their existence.  But this most certainly does not imply that there should be "blind" discipline.  Discipline does not exclude, but presupposes understanding, voluntary submission, for only a conscious discipline can be iron discipline.
Murphy, John Thomas. Stalin, London, John Lane, 1945, p. 170
 
            Stalin encouraged outspokenness in other ways.  In May 1935, as a replacement for the old slogan "Technology Decides Everything," he offered "Cadres Decide Everything."  In this context, cadres meant almost anyone, for, he continued, this policy "demands that our leaders display the most careful attitude toward our workers, toward the 'small' and the 'big,' no matter what area they work in.
Thurston, Robert. Life and Terror in Stalin's Russia, 1934-1941. New Haven: Yale University Press, c1996, p. 187
 
STALIN DID NOT RULE BY IMPOSING HIS WILL ON THE MASSES BUT BY PERSONALITY
 
That the Bolsheviks ever entertained the idea they could impose their solution on the masses is absurd, and that Stalin could impose his will on the Bolshevik party is equally absurd.  That he expressed the will and power of the party more emphatically than any other man is more a tribute to his qualities as a collective worker than an indication of domination by personal power.
Murphy, John Thomas. Stalin,  London, John Lane, 1945, p. 172
 
            It is authority rather than power that Stalin possesses.  Though his standing is far higher than that of any man in the Soviet Union, though he is cheered and quoted at all congresses as high authority, men never speak of "Stalin's will" or "Stalin's power," but of the "Party Line" which Stalin reports but does not make.
Strong, Anna Louise. This Soviet World. New York, N. Y: H. Holt and company, c1936, p. 109
 
            Nor did his authority within the party-state system rest on actual or threatened physical repression....  In dealing with Bolsheviks...his authority rested mainly on personality, on decisiveness and  that capacity for non-physical intimidation that has served well so many successful bosses throughout history.  Lenin was relying on this quality in January 1922 when he entrusted Stalin with an important commission concerning grain purchases abroad, a vital matter in a time of famine.
McNeal, Robert, Stalin: Man and Ruler. New York: New York University Press, 1988, p. 48
 
STALIN’S STYLE OF LEADING DIFFERS FROM LENIN’S
 
His [Stalin] method of working is somewhat different from Lenin's.  Lenin usually presented his "theses" for discussion by the Political Bureau, committee, or commission.  He would supplement his written document with a speech amplifying the ideas contained in it, after which every member would be invited to make his critical observations, to amend or provide an alternative.  Lenin would consult specialists on particular aspects of a problem, and no one ever went to such lengths to talk matters over with the workers individually and collectively.
Murphy, John Thomas. Stalin, London, John Lane, 1945, p. 172
 
 
Stalin on the other hand rarely presents theses and resolutions first.  He will introduce a "problem" or a "subject" requiring a decision in terms of policy.  The members of the Political Bureau, the Central Committee, or the commission of which he may be the chairman, are invited to say what they think about the problem and its solution.  People known to be specially informed on the topic are invited to contribute to discussion, whether they are members of the committee are not.  Out of the fruits of such collective discussion, either he himself will formulate the decision or resolution, or someone specially fitted will prepare the draft.
Murphy, John Thomas. Stalin, London, John Lane, 1945, p. 172
 
Stalin holds the view that decisions made by one person are nearly always one-sided.  He does not believe in "intuition's."  He regards the Bolshevik Central Committee as the collective wisdom of the Party, containing the best managers of industry, military leaders, agitators, propagandists, organizers, the men and women best acquainted with the factories, mills, mines, farms, and different nationalities comprising the life of the Soviet Union.  And the Political Bureau of this Central committee he regards as its best and most competent part.  If its members are otherwise they will not hold their positions for long.  Hence he believes in everyone having freedom to correct the mistakes of individuals, and in there being less chance of a collective decision proving lop-sided than an individual one.  But once a decision is arrived at he likes to see it carried out with military precision and loyalty.  Throughout his career his victories have been triumphs of team-work and of his native capacity to lead the team by securing a common understanding of the task in hand.
Murphy, John Thomas. Stalin, London, John Lane, 1945, p. 172
 
Suppose today Stalin outlines a policy which he thinks should be adopted.  Others criticize it, not to weaken it, but to fill in possible holes.  Stalin answers.  Some amendments are accepted; the majority fail.  The final decision is reached only when everyone is convinced that no improvement is possible.  Such is the real government of Soviet Russia.
Duranty, Walter.  Duranty Reports Russia. New York: The Viking Press, 1934, p. 103
 
            Stalin was less sure of himself than Lenin.  Instead of saying, "I am right unless you can prove me wrong," he would ask the advice of others and gradually form a composite opinion and decision.  Once that opinion was formed, however, he was much more rigid than Lenin about subsequent misgivings or opposition.
Duranty, Walter.  Story of Soviet Russia. Philadelphia, N. Y.: JB Lippincott Co. 1944, p. 164
 
            He [Stalin] loved to hear the other members of the leadership expounding their views, while he would wait until the end before giving his own, which would usually clinch the matter.
Volkogonov, Dmitri. Stalin: Triumph and Tragedy. New York: Grove Weidenfeld, 1991, p. 220
 
            Bazhanov goes on to describe Stalin's behavior at meetings of the Politburo and the Central Committee.  Stalin never presided at these:
            "He smoked his pipe and spoke very little.  Every now and then he would start walking up and down the conference room regardless of the fact that we were in session.  Sometimes he would stop right in front of a speaker, watching his expression and listing to his argument while still puffing away at his pipe....
            He had the good sense never to say anything before everyone else had his argument fully developed.  He would sit there, watching the way the discussion was going.  Whenever everyone had spoken, he would say: "Well, comrades, I think the solution to this problem is such and such"--and he would then repeat the conclusions toward which the majority had been drifting."
Bullock, Alan. Hitler and Stalin: Parallel Lives. New York: Knopf, 1992, p. 180
 
            That's how it is with Stalin, in terms of actual power, but according to all accounts he is far from domineering in dealing with his colleagues.  Lenin, we are told, took a different attitude.  He used to say: "Here is what I think our policy should be.  If anyone has suggestions to offer or can make any improvements, I am willing to listen.  Otherwise, let us consider my plan adopted."
            Stalin is more inclined to begin, if the subject matter discussion concerns foreign affairs: "I should like to hear from Molotov."  Then, he might continue, "Now, what does Voroshilov think on the military aspects of the subject," and later he would ask Kaganovich about the matter in relation to industry and transportation.
            Gradually he would get a compromise opinion from the Politburo, probably "leading" the discussion along the lines he desires, but not appearing to lay down the law, until the final conclusion is reached.  Thus, superficially at least, he seems to act as a chairman of a board, or arbiter, rather than as the boss.
Duranty, Walter. Stalin & Co. New York: W. Sloane Associates, 1949, p. 90
 
            As a rule, he was businesslike and calm; everybody was permitted to state his opinion.  He addressed everyone in the same stern and formal manner.  He had the knack of listening to people attentively, but only if they spoke to the point, if they knew what they were saying.  Taciturn himself, he did not like talkative people and often interrupted those who spoke volubly with a curt "make it snappy" or "speak more clearly."  He opened conferences without introductory words.  He spoke quietly, freely, never departing from the substance of the matter.  He was laconic and formulated his thoughts clearly.
Zhukov, Georgi. Reminiscences and Reflections Vol. 1. Moscow: Progress Pub., c1985, p. 364
 
            According to Bazhanov, who served for several years as a junior secretary in the Political Bureau, Stalin at the meetings of this high tribunal maintains his usual reserve.  He seldom generalizes.  He sees only concrete problems and seeks practical solutions.  He attacks few questions and rarely makes mistakes.
            "At the meetings of the Political Bureau," he writes in his revelations, "I always had the impression that Stalin was much more inclined to follow events than to direct them.  During discussions he would keep silent and listen attentively.  He never would give his opinion until the debate was over and then would propose in a few words, as if it were his own idea, the solution on which the majority of his assistants had already agreed.  For that reason his opinion was ordinarily adopted.
            Stalin is not imaginative, but he is steadfast.  He is not brilliant, but he knows his limitations.  He is not universal; he is single-tracked.  These properties may be defects, but in Stalin's position they are sources of strength.  He is a "big business man," a type new in Russian political life.  He is the carrier of that modern "ism" which has invaded the Old  World--Americanism.
Levine, Isaac Don.  Stalin.  New York: Cosmopolitan Book Corporation, c1931, p. 337-338
 
BOLSHEVIKS RULE BY MASS SUPPORT
 
            This position of Stalin in relation to the Party was matched by the position of the Party in relation to the masses....  Since the moment when they [the Bolsheviks] first secured a majority in the Soviets prior to the November Revolution they have retained the confidence of the majority, or they could not have maintained power.
Murphy, John Thomas. Stalin, London, John Lane, 1945, p. 173
 
            "But if you take the progressive peasants and workers, not more than 15 percent are skeptical of the Soviet power, or are silent from fear or are waiting for the moment when they can undermine the Bolsheviks state.  On the other hand, about 85 percent of the more or less active people would urge us further than we want to go.  We often have to put on the brakes.  They would like to stamp out the last remnants of the intelligentsia.  But we would not permit that.  In the whole history of the world there never was a power that was supported by nine tenths of the population as the Soviet power is supported.
Ludwig, Emil, Stalin. New York, New York: G. P. Putnam's sons, 1942, p. 175
 
            These characteristics of a Bolshevik party are far from being fully understood by supporters of the Soviet Union today.  The Communist Party is continually being described as a small disciplined elite, ordering the people of the Soviet Union hither and thither for their own good.  In short, the Soviet regime is pictured as the dictatorship of a Party.
            This is a travesty which is unfortunately accepted by friends, as well as by enemies.  In the remarks we have quoted above, Lenin is explaining to the Socialists of Western Europe that the Communist Party could only function on the basis of the confidence of the workers; that this confidence was not created by propaganda, but by people testing from their own experience the quality of the political leadership of the Party; that before any policy could be carried out, the Communist Party had to secure the co-operation of millions of people who were not Party members, who were not under Party discipline, who could not be coerced into co-operation, but who could only be convinced on the basis of their experience; and that further, if in the progress of the struggle a change of direction was necessary, not only the Party, but tens of millions of non-party people had to be convinced of the need for this change of direction and had to understand the methods of carrying it through.
            In carrying out its activities, the Party rests on the trade unions and on the Soviets.  Without the support of the 20 million trade unionists, without the support of the peasantry, organized in the Soviets and in the collective farms, the Party could not last for a week, for it is not the dictatorship of the Party, but a dictatorship of the working-class, in alliance with the peasantry.
Campbell, J. R. Soviet Policy and Its Critics. London: V. Gollancz, ltd., 1939, p. 15-16
 
            The British War Cabinet scheduled a meeting for July 29, 1919 to discuss the Russian situation.  The news of Kolchak's reverses emboldened those who had all along wanted an accommodation with Lenin.  Their thinking was reflected in a memorandum submitted to the Cabinet by a Treasury official and banker named Harvey.  The document grossly distorted the internal situation in Russia to press the argument for abandoning the White cause.  Its basic premise held that in a Civil War the victory went to the side that enjoyed greater popular support, from which it followed that since Lenin's government had beaten off all challengers it had to have the population behind it [the document stated]:
            "It is impossible to account for the stability of the Bolshevik Government by terrorism alone.... When the Bolshevik fortunes seemed to be at the lowest ebb, a most vigorous offensive was launched before which the Kolchak forces are still in retreat.  No terrorism, not even long suffering acquiescence, but something approaching enthusiasm is necessary for this.  We must admit then that the present Russian government is accepted by the bulk of the Russian people."
 
            The pledge of the Whites immediately after victory to convene a Constituent Assembly meant little since there was no assurance that "Russia, summoned to the polls, will not again return the Bolsheviks."  The unsavory aspects of Lenin's rule were in good measure forced on him by his enemies:
            "Necessity of state enables him to justify many acts of violence whereas in a state of peace his Government would have to be progressive or it would fall.  It is respectfully contended that the surest way to get rid of Bolshevism, or at least to eradicate the vicious elements in it, is to withdraw our support of the Kolchak movement and thereby end the Civil War."
 
            Although the author did not explicitly say so, his line of argument led to the inescapable conclusion that support should also be withdrawn from Denikin and Yudenich.
Pipes, Richard. Russia Under the Bolshevik Regime. New York: A.A. Knopf, 1993, p. 96
 
            The very small number of active dissidents against the Soviet system has reflected their lack of support in the general population.  All active dissidents have generally acknowledged that their ideas and activities are unpopular and elicit no responsive chords in the Soviet population.  The Soviet system has a high degree of legitimacy among almost all of its citizens, as is readily admitted by virtually all of its critics both inside and outside the USSR.  The legitimacy of the regime was greatly enhanced by the trauma of World War II and the heroic, and very bloody, victory over the Nazi invaders (which not only generated great feelings of solidarity and sacrifice, but also confirmed the national fear of foreign intervention which has lasted until today).  The Communist Party's successful industrialization and modernization program has also generated massive support for the Soviet system, as has the high rate of upward mobility and the considerable Soviet achievements in science, education, public-health, and other welfare services.  Western Sovietologists (most of whom are not sympathizers of the Soviet system) essentially concede that there is widespread support for Soviet institutions among the Soviet people as a whole.
Szymanski, Albert. Human Rights in the Soviet Union. London: Zed Books, 1984, p. 274
 
UNDER STALIN STUDENTS GOT INTO UNIVERSITIES BY ABILITY ONLY NOT WEALTH
 
Students were admitted to the universities on the basis of ability only, and paid while they studied.
Murphy, John Thomas. Stalin, London, John Lane, 1945, p. 176
 
STALIN REIGNS IN COLLECTIVIZATION EXCESS
 
At no time did Stalin lose control of the situation.
            It had been estimated that by the end of the First Five-year Plan some 30 percent of the farms would be collectivized, but suddenly towards the end of 1929 and in 1930 the process of transformation developed into a mass rush of the poor and middle poor peasants into collectivization, a rush that entirely out-stripped the capacity of the still developing industry to supply the requisite technical equipment.  With the characteristic Russian flare for making "the sky limit," collectivization at all costs and by all means, including compulsory methods, became a universal craze....  Stalin put on the breaks.  Standing firmly on the cumulative decisions of the Congresses, he published an open letter telling the Bolsheviks they had become "dizzy with success," and brought them back to the line of voluntary collectivization.
Murphy, John Thomas. Stalin, London, John Lane, 1945, p. 177
 
Kulak opposition is often no less ruthless than the communist hot-heads whom Stalin denounced during March 1930.
Duranty, Walter.  Duranty Reports Russia. New York: The Viking Press, 1934, p. 381
 
            0n March 2, 1930, there appeared in all the papers his [Stalin] famous article 'Dizzy with Success!'  The newspapers were then reporting the complete collectivization of agriculture in European Russia.  In this famous article Stalin declared that the success of collectivization had intoxicated the party and government officials in the villages, so that they had lost all sense of proportion.  They had shot far beyond the target.  It was an entire mistake to aim already at the agricultural commune; it was success enough to have attained the agricultural co-operative, the artel.  Associations for common use of the soil would also suffice.  In this article Stalin quite openly mentioned the dangers, especially the possibility that the majority  of the peasants might turn against the Soviet State.
Basseches, Nikolaus. Stalin. London, New York: Staples Press, 1952, p. 185
 
            On March 2, 1930, when the basic grain areas had their "seed collections" made, Stalin issued his famous statement: "Dizziness From Success."  He said that the speed with which peasants joined collective farms had made "some comrades dizzy."  He reminded everyone that membership was voluntary and that the type of collective farm recommended for the present period socialized only the land, draft animals, and larger machinery, but left as personal property such domestic animals as cows, sheep, pigs, chickens.  Every paper in the land published the statement in full; millions of copies circulated as leaflets.  Peasants road to town and paid high for the last available copy, to wave in the face of local organizers as their charter of freedom.  Stalin suddenly became a hero to millions of peasants, their champion against local excesses.  Stalin quickly checked this hero-worship by publishing Answers to Collective Farmers, in which he stated: "Some people speak as if Stalin alone made that statement.  The Central Committee does not... permit such actions by any individual.  The statement was... by the Central Committee."
Strong, Anna Louise.  The Stalin Era. New York: Mainstream, 1956, p. 39
 
            How did Stalin and the leadership of the Bolshevik Party react to the spontaneous and violent collectivization and `dekulakization' tide?
            They basically tried to lead, discipline and rectify the existing movement, both politically and practically.  
            The Party leadership did everything in its power to ensure that the great collectivization revolution could take place in optimal conditions and at the least cost.  But it could not prevent deep antagonisms from bursting or `blowing up', given the countryside's backward state.
Martens, Ludo.  Another View of Stalin. Antwerp, Belgium: EPO, Lange Pastoorstraat 25-27  2600, p. 68 [p. 56 on the NET]
 
            [Letter from Stalin to Sholokhov, May 3, 1933, on sabotage by the grain growers of the Veshenskii raion]
            ... I am thankful to you for your letters, as they reveal the open sores in party and Soviet work; they reveal how our officials, in their ardent desire to restrain the enemy, sometimes inadvertently beat up their friends and sink to the point of sadism.
Koenker and Bachman, Eds. Revelations from the Russian Archives. Washington: Library of Congress, 1997, p. 397
 
            In his article "Dizzy from Success” he was quite frank to admit that the collectivization of the peasants had progressed too quickly.
Gunther, John. Inside Europe. New York, London: Harper & Brothers, c1940, p. 517
 
            But with all the phenomenal progress of collectivization, certain faults on the part of Party workers, distortions of the Party policy in collective farm development, soon revealed themselves.  Although the Central Committee had warned Party workers not to be carried away by the success of collectivization, many of them began to force the pace of collectivization artificially, without regard to the conditions of time and place, and heedless of the degree of readiness of the peasants to join the collective farms....
            It was found that the voluntary principle of forming collective farms was being violated, and that in a number of districts the peasants were being forced into the collective farms under threat of being dispossessed, disfranchised, and so on.
Commission of the Central Committee of the C.P.S.U. (B.), Ed. History of the CPSU (Bolsheviks): Short Course. Moscow: FLPH, 1939, p. 307
 
            Although the Central Committee had specified that the chief form of the collective-farm movement must be the agricultural artel, in which only the principal means of production are collectivized, in a number of places pigheaded attempts were made to skip the artel form and pass straight to the commune; dwellings, milk-cows, small livestock, poultry, etc., not exploited for the market, were collectivized....
            Carried away by the initial success of collectivization, persons in authority in certain regions violated the Central Committee's explicit instructions regarding the pace and time limits of collectivization.
Commission of the Central Committee of the C.P.S.U. (B.), Ed. History of the CPSU (Bolsheviks): Short Course. Moscow: FLPH, 1939, p. 307
 
            Take, for example, our mistakes in collective farm construction.  You, no doubt, remember 1930, when our Party comrades thought they could solve the very complicated problem of transferring the peasantry to collective farm construction in a matter of three or four months, and when the Central Committee of the Party found itself obliged to curb these over-zealous comrades.  This was one of the most dangerous periods in the life of our Party.  The mistake was that our Party comrades forgot about the voluntary nature of collective farm construction, forgot that the peasants could not be transferred to the collective farm path by administrative pressure; they forgot that collective farm construction required, not several months, but several years of careful and thoughtful work.  They forgot about this and did not want to admit their mistakes.  You, no doubt, remember that the Central Committee's reference to comrades being dizzy with success and its warning to our comrades in the districts not to run too far ahead and ignore the real situation were met with hostility.  But this did not restrain the Central Committee from going against the stream and turning our Party comrades to the right path.  Well?  It is now clear to everybody that the Party achieved its aim by turning our Party comrades to the right path.  Now we have tens of thousands of excellent peasant cadres for collective farm construction and for collective farm leadership.  These cadres were educated and trained on the mistakes of 1930.  But we would not have had these cadres today had not the Party realised its mistakes then, and had it not rectified them in time.
Stalin, Joseph. Works, Vol. 14, Speech in Reply to Debate, 1 April 1937, Red Star Press, London, Pravda 1978, pp. 285.
 
THE HIGH COST OF INDUSTRIALIZATION
 
The second Five-Year Plan was completed....  There is nothing with which to compare its development.  To judge the incidents of this mightiest of human emancipatory movements by the yardsticks of Western political democracy is a sheer waste of the critical faculty.  Stalin and the Bolshevik Party were leading a war which had to be won quickly because war of another kind was already in the offing.  In this period Russia was no eldorado.  The Socialist Society was not falling as heavenly manna from the skies.  It was being won with "sweat, blood, and tears" and the casualties were great.  Thousands upon thousands were killed and wounded, frozen to death, starved....  Thousands were court-martialed, shot.  The winning of the industrial battle of Magnitogorsk, which gave the Soviet Union her greatest steel-producing plant, made possible the winning of the Battles of Stalingrad, Kharkov, Kiev, and many more, but it was not without casualties.  The riveters who froze to death on the top of the great construction, the riggers who fell from swaying scaffolding, the thousands who starved in tents in the Siberian temperatures of 40 below 0, must not be forgotten in assessing the costs of saving the world from Nazi domination.  To crowd into ten years whole centuries of human experience would have been impossible without casualties, injustices, and suffering unpardonable judged by the standards of another society enjoying a period of comparatively quiescent development.
Murphy, John Thomas. Stalin, London, John Lane, 1945, p. 180
 
            Industrial reconstruction means the transfer of resources from the field of production of articles of consumption to the field of production of means of production.  Without that, there is not, and cannot be, any serious reconstruction of industry, especially under Soviet conditions.  But what does that mean?  It means that money is being invested in the construction of new enterprises, that the number of new towns and new consumers is increasing, while, on the other hand, the new enterprises will begin to put out additional masses of commodities only in three or four years' time.  It is obvious that this does not help to overcome the shortage of goods.  Does it mean that we have to fold our arms and admit our impotence in the face of the shortage of goods?  Of course not.  We must take energetic measures to mitigate the shortage.  That can be done, and should be done, immediately.  For this purpose we must accelerate the expansion of those branches of industry which are directly associated with the development of agriculture: the Stalingrad tractor works, the Rostov agricultural machinery works, the Voronezh seed-sorter works, etc., etc..  Further, we must as far as possible strengthen the branches of industry which can increase the output of deficient goods (cloth, glass, nails, etc.) and so on, and so forth.
Stalin, Joseph. Stalin's Kampf. New York: Howell, Soskin & Company, c1940, p. 144
 
 
COMINTERN WAS NECESSARY REGARDLESS
 
It has been asserted that the Comintern was formed as an appendage of the Soviet Foreign Office.  That assertion I regard as wholly inaccurate.  There is ample evidence in Lenin's writings to prove that he would have established it even had there been no Russian Revolution.
Murphy, John Thomas. Stalin, London, John Lane, 1945, p. 190
 
STALIN WORKED VERY HARD AND SOUGHT OTHERS ADVICE
 
Stalin was, and is, a most systematic worker.  His office at the headquarters of the Russian Bolshevik party is a model of simplicity and good order....  Stalin's serenity hid his tireless activity.  And contrary to the common conception of his relationship with other people, he was always seeking collective decisions.
Murphy, John Thomas. Stalin, London, John Lane, 1945, p. 193
 
            The Marshal is an extremely hard worker.  He keeps long but unusual hours--probably a heritage from his early days in the revolutionary movement.  He is seldom in the Kremlin in the morning.  The afternoon is usually spent in his office, and following his evening meal, he works until the early morning hours, sometimes all night.   In spite of long hours and a rigorous schedule, at 66 he looks the picture of health.
Davis, Jerome. Behind Soviet Power. New York, N. Y.: The Readers' Press, Inc., c1946, p. 10
 
            In his 'secret speech' to the 20th Party Congress in 1956, Premier Khrushchev said: 'We should note that Stalin planned operations on a globe.  Yes, comrades, he used to take the globe and trace the front line on it!'
            But t two high-ranking military men with a reputation for veracity, who know more than Khrushchev about this matter (they met Stalin sometimes daily during the war), disagree.  Marshal Zhukov says: 'The widespread tale that the Supreme Commander studied the situation and adopted decisions when toying with a globe is untrue.'  And General Shtemenko, who daily took to the Kremlin an armful of detailed maps of the various Fronts for Stalin's perusal says that: 'The talk of the Fronts being directed by reference to a globe is completely unfounded.'
Axell, Albert. Stalin's War: Through the Eyes of His Commanders. London, Arms and Armour Press. 1997, p. 167
 
            ...Khrushchev's picture of Stalin deciding battle strategy on a globe of the world is clearly a caricature.  Stalin took advice from the military experts, at least following the initial military setbacks.
Gill, Graeme. Stalinism. Atlantic Highlands, N.J.: Humanities Press International, 1990, p. 41
 
            Antonov alternated with General Shtemenko as Stalin's principal duty officer, the former covering from noon until five or 6 a.m. and the latter from 7 p.m. until 2 p.m..  Thus, both officers were available when Stalin was at his best, from six or 7 p.m. until 5 a.m.  They reported on the military situation three times daily, with a joint summary somewhere around midnight, using maps on a scale of 1:200,000 for each army group, showing the position of each division and sometimes of regiments.  Shtemenko notes that there was indeed a globe in Stalin's Kremlin office, but he never saw it used in discussions of operations.  This is one of several sources that discredits Khrushchev's polemical assertion in 1956 that Stalin planned Red Army operations on a globe.
McNeal, Robert, Stalin: Man and Ruler. New York: New York University Press, 1988, p. 242
 
 
            In practical work Stalin was not so much stronger as he was more persistent.  That could be a disadvantage.  He was a great specialist on the national question.
Chuev, Feliks. Molotov Remembers. Chicago: I. R. Dee, 1993, p. 129
 
            Stalin had a rather singular daily schedule: he worked mainly in the late hours of the evening and at night, hardly ever rising before noon.  He worked a lot, 12-15 hours at a stretch.  Adapting themselves to Stalin's schedule, the Central Committee of the Party, the Council of People's Commissars, the Commissariats, and the major government and planning bodies would likewise keep working until late at night.  Such a routine exhausted people.
Cameron, Kenneth Neill. Stalin, Man of Contradiction. Toronto: NC Press, c1987, APPENDIX 1
Portrait of Stalin by Zhukov, p. 142
 
            This frank and great man is, we have already seen, a simple man.  He is only difficult to meet because he is always working.  When one goes to see him in a room in the Kremlin, one never meets more than three or four people altogether at the foot of a staircase or in the ante-rooms....  Stalin goes to bed regularly at four in the morning.  He does not employ 32 secretaries, like Mr. Lloyd George; he has only one, Comrade Proskrobicheff.  He does not sign what other people write.  He is supplied with the material and does everything else himself.  Everything passes through his hands.  And that does not prevent him from replying or having replies sent to every letter he receives.  When one meets him, he is cordial and unrestrained.  His "frank cordiality," says Serafima Gopner.  "His kindness, his delicacy," says Barbara Djaparidze, who fought beside him in Georgia.  "His gaiety," said Orakhelashvili.  He laughs like a child.
Barbusse, Henri. Stalin. New York: The Macmillan company, 1935, p. 277
 
The French writer Henri Barbusse (French writer (1873-1935) describes the simplicity of Stalin's life-style: "One goes up to the first floor, were white curtains hang over three of the windows.  These three windows are Stalin's home. In the tiny hall a long military cloak hangs on a peg beneath a cap. In addition to this hall there are three bedrooms and a dining room. The bedrooms are as simply furnished as those of a respectable, second-class hotel.  The eldest son, Jasheka, sleeps at night in the dining room, on a divan which is converted into a bed; the younger sleeps in a tiny recess, a sort of alcove opening out of it. . . . Each month he earns the five hundred roubles, which constitute the meagre maximum salary of the officials of the Communist Party (amounting to between £20 and £25 in English money). . .  This frank and brilliant man is . . . a simple man. . . .  He does not employ thirty-two secretaries, like
Mr. Lloyd George; he has only one. . . . Stalin systematically gives credit for all progress made to Lenin, whereas the credit has been in very large measure his own".
Barbusse, Henri.  'Stalin: A New World Seen Through One Man'; London; 1935; p. vii, viii, 291, 294).
 
            In trying to recall all the comments about Stalin he had heard, Trotsky also quoted Bukharin to the effect that, above all, Stalin was an extremely lazy person.  This opinion (if Bukharin really voiced it) is mistaken.  Stalin was leisurely and unhurried in his actions but he was by no means lazy.
Medvedev, Roy. Let History Judge. New York: Columbia University Press, 1989, p. 89
 
            Stalin had the reputation of a hard-working, reliable, and able Party worker....
            He was a dynamic, fearless, indefatigable party workhorse, at least until his last, longest internment in 1913....
Laqueur, Walter. Stalin: The Glasnost Revelations. New York: Scribner's, c1990, p. 8
 
            Stalin was very hard-working, according to Orlov, another of his personal guards.  He worked day and night, especially during the war; usually he fell asleep only in the early hours of the morning, without even having undressed himself, in his gray military coat and his high boots.
Laqueur, Walter. Stalin: The Glasnost Revelations. New York: Scribner's, c1990, p. 149
 
            Yenukidze said, "The Bolshevist newspapers of the period in Tiflis were largely founded on Stalin," writes Yenukidze.  "In addition to numerous revolutionary articles, on questions of historical materialism, the labor movement, the trade-union question, Stalin wrote a lot on the national problem.  Incidentally, in this question he undoubtedly, with the exception of Lenin, is the leading theoretician of our party.  In a word, Stalin was the ideological and practical guide of our organizations in Transcaucasia.  In order to take care of this enormous task, it was necessary to work incessantly, to be swallowed up by it entirely, and constantly to replenish one's knowledge.  Stalin actually gave all of himself to the work.  For him, outside of the revolutionary activity, there was no life, nothing existed.  When he did not attend meetings and conduct circles, he spent all his time in a little room piled with books and newspapers, or in the editorial office of a Bolshevist journal which was just as 'spacious.'"
Levine, Isaac Don.  Stalin.  New York: Cosmopolitan Book Corporation, c1931, p. 58
 
            Stalin works hard, but he also knows how to relax.  The general impression notwithstanding, Stalin is fond of sports and recreation.  He hunts, fishes, and reads a great deal.
Levine, Isaac Don.  Stalin.  New York: Cosmopolitan Book Corporation, c1931, p. 322
 
            Having risen to political supremacy, he could have slackened his routines.  But Stalin was a driven man.  He thrashed himself as hard as he did his subordinates.  He could no more spend a day in indolence than he was able to leap to the moon.  Stalin, unlike Hitler, was addicted to administrative detail.  He was also ultra-suspicious in his ceaseless search for signs that someone might be trying to dislodge his policies or supplant him as the Leader.
Service, Robert. Stalin. Cambridge, Mass.: Belknap Press of Harvard Univ. Press, 2005, p. 571
 
STALIN SIGNED WITH HITLER BECAUSE OF ALLIED REJECTION
 
This [the masses having to choose between bourgeois democracy and fascism] continued until 1939, when the reluctance of the non-aggressor powers to ally themselves with the Soviet Union led Stalin to sign the non-aggression pact with Germany.
Murphy, John Thomas. Stalin, London, John Lane, 1945, p. 198
 
SOVIETS BANKED ON CAPITALIST DISAGREEMENTS
 
While they [communist parties of other countries] recognized differences in the capitalist countries and differences between them, there is always the assumption in their policy that the capitalists would converge into a common front against the USSR....  But once again the contradictory interests of the capitalist States intervened and saved us [communist parties] from that disaster.
            Fortunately capitalism as a whole has never been able to secure world unity on anything.
Murphy, John Thomas. Stalin, London, John Lane, 1945, p. 199
 
STALIN TRIED TO AID THE WORLD’S WORKERS
 
Naturally the capitalist elements of every country, each influenced by their own special interests, accused the Bolsheviks in general and the Soviet Government in particular of responsibility for all the “disturbances” and “unrest” in the world.  Stalin answered the critics: "The accusation does us too much honor!  Unfortunately, we're not yet strong enough to give all the colonial countries direct aid in their struggle for liberation..."
            Russian trade unions collected 1 million pounds from their members to aid locked-out British miners.  This incident undoubtedly paved the way to the severing of diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union in 1927, but the severance did not divert Stalin from the policy of aiding the workers of other countries.
Murphy, John Thomas. Stalin, London, John Lane, 1945, p. 206
 
            To be sure, Stalin never ignored the interests of the Soviet state and he was often cautious to the point of pessimism about the prospects for immediate revolution.  But the letters show that he was also capable of hope and enthusiasm when revolution seemed to be on the move and ready to put his money where his mouth was.
            ... All in all, Stalin comes out of the letters with his revolutionary credentials in good order.
Naumov, Lih, and Khlevniuk, Eds. Stalin's Letters to Molotov, 1925-1936. New Haven: Yale University Press, c1995, p. 36
 
            In an October 7, 1929, letter to Molotov Stalin stated, “I think that it's time to think about organizing an uprising by a revolutionary movement in Manchuria....  We need to organize two double regiment brigades, chiefly made up of Chinese, outfit them with everything necessary (artillery, machine guns, and so on), put Chinese at the head of the brigade, and send them into Manchuria with the following assignment: to stir up a rebellion among the Manchurian troops, to have reliable soldiers from these forces join them...to occupy Harbin, and after gathering force, to declare Chang Hsueh-liang overthrown, establish a revolutionary government (massacre the landowners, bring in the peasants, create soviets in the cities and towns, and so on).  This is necessary.  This we can and, I think, should do....
            ...The matter will have to be put on the agenda of the Central Committee plenum.  I should think that Bukharin is going to be kicked out of the Politburo.”
Naumov, Lih, and Khlevniuk, Eds. Stalin's Letters to Molotov, 1925-1936. New Haven: Yale University Press, c1995, p. 182
 
            When Stalin looked out onto the capitalist world and the survivals within it of its "feudal" predecessor, he saw that it was evil.  He saw that the overwhelming majority of the world's people were compelled to work back-breakingly hard just to continue to exist in dreadful poverty, starvation, ignorance, humiliation, oppression, and war.  Many Westerners are tempted to say that Stalin and the other Communists exaggerated the misery of the tolling masses of the world, but after looking carefully we realize that it is impossible for anyone, even Stalin, to exaggerate the horror of being poor.
Randall, Francis. Stalin's Russia. New York: Free Press,1965, p. 81
 
            [In an interview with an American labor delegation on September 7, 1927 Stalin stated] But what would happen if the Communist Party of America did appeal to the Communist Party of the USSR for assistance?  I think that the Communist Party of the USSR would render it what assistance it could.  Indeed, what would be the worth of the Communist Party, particularly as it is in power, if it refused to do what it could to assist the Communist Party of another country living under the yoke of capitalism?  I should say that such a Communist Party would not be worth a farthing.
            Let us assume that the American working-class had come into power after overthrowing its bourgeoisie; ...would the American working-class refuse such assistance?  I think it would cover it self with disgrace if it hesitated to render assistance.
Stalin, Joseph. Works. Moscow: Foreign Languages Pub. House, 1952, Vol. 10, p. 136
 
STALIN’S AIDES ARE NOT YES MEN
 
Someday it will dawn on the mass of non-Russian people that Stalin's Lieutenant's are not political children or yes men, but leaders who are in fundamental accord in principles, outlook, and aims and not a collection of men of dissimilar philosophies and interests.
Murphy, John Thomas. Stalin, London, John Lane, 1945, p. 213
 
            Stalin has been reproached, by Trotsky and others, with the desire to surround himself with mediocrities.  I am certain he would say, "Better a dull man I can trust than a bright man I'm not sure of,"...
Duranty, Walter. Story of Soviet Russia. Philadelphia, N. Y.: JB Lippincott Co. 1944, p. 172
 
            Yet with all the hard work and the sicknesses of impending old age, Stalin was a most considerate boss; according to Rybin, he never raised his voice.... According to the same source, Stalin did not want to be surrounded by yes-men.  About those who told him, "Whatever you command will be done," he said: "I do not need advisers of this kind."  According to Orlov, he liked people to insist on their point of view if they were convinced that they were right.
Laqueur, Walter. Stalin: The Glasnost Revelations. New York: Scribner's, c1990, p. 150
 
            Stalin did not like people who did not stand up for their convictions with truthful comments and arguments or people who always agreed: 'As you say, I will do it.' He always referred to such helpers, saying: 'Such consultants I do not need or people do not need to consult.'  Having found this out, I often debated and disagreed with him.  Stalin always said after the exchange: 'Fine, I will think about this.' He never liked it when people ran to him, or if he heard their hesitant steps, with cap in hand.  You should always go to him boldly, any time.  His office was never closed.
Rybin, Aleksei. Next to Stalin: Notes of a Bodyguard. Toronto: Northstar Compass Journal, 1996, p. 37
 
            Now Second Secretary after Stalin himself, Molotov admired Koba but did not worship him.   He often disagreed with, and criticized, Stalin right up until the end.
Montefiore, Sebag. Stalin: The Court of the Red Tsar. New York: Knopf, 2004, p. 39
 
            Voroshilov, Mikoyan and a Molotov frequently disagreed with Stalin....
Montefiore, Sebag. Stalin: The Court of the Red Tsar. New York: Knopf, 2004, p. 48
 
 
STALIN FELT FULLY JUSTIFIED IN SIGNING THE PACT
 
It was a dramatic moment when in the conference room of the Kremlin, Stalin and Molotov, the leaders of world revolution, stood side-by-side with Ribbentrop the spokesman of Hitler, the leader of world counter-revolution.  But Stalin was unperturbed.  His evaluation of the course of events and of the forces engaged was not that of the frantic critics in the West.  Rightly or wrongly, he was convinced that he had averted, at least for a time, a war with Nazi Germany in which the Chamberlain and Daladier Governments of Britain and France would have become first Hitler's arms merchants and finally his co-belligerents.  He felt that his conscience had nothing with which to reproach him.  He laughed to scorn those who regarded the pact as a wedding of Bolshevism and Nazism, and regarded their attacks as the chatter of fools.  Why should he be regarded as a criminal for signing such an agreement when the statesmen of the critics’ own governments had been in constant political and personal association with the leaders of Nazism and Fascism, and had made pacts with them without consulting the Soviet Union or even the League of Nations, of which they were members and with which they were pledged to prior consultation?
Murphy, John Thomas. Stalin, London, John Lane, 1945, p. 215-16
 
            As for Stalin's decision to sign the Treaty, that was also a political maneuver.  He thought he was deceiving Hitler, turning him against the West.  I don't think either Stalin or Hitler took the Treaty seriously.  Each was pursuing his own goals.  Hitler's were those that we knew from Mein Kampf.  Stalin understood correctly what Hitler was up to, but he thought he could deflect the blow of the German army away from the USSR and direct it at the West, and in that way buy time.  Of course, the West, meanwhile, did everything it could to turn Hitler against the East.
Schecter, Jerrold. Trans & Ed. Khrushchev Remembers: the Glasnost Tapes. Boston: Little, Brown, c1990, p. 50
 
 
            These events served to feed the suspicion and arouse the dissatisfaction of the realistic Soviet leaders, including Stalin.  Apparently they got "fed up" with attempting to stop the aggressors by participation in European affairs, and characteristically boldly reversed their attitude and decided to secure their own position by making a pact of nonaggression with Germany, which would assure peace for Russia, at least for a time, regardless of any possibility of war in Europe.
Davies, Joseph E. Mission to Moscow. New York, N. Y.: Simon and Schuster, c1941, p. 456
 
            At the same time, however, it was obvious that a rapprochement between the Soviet Union and France, marked by the signing of a mutual assistance treaty, was proceeding at an even more intense pace.  The Soviet Union had also joined the League of Nations and was conducting intensive diplomatic and political activities aimed at curbing the aggressive aims and actions of the ruling circles in Germany, Italy, and Japan.
            The policy of the Soviet Union found very little support among the ruling parties of England and France.  They, like Hitler, were pursuing a double game at that time, playing now an anti-Soviet card, now an antifascist one.  Under the circumstances, Soviet diplomats also had to play a double game....
Medvedev, Roy. Let History Judge. New York: Columbia University Press, 1989, p. 725
 
            ...As Stalin learned, his negotiating partners were, moreover, simultaneously continuing their secret efforts to reach an acceptable understanding with Hitler.  It was clear that Britain and France were simply playing for time while seeking the most favorable outcome from their own point of view and without regard for Soviet interests.  In effect, the Western powers offered no concrete ideas for joint action against Germany.  Their intention was plainly to let the USSR play the chief part in resisting possible German aggression without giving guarantees that they would share a proportion of the burden.
            ...By the end of the summer of 1939 in had become plain to the Soviet leadership that, with Nazi Germany to the West and militaristic Japan to the East, in had no one on whom to rely.  The argument Stalin had put forward at the 18th Congress seemed justified: anti-communism and a lack of a desire by Britain and France to pursue a policy of collective security had opened the sluice gates for aggression by the anti-Comintern pact.  London and Paris were blinded to the real danger by their self-interest and hatred of socialism.  Short-sighted politicians were saying, let Hitler make his anti-Communist crusade in the east.  He seemed to them the lesser evil.
            The Soviet Union faced an extremely limited choice, but Stalin realized that it must be made, however negative the reaction in other countries.  As a pragmatist, he cast ideological principles aside and, once he was sure the Anglo-French-Soviet talks would not produce results, he resorted to the German option which was being offered so assiduously by Berlin.  He thought there was now no other choice.  The alternative was to place the USSR in confrontation with the broad anti-Soviet front, which would be far worse.  He had no time to think of what successive generations would say.  The war was at hand and he had to postpone its outbreak at any cost.
Volkogonov, Dmitri. Stalin: Triumph and Tragedy. New York: Grove Weidenfeld, 1991, p. 351
 
            Looking back, the Non-Aggression Pact appears extremely tarnished, and morally an alliance with the Western democracies would have been immeasurably preferable.  But neither Britain nor France was ready for such an alliance.  From the point of view of state interest the Soviet Union had no other acceptable choice.  A refusal to take any step would hardly have stopped Germany.  The Wehrmacht and the nation were tuned to such a degree of readiness that the invasion of Poland was a foregone conclusion.  Assistance to Poland was hampered not only by Warsaw's attitude, but also by the Soviet Union's unpreparedness.  Rejection of the pact would could have led to the formation of a broad anti-Soviet alliance and threatened the very existence of socialism.
            In any case, Britain and France had both signed similar pacts with Germany in 1938 and were conducting secret talks with Hitler in the summer of 1939 with the aim of creating an anti-Soviet bloc.  It is commonly suggested that the pact triggered the start of the Second World War, while it is commonly forgotten that by then the Western powers had already sacrificed Austria, Czechoslovakia and Memel to Hitler, and that Britain and France had done nothing to save the Spanish republic.
Volkogonov, Dmitri. Stalin: Triumph and Tragedy. New York: Grove Weidenfeld, 1991, p. 356
 
            After the war, the French Communist leader Bonte stated that the Kemsley visit, along with knowledge of the clandestine meeting between Goering and the British businessman, had been the chief factors in influencing the Soviets to seek an agreement with Germany.  While this is certainly an exaggeration, there can be no doubt that the undercover dealings did have a strong influence on Stalin, as well as on Hitler, who was convinced by them that Britain would not fight.  How could the Soviet leader trust a government which continued to indulge in such underhand activities while supposedly negotiating seriously with him?  Admittedly, he was himself talking to the Germans, but he could always justify this as insurance, in case the Allied talks failed.
            In keeping his options open until the very last moment, Stalin does seem to have been prepared to give the allies every opportunity to succeed.
Read, Anthony and David Fisher. The Deadly Embrace. New York: Norton, 1988, p. 230
 
            To the people of the USSR and foreign Communists, this Soviet-German Pact was a blow.  True Communists were dismayed that Socialist Russia should make a treaty with the arch-enemy Hitler.  They regarded Fascism as "the most aggressive form of Capitalism and Imperialism."
            But Stalin had his answer.  He called the unpopular pact a "Marriage of Reason" and slowly the Soviet nation swallowed the pill, accepted their leader's explanation, and even began to agree that Stalin had made "one of the wisest moves in history."
Fishman and Hutton.  The Private Life of Josif Stalin. London: W. H. Allen, 1962, p. 131
 
            At half-past-six on the afternoon of July 3, 1941, the day after his return to Moscow, Stalin spoke to his people:
            "What did we gain by concluding a Pact of Non-Aggression with Germany?  We assured our country peace during 18 months, as well as an opportunity of preparing our forces for the event of Germany's attacking our country.  This was a gain for us, and a loss for Fascist Germany.”
Fishman and Hutton.  The Private Life of Josif Stalin. London: W. H. Allen, 1962, p. 142
 
 
STALIN MOVED INTO POLISH TERRITORY WHEN JUSTIFIED
 
            Accordingly, in the hour when the Polish government and general staff abandoned their country to its fate, with a promptitude that once more surprised the world Stalin set the Red Army on the march towards the "Curzon line."  This line, which had been universally recognized as the Russo-Polish boundary until the Poles tore a great area of white Russia and the Ukraine from the Soviets during the intervention wars, meant an advance through territory containing 12 million inhabitants.  The banner of Revolution was raised, and to the rescue of these 12 million former Soviet subjects the Red Army hastened.
            However the argument may go, the fact is that Stalin did not send the Red Army into the onetime Polish territory until there was no government left in Poland and the country was wide-open for the Nazis to acquire land as far beyond the "Curzon Line" as they chose.
Murphy, John Thomas. Stalin, London, John Lane, 1945, p. 215
 
            Their [the Russians] immediate purpose was to occupy as quickly as possible the Polish area whose possession they had wrung from Germany as part of the price for their pact of friendship and their supplies of oil, grain, manganese, and cotton.  That they did this with no regard for Polish or Anglo-American public opinion is neither to their detriment nor their credit; it simply showed that Stalin, fully alive to the danger of Nazi invasion, was determined to put as much space as possible between his prepared defense zone and the coming blitzkrieg.
Duranty, Walter. Story of Soviet Russia. Philadelphia, N. Y.: JB Lippincott Co. 1944, p. 251
 
 
SU INVADED BY THE BIGGEST ARMY EVER
 
Already almost all the nations of Europe had gone down like ninepins.
            The decision of Hitler...to turn eastward after the conquest of Europe, will probably go on permanent record as the greatest blunder in military history....
            Two hundred and sixty divisions from Germany and her allies, Romania, Italy, Hungary, Spain, and Finland, swept eastward.  There is nothing in the history of warfare with which to make comparison of the striking power of these forces against a single country.
Murphy, John Thomas. Stalin, London, John Lane, 1945, p. 220
 
            One hundred seventy-nine German divisions, 22 Rumanian divisions, 14 Finnish divisions, 13 Hungarian divisions, 10 Italian divisions, one Slovak division, and one Spanish division [Totaling 240 divisions-Editor], a total of well over 3 million troops, the best armed and most experienced in the world, attacked along a 2000 mile front, aiming their spearhead directly at Leningrad, Moscow, and Stalingrad.
Franklin, Bruce, Ed.  The Essential Stalin; Major Theoretical Writings. Garden City, New York: Anchor Books, 1972, p. 31
 
            On 25 April 1941 the German army contained 296 divisions overall with about 40 further divisions in the process of formation.
Medvedev, Roy & Zhores.  The Unknown Stalin. NY, NY: Overlook Press, 2004, p. 233
 
STALIN WAS ONLY SURPRISED AS TO THE EXACT TIME OF THE INVASION
 
Was Stalin taken by surprise with the turn of events?  In the broader sense, no.  All his actions from the day Hitler rose to power provide a complete proof of this.  But there still remained in the situation an element of surprise in the sense that it was not possible to know the precise moment at which the blow would fall.
Murphy, John Thomas. Stalin, London, John Lane, 1945, p. 221
 
            German attacks on Austria, Czechoslovakia, and Poland had indeed been preceded by open claims and loud threats.  Stalin apparently thought that Hitler would act according to precedent.  Because he did not see the usual danger signals he refused to admit the imminent danger.
Deutscher, Isaac. Stalin; A Political Biography. New York: Oxford Univ. Press, 1967, p. 455
 
            Stalin received the correct information that "Barbarossa" would start on June 22 for instance - but he was also given other dates ranging from April 6 right through May and up to June 15 - and as each one proved wrong, it became less likely that he would accept the true version for what it was.  Werner Wachter, a senior official at the Propaganda Ministry, later explained Goebbels's technique in admirably simple language.  The preparations for "Barbarossa," he said, were accompanied by so many rumors, "all of which were equally credible, that in the end there wasn't a bugger left who had any idea of what was really going on."
            Certainly, that comment seems to have been true for Stalin and his intelligence chiefs as the hour for the attack drew steadily closer.
Read, Anthony and David Fisher.  The Deadly Embrace. New York: Norton, 1988, p. 600
 
CHURCHILL COMPLIMENTS STALIN
 
On September 7, 1942, after his first visit to Moscow, Mr. Churchill reported to the British house of Commons, "Premier Stalin also left upon me an impression of deep cool wisdom and a complete absence of illusions of any kind..."
Murphy, John Thomas. Stalin, London, John Lane, 1945, p. 237
 
Churchill said about Stalin, "Stalin also left upon me the impression of a deep, cool wisdom, and a complete absence of illusion of any kind."
Schuman, Frederick L. Soviet Politics. New York: A.A. Knopf, 1946, p. 442
 
            Stalin cannot help but impress anyone who comes in close contact with him.  This has been testified to by the many Allied leaders who saw him during the war.  After Wendell Willkie's visit to Russia I asked him for his impressions of the Marshall.  Willkie said, "Stalin would have made a great political leader or businessman if he had been born in the West.  I'm glad he wasn't, for he would have given us too much competition."  Cordell Hull, former Secretary of State, declared, "I found in Marshall Stalin a remarkable personality, one of the great statesman and leaders of this age."  The testimony of Winston Churchill, since he bitterly dislikes even the mild socialism of the British Labor government to say nothing of communism, is even more impressive.  "It is very fortunate for Russia in her agony to have this rugged chief at her head," said Churchill during the war.  "He is a man of outstanding personality, suited to the somber and stormy times in which his life has been cast.  He is a man of inexhaustible courage and will power, a man of direct and even blunt speech.  Above all, he is a man with a saving sense of humor which is of high importance to all men and to all nations.  Premier Stalin left upon me an impression of deep, cool wisdom, and a complete absence of illusions of any kind."
Davis, Jerome.  Behind Soviet Power. New York, N. Y.: The Readers' Press, Inc., c1946, p. 13
 
Churchill said as early as 1918 that Soviet power should be strangled in its infancy.  But at our intimate dinners with Roosevelt in Tehran and Yalta, he said, "I get up in the morning and pray that Stalin is alive and well.  Only Stalin can save the peace!"  He was confident that Stalin would play that exceptional role which he had assumed in the war.  His cheeks were wet with tears.  Either he was a great actor or he spoke sincerely.
Chuev, Feliks. Molotov Remembers. Chicago: I. R. Dee, 1993, p. 49
 
            It should be emphasized that Churchill obviously held Stalin in high esteem and, I felt, feared to enter into acute discussions with him.  In all his arguments with Churchill Stalin was always extremely specific and logical.
Zhukov, Georgii. Memoirs of Marshal Zhukov. London: Cape, 1971, p. 675
 
PEOPLE COMPLIMENT STALIN’S MIND AND COMPOSURE
 
Mr. Joseph Davies, formerly American ambassador to the Soviet Union, telling his daughter of his meeting with Stalin, says,
            "He gives the impression of a strong mind which is composed and wise.  His brown eye is exceedingly kind and gentle.  A child would like to sit on his knee and a dog would sidle up to him....  He has a sly humor.  He has a very great mentality.  It is sharp, shrewd and above all things else, wise, at least so it would appear to me.  If you can picture a personality that is exactly opposite to what the most rabid anti-Stalinist anywhere could conceive, then you might picture this man...."
Murphy, John Thomas. Stalin, London, John Lane, 1945, p. 238
 
            ... Stalin has a sly humor.  He has a very great mentality.  It a sharp, shrewd, and above all things else, wise, at least so it would appear to me.  If you can picture a personality that is exactly opposite to what the most rabid anti-Stalinist anywhere could conceive, then you might picture this man.  The conditions that I know to exist here and his personality are just as far apart as the poles.
Davies, Joseph E. Mission to Moscow. New York, N. Y.: Simon and Schuster, c1941, p. 357
 
            Yenukidze states, "Stalin then, as now, was not noted for verbosity.  Brevity, clarity, exactitude from his early years were his distinctive qualities.
Life of Stalin, A Symposium. New York: Workers Library Publishers, 1930, p. 91
 
            "I see quite clearly before me young Soso at Tiflis," writes Yenukidze, "where I had my first business interview with him.  Stalin even then, as now, was not distinguished by talkativeness.  Brevity, clarity, accuracy were his distinctive qualities....  The natural simplicity of his speech and address, his absolute carelessness of his own private comfort, his inner hardness and complete absence of vanity, the fact that already he was politically educated, made this young revolutionary an authority among the Tiflis workers, who looked upon him as one of themselves.
Levine, Isaac Don.  Stalin.  New York: Cosmopolitan Book Corporation, c1931, p. 15
 
            Yet despite the adulation to which he is constantly subjected, it is agreed by men who have had contact with him, and it is obvious from his works, that Stalin is no neurotic megalomaniac.  Throughout the war he has maintained an active sense of proportion and a Russian sense of modesty.  Stalin has never made any claims to supernatural guidance or claimed messianic wisdom, nor does he affect the personal mannerisms of a dictator.  It cannot be shown anywhere that he ever boasted of adding any new principle to Marxism, though he has not opposed the use of the phrase Marxism-Leninism-Stalinism.
            "I am merely a pupil of Lenin," he likes to repeat, "and my aim is to be a worthy pupil of his."...
            Appreciation of the limitations of his own knowledge evidently saved Stalin from interfering disastrously with the work of experts.  He never made the mistake of setting up headquarters at the front, and countermanding tactical plans, as Hitler did.
Snow, Edgar. The Pattern of Soviet Power, New York: Random House, 1945, p. 150
 
            He studies assiduously in many branches of knowledge and he has the help of experts always in readiness for consultation.  I never met anyone who talked to him who was not surprised by his ready fund of information on a wide variety of subjects, his ability to ask searching and highly pertinent questions, and his great capacity to listen.
Snow, Edgar. The Pattern of Soviet Power, New York: Random House, 1945, p. 156
 
            ...He [Stalin] is direct to the extent of bluntness or rudeness.  He likes candor in other people too....
Snow, Edgar. The Pattern of Soviet Power, New York: Random House, 1945, p. 157
 
            ...As regards personal qualities, he had a very strong character, dogged determination, clarity of mind that most lacked.
Chuev, Feliks. Molotov Remembers. Chicago: I. R. Dee, 1993, p. 181
 
            He had an exceptional memory.
Chuev, Feliks. Molotov Remembers. Chicago: I. R. Dee, 1993, p. 184
 
            Stalin is in no sense a "misfit."  He won a scholarship as a boy.  That feature of his ability is still evident in him.  He has an unusual memory.  He has an instinct for finding facts and culling from most unexpected sources information which he can use in a practical manner.
Levine, Isaac Don.  Stalin.  New York: Cosmopolitan Book Corporation, c1931, p. 322
 
            Stalin was a fast learner and was quick to grasp anything new.
Chuev, Feliks. Molotov Remembers. Chicago: I. R. Dee, 1993, p. 226
 
SHAKHURIN:  I am in a position to know that Stalin had very many positive qualities, because I met with him frequently--almost every day--for six years, Shakhurin said.  I know personally of his many rare, positive qualities and how much he accomplished.  He had unique attributes, the mind of the greatest of statesmen.
Chuev, Feliks. Molotov Remembers. Chicago: I. R. Dee, 1993, p. 308
 
            Not the least of Stalin's qualities is his ability to profit by experience.
Duranty, Walter. Story of Soviet Russia. Philadelphia, N. Y.: JB Lippincott Co. 1944, p. 135
 
            Unfortunately for his tranquility he secretly studied, at the Tiflis Seminary, books on the natural sciences and on sociology.  He introduced into this well-ordered house the written poison of positive knowledge.  The scandal was discovered by the authorities of the place.  The need for genuine self-instruction being incompatible with the pure tradition of the Seminary, young Soso was expelled on the ground that he displayed a lack of "political balance."
            In 1898 he joined the Tiflis branch of the Russian Social Democratic Workers' Party....  This intellectual, the son of a peasant worker, embraced the calling of "professional revolutionary," first among the Tiflis railway workers and later among the tobacco workers and the workers in the boot factories and, later still, among the workers at the meteorological observatory--a little everywhere, in fact: a workman in the workers' cause.
Barbusse, Henri. Stalin. New York: The Macmillan company, 1935, p. 8
 
            Addressing the conference [at Tehran], Stalin spoke quietly and at times curtly.  He had a highly disciplined mind and expressed himself with utmost economy.  Nothing aggravated him more than woolly, long-winded oratory.
Grey, Ian. Stalin, Man of History. London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1979, p. 381
 
            I admit that there was something in his personality which revealed pre-eminence, a grasp of the essentials, the alert mind, which could not fail to impress and fascinate.  He relied to a minimum on his assistants at the roundtable; he carried all the details in his head.  Nor did he miss any weakness in the argument of his opponents, on which he would pounce like a bird of prey.  I liked his slow, simple manner of expressing himself, which entailed no effort for his interpreter to follow his train of thought.
Birse, Arthur Herbert. Memoirs of an Interpreter. New York: Coward-McCann, 1967, p. 212
 
            Zhukov detected in Stalin 'an ability to formulate an idea concisely, a naturally analytical mind, great erudition and a rare memory'.
Volkogonov, Dmitri. Stalin: Triumph and Tragedy. New York: Grove Weidenfeld, 1991, p. 233
 
            Recalling Stalin traits, Marshal Vasilevsky singled out his phenomenal memory:
            "I have never met anyone who could remember as much.  He knew by name all the army and front commanders, of whom there were more than 100, and he even knew the names of some corps and divisional commanders....  Throughout the war Stalin had the composition of the strategic reserves in his head and could name any formation any time."
            Stalin's ability to grasp the essence of a situation quickly also made a deep impression on Winston Churchill: 'Very few people alive could have comprehended in so few minutes the reasons which we had all so long been wrestling with for months.  He saw it all in a flash.'
            It seems indisputable that Stalin had considerable intellectual powers, in addition to his highly developed purposefulness and strong will, and that it was more than force of circumstance or mere chance that made of him one of Lenin's comrades-in-arms during the revolution and civil war.  He was able to show these qualities at a time when they were most needed, and it was perhaps for that reason they became evident.  Perhaps as a result Stalin came to believe in himself, and perhaps he was therefore able to do things that others found impossible.
Volkogonov, Dmitri. Stalin: Triumph and Tragedy. New York: Grove Weidenfeld, 1991, p. 234
 
            He [Stalin in] would recall his civil war years with pride: with the exception of Trotsky, he had probably been on more fronts than anyone.
            He personally knew nearly all the officers from corps commander up, most of the marshals and army commanders since the civil war,...
Volkogonov, Dmitri. Stalin: Triumph and Tragedy. New York: Grove Weidenfeld, 1991, p. 316
 
            One of his great characteristics was a phenomenal memory, at least in the matters which concerned him most.  And he had the ability to master the facts in a variety of fields.
Conquest, Robert. Stalin: Breaker of Nations. New York, New York: Viking, 1991, p. 193
 
            In December 1941 Anthony Eden, the British Foreign Secretary, came to Moscow and saw Stalin.  He had had an interview with him in 1935.  Stalin had then 'impressed me from the first: his personality made itself felt without effort or exaggeration.  He had natural good manners, perhaps a result of his Georgian inheritance.  Though I knew the man to be without mercy, I respected the quality of his mind and even felt a sympathy which I have never been able entirely to analyze.'
Conquest, Robert. Stalin: Breaker of Nations. New York, New York: Viking, 1991, p. 250
 
 
            I was amazed at the rapidity of his judgments, at their accuracy, and at the ease with which he grasped the essentials of cases whose untangling sometimes required hours of work from me, so that I wondered at times if the local authorities had not purposely tried to make their acts too incomprehensible for us to understand them.  I once expressed to him my surprise at the facility he showed in unraveling complicated matters.
            He shrugged his shoulders.
            "I'm used to spotting the essential link in each of these matters.  After that, the rest is easy."
Svanidze, Budu. My Uncle, Joseph Stalin. New York: Putnam, c1953, p. 178
 
            I found my uncle sitting on the veranda of the Villa Nadejda, watching the sunset and reading Les Chouans, by his favorite author, Balzac....
            "Well, Budu!" he said.  "I read with interest your observations on Hungarian monetary reform which Sviridov sent on to me.  Congratulations!  Except, of course, for confusing the prewar pengo with the one which circulated in Sub-Carpathian Russia, which was still tied to the Czech crown."
            It was a fact that I had made this slip, of no great practical importance.  I marveled once again at his [Stalin] ability to detect the errors of others in apparently every field, and said as much to him.
            "There's nothing astonishing about my knowing that," he said.  "I have nothing to do now and I'm reading and studying all sorts of economic problems of Central Europe."
            "Why so?"  I asked.
            "It's obvious that we've got to take a hand there.  As a result of my recent reading, I'm of the opinion that Molotov is wrong about the economic attachment of these countries to the USSR.  It's a difficult problem to solve.  Unfortunately, Voroshilov agrees with him and the other members of the Politburo are backing them out."
            "He then put a series of questions to me on various financial and economic problems in the regions which we had occupied.  He always went straight to the point on every question and showed a deep understanding of all these matters, which amazed me.  This was my specialty, not his particularly, yet on many points I was obliged to admit that he was my master in my own field.
Svanidze, Budu. My Uncle, Joseph Stalin. New York: Putnam, c1953, p. 227
 
            He was neither hot-tempered, nor openhearted, nor emotional, nor sentimental; in other words, he lacked all that was characteristic of a typically Georgian temperament.
Alliluyeva, Svetlana. Only One Year. New York: Harper & Row, 1969, p. 359
 
            The fact, however, remains that my father was capable of flaring up, of flying into a temper, and using rude language.  He slapped my face twice on an occasion when he lost his temper.  He hit Vasily once, when Vasily was still a small boy.  Such short outbursts were sufficient to cool him down....  But my father's grossness was limited, in essence, to his tongue.
Alliluyeva, Svetlana. Only One Year. New York: Harper & Row, 1969, p. 365
 
            But Stalin has great power of mental concentration.  He went through a test of a kind once.  It was before the revolution.  The Tsar's police and military were tired of his constant escapes from banishment and decided to put him through a torture which few survive with sanity.  He was made to run the gauntlet of the Salyansky regiment and each soldier beat him as he passed with the butt end of his rifle.  Stalin concentrated his thoughts upon some aspect of Marxism, gritted his teeth and walked the whole alley of yelling and buffeting soldiers.  The man who could do that has some almost Indian power of thought over body.  So one need not assume that in his long silences over his pipe Stalin has not thought out the development of the revolution and the next steps in his career.
Graham, Stephen. Stalin. Port Washington, New York: Kennikat Press, 1970, p. 120
 
            He [Stalin] is not an emotional man like Roosevelt, nor does he live on his nerves like Lloyd George or McDonald.  He has nerves, he can get excited, but he is always under control.  His nerves are not frayed by the difficulties of administration.
Graham, Stephen. Stalin. Port Washington, New York: Kennikat Press, 1970, p. 122
 
            Stalin recognized only the truth, no matter how bitter that truth was.  To the end of his days, Stalin always had a steady character, a phenomenal memory, quick mind, sharp reflexes, and was very observant of life.
Rybin, Aleksei. Next to Stalin: Notes of a Bodyguard. Toronto: Northstar Compass Journal, 1996, p. 104
 
            Then, consider his patience, his tenacity.  His perseverance, as Walter Duranty says, is "inhuman."  He is a slow builder of bricks, so slow that often his followers are impatient, because they do not see the outline of the finished structure he is building.  His line is undeviating; he takes only "the long view."
Gunther, John.  Inside Europe. New York, London: Harper & Brothers, c1940, p. 517
 
            Again, there is his sense of detail, which is very great.  His wary eye penetrates to the smallest elements in the national life,...  Stalin reads everything, down to the last paragraph in Pravda.  His day begins with the perusal of local reports, carefully sifted from all parts of the Soviet Union.  W. H. Chamberlain (cf. Russia's Iron Age, p. 187), certainly no friendly critic, notes that Stalin, by personal intervention, remedied injustices in spheres very far removed from his normal business.
Gunther, John. Inside Europe. New York, London: Harper & Brothers, c1940, p. 518
 
            His intelligence is wary, cautious, thorough.... witness his talk with H. G. Wells, wherein he more then held his own with that glib and eloquent interlocutor.  And witness his remarkable interview in 1927 with an American women's delegation when he answered questions for four solid hours, questions of great diversity and difficulty.  He talked strictly extemporaneously, but with perfect organization of material, of a kind only possible to a man completely sure of himself.  The verbatim report, about 11,800 words, comprises one of the most comprehensive and discerning statements of Soviet aims ever made; it was a tour de force quite beyond the capacity of any but an exceptionally intelligent man.
            When the delegation, thoroughly exhausted, had concluded its queries, Stalin asked if he might ask questions about America--and he did so for two hours more.  His questions were penetrating and showed considerable knowledge of American conditions; Stalin, single-handed, answered the delegation's questions much better than they replied to him.  During this 6 ours of talk, the telephone did not ring once; no secretary was allowed to interrupt--another indication of Stalin's habit of utter concentration to the job in hand.
Gunther, John. Inside Europe. New York, London: Harper & Brothers, c1940, p. 519
 
            In the company of two such astute politicians as Churchill and Roosevelt [at Yalta], with their long experience of the turmoil of democratic politics, Stalin impressed all who sat around the table with him, or heard him speak, with his mastery of the business, his remarkable memory--he never made a note or consulted a paper--his skill in debate and the quickness with which he could switch from the "roughness" that Lenin had criticized to the charm that Churchill felt even when he resisted it.
Bullock, Alan. Hitler and Stalin: Parallel Lives. New York: Knopf, 1992, p. 876
 
            [After a meeting with Stalin in July 1941 shortly after the German attack Harry Hopkins stated in the American magazine: Not once did he repeat himself.  He talked as he knew his troops were shooting--straight and hard.  He welcomed me with a few, swift Russian words.  He shook my hand briefly, firmly, courteously.  He smiled warmly.  There was no waste of word, gesture, nor mannerism.  It was like talking to a perfectly co-coordinated machine, an intelligent machine.  Joseph Stalin knew what he wanted, knew what Russia wanted, and he assumed that you knew.  We talked for almost four hours on this second visit.  The questions he asked were clear, concise, direct.  Tired as I was, I found myself replying as tersely.  His answers were ready, unequivocal, spoken as if the man had had them on his tongue for years.
            Only once while we talked did his telephone ring.  He apologized for the interruption, telling me he was making plans for his supper at 12:30 that night.  Not once did a secretary enter with dispatches or memoranda.  And when we said goodbye we shook hands again with the same finality.  He said goodbye once, just as only once he said hello.
            No man could forget the picture of the dictator of Russia as he stood watching me leave --an austere, rugged, determined figure in boots that shone like mirrors, stout baggy trousers, and snug-fitting blouse.  He wore no ornament, military or civilian.  He's built close to the ground, like a football coach's dream of a tackle.  He's about five feet six, about 190 pounds.  His hands are huge, as hard as his mind.  His voice is harsh but ever under control.  What he says is all the accent and inflection his words need....
            If he is always as I heard him, he never wastes a syllable.  If he wants to soften an abrupt answer or a sudden question he does it with that quick, managed smile--a smile that can be cold but friendly, austere but warm.  He curries no favor with you.  He seems to have no doubts.  He assures you that Russia will stand against the onslaughts of the German army.  He takes it for granted that you have no doubts, either....
            He offered me one of his cigarettes and he took one of mine.  He's a chain smoker, probably accounting for the harshness of his carefully controlled voice.  He laughs often enough, but it's a short laugh, somewhat sardonic, perhaps.  There is no small talk in him.  His humor is keen, penetrating.  He speaks no English, but as he shot rapid Russian at me he ignored the interpreter, looking straight into my eyes as though I understood every word that he uttered.
Sherwood, Robert E.  Roosevelt and Hopkins. New York: Harper, 1948, p. 343-344
 
            Beaverbrook noted of Stalin, "We had got to like him; a kindly man, with a habit, when agitated, of walking about the floor with his hands behind his back.  He smoked a great deal and practically never shows any impatience at all."
Sherwood, Robert E.  Roosevelt and Hopkins. New York: Harper, 1948, p. 391
 
            I met him [Stalin] several times towards the end of his life, and I was able to observe the facility with which he went straight to what was essential, even in technological spheres he knew nothing about.   He had the gift of putting his finger on the weak points.   An organizer of genius, he was able to create a service in a few minutes, give it a mission to perform, and obtain the result he wanted within the deadline fixed by him.   In that he was better even than my father.
Beria, Sergo.  Beria, My Father: Inside Stalin's Kremlin. London: Duckworth, 2001, p. 134
 
            Far from being the head-case he is described as nowadays, Stalin was supremely intelligent....
            Methodical in the extreme, Stalin's vast memory constituted a veritable collection of archives, and he drew from it at will the data he considered he needed in order to achieve an aim.   He prepared carefully for every meeting, studying the questions he meant to raise.   He swotted at his books like a good pupil, said my father, who did the same himself.   Stalin's life was just as ordered, despite the distressing timetables that he inflicted on his collaborators, because he worked late into the night.
Beria, Sergo. Beria, My Father: Inside Stalin's Kremlin. London: Duckworth, 2001, p. 148
 
            Stalin's gift, apart from his catechismic rhythms of question and answer, was the ability to reduce complex problems to lucid simplicity, a talent that is invaluable in a politician.   He could draft, usually in his own hand, a diplomatic telegram, speech or article straight off in the clearest, yet often subtle prose....
Montefiore, Sebag.  Stalin: The Court of the Red Tsar. New York: Knopf, 2004, p. 98
 
            He [Stalin] found the solution in a meticulous and pedantic study of international problems and of diplomatic history, as well as in keeping the closest watch on his diplomatists.   This study yielded results.   The extent of his knowledge in this domain began to surprise the statesmen who came into contact with him.   Roosevelt, Churchill, Eden, Stettinius, T.V. Soong, and Victor Hoo, negotiating with Moscow in 1945, were astonished by the degree of his erudition and by his memory.
Delbars, Yves.  The Real Stalin. London, Allen & Unwin, 1951, p. 196
 
            The information which he received was as usual contradictory.   In these circumstances Stalin adhered to his basic principle.   He tried to obtain as much information as possible while endeavoring to perceive, through his personal informers, the realities which so often escaped them.   By endeavoring to maintain an absolute objectivity, he detached himself from all the ideas inspired by his own theories and conceptions.   In this he was entirely successful, which unfortunately cannot always be said of the majority of people at work in the international arena.
Delbars, Yves. The Real Stalin. London, Allen & Unwin, 1951, p. 223
 
            Certainly in personal conversation or in the wording of his speeches, Stalin gives no sign of arrogance or undue self-esteem.  This has been noted by everyone who comes into contact with him.  Churchill, for instance, said: "Premier Stalin left on me an impression of deep, cool wisdom and absence of illusions...  A man direct, even blunt in speech...with that saving sense of humor which is of high importance."  Wendell Willkie said: "As I was leaving him after my first talk, I thanked him for the time he had given me in the honor he had conferred upon me in talking so candidly.  A little embarrassed, he replied: 'Mr. Willkie, you know I grew up a Georgian peasant.  I am unschooled in pretty talk.  All I can say is I like you very much.'  He is a simple man with no affectations or poses."  Former Ambassador Davies in an official report to Secretary Hull, June 9, 1938, on his interview with Stalin, said: "His demeanor is kindly, his manner almost deprecatingly simple....  He gave me the impression of being sincerely modest."
Duranty, Walter.  Stalin & Co. New York: W. Sloane Associates, 1949, p. 52
 
            I associated with Stalin from February 1941, when I stepped into the post of Chief of General Staff.  Stalin's outer appearance has been described many times.  Though of moderate height and externally undistinguished, Stalin produced a strong impression on whoever spoke with him.  Free of affectations and mannerisms, he won people's hearts by his simple ways.  His uninhibited way of speaking, the ability to express himself clearly, is inborn analytical mind, his extensive knowledge and phenomenal memory, made even old hands and eminent people brace themselves and gather their wits when talking to him.
Zhukov, Georgi. Reminiscences and Reflections Vol. 1. Moscow: Progress Pub., c1985, p. 365
 
            All his life he devoted himself to accumulating knowledge.  His attentiveness, memory, and analytical skills were razor-sharp even if he did not brag about this to others;...
Service, Robert. Stalin. Cambridge, Mass.: Belknap Press of Harvard Univ. Press, 2005, p. 115
 
 
STALIN FEELS THE COMINTERN MUST BE DISBANDED
 
            Stalin stated, "It is true that at one time I did think, with Lenin, that the process of world Revolution could be led by a centralized international Communist Party--the Communist international.  Experience, however, has proved that this is not possible.  Hence the dissolution of the Communist international and the decision that each Communist Party must pursue its own aims and tasks independently, guided by the teachings of Marx and Lenin and the experiences of the Comintern....”
Murphy, John Thomas. Stalin, London, John Lane, 1945, p. 241
 
            In this regard, Stalin said on 11 May 1943, "Experience has shown that one cannot have an international directing center for all countries.  This became evident in Marx's lifetime, in Lenin's, and today.  There should perhaps be a transition to regional associations, for example, of South America, of the United States and Canada, of certain European countries, and so on, but even this must not be rushed....
Dimitrov, Georgi,  The Diary of Georgi Dimitrov, 1933-1949.  Ed. Ivo Banac. New Haven: Yale University Press, c2003, p. 271
 
            On 21 May 1943 Stalin explained that experience has shown that in Marx's time, in Lenin's time, and now, it is impossible to direct the working-class movement of all countries from a single international center.  Especially now, in wartime conditions, when Communist parties in Germany, Italy, and other countries have the tasks of overthrowing their governments and carrying out defeatist tactics, while Communist parties in the USSR, England, America and other countries, on the contrary, have the task of supporting their governments to the fullest for the immediate destruction of the enemy.  We overestimated our resources when we were forming the Comintern and believed that we would be able to direct the movement in all countries.  That was our error.  The further existence of the Comintern would discredit the idea of the International, which we do not desire.
 
            There is one other reason for dissolving the Comintern, which is not mentioned in the resolution.  That is the fact that the Communist parties making up the Comintern are being falsely accused of supposedly being agents of a foreign state, and this is impeding their work in the broad masses.  Dissolving the Comintern knocks this trump card out of the enemy's hands.  The step now been taken will undoubtedly strengthen the Communist parties as national working-class parties and will at the same time reinforce the internationalism of the popular masses, whose base is the Soviet Union.
Dimitrov, Georgi,  The Diary of Georgi Dimitrov, 1933-1949.  Ed. Ivo Banac. New Haven: Yale University Press, c2003, p. 275
 
 
SU INVADED BY 14 COUNTRIES, INCLUDING FINLAND
 
By the summer of 1919, without declaration of war, the forces of 14 states had invaded the territory of Soviet Russia.  The countries involved were: Great Britain, France, Japan, Germany, Italy, the United States, Czechoslovakia, Serbia, China, Finland, Greece, Poland, Romania, and Turkey.
Sayers and Kahn.  The Great Conspiracy.  Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1946, p. 79.
 
            Instead of acting with vision and cooperating with revolutionary Russia the Allies decided to attack Russia from all sides, supporting every would-be tyrant and dictator who aspired to rule and could organize a band of mercenaries.
Davis, Jerome. Behind Soviet Power. New York, N. Y.: The Readers' Press, Inc., c1946, p. 93
 
 
SU INVADED BY MANY COUNTRIES IN WWII
 
The assault was launched not by Germany but by all of fascist Europe.
            By every rational calculation of war potential, the Soviet Union was doomed to swift and complete defeat, regardless of what British or American policy might be.  Defeat would've meant not only the enslavement of the Soviet peoples but the ultimate conquest of Britain and China and the reduction of America to helplessness before the unchallenged masters of Eurasia and Africa.
Schuman, Frederick L. Soviet Politics. New York: A.A. Knopf, 1946, p. 419
 
Franco whose fascist "Blue Legion" was fighting the Red Army.
Schuman, Frederick L. Soviet Politics. New York: A.A. Knopf, 1946, p. 455
 
 
TROTSKY AND TUKHACHEVSKY CAUSE POLISH DEBACLE
 
The Red Troops, Commanded by General Tukachevsky and War Commissar Leon Trotsky had dangerously over-extended their lines of communications.  Now they suffered the consequences, as the Polish counter offensive drove them back along the entire front.
Sayers and Kahn. The Great Conspiracy. Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1946, p. 94
 
WHITE ARMIES WERE LED BY PRE-FASCISTS
 
There were a few sincere nationalists among them, but the white armies were overwhelmingly dominated by reactionaries who were the prototypes of the fascist officers and adventurers who were later to emerge in central Europe.
Sayers and Kahn.  The Great Conspiracy.  Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1946, p. 100
 
RAMZIN GETS A LIGHT SENTENCE AND REDEEMS HIMSELF
 
Two days after the completion of the Industrial Party trial, Professor Ramzin and the other four defendants who had been sentenced to death petitioned the Soviet Supreme Court for a reprieve.  The court granted the petition and commuted the sentences of death to sentences of ten years imprisonment on the grounds that Ramzin and his colleagues had been the tools of the real conspirators who were outside the Soviet Union.  In the years following the trial, Professor Ramzin, who was granted every opportunity by the Soviet authorities for new scientific work, became completely won over to the Soviet way of life and began making valuable contributions to the industrial program of the USSR.  On July 7, 1943, Professor Ramzin was awarded the Order of Lenin and the Joseph Stalin Prize of 30 thousand dollars for the invention of a simplified turbo generator, said to be better than any other in the world.  Under a decree issued by the Kremlin, the turbo generator bares the inventors name.
Sayers and Kahn. The Great Conspiracy. Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1946, p. 170
 
            The internal detente remained in force for the deserving.   Even some former anti-Bolsheviks found themselves among them.   A governmental decree amnestied Ramzin and eight fellow convicts in the Industrial Party trial for their successful work on boiler design while in prison.   Along with the decree was printed a letter of thanks for clemency in which Ramzin and three others took note of the "solicitude for man" that the NKVD had shown during their five-year imprisonment by providing all conditions for continued scientific work.
Tucker, Robert. Stalin in Power: 1929-1941. New York: Norton, 1990, p. 322
 
            Stalin was capable of gratitude.  The main defendant, Ramzin, was sentenced to death by shooting, but this was commuted to imprisonment.  The same Ramzin whose name had been anathema to the country at large was shortly released, and eventually became director of the very same Technological Institute, and a winner of the country's highest award, the Stalin Prize.  Several other of the "inveterate wreckers" would be numbered among Stalin's pet scientists.
Radzinsky, Edvard.  Stalin. New York: Doubleday, c1996, p. 251
 
 
TROTSKY HEADED THE NAZI 5TH COLUMN IN THE SU
 
From the moment Hitler took power in Germany, the international counter-revolution became an integral part of the Nazi plan of world conquest.  In every country, Hitler mobilized the counterrevolutionary forces which for the past fifteen years had been organizing throughout the world.  These forces were now converted into the Fifth Columns of Nazi Germany, organizations of treason, espionage, and terror.  These Fifth Columns were the secret vanguards of the German Wehrmacht.
            One of the most powerful and important of these Fifth Columns operated in Soviet Russia.  It was headed by a man who was perhaps the most remarkable political renegade in all history. 
            The name of this man was Leon Trotsky.
Sayers and Kahn.  The Great Conspiracy.  Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1946, p. 185
 
When the Third Reich came into being, Leon Trotsky was already the leader of an international anti-Soviet conspiracy with powerful forces inside the Soviet Union.  Trotsky in exile was plotting the overthrow of the Soviet government, his own return to Russia, and the assumption of that personal power he had once so nearly held.
Sayers and Kahn. The Great Conspiracy. Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1946, p. 185
 
In the winter of 1921-1922, the leading Trotskyite, Krestinsky, had become the Soviet ambassador to Germany.  In the course of his duties in Berlin, Krestinsky visited general Seeckt, Commander of the Reichswehr.  Seeckt knew from his intelligence reports that Krestinsky was a Trotskyite.  The German general gave Krestinsky to understand the Reichswehr was sympathetic with the aims of the Russian Opposition led by War Commissar Trotsky.
Sayers and Kahn. The Great Conspiracy. Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1946, p. 197
 
In Moscow, a few months later, Krestinsky reported to Trotsky what general Seeckt had said.  Trotsky was desperately in need of funds to finance his growing underground organization.  He told Krestinsky that the Opposition in Russia needed foreign allies and must be prepared to form alliances with friendly powers.  Germany, Trotsky added, was not an enemy of Russia, and there was no likelihood of an early clash between them:
Sayers and Kahn. The Great Conspiracy. Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1946, p. 197
 
 
This High Command of the Opposition was named the "Bloc of Rights and Trotskyites."  It was constructed on three different levels or layers.  If one of a layers was exposed, the others would carry on.
            The first layer, the Trotskyite-Zinovievite Terrorist Center headed by Zinoviev, was responsible for the organization and direction of terrorism.
            The second layer, the Trotskyite Parallel Center, headed by Pyatakov, was responsible for the organization and direction of sabotage.
            The third and most important layer, the actual Bloc of Rights and Trotskyites, headed by Bucharin and Krestinsky, comprised most of the leaders and highest ranking members of the combined Opposition forces.
            The entire apparatus consisted of not more than a few thousand members and some 20 or 30 leaders who held positions of authority in the Army, foreign office, Secret Service, industry, trade unions, party and government offices.
Sayers and Kahn.  The Great Conspiracy. Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1946, p. 230-31
 
 
The conspiratorial apparatus of the Trotskyites, Rights, and Zinovievites was, in fact, the Axis Fifth Column in Soviet Russia.
Sayers and Kahn.  The Great Conspiracy.  Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1946, p. 233
 
Trotsky began by stating flatly that "the seizure of power in Russia could be consummated only by force."  But the conspiratorial apparatus alone was not strong enough to carry out a successful coup and to maintain itself in power without outside aid.  It was therefore essential to come to a concrete agreement with foreign states interested in aiding the Trotskyites against the Soviet government for their own ends.
Sayers and Kahn.  The Great Conspiracy. Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1946, p. 237
 
By the autumn of 1934, Trotskyite and Right terrorist groups were functioning throughout the Soviet Union.
            A list had been compiled of the Soviet leaders who were to be assassinated.  At the head of the list was the name of Joseph Stalin.  Among the other names were Voroshilov, Molotov, Kirov, Kaganovich, Zhdanov, Menzhinsky, Gorky, and Kuibyshev.
Sayers and Kahn.  The Great Conspiracy. Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1946, p. 245
 
            The official public records of these trials, comprising more than 1,500 pages of detailed testimony, are not only fascinating reading but also represent the most comprehensive public expose ever made of a contemporary secret state conspiracy.  In addition, these records contain the first full disclosures of the inner workings of an Axis Fifth Column.  They are an invaluable source of material for this period in world history, in which the Axis Fifth Columns played a major role.
Sayers and Kahn. The Great Conspiracy. Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1946, p. 409
 
In this conjunction of men and motives, the killers who held power in Berlin and Tokyo found their opportunity.  In the capitalist democracies they found allies among industrialists, aristocrats, anti-semites, native fascists, reactionary army officers, political adventurers, and prostituted journalists and politicians.  In the USSR a corps of potential Quislings could be recruited only from the ranks of the secret dissenters within the Party and from such diplomats and army commanders as favored continued Soviet collaboration with the Reichswehr against the Western Powers rather than a program of collective security designed to checkmate Japan and the Axis.  The elements of such a "Fifth Column" were in fact organized and partially mobilized for action with the aid of Trotsky, Tukhachevsky, Zinoviev, Kamenev, Pyatakov, Bukharin, Rykov, Yagoda, and other dissidents.  Thanks to the vigilance of the NKVD and to the inhibitions, confusions, and quarrels among the conspirators, the plot ended in failure, exposure, belated repentance, and punishment.
Schuman, Frederick L. Soviet Politics. New York: A.A. Knopf, 1946, p. 267
 
Had the plot not been exposed and crushed, the Soviet Union in the early 1940s would have suffered the fate of Spain, Czechoslovakia, Norway, the Netherlands, Belgium, France, Yugoslavia, and Greece.  The Nazi technique which prepared 16 other countries for occupation, subjugation, and partial extermination between 1938 and 1941 was precisely the technique set forth in the confessions of the accused in the Moscow trials.  Had the conspiracy not been ruthlessly suppressed, Hitler and Hirohito would have won their war not only against Soviet Union but against Britain and America as well.
Schuman, Frederick L. Soviet Politics. New York: A.A. Knopf, 1946, p. 268
 
The truly shocking result that Trotsky, whose services to the Revolution had been magnificent and honored as such by Lenin, became in the last sad end the chief tool of his country's foes.
Duranty, Walter.  The Kremlin and the People. New York: Reynal & Hitchcock, Inc., 1941, p. 72
 
            The testimony of Radek, Sokolnikov, and Pyatakov outlined the following version.  Trotsky conducted negotiations with Hess, the deputy chairman of the Nazi party.  Referring to these negotiations, Trotsky told the "center" that in 1937 Germany was planning to attack the USSR.  In this war, Trotsky felt, the Soviet Union would inevitably suffer a defeat in which "all the Trotskyist cadres would also perish in the ruins of the Soviet state."  In order to save these cadres from destruction, Trotsky obtained a promise from the leaders of the Third Reich to allow the Trotskyists to come to power, promising them "compensation" in turn: they would be granted concessions and Germany would be sold important economic objects of the USSR; she would be provided with raw materials and produce at prices below the world market, as well as territorial concessions in the form of satisfying German wishes for expansion in the Ukraine.  Analogous concessions would be made to Japan, to whom Trotsky promised to give the Priamur and Primore regions in the Far East; he also pledged to guarantee oil "in case of war with the USA."  In order to expedite the defeat of the USSR, Trotsky ordered the "center" to prepare a series of the most important industrial enterprises to be taken out of commission at the start of the war.  Radek and Sokolnikov "confirmed Trotsky's right to speak in the name of Soviet Trotskyists" in negotiations with the fascist powers, and in conversations with German and Japanese diplomatic representatives they promised the support of "realistic politicians" in the USSR for Trotsky's position.
Rogovin, Vadim.  1937: Year of Terror. Oak Park, Michigan: Labor Publications, 1998, p. 118
 
            Who was united under Trotsky's Fascist banner?  All the counter-revolutionary elements rallied under that banner.  What means did the conspiracy use?  High treason, the defeat of their own country, sabotage, espionage, and terror."
Laqueur, Walter. Stalin: The Glasnost Revelations. New York: Scribner's, c1990, p. 92
 
TROTSKY HAD A HUGE EGO
 
Here is how war commissar Trotsky, addressing one of his spectacular mass rallies in Moscow, was described by the famous American foreign correspondent, Isaac Marcosson:
            "Trotsky made his appearance in what actors call a good entrance...after a delay, and at the right psychological moment, he emerged from the wings and walked with quick steps to the little pulpit.... 
            He inundated his hearers with a Niagara of speech, the like of which I have never heard.  Vanity and arrogance stood out pre-eminently.
Sayers and Kahn. The Great Conspiracy. Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1946, p. 186
 
Trotsky left nothing to chance.  He was fond of quoting the words of the French Anarchist, Proudhon: "Destiny -- I laugh at; and as for men, they are too ignorant, too enslaved for me to feel annoyed at them."
Sayers and Kahn.  The Great Conspiracy. Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1946, p. 212
 
Trotsky lacked much of the quality of the true statesman and leader.  His brilliant gifts were marred, as his works continually show, by an extraordinary vanity.  He was almost pathologically egocentric.  He always played the strong, self-confident man; yet many of his actions showed that he was tortured by inhibitions, often, behind the mask of superiority, anything but sure of himself, and, in fact, that he was far from being the strong personality he tried to appear in public.
Basseches, Nikolaus.  Stalin. London, New York: Staples Press, 1952, p. 118
 
The combination, so often found, of great gifts and unbounded vanity gave Trotsky from the outset a revolutionary career whose tragic end might be foreseen.  For Trotsky was never ready to learn, wanted always to teach, could never endure the second-place but must always have the first.
Basseches, Nikolaus. Stalin. London, New York: Staples Press, 1952, p. 119
 
Thus there was much in Trotsky's existence that flattered his almost morbid vanity and gave support to his self-insurance.
Basseches, Nikolaus. Stalin. London, New York: Staples Press, 1952, p. 123
 
            When people say that Trotsky had an attractive personality, they are speaking mainly of his public persona, his appearance before great meetings, his writings, his dignity.  But even so, he repelled many who felt him to be full of vanity, on the one hand, and irresponsible, on the other, in the sense that he tended to make a bright or "brilliant" formulation and press it to the end regardless of the danger.
Conquest, Robert.  The Great Terror. New York: Oxford University Press, 1990, p. 413
 
            Trotsky was above politics, but he was imperious, flushed with an exaggerated sense of his importance, and flaunted his ego in a manner that made people think of Napoleon’s in embryo.
Levine, Isaac Don.  Stalin.  New York: Cosmopolitan Book Corporation, c1931, p. 164
 
TROTSKY ATTACKED LENIN
 
In a pamphlet entitled Our Political Tasks, published in 1904, Trotsky accused Lenin of trying to impose a "barracks-room regime" on the Russian radicals.  In language startlingly similar to that which he was later to use in his attacks on Stalin, the young Trotsky denounced Lenin as "the leader of the reactionary wing of our party."
Sayers and Kahn.  The Great Conspiracy. Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1946, p. 188
 
Abroad again, after the defeat of the 1905 Revolution, Trotsky set up his own political headquarters in Vienna, attacking Lenin as "a candidate for the post of dictator," launched a propaganda campaign to build his own movement....
            "The whole construction of Leninism," wrote Trotsky in a confidential letter to the Russian Menshevik leader Tscheidze, on February 23, 1913, "is at present built up on lies and contains the poisonous germ of its own disintegration."  Trotsky went on to tell his Menshevik associate that, in his opinion Lenin was nothing more than "a professional exploiter of every backwardness in the Russian workers movement."
Sayers and Kahn.  The Great Conspiracy.  Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1946, p. 189
 
            He [Trotsky] had passed the earlier 13 or 14 years in factional struggle against Lenin, assailing him with ferocious personal insults, as "slovenly attorney," as "hideous caricature of Robespierre, malicious and morally repulsive," as "exploiter of Russian backwardness," "demoralizer of the Russian working-class," etc., insults compared with which Lenin's rejoinders were restrained, almost mild.
Deutscher, Isaac.  The Prophet Outcast.  London, New York: Oxford Univ. Press, 1963, p. 249
 
            Stalin had some cause to regard Trotsky's elevation as a grievance, especially considering that this man had for a decade been one of Lenin's most vociferous factional opponents.
McNeal, Robert, Stalin: Man and Ruler. New York: New York University Press, 1988, p. 36
 
TROTSKY ALLIED HIMSELF WITH EX CZARIST OFFICERS, SUBVERSIVES, AND SR’S
 
The former Social Revolutionary terrorist, Blumkin, the assassin of Count Mirbach, became chief of Trotsky's personal bodyguard.
            Trotsky also allied himself with a number of former Tsarist officers whom he befriended and, despite frequent warnings from the Bolshevik Party, placed in important military posts.  One ex tsarist officer whom Trotsky became intimately associated with in 1920, during the Polish campaign, was Tukhachevsky, a military leader with Napoleonic ambitions of his own.
            The aim of the combined Left Opposition was to supplant Lenin and take power in Soviet Russia.
Sayers and Kahn.  The Great Conspiracy. Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1946, p. 193
 
TROTSKY AND LEFT OPPOSITION ARE SUBVERSIVE
 
Trotsky, Bukharin, and Zinoviev held that it was impossible to build socialism in "backward Russia."  The Left Opposition wanted to convert the Russian Revolution into a reservoir of "world Revolution," a world center from which to promote revolutions in other countries.  Stripped of its "ultra-revolutionary verbiage," as both Lenin and Stalin repeatedly pointed out, the Left Opposition really stood for a wild struggle for power, "bohemian anarchism,” and, inside Russia, military dictatorship under War Commissar Trotsky and his associates.
Sayers and Kahn.   The Great Conspiracy. Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1946, p. 193-94
 
By 1923, Trotsky's underground apparatus was already a potent and far-reaching organization.  Special codes, ciphers, and passwords were devised by Trotsky and his adherents for purposes of illegal communication.  Secret printing presses were set up throughout the country.  Trotskyite cells were established in the Army, the diplomatic corps, and in the Soviet state and party institutions.
            Years later, Trotsky revealed that his own son, Sedov, was involved at this time in the Trotskyite conspiracy which was already ceasing to be a mere political opposition within the Bolshevik party and was on the point of merging with the secret war against the Soviet regime.
Sayers and Kahn.  The Great Conspiracy. Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1946, p. 196
 
  In the autumn of 1923 Trotsky issued a "Declaration of the 46 Oppositionists," criticizing the NEP, predicting a great economic crisis, and demanding full freedom for dissenting groups and factions.
Schuman, Frederick L. Soviet Politics. New York: A.A. Knopf, 1946, p. 198
 
What I did not know until much later was that Trotsky's salvos had been followed by a regular broadside known as the "Statement of the 46," signed by 46 members of party, most of whom had taken part in former opposition movements.
Duranty, Walter.  I Write as I Please. New York: Simon and Schuster, 1935, p. 213
 
            Stalin, in answer to a delegation's question in November, 1927, as to the support of the Opposition, said:
            "I think that the Opposition chiefly supports itself on non-proletarian circles....  The Opposition is the reflection of this dissatisfaction [of non-proletarian sections]."
            I was in Russia in the months of 1927 when the issue was raging in the press and conversation.  Seeing something of the former aristocrats, I got the impression of their interest in the conflict.  Many of them welcomed the Trotsky Opposition as the hope of destroying the dictatorship.
Baldwin, Roger. Liberty under the Soviets, New York: Vanguard Press, 1928, p. 57
 
            I sincerely believed at the time, and still believe now, that Zinoviev, Kamenev, Trotsky, and Bukharin were real enemies of Stalin;...
Sudoplatov, Pavel.  Special Tasks. Boston: Little, Brown, c1993, p. 54
 
            His [Trotsky] challenge to Stalin kept the Communist movement in turmoil and weakened our position in Western Europe and Germany in the 1930s.
Sudoplatov, Pavel.  Special Tasks. Boston: Little, Brown, c1993, p. 69
 
 
            [Footnote 7] He [Kamenev] was twice expelled from the Communist Party but readmitted; then, in 1935, he was again expelled and jailed.
Sudoplatov, Pavel.  Special Tasks. Boston: Little, Brown, c1993, p. 54
 
            It appears to anyone who casts a summary glance over the salient facts of the Russian revolutionary movement from the end of the 19th-century, that two basic tendencies, namely, the reformist and revolutionary, which had brought about the schism between the Mensheviks and Bolsheviks, subsisted up to a certain degree in the very heart of the Bolshevik Party which had come into power.  Some of the leaders, Kamenev, Zinoviev and, to a certain degree, Trotsky, were, as we have seen, in certain important connections, hostile to revolutionary methods.  They would have liked to have prevented the October Revolution and, once this had been accomplished, to have avoided the dictatorship of proletariat.
            In practice they would have preferred a constitutional-democratic regime to a socialist regime.  They had no confidence in the strength or the durability of a truly Socialist state in the heart of a capitalist world; they did not believe that the better class peasants could be won over to this cause.  In addition, they criticized the principle of State industry which they looked upon as an enterprise of a capitalist order.  They were in favor of freedom for splits and groups in the heart of the Party, that is to say, of the heterogeneousness of the Party.  These points, upon which Zinoviev, Kamenev, and Trotsky came together repeatedly, constitute the principal characteristics of the most important of the "Oppositions."  It is the return to life of the Menshevik ferment.
            So that, during Lenin's lifetime, the Opposition consisted of those who opposed Lenin's point of view, since Lenin actually ruled the Party which he "had forged with his own hands for 25 years," and which was his own creation.  But after Lenin's death it [the Opposition] made, if one may say so, a pretext of Stalin to intensify its offensive and to attack the same theses with the same arguments, pretending all the while to be defending the purity of Leninism.
Barbusse, Henri. Stalin. New York:  The Macmillan company, 1935, p. 163
 
            Whether or to what extent Trotsky should be regarded as the direct sponsor of this coalition [the Forty-Six] is not certain....  Even many years after Trotsky's death those who had stood close to him claimed that he observed the rules of discipline so strictly that he could not have acted as the sponsor of this particular demonstration of protest.  In the light of all that is known about Trotsky's conduct in such matters, this may be accepted as true.  However, it is doubtful that he had, as is also claimed, no foreknowledge of the action of the Forty-Six or that he was surprised by it.  Preobrazhensky, Muralov, or Antonov-Ovseenko undoubtedly kept him informed about what they were doing, and would not have done what they were doing without some encouragement from him.  And so even if Trotsky was not formally responsible for their action, he must be regarded as its actual prompter.
            ... As to Trotsky, it [the Central Committee] did not charge him plainly with organizing the faction but held him morally responsible for the offense of which it found the Forty-Six guilty.
Deutscher, Isaac. The Prophet Unarmed. London, New York: Oxford Univ. Press, 1959, p. 114
 
            Take, for example, the Trotskyite Counter-Revolutionary Fourth International, two- thirds of which is made up of spies and subversive agents.
Stalin, Joseph.  Mastering Bolshevism. San Francisco: Proletarian Publishers, 1972, p. 25
 
PARTY OUTLAWS FACTIONS AND DEMOTES TROTSKYISTS
 
At the Tenth Bolshevik Party Congress, in March 1921, the Central Committee headed by Lenin passed a resolution outlawing all "factions" in the party as a menace to the unity of the revolutionary leadership.  From now on all party leaders would have to submit to the majority decisions and the majority rule, on penalty of expulsion from the party.  The Central Committee specifically warned "Comrade Trotsky" against his "factional activities," and stated that "enemies of the state," taking advantage of the confusion caused by his disruptive activities were penetrating the party and calling themselves "Trotskyites."  A number of important Trotskyites and other Left Oppositionists were demoted.  Trotsky's chief military aide, Muralov, was removed as Commander of the strategic Moscow Military Garrison and replaced by the old Bolshevik, Voroshilov.
            The following year, in March 1922, Joseph Stalin was elected general secretary of party....
Sayers and Kahn.  The Great Conspiracy. Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1946, p. 196
 
            There was also sharp divergence amongst the delegates to the Tenth Party Congress about the powers and functions of labor unions in the Soviet State.  Feelings ran so high and differences of opinions were so violent on both these important questions (the NEP and labor unions) that Lenin was led to make an impassioned plea for Party Unity, which he described as the cardinal and all-essential factor for this and every subsequent Congress to remember and reserve.
Duranty, Walter.   Story of Soviet Russia. Philadelphia, N. Y.: JB Lippincott Co. 1944, p. 70
 
            The Tenth Congress further authorized the Central Committee, as supreme permanent organism of the Party, to apply appropriate penalties to all Communists--including members of the Committee itself--guilty of violating party discipline, and especially of creating intra-party factions.
Duranty, Walter. Story of Soviet Russia. Philadelphia, N. Y.: JB Lippincott Co. 1944, p. 70
 
            This incident so alarmed Lenin that he caused the 10th Congress of the CPSU to pass a special resolution against the formation of separate blocks, groups, and factions within the Party.  Lenin was of the view that party members were entitled to differ with each other and to resolve their differences by discussion.  But once a decision had been arrived at after a thorough discussion, and criticism had been exhausted, unity of will and action of the Party members were necessary, for without this unity a proletarian Party and proletarian discipline were inconceivable.  This Trotsky could never understand.  Whenever he found himself in a minority he rushed ahead to form a faction within the Party--thus jeopardizing the Party and the Soviet Republic.
Brar, Harpal. Trotskyism or Leninism. 1993, p. 103
 
            When Trotsky asks about the rights of factions, it is not the right of Communist Party members to express their opinion within the Party that he is concerned with.  That is not and never has been challenged.  What Trotsky means by factions is not minority opinion on one or another issue within the Party, but the right of a group to establish its own leadership, its own connections, its own press within the Party--in short, its right to establish a party within the Party with a view to splitting the Party.  That will never be tolerated.
Campbell, J. R.   Soviet Policy and Its Critics. London: V. Gollancz, ltd., 1939, p. 187
 
            A Party conference, the first organized by him [Stalin], was held in January 1924.  It was unsparing in its condemnation of Trotsky and the opposition, and it decided that the secret resolution [Lenin's resolution] "on expulsion from the Party for factional activity" should be made public for the first time.
Radzinsky, Edvard.  Stalin. New York: Doubleday, c1996, p. 212
 
TROTSKY TRIED TO SUCCEED LENIN AND FAILED BADLY
 
Immediately after Lenin's death, Trotsky made his open bid for power.  At the Party Congress in May 1924 Trotsky demanded that he, and not Stalin, be recognized as Lenin’s successor.  Against the advice of his own allies, he forced the question to a vote.  The 748 Bolshevik delegates at the Congress voted unanimously to maintain Stalin as general secretary, and in condemnation of Trotsky's struggle for personal power.  So obvious was the popular repudiation of Trotsky that even Bucharin, Zinoviev, and Kamenev were compelled to side publicly with the majority and vote against him.  Trotsky furiously assailed them for "betraying" him.  But a few months later Trotsky and Zinoviev again joined forces and formed a "New Opposition."
            An actual secret Trotskyite army was in process of formation on Soviet soil.
Sayers and Kahn.   The Great Conspiracy. Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1946, p. 199
 
            Trotsky was in the Politburo, but in fact everyone had united around Stalin, including the right-wing--Bukharin and Rykov.  We called ourselves "the majority" against Trotsky.  He surely sensed, of course, this collusion against him.  He had his supporters and we had ours.  But he did not have many in the Politburo or in the Central Committee, only two or three.  There was Shliapnikov from the Workers Opposition and Krestinsky from the Democratic Centralists.
Chuev, Feliks. Molotov Remembers. Chicago: I. R. Dee, 1993, p. 143
 
            ...The official history of the Communist Party suggests that Trotsky was emboldened by Lenin's illness to make a deliberate bid for power as Lenin's successor.  This may be an exaggeration, although Trotsky must have known that Lenin was doomed, but it is significant that he mobilized a powerful group of critics to sign a document called the "Declaration of the Forty-six."  The declaration was a blow to the Central Committee, but Trotsky was rash enough to pursue his advantage by a letter which not only carried the attack further but established himself as leader of what was described by the Central Committee as an Opposition bloc.  The word "opposition" or "factionalism" produced a reaction.  The Central Committee retorted fiercely that Trotsky was not a Bolshevik at heart and never had been, that he and his "Forty-six" were voicing Menshevik heresies as they had done before, and that most of them had already been castigated by Lenin for subversive or mistaken ideas.
Duranty, Walter.   Story of Soviet Russia. Philadelphia, N. Y.: JB Lippincott Co. 1944, p. 105
 
 
TROTSKY DENIES THERE IS A TESTAMENT
 
Footnote:  Trotsky himself at first admitted that Lenin had left no Testament or Will.  In a letter to the New York Daily Worker on August 8, 1925, Trotsky wrote: "As for the “will’, Lenin never left one, and the very nature of his relations with the Party as well as the nature of the Party itself made such a “will’ absolutely impossible.
            “In the guise of a “will’ the emigre and foreign bourgeois and Menshevik press have all along been quoting one of Lenin's letters (completely mutilated) which contains a number of advices on questions of organization.
            “All talk about a secreted or infringed “will’ is so much mischievous invention directed against the real will of Lenin and of the interests of the Party created by him."
Sayers and Kahn.   The Great Conspiracy. Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1946, p. 200
 
            ...[at the October 1927 combined meeting of the Central Committee and the Central Control Commission] he [Stalin] exploited the fact that, at the Politburo's (and above all his own) insistence, Bolshevik of September 1925 had published a statement by Trotsky concerning the Testament.  Giving into pressure from Stalin on that occasion, Trotsky had written:
            "Since becoming ill, Vladimir Ilyich had frequently written proposals, letters, etc. to the party's leading bodies and its congresses.  All these letters etc. were naturally always delivered to their intended destinations, and were brought to the attention of the delegates to the 12th and 13th Congresses and always, naturally, had the appropriate influence on party decisions....  Vladimir Ilyich left no testament, and the very nature of his relations with the party, as well as the nature of the party itself, exclude the possibility of any such testament, so that any talk about concealing or not carrying out a testament is a malicious invention and is aimed in fact entirely against Vladimir Ilyich's intention."
Volkogonov, Dmitri. Stalin: Triumph and Tragedy. New York: Grove Weidenfeld, 1991, p. 138
 
            Citing the article in Bolshevik Stalin went straight for his target:
            "That was written by Trotsky and by no one else.  What basis can Trotsky, Zinoviev, and Kamenev now have for wagging their tongues and claiming that the party and its Central Committee are 'concealing' Lenin's testament?...
Volkogonov, Dmitri. Stalin: Triumph and Tragedy. New York: Grove Weidenfeld, 1991, p. 139
 
            It was only after they have been beaten, in the spring 1926, that Zinoviev and Kamenev at last threw in their lot with Trotsky.  Meanwhile, Trotsky, too, had further weakened his position by renouncing his supporters abroad, who had published Lenin's testament.  He even went so far-- and all in the name of discipline--as to describe the document as apocryphal.  The union of the two oppositions represented therefore little more than the joint wreckage of their former separate selves.
Deutscher, Isaac. Stalin; A Political Biography. New York: Oxford Univ. Press, 1967, p. 307
 
            It was ironically enough Trotsky who had publicly denied the existence of Lenin's Testament.
Conquest, Robert.  The Great Terror. New York: Oxford University Press, 1990, p. 115
 
            The will afforded little political or moral advantage to Trotsky.  It was his moment to strike at Stalin but either he was paralyzed by Lenin's words or he simply lacked the pluck.  The will was waste paper as far as he was concerned, and he did not object to the proposal that its existence should be hidden from the Party as a whole and from the Russian people.  When its contents were divulged onl hearsay by the emigre Press in Paris and Berlin Trotsky authoritatively denied that there had been such a document.  In his autobiography Trotsky now gives his version of the will.  The essence of it according to Trotsky was that Stalin be removed in order to avoid a split in the party.  If so, why did he not press for it?
Graham, Stephen. Stalin. Port Washington, New York: Kennikat Press, 1970, p. 92
 
 
TROTSKY OPPOSED STALIN IN THE 1920S FROM WITHIN
 
Back in Moscow after his trip to Germany, Trotsky launched an all-out campaign against the Soviet leadership....  With the threat of war hanging over Russia in the summer of 1927, Trotsky renewed his attacks on the Soviet government.  Trotsky publicly declared: "We must restore the tactics of Clemenseau, who, as is well-known, rose against the French Government at a time when the Germans were 80 kilometers from Paris!"
            Stalin denounced Trotsky statement as treasonable.
            Once again, a vote was taken on the subject of Trotsky and his Opposition.  In a general referendum of all Bolshevik party members the overwhelming majority, by a vote of 740,000  to 4000, repudiated the Trotskyite Opposition and declared themselves in favor of Stalin's administration.
Sayers and Kahn.  The Great Conspiracy. Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1946, p. 203
 
            Speaking as one nomenklatura member to another, he [Trotsky] issued the ultimate threat: if the Stalinists refused to deal with him, he would feel free to agitate for his views among rank-and-file party members.
Getty & Naumov,  The Road to Terror. New Haven, Conn.: Yale Univ. Press, c1999, p. 63
 
            Trotsky's adherents met secretly to make a program of their own and start a party within the Party.
Graham, Stephen. Stalin. Port Washington, New York: Kennikat Press, 1970, p. 101
 
OPPOSITION NEVER HAS ANY SIGNIFICANT SUPPORT
 
4,000 votes was the most that the Opposition forces polled at any one time in the entire course of their agitation.  Despite the party band on "factions" and the official insistence on "revolutionary unity" as the cornerstone of Soviet domestic politics, an astounding measure a freedom of debate, criticism, and assembly was granted to the Trotskyite oppositionists by the Soviet government.
Sayers and Kahn.  The Great Conspiracy. Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1946, p. 204
 
            To speak of it, however, as a victory of Stalin over Trotsky is incorrect.  They only personified the issues.  Both represented policies with wide support.  Trotsky's immense personal popularity-- (his picture, with Lenin's, adorned more office walls at the time of my visit than any other)--gave his policies prestige.  But Trotsky's disruptive tactics finally alienated all but a small support.
Baldwin, Roger. Liberty under the Soviets, New York: Vanguard Press, 1928, p. 58
 
            A combined plenum of the Central Committee and the Central Control Commission in October 1923 condemned Trotsky.  He was supported by only two out of the 114 participants in the meeting.  In effect, even before the meeting, Trotsky was isolated in the struggle for leadership of the party.  He had been utterly defeated.  He then tried to rely on the army, where he still had considerable authority.  With the help of his old ally, Antonov-Ovseyenko who was head of the Political Administration of the Revvoensoviet, he proposed to use the armed forces to demonstrate against the Central Committee's line.  But, with few exceptions, the Communists in the army and navy would not support him, either.  The 13th Party Conference of January 1924, which debated the issue, not only condemned Trotsky, it also passed a number of measures in the field of economic policy.  As a result, Trotsky admitted that his attacks on the Central Committee, and the discussion he had initiated, were undertaken with the aim of his becoming leader of the party.  One cannot help noticing, however, that Trotsky started up every discussion at a time least favorable to himself, and virtually knowing in advance that he would be defeated.
Volkogonov, Dmitri. Stalin: Triumph and Tragedy. New York: Grove Weidenfeld, 1991, p. 87
 
            In June 1926 Stalin launched an open offensive against the new grouping.  Trotsky & Zinoviev in the Politburo, and Kamenev in its non-voting membership, had no support except for a handful of Central Committee members, and a few thousand individual Communists.
Conquest, Robert. Stalin: Breaker of Nations. New York, New York: Viking, 1991, p. 136
 
            Of course, in the 1930s there still remained oppositional elements in the Soviet Union whose inclinations bore an anti-communist character and who were prepared at the appropriate moment to wage a battle against Stalinism "from the right," even at the cost of collaborating with fascist interventionists.  The continued existence of such elements was clearly seen during the years of World War II.
Rogovin, Vadim. 1937: Year of Terror. Oak Park, Michigan: Labor Publications, 1998, p. 143
 
            I did not believe our victory [Victor Serge recollects] and at heart I was even sure that we would be defeated.  When I was sent to Moscow with our group's messages for Trotsky, I told him so.  We talked in the spacious office of the Concessions Committee... he was suffering from a fit of malaria; his skin was yellow, his lips were almost livid.  I told him that we were extremely weak, that we, in Leningrad, had not rallied more than a few hundred members, that our debates left the mass of workers cold.  I felt that he knew all this better than I did.
Deutscher, Isaac. The Prophet Unarmed. London, New York: Oxford Univ. Press, 1959, p. 310
 
            The opposition represents an insignificant minority in our party....  Whether we will have unity with that insignificant group in the Party known as the opposition, depends on them.  We want to work in harmony with the opposition.  Last year, at the height of the discussion, we said that joint work with the opposition was necessary.  We've re-affirm this here today....  The majority wants united activity.  Whether the minority sincerely wants it, I do not know.  That depends entirely on the comrades of the opposition.
Stalin, Joseph. Works. Moscow: Foreign Languages Pub. House, 1952, Vol. 6, p. 244
 
GREAT FREEDOM GIVEN TO THE OPPOSITION
 
Footnote:  The public propaganda of the Opposition exploited every possible kind of political argument against the Soviet regime.  The social and economic policies of the Stalin administration were subjected to continuous criticism under such slogans as "incompetence in administration," "uncontrolled bureaucracy," "one-man, one-party dictatorship," "degneration of the old leadership" and so on.  No attempt was made to suppress Trotsky's agitation until it had openly exposed itself as, in fact, anti-Soviet and connected with other anti-Soviet forces.  From 1924 until 1927, in the words of Sydney and Beatrice Webb, in Soviet Communism -- A New Civilization, "There ensued what must seem surprising to those who believe that the USSR lies groaning under a preemptory dictatorship, namely, three years of incessant public controversy.  This took various forms....  There were hot arguments in many of the local soviets, as well as in the local Party organs.  There was a vast [Oppositionist] literature of books and pamphlets, not stopped by the censorship, and published, indeed, by the state publishing houses, extending, as is stated by one who has gone through it, to literally thousands of printed pages."  The Webbs add that the issue "was finally and authoritatively settled by the Plenum of the Central Committee of the Party in April 1925;... after these decisions, Trotsky persisted in his agitation, attempting to stir up resistance; and his conduct became plainly factious."
Sayers and Kahn.  The Great Conspiracy. Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1946, p. 204
 
            But during the 1920s the Stalinist leadership had often permitted the publication of statements and articles by various oppositionists within the party, at least until the moment of their defeat and expulsion.  Trotsky's works were published until the mid-1920s, and Bukharin continued to publish, howbeit within controlled parameters, until his arrest in 1937; he was in fact editor of the government newspaper Izvestia until that time.  [Stalin had personally nominated Bukharin to the Izvestia position in 1934]
Getty & Naumov.  The Road to Terror. New Haven, Conn.: Yale Univ. Press, c1999, p. 103
 
            ...After all, it is interesting that we went on living with the oppositionists and oppositionist factions until the events­ of the late 1930s....  Without a man like Stalin it would have been very, very difficult, especially during the war.  There would no longer have been teamwork.  We would have had splits in the party.  It would have been nothing but one against another.  Then what?
Chuev, Feliks. Molotov Remembers. Chicago: I. R. Dee, 1993, p. 258
 
            In the course of some six months the party had been shaken by two major revolts.  First, there had been the "waverers," the faction led by Zinoviev and Kamenev, who had opposed the Bolshevik seizure of power.  Then, distinct from this faction, came the left communists, led by Bukharin, who called for a return to the purity of socialist principles.  In both cases there had been free debate within the party.
Grey, Ian.  Stalin, Man of History. London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1979, p. 109
 
            Interest groups in the bureaucracy usually could not oppose the established line, but in cases where there was no firmly fixed policy, debate, negotiation, and lobbying were possible even in the Stalin years.
Getty, A.   Origins of the Great Purges. Cambridge, N. Y.: Cambridge Univ. Press, 1985, p. 11
 
            Actually Trotsky wanted to try another test of strength with the Politburo.  It seemed to him that the mood in the party had shifted in his favor.  Dozens of oppositionists who came to see him at the offices of the Chief Concessions Committee assured him that this was so.  Thus Trotsky decided on a renewal of factional political activity, which was conducted on a large scale and attracted more supporters than in the fall of 1926.  The opposition groups in the various Soviet cities had their own local leaderships and their own faction discipline, and dues were collected from members.  Opposition materials were published secretly on government printing presses, and a small illegal print shop was set up in Moscow for the same purpose.  Trotsky knew about, and fully approved of, the use of such prerevolutionary conspiratorial methods.  Assessing these events several years later, Trotsky wrote:
            "In a very short time it was apparent that as a faction we had undoubtedly gained strength--that is to say, we had grown more united intellectually, and stronger in numbers...."
            In this passage Trotsky obviously exaggerates the extent of Opposition influence among rank-and-file party members.  He overstates even more the extent to which Stalin had been discredited by the Chinese events.  Moreover, most of the illegal meetings and Opposition materials were no secret to Stalin and his immediate circle.  He followed the activities of the opposition leaders very closely.
Medvedev, Roy. Let History Judge. New York: Columbia University Press, 1989, p. 171
 
            In November 1923 the alarm caused by the crisis led the triumvirs to table a motion in favor of democratic reform in the party.  As in the Georgian affair, so now Stalin agreed to make any verbal concession to Trotsky.  The motion was carried by the Politburo unanimously.  Trotsky had no choice but to vote for it.  On November 7 the sixth anniversary of the revolution, Zinoviev officially announced the opening of a public discussion on all issues that troubled the Bolshevik mind.  The state of siege in the party, so it might have seemed, was at last being lifted.
Deutscher, Isaac. Stalin; A Political Biography. New York: Oxford Univ. Press, 1967, p. 260
 
            If a workers democracy was needed, did that mean that the Mensheviks and the Social Revolutionaries were to be allowed to come back?  Most of Stalin's critics, including Trotsky, agreed that the Mensheviks should remain outlawed.
Deutscher, Isaac. Stalin; A Political Biography. New York: Oxford Univ. Press, 1967, p. 261
 
            After the 13th Congress, in 1925, 1926, the 1927, the same freedom existed within the Party.  The fight against the opposition was carried out in the committees, Party cells, and meetings of organs and militants of the Party.  Leaders of the opposition vehemently urged their partisans to be as active as possible to attack the Central Committee.  In so doing, they would underline the strength and influence of the opposition.
            I was astonished when, after the 14th congress [December 1925], Stalin and his new majority in the Central Committee did not oppose this freedom....  it would have been simpler to forbid discussions within the Party and to proclaim, by a resolution of the Central Committee's plenum, that such discussions harmed the Party and turned its efforts away from constructive lines, etc.
            ... I was able definitely to confirm my theory during a conversation with Stalin and Mekhlis.  The latter was holding in his hands the report of the local Party meeting, and he cited violent intervention by opposition elements.  He was indignant and said, "Comrade Stalin, don't you think this goes too far, and the Central Committee is wrong in letting itself be discredited so openly?  Wouldn't it be better to forbid it?"  Stalin smiled, "Let them speak!  Let them speak!  The dangerous enemy is not he who shows his hand.  It's the hidden enemy, whom we don't know, who is dangerous.  We know all the people [in this report] and have files on them...."
Bazhanov, Boris.  Bazhanov and the Damnation of Stalin.  Athens, Ohio: Ohio University Press, c1990, p. 92
 
            The bans on other political parties remained but, during the period of the New Economic Policy (1921-1928) there was a relatively high level of tolerance for diverse perspectives in Soviet society.  Restrictions on the press were relaxed and scores of private printing houses and non-party journals were founded.
            In the 1924-25 period nomination rules were relaxed in order to make it easy for candidates not approved by the Communist Party to win elections to the local Soviets.  In new electoral instructions issued in early 1925, Party organizations were told to cease to 'impose their list at election meetings' and no longer to insist that voters 'be excluded merely because they have been critical of local Soviet authorities.'  As a result the majority of those elected to the village Soviets in the rural areas of the Ukraine and Russian republic were non-Party.  After the 1927 elections about 90 percent of the delegates and 75 percent of the local Soviet chairmen in both Republics were non-Party.
            The ban on organized factions in the Party was not rescinded, but a vital internal party life, as well as toleration of widely diverse viewpoints within the Party, continued throughout the period of the New Economic Policy....  While the center-right alliance of those around Stalin and Bukharin had the upper hand in the period after Lenin's death (they were united on the continuation of the New Economic Policy and a fairly moderate international line), their left opponents continued to occupy leading positions.
Szymanski, Albert.  Human Rights in the Soviet Union. London: Zed Books, 1984, p. 211
 
            The workers' Opposition was not alone in voicing disillusionment.  At the 11th Congress, last attended by Lenin, Trotsky saw himself and Lenin attacked by old and intimate friends: Antonov-Ovseenko, who spoke about the party's surrender to the kulak and foreign capitalism; Ryazanov, who thundered against the prevalent political demoralization and the arbitrary manner in which the Politburo ruled the party; Lozovsky and Skrypnik, the Ukrainian commissar, who protested against the over-centralistic method of government, which, he said, was all too reminiscent of the "one and indivisible" Russia of old; Bubnov, still the Decemist, who spoke about the danger of the party's "petty bourgeois degeneration"; and Preobrazhensky, one of the leading economic theorists and former secretary of the Central Committee.  One day most of the critics would be eminent members of the "Trotskyist' Opposition; and one-day Trotsky himself would appeal, as Shliapnikov and Kollontai had done, against the Russian Central Committee to the International.
Deutscher, Isaac.  The Prophet Unarmed. London, New York: Oxford Univ. Press, 1959, p. 31
 
            The discussion was at once focused on the statement of the Forty-Six who were now free to expound their views to the rank-and-file.  Pyatakov was their most aggressive and effective spokesman; wherever he went he easily obtained large majorities for bluntly worded resolutions.
Deutscher, Isaac. The Prophet Unarmed. London, New York: Oxford Univ. Press, 1959, p. 116
 
            ...curious though the factional fights became, they were still contained within limits.  Until the end of 1927, they were still fought out openly before the Central Committee Plenum, the Party Congress or Conference, where the opposition was free to challenge the leadership, issues were settled by votes, and the debates reported.  The opposition spokesman were more and more subject to heckling and interruption, but that is true even of parliamentary assemblies; they had increasing difficulty in rallying support inside the party, but even when in 1928-29 the clash between Stalin and the right opposition took place behind closed doors, the opposition could not be suppressed, it had to be defeated.  The leaders were not arrested or shot; even Trotsky was banished, not imprisoned or executed, and most of the others, like Zinoviev and Kamenev, were allowed back into the party--even, like Bukharin, to hold official posts.
Bullock, Alan. Hitler and Stalin: Parallel Lives. New York: Knopf, 1992, p. 182
 
            Comrades, oppositionists can and should be allowed to hold posts.  Heads of Central Committee departments can and should be allowed to criticize the Central Committee's activities.
Stalin, Joseph.  Works.  Moscow: Foreign Languages Pub. House, 1952, Vol. 6, p. 44
 
            [In a report on the Results of the 13th Congress of the Party on June 17, 1924 Stalin stated]  What should our policy be with regard to these oppositionists, or, more precisely, with regard to these former oppositionists?  It should be an exceptionally comradely one.  Every measure must be taken to help them come over to the basic core of the Party and to work jointly and in harmony with this core.
Stalin, Joseph.  Works. Moscow: Foreign Languages Pub. House, 1952, Vol. 6, p. 267
 
            Next question.  Why did not the Central Committee publish the opposition's "platform"?  Zinoviev and Trotsky say that it was because the Central Committee and the Party "fear" the truth.  Is that true?  Of course not.  More than that.  It is absurd to say that the Party or the Central Committee fear the truth.  We have the verbatim reports of the plenums of the Central Committee and Central Control Commission.  Those reports have been printed in several thousand copies and distributed among the members of the Party.  They contain the speeches of the oppositionists as well as of the representatives of the Party line.  They are being read by tens and hundreds of thousands of Party members.  If we fear the truth we would not have circulated those documents.  The good thing about those documents is precisely that they enable the members of the party to compare the Central Committee's position with the views of the opposition and to make their decision.  Is that fear of the truth?
Stalin, Joseph. Works. Moscow: Foreign Languages Pub. House, 1952, Vol. 10, p. 183
 
            Although, in the early years of the regime, its ideological opponents, such fans and socialist revolutionaries, had been put in prison, the game--at least in theory--was not depressed and physically or to put him into their intellectual life, but merely to segregate them from the rest of the population and prevent them from spreading their ideas.
Berger, Joseph.  Nothing but the Truth.  New York, John Day Co. 1971, p. 60
 
            Since the revolution, and especially during the period of the New Economic Policy the arts and intellectual life had enjoyed a considerable degree of autonomy.  True, open political opposition was forbidden, and the regime could use the power of the purse to support this or that tendency.  But direct political supervision was sporadic, and diverse schools of thought and art could and did contend, even forming separate organizations in literature, for example.
McNeal, Robert, Stalin: Man and Ruler. New York: New York University Press, 1988, p. 153
 
TROTSKY TRIED TO TAKE OVER IN 1927
 
Trotsky was feverishly preparing for the coming showdown.  By the end of October, his plans were made.  An uprising was to take place on November 7, 1927, the tenth anniversary of the Bolshevik Revolution.  Trotsky's most resolute followers, former members of the Red Army Guard, were to head the insurrection.  Detachments were posted to take over strategic points throughout the country.  The signal for the rising was to be a political demonstration against the Soviet government during the mass workers parade in Moscow on the morning of November 7th.
Sayers and Kahn.  The Great Conspiracy. Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1946, p. 205
 
 
TROTSKY’S ATTEMPTED TAKEOVER COLLAPSES
 
...The majority of the Politburo gained the day.  Trotsky was expelled from the Politburo and the Central Committee, and deprived of both his offices.  His supporters, too, were dismissed from the principal offices in the State....  While Trotsky's supporters were removed from direct political influence, only those who took active steps against the party were later exiled.
            Trotsky, now no longer in the Politburo or the Central Committee, went on with his activities.  Now that it was really too late to do anything, he became energetic.  He went really to work at building up an illegal organization to overthrow the party and the Government.  Suddenly there appeared in Moscow, though in no great numbers, illegal leaflets, addressed not to the mass of the people but as a rule only to party members....
            It was November 7, 1927; the Soviet Union was celebrating the 10th anniversary of the victory of Bolshevism in Russia....
Basseches, Nikolaus. Stalin. London, New York: Staples Press, 1952, p. 136
 
            No worse day could have been chosen for an appeal to opposition sentiment.... Here there assembled on this day a few supporters of Trotsky, including Karl Radek.  From an open window in this corner building, they tried to address the marching columns in support of the Opposition.  Trotsky showed himself, but attracted no attention from the crowds.  The Opposition had conceived this as an important demonstration, and had hoped for great results from it.  The few speakers at the window were noticed, however, only by the State police.  The demonstration was a failure.
            This attempted demonstration against the Government gave the signal for the penultimate move in the dramatic conflict.  A great purge began.  Now the party organization had ample evidence that there was a Trotskyist opposition organization within the party.  It had proof also of illegal activity on the part of that opposition, aiming at the overthrow of the party majority and even of the Government.  Everyone suspected of supporting Trotsky was expelled from the party; very many were exiled.
            Trotsky's banishment was then resolved on in that dramatic atmosphere.  He was exiled to Alma Ata, a town in Russian Central Asia,....
Basseches, Nikolaus. Stalin. London, New York: Staples Press, 1952, p. 137-138
 
Trotsky's insurrection collapsed almost as soon as it started.  On the morning of November 7th, as the workers marched through the Moscow streets, Trotskyite propaganda leaflets were showered down on them from high buildings announcing the advent of the "new leadership."  Small bands of Trotskyite's suddenly appeared in the streets, waving banners and placards.  They were swept away by irate workers.
Sayers and Kahn. The Great Conspiracy. Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1946, p. 205
 
            ... Having taken his earlier defeat to heart, Trotsky was now convinced that, if necessary, a new party must be created to oppose the official body.  To gather recruits for this objective, he distributed his supporters among the local Soviets and factory committees, with instructions to express the Opposition viewpoint wherever possible.
            This final maneuver more than anything else goaded Stalin to sudden action.  Wordy criticism he would permit, but an Opposition which sought to undermine the very roots of Leninism must be smashed once and for all....
            Faced by such a show of force and frightened by the implications contained in Trotsky's suggestion to set up a new party, Zinoviev and his group again surrendered and again made public and servile apologies to Stalin, who once more forgave them.
Cole, David M.   Josef Stalin; Man of Steel. London, New York: Rich & Cowan, 1942, p. 69
 
            Stimulated by the ill-luck which dogged Stalin's policy in China, the Opposition decided to come into the open for a final attempt to oust the General Secretary.  Preparations began for the Congress of 1927.
            If he had received a setback in China, Stalin was by no means beaten.  This time he decided to destroy the Opposition altogether and to except no more sham capitulations.  On November 15, 1927, the Central Committee of the Party decided to expel Trotsky, Zinoviev, and Kamenev from its sittings.  On December 18th the assembled Congress confirmed the earlier decision and expelled all the leading dissenters of the Party.
            For all its bellicose phrases, this was more than the Opposition expected.  Expulsion from the party meant the loss of good jobs, the loss of citizen rights, possibly even Siberian exile would follow.  Only Trotsky and a few others were sufficiently steadfast to endure this.  First Zinoviev and Kamenev, then Rakovsky, Sokolnikov and others, asked forgiveness of Stalin.  In the most servile turns, they begged to be allowed to re-enter the fold, forswearing all future connections with Trotsky and the intransigeants.
            For the last time, with surprising lack of animosity, Stalin granted their request, allotting them subordinate positions but removing them from leadership of the Moscow and Leningrad Soviets.
Cole, David M.   Josef Stalin; Man of Steel. London, New York: Rich & Cowan, 1942, p. 70
 
            The party leadership was rather slow in applying extreme disciplinary measures to the opposition leaders.  There were plenty of warnings and resolutions of censure by the leading Party organs, and Trotsky, Zinoviev, and Kamenev were gradually stripped of their more important Party and Soviet posts.
            On the 10th anniversary of the Revolution, on November 7, 1927, groups of oppositionists organized counter-demonstrations under their own banners and slogans.  Although this effort was very unsuccessful because of the small number of the participants, it gave the Party leadership an excuse for proceeding much more vigorously.  Trotsky and Zinoviev were promptly expelled from the Party.  The Party Congress, meeting at the end of the year, formally expelled all the other oppositionists of any prominence and laid down the rule that adherence to the views of the Trotskyist opposition was inconsistent with membership in the Communist Party.
            With expulsion and exile hanging over their heads Zinoviev and Kamenev weakened and left Trotsky alone in the role of a martyr to his principles.  Together with most of their associates, they recanted and after a period of probation were readmitted to the Party.  Trotsky remained unyielding, and early in 1928 he and a number of his chief associates were banished to various remote parts of the Soviet Union....
            Trotsky's place of banishment was Alma Ata in the eastern part of Russian Turkestan, not far from the Chinese frontier.  He was not placed under actual restraint, but was kept under close observation.  Notwithstanding this, he and his associates, all of them old revolutionists, well versed in the tricks of eluding guards and spies, kept up a lively clandestine correspondence between themselves and with the remnants of their underground organization throughout the country.  Most of this correspondence, to be sure, ultimately fell into the hands of the GPU and the Party authorities.
Chamberlin, William Henry. Soviet Russia. Boston: Little, Brown, 1930, p. 74-75
 
            Trotsky's two chief associates in opposition, Zinoviev and Kamenev of whom the former was for a long time President of the Communist International and the latter Vice Premier and President of the Moscow Soviet, have gone to Canossa, confessed their mistakes, and received minor posts in the Party and Social service.
Chamberlin, William Henry.  Soviet Russia. Boston: Little, Brown, 1930, p. 104
 
            ...At any rate, on November 7th, 1927, [the Tenth] anniversary of the Revolution, they [The Opposition] ventured a direct appeal to the public in Moscow, Leningrad, and other great cities from balconies or improvised platforms in parks and squares.  This forlorn hope was an utter failure; the masses refused to be stirred.  The Opposition orators were greeted with some booing and cat-calls, and a few rotten apples were thrown, but there was no excitement or disorder.  Nevertheless the gesture was flagrant, and by Soviet law tantamount to open rebellion.  The Fifteenth Party Congress, which met in December, expelled Trotsky, Kamenev, Zinoviev, and 75 of their principal adherence from the Communist Party.
Duranty, Walter.  Story of Soviet Russia. Philadelphia, N. Y.: JB Lippincott Co. 1944, p. 115
 
 
TROTSKY IS EXILED IN COMFORT
 
Trotsky was exiled to Alma Ata, capital of the Kazakh Soviet Republic in Siberia, near the border of China.  He was given a house for himself, his wife Natalie, and his son, Sedov.  Trotsky was treated leniently by the Soviet government, which was as yet unaware of the real scope and significance of his conspiracy.  He was permitted to retain some of his personal body guards, including the former Red Army officer Dreitzer.  He was allowed to receive and send personal mail, to have his own library, and confidential "archives" and to be visited from time to time by friends and admirers.  But Trotsky's exile by no means put an end to his conspiratorial activities....
            Pyatakov, Radek, Zinoviev, Kamenev, and other exiled oppositionists began denouncing Trotsky, proclaiming the "tragic error" of their past opposition and pleading for readmission to the Bolshevik party.
Sayers and Kahn.  The Great Conspiracy. Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1946, p. 206
 
Congress 15 opened on December 2, 1927.  The Congress expelled from the party Trotsky, Zinoviev, Kamenev, Radek, Rakovsky, Preobrazhensky, Smirnov, Serebryakov and several hundred lesser oppositionists....  All the leading oppositionists except Trotsky recanted and were readmitted on probation in June 1928 on condition of denouncing Trotskyism and accepting unconditionally party decisions.  Trotsky was exiled to Alma Alta.
            Here he hunted, fished, lived comfortably,...  And carried on an extensive correspondence with little interference.  Between April of October by his own account he sent out 800 political letters...and 550 telegrams and received 1000 political letters and 700 telegrams.  On December 16, 1928, an agent of the GPU arrived from Moscow with the demand that he cease leadership of the opposition.  He refused.
Schuman, Frederick L. Soviet Politics. New York: A.A. Knopf, 1946, p. 205
 
As for his sojourn in Turkey I can only say that two of my friends visited him on the Bosphorus Island and both of them remarked on his robust physical condition.  In the spring of 1930 I went to Alma Alta in Central Asia, to which Trotsky had first been exiled.  During his stay there Trotsky's sympathizers in Moscow wailed loudly that is health was being ruined by the extremes of heat and cold.  He refers in his autobiography to the prevalence of malaria and leprosy.  I saw the house where he lived in Alma Alta, which is far more comfortable and spacious than my own apartment in Moscow; I saw the pleasant villa in the mountains where he spent the summer; and I heard everyone, from the local GPU men to the man in the street, talk warmly of Trotsky's hunting trips and how hard he worked and how cheerful and friendly he was to one and all.
Duranty, Walter. I Write as I Please. New York: Simon and Schuster, 1935, p. 229
 
            It was by no means an unpleasing place of exile.... At Alma Ata Trotsky lived as a grand seigneur.  His library and his furniture had been dispatched to him, and he sent for countless other things, including elaborate hunting and angling equipment.  He was not short of money; the State publishing office had paid him the sums due to him under his contract with it.  His works were withdrawn, of course, from circulation, but there had been such sales already and such countless subscriptions paid that his royalties amounted to tens of thousands of gold rubles.
            Up to that time Stalin could not be charged with active malevolence.  It had been a political struggle.  As the years had passed, Stalin's enmity toward Trotsky had certainly sharpened...; but he had never given full vent...and he did not even when Trotsky did not lie low in Alma Ata.  Trotsky appears to have kept up an active correspondence with his secret supporters, and, in spite of the watchfulness of the secret police, he tried to continue building up an illegal party of his own.  Now and then well printed leaflets made their appearance in Moscow.  In 1929 Stalin moved that Trotsky should be sent into exile abroad.
Basseches, Nikolaus. Stalin. London, New York: Staples Press, 1952, p. 139
 
            Trotsky and his family lived in Alma-Ata for a year.  He maintained ties with his supporters, legally and illlegally, carrying on a vast correspondence.
Medvedev, Roy. Let History Judge. New York: Columbia University Press, 1989, p. 176
 
            While he was in Alma-Ata, Trotsky continued his political activity.  Every month he sent hundreds of letters and telegrams to various addresses.  His elder son's notes show that the clandestine correspondence which Trotsky carried on in Alma-Ata between April and October 1928, amounted to some 800 political letters and 550 telegrams from him, and more than 1000 political letters and 700 telegrams received by him.  In addition, letters and other items came and went by courier.  He was trying to reactivate the opposition.
Volkogonov, Dmitri. Stalin: Triumph and Tragedy. New York: Grove Weidenfeld, 1991, p. 143
 
            ...A curious incident.  It is reported that the Instantia received a request from Trotsky.  He asked for permission to buy a shotgun and another hunting rifle, because he intended to go lion-hunting--to hunt the celebrated Semirechensk lions.... His request was granted.  Klim is reported to have said: "Let him hunt.  Maybe the Semirechensk lions will eat up our Kherson Lev...."
Litvinov, Maksim Maksimovich.  Notes for a Journal. New York: Morrow, 1955, p. 83
 
            Here are a few bits of statistical data from my son's notes: For the period of April to October, 1928, we sent out from Alma-Ata about 800 political letters, among them quite a few large works.  The telegrams sent amounted to about 550.  We received about 1000 political letters, both long and short, and about 700 telegrams, in most cases from groups of people.  All this refers chiefly to the correspondence within the region of exile, but letters from exile filtered out into the country as well.  Of the correspondence sent us, we received, in the best months, not more than half.  In addition we received about eight or nine secret mails from Moscow, that is, secret material and letters forwarded by special courier.  About the same number were sent by us in similar fashion to Moscow.  The secret mails kept us informed of everything that was going on there and enabled us, though only after much delay, to respond with our comments on the most important events.
Trotsky, Leon. My Life. Gloucester, Massachusetts: P. Smith, 1970, p. 556
 
            On December 16, a special representative of the GPU, coming from Moscow, in the name of that institution handed me an ultimatum: I must stop directing the opposition; if I did not, measures would be taken "to isolate me from political life."
            I think it necessary to quote the main points of this letter here:
            "The work of your political sympathizers throughout the country" (almost word for word) "has lately assumed a definitely counter-revolutionary character; the conditions in which you are placed at Alma-Ata give you full opportunity to direct this work; in view of this, the collegium of the GPU has decided to demand from you a categorical promise to discontinue your activity; failing this, the collegium will be obliged to alter the conditions of your existence to the extent of completely isolating you from political life.  In this connection, the question of changing your place of residence will rise."
Trotsky, Leon.  My Life. Gloucester, Massachusetts: P. Smith, 1970, p. 558
 
            Between April and October [in 1928] we received approximately 1000 political letters and documents and about 700 telegrams.  In this same period we sent out 550 telegrams and not fewer than 800 political letters, including a number of substantial works, such as the Criticism of the Draft Program of the Comintern, and others.  Without my son I could not have accomplished even 1/2 of the work.
Trotsky, Leon. Leon Sedoff. New York City: Young People's Socialist League, (Fourth Internationalists), 1938, p. 10
 
            Trotsky, unyielding, was forced to go into (comfortable) exile in Central Asia, and finally, at the beginning of 1929, was expelled from the country; he was allowed to take all his personal effects and papers with him.  Throughout the mid-1930s, internal opposition within the Party, even of the most aggressive type, such is that of Trotsky, was treated with relative benevolence.
Szymanski, Albert.  Human Rights in the Soviet Union. London: Zed Books, 1984, p. 212
 
            Save for a few hunting trips, Trotsky spent most of his time in Alma-Ata at his desk.  Between April and October 1928 he sent his supporters about 550 telegrams and 800 "political letters," some of them lengthy political tracts.  During the same period he received 700 telegrams and 1000 letters from various parts of the Soviet Union, but believed that at least as many more had been confiscated en route.
Andrew and Mitrokhin.  The Sword and the Shield (Pt 1). New York: Basic Books, c1999, p. 39
 
            Here [at Alma Ata] Trotsky was to stay.  Stalin was eager to keep him as far from Moscow as possible and to reduce him to his own resources....  Stalin appeared to have no further designs on his enemy; and the GPU still treated Trotsky with consideration that would have been unthinkable later.  It took care that his enormous library and archives, containing important state and party documents, should reach him--a lorryful of these presently arrived at Alma Ata.  Trotsky protested to Kalinin, Ordjonikidze, and Menzhinsky against the conditions in which he was placed, demanding better accommodation, the right to go on hunting trips, and even to have his pet dog sent to him from Moscow.  He complained that he was kept at the inn at Gogol Street only to suit the GPU's convenience and that his punishment was virtual imprisonment.  "You could just as well have jailed me in Moscow--there was no need to deport me 4000 versts away."  The protest was effective.  Three weeks after his arrival he was given a four-room flat in the center of the town, at 75 Krasin Street-- the street was so named after his deceased friend.  He was allowed to go on hunting trips.  He showered further sarcastic telegrams on Moscow, making demands, some serious, others trivial, and mixing little quarrels with great controversy.
            He appeared almost relaxed after so many years of ceaseless toil and tension.  Thus, unexpectedly and oddly, there was a quasi-idyllic flavor about the first few months of his stay at Alma Ata.  Steppe and mountain, river and lake lured him as never since his childhood.  He relished hunting; and in his voluminous correspondence political argument and advice are often interspersed with poetic descriptions of landscape and humorous reports on hunting ventures.  He was at first refused permission to go out of Alma Ata.  Then he was allowed to go hunting but no further than 25 versts away.  He telegraphed to Menzhinsky that he would disregard the restriction because there were no suitable hunting grounds within that distance and he was not going to be bothered with small game--he must be allowed to go at least 70 versts away; and let Moscow inform the local GPU about this so as to avoid trouble.  He went; and there was no trouble.  Then he protested to the chief of the local GPU against being pursued rudely and conspicuously by sleuths and declared that because of this he would "go on strike" and cease to hunt --unless this form of police supervision was prescribed directly by Moscow, in which case he understood the position of the local GPU and waived his objections.  The supervision became milder and less conspicuous.
Deutscher, Isaac. The Prophet Unarmed. London, New York: Oxford Univ. Press, 1959, p. 397-398
 
            The fees paid to him [Trotsky] by Ryazanov [for articles written] supplied the family's needs and covered most of Trotsky's huge correspondence.
            ...No doubt the censorship and the GPU kept a watchful eye on the correspondence.  Most of it was with Rakovsky, who had been deported to Astrakhan, Radek, who was at Tobolsk, Preobrazhensky, exiled to Uralsk, Smilga who was at Narym, Beloborodov, banished as for north as Ust-Kylom in the Komi Republic, Serebryakov, who was at Semi-Palatinsk in Central Asia, Muralov at Tara, Ivan Smirnov at Novo-Bayazet in Armenia, and Mrachkovsky at Voronezh.
            [Footnote]: Between April and October 1928 Trotsky mailed 800 political letters, many of essay length, and 550 telegrams; and he received 1000 letters and 700 telegrams, apart from private mail.
Deutscher, Isaac. The Prophet Unarmed. London, New York: Oxford Univ. Press, 1959, p. 401
 
BUKHARIN SWITCHES FROM LEFT TO RIGHT LEADER
 
Footnote:  Bucharin had called himself a "Left Communist"; now, after Trotsky's debacle, he began to formulate the principles of what was soon to be publicly known as the Right Opposition.
            Behind the scenes, Bucharin formulated the real program of the Right Opposition at conspiratorial meetings with Trotsky's representatives, and with agents of the other underground organizations.
            Trotsky at first resented Bucharin's assumption of leadership of the movement he had initiated; but, after a brief period of rivalry and even feuding, the differences were reconciled.  The public and "legal" phase of the Right Opposition lasted until November 1929 when a plenum of the Central Committee of the Bolshevik Party declared that the propaganda of the views of the Rights was incompatible with membership in the Party.  Bucharin, Rykov, and Tomsky were removed from their high official positions.
Sayers and Kahn.  The Great Conspiracy. Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1946, p. 207-208
 
            Bukharin was a left-winger during the Brest Peace and afterward turned to the right.
Chuev, Feliks. Molotov Remembers. Chicago: I. R. Dee, 1993, p. 119
 
            Only one member of the Politburo, Bukharin, openly backed the Georgian and Ukrainian oppositions.
Deutscher, Isaac. Stalin; a Political Biography. New York: Oxford Univ. Press, 1967, p. 255
 
 
TROTSKY WAS DEPORTED RATHER THAN IMPRISONED
 
On the morning of January 22, 1929, Trotsky was formally deported from Soviet Union.
Sayers and Kahn.   The Great Conspiracy. Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1946, p. 209
 
            ...On Jan. 18, 1929 he [Stalin] proposed to the Politburo that Trotsky be expelled from Russia.  The proposal was passed, against Bukharin's protests....
Deutscher, Isaac.  Stalin; a Political Biography. New York: Oxford Univ. Press, 1967, p. 316
 
HITLER PRAISES TROTSKY’S BOOK
 
Hitler read Trotsky's autobiography as soon is it was published.  Hitler's biographer, Conrad Heiden, tells in Der Fuehrer how the Nazi leader surprised a circle of his friends in 1930 by bursting into rapturous praises of Trotsky's book.  "Brilliant!"  cried Hitler, waving Trotsky's My Life at his followers.  "I have learnt a great deal from it, and so can you!"
Sayers and Kahn.  The Great Conspiracy. Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1946, p. 216
 
PYATAKOV SPEAKS AGAINST TROTSKY
 
Pyatakov said, Trotsky was firmly in favor of the forcible overthrow of the Stalin leadership by methods of terrorism and wrecking.
Sayers and Kahn.  The Great Conspiracy. Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1946, p. 223
 
            Pyatakov [said]... “I have waived my right to a speech in my defense because the prosecution is right in its statement of the facts, and in its estimation of my crime.  But I cannot reconcile myself to one assertion made by the State Prosecutor, namely, that even now I am a Trotskyite.  Yes, I was a Trotskyite for many years; but my only motive for the statements I have made at this trial, was the desire, even now, even when it is too late, to get rid of my loathsome Trotskyite past.”
            Nobody acquainted with Pyatakov's work could seriously doubt that he was speaking the truth.
Tokaev, Grigori. Comrade X. London: Harvill Press, 1956, p. 66
 
            ...Orlov declined to become involved.  He had already learned the sordid details of the second Moscow show trial, after which Pyatakov and Radek had been shot together with 15 other old Bolsheviks after abjectly confessing yet another Trotskyist plot against Stalin.
Costello, John and Oleg Tsarev.  Deadly illusions. New York: Crown, c1993, p. 284
 
 
SHESTOV SPEAKS AGAINST SEDOV
 
Shestov followed Trotsky with fanatical devotion....  Shestov quotes Sedov as saying "the only correct way, the difficult way but a sure one, was forcibly to remove Stalin and leaders of the government by means of terrorism."
Sayers and Kahn.  The Great Conspiracy. Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1946, p. 225
 
TROTSKYITES MEET WITH SUBVERSIVE GROUPS
 
Trotskyite organizers addressed motley secret gatherings of die hard enemies of the Soviet regime -- Social Revolutionaries, Mensheviks, leftists, rightists, nationalists, anarchists, and white Russian fascists and Monarchists.
Sayers and Kahn.  The Great Conspiracy. Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1946, p. 228
 
TROTSKYITE MRACHKOVSKY ADVOCATES TERROR AGAINST THE GOVERNMENT
 
Mrachkovsky one of Trotsky's followers told one of these terrorist groups in Moscow in 1932, "The methods of struggle used until now haven't produced any positive results.  There remains only one path of struggle, and that is the removal of the leadership of the party by violence.  Stalin and the other leaders must be removed.  That is the principal task!"
Sayers and Kahn.  The Great Conspiracy. Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1946, p. 229
 
ANTI-STALIN GROUPS FORM UNDER TROTSKY’S LEADERSHIP
 
The chief defendant at all of the three Moscow trials was a man 5000 miles away.
Sayers and Kahn.  The Great Conspiracy. Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1946, p. 312
 
 
By the summer of 1932, an agreement to suspend past rivalries and differences, and to work together under Trotsky's supreme command, was under discussion between Pyatakov, as Trotsky's lieutenant in Russia, and Bucharin, the leader of the Right Opposition.  The smaller group headed by the veteran oppositionists, Zinoviev and Kamenev, agreed to subordinate its activities to Trotsky's authority.
Sayers and Kahn.  The Great Conspiracy. Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1946, p. 230
 
 
KAMENEV UNHAPPY THAT STALIN WAS NOT KILLED
 
"A pity," said, Kamenev, when the terrorist Bakayev reported the failure of one of his plots to kill Stalin.  "Let's hope the next time we’ll be more successful."
Sayers and Kahn.  The Great Conspiracy. Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1946, p. 247
 
SU REPEATEDLY SEEKS TO UNITE ANTI-FASCIST NATIONS
 
In face of the growing war threat, the Soviet government repeatedly called for united action by all countries menaced by fascist aggression.
Sayers and Kahn.  The Great Conspiracy. Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1946, p. 270
 
The verdict of the record is unmistakable and obvious: responsibility for the breakdown of collective security rests on the Western democracies, not on the Soviet Union.
The melancholy details of the record need no restatement, except as they bear upon the situation in which the USSR found itself by 1939.  Eight times during the preceding eight years the aggressors posed to the Western democracies a test of their willingness to organize and enforce peace.  Eight times the Soviet Union called for collective action against aggression.  Eight times the Western power evaded their responsibilities and blessed the aggressors.
            The first test was posed by the Japanese seizure of Manchuria in September 1931.  The second test was posed by Hitler's repudiation of the disarmament clauses of Versailles in March 1935.  The third test was posed by the fascist invasion of Ethiopia in October 1935.  The fourth test was posed by Hitler's remilitarization of the Rhineland in March 1936.  The fifth test was posed by the fascist attack of the Spanish Republic.  The sixth test was posed by the resumption of the Japanese attack on China in July 1937.  The seventh test was posed by the nazi seizure of Austria in March 1938.  The eighth test was posed by the unleasheding, through propaganda, diplomacy, and terrorism, of the nazi campaign against Prague in the summer 1938.
            Chamberlain flew three times to Germany on the principal that "if you don't concede the first time, fly, fly, again. 
Schuman, Frederick L. Soviet Politics. New York: A.A. Knopf, 1946, p. 275-80
 
On May 3, 1939, Litvinov resigned as Commissar for Foreign Affairs.  He was the incarnation of collective security.
Schuman, Frederick L. Soviet Politics. New York: A.A. Knopf, 1946, p. 366
 
            By March 1938 there was a ample reason for Soviet leaders to fear war.  Japanese aggression in the Soviet Far East and in China, the Spanish fascists' victories over the army of the Spanish Republic and the International Brigades, Germany's increasingly menacing policies and its occupation of Austria, and the anemic reaction of Western powers to these events and their reticence in supporting Soviet collective security efforts provided sufficient cause for concern in Moscow.
Chase, William J., Enemies Within the Gates?  translated by Vadim A. Staklo, New Haven: Yale University Press, c2001, p. 294.
 
 
TROTSKY MAKES HIS PEOPLE PAWNS OF THE GERMANS AND JAPANESE
 
“From now on,” wrote Trotsky, "the diversive acts of the Trotskyites in the war industries" would have to be carried out under the direct "supervision of the German and Japanese high commands."  The Trotskyites must undertake no "practical activity" without first having obtained the consent of their German and Japanese allies.
Sayers and Kahn.  The Great Conspiracy. Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1946, p. 276
 
TROTSKY TALKS WITH HESS
 
It was clear to Pyatakov that Trotsky had not invented this information.  Trotsky now revealed to Pyatakov that for some time past he had been "conducting rather lengthy negotiations with the Vice Chairman of the German National Socialist Party -- Hess."
            As a result of these negotiations with Hitler's deputy, Trotsky had entered into an agreement, "an absolutely definite agreement," with the government of the Third Reich.  The Nazis were ready to help the Trotskyites to come to power in the Soviet Union.
Sayers and Kahn.  The Great Conspiracy. Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1946, p. 281
 
Trotsky had agreed (1) to guarantee a generally favorable attitude towards the German government and the necessary collaboration with it in the most important questions of international character; (2) to agree to territorial concessions--the Ukraine; (3) to permit German industrialists, in the form of concessions, to exploit enterprises in the USSR essential as complements to the German economy (iron ore, manganese, oil, gold, timber, and so forth); (4) to create in the USSR favorable conditions for the activities of German private enterprise; (5) in time of war to develop extensive diversive activities in enterprises of the war industry and at the front.  These diversive activities to be carried on under Trotsky's instructions, agreed upon with the German General Staff.
Sayers and Kahn.  The Great Conspiracy. Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1946, p. 281
 
Pyatakov, as Trotsky's chief lieutenant in Russia, was concerned that this out and out deal with Nazism might be difficult to explain to the rank and file members of the Bloc of Rights and Trotskyites.
Sayers and Kahn.  The Great Conspiracy. Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1946, p. 281
 
NEW EVIDENCE WARRANTS A SECOND TRIAL FOR ZINOVIEV AND KAMENEV
 
New evidence had been brought to light as the result of the special investigation into Kirov's murder.  Kamenev and Zinoviev were to stand trial again.
Sayers and Kahn.  The Great Conspiracy. Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1946, p. 285
 
            Once again, innocent people were victimized because of what they might do.  [Sounds like the Japanese and McCarthy]
            It is clear that early in 1936 Stalin had become suspicious of the former opposition.  Investigations and repression against them proceeded by degrees, with delays, indecision, and various twists and turns, zigs and zags.  Back in 1935 the opposition had been accused only of moral complicity in indirectly encouraging minor figures in their dangerous opposition and assassination conspiracies.  At that time the matter was declared closed.  Later, "on the basis of new materials received in 1936," it was said that Zinoviev and Kamenev, at Trotsky's behest, had themselves been assassins, but that Bukharin and the Right had not been involved.  Then, at the beginning of 1937--and not without considerable hesitation and ambiguity--the new political line began to implicate the rightists as well, though it was some time yet before this policy took its final shape.
Getty & Naumov, The Road to Terror. New Haven, Conn.: Yale Univ. Press, c1999, p. 487
 
            In June Zinoviev, Kamenev, and other members of the old Leningrad Opposition were tried secretly for complicity in the murder of Kirov.  There seems to have been a somewhat tenuous link between them and persons with whom the assassin Nikolaev was acquainted, and there were also ugly suggestions of extraneous, that is non-Russian, influences at work.  Be that as it may, the accused were all acquitted but not released from custody, and the inquiry continued....
Duranty, Walter.  Story of Soviet Russia. Philadelphia, N. Y.: JB Lippincott Co. 1944, p. 212
 
            After their conviction in the January 1935 trial, Zinoviev, Kamenev, and others were sent to the Verkhne-Uralsk political prison.   Ciliga, who saw them there, reported later that Zinoviev arrived with a bunch of books on fascism, a subject in which he was showing special interest, and that during the summer of 1935 he and Kamenev were returned to Moscow where they were put on trial a second time in secret, along with 34 others, on charges of preparing an attempt on the life of Stalin.   Although Kamenev's brother, the painter Rosenfeld, was a prosecution witness against him, he categorically denied all charges.   As a consequence, the five-year sentence he received in the January 1935 trial was doubled.   Ciliga learned about the second trial after Zinoviev and Kamenev were bought back to Verkhne-Uralsk. The decisive period in the trial preparation still lay ahead.
Tucker, Robert. Stalin in Power: 1929-1941. New York: Norton, 1990, p. 314
 
TOMSKY EXPOSES GENERALS AGREEING TO SURRENDER TO GERMANS
 
Tomsky added that the moment the Nazis attacked Soviet Russia, the military group planned to "open the front to the Germans"--that is, to surrender to the German High Command.  This plan had been worked out in detail and agreed-upon by Tukhachevsky, Putna, Gamarnik, and the Germans.
Sayers and Kahn.  The Great Conspiracy. Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1946, p. 292
 
GUNTHER SAYS DEFENDANTS DID NOT WHIMPER BUT ARGUED
 
As John Gunther later reported in Inside Europe:
            "…the impression held widely abroad that the defendants all told the same story, that they were abject and grovelling, that they behaved like sheep in the executioner's pen, isn't quite correct.  They argued stubbornly with the prosecutor; in the main they told only what they were forced to tell....
Sayers and Kahn. The Great Conspiracy. Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1946, p. 297
 
DAVIES COMPLIMENTS VYSHINSKY’S DEMEANOR AT THE TRIAL
 
The American ambassador in Moscow, Joseph Davies, was profoundly impressed by the trial.  He attended it daily and, assisted by an interpreter, carefully followed the proceedings.  A former Corporation lawyer, Davies stated that Vyshinsky...Impressed him as being "calm, dispassionate, intellectual, able, and wise.  He conducted the treason trial in a manner that won my respect and admiration as a lawyer."
Sayers and Kahn.  The Great Conspiracy. Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1946, p. 301
 
            The Attorney General is a man of about 60 and is much like Homer Cummings; calm, dispassionate, intellectual, and able and wise.  He conducted the treason trial in a manner that won my respect and admiration as a lawyer.
Davies, Joseph E. Mission to Moscow. New York, New York: Simon and Schuster, c1941, p. 67
 
DAVIES SAYS NEARLY ALL OBSERVERS AGREED THERE WAS A PLOT
 
On February 17, 1937, U.S. Ambassador Davies reported in a confidential dispatch to Secretary of State Hull that almost all the foreign diplomats in Moscow shared his opinion of the justice of the verdict.  Davies wrote,
            "I talked to many, if not all, of the members of the Diplomatic Corps here and, with possibly one exception, they are all of the opinion that the proceedings established clearly the existence of a political plot and conspiracy to overthrow the government.
Sayers and Kahn.  The Great Conspiracy. Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1946, p. 301
 
But these facts were not made public.  Powerful forces conspired to hide the truth about the Fifth Column in Soviet Russia.  On March 11, 1937, Ambassador Davies recorded in his Moscow diary:
            "Another diplomat, minister made a most illuminating statement to me yesterday.  In discussing the trial, he said that the defendants were undoubtedly guilty; that all those who attended the trial had practically agreed-upon that;...
Sayers and Kahn.  The Great Conspiracy. Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1946, p. 301
 
Ambassador Davies, who attended the proceedings, found the trial “terrific” in legal, human and political drama.  He wrote his daughter on March 8,
            "All the fundamental weaknesses and vices of human nature--personal ambitions at their wors --are shown up in the proceedings.  They disclose the outlines of a plot which came very near to being successful in bringing about the the overthrow of this government.
Sayers and Kahn.  The Great Conspiracy. Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1946, p. 309
 
            Three years later, in the summer of 1941, following the Nazi invasion of USSR, ambassador Davies wrote: "In re-examining the record of these cases [the trials of 1937 and 1938, which I had attended and listened to.  I found that practically every device of German Fifth Column activity, as we now know it, was disclosed and laid bare by the confessions and the testimony elicited at these trials of self-confessed “Quislings” in Russia....
            All of these trials, purges, and liquidations, which seemed so violent at the time and shocked the world, are now quite clearly a part of a vigorous and determined effort of the Stalin government to protect itself from not only revolution from within but from attack from without.  They went to work early to cleanup and clean out all the treasonable elements within the country.  All doubts were resolved in favor of the government.
            There were no Fifth Columnists in Russia in 1941-- they shot them.  The purge had cleansed the country and rid it of treason.  The Axis Fifth Column in Soviet Russia had been smashed.
Sayers and Kahn.  The Great Conspiracy. Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1946, p. 311
 
I cannot forget what a high-placed and saddened Frenchman told me recently in Washington when we were discussing the Purge...  But don't forget, mon ami, that in Russia they shot the Fifth Columnists, and in France we made them Cabinet Ministers.  You see both results today...  At Vichy, and on the Red war-front.
Duranty, Walter.  The Kremlin and the People. New York: Reynal & Hitchcock, 1941, p. 135
 
            At the time of the trial of Zinoviev and Kamenev, no one had any knowledge of the existence of the Right-Left coalition.  Opinion abroad has varied in regard to the great Moscow trials.  At first it was supposed that they were a 'frame up', a mere pretext used by Stalin for the physical extermination of all his opponents.  Later, when the Soviet Union came into the war and people had personal experience, especially in France, of the activities of the German 'fifth column', a very different view was expressed: Stalin, it was said, had been the only clear-sighted leader, and had ruthlessly destroyed the fifth column in the Soviet Union long before the war.
Basseches, Nikolaus. Stalin. London, New York: Staples Press, 1952, p. 290
 
            When World War II finally came to the USSR, the rest of the world noted the relative absence of the Hitler Fifth Column, which had overthrown most of the governments of Europe.  Howard K. Smith commented: "Had Russia not liquidated a few thousand bureaucrats and officers, there is little doubt that the Red Army would have collapsed in two months."  [The Last Train from Berlin, p. 325]
Strong, Anna Louise.   The Stalin Era. New York: Mainstream, 1956, p. 71
 
 
MILITARY TRIAL KEPT SECRET BECAUSE OF SECRET INFORMATION
 
Because of the confidential military character of the testimony to be heard, the trial was held behind closed doors.
Sayers and Kahn.  The Great Conspiracy. Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1946, p. 305
 
BUKHARIN REJECTS PEOPLE DEFENDING HIS CRIMINAL ACTS
 
Bucharin said, "I may infer a priori that Trotsky and my other allies in crime, as well as the Second International...will endeavor to defend us, and particularly myself.  I reject this defense....  I await the verdict.
Sayers and Kahn.  The Great Conspiracy. Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1946, p. 310
 
            The third trial was that of Bukharin and Rykov, and also of Yagoda, the former head of the secret police, and of Krestinsky, Deputy Commissar for Foreign Affairs.  Here again the truth of the facts alleged was thoroughly proved.
Basseches, Nikolaus. Stalin. London, New York: Staples Press, 1952, p. 294
 
BEALS RESIGNS FROM COMMISSION DENOUNCING ITS BIAS
 
The detailed evidence presented against Trotsky at the Moscow trials was, for the most part, completely ignored by the Commission of Inquiry.  On April 17 Beals resigned from the commission.  Beals issued a public statement which read in part: "...  The hushed adoration of the other members of the committee for Mr. Trotsky throughout the hearings has defeated all spirit of honest investigation....  The very first day I was told my questions were improper.  The final cross-examination was put in a mold that prevented any search for the truth.  I was taken to task for quizzing Trotsky about his archives....  The cross-examination consisted of allowing Trotsky to spout propaganda charges with eloquence and wild denunciations, with only rare efforts to make him prove his assertions....  The commission may pass its bad check on the public if it desires, but I will not lend my name to the possibility of further childishness similar to that already committed.
Sayers and Kahn.   The Great Conspiracy. Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1946, p. 313
 
 
STALIN OFFERED FINLAND VERY GOOD TERMS
 
During the first week of October, 1939, while still negotiating its new treaties with the Baltic states, the Soviet Government proposed a mutual assistance pact with Finland.  Moscow offered to cede several thousand square miles of Soviet territory on central Karelia in exchange for some strategic Finnish islands near Leningrad, a portion of the Karelian Isthmus, and a 30 year lease on the port of Hango for the construction of a Soviet naval base.  The Soviet leaders regarded these latter territories as essential to the defense of the Red naval base at Kronstadt and the city of Leningrad.
            ...But the pro-Nazi clique dominating the Finnish government refused to make any concessions and broke off all the negotiations.
Sayers and Kahn.  The Great Conspiracy. Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1946, p. 333
 
Then Finland sued for peace, and, surprisingly, the Kremlin asked little more than its terms before the war began--a frontier somewhat more distant, the Mannerheim Line disrmed, and the occupation by Soviet units of strategic points like the island of Hango.
Duranty, Walter.   The Kremlin and the People. New York: Reynal & Hitchcock, 1941, p. 179
 
            Having secured the southern Baltic against surprise attack, Moscow approached Finland, which holds the gateway of the north.  Though Finland's independence was a free gift from the Russian Revolution, Finland was known as the most hostile of the Baltic States.  That early democratic Finland had been bloodily overthrown by Baron Mannerheim, an ex-Czarist general, with the aid of the kaiser's troops.  Finland had become a base for international actions against the USSR....  Finland's air fields were built by the Nazis.  Made to accommodate 2,000 planes, when Finland had 150, they were clearly designed for use by a major power....
            The Finnish delegation came to Moscow October 11th.  The Soviets proposed an alliance, but dropped it since the Finns were unwilling.  Then they proposed an exchange of territory to protect Leningrad.  They asked that the border be moved back enough to take Leningrad out of gunshot and that some small islands, guarding the sea approach, be given to the USSR.  They offered in return twice as much territory, equally good but less strategic.  They also asked a 30 year lease of Hangoe or some other point at the entrance to the Gulf of Finland--that long thin waterway that leads to Leningrad--as a naval base.  President Cajander, of Finland, broadcast a statement that the terms did not affect Finland's integrity.
            A month of bargaining went on in which Moscow raised her offers.  Finland stood to get nearly 3 to 1 in the territorial trade; and Hangoe base would be held, not 30 years, but only during the Anglo-German war and would then come to Finland fully equipped.  Many Finns were boasting of the "smart bargain" their diplomats were getting.  Then, suddenly, the Finnish negotiators broke off discussions with the cryptic remark that circumstances would decide when and by whom they would be renewed....
            So when Finnish artillery shot over the border in late November and killed Red Army men, Moscow sharply protested, and, when Finland disregarded the protest, Soviet troops marched into Finland on November 30, 1939.  Finland declared war and appealed for foreign aid.
Strong, Anna Louise.  The Stalin Era. New York: Mainstream, 1956, p. 83
 
            Compared with our own vast territorial and natural resources, Finland had little to offer us in the way of land and forests.  Our sole consideration was security--Leningrad was in danger.
Talbott, Strobe, Trans. and Ed. Khrushchev Remembers. Boston: Little Brown, c1970, p. 152
 
            On April 8, 1938, the NKVD resident in Finland, Rybkin, was summoned to the Kremlin,...  Rybkin was ordered to offer the Finnish government a secret deal, sharing interests in Scandinavia and economic cooperation with the Soviet Union, on the conditions of their signing a pact of mutual economic and military assistance in case of aggression by third parties.  The pact was to guarantee Finland eternal safety from attack by European powers and mutual economic privileges for the two countries on a permanent basis.  Included in the proposals was a division of spheres of military and economic influence over the Baltic areas that lay between Finland and the Soviet Union.
Sudoplatov, Pavel.  Special Tasks. Boston: Little, Brown, c1993, p. 94
 
            On Oct. 14, 1939, a Soviet note made firm proposals for an exchange of territory, together with a 30 year lease of the Hango peninsula and frontier adjustments in the Petsamo area and on the Karelian Isthmus.  The Finns refused to yield at any point.  Attempts to negotiate continued, but made no progress.  On Nov. 13, 1939, Stalin broke them off.  His patience was exhausted.  He decided to use force.
Grey, Ian. Stalin, Man of History. London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1979, p. 312
 
            Encouraged by the success of his [Stalin] measures on the western borders, he now turned his attention to the northwest.  He was worried by the proximity of the Finnish border to Leningrad and Finland's obvious inclination towards Germany.  Talks were conducted with the aim of compelling the Finns to move their border further from Leningrad for appropriate territorial compensation, but the Finnish foreign minister, Tanner, was under instruction from the country's head of state, Field Marshal Mannerheim, a former general in the tsarist army, not to yield to the Russians....  At the end of November mutual recriminations started up over unprovoked exchanges of fire, notably in the vicinity of the Soviet village of Mainilo.  Molotov handed the Finnish envoy, Irne-Koskinen, a note which contained a demand, amounting to an ultimatum, 'for the immediate withdrawal of your forces 20 to 25 kilometers away from the frontier on the Karelian peninsula.'  Two days later the envoy replied that his government was 'ready to enter talks on the mutual withdrawal of forces to a certain distance from the frontier'.  Finland had taken up the challenge and, being equally unyielding, announced mobilization.  On Nov. 28, 1939 the USSR renounced the 1932 Soviet-Finnish treaty of non-aggression.  Neither Moscow nor Helsinki had exhausted all means to avoid war, to put it mildly.
Volkogonov, Dmitri. Stalin: Triumph and Tragedy. New York: Grove Weidenfeld, 1991, p. 363
 
            In 1938, the Soviet fear was that in the event of war between Germany and the Soviet Union, the islands [Aalands] could be used as a base for the protection of ships carrying vital German supplies of iron ore from Sweden.  For Finland, the Aalands were important for the protection of her western shore.  Now, Stalin was prepared to allow Finland to fortify the islands, on two conditions.  One was that the Soviets should participate in the building and send observers to supervise the work.  The other was that the Finns should allow them to build a fortified air and naval base on Suursaari, one of the Finnish islands which commanded the approach to Leningrad and the Soviet Baltic Fleet's base at Kronstadt.  The protection of both had become a matter of urgency for Stalin, and he was now, for the first time, prepared to do deals in order to acquire strategic bases for this purpose.
            Once again, however, mutual distrust caused the talks to end in deadlock.  Yartsev suggested that they should be continued under cover of the official trade negotiations which were then taking place in Moscow.  The Finns refused.  But Stalin did not give up.  In March 1939 he sent a new emissary to Helsinki: Boris Stein, then Soviet ambassador in Rome.  Stein had served for some years in Helsinki and was known personally to many members of the Finnish government.  No doubt Stalin hoped someone more senior than Yartsev might carry greater weight.
            Stein brought fresh proposals.  The Soviet Union agreed that a fortified base on Suursaari might compromise the neutrality which the Finns had gone to such great links to establish.  Therefore, the Soviets had another, less contentious offer: would Finland agree to lease to the USSR the string of islands including Suursaari?  Or, if this proved unacceptable, would Finland be prepared to exchange the islands for an area of Soviet territory on the mainland?  The islands measured 183 square kilometers.  Stalin was willing to give a larger area in exchange, and to undertake not to fortify the islands.
            In spite of advice from Marshal Mannerheim that they should negotiate seriously with the Soviets, and that it would be a mistake to send them away empty handed yet again, the Finnish government said no.
Read, Anthony and David Fisher.  The Deadly Embrace. New York: Norton, 1988, p. 379
 
            The preliminary skirmishing of was now over.  Molotov stepped back and Stalin took charge, running the conference himself from then on.  He was consistently brief and to the point.  Sometimes, when some particularly knotty problem came up, he would, as was his habit, rise from his seat and pace up and down, puffing on his pipe and listening carefully to all the arguments before making up his mind.
            He made it clear that with the advent of the European war, the protection of Leningrad had become the immediate Soviet concern.  Leningrad must be protected at all costs from any potential attack by land or sea.  He therefore proposed moving the present Soviet-Finnish border northwards, up the Karelian Isthmus into Finland, a matter of some 25 miles, to take it well out of artillery range of Leningrad.  In addition, in order to protect the city from attack by sea, he proposed that the USSR should take over all the islands in the Gulf of Finland, and lease the port of Hanko on the Finnish mainland for use as a Soviet naval base.  He offered a payment of 8 million Finnish marks for a 30 year lease.
            In the far north, he pointed out that the approaches to Murmansk, the Soviet Union's only ice-free ocean port in the western part of the huge country, were also vulnerable.  Here, he demanded that Finland should cede to him the Rybachi Peninsula, which commanded the approaches to Murmansk.
Read, Anthony and David Fisher.  The Deadly Embrace. New York: Norton, 1988, p. 388
 
 
            In return for the territory to be ceded to the Soviet Union in both the north and south, Stalin offered the Finns over twice as much territory alongside the center of Finland.  This would have the beneficial effect to Finland of thickening her dangerously narrow 'waist ', the nightmare of Finnish military strategists since it meant an invader can swiftly divide the country in two.
            The meeting ended on that note, and Paasikivi [the Finnish representative] and his team returned to the legation to wire the Soviet demands to their government in Helsinki.  The government's reply was uncompromising: they were not disposed to concede much, if anything at all.
            Stalin was not a soldier - he was a bureaucrat.  His days of military glory, such as they were, were long past.  Yet throughout the conference he was evidently haunted by the ghosts of the Russian Civil War of 20 years before, when British warships had lurked in the Gulf of Finland and the White General Yudenich had tried to take Petrograd, the home of the Revolution.  Then Stalin, having already claimed the glory for saving Tsaritsyn, the city which was later to be renamed Stalingrad, took control of the Red forces, as the special representative of the party's Central Committee, and saved Petrograd, the city which was to become Leningrad.
Read, Anthony and David Fisher.  The Deadly Embrace. New York: Norton, 1988, p. 389
 
 
            In June 1919, against the advice of his military experts, he [Stalin] had flung units of the Baltic Fleet, a few aircraft, and 800 troops from Petrograd into an assault on the two forts, Krasnaya Gorka and Seroya Loshad, which guarded the approaches to the city.  "The swift capture of Gorka," he had written in a report at the time which did nothing to play down his part in the proceedings, "came as a result of the rudest intervention by me and other civilians in operational matters, even to the point of countermanding orders on land and sea and imposing our own."  He had added ominously, "I consider it my duty to announce that I shall continue to act in this way in the future."  In 1939, his vision of himself as "Stalin, the Savior of Petrograd" kept intruding into the problems of the present.
            "It is not the fault of either of us," he told the Finns, "that geographical circumstances are as they are.  We must be able to bar entrance to the Gulf of Finland.  If the channel to Leningrad did not run along your coast, we would not have the slightest occasion to bring the matter up.  Your memorandum is one-sided and over-optimistic....  It is a law of naval strategy that passage into the Gulf of Finland can be blocked by the cross-fire of batteries on both shores as far out as the mouth of the Gulf.  Your memorandum supposes that an enemy cannot penetrate into the Gulf.  But once a hostile fleet is in the Gulf, the Gulf can no longer be defended.
            "You ask why we want Koivisto?  [A Finnish island off the east coast of the Karelian Isthmus.]....  Regarding Koivisto, you must bear in mind that if 16-inch guns were placed there they could entirely prevent movements of our fleet in the inmost extremity of the Gulf [i.e.: round the port of Kronstadt].  We asked for 2700 square kilometers and offer more than 5500 in exchange.  Does any other great power do that?  No.  We are the only ones who are that simple."
Read, Anthony and David Fisher.  The Deadly Embrace. New York: Norton, 1988, p. 390
 
 
            At the end of this second day of the conference, Paasikivi informed Stalin that their discussions had now reached the point where he must return to Helsinki in order to obtain fresh instructions from his government.  Stalin agreed, but reminded him of the urgency of the matter: the Finnish army was already mobilizing, while the Soviets were reinforcing their own border troops.  The situation was therefore explosive.
            "This cannot go on for long without the danger of accidents," he said.  Later that evening, the Soviets handed over a written memorandum containing their proposals.  Stalin made no threats, delivered no ultimatum.  He did not think it necessary to do so.  He believed he made the Finns a fair offer, one they could not afford to refuse.  But Paasikivi sounded a note of warning.
            Paasikivi was not so optimistic.  "The Hanko Neck concession and the cession of the area on the Isthmus are exceptionally difficult matters," he said.
Read, Anthony and David Fisher.  The Deadly Embrace. New York: Norton, 1988, p. 391
 
 
            Paasikivi did not care for the implication of this last remark.  His country was neutral and wished to remain so.  "We want to continue in peace," he said, "and remain apart from all incidents."
            Stalin's reply was blunt.  "That is impossible," he said brusquely.
            Paasikivi refused to be put down, however.  "How do these proposals of yours fit in with your famous slogan, "We  do not want a crumb of foreign territory, but neither do we want to cede an inch of our own territory to anyone"? he asked.
            "In Poland, we took no foreign territory," came the reply, meaning that the Red Army had simply re-occupied land that once belonged to the tsars.  "And this is a case of exchange."
Read, Anthony and David Fisher.  The Deadly Embrace. New York: Norton, 1988, p. 392
 
 
            Paasikivi started by saying Finland was now prepared to make some concessions.  These included ceding various islands in the Gulf of Finland and moving the Karelian frontier back up the Isthmus some 13 kilometers, eight miles, though not the 25 miles demanded by Stalin.  However, he made it clear that on Hanko the Finns had not changed their position.
            Stalin was not impressed, and insisted the new concessions were not enough.  The original demands, he said, had been the bare minimum required for Soviet security, and could not be bargained away.  He thought the present European war could easily escalate into a world war which might last for many years.  In that event, the USSR must be able to defend Leningrad from attack via the Gulf.
Read, Anthony and David Fisher.  The Deadly Embrace. New York: Norton, 1988, p. 393
 
 
            Paasikivi's tough stand paid off.  At about 9 p.m., barely an hour after the Finns had walked out, Molotov's secretary telephoned them to ask if they would come back to the Kremlin for further talks that night.  The resumed meeting started at 11 p.m.
            Again, Stalin and Molotov faced the Finns alone.  Molotov had drafted a memorandum after the earlier session, in which the Soviets made certain modifications to their position.  Instead of demanding the right to put a Soviet garrison of 5000 men into Hanko, they were prepared to reduce the number to 4000, and guarantee to remove them on "the termination of the British-French-German war".  In addition they were prepared to compromise on the Karelian frontier issue.
            Neither Paasikivi nor Tanner thought these concessions were in themselves enough to change the mind of the government, but they agreed to report them to Helsinki nevertheless.
            Early next morning, Paasikivi went to Tanner's room in the legation, after a sleepless night spent trying to find a way through the impasse.  He had come to the conclusion, he told Tanner that for the past 20 years the Finns had been living in a fool's paradise.  They had chosen neutrality, but the truth was that neutrality was a luxury they could not afford with the Soviet Union as a next-door neighbor.  Since they could not change the geography, they would have to change their policies.
            If they refused the Soviet demands, he continued, this would lead to war - a war which Finland would inevitably lose.  He proposed, therefore, to advise the Finnish government to accept Moscow's terms....
            Paasikivi and Tanner arrived back in Helsinki on Oct. 26 to find the Council had still failed to grasp the realities of the situation.  The ministers seemed to be living in an Alice in Wonderland world, making statements which were totally at variance with the coldly pessimistic assessments of their own military advisers.  Marshal Mannerheim himself bluntly forecast national disaster in the event of war with the Soviet Union.  But the politicians refused to heed such warnings.  Defense Minister Nuikkanen pooh-poohed his own generals.  "The military command is always too pessimistic," he told Paasikivi airily.
            To compound their stupidity, the members of the Council of State also conspired to keep the Finnish people in ignorance of the true state of affairs.  Erkko [Finnish Foreign Minister] even continued to preserve the fiction that in the last resort they could rely on Sweden to come to their aid.  Bolstered by this false confidence, he drafted yet another set of proposals for Paasikivi to take back to Moscow.  These offered a little more territory in Karelia - taking the border to 37 miles from Leningrad - and some in the far north, but not enough to come close to satisfying even the latest, scaled-down Soviet demands.
Read, Anthony and David Fisher.  The Deadly Embrace. New York: Norton, 1988, p. 394
 
 
            On the Soviet side it is clear that Stalin, no doubt advised by Otto Kuusinen, his Finnish confidant, still believed the Finns would see sense in the end.  Perhaps Kuusinen overestimated the political flexibility of his countrymen.  In any event, the last thing Stalin wanted at this time was a war on his northern frontier.  He and his advisers had analyzed the Finnish position with great care, concluding that it was hopeless.  They presumed the Finns must have come to the same conclusion - what other conclusion was there to be reached?  Surely, their argument went, no country would contemplate its own destruction when, by coming to an agreement, it would actually gain rather than lose territory?  As always with Stalin, political logic dictated his own actions, and, as always, he presumed it dictated the actions of others.
Read, Anthony and David Fisher.  The Deadly Embrace. New York: Norton, 1988, p. 395
 
 
            Molotov told Schulenburg in Moscow that he was extremely angry with the Finns, saying their stubbornness in refusing such modest Soviet demands could be explained as only "resistance bolstered by England."  The Soviet Union, he said, had even offered to pay all the expenses involved in moving the Finnish population from areas ceded to her, including the cost of building new homes for them.  It could not understand their refusal of such generosity.
            The failure of the negotiations to achieve the peaceful transfer of territory which he desired had far-reaching effects, even on Stalin himself.  He came under considerable pressure from a strong body of opinion within the Politburo, led by Zhdanov.  Lined up with Zhdanov were Adm. Kuznetsov, General Meretskov, commander of the Leningrad Military District, and Adm. Tributz, the new commander of the Baltic Fleet.  No doubt Molotov, whose earliest political positions of any note had been in the Petrograd (as it then was) party, and who had been chairman of the economic council for the northern region, which included Karelia, was among those who had become convinced Stalin was being too soft with the Finns.  These hard-liners thought the time for polite negotiation was over - in their view, even Stalin's initial demands had been quite inadequate in military terms.  They made no bones about the fact that they wanted a return to Peter the Great's frontier with Finland, which had included the whole of the Karelian Isthmus and the city of Vipuri.
            In Zhdanov's eyes, the security of Leningrad was the single most important foreign policy issue facing the USSR.  If Leningrad were not made secure from any external threat, the country could be sucked into the so-called "Second Imperialist War" because of the need to defend the city.
            Stalin was a cautious man, but in the end he was won over by Zhdanov's argument - and possibly by the fear of the consequence of his not backing the judgment of his own military men.
Read, Anthony and David Fisher.  The Deadly Embrace. New York: Norton, 1988, p. 400
 
 
            The Finnish government instigated the incident, and did not deny that seven shells had struck the village of Mainila....  With a certain bravura, the Finns suggested that in order to avoid any further incidents, both sides should withdraw their forces the same distance from the frontier.
            The Soviets were not amused by the Finnish reply.  Molotov delivered another blast on Tuesday, Nov. 28, 1939.  The relative positions of the two forces, he argued, were not comparable.  "The Soviet forces do not threaten any vital Finnish center, since they are hundreds of kilometers from any of these, whereas the Finnish forces, 32 kilometers away from the USSR's vital center, Leningrad, which has a population of 3,500,000 creates for the latter a direct menace.  It is hardly necessary to state that there is actually no place for the Soviet troops to withdrawal to, since withdrawal to a distance of 25 kilometers would place them in the suburbs of Leningrad, which clearly would be absurd from the point of view of the security of Leningrad.
            The Soviet Union regarded the concentration of troops near the frontier, and the incident of the seven artillery shots, as hostile acts.  This was, Molotov declared, "incompatible" with the 1934 non-aggression pact between the two countries.  "Consequently, the Soviet government considers itself obliged to declare that it considers itself as of today as being relieved of its obligations under the non-aggression pact...which is being systematically violated by the government of Finland."
Read, Anthony and David Fisher.  The Deadly Embrace. New York: Norton, 1988, p. 404
 
 
            Only that afternoon [December 1st] a "People's government of Finland", under the presidency of Kuusinen, had been established in Terijoki, which the Red Army had managed to "liberate."  The Soviet Union instantly recognized this government as representing the "Democratic Republic of Finland," and announced the formation of a "1st Finnish Corps" made up of volunteers, which would form the nucleus of the future people's army.
            Next day, Molotov signed a pact of mutual assistance with Kuusinen.  Stalin, Voroshilov, and Zhdanov, Moscow Radio announced, were all present at the "negotiations."  It was no surprise to anyone that the new pact gave the Soviets everything they had demanded in the talks with Paasikivi, including the whole of the Karelian Isthmus, Hanko and the islands in the Gulf.  What was surprising was that in return the Soviet Union gave the Finnish Democratic Republic no less than 70,000 square kilometers of central Karelia - over 20 times the amount of territory being ceded by the Finns - plus 120 million Finnish marks as compensation for the railways in the Isthmus and 3 million marks for the islands and the Rybachi peninsula in the far north.
Read, Anthony and David Fisher.  The Deadly Embrace. New York: Norton, 1988, p. 405
 
            The proposal that Stalin put to the Finns on Oct. 12 was to move the existing Soviet-Finnish border on the Karelian isthmus 25 miles farther away from Leningrad; and, for better protection of the city from attack by sea, for the Soviet Union to take over all the islands in the Gulf of Finland and lease the port of Hankow for use as a naval base.  In the north, he asked for the cession of the Rybachi Peninsula, which commanded the approaches to Murmansk, the Soviet Union's only ice-free port on its western side.  In return the Russians offered twice as much territory adjoining the center of Finland, where the narrow "waist" between the Russian frontier and the Gulf of Bothnia exposed the Finns to the danger of an invader cutting the country in two.
            In the negotiations, which continued until November 8, Stalin showed himself willing to moderate his demands but not to withdraw them.  Both Marshall Mannerheim, the hero of the earlier Finnish-Soviet war, and Paasikivi were in favor of coming to terms with the Russians, but the Finnish government, fully supported by public opinion, refused;...
            Stalin was surprised at the Finnish intransigence; he appears to have hesitated before accepting the view of the hard-liners led by Zhdanov, the party boss of Leningrad, that they should not waste any more time but take what they needed by force.  He finally agreed, subject to the proviso that only troops from the Leningrad Military District were to be involved.
Bullock, Alan. Hitler and Stalin: Parallel Lives. New York: Knopf, 1992, p. 660
 
            It so happened that I was gone, during that week, on a visit to Finland.   I found the Finns pleasant and friendly.   I was received in audience by President Paasikivi, that great Finnish realist, who, though originally a highly conservative businessman, considered it in Finland's interests never to quarrel with the Russians.   He said he had done his utmost, in November 1939, to meet the Russians at least half-way, since he regarded their demand for a frontier or rectification north-west of Leningrad "understandable and reasonable" in the tense atmosphere of the Second World War, which had already begun.   He was prepared at the time to make concessions to the Russians, but he was overruled by the Finnish government.
            ... I met the future president of Finland, Mr. Kekkonen.   Kekkonen's line was very similar to Paasikivi: Finland had to be realistic; the Finnish government of 1939 was wrong to have dug in its heels; but although the Russian armistice terms-- particularly the $300 million in reparations--were pretty tough, Finland was lucky not to be occupied by Russian troops and the most important thing for her was to maintain good-neighborly relations with Russia and to remain strictly neutral.   The Finns, he said, were happy to have remained masters in their own house.   Needless to say, a good deal was said about the Fulton speech; nobody present was happy about it.   On the contrary, as Kekkonen said, it was going to poison the international atmosphere.   This kind of thing, he remarked, would do nobody any good, and Finland was frankly worried about it, for it might provoke the Russians who until then had been "pretty reasonable" in their relations with the Finns.
Werth, Alexander. Russia; The Post-War Years. New York: Taplinger Pub. Co. 1971, p. 110-111
 
            He [Stalin] expressed strong resentment over the Iron Curtain speech made at Fulton, Missouri, by former Prime Minister Winston Churchill.  This speech, Stalin said, was an unfriendly act; it was an unwarranted attack upon the USSR.  Such a speech, if directed against the United States, never would have been permitted in Russia.
Smith, Walter Bedell. My Three Years in Moscow. Philadelphia: Lippincott, 1950, p. 52
 
            Would the czarist government have dealt so reasonably with Finland, asked Stalin?  'There is no doubt on this', he replied.  Would any other great power offer 5500 km2 in exchange for 2700 (for the Soviets were willing to compensate the Finns in the north for the territory that the Finns were asked to cede in the south)?  'No.  We are the only one that is so stupid.'
McNeal, Robert, Stalin: Man and Ruler. New York: New York University Press, 1988, p. 223
 
            Early in 1939 Stalin, with security in mind, asked the Finns to meet him for discussions about frontier adjustments, offering to exchange territory.  In addition, he wanted the lease of a port on the Gulf of Finland, and asked the Finns to give up other strategic parcels of territory, totalling 1066 square miles in return for nearly twice as much--but less valuable--Russian territory in the far north.  No agreement was reached.  After the signing of the German-Soviet non-aggression pact and Hitler's invasion of Poland, Stalin again sought territorial adjustments with Finland....
Axell, Albert. Stalin's War: Through the Eyes of His Commanders.  London, Arms and Armour Press. 1997, p. 56
 
STALIN EXTRACTED THE MINIMUM FROM FINLAND
 
Hostilities between Finland and the Soviet Union ended on March 13, 1940.  According to the peace terms, Finland gave to Russia to Karelian Isthmus, the Western and Northern Shores of Lake Ladoga, a number of strategic islands in the Gulf of Finland essential to the defense of Leningrad, the Soviet government restored to Finland the port of Petsamo, which had been occupied by the Red Army, and took a 30 year lease on the Hango Peninsula for an annual rental of 8 million Finnish marks.
            Addressing the supreme Soviet of the USSR on March 29 Molotov declared: the Soviet Union having smashed the Finnish Army and having every opportunity of occupying the whole of Finland, did not do so and did not demand any indemnities for its expenditures in the war as any other power would have done, but confined its desires to a minimum....  We pursued no other objects in the peace treaty than that of safeguarding the security of Leningrad, Murmansk, and the Murmansk railroad...."
Sayers and Kahn.  The Great Conspiracy. Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1946, p. 334
 
            In the end Stalin seems to have realized the farcical nature of the whole proceeding.  Although the Russian troops were victorious and all Finland could have been conquered, he concluded a moderate peace.  The shadowy Finnish Soviet government disappeared from the scene.  Stalin contented himself with little more than the territorial demands originally put forward.  He was also realistic enough to see that, unlike the Baltic States, Finland offered not the slightest basis for the setting up of a Soviet regime established by the use of foreign bayonets.  This recognition saved Finland after her second defeat in war.
Basseches, Nikolaus. Stalin. London, New York: Staples Press, 1952, p. 347
 
            When Stalin actually gained his point after a hard-fought campaign, the policy he followed forces the observer to think that he never had any real intention of instituting a Finnish Soviet State.  He certainly dropped the Kuusinen government the moment his demands were granted, though the military situation would have permitted him to overrun the entire country without further resistance.
            In spite of the difficulties encountered, the Russian terms were surprisingly light.  The Soviet assumed control of the Karelian Isthmus, possession of which assisted in the defense of Leningrad, together with certain vital coastal areas on the Arctic seaboard and several small islands in the Gulf of Finland.  The whole area comprised only 3970 square kilometers, but it contained the whole of the Mannerheim Line and many of Finland's most important defensive centers.  As compensation for this annexation, the Soviet ceded over 70,000 square kilometers of territory situated in a less vital spot.
Cole, David M.   Josef Stalin; Man of Steel. London, New York: Rich & Cowan, 1942, p. 116
 
            In the peace terms, the Soviets took the Mannerheim Line and the naval base at Hangoe, protecting both land and sea approaches to Leningrad.  But they returned Petsamo and its nickel mines; they asked no indemnities but agreed to supply a starving Finland with food.  As terms go, these were not excessive.  Sir Stafford Cripps, British ambassador to Moscow in 1940, told me, as I sat at tea in his embassy, that the Russians might someday be sorry they had not taken more when they could.  He was thinking of Petsamo, which was soon to be a Nazi base against Allied shipping on the Murmansk run.  But Sir Stafford was wrong; Stalin's political sense was better than Sir Stafford's.  The Soviets were well advised to make easy terms.  Had their demands gone beyond the obvious needs of Leningrad's security, Sweden's neutrality might have been shaken.
Strong, Anna Louise.   The Stalin Era. New York: Mainstream, 1956, p. 86
 
            It would be to claim that Stalin started the war intending to seize Finland.  You might ask, why didn't we seize Finland during World War II, when the Finnish army was virtually wiped out?  Stalin showed statesmanly wisdom here.  He knew that the territory of Finland wasn't relevant to the basic needs of the world proletarian Revolution.  Therefore when we signed a treaty with the Finns during World War II, just ending the war itself was more profitable for us than an occupation would have been.  Finland's cessation of hostilities set a good example for other satellites of Hitlerite Germany, and it also made good marks for us with the Finnish people. 
Talbott, Strobe, Trans. and Ed. Khrushchev Remembers. Boston: Little Brown, c1970, p. 156
 
            The Finns were overwhelmed by weight of numbers and by constant bombardment.  They sued for peace on March 8, and four days later the treaty was signed in Moscow.  The territories needed to secure the Baltic approaches to Russia's frontiers had been won.  Stalin did not consider occupying Helsinki or encroaching on other parts of Finland.  The callousness and contempt that the Russians showed towards the Poles did not extend to the Finns, whom they respected.
Grey, Ian. Stalin, Man of History. London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1979, p. 313
 
            ...Stalin recognized there were limits beyond which it would be dangerous to push one's luck.  The most striking example of this is his retreat over Berlin in 1949; but there are two other examples in 1944 that are more surprising because they affected areas closer, in one case very much closer, to Russia's borders.
            The first was Finland.  When the Finns sought peace, the terms they were granted in September made permanent the loss of territory they had suffered in 1940, imposed a substantial indemnity, and required them to lease the naval base at Porkkala to Russia for 50 years.  But remembering the international reaction to Russia's earlier attack on them, Stalin allowed Finland to retain a greater degree of independence than any other East European country and acquiesced in the exclusion of the Finnish Communist party from a share in power.
Bullock, Alan. Hitler and Stalin: Parallel Lives. New York: Knopf, 1992, p. 856
 
            So the Kuusinen government was told to disband, and on March 12, 1940, the USSR concluded a lenient peace (considering everything) with Finland.
Ulam, Adam. Stalin; The Man and his Era.  New York: Viking Press, 1973, p. 522
 
            The Government of Finland declined, one after another, all the friendly proposals made by the Soviet Government with the object of safeguarding the security of the USSR, particularly of Leningrad, and this in spite of the fact that the Soviet Union was willing to go out to meet Finland and satisfy her legitimate interests.
            The Finnish Government declined the proposal of the USSR to shift back the Finnish border on the Karelian Isthmus a few dozen kilometers, although the Soviet Government was willing to compensate Finland with an area twice as large in Soviet Karelia.
            The Finnish Government also declined the proposal of the USSR to conclude a pact of mutual assistance, thereby making it clear that the security of the USSR from the direction of Finland was not safeguarded.
            In his speech at the session of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR on March 29, 1940, Molotov said:
            "...The Soviet Union having smashed the Finnish army, and having had every opportunity of occupying the whole of Finland, did not do so and did not demand any indemnities for its war expenditure as any other Power would have done, but confined its demands to a minimum....
            We pursued no other object in the Peace Treaty than that of safeguarding the security of Leningrad, Murmansk, and the Murmansk Railway."
Foreign Lang. Pub. House. Schuman, F. L. Intro.   Falsifiers of History. Moscow, 1948, p. 44
 
            Liddell  Hart says that after a negotiated peace was signed in March 1940, Stalin 'showed statesmanship' by offering the Finns 'remarkably moderate terms'.
 
            George Bernard Shaw, In a comment on the Winter War, said that the 'only novelty' about it was that Stalin took only what he needed instead of taking back the whole country as any other Power would have done.  (This was an allusion to the fact that before the Russian Revolution, Finland had been a part of the Czarist Empire.)
Axell, Albert. Stalin's War: Through the Eyes of His Commanders.  London, Arms and Armour Press. 1997, p. 57
 
            On 21 January 1940 Stalin said, "We have no desire for Finland's territory but Finland should be a state that is friendly to the Soviet Union.
Dimitrov, Georgi, The Diary of Georgi Dimitrov, 1933-1949.  Ed. Ivo Banac. New Haven: Yale University Press, c2003, p. 124
 
STALIN IS NOT A DICTATOR
 
            Assuming that we accept the primary meaning of the term dictator, as it is defined in the The New English Dictionary -- "a ruler or governor whose word is law; an absolute ruler of the state -- and who authoritatively prescribes a course of action or dictates what is to be done" -- Stalin is not a dictator.
            In May 1941 Stalin hitherto content to be a member of the Presidium, alarmed at the menace of a victorious German Army invading the Ukraine, took over, with the consent of the Presidium, the office a prime minister and Minister of defense, leaving Molotov as foreign Secretary; in exactly the same way, and for a similar reason--the world war--that Winston Churchill, with the consent of the house of Commons, became prime minister and Minister of defense with Chamberlain,....  Neither the prime minister of the British cabinet nor the presiding member of the Sovnarkom has anything like the autocratic power of the president of the USA, who not only selects his cabinet, subject merely to approval by a simple majority of the Senate, but is also commander in chief of the American Armed Forces and, under the Lend Lease act, is empowered to safeguard in one way or another, the arrival of munitions and food at the British ports.  By declaring, in May 1941, a state of unlimited national emergency, President Roosevelt legally assumes a virtual dictatorship of the United States.  He has power to takeover transport, to comandeer the radio for the purposes of propaganda, to control imports in all exchange transactions, to requisition ships and to suspend laws governing working hours, and most important of all, to decide on industrial priorities and, if necessary, to take over industrial plants.
Webb, Sidney.  The Truth about Soviet Russia. New York: Longmans, Green, 1942, p. 16
 
Stalin's opponents accuse him of absolutism, and it is true and false.  Absolutism there is--not that Stalin wants it for his ambition or vainglory but because the circumstances in Russia demand it....
            Outsiders may write nonsense about Stalin's ego and the purely personal quality of "the struggle for power" between him and Trotsky or Rykov or Zinoviev.
Duranty, Walter.  Duranty Reports Russia. New York: The Viking Press, 1934, p. 218
 
            ...To begin with, Stalin is anything but remote or autocratic in method.  I doubt if any national leader has his ear so close to the ground, and by all accounts his method in meetings of the Politburo, which is the real government, is to let other people talk, after he has briefly indicated the lines of discussion, and to reach a conclusion by the process of summary, comparison, and the elimination of his colleagues' views.
Duranty, Walter.  Duranty Reports Russia. New York: The Viking Press, 1934, p. 225
 
            Stalin does not rule personally....  When Emil Ludwig asked him who really made decisions, he answered: "Single persons cannot decide....  The leadership of our party is the Central Committee, which directs all the Soviet and Communist organizations, consists of about 70 people....  It is in this Supreme Council that the whole wisdom of our party is concentrated.  Each man is entitled to challenge his neighbor's opinion or suggestion.  Each man may give the benefit of his own experience.  If it were otherwise, if individual decisions were admitted, there would be serious mistakes in our work."
Strong, Anna Louise.  This Soviet World. New York, N. Y: H. Holt and company, c1936, p. 110
 
            At one point the head of our Regional Party organization requested that Comrade Stalin permit himself to be photographed with our delegation.... The photographer, whose name was Petrov, went to this camera and started to arrange the group for the picture.  Petrov was a respected specialist in his trade.  He had worked around the Kremlin for years and was well-known among Party workers.  He started giving us instructions on which way to look and how to turn our heads.  Suddenly Stalin remarked in a voice everyone could hear, "Comrade Petrov loves to order people around.  But now that's forbidden here.  No one may order anyone else around ever again."  Even though he said this jokingly, we all took him seriously and were heartened by the democratic spirit he displayed.
Talbott, Strobe, Trans. and Ed. Khrushchev Remembers. Boston: Little Brown, c1970, p. 26
 
            A similar incident occurred a few years later when my friend Rimsky took a group of students to Moscow to see the sights of the capital.  Rimsky decided to ask Stalin if he would receive a delegation of these students.  As Rimsky told me, "I called the Kremlin and was put straight through to Stalin.  What accessibility!  Stalin agreed to receive us.  When we arrived in Stalin's office, I said, 'Comrade Stalin, we've come from the city formerly called Yuzovka which now bears your name.  It's called Stalino.  Therefore we'd like to ask you to send a letter of greeting back with us to the Stalino workers.'" And here is how Stalin answered this request: "What do you think I am?  A big landowner?  The workers in the factories aren't serfs on my farm.  It would be insulting and completely unsuitable for me to write them a letter of greeting.  I won't do it myself, and I don't like it when other people do that sort of thing."  Rimsky was pleasantly surprised.  When he got home he spread the story around to illustrate Stalin's democratic spirit, his accessibility, and his proper understanding of his place.
Talbott, Strobe, Trans. and Ed. Khrushchev Remembers. Boston: Little Brown, c1970, p. 27
 
            ...there are situations in which he [Stalin] does not have as much freedom as the President of the United States.
            Roosevelt, for example, did not ask his Cabinet's permission when he chose to go abroad.  In declining to attend the Quebec Conference, Stalin explained that his government--really the Politburo--thought it undesirable that he should leave at that moment....
            "The decisions of single persons," said Stalin, in rejecting the Fuhrer principle of personal dictatorship, "are always, or nearly always, one-sided.  Out of every 100 decisions made by single persons, that have not been tested and corrected collectively, 90 are one-sided.  In our leading body, the Central Committee of our party, which guides all our soviet and party organizations, there are about 70 members.  Each one is able to contribute his experience.  Were it otherwise, if decisions had been taken by individuals, we should have committed very serious mistakes."
Snow, Edgar. The Pattern of Soviet Power, New York: Random House, 1945, p. 164
 
            ...The characterization of Stalinism as highly centralized can be applied to the decision-making process at the top of the Soviet hierarchy where Stalin's personal involvement was clearly immense, but it is less applicable when discussing the relations between central and lower-level political organs.  Furthermore the term totalitarian, with its connotations of all pervasive control, does not accord well with the severe limitations that existed on central power and the massive social upheavals over which it was physically impossible to exercise close control.
Gill, Graeme.  Stalinism. Atlantic Highlands, N.J.: Humanities Press International, 1990, p. 56
 
            ...Although Stalin was clearly able to exercise considerable power at the lower levels of the political system, and certainly much more than his opponents, he was not able to build up an extensive, smoothly organized and disciplined political machine that would obey his will.  Instead he had to proceed principally through gaining the support of other political leaders at all levels in a coalition-building process.
Gill, Graeme.  Stalinism. Atlantic Highlands, N.J.: Humanities Press International, 1990, p. 65
 
            Although by the end of the decade [1930s] he [Stalin] was unquestionably the supreme leader, he was never omnipotent, and he always functioned within a matrix of other groups and interests.
Getty & Naumov, The Road to Terror. New Haven, Conn.: Yale Univ. Press, c1999, p. 7
 
            The main causal element in the literature has always been Stalin's personality and culpability.  In most accounts there were no other authoritative actors, no limits on his power, no politics, no discussion of society or social climate, no confusion or indecision.  Stalin gave and everyone else received.  The actions of others, or the environment within which he worked, were largely irrelevant or impotent.  As a result, these accounts came perilously close to falling into the literary genre of fairy tales, complete with an evil and all-powerful sorcerer working against virtuous but powerless victims.  Many existing historical treatments of the terror--including some quite recent ones--followed simple linguistic conventions and structures in order to illustrate their only point.  Given the narrow focus, it was difficult to say more than "At this time Stalin decided to destroy...."
Getty & Naumov, The Road to Terror. New Haven, Conn.: Yale Univ. Press, c1999, p. 570
 
            There can be no [one man] dictatorship in the Communist International and in the USSR.  It cannot exist because Communism and the Soviet regime develop along the lines of an extremely definite doctrine, of which the most important people are merely the servants, whereas the characteristic of dictatorship, of personal power, is to impose one's own will, one's own fancies, in opposition to existing law.
            There may be different interpretations of Marxism, especially in its reaction to events and, from this point of view, a particular interpretation or even a particular course of action may at any given moment predominate at the head of the State of the International.  The question of whether such interpretation or course of action is a good one is solved automatically, and the leaders prove themselves to be right or wrong by contact with logical exigencies and the sequence of events.  It would therefore be a great mistake to think that there is any supreme authority in the USSR, an individual sovereignty imposing itself on this great organization by artificial means, such as force of arms or intrigues.  (The tyrant who, when anyone stands in his way, makes a sign to the executioner, like the Caliphs in the Arabian Nights or to hired assassins.)
Barbusse, Henri. Stalin. New York:  The Macmillan company, 1935, p. 147
 
            [Interview of Yaroslavski with an American delegation of professors at the Central Council of the League of Militant Atheists, July 13, 1932]
QUESTIONER:  In America there is the widespread opinion that (the Soviet Union) is an absolute dictatorship.
COMRADE YAROSLAVSKI: Of course, any talk of Comrade Stalin's dictatorship is utter nonsense.  Comrade Stalin is not a dictator but the extremely beloved leader of our party, who enjoys unlimited trust and extraordinary prestige because he has carried out the correct line of the party for more than 30 years, never wavered at the most critical moments, and always walked side-by-side with Lenin.  No one in our party ever considered, considers him, or could ever consider him a dictator because Comrade Stalin's proposals are discussed by the supreme bodies of our party, including the Central Committee, the Political Bureau, the Presidium of the Central Executive Committee, and the congresses, which may disagree with Comrade Stalin.  If they do agree with him, it is because his policy is the correct one.  In this respect, Lenin was also "justifiably" or, more probably, without any justification, called a dictator in his day, even though his authority was based on boundless trust and respect, not subordination.  In Comrade Stalin's writings you can find a number of articles and letters in which he argues with his comrades who disagree with him and tries to persuade them.  Of course, if the rumors you're talking about were true, he wouldn't even try to persuade or argue with his comrades.
QUESTIONER:  We personally don't doubt that Comrade Stalin is a great man and a great leader, but have there not been cases, despite all his prestige, where the proposals he has submitted to the Central Committee have failed to win a majority of votes?  After all, Lenin was sometimes in the minority.
COMRADE YAROSLAVSKI: I don't remember any instances where Comrade Stalin has submitted incorrect proposals.  With respect to your comments that Lenin was sometimes in the minority, during the Brest peace negotiations many people disagreed with Lenin.  I myself was opposed to the Brest Treaty, which I have always deeply regretted, because I was wrong and Lenin was right.  Even then Comrade Stalin supported Lenin's policy.
Koenker and Bachman, Eds. Revelations from the Russian Archives. Washington: Library of Congress, 1997, p. 609
 
            As Timothy Dunmore recently noted, "Few are now prepared to accept too literally Djilas's picture of senior Politburo members obsequiously following Stalin about and taking his orders down on a convenient note pad."
Getty, A.  Origins of the Great Purges. Cambridge, N. Y.: Cambridge Univ. Press, 1985, p. 199
 
            When I then asked him whether an individual was not governing in Russia, instead of a committee, he pointed to the 16 chairs round our table and said: "Three revolutions have taught us that of every 100 decisions an individual makes, 90 are wrong.  Our committee of 70 members comprises the most intelligent leaders of industry, the shrewdest businessmen, the most skillful agitators, experts in agriculture and nationality.  Each one of them can correct a single resolution by his experience."
Ludwig, Emil. Three portraits: Hitler, Mussolini, Stalin. New York Toronto: Longmans, Green and Company, c1940, p. 118
 
            And yet it should be kept in mind that at­ the end of the 1920s Stalin certainly did not yet possess unlimited power.  Major decisions were taken by a group of 20 to 30 individuals including certain key figures on the Central Committee who were the leaders of the most important provincial organizations.
Medvedev, Roy.  On Stalin and Stalinism. New York: Oxford University Press, 1979, p. 66
 
            Stalin apologized to Mikoyan and he often had to apologize to the others too.   Dictators did not need to apologize.
Montefiore, Sebag. Stalin: The Court of the Red Tsar. New York: Knopf, 2004, p. 62
 
            He [Stalin] discovered, moreover, that the President of the United States had more liberty of action than the master of the Kremlin, who had always to deal with his Politburo.
Delbars, Yves.  The Real Stalin. London, Allen & Unwin, 1951, p. 347
 
            On the eve of the Yalta Conference the Politburo appointed a Permanent Committee to follow the negotiations on the spot.   The President of this committee was Molotov; it included Beria, Malenkov, Bulganin, Voroshilov, and Mikoyan.  Stalin's authority was, of course, very great, but for once his traditional tactics of taking refuge behind the decisions of the Politburo turned against him.   Carried away by Roosevelt's example, he wanted to form decisions which had not been previously considered by the committee.   He even did so.   But the Politburo was accustomed to being the supreme official authority; it jibbed at this, and sought to impose its actual authority.
            ...The result was that Stalin, contrary to the general belief, was less free in his decisions than Churchill and Roosevelt.
Delbars, Yves.  The Real Stalin. London, Allen & Unwin, 1951, p. 369
 
            But Stalin was not free to maneuver as he wished.   The Permanent Committee was keeping a watch on him.
Delbars, Yves.  The Real Stalin. London, Allen & Unwin, 1951, p. 370
 
            It was then that Stalin made a series of confidences to Roosevelt, which Stettinius and Pavlov remembered: "You are mistaken in believing that I am a dictator like Hitler," said Stalin.   "I am not.   Of course, I exercise indisputable authority, and I could impose concessions which I am ready to make, but which my colleagues would not wish to allow.   But in this case I have to show them the immediate or future advantages which I should expect from such concessions.   Otherwise I should be diminishing my own authority."
Delbars, Yves.   The Real Stalin. London, Allen & Unwin, 1951, p. 374
 
            This was his [Stalin] last act of homage [accepting  Roosevelt’s refusal to OK the Soviet demand for the right of veto concerning the questionss to be inscribed on the order of the day] to the memory of the great President, before whom he had accepted the liberty of discussion in the Security Council of the United Nations Organization.   From this moment he once more became a prisoner of the aggressive obstinacy of his colleagues of the Politburo, who in the vertigo of victory thought they could impose their conceptions on the whole world.
Delbars, Yves.  The Real Stalin. London, Allen & Unwin, 1951, p. 388
 
            In the autumn of 1945 Stalin left for Sochi.   This absence was justified by the prescription of semi-retirement, and by the state of his health, and his disappointments; it coincided with a fit of exasperation with the attitude of the majority of the Politburo, which disagreed with him on a number of questions.
Delbars, Yves.  The Real Stalin. London, Allen & Unwin, 1951, p. 398
 
            In the higher spheres of Communism no secret was made of this [others were making decisions challenging those of Stalin and making themselves his equal].   Thus, Zhdanov once said before Diaz and two other Spanish Communists who were refugees in Moscow, in explanation of the private ideas of the group of Stalin's successors: "The king is absolute when he does our will."   This translation of Schiller's sentence: "Und der Konig ist absolute wenn er unseren Willen tut," shows plainly that the new bureaucratic caste which had been created in the USSR saw in Stalin merely an external symbol of the unity of the State, and no longer a source of immediate power.   The "Supreme Arbiter" was relegated to Sochi for months at a time, and remained in the background, while others ruled the country in his name and under his authority.   Stalin's superior astuteness consisted in accepting this "diminution" as though it were imposed upon him, whereas it was actually precisely what he desired.
Delbars, Yves.  The Real Stalin. London, Allen & Unwin, 1951, p. 400
 
            Harold Lasky, who went to Moscow in 1947, and who had the advantage of being able to speak Russian, explained in the Labor press that "Stalin was not a true personal dictator, since he is obliged to obey the majority of the Politburo."
Delbars, Yves.   The Real Stalin. London, Allen & Unwin, 1951, p. 401
 
            But [my] four lengthy talks and one or two brief social meetings with Stalin were more than any other Western diplomat enjoyed during the period I was in Russia, and those opportunities to meet the leader of the Soviet peoples face-to-face, climaxing careful study of what he has said and what he has done during the past years, make it possible to differentiate the Stalin of fact from the Stalin of legend....
            From that spirit, I had drawn certain conclusions about Stalin in the sixty-ninth year of his life and his 25th year in power:
            He is not, for instance, an absolute dictator, on the one hand, nor a prisoner of the Politburo, on the other; his position, I would say, is more that of chairman of the board with the decisive vote.
Smith, Walter Bedell. My Three Years in Moscow. Philadelphia: Lippincott, 1950, p. 55
 
            Sometimes it is asserted that, whereas the form may be otherwise, the fact is that, whilst the Communist Party controls the whole administration, the Party itself, and thus indirectly the whole state, is governed by the will of a single person, Josef Stalin.
            First let it be noted that, unlike Mussolini, Hitler, and other modern-day dictators, Stalin is not invested by law with any authority over his fellow-citizens, and not even over the members of the Party to which he belongs.   He has not even the extensive power which the Congress of the United States has temporarily conferred upon President Roosevelt, or that which the American Constitution entrusts for four years to every successive president.   So far as grade or dignity is concerned, Stalin is in no sense the highest official in the USSR, or even in the Communist Party.   He is not, and has never been, President of the Presidium of the Central Executive Committee of the All-Union Congress of Soviets--a place long held by Sverdlov and now by Kalinin, who is commonly treated as the President of the USSR.   He is not (as Lenin was) the President of the Sovnarkom of the RSFSR, the dominant member of the Federation; or of the USSR itself, the place now held by Molotov, who may be taken to correspond to the Prime Minister of a parliamentary democracy.   He is not even a People's Commissar, or member of the Cabinet, either of the USSR or of any of the constituent republics.   Until 1934 he held no other office in the machinery of the constitution than that, since 1930 only, of membership (one among 10) of the Committee of Labor and Defense.   Even in the Communist Party, he is not the president of the Central Committee of the Party, who may be deemed the highest placed member; indeed, he is not even the president of the presidium of this Central Committee.   He is, in fact, only the General Secretary of the Party, receiving his salary from the Party funds and holding his office by appointment by the Party Central Committee, and, as such, also a member (one among nine) of its most important subcommittee, the Politburo.
Webb, S. Soviet Communism: A New Civilisation. London, NY: Longmans, Green, 1947, p. 333
 
            If we are invited to believe that Stalin is, in effect, a dictator, we may inquire whether he does, in fact, act in the way that dictators have usually acted?
            We have given particular attention to this point, collecting all the available evidence, and noting carefully the inferences to be drawn from the experience of the past eight years (1926-1934).   We do not think that the Party is governed by the will of a single person; or that Stalin is the sort of person to claim or desire such a position.   He has himself very explicitly denied any such personal dictatorship in terms which, whether or not he is credited with sincerity, certainly accord with our own impression of the facts....
            This reasoned answer [his response to Emil Ludwig’ questions] by Stalin himself puts the matter on the right basis.   The Communist Party in the USSR has adopted for its own organization the pattern which we have described as common throughout the whole soviet constitution.   In this pattern individual dictatorship has no place.   Personal decisions are distrusted, and elaborately guarded against.   In order to avoid the mistakes due to bias, anger, jealousy, vanity, and other distempers, from which no person is, at all times, entirely free or on his guard, it is desirable that the individual will should always be controlled by the necessity of gaining the ascent of colleagues of equal grade, who have candidly discussed the matter, and who have to make themselves jointly responsible for the decision.
            We find confirmation of this inference in Stalin's explicit description of how he acted in a remarkable case.   He has, in fact, frequently pointed out that he does no more than carry out the decisions of the Central Committee of the Communist Party.   Thus, in describing his momentous article known as "Dizzy with Success," he expressly states that this was written on "the well-known decision of the Central Committee regarding the 'Fight against Distortions of the Party Line' in the collective farm movement...."   "In this connection," he continues, "I recently received a number of letters from comrades, collective farmers, calling up on me to reply to the questions contained in them.   It was my duty to reply to the letters in private correspondence; but that proved to be impossible, since more than half the letters received did not have the addresses of the writers (they forgot to send their addresses).   Nevertheless the questions raised in these letters are of tremendous political interest to all our comrades....   In view of this I found myself faced with the necessity of replying to the comrades in an open letter, i.e. in the press....   I did this all the more willingly since I had a direct decision of the Central Committee to this purpose."   We cannot imagine the contemporary "dictators" of Italy, Hungary, Germany and now (1935) the United States--or even the Prime Minister of the United Kingdom or France--seeking the instructions of his Cabinet as to how he should deal with letters which he could not answer individually.   But Stalin goes further.   He gives the reason for such collegiate decision.   He points out that there is a "real danger" attendant on the personal decreeing by individual representatives of the Party in this or that corner of our vast country.   I have in mind not only local functionaries, but even certain regional committee members, and even certain members of the Central Committee, a practice which Lenin had stigmatized as communist conceit.   "The Central Committee of the Party," he said, "realized this danger, and did not delay intervening, instructing Stalin to warn the erring comrades in an article on the collective farm movement.   Some people believe that the article 'Dizzy with Success' is the result of the personal initiative of Stalin.   That is nonsense.   Our Central Committee does not exist in order to permit the personal initiative of anybody, whoever it may be, in matters of this kind.   It was a reconnaissance on the part of the Central Committee.   And when the depth and seriousness of the errors were established, the Central Committee did not hesitate to strike against these errors with the full force of its authority, and accordingly issued its famous decision of March 15, 1930."
            The plain truth is that, surveying the administration of the USSR during the past decade, under the alleged dictatorship of Stalin, the principal decisions have manifested neither the promptitude nor the timeliness, nor yet the fearless obstinacy that have often been claimed as the merits of a dictatorship.   On the contrary, the action of the Party has frequently been taken after consideration so prolonged, and as the outcome of discussion sometimes so heated and embittered, as to bear upon their formulation the marks of hesitancy and lack of assurance.   More than once, their adoption has been delayed to a degree that has militated against their success; and, far from having been obstinately and ruthlessly carried out, the execution has often been marked by a succession of orders each contradicting its predecessor, and none of them pretending to completeness or finality.   Whether we take the First Five-year Plan, or the determination to make universal the collective farms; the frantic drive towards "self-sufficiency" in the equipment of the heavy industries, and in every kind of machine-making, or the complete "liquidation of the kulaks as a class," we see nothing characteristic of government by the will of a single person.   On the contrary, these policies have borne, in the matter of their adoption and in the style of their formulation, the stigmata of committee control.   If the USSR during the past 8 or 10 years has been under a dictatorship, the dictator has surely been an inefficient one!   He has often acted neither promptly nor at the right moment; his execution has been vacillating and lacking in ruthless completeness.   If we had to judge him by the actions taken in his name, Stalin has had many of the defects from which, by its very nature, a dictator is free.   In short, the government of the USSR during the past decade has been clearly no better than that of a committee.   Our inference is that it has been, in fact, the very opposite of a dictatorship.   It has been, as it still is, government by a whole series of committees.
            This does not mean, of course, that the interminable series of committees, which is the characteristic feature of the USSR Government, have no leaders; nor need it be doubted that among these leaders the most influential, both within the Kremlin and without, is now Stalin himself.   But so far as we have been able to ascertain, his leadership is not that of a dictator.   We are glad to quote an illustrative example of Stalin's administration, as described by an able American resident of Moscow: "Let me give a brief example of how Stalin functions.   I saw him preside at a small committee meeting, deciding a matter on which I had brought a complaint.   He summoned to the office all the persons concerned in the matter, but when we arrived we found ourselves meeting not only with Stalin, but also with Voroshilov and Kaganovich.   Stalin sat down, not at the head of the table, but informally placed where he could see the faces of all.   He opened the talk with a plain, direct question, repeating the complaint in one sentence, and asking the man complained against: 'Why was it necessary to do this?'
            "After this, he said less than anyone.   An occasional phrase, a word without pressure; even his questions were less demands for answers than interjections guiding the speaker’s thought.   But how swiftly everything was revealed, all our hopes, egotisms, conflicts, all the things we had been doing to each other.   The essential nature of men I had known for years, and of others I met for the first time, came out sharply, more clearly than I had ever seen them, yet without prejudice.   Each of them had to cooperate, to be taken account of in a problem; the job we must do, and its direction became clear.
            There is, in fact, a consensus of opinion, among those who have watched Stalin's action in administration, that this is not at all characteristic of a dictator.   It is rather that of a shrewd and definitely skillful manager facing a succession of stupendous problems which have to be grappled with.   He is not conceited enough to imagine that he has, within his own knowledge and judgment, any completely perfect plan for surmounting the difficulties.   None of the colleagues seated around the committee table, as he realizes, has such a plan.   He does not attempt to bully the committee.   He does not even drive them.  Imperturbably he listens to the endless discussion, picking up something from each speaker, and gradually combining every relevant consideration in the most promising conclusion then and there possible.   At the end of the meeting, or at a subsequent one--for the discussions are often adjourned from day-to-day--he will lay before his colleagues a plan uniting the valuable suggestions of all the other proposals, as qualified by all the criticisms; and it will seem to his colleagues, as it does to himself, that this is the plan to be adopted.   When it is put in operation, all sorts of unforeseen difficulties reveal themselves, for no plan can be free from shortcomings and defects.   The difficulties give rise to further discussions and to successive modifications, none of which achieves perfect success.   Is not this very much how administration is carried on in every country in the world, whatever may be its constitution?   The "endless adventure of governing men" can never be other than a series of imperfect expedients, for which, even taking into account all past experience and all political science, there is, in the end, and inevitable resort to empirical "trial and error."
Webb, S. Soviet Communism: A New Civilisation. London, NY: Longmans, Green, 1947, p. 334-337
 
            If he is a dictator, he is not of the obtrusive conventional variety.  He does not believe in hero-worship and does not practice it.  The trappings of power do not tempt him.
Levine, Isaac Don.  Stalin.  New York: Cosmopolitan Book Corporation, c1931, p. 301
 
            Is Stalin a dictator?  Like the mythical Atlas, he carries the world on his shoulders.  That Stalin knows.  But he does not regard himself as a dictator.  It is unquestionable that his attitude defies the conventional idea of an absolutist ruler.  He is not and does not want to be a Nero.  He is not and does not seek to be a Napoleon.  He has no ambitions of gain.  Worldly prowess is alien to his nature.  He believes that he is helping create a new order from which someday all happiness will automatically flow to mankind.  He believes that it is imperative to traverse a road of untold travail to reach that ideal.  The vivisection of 160 million people today he justifies as a sacrifice necessary to bring bliss to double that number tomorrow.  To Stalin, only Lenin has charted the right course through the darkness to light.  And Stalin is adamant in his belief that he alone understands Lenin's cosmography correctly.
Levine, Isaac Don.  Stalin.  New York: Cosmopolitan Book Corporation, c1931, p. 314
 
            "Comrade Stalin, the press of the world is by this time in the habit of calling you a dictator," I said.  "Are you a dictator?"
            I could see that Voroshilov waited with interest for the answer.
Stalin smiled, implying that the question was on the preposterous side.
            "No, I am no dictator.  Those who use the word do not understand the Soviet system of government and the methods of the Communist Party.  No one man or group of men can dictate.  Decisions are made by the Party and acted upon by its chosen organs, the Central Committee and the Politburo."
Lyons, Eugene.  Assignment in Utopia. New York: Harcourt, Brace and Company, c1937, p. 387
 
            [Stalin said to Ludwig in an interview]  Just now you asked me whether everything in our country was decided by one person.  Never under any circumstances would our workers now tolerate power in the hands of one person.  With us personages of the greatest authority are reduced to nonentities, become mere ciphers, as soon as the masses of the workers lose confidence in them, as soon as they lose contact with the masses of the workers.
Stalin, Joseph.  Works. Moscow: Foreign Languages Pub. House, 1952, Vol. 13, p. 113
 
            Powerful though he was, his powers were not limitless...constraints of power existed even for Stalin.
Service, Robert. Stalin. Cambridge, Mass.: Belknap Press of Harvard Univ. Press, 2005, p. 9
 
            The solution [to Stalin’s alleged tendency to have his way] was obvious.  Trotsky, Zinoviev, and Bukharin were appointed to the Orgbureau.  They could oppose Stalin’s schemes whenever they wanted.
Service, Robert. Stalin. Cambridge, Mass.: Belknap Press of Harvard Univ. Press, 2005, p. 215
 
            Though dominant in the Politburo, Stalin did not chair it.  The tradition persisted that the chairman of Sovnarkom should perform this task.
Service, Robert. Stalin. Cambridge, Mass.: Belknap Press of Harvard Univ. Press, 2005, p. 277
 
            Yet this was not a totalitarian dictatorship as conventionally defined because Stalin lacked the capacity, even at the height of his power, to secure automatic universal compliance with his wishes.  He could purge personnel without difficulty.  But when it came to ridding the Soviet order of many informal practices he disliked, he was much less successful.  In such cases it was like someone trying to strike a match on a block of soap....
            Constraints continue to exist upon his rule.  In 1937 he had told the Party Central Committee that he intended to eradicate the network of political patronage in the USSR.  Yet clientele groups survived.
Service, Robert. Stalin. Cambridge, Mass.: Belknap Press of Harvard Univ. Press, 2005, p. 371
 
"Stalin was no tyrant, no despot.  He was a man of principle; he was just, modest and very kindly and considerate towards people, the cadres, and his colleagues."
Hoxha, Enver. With Stalin: Memoirs. Tirana: 8 N‘ntori Pub. House, 1979. p. 14-15
 
            Stalin’s opponents accuse him of absolutism, and it is true and false.  Absolutism there is--not that Stalin wants it for his ambition or vainglory but because the circumstances and Russia demand it; because there is no more time for argument or discussion or even freedom in the Western sense, for which Russia cares nothing, because, in short, a house divided against itself cannot stand in an hour of stress.
            Outsiders may write nonsense about Stalin’s egoism and the purely personal equality of “the struggle for power” between him and Trotsky or Rykov or Zinoviev.  Personal elements do and must enter all human relations, but in default of familiarity with the new Russia these critics might study the early history of the Christian Church, which as wracked and torn far worse by “ideological controversy,” as the Bolsheviki call it....
            The parallel is sharper and closer than either Christians or Bolsheviki would care to admit....
            Stalin did not do it--if the truth were known it was perhaps done despite him--but Russia did it, is doing it, and will go on doing it whatever happens.
Duranty, Walter.  “Stalinism’s Mark is Party Discipline,” New York Times, June 27, 1931.
 
 
            There is, incidentally, no doubt about responsibility for the disaster.  Stalin must be primarily answerable as the leading advocate of excessive demands on the peasantry and the prime backer of hard-line collectivization.  But there is plenty of blame to go around.  It must be shared by the tens of thousands of activists and officials who carried out the policy and by the peasants who chose to slaughter animals, burn fields and boycott cultivation in protest.  Beyond fixing blame, however, the tempting conclusion of intentionality is unwarranted: the case for a purposeful famine is weakly supported by the evidence and relies on a very strained interpretation of it....
            There are reasons why the majority of scholars have so far rejected the theory [Conquest’s contention the famine was intentionally caused].  First, we actually know very little about the scale of the famine.  Using census calculations of excess mortality, Conquest arrives at a figure of some 5,000,000 victims of the Ukrainian famine.  Yet such respected economic and demographic experts as Wheatcroft, Barbara Anderson and Brian Silver have examined the same census data and have suggested that the numbers Conquest supports are much too high.... 
            Second, Conquest has failed to establish a convincing motive for genocide.  Certainly Stalin was capable of vindictive cruelty and cold-hearted repression, but those who knew and dealt with him during the war and after, and they include many Westerners, agree that he was not insane or irrational.  Although he certainly mean to break peasant resistance to his brand of socialism, one must wonder why any national leader would deliberately imperil the country’s survival, its military strength and thus his own security, by methodically setting out to exterminate those who produced the food--and then stopping short of completing the presumed genocide....  our knowledge of the sources suggests that a genocidal Stalin is unnecessary to explain the events of the famine as we know them.  More convincing explanations can be advanced....
            Conquest’s argument for the terror-famine assumes a situation in which the Stalin leadership was always able to realize its will in the country.  We might first observe that nearly all the students of the Thirties agree that Stalin’s power was not absolute even in the upper leadership until the Great Purges of 1937-1939.  Any intentional genocide would have been a joint project.
            Second, the more scholars learn about the Thirties, the more they are struck by the limits and inhibitions on Moscow’s exercies of power in the provinces.  Kremlin orders, which were vague and frequently contradictory to begin with, were routinely stalled, transformed, ignored, or even reversed as they made their way down the chain of command.  From the works of Lynn Viola, Peter Solomon, Sheila Fitzpatrick and others, we now have much evidence on this bureaucratic compartmentalization, inefficiency, and local autonomy in agriculture, administration of justice, party structure and industry.  Stalinist bureaucracy of the Thirties was more disjointed than efficient.  Conquest himself cites numerous instances in which local implementation of collectivization differed sharply from Moscow’s presumed intentions.  In some places, Stalin’s original projections for kulak expropriations were wildly exceeded.  In others, local leaders minimised or even ignored Moscow’s call for full collectivization.
            Within rather broad and vague parameters, local party leaders ran their satrapies largely as they saw fit.  Moscow was far away and the infrequent inspectors...from Moscow could often be ignored.  Officials protected each other, lobbied and negotiated for themselves and their regions in Moscow, and ruled their territories arbitrarily....Insofar as the Stalinists set the broad policies of the period, they are responsible for the consequent tragedy.  But we can no longer be sure that what happened on the ground accurately reflected their plans.  It was surely easier to ignite a social revolution...than it was to predict or control the results....
            Yet there is no more evidence for the claim that Stalin planned to destroy the Ukraine than there is for the theory that he wanted the Germans to invade.
            Once the 1932 cataclysm unfolded, the Stalinists tried to cope with what they had done.  As Conquest shows, some grain quotas were lowered, highly prized-grain exports were cut to 1 or 2 percent of the harvest and some grain reserves were opened.  Although famine was limited to certain areas, food was not plentiful anywhere in the USSR in 1932.  To contain the famine, to prevent runs on meager food supplies in non-famine areas, and to keep disaster from overwhelming the entire country, the Ukraine is said to have been partially sealed off.  (The evidence for this isolation comes exclusively from memoir sources.)  Such a cold, hard way to cope with the famine would resemble Stalin’s 1941 decision to strip resources from Leningrad to save Moscow from falling to the Germans.  His leadership contributed directly or indirectly to both disasters, and millions of Ukrainians and Leningraders paid the price for his policies and raison d’etat.  But it’s a long and polemical leap from this to the assertion that Stalin deliberately brought about either holocaust.                          
Getty, Arch.   “Starving the Ukraine.”  Reviewing in The London Review of Books on January 22, 1987, The Harvest of Sorrow: Soviet Collectivization and the Terror-Famine by Robert Conquest September,1986.
 
            During my years in Moscow I never stopped marveling at the contrast between the man [Stalin] and the colossal likenesses that had been made of him.  That medium-sized, slightly pockmarked Caucasian with a mustache was as far removed as could be from the stereotype of a dictator.  The sweeping gestures of Hitler and Mussolini were lacking completely in him; he did not gesture even when making speeches, no matter how impassioned the words.
Tuominen, Arvo,  The Bells of the Kremlin: Hanover: University Press of New England, 1983, p. 155
 
            Nevertheless, the prevailing impression that he was an autocrat in all the initial stages of deliberation, a tyrant who dictated his decisions from on high to be executed by the party organizations and the government, was untrue.  On the contrary, he was quite democratic and cooperative in certain matters, particularly when important questions were being resolved.
Tuominen, Arvo, The Bells of the Kremlin: Hanover: University Press of New England, 1983, p. 156
 
AUTHOR: In the documentary film 'Zhukov', Marshall Zhukov says that Stalin was not a dictator; that he, Zhukov, could argue with Stalin, that he was able to stand up to Stalin and say 'nyet,' Comrade Stalin, 'nyet.'  Is this true in your opinion?
MARSHAL RUDENKO: Yes.  A dictator in the formal sense to someone who never agrees with anyone else's opinion, only his own.  But you could argue with Stalin.  Zhukov did, Rokossovsky did.  Meretskov, did.  When these marshals stuck to their guns and proved they were correct, Stalin changed his mind.
Axell, Albert. Stalin's War: Through the Eyes of His Commanders.  London, Arms and Armour Press. 1997, p. 50
 
CRITICS OF SU GET THEIR INFO FROM SOVIET SOURCES
 
            Moreover, when these criticisms are published in the press, they provide the hostile foreigner with evidence of the apparent failure of Soviet communism.  Indeed it is amusing to discover that nearly all the books that are now written proving that there is corruption, favoritism, and gross inefficiency in the management of industry and agriculture, are taken from reports of these discussions in the Soviet press, in Pravda, the organ of a Communist Party; in Isvestia, the organ of the government; in Trud, the organ of the trade union movement, and in many other local and specialist newspapers.
Webb, Sidney.  The Truth about Soviet Russia. New York: Longmans, Green, 1942, p. 34
 
CRITICISM IS ENCOURAGED
 
            As we have described previously, free criticism, however hostile it may be, is permitted, even encouraged, in the USSR, of the directors of all forms of enterprise, by the workers employed, or by the consumers of the commodities or services concerned.
Webb, Sidney.  The Truth about Soviet Russia. New York: Longmans, Green, 1942, p. 74
 
Moscow, August 16, 1930--although "free speech" and a "free press" in the western sense are unknown in Soviet Russia, Moscow newspapers are now indulging in such a loud chorus of complaints, rebukes, and pessimism as has probably not been equaled since Jeremiah was the "official spokesman" of Israel.  To read the newspapers one would suppose the country was headed straight to perdition.
Duranty, Walter.  Duranty Reports Russia. New York: The Viking Press, 1934, p. 369
 
            But it must not be assumed that the press is barren of criticism of the regime.  Indeed, it is full of it--from Party meetings and in letters from the thousands of worker and peasant correspondents all over the Union.  But it must all be helpful criticism, attacking bad administration or ill-advised regulations, and directed toward the upbuilding of Russia according to Soviet objectives.  No criticism in opposition to the regime itself or its general program is tolerated.
Baldwin, Roger.  Liberty under the Soviets, New York: Vanguard Press, 1928, p. 152
 
            Former Mensheviks or Social Revolutionists, still numerous in the unions, are now not expelled even when critical.  But their criticism must be "constructive,"--intended to remedy the evils and defects of the accepted system and program, not to attack its purposes....
            But the general policy is to encourage "helpful" criticism and the fullest rank and file participation in solving industrial problems, a process not altogether easy in view of the relations of the unions to the State.
Baldwin, Roger.  Liberty under the Soviets, New York: Vanguard Press, 1928, p. 169
 
            I happened upon a village meeting way out in Moscow province called to receive the tax bills for the year brought over by a messenger from the county seat.  For two hours I listened to as bitter and excited a denunciation of the government as I ever heard anywhere.  The regime was roundly scored as a robber of peasants.  There was not the slightest fear or limitation in speaking out.  It even looked for a while as if the young messenger were to be mobbed.  When they calmed down, with the appointment of a committee to take up their grievances, they found enough hope for the village solvency to vote money for new a fire apparatus and a new village bull.  The meeting was convincing evidence of the lack of any fear of the government or of the police, and of a healthy resistance to what was to them injustice.
            The offenses which the GPU controls have little relation to peasant life.  I speak of that at the start to make it clear that the terrorism charged to the GPU does not exist for the masses of the Russian people.
Baldwin, Roger. Liberty Under the Soviets, New York: Vanguard Press, 1928, p. 178
 
            Thus, side-by-side with all the self-praise and glorification I have mentioned, the Soviet press throughout the war period carried sharp criticisms of party and state officials.  Over a period of months I collected literally hundreds of items of this nature, covering a wide variety of activity.  Probably the most numerous reprimands and warnings were addressed to officials responsible for weaknesses in the production system.
            Slipshod methods of harvesting, which resulted in great losses of grain, were continuously criticized in specific regions.  Individual officials caught in the wrongful use or appropriation of state property were singled out as examples.  Instances of losses due to poor packing and shipment of manufactured goods were frequently cited, and engineers responsible for waste of metals and materials were upbraided.  Outright thefts of materials and embezzlement of funds were exposed and cases of bribery of state employees were frequently reported in the Government and party press.
            Blockheadedness, indifference to duty, and evasion of responsibility by officials and bureaucrats were the subject of many editorials and newspaper stories, in which individuals and localities were often mentioned by name.  The detail into which these criticisms enter is frequently surprising....
            ...Other town fathers were rebuked for failing to provide adequate living quarters, for inhuman bureaucracy, for falsifying reports, for neglecting improvements in the school system, and so on.
Snow, Edgar. The Pattern of Soviet Power, New York: Random House, 1945, p. 205
 
            ...Open criticism of different party branches for failure to accomplish their educational and organizational duties, in the rear and at the front, also, usually preceded or coincided with dismissals and new appointments.  And from the extent of such criticism in the press it was evident that a process of change and reform was going on all the time.
Snow, Edgar.  The Pattern of Soviet Power, New York: Random House, 1945, p. 207
 
            Stalin continued his criticism of party leaders by discussing another familiar topic: the "verification of fulfillment of decisions."...  Stalin stated, "There is still another kind of verification, the check-up from below, in which the masses, the subordinates, verify the leaders, pointing out their mistakes, and showing the way to correct them.  This kind of verification is one of the most effective methods of checking up on people."
            Stalin stated, "Some comrades say that it is not advisable to speak openly of one's mistakes, since the open admission of one's mistakes may be construed by our enemies as weakness and may be used by them.
            This is rubbish, comrades, downright rubbish.  The open recognition of our mistakes and their honest rectification can, on the contrary, only strengthen our party, raise its authority in the eyes of the workers, peasants, and working intellectuals....  And this is the main thing.  As long as we have the workers, peasants, and working intellectuals with us, all the rest will settle itself."
Getty, A.  Origins of the Great Purges. Cambridge, N. Y.: Cambridge Univ. Press, 1985, p. 146
 
            That this Soviet patriotism excludes all criticism is, moreover, by no means the truth.  "Bolshevist self-criticism" is certainly no empty expression.  One reads in the newspapers a succession of most bitter attacks on numerous real or imaginary grievances and on prominent individuals, whose fault, allegedly, these grievances are; I was astonished at industrial meetings by the strength of the criticisms leveled at the managers of the industries, and I stood amazed before news posters which attacked or caricatured principals and responsible people with positive savagery.  And foreigners are not prohibited from expressing their honest opinions.  I have already mentioned that not only did the national newspapers leave my articles uncensored, even when I deplored certain intolerances or excessive Stalin-worship, or when I demanded more light on the conduct of an important political trial; what is more, they took pains to reproduce as faithfully as possible in the translation every nuance of these very passages, negative as they were.  The prominent national personalities whom I met were without exception more interested in criticism than in indiscriminating praise.  They like to measure their own achievement with that of the West, and they measure accurately, often all too accurately, and when their own work falls short of that of the West, they do not hesitate to admit it.  Indeed they often overrate Western achievements to their own disadvantage.  But when a foreigner indulges in petty and inconsequent fault-finding and loses sight of the value of the whole achievement in unimportant shortcomings, Soviet people quickly lose patience, while empty hypocritical compliments they can never forgive.
Feuchtwanger, Lion.  Moscow, 1937. New York: The Viking Press, 1937, p. 40
 
            Of course, criticism had been strongly encouraged during the purges, and local records contain plenty of it.  The press strongly endorsed criticism from below at the end of 1938.
Thurston, Robert. Life and Terror in Stalin's Russia, 1934-1941. New Haven: Yale University Press, c1996, p. 161
 
            The regime regularly urged people to criticize local conditions as well as leaders, at least those below an exalted level....  Pravda went so far as to identify lack of criticism with enemies of the people: "Only an enemy is interested in saying that we, the Bolsheviks... do not notice actual reality....  Only an enemy... strives to put the rose-colored glasses of self-satisfaction over the eyes of our people."  As the Zawodny materials and a mass of other evidence show, these calls were by no means merely a vicious sham that permitted only carefully chosen, reliable individuals to make "safe" criticisms.
Thurston, Robert. Life and Terror in Stalin's Russia, 1934-1941. New Haven: Yale University Press, c1996, p. 185
 
            National authorities took a different view and encouraged criticism from below, primarily for three reasons.  First, it was a check on the pretensions and behavior of local officials.  Second, it was a way of getting some reliable information about performance.  Given the penchant of Soviet administrators to lie about what was happening, frank statements were highly prized at the upper levels of government.  Third, workers' ability to criticize made them feel that they played a significant role in their own affairs and that their views were taken seriously.  In short, the opportunity to express grievances increased workers' sense that the Soviet system was legitimate.  At the same time, national figures and institutions could convey the sense, not without reason, that they defended ordinary people against local despots.
Thurston, Robert. Life and Terror in Stalin's Russia, 1934-1941. New Haven: Yale University Press, c1996, p. 188
 
            These criticisms and threats from below challenged newly appointed administrators, undercutting the assertion that criticism was allowed only against those the regime had already decided to remove.  In another case, speakers at a union election meeting heavily scolded one of their officials, yet he received the most votes of anyone present in the selection of an important commission.  Criticism was encouraged and sometimes staged from above, but it was also an everyday occurrence that came from the workers themselves.
Thurston, Robert. Life and Terror in Stalin's Russia, 1934-1941. New Haven: Yale University Press, c1996, p. 190
 
            In these and many other cases, workers behaved proudly and aggressively toward superiors; they stood firmly on their rights.
            ... But like this book, the same investigation also shows that workers constantly took the trouble to protest to various organizations and periodicals, from which they demanded a thoughtful response.  Alienated people do not bother to express their grievances in this way any more than they bother to vote.
Thurston, Robert. Life and Terror in Stalin's Russia, 1934-1941. New Haven: Yale University Press, c1996, p. 196
 
            Nowhere in the world outside the USSR is there such a continuous volume of pitiless criticism of every branch of government, every industrial enterprise and every cultural establishment.   This perpetual campaign of exposure, which finds expression in every public utterance of the leading statesmen, in every issue of the press, and in every trade union or corporate meeting, is not only officially tolerated, but also deliberately instigated, as powerful incentive to improvement, alike in direction and in execution.   Thus, the public speeches by Stalin, Molotov, Kaganovich, and other Soviet statesmen--in striking contrast with those of British, French or American statesmen--nearly always lead up to a tirade of criticism of some part of soviet administration.   They usually begin with a glowing, and, as we may think, an optimistic account of the successful progress of the department or institution under discussion, of its remarkable achievements and of the valuable services of those working in it towards the "building of the socialist state."   This is rendered all the more alluring by a vision of the dismal failure of capitalism in Europe and America.   But invariably the speaker descends presently to an outspoken criticism of the technical shortcomings of the particular enterprise, with a detailed exposure of its partial or temporary failures, and often a scathing denunciation of particular cases of slackness or waste or other inefficiency, and similar criticism is invited from below.   Official speakers will often blame conferences and congresses for their failure to criticize their own superior councils and committees, as well as their own officials, for their shortcomings and their failures.
Webb, S. Soviet Communism: A New Civilisation. London, NY: Longmans, Green, 1947, p. 628
 
            Stalin, the press, and the Stakhanovite movement all regularly encouraged ordinary people to criticize those in authority.  At the very top, Stalin was certainly an unassailable figure, but during the Ezhovshchina anyone several rungs below him was fair game.  If the citizenry was supposed to be terrorized and stop thinking, why encourage criticism and input from below on a large scale?
            Thurston, Robert W. "On Desk-Bound Parochialism, Commonsense Perspectives, and Lousy Evidence: A Reply to Robert Conquest."  Slavic Review 45 (1986), 239.
 
            it cannot be said, however, that the Kremlin abuses the terrific power of the press, the radio and Communist party effort.  Stalin may not be one of the world’s great men in the sense that Lenin was, but he certainly “knows his politics” and has been careful to correct the dangers of unchallenged authoritative and unified control of public opinion by what is known as “self-criticism,” which is not the least interesting feature of the Stalinist system.
            Self-criticism is the salt in the Soviet home propaganda pie.  It enables any writer or speaker, high or low, to take a violent and enjoyable crack at almost any one or anything, provided he sticks to concrete facts or remains “objective,” as the Russians call it, and refrains from the unwisdom--or positive danger--of ideological criticism or covert attacks on the “party line” which will brand him with heresy and disgrace.
            The Russians by nature have a streak of anarchic iconoclasm...and “self-criticism” gives then welcome relief from the stark rigidity of Stalinism, a relief no less delightful because it is apt to be dangerous.  There has been cases when overzealous critics have been compelled to make ignominious retractions or have lost their jobs or even been expelled from the party.
            But it is a splendid safety valve, none the less, and so widely used by the Moscow press in particular, which is closest, of course to the Kremlin, that a foreign observer often wonders whether everything is “going to the bowwows,” so long and grievous is the tale of mismanagement, waste and bureaucratic error....  The Communist Youth Pravade or an illiterate worker can sling a pebble at the Railroad Commissariat and get away with it if he only has got facts to back his charge.
            Duranty, Walter. “Soviet Fixes Opinion By Widest Control,” New York Times, June 22, 1931.
 
SU CONSTITUTION GUARANTEES A JOB WHICH CAPITALISTS DON’T
 
Article 118: citizens of the USSR have the right to work, that is, the right to guarantee employment and payment for their work in accordance with its quantity and quality.
Constitution of the USSR.  Moscow: Co-operative Pub. Society of Foreign Workers in the U.S.S.R., Chapter 10, 1936
 
            The idea of the Soviets is founded on the right to work and the duty to work.
            This categorical obligation, up to now imposed by no state on its citizens, is balanced through the equally new duty of the state: "The citizens of the union have the right to work, the right to be guaranteed a job and pay for their work, according to it's value and amount.  The right to work is assured through the socialistic system of economics."
Ludwig, Emil, Stalin. New York, New York: G. P. Putnam's sons, 1942, p. 164
 
            The Constitution also exacts certain duties from citizens.  Every able-bodied citizen must work.  The new Testament principle of "he who does not work shall not eat" is rigidly observed....
Davis, Jerome.  Behind Soviet Power. New York, N. Y.: The Readers' Press, Inc., c1946, p. 34
 
 
SU CONSTITUTION GUARANTEES A RIGHT TO REST
 
Article 119: citizens of the USSR have the right to rest.
            The right to rest is insured by the reduction of the working day to seven hours for the overwhelming majority of the workers, the institution of annual vacations with pay for workers and other employees, and the provision of a wide network of sanatoria, rest homes, and clubs serving the needs of the working people.
Constitution of the USSR.  Moscow: Co-operative Pub. Society of Foreign Workers in the U.S.S.R., Chapter 10, 1936
 
SU CONSTITUTION GUARATEES SECURE RETIREMENT AND MEDICAL CARE
 
Article 120: citizens of the USSR have the right to material security in old age, and also in case of sickness or loss of capacity to work.
            This right is insured by the wide development of social insurance of workers and other employees at state expanse, free medical service for the working people, and the provision of a wide network of health resorts at the disposal of the working people.
Constitution of the USSR.  Moscow: Co-operative Pub. Society of Foreign Workers in the U.S.S.R., Chapter 10, 1936
 
SU CONSTITUTION GUARANTEES FREE EDUCATION AND STIPENDS
 
Article 121: citizens of the USSR have the right to education.  This right is insured by universal compulsory elementary education, by education free of charge including higher education, by a system of state' stipends for the overwhelming majority of students in higher schools, by instruction in schools in the native language, and by the organization in factories, state Farms, machine tractor stations, and collective Farms of free industrial, technical, and agricultural education for the working people.
Constitution of the USSR.  Moscow: Co-operative Pub. Society of Foreign Workers in the U.S.S.R., Chapter 10, 1936
 
SU CONSTITUTION GUARANTEES WOMEN EQUAL RIGHTS AND CHILD CARE
 
Article 122: Women in the USSR are accorded equal rights with men in all spheres of economic, state, cultural, social, and political life.
            The realization of these rights of women is insured by affording women equality with men, the right to work, payment for work, rest, social insurance and education, and by state protection of the interests of mother and child, pregnancy leave with pay, and the provision of a wide network of maternity homes, nurseries, and kindergartens.
Constitution of the USSR.  Moscow: Co-operative Pub. Society of Foreign Workers in the U.S.S.R., Chapter 10, 1936
 
 
SU CONSTITUTION GUARANTEES EQUAL RIGHTS FOR ALL RACES AND NATIONALITIES
 
Article 123: equal rights for citizens of the USSR, irrespective of their nationality or race, in all spheres of economic, state, cultural, social, and political life, shall be irrevocable law.
Constitution of the USSR.  Moscow: Co-operative Pub. Society of Foreign Workers in the U.S.S.R., Chapter 10, 1936
 
            Whatever one may say about the lack of personal freedom and individual liberty under his regime--and very much indeed can be said against it--there is no doubt that realization of the principle of racial and national equality inside the Soviet Union is in line with the best traditions of democracy.  Stalin was quite right in attributing much of Soviet Russia's strength to that policy.
Snow, Edgar. The Pattern of Soviet Power, New York: Random House, 1945, p. 162
 
            In 1922 the USSR was created.  The name of Stalin is indissolubly bound up with that great historic event.  The Constitution of the USSR is, fundamentally, the marvelous set of rules drawn up by the revolutionary minority under Tsarism.  It may be summed up as follows.  It establishes, or, rather, it proposes: "A close economic and military union, at the same time as the widest possible independence, complete liberty of development of all national culture, systematic destruction of all survivals of national inequality, and powerful aid from the stronger nations for the weaker."
Barbusse, Henri. Stalin. New York:  The Macmillan company, 1935, p. 101
 
            Thus national equality in all forms (language, schools, etc.) is an essential element in the solution of the national problem.  A state law based on complete democracy in the country is required, prohibiting all national privileges without exception and all kinds of disabilities and restrictions on the rights of national minorities.
Stalin, Joseph.  Stalin's Kampf. New York: Howell, Soskin & Company, c1940, p. 196
 
            Kazakhstan is one of the minority republics of the Soviet Union, and the Communist authorities had passed a law some time before providing that all industries in minority republics should employ at least 50 percent of the native races, both in production and management.  This may be a very enlightened law, which appeals to professors and humanitarians in all parts of the world, but didn't seem to work out in Kazakhstan in 1932....
Littlepage, John D.  In Search of Soviet Gold. New York: Harcourt, Brace, c1938, p. 107
 
            I cannot speak with authority about pre-Revolutionary Russia.  I do know that since 1928 The Soviet Government has vigorously enforced its [anti-racist] laws making the slightest demonstrations of race prejudice criminal offenses.  I saw, during the years I traveled among the Asiatic tribes, that no offense was likely to be punished more swiftly.  In fact, the authorities leaned over backward in this respect, and Russians took care not to get involved in a dispute with members of minority races, because they knew that Soviet courts would give them the worst of it.
            I am sure that mining and other industries located in minority republics have been held back because the Communists strictly enforce a regulation that native men and women must occupy at least half the jobs in any local industry, and half of the managing jobs as well.  This regulation, in my opinion, has been carried to ridiculous extremes.  I have come up against incompetent, ignorant, and arrogant native tribesmen holding down executive jobs in mines and mills for which they were entirely unsuited.  Their Russian subordinates, who were trying to cover up their mistakes, apparently were afraid to remove them for fear they would be accused of chauvinism, a capital crime in Soviet law.
            The same principle is observed in the political field, and large districts have been terrorised or at least retarded in their proper development because the highest political positions have been turned over to illiterate Asiatic tribesmen.  Native officials usually have their Russian secretaries, who probably keep control in their own hands.  But it requires a lot of patience to deal with these people, especially after they have gotten the idea that they hold the whip-hand, and that Russian underlings will not dare interfere with them.
Littlepage, John D.  In Search of Soviet Gold. New York: Harcourt, Brace, c1938, p. 256-257
 
            At any rate, the Asiatic regions of Russia with which I have been familiar for many years had been transformed almost beyond recognition during the time I have known them.  The change-over from an agricultural to an industrial manner of life has been accomplished in these regions in a remarkably short time.  Hundreds of thousands, perhaps millions, of Asiatics have been pushed into new forms of industrial labor, and a large proportion of those who were illiterate have been taught to read and write, and provided with new alphabets and new books in their own languages where none existed before.  So far as possible, the Asiatic tribes have been given schools, hospitals and clinics, libraries, and theaters equal to those in European Russia.
            The Communists make a great point of their belief that all races are equal in potential ability, and that one can be as good as another if it has the same opportunities.  Holding this belief, they are determined to give the same opportunities to all races and tribes in Russia at the earliest possible moment.  They had distributed a disproportionate amount of their available funds for education, public health, and sanitation, in the Asiatic regions where these things had been most neglected.
Littlepage, John D.  In Search of Soviet Gold. New York: Harcourt, Brace, c1938, p. 259
 
            ...The white people in Russia have been remarkably free from prejudice against the colored races for generations, if not centuries.  Now all social and legal discriminations against mixed marriages are being rigorously prohibited by law and custom.
Littlepage, John D.  In Search of Soviet Gold. New York: Harcourt, Brace, c1938, p. 262
 
            Clearly, in no sense can the Asiatic Republics of the USSR be characterized as colonies or neo- colonies of the Slavic areas; they have been rapidly and thoroughly integrated into the USSR while their native languages and cultures have thrived.  Their living standards, educational opportunities, and welfare systems have been raised to those of the European USSR.  Rather than being exploited by Russia, and their industrialization and all around economic development impeded, their economies have been rapidly industrialized and modernized, largely at the expense of heavy economic subsidies from the European areas.  Natives of the Asiatic Republics predominate in the politically responsible positions.  The absence of any significant signs of discontent with the Soviet system among Soviet Asians contrasts radically with nationalist and anti-imperialist movements across the Soviet borders in such countries as pre-1979 Iran, and is evidence of the lack of felt national oppression among Soviet Asians.
Szymanski, Albert.  Human Rights in the Soviet Union. London: Zed Books, 1984, p. 68
 
 
SU CONSTITUTION GUARANTEES SEPARATION OF CHURCH AND STATE
 
Article 124: in order to insure or to citizens freedom of conscience, the church in the USSR shall be separated from the state, and the school from the church.  Freedom of religious worship and freedom of anti-religious propaganda shall be recognized for all citizens.
Constitution of the USSR.  Moscow: Co-operative Pub. Society of Foreign Workers in the U.S.S.R., Chapter 10, 1936
 
SU CONSTITUTION GUARANTEES FREEDOM OF PRESS AND SPEECH TO WORKING CLASS
 
Article 125: in accordance with the interests of the working people, and in order to strengthen the socialist system, the citizens of the USSR are guaranteed by law: freedom of speech, freedom of the press, freedom of assembly and meetings, ( freedom of street processions and demonstrations.
            These rights of citizens are insured by placing at the disposal of the working people and their organizations printing shops, supplies of paper, public buildings, the streets, means of communication, and other material requisites for the exercise of these rights.
Constitution of the USSR.  Moscow: Co-operative Pub. Society of Foreign Workers in the U.S.S.R., Chapter 10, 1936
 
(Foreign Delegation’s Interview with Stalin on November 5, 1927)
QUESTION: Why is there no freedom of the Press in the USSR?
ANSWER: What freedom of the Press have you in mind?  Freedom of the Press?  For which class --the bourgeoisie or the proletariat?  If it is a question of freedom of the Press for the bourgeoisie, then it does not and will not exist here as long as the Proletarian Dictatorship is in power.  But if it is a question of freedom of the Press for the proletariat, then I must say that you will not find another country in the world where such broad and complete freedom of the Press exists as in the USSR.  Freedom of the Press for the proletariat is not an empty phrase.  And without the greatest freedom of assembly, without the best printing works, the best clubs, without free organizations of the working class, beginning with the narrow and ending with the broad organizations, embracing millions of workers, there is no freedom of the Press.  Look at conditions in the USSR, survey the workers' districts, and you will find that the best printing works, the best clubs, entire paper mills, entire ink factories, producing necessary material for the Press, huge assembly halls--these and many other things which are so necessary for the freedom of the Press of the working class, are entirely and fully at the disposal of the working class and the toiling masses.  This is what we call freedom of the Press for the working class.  We have no freedom of the Press for the bourgeoisie.  We have no freedom of the Press for the Mensheviks and Social Revolutionaries, who represent the interests of the beaten and overthrown bourgeoisie.  But what is there surprising in that?  We have never pledged ourselves to grant freedom of the Press to all classes, and to make all classes happy.  Taking power in October, 1917, the Bolsheviks openly declared that this Government is a government of one class, a government of the proletariat, which will subdue the bourgeoisie, in the interests of the toiling masses of town and country representing the overwhelming majority of the population of the USSR.  How can one, after this, demand from the Proletarian Dictatorship freedom of the Press for the bourgeoisie?
Stalin, Joseph.  The Worker’s State. London: Communist Party of Great Britain. 1928, p. 6
 
LENIN PREACHED DEMOCRATIC CENTRALISM
 
Loose talk, endless debate, public discussion, and voting on goals and tactics, perpetual compromise in the Democratic tradition among factions within and with critics outside, constant efforts to win more converts by opportunistic popular appeals -- all these things, held Lenin, would be fatal to the enterprise....  What was needed was a centralized, regimented conspiracy of those who would give all their time to the crusade and would be supported and financed by party funds....  Elected delegates of local groups would then meet in Congress and decide by discussion what the party line should be.  But even then, once a decision should be voted, all members must carry it out at any cost and regardless of their personal views.  This principle of organization came to be known later as "Democratic centralism."
Schuman, Frederick L. Soviet Politics. New York: A.A. Knopf, 1946, p. 36
 
            ... but, according to party rules, largely formulated by Lenin, and supported previously by Trotsky as well as Stalin, once the majority has ruled everyone in the Party is obligated loyally to support the decision.  This is called "democratic centralism."  Not to do so is considered treason.  Yet Trotsky and his supporters refused to abide by their own rules.  They built up a secret organization with a secret printing press.
            ... Stalin explained his position on democratic centralism when I talked to him in 1926.  I asked him "In Russia, according to the Communist Party Constitution, when the party has decided a question by what we call a Party caucus the minority is not permitted to agitate against the majority.  We all know that majorities are sometimes wrong and that minorities are sometimes morally right.  How can a wrong majority decision ever be righted?"
            "We are a war party of several million people," Stalin answered.  "A fighting party must execute its decisions, not degenerate into a discussion club.  At the time of a conference and before an election to a conference there is complete freedom of opinion.  But once a decision has been reached it is no longer a question of a majority or minority but rather of getting everyone to work to execute the decision, not begin anew the debate.
            "Russians love to discuss things, and private discussions go on continuously on every issue, but after a decision is made no one is allowed by any act to oppose it.
Davis, Jerome.  Behind Soviet Power. New York, N. Y.: The Readers' Press, Inc., c1946, p. 26
 
            The achievement and maintenance of the dictatorship of the proletariat are impossible without a Party strong and its cohesion and iron discipline.  But iron discipline in the Party is impossible without unity of will and without absolute and complete unity of action on the part of all members of the Party.  This does not mean of course that the possibility of a conflict of opinion within the Party is thus excluded.  On the contrary, iron discipline does not preclude but presupposes criticism and conflicts of opinion within the Party.  Least of all does it mean that the discipline must be "blind" discipline.  On the contrary, iron discipline does not preclude but presupposes conscious and voluntary submission, for only conscious discipline can be truly iron discipline.  But after a discussion has been closed, after criticism has run its course and a decision has been made, unity of will and unity of action of all Party members become indispensable conditions without which Party unity and iron discipline in the Party are inconceivable.  [Lenin called this democratic centralism]
Stalin, Joseph.  Stalin's Kampf. New York: Howell, Soskin & Company, c1940, p. 247
 
            Lenin's authoritarian bent underlies his distrust of spontaneity and lays stress on a rigid centralization which he called democratic but which, having arrived at its conclusions, would then broke no discussion.
Richardson, Rosamond.   Stalin’s Shadow. New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1994, p. 62
 
LENIN SAYS A PARTY MUST PURGE AND STRUGGLE
 
Under the title What Is to Be Done? Lenin included a letter from Lassalle of June 24,1852: "party struggles give a party strength and life.  The best proof o­f the weakness of a party is its diffusness and its blurring of clear-cut differences....  A party becomes stronger by purging itself."
Schuman, Frederick L. Soviet Politics. New York: A.A. Knopf, 1946, p. 37
 
            After the victory of the revolution, when the Communist party had become the ruling party, the party leadership and Lenin had to acknowledge that some unwelcome elements had penetrated into the party and state apparatus. They were people who wanted to make a career via a membership in the party.  At the eighth party conference in December of 1919 Lenin brought this problem up.  According to Lenin “It is natural, on the one hand, that all the worst elements should cling to the ruling party merely because it is the ruling party.”  For that reason it was important to evaluate the contribution of the party members.  On the proposal of Lenin, the party carried out a re-registration of all party members.  Every member had to answer for his actions in front of the member collective; those who were considered unreliable were excluded.  That was the first purification of the party apparatus.  This method, to strengthen the party by purging the opportunistic elements, was to characterise the Communist party for many years to come.
Sousa, Mario.  The Class Struggle during the Thirties in the Soviet Union, 2001.
 
LENIN SAYS PARTY MUST ENGAGE IN LEGAL PARLIAMENTS AND ILLEGAL WORK
 
Lenin assailed the "Liquidators" (Mensheviks favoring the liquidation of the illegal work of the party and its transformation into a lawful political organization) and the Otzovists or "Recallers" who were urging the withdrawal of all Social Democrats from the Duma and from all legal organizations.  Lenin held that the party must participate in elections and legislative activities and must at the same time carry on underground revolutionary work.
Schuman, Frederick L. Soviet Politics. New York: A.A. Knopf, 1946, p. 47
 
            The workers' deputies were going to the State Duma not for legislative purposes, but to utilize that body as a revolutionary tribune.  Such were the main lines of the mandate to the deputies in the Third Duma.
            In a leaflet issued in November 1907 in connection with the opening of the Third State Duma, it was pointed out that the workers' group in the State Duma could function successfully only if the masses of the people were kept informed of what went on in the Duma, and if the Party organizations explained to the masses that all hopes of securing the satisfaction of their demands in a peaceful, bloodless and "parliamentary" way were vain.
Yaroslavsky, Emelian.  Landmarks in the Life of Stalin. Moscow: FLPH, 1940, p. 61
 
            In this Mandate Comrade Stalin laid down the principles upon which the workers' deputies in the State Duma were to base their activities....  It explained that "the Duma tribune is, under the present conditions, one of the best means for enlightening and organizing the broad masses of the proletariat."  The Mandate went on to say:
            "We want to hear the voices of the members of the Social-Democratic group ring out loudly from the Duma Tribune,...proclaiming the peasantry as the most reliable ally of the working-class, and denouncing the bourgeois liberals as the betrayers of the 'people's freedom."
Yaroslavsky, Emelian.  Landmarks in the Life of Stalin. Moscow: FLPH, 1940, p. 73
 
            And in that year (1907), too, he launched with Lenin a violent campaign against the Otzovists, members of the extreme Left who contended that the revolutionary members of the Duma ought to be withdrawn– by the Party.  Lenin and Stalin declared this to be a mistake.  However rotten this young organization [the Duma] might be to begin with, the good elements in it should remain there as long as possible, in order to be able to make new contacts and to get new outlets for propaganda.  (This proves that, in spite of their inflexible policy, the Bolshevik's knew quite well that they should never go beyond the limits of practical common sense, and that, in any case, they admitted the employment of legal methods.)
Barbusse, Henri. Stalin. New York:  The Macmillan company, 1935, p. 41
 
            It was elevated to a political principal by Menshevik writers, who demanded that the party should wind up its underground activity, abandon its old habits, and transform itself into an ordinary opposition working for its ends openly, within the limits prescribed by the law--like the European Socialist parties.  Those who preached this 'revaluation of values' were derogatorily labeled by Lenin 'the liquidators', the grave-diggers of the party.
Deutscher, Isaac. Stalin; A Political Biography. New York: Oxford Univ. Press, 1967, p. 94
 
 
TROTSKY’S EGO CAUSED HIM TO OPPOSE DEMOCRATIC CENTRALISM
 
Trotsky apparently opposed "centralism" then, as he was to do a quarter of a century later, less out of attachment to Democratic methods than out of opposition to dictation by anyone but itself.  For the next fourteen years he fought Lenin.  But also quarreled intermittently with the Menshevik leaders.  He was detested by Plekhanov, although at times they made common cause against Lenin.
Schuman, Frederick L. Soviet Politics. New York: A.A. Knopf, 1946, p. 48
 
            By comparison with what he had said about Stalin, his [Lenin] characterization of Trotsky was more critical, in spite of the tribute to his greater talents.  Lenin recalled a recent instance of Trotsky's 'struggle against the Central Committee', in which Trotsky displayed 'too far-reaching a self-confidence and a disposition to be too much attracted by the purely administrative side of affairs '.  If the party were to choose between the 'two most able men' on the basis of these remarks only, the odds might have been slightly in Stalin's favor.  Not only were Trotsky's shortcomings stressed with the greater emphasis; Lenin also hinted at Trotsky's inclination to oppose himself to the Central Committee, a grave fault in the leader of a party which was bred in discipline, team-work, and was suspicious of 'individualism'.
Deutscher, Isaac. Stalin; A Political Biography. New York: Oxford Univ. Press, 1967, p. 248
 
 
TROTSKY DENOUNCED LENIN FOR BEING A REACTIONARY DICTATOR
 
Trotsky in turn denounced Lenin as the "head of the reactionary wing of our party" and a "dull caricature of the tragic intransigence of Jacobinism."  He further observed that Lenin's conception of centralism would lead to a situation in which "the organization of the party takes the place of the party itself, the Central Committee takes the place of the organization, and finally the dictator takes a place of the Central Committee."  The Bolsheviks under "Maximilien Lenin," he contended, were aiming at "a dictatorship over the proletariat."
Schuman, Frederick L. Soviet Politics. New York: A.A. Knopf, 1946, p. 49
 
Trotsky condemned Lenin for "sectarian spirit, individualism of the intellectual, and ideological fetishism."
            Trotsky in turn wrote to Chkheidze that Lenin was a master at "petty squabbling" and that Leninism "flourishes on the dung-heap of sectarianism" and is "founded on lies and falsifications and carries within itself the poison germ of it's own decomposition.”  (Souvarine pp. 131 -- 32)
Schuman, Frederick L. Soviet Politics. New York: A.A. Knopf, 1946, p. 51
 
            [In a speech on the Trotskyist Opposition delivered at a joint plenum of the Central Committee and Central Control Commission of the CPSU on October 23, 1927 Stalin quoted Trotsky's letter to Chkheidze in 1913 denouncing Lenin and said] Is it surprising, then, that Trotsky, who wrote in such an ill-mannered way about the great Lenin, whose shoelaces he
was not worthy of tying should now hurl abuse at one of Lenin's numerous pupils--Comrade Stalin?
Stalin, Joseph.  Works. Moscow: Foreign Languages Pub. House, 1952, Vol. 10, p. 178
 
 
BOLSHEVIKS TOOK OVER WITH VERY LITTLE VIOLENCE
 
...In any case, contrary to the impression which soon became current in the West, the Soviet Government between November and June, 1917-18, established itself and pursued its program with the less violence and with far fewer victims than any other social revolutionary regime in human annals.
Schuman, Frederick L. Soviet Politics. New York: A.A. Knopf, 1946, p. 129
 
OTHER PARTIES WERE ALLOWED TO OPERATE WHEN BOLSHEVIKS BEGAN
 
            During this period the practical meaning of the time-honored Marxist slogan of a "dictatorship of the proletariat," as defined and implemented by the Bolsheviks, was not that the Party alone should rule.  All parties were welcome to participate, provided that they accepted the goal of socialism, represented workers and peasants, and acknowledged the Soviet as the basis of the new State.
Schuman, Frederick L. Soviet Politics. New York: A.A. Knopf, 1946, p. 129
 
            For the first seven months after the Bolshevik revolution there were still opposition parties in the Soviets, though they were minorities.  The first Soviet Government was a coalition government, a coalition between the Bolshevik party and the Left wing of the peasant Social Revolutionary Party, which at that time adhered to the Soviet regime with its dictatorship of the workers and peasants.
Basseches, Nikolaus. Stalin. London, New York: Staples Press, 1952, p. 275
 
            I wanted to hear the so-called "Bloody Czar" himself talk about the terror, and include a part of our conversation, such as it was then published in Russia with Stalin's permission.
            "You have led the life of a conspirator for such a long time," I said to Stalin; "and do you now think that, under your present rule, illegal agitation is no longer possible?"
            "It is possible, at least to some extent."
            "Is the fear of this possibility the reason why you are still governing with so much severity, so many years after the revolution?"
            "No, I will illustrate the chief reason for this by giving a few historical examples.  When the Bolsheviks came to power they were soft and easy with their enemies.  At that time, for example, the Mensheviks (Moderate Socialists) had their lawful newspapers and also the Social Revolutionaries.  Even the military cadets had their newspapers.  When the white-haired Gen. Krasnov marched upon Leningrad and was arrested by us, under the military law he should have been shot or at least imprisoned, but we set him free on his word of honor.  Afterward it became clear that with this policy we were undermining the very system we were endeavoring to construct.  We had begun by making a mistake.  Leniency toward such a power was a crime against the working classes.  Then we realized that the only way to get ahead was by the policy of absolute severity and intransigence.
Ludwig, Emil, Stalin. New York, New York: G. P. Putnam's sons, 1942, p. 172
 
            In the spring of 1918 the Bolsheviks were not the only legal party.  The Left Social Revolutionaries, Mensheviks, Menshevik internationalists, Anarchists, Maximalists, and several other small political parties also existed legally and published their newspapers.  After the Brest-Litovsk treaty they were all in opposition to the Bolsheviks.  Naturally, the Bolsheviks kept a very close eye on this opposition press.
            ... The Social Revolutionaries, who at this time [early 1918] were the political allies of the Mensheviks,...
Medvedev, Roy. Let History Judge. New York: Columbia University Press, 1989, p. 52
 
            Of course the Right Socialist-Revolutionaries had a long record of crimes against the Soviet government.  Suffice it to recall Fannie Kaplan's attempt to kill Lenin in 1918, the assassinations of Uritsky and Volodarsky, and the crimes of Socialist-Revolutionary authorities in the Volga Region during the summer of 1918 and in Arkhangelsk.  Nonetheless, in 1919 the Soviet government had declared an amnesty and legalized the Right Socialist Revolutionary Party, which began to publish its newspaper, Delo Naroda, in Moscow.
Medvedev, Roy. Let History Judge. New York: Columbia University Press, 1989, p. 645
 
            In December 1919, the Social-Democrats Internationalists voted to join the Communist Party.
            As a reward for this about-face, the Bolshevik leadership reversed its decision of the previous June to expel the Mensheviks from the Soviets.  In January 1919 the party received permission to bring out its organ, the newspaper Vsegda vpered.  The paper published such scathing criticism of the government, especially of the Red Terror, however, that it was closed after several issues.  It never reappeared.
Pipes, Richard.  Russia Under the Bolshevik Regime. New York: A.A. Knopf, 1993, p. 43
 
            The main body of the SR Party felt it had no choice but to adopt the policy of accommodation as well....
            SR's were instructed to work for the overthrow of the governments of Denikin and Kolchak but to refrain from actively resisting the Communist regime.  The policy was justified as a "tactical" concession that did not imply even a conditional recognition of Bolshevik authority.  This stipulation did not alter the fact that at the decisive phase of the Civil War, the Socialist-Revolutionaries placed themselves squarely on the side of the Bolsheviks.  As a reward, in February 1919 they were also allowed to rejoin the soviets.  On March 20, the SR Party was legalized and given permission to bring out its daily, Delo naroda.  The paper, the first copy of which appeared on the same day, was suspended after six issues.
Pipes, Richard. Russia Under the Bolshevik Regime. New York: A.A. Knopf, 1993, p. 44
 
            On November 7, 1917, Lenin decreed advertising a state monopoly which deprived the press of its principal source of income.  The authorities also nationalized many printing establishments, turning them over to Bolshevik organizations.  Even so, an independent press managed to carry on.  Between October 1917 and June 1918, some 300 non-Bolshevik newspapers continued to appear in the provincial towns, that is, outside Moscow and Petrograd.  In Moscow alone, there were 150 independent dailies.
Pipes, Richard.  Russia Under the Bolshevik Regime. New York: A.A. Knopf, 1993, p. 293
 
            A more specific consequence of Brest Litovsk was the breakup of the coalition between the Bolsheviks and left Social Revolutionaries.  The latter resigned from the Government in March.  Their motives were in part identical with those of the left Communists; in part they were dictated by ordinary nationalism.  From now on power would be exercised by a single party.  Government by a single party had hitherto not been a plank in the Bolshevik program.  But the course of events was such that the Bolsheviks could not help becoming the country's sole rulers after their partners had refused to share responsibility for the peace.  Alone in office, they still refrained from suppressing their opponents, except for the extreme right the initiators of the civil war.  Only in June 1918, when the civil war was already in full swing, were the Mensheviks and the right-wing Social Revolutionaries temporarily outlawed, on the ground that some of their members sided with the White Guards.  The Mensheviks were again permitted to come into the open in November of the same year when they pledged themselves to act as a loyal opposition within the framework of the Soviet regime.
Deutscher, Isaac. Stalin; A Political Biography. New York: Oxford Univ. Press, 1967, p. 190
 
            ...At first the Bolsheviks tried to display tolerance towards their opponents.  At the congresses of Soviets and trade unions, Menshevik, Social Revolutionary, Syndicalist, and Anarchist spokesman freely and severely criticized the Government.  A restricted but still wide freedom of expression existed.  The ruling party itself was continually alive with open controversy, in which ideas were vigorously thrashed out and no authority was spared.  Its members were free to form themselves into separate groups and factions in order to promote their views inside the party.  There was no clear-cut or stable line of division between the groups and factions that fluctuated with events and with the issues as they arose.  The libertarian spirit of the revolution survived the climax of the civil war until well into the year 1920.  It was in the latest phases of the struggle, when victory was virtually assured, that it began to vanish, that the parties of the opposition were denied legal existence, and that even the ruling party found its freedom hemmed in by restrictions and coercion.
Deutscher, Isaac. Stalin; A Political Biography. New York: Oxford Univ. Press, 1967, p. 217-218
 
            The Sovnarkom met three times, on 7, 8, and 9 December 1917, under Lenin's chairmanship, to discuss broadening the political base of the new regime by including some Left Socialist-Revolutionaries (Left SR's), and finally agreed to include seven of them, five as People's Commissars and two as ministers without portfolio.
Volkogonov, Dmitrii.  Autopsy for an Empire. New York: Free Press, c1998, p. 13
 
            During the first four years of Soviet power, non-Bolshevik working-class parties continued to operate legally in the Soviet Union.  The Left Social Revolutionaries were co-partners with the Bolsheviks on the ruling Council of People's Commissars (occupying 7 of the 18 seats) until July 1918.  When, in July 1918, the Left Social Revolutionaries declared themselves in opposition to the Bolshevik leadership of the Civil War, and actually organized an armed insurrection, they were temporarily banned from participation in the Soviets.  Although they had not supported the seizure of power, the Right Social Revolutionaries and Mensheviks were active in the Soviets until they were banned from participation, also in June 1918, they were temporarily excluded owing to their failure to support the Reds in the Civil War.  But even after their expulsion the three parties continued to operate as legal and active political organizations.  The decrees banning Menshevik and Social Revolutionary participation in the Soviets were rescinded in the winter of 1918-19 after these organizations declared themselves opposed to foreign intervention and to collaboration with the bourgeoisie (i.e., had declared their support of the Reds in the Civil War).  The Right Social Revolutionaries were allowed to resume publication of their newspaper in 1919, and both groups legally held congresses during 1919.  In 1920 the Mensheviks were still electing substantial numbers of representatives to the Soviets in a number of cities, including Moscow.
Szymanski, Albert.  Human Rights in the Soviet Union. London: Zed Books, 1984, p. 209
 
            For the next three years, the Menshevik leadership represented the democratic opposition, within the legal means permitted.  Lenin, meanwhile, missed no opportunity to launch insulting attacks on his former comrades.  Nevertheless, until 1920 the Menshevik's led a more or less legal existence, even if the term "Social Democrat" became a dirty word.  Then the Politburo launched open persecution, beginning with "semi-harsh" measures.  On June 22, 1922, it was decided that the political activity of "these accomplices of the bourgeoisie" must be "curtailed," and that this should be achieved for the time being by exile:...
Volkogonov, Dmitrii. Lenin: A New Biography. New York: Free Press, 1994, p. 86
 
            On 30 November 1917,.. he [Lenin] was assisted in these "initiatives" [governmental changes] by the Left SR's, to whom, after debate in the Central Committee, he decided to give several portfolios.  The matter was reviewed by the Sovnarkom on 9 December, and a decision was taken to make it a condition that the Left SR's "must follow the general policy of the Sovnarkom."  That is, the Bolshevik Central Committee.  After a night of negotiation between Sverdlov and the Left SR representatives, it was announced at the Sovnarkom that "full agreement" had been reached.  Agriculture was given to Kollegaev, Justice to Shteinberg, Posts and Telegraph to Proshyan, Local Self-Government to Trutovsky, State Property to Karelin, and Algasov was made People's Commissar without portfolio but with voting powers....
            Although the Left SR's were hardly less radical than the Bolsheviks themselves (they tended to stress peasant interests), this interval in Soviet history represented a rare moment of socialist pluralism...
            But, for a time, the collaboration was a fact.  Of the 20 members of the Cheka Collegium, seven were Left SR's, including Dzerzhinsky's deputies Alexandrovich and Zaks.  In April 1918 the Left SR's helped the Bolsheviks to crush the Anarchists...and also helped to spread Bolshevik influence in the countryside by supporting the...decree of 13 May 1918 which legitimized the confiscation of grain from the peasants.
Volkogonov, Dmitrii. Lenin: A New Biography. New York: Free Press, 1994, p. 171-172
 
            The Soviet Government had a coalition with the Left Socialist-Revolutionists during the first year of its existence.  This is not generally realized.  It was not until 1919 that the non-Bolshevist commissars were forced out from Lenin's cabinet.
Levine, Isaac Don.  Stalin.  New York: Cosmopolitan Book Corporation, c1931, p. 203
 
            The Bolsheviks began the heroic period of revolution by erring on the side of tolerance and forbearance in the treatment of all the non-Bolshevik political parties.  The bourgeois, Social Revolutionary and Menshevik newspapers turned from the first days of October into a harmonizing chorus of howling wolves, prowling jackals and baying mad dogs.  Only Novoye Vremya [The New Times], the shameless organ of the darkest Tsarist reaction, attempted super-subtle maneuvering by trying to maintain a "loyal" tone, wagging its tail.  Lenin saw through them all and saw the danger of tolerating the whole pack of them.  "Are we going to let this rabble get away with it?"  Ilyich demanded on every occasion.  "Good Lord!  What kind of dictatorship have we!"  The newspapers of these hyenas pounced upon the phrase "plunder the plunderers" and made the most of it in editorials, in verse, in special articles.  "What aren't they doing to that 'plunder the plunderers,'" Lenin  exclaimed once in jocular despair.  "Who really said it?"  I asked, "or is it pure fabrication?"-- "Not at all!"  Lenin retorted.  "I did actually use those words.  Said them and forgot about them.  And here they've made a whole program of them!"  He waved his hand humorously.
Trotsky, Leon,  Stalin. New York: Harper and Brothers Publishers, 1941, p. 338
 
EXPROPRIATIONS PROCEEDED SLOWLY AT FIRST AFTER THE REVOLUTION
 
But there was no sweeping nationalization of business property.  By mid-May of 1918 only 304 plants had been nationalized, mainly in mining and heavy industry.  Even foreign trade remained in private hands until April 2, 1918, when it was made a state monopoly.  Lenin moved slowly toward socialism....
Schuman, Frederick L. Soviet Politics. New York: A.A. Knopf, 1946, p. 130
 
SU BECAME ONE-PARTY DICTATORSHIP IN SUM. 1918 BECAUSE OF ATTACKS
 
During this summer of 1918 the Soviet government became a one party dictatorship, ruthlessly suppressing all opposition by terror.  Its transformation was occasioned by armed attacks launched against it from all points of the compass by its domestic and foreign foes, employing all possible weapons from conspiracy and blockade to invasion and assassination.
Schuman, Frederick L. Soviet Politics. New York: A.A. Knopf, 1946, p. 142
 
            In reply to a question on the monopoly of legality by the Communist Party, Stalin said, "... The monopoly of our party grew out of life, it developed historically as a result of the fact that the Socialist Revolutionary Party and the Menshevik Party became absolutely bankrupt and departed from the stage of our social life.
            "What were the Socialist Revolutionary Party and the Menshevik Party in the past?  They were channels for conducting bourgeois influence into the ranks of the proletariat.  By what were these parties cultivated and sustained prior to October 1917?  By the existence of the bourgeois class and ultimately by the existence of bourgeois rule.  Clearly, when the bourgeoisie were overthrown the basis for the existence of these parties disappeared.  What did these parties become after October 1917?  They became parties for the restoration of capitalism and for the overthrow of the rule of the proletariat.  Clearly these parties have lost all support and all influence among the workers and the toiling strata of the peasantry."
Davis, Jerome.  Behind Soviet Power. New York, N. Y.: The Readers' Press, Inc., c1946, p. 37
 
 
MIRBACH MURDER LED TO SUPPRESSION OF OTHER PARTIES
 
...The murder of Mirbach and the abortive revolt of the Left Social Revolutionaries on the next day, followed by the desertion of the Social Revolutionary General Muraviev to the enemy at Simbirsk, led to the suppression of the [SR] party.  By the time the first Soviet Constitution was promulgated (July 19) all the SR’s, Mensheviks, and Cadets were at war with the Communists and prepared to cooperate with the Allies and White reactionaries for the overthrow of the Soviet.
Schuman, Frederick L. Soviet Politics. New York: A.A. Knopf, 1946, p. 157
 
STALIN’S ANALYSES ARE BETTER THEN HIS OPPONENTS
 
On the whole Stalin's judgments, both at home and abroad, as to which evils were greater and which lesser were vindicated by the course of ends.
            The various intra-party oppositionists, both left in right, were almost invariably wrong in their estimates of the changing situation within the USSR and in the outside world.  They would not have won the support of a majority of the membership even under a regime permitting complete freedom of speech, press, propaganda, and political action.  Many of them were guilty from the outset of gross infractions of party discipline.  None of them, however, had any original desire to "restore capitalism" or cooperate with foreign enemies of the Soviet Union.  But after 1930, when their failures and frustrations begot irresistible aggression's against Stalin's leadership, some of them resorted to sabotage, assassination, and conspiracy with foreign agents in the hope of disrupting the Soviet state and thereby creating an opportunity for their own return to power.
Schuman, Frederick L. Soviet Politics. New York: A.A. Knopf, 1946, p. 197
 
            The October Revolution saddled this small organization with a stupendous task, and it is remarkable that Lenin could find even a bare minimum of comrades capable of doing the job at all.  That the regime survived owes much to people like Stalin, in whom previously untapped qualities were discovered, most especially an aptitude for exercising power.  Stalin's affinity for authority began with a zest for it.  This sounds obvious enough, but there are serious grounds to doubt that many of the leading Bolsheviks, Trotsky, Zinoviev, and Bukharin among them, fully shared this quality.  Certainly none of them displayed in the five years of Lenin's rule the capacity for politics and administration that Stalin revealed in this time.
McNeal, Robert, Stalin: Man and Ruler. New York: New York University Press, 1988, p. 48
 
PRIOR TO KIROV KILLING THERE WAS NO CRACKDOWN
 
Prior to this tragic finale [the decision of the Opposition to use terror and sabotage], Stalin and his colleagues displayed no blood thirsty passion to exterminate opponents, but on the contrary, acted with remarkable patience and toleration in an effort to conciliate and reconvert the dissenters.
Schuman, Frederick L. Soviet Politics. New York: A.A. Knopf, 1946, p. 198
 
STALIN SAVED THE SOVIET PEOPLE BY PUSHING THEM
 
            Had the party under Stalin not driven the Soviet people, by terrific pressure and incessant appeals, to prodigious and costly feats of construction and production, and had it not smashed ruthlessly the conspiracies of the 1930’s, the Soviet Union and all the United Nations would have suffered irreparable defeat in World War II at the hands of insanely savage foes who in the end would have left the vanquished without eyes for weeping and without tongues for protest or lamentation.
Schuman, Frederick L. Soviet Politics. New York: A.A. Knopf, 1946, p. 198
 
            The Communists do not merely reflect the will of the masses, as a ballot might, or a showing of hands.  They do not merely analyze what the "majority want" and hand it out.  It is their job to lead, to organize the people's will.  No group of unurged soldiers would ever vote to storm a trench.  Certainly the workers of the Soviet Union would not have voted, un urged, unled, for the hardships of the Five-Year Plan of rapid industrialization taken out of their own food and comforts, for the painful speed of farm collectivization without adequate machines or organizers.  But when the Communist Party analyzed, urged and demanded, showing the world situation and the need of making the USSR well prepared industrially and for defense, showing the enemy classes which must be abolished to attain the goal of a socialist state, they were able to find, organize and create, deep in the heart of the masses, a will that carried through.  Without that will in tens of millions, the 3 million [party members] could have done little.
Strong, Anna Louise.  This Soviet World. New York, N. Y: H. Holt and company, c1936, p. 104
 
 
            During the decade from 1930 to 1940 some 200 industrial aggregates of all kinds were constructed and put into operation in the Urals.  This herculean task was accomplished thanks to the political sagacity of Joseph Stalin and his relentless perseverance in forcing through the realization of his construction program despite fantastic costs and fierce difficulties.
Scott, John. Behind the Urals, Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1942, p. 256
 
            ...The reconstruction effort, added to the increased capacity which had been developed in the Urals and Siberia during the war, insured that by the time of Stalin's death the Soviet industrial infrastructure had recovered from the ravages of the war.
Gill, Graeme.  Stalinism. Atlantic Highlands, N.J.: Humanities Press International, 1990, p. 43
 
MOLOTOV:  We demanded great sacrifices from workers and peasants before the war.  We paid little to peasants for bread or cotton or their labor--we simply had nothing to pay with!  What to pay?  We are reproached--we didn't think of the material interests of the peasants.  Well, if we had, we would have wound up in a dead end.  We didn't have enough money for cannons!
Chuev, Feliks. Molotov Remembers. Chicago: I. R. Dee, 1993, p. 27
 
            A first-class industry had to be created.  This industry had to be so directed as to be capable of technically reorganizing not only industry, but also our agriculture and our railway transport.  And for this it was necessary to make sacrifices and to impose rigorous economy in everything; it was necessary to economize on food, on schools and on textiles, in order to accumulate the funds required for the creation of industry.  There was no other way of overcoming the famine in technical resources.  Thus Lenin taught us, and in this matter we followed in the footsteps of Lenin....
            Well then, there were comrades among us who were scared by the difficulties and began to call on the Party to retreat.  They said: "What is the good of your industrialization and collectivization, your machines, iron and steel industry, tractors, combines, automobiles?  It would be better if you gave us more textiles, if you bought more raw materials for the production of consumers' goods and gave the population more of the small things which adorn the life of man.  The creation of industry, and a first-class industry at that, when we are so backward, is a dangerous dream."
            Of course, w­e could have used the 3 billion rubles of foreign currency obtained as a result of the severest economy, and spent on the creation of our industry, for the importation of raw materials and for increasing the production of articles of general consumption.  That is also a kind of "plan."  But with such a "plan" we should not have had a metallurgical industry, or a machine-building industry, or tractors and automobiles, or airplanes and tanks.  We should have found ourselves unarmed in the face of the external foe.  We should have undermined the foundations of Socialism in our country.  We should found ourselves in captivity to the bourgeoisie, home and foreign.
Stalin, Joseph.  Stalin's Kampf. New York: Howell, Soskin & Company, c1940, p. 95-96
 
            He [Stalin] 'built socialism'; and even his opponents, while denouncing his autocracy, admitted that most of his economic reforms were indeed essential for socialism.
Deutscher, Isaac. Stalin; A Political Biography. New York: Oxford Univ. Press, 1967, p. 361
 
 
TROTSKY HAD TIME TO GET TO LENIN’S FUNERAL
 
            When Lenin died, Trotsky was in Tiflis.  He was at once informed by wire from Stalin.  He had a week to get back to Moscow for the funeral and was not too ill to do so.  Instead he went to Sukhumi on the Black Sea coast.  His absence at the last rites was the first of a long series of political blunders.
Schuman, Frederick L. Soviet Politics. New York: A.A. Knopf, 1946, p. 199
 
Whatever may have been his reasons, Trotsky's failure to pay his last tribute to the dead leader horrified the people of Moscow as a want of respect and good taste.  It was, moreover a political error of the first magnitude and dealt a fatal blow to Trotsky's prestige....  To this day I cannot imagine why he did not come.
Duranty, Walter.  I Write as I Please. New York: Simon and Schuster, 1935, p. 225
 
Such a combination of personal callousness and political insensitiveness does more to explain Trotsky's downfall than a hundred books by Stalin's warmest supporters.  From that time onwards, although he had many devoted adherents in the Party, he had irretrievably "lost face" with the mass of the Russian people.
Duranty, Walter.  I Write as I Please. New York: Simon and Schuster, 1935, p. 228
 
It is clear from his own account that it was not the state of his health which prevented Trotsky from taking part in Lenin's funeral.
Duranty, Walter.  I Write as I Please. New York: Simon and Schuster, 1935, p. 229
 
One only of the highest party leaders was not there--Trotsky, President of the War Council and Minister of War.  He was in the Caucasus.
Basseches, Nikolaus. Stalin. London, New York: Staples Press, 1952, p. 97
 
            The body was laid in state in the Kremlin, while members of the Bolshevik Central Committee took turns to watch over the remains of the revered leader....  among the symbolic figures standing silently by the bier, Stalin was prominent, but Trotsky was never seen.  In his later efforts to justify this amazing stupidity, Trotsky took refuge behind the fact that he was ill at the time and only received the news of Lenin's death while traveling to the Caucasian Riviera for a holiday, a fact which would certainly not have prevented Stalin from taking his place by the body.
Cole, David M.   Josef Stalin; Man of Steel. London, New York: Rich & Cowan, 1942, p. 61
 
            The absence of Trotsky was the absorbing question in that week of strain and sorrow to everyone in Moscow, whether Russian or foreign.  It was a period of intense popular emotion and we all knew that to 9/10's of the Russian masses Trotsky was second only to Lenin in popular esteem.  He was said to be sick and traveling to a cure in the Caucasus, but nothing could condone his absence save the fact that he was so near death that it would have been fatal for him to make the return journey, which was not the case.  Whatever may have been his reasons, Trotsky's failure to pay his last tribute to the dead leader horrified the people of Moscow as a want of respect and good taste.  It was, moreover, a political error of the first magnitude and dealt a fatal blow to Trotsky's prestige, which his adversaries were quick to see and turn to good account.  To this day I cannot imagine why he did not come.  The night after the funeral I discussed the problem with my friend Rollin, the only French correspondent in Moscow at that time....
            Rollin agreed with me that Trotsky's absence was inexplicable.  "From all I can learn," he said, "Trotsky is not even dangerously ill, although I won't accept the view that his illness is wholly, or mainly, diplomatic."  He paused and rubbed his high, broad forehead.  "Yes," he said, "it's extraordinary--worse than any surrender.  How pleased Stalin must be!"
Duranty, Walter.  Story of Soviet Russia. Philadelphia, N. Y.: JB Lippincott Co. 1944, p. 99
 
            Rollin continues, "As a matter of personal respect to Lenin, Trotsky should have risen from his death-bed to be present; it was his duty and obligation, and there isn't a man or woman in the whole country who doesn't think so.  It is a blunder that will cost him dearly.  Think too of what he missed; if he had come to Moscow, he couldn't have failed to be the central figure in the funeral ceremonies.  No one would have dared to interfere with him; he would have stolen the show, as you say in America, whether Stalin and the others liked it or not.  But he did not come.  Henceforth, I tell you, my money is on Stalin."
            "So his mine," I said, "but it was already."
Duranty, Walter.  Story of Soviet Russia. Philadelphia, N. Y.: JB Lippincott Co. 1944, p. 100
 
            Trotsky's own explanation in his autobiography of his absence from Lenin's funeral is thin and unconvincing, and does small credit either to his heart or head.  He declares that a coded message from Stalin announcing Lenin's death was delivered to him in his private car at the station in Tiflis on January 21st, that is to say a few hours after Lenin died.  He continues, "I got the Kremlin on the direct wire.  In answer to my inquiry I was told: 'The funeral will be on Saturday; you cannot get back in time and so we advise you to continue your treatment.' Accordingly, I had no choice.  As a matter of fact, the funeral did not take place until Sunday and I could easily have reached Moscow by then.  Incredible as it may appear, I was even deceived about the date of the funeral."
            This final accusation was as unjust as it was ungenerous.  Lenin died on the afternoon of Monday, January 21st, and his funeral was originally set for Saturday, the 26, but the number of people who wished to see him was so great--thousands came from places more distant than Tiflis--that it was postponed 24 hours.  The journey from Moscow to Tiflis by ordinary express takes three days and three nights--allow four or even five days and nights in 1924 in winter-time.  Trotsky's private car was in the station when he received the news on Monday night.  Tiflis is one of the biggest railroad depots in south Russia and there is not the slightest doubt that the Red war-lord, whose authority was still unquestioned, could have ordered a special chain and been back in Moscow within 72 hours.  Trotsky's account continues theatrically, "The Tiflis comrades came to demand that I should write on Lenin's death at once.  But I knew only one urgent desire--and that was to be alone.  I could not stretch my hand to lift the pen."  He then adds that he wrote a "few handwritten pages."  Strangest of all, there is no word in Trotsky's recital of any surmise on his part, much less compunction, as to what people in Moscow might feel about his failure to return immediately.  Any thought of the duty he owed to his dead comrade seems to have been as remote from his mind as perception of the political effects of his absence.  Instead he writes of spending those days before the funeral lying on a balcony in the sun at Sukhumi, a twenty-four hour train journey from Tiflis which apparently caused him no physical distress--facing the glittering sea and the huge palms--and of his own "sensation of running a temperature" with which mingled, he says, thoughts of Lenin's death.  To make the picture complete Trotsky quotes a passage from his wife's diary: "We arrived quite broken down; it was the first time we had seen Sukhumi.  The mimosa were in full bloom, magnificent palms, camellias.  In the dining room of the rest-house there were two portraits on the wall, one--draped in black--of Vladimir Ilich, the other of L. D. (Trotsky).  We felt like taking the latter one down but thought it would be too demonstrative."  Later Madame Trotsky wrote: "Our friends were expecting L. D. to come to Moscow and thought he would cut short his trip in order to return, since no one imagined that Stalin’s telegram had cut off his return.”  (This refers to the [alleged] message from the Kremlin saying that the funeral would be on Saturday and that Trotsky could not get back in time.)  “I remember my son’s letter received at Sukhumi.  He was terribly shocked by Lenin’s death and, though suffering from a cold with a temperature of 104, he went in his not very warm coat to the Hall of Columns to pay his last respects and waited, waited, and waited with impatience for our arrival.  One could feel in his letter his bitter bewilderment and diffident reproach.”  On these extracts from his wife’s diary Trotsky makes no comment at all.
Duranty, Walter. Story of Soviet Russia. Philadelphia, N. Y.: JB Lippincott Co. 1944, p. 100
 
 
            Such a combination of personal callousness and political insensitiveness does more to explain Trotsky's downfall than 100 books by Stalin's warmest supporters....  From that time onwards, although he had many devoted adherents in the Party, he had irretrievably "lost face" with the mass of the Russian people.  His adversaries in Russia have not failed to question the genuineness of his illness at that time; they have claimed that it was sickness of spirit rather than sickness of body,  that Trotsky had made an ambitious bid for Lenin’s succession and when he failed his wounded egotism turned on itself like a scorpion and poisoned him....  It is clear from his own account that it was not the state of his health which prevented him from taking part in Lenin's funeral.
Duranty, Walter. Story of Soviet Russia. Philadelphia, N. Y.: JB Lippincott Co. 1944, p. 102
 
            The most decisive of such shifts in personnel was the replacement of Slansky, Trotsky's right-hand man in the Commissariat of War, by Frunze, who later succeeded Trotsky as Commissar of War.  This and other similar changes were approved by the Thirteenth Party Congress, in May, 1924, which Trotsky inexplicably failed to attend--a political blunder scarcely less disastrous than his failure to attend Lenin's funeral.
            The truth of the matter was that Trotsky was prostrate and broken, not by defeat at the Conference or, as he himself suggests, by illness, but by the sickening realization of what his absence from the funeral had done to him and his career....  I have already suggested that the cause of his illness was psychological as well as physical.  In what torment he must have writhed when letter after letter, friend after friend, told him, albeit unwillingly, the plain and sorry truth.  At first, I have been informed, he refused to believe that his tremendous popularity had not only faded but was changed in no small degree to resentment.  Gradually, despite himself, he was forced to understand that this was the case, and, worse still, that he had missed the heaven-sent opportunity of confirming in the mind of the masses the position that he claimed of Lenin's right hand and destined successor.
Duranty, Walter.  Story of Soviet Russia. Philadelphia, N. Y.: JB Lippincott Co. 1944, p. 108
 
            On the day of Lenin's death, Trotsky arrived in Tiflis en route to the resort city of Sukhumi.  He learned of it the next day from a coded telegram signed by Stalin.  In response to a cable query, Stalin advised him that the funeral would take place on Saturday (Jan. 26) and added that since there was not enough time for him to return for the funeral, the Politburo thought it best that he proceed to Sukhumi as planned.  As it turned out, the funeral took place on Sunday.  Trotsky subsequently accused Stalin of deliberately misinforming him in order to have him miss the funeral.  The charge does not stand up to scrutiny.  Lenin died on Monday and Trotsky had the information on Tuesday morning.  It had taken him three days to travel from Moscow to Tiflis.  Had he immediately turned around, he could have reached Moscow by Friday at the latest, in good time to attend the funeral even if it had been on Saturday.  Instead, for reasons he never satisfactorily explained, he followed Stalin's advice and went on to Sukhumi.  There he basked in the Black Sea sun while Lenin's body lay in state in wintry Moscow attended by the Old Guard.  His absence caused widespread surprise and dismay.
            [Footnote]: The decision to postpone Lenin's funeral to Sunday was announced only on Friday, Jan. 25, so that it is by no means apparent that in cabling on Jan. 22 that it would take place on Saturday, Stalin was deliberately deceiving him, as Trotsky later claimed.  Deutscher, in a not uncharacteristic instance of carelessness favorable to his hero, claims that Stalin advised Trotsky the funeral would be "the next day".  Stalin's second cable stated that the funeral would be on Saturday, i.e., not the "next" day but in four days.
Pipes, Richard. Russia Under the Bolshevik Regime. New York: A.A. Knopf, 1993, p. 487
 
            In any case, his [Trotsky] subsequent explanation that he was misled by Stalin as to the date of the funeral and that he could not possibly make it back to Moscow on time does not hold water....
            [Footnote]: He [Trotsky] alleges being told on January 22 that it would be on January 26 (and not, as Deutscher states, on the next day), while it actually took place on January 27.   Even so, only three days by regular train separated Tiflis from Moscow.
Ulam, Adam. Stalin;  The Man and his Era. New York: Viking Press, 1973, p. 235
 
            At 6:50 p.m. on Monday 21 January 1924, Lenin died.
            Stalin notified all regional and republican Party committees of Lenin's death, and called for immediate steps to maintain order and prevent panic.  Among his numerous other chores, Stalin sent a coded cable to Tiflis: "Tell Comrade Trotsky that on 21 January at 6:50 p.m. Comrade Lenin died suddenly.   Death was caused by paralysis of the respiratory center.  Funeral Saturday 26 January 1924."
Volkogonov, Dmitrii. Lenin: A New Biography. New York: Free Press, 1994, p. 435-436
 
            There is no persuasive evidence that Stalin was busy plotting to keep Trotsky, away from the funeral.  In his autobiography, Trotsky says that he wired 'the Kremlin' and that 'the conspirators' falsely told him that the funeral would be on the 26th, which would not permit Trotsky to return in time from his sick-leave in Georgia.  No substantiating documents have turned up in Trotsky's archive, although one might expect that he would have taken some pains to preserve such a communication.  Even if true, the report does not mention Stalin by name, and tends to inculcate other comrades.  Stalin's office was not in the Kremlin at this time, and if Trotsky had contacted Lenin's office, the office of the Sovnarkom, which was in the Kremlin, he would not have been dealing with Stalin.  In any case, it was a remarkable political error on Trotsky's part not to make every effort to get the date of the funeral changed or to attempt to get back to Moscow.  After all, the narkom of the armed forces could commandeer special trains or even aircraft.
McNeal, Robert, Stalin: Man and Ruler. New York: New York University Press, 1988, p. 86
 
STALIN OPPOSED EXPELLING TROTSKY FROM THE PARTY
 
The 14th Congress in December 1925.  Zinoviev and Kamenev favored the expulsion of Trotsky from the Party.  Stalin opposed them: "Today we cut off one, tomorrow another, the day after tomorrow a third.  But, by then, what will be left of the Party?"
Schuman, Frederick L. Soviet Politics. New York: A.A. Knopf, 1946, p. 203
 
The result [of the Party rejecting Trotsky’s proposals to suppress the kulaks and nepmen] was that the Communist Party Congress in December 1925 rejected Trotsky's proposals, and he was saved from expulsion from the party only by Stalin itself.
            ...The party Congress of December 1927 expelled the Trotskyist critics wholesale....
Duranty, Walter.  Duranty Reports Russia. New York: The Viking Press, 1934, p. 153
 
June 27, 1931--no excuse or evasion of party orders is permitted, and infractions of discipline are punished by a reprimand, or, if repeated, by expulsion from the party.  Of this, Stalin himself, only five years ago, speaking in behalf of Trotsky, when Kamenev and Zinoviev urged his expulsion, said: "Expulsion is a final and fatal weapon to be employed only in a hopeless case."
Duranty, Walter.  Duranty Reports Russia. New York: The Viking Press, 1934, p. 217
 
            Of this, Stalin himself, only five years ago, speaking in behalf of Leon Trotsky, when Kamenev and Zinoviev urged his expulsion, said:
            “Expulsion is a final and fatal weapon to be employed only in a hopeless case.”
Duranty, Walter.  “Stalinism’s Mark is Party Discipline,” New York Times, June 27, 1931.
 
            Far more damaging were Stalin's revelations of all the discreditable maneuvers of Zinoviev against Trotsky.  Pravda gave details of a secret meeting between Stalin and his two late associates on the Troika, in which Zinoviev had descended so low as to suggest that Trotsky be removed by an assassin in such a way that the deed could be attributed to some counter revolutionary agent.  Stalin's reply was characteristic: he did not deplore the moral aspect of the situation, which probably never occurred to him, but he would not be a party to such bad political tactics.  "Why make a martyr out of Trotsky, who will certainly be defeated anyway?"  he is alleged to have replied, adding the significant warning: "An amputation policy is full of dangers to the Party, the amputation method is dangerous and infectious; today one is amputated, another tomorrow, a third the day after.  What will be left of the Party in the end?"
            Stalin had not forgotten the tragic history of the French Revolutionary leaders, who turned from mutual assistance to rend one another in a fight for power, only to elevate Napoleon Bonaparte to an Imperial throne.
Cole, David M.   Josef Stalin; Man of Steel. London, New York: Rich & Cowan, 1942, p. 68
 
            The year 1925 represented a new turn in the situation.  Trotsky returned from the Caucasus in the spring and filled several minor posts, including that of head of the Concessions Committee.  Meanwhile a breach had developed between Stalin and his associates, Zinoviev and Kamenev.  The latter desired to apply much more drastic punitive measures against Trotsky, including even his expulsion from the party.  Stalin opposed this and carried the majority of the Politburo and the Central Committee with him.
Chamberlin, William Henry. Soviet Russia. Boston: Little, Brown, 1930, p. 71
 
            And when defeatists like Kamenev and Zinoviev, after the 14th Party Conference of the CPSU, declared themselves against the possibility of building socialism, Trotsky, sharing their defeatism and skepticism, rushed to form an opportunist alliance with them--the same Zinoviev and Kamenev  whom Trotsky had described in his Lessons of October as right-wingers and whose removal from the Party he had been seeking only recently; the same Zinoviev and Kamenev who in turn had been trying their utmost to secure the removal of Trotsky from the Party leadership, if not from the Party itself.  In fact it was none other than Stalin (the same Stalin who, according to Trotskyite legend, was afraid of the “brilliance” of Trotsky and was therefore implacably hostile to him, seeking his removal from the Party at any cost) who opposed Zinoviev and Kamenev's attempts to expel Trotsky from the Party leadership.  Here is what Stalin said in this regard:
            "We know that the policy of lopping off, the method of blood letting [it was blood letting that Kamenev and Zinoviev were demanding] is dangerous and infectious.  Today, you lop off one limb, tomorrow another, the day after tomorrow a third-and what is left of the Party?"
            All this, however, does not prevent the Trotskyites and other bourgeois elements from repeating the above-mentioned legend regarding the alleged implacable hostility of Stalin towards the “brilliant” Trotsky.
Brar, Harpal.  Trotskyism or Leninism. 1993, p. 193
 
            At the Central Committee meeting [January 17-20, 1925] Zinoviev and Kamenev showed eagerness to make the final kill.  Supported by others, they demanded the expulsion of Trotsky not only from the committee and the Politburo but from the party itself.  This, the final sentence of excommunication, was opposed by Stalin.  Reporting later to the 14th Party Congress, he explained that "we, the majority of the Central Committee... did not agree with Comrades Zinoviev and Kamenev because we realized that the policy of cutting off heads is fought with major dangers for the party.... It is a method of blood-letting--and they want blood--dangerous and contagious; today you cutoff one head, tomorrow a second, and then a third: who would remain in the party?"  It was a fateful pronouncement.
Grey, Ian. Stalin, Man of History. London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1979, p. 204
 
            Permit me now to pass to the history of our internal struggle within the majority of the Central Committee.  What did our disaccord start from?  It started from the question: "What is to be done with Trotsky?"  That was at the end of 1924.  The group of Leningrad comrades at first proposed that Trotsky be expelled from the Party.  Here I have in mind the period of the discussion in 1924.  The Leningrad Gubernia at Party Committee passed a resolution that Trotsky be expelled from the Party.  We, i.e., the majority on the Central Committee, did not agree with this, we had some struggle with the Leningrad comrades and persuaded them to delete the point about expulsion from their resolution.  Shortly after this, when the plenum of the Central Committee met and the Leningrad comrades, together with Kamenev, demanded Trotsky's immediate expulsion from the Political Bureau, we also disagreed with this proposal of the opposition, we obtained a majority on the Central Committee and restricted ourselves to removing Trotsky from the post of People's Commissar of Military and Naval Affairs.  We disagreed with Zinoviev and Kamenev because we knew that the policy of amputation was fraught with great dangers for the party, that the method of amputation, the method of blood-letting--and they demanded blood--was dangerous, infectious: today you amputate one limb, tomorrow another, the day after tomorrow a third--what will we have left in the Party?
Stalin, Joseph.  Works. Moscow: Foreign Languages Pub. House, 1952, Vol. 7, p. 389
 
            We are against amputation.  We are against the policy of amputation.  That does not mean that leaders will be permitted with impunity to give themselves airs and ride roughshod over the Party.  No, excuse us from that.  There will be no obeisances to leaders.  We stand for unity, we are against amputation.  The policy of amputation is abhorrent to us.
Stalin, Joseph.  Works. Moscow: Foreign Languages Pub. House, 1952, Vol. 7, p. 401
 
            A more serious struggle ensued in the Central Committee over the fate of Trotsky, who had already been defeated politically.  Zinoviev and Kamenev demanded the expulsion of Trotsky and his closet associates from the party.  On this question Stalin opposed his recent allies, and a majority of the Central Committee agreed with Stalin.  Trotsky was not expelled; indeed, he remained a member of the central committee and the Politburo.  Foreseeing a clash with Zinoviev and Kamenev Stalin wished to neutralize Trotsky and the Trotskyists.  He later said:
            "We did not agree with comrades Zinoviev and Kamenev because we knew that a policy of cutting off members was fraught with great dangers for the party, that the method of cutting off, the method of bloodletting --and they are asking for blood--is dangerous and contagious.  Today one person is cut off, tomorrow another, the next day a third--but what will remain of the party?"
            Most party officials were impressed by this point of view.
            Zinoviev and Kamenev tried to pressure the Politburo through the leadership of the Komsomol, the majority of which consisted of their supporters.  The Komsomol Central Committee passed a surprise resolution demanding the removal of Trotsky from the Politburo.  The Politburo gave a speedy reply: 15 members of the Komsomol Central Committee were removed.  All these episodes marked the collapse of the triumvirate.
Medvedev, Roy. Let History Judge. New York: Columbia University Press, 1989, p. 145
 
            Curiously enough their [Zinoviev and Kamenev] first point of disagreement with the Party Central Committee arose on the question of Trotsky.  Zinoviev and Kamenev wanted to expel Trotsky from the Party.  When this was rejected they returned to the charge and demanded at least his expulsion from the political leadership of the Party.  The Trotskyist legend of the implacable hostility of Stalin to the "brilliant" Trotsky notwithstanding, Zinoviev and Kamenev found no stronger opponent amongst the Party leadership than Stalin.  "We knew," explained Stalin, "that the policy of lopping off might entail grave dangers for the Party.  The method of lopping off, the method of blood-letting (it was blood-letting they wanted) is dangerous and infectious.  Today, you lop off one limb, tomorrow another.  The day after tomorrow a third--and what is left of the Party?"
Campbell, J. R.  Soviet Policy and Its Critics. London: V. Gollancz, ltd., 1939, p. 38
 
            Trotsky was enormously popular with us.  The campaign directed against him, conducted by Zinoviev, to whom Stalin, with great astuteness, had left all initiative in the business, reserving to himself the role of moderating influence, had resulted in the piling up of a great deal of resentment against both Zinoviev and Kamenev.  Both men, realizing what had happened, made a sudden volte-face, and openly joined forces with their adversary of yesterday--Trotsky, the very incarnation of the spirit of opposition, who was developing in secret a scheme for the complete reformation of the regime.
Barmine, Alexandre.  Memoirs of a Soviet Diplomat. London: L. Dickson limited, 1938, p. 217
 
            At the 14th Congress [in late 1925], when the Central Committee limited itself to removing Trotsky from the post of Commissar for War, Stalin said:
            We did not agree with Zinoviev and Kamenev because we know that a policy of severance is pregnant with dangers for the party, that the severance method, the blood-letting method--and they demanded blood--is dangerous and contagious: today we sever one person, tomorrow someone else, the next a third person--what will be left of the party?
Volkogonov, Dmitri. Stalin: Triumph and Tragedy. New York: Grove Weidenfeld, 1991, p. 61
 
            Sensing the mood of the majority [at the 14th Congress in 1925], and sweeping aside Kamenev's proposal that the Secretariat be turned simply into a technical organization, he [Stalin] emphasized that he was against 'expelling' certain members of the leadership from the Central Committee.  He calculated, given the atmosphere, that it was prudent once again to declare that, if the comrades insisted, he 'was ready to leave his place without a fuss.' 'Expulsion means bloodletting,' he declared to applause, 'and that is a dangerous and infectious way to proceed.  Today one person is expelled, tomorrow another, the next they someone else--who will be left in the party?'  He spoke like a practiced politician, again finding support among the delegates, demonstrating his disinterest and his concern for the party's future.  As he mocked and criticized the opposition, he displayed his 'magnanimity by the use of such phrases as 'Well, good luck to them!'  Although he had already decided it was time to part company with Zinoviev and Kamenev, he nevertheless demonstrated that he wanted peace: 'We are for unity, we are against expulsions.  The policy of expulsion is repellent to us.  The party wants unity and it will achieve it, with Kamenev and Zinoviev, if that is what they want, and without them, if they do not.'
Volkogonov, Dmitri. Stalin: Triumph and Tragedy. New York: Grove Weidenfeld, 1991, p. 115
 
 
            In January 1925, Zinoviev and Kamenev urged in the Central Committee that Trotsky be expelled from the Politburo.  Stalin made several alternative suggestions, including merely removing Trotsky as War Commissar (from which post he had in fact just offered his resignation).  This was carried.  As Stalin was to say later:
            'We did not agree with Zinoviev and Kamenev because we knew that a policy of decapitation is pregnant with great dangers for the party; we know that the method of axing and bloodletting--for blood is what they are demanding--is dangerous and infectious.  Today you cut off one man, tomorrow another, the day after tomorrow a third... and what shall be left of the party then?'
Conquest, Robert. Stalin: Breaker of Nations. New York, New York: Viking, 1991, p. 123
 
            Taking note of his [Trotsky] refusal to fall in step, the Plenum voted 102 against 2 (with 10 abstentions) to reprimand him for engaging in "factionalism."  It also "completely approved” the conduct of the Party's leadership.  Kamenev and Zinoviev wanted Trotsky expelled from the party, but Stalin thought this not prudent: on his urging, the motion was rejected....
Pipes, Richard.  Russia under the Bolshevik Regime. New York: A.A. Knopf, 1993, p. 485
 
            After Trotsky had thus effaced himself, the only bond that kept the triumvirs together snapped.  Up to last moment Zinoviev clamored for harsher reprisals against Trotsky, even for his arrest.  Stalin countered his demands with a public statement to the effect that it was 'inconceivable' that Trotsky should be eliminated from the leadership of the party.
Deutscher, Isaac. Stalin; A Political Biography. New York: Oxford Univ. Press, 1967, p. 297
 
            From his [Stalin] position of vantage, he watched his divided opponents, their shy mutual overtures, their jealousies and resentments.  He added to the confusion in their ranks by his own vague advances to Trotsky.  Agents of the General Secretariat assiduously reminded Trotsky's followers that Zinoviev, not Stalin, had exhibited the worst virulence in the fight against them.  Stalin himself in his book Problems of Leninism, which was published in January 1926, turned all his political zest against Zinoviev and Kamenev, and refrained from making a single unfriendly remark about Trotsky....
Deutscher, Isaac. Stalin; A Political Biography. New York: Oxford Univ. Press, 1967, p. 305
 
            On formal grounds Stalin could not expel Trotsky from the party for his 'Clemenceau statement', even though it implied the threat of an overthrow of the Government.
Deutscher, Isaac. Stalin; A Political Biography. New York: Oxford Univ. Press, 1967, p. 315
 
            This is, for instance, how he countered Zinoviev's and Kamenev's demand for reprisals against Trotsky: “We have not agreed with Zinoviev and Kamenev, because we have known that a policy of lopping off [heads] is fraught with great dangers....  The method of chopping off and blood-letting--and they did demand blood--is dangerous and infectious.  You chop off one head today, another one tomorrow, still another one the day after--what in the end will be left of the party?”  The revolution of the 20th century, he seemed to say, may spurn its children but it need not devour them.
Deutscher, Isaac. Stalin; A Political Biography. New York: Oxford Univ. Press, 1967, p. 347
 
            It is amusing that at that time, in the Central Committee, Stalin slowed down the attacks against Trotsky by Zinoviev and Kamenev.
Bazhanov, Boris.  Bazhanov and the Damnation of Stalin. Athens, Ohio: Ohio University Press, c1990, p. 97
 
            Zinoviev, on the other hand, vociferously urged definitive elimination of Trotsky.  During the January 1925 plenum of the Central Committee, Zinoviev and Kamenev proposed exclusion of Trotsky from the Party.  Stalin opposed this, playing the role of conciliator.  He persuaded the plenum not only to keep Trotsky in the Party, but to keep him in the Central Committee and the Politburo.  It's true that the plenum condemned Trotsky's interventions and his political views, but the important point was that the moment had arrived to rid the Red Army of him.  His replacement had been ready for a long time, in the person of his assistant, Frunze.  The latter was not particularly Stalin's man, but Zinoviev and Kamenev liked him, and in the course of long Troika sessions on the subject Stalin accepted the nomination of Frunze to replace Trotsky as people's commissar for war and president of the Revolutionary War Council, with Voroshilov as assistant.
Bazhanov, Boris.  Bazhanov and the Damnation of Stalin. Athens, Ohio: Ohio University Press, c1990, p. 98
 
            And yet they not only did not exclude Trotsky from the party, but they did not even remove him from the Politburo!  He remains a member of the ruling committee of seven, who exercise the sovereign power in a party, to whose whole essential nature, purpose, and philosophy he is declared to be opposed.  This anomalous situation means, in the first place, that there is not the slightest breath of sincerity in that outrageous indictment of Trotsky.  And it means, in the second place, that there is a bitter rivalry between Stalin and Zinoviev for the position of leadership.  Zinoviev demanded Trotsky's exclusion from the Politburo, and he was supported in this by Kamenev.  Stalin, for his own reasons, opposed this demand, and Zinoviev, in a huff, declaring that Stalin merely wanted to use Trotsky against him, tendered his own resignation.
Eastman, Max. Since Lenin Died. Westport, Connecticutt: Hyperion Press. 1973, p. 127
 
            In the last week of May 1924 the 13th Congress assembled....  The Congress turned into an orgy of denunciation.  Zinoviev fumed and fulminated: "It was now 1000 times more necessary than ever that the party should be monolithic."  Months before he had urged his partners to order Trotsky's expulsion from the party and even arrest; but Stalin cool-headedly refused to comply and hastened to declare in Pravda that no action was contemplated against Trotsky, and that a party leadership without Trotsky was "unthinkable."
Deutscher, Isaac. The Prophet Unarmed. London, New York: Oxford Univ. Press, 1959, p. 138
 
            At the Politburo [in January 1925] Zinoviev and Kamenev proposed to ask the Central Committee to expel Trotsky from the Politburo and the Central Committee.  Once again, to their irritation, Stalin refused to comply; and Zinoviev and Kamenev wondered whether he might not make peace with Trotsky at their expense.
Deutscher, Isaac. The Prophet Unarmed. London, New York: Oxford Univ. Press, 1959, p. 162
 
            ... Once the triumvirs had defeated Trotsky and removed him from the Commissariat of War, the bonds of their solidarity snapped.  Molotov related afterwards that the discord began in January 1925 when Kamenev proposed that Stalin should take Trotsky's place at the Commissariat of War.  According to Molotov, Kamenev and Zinoviev hoped in this way to oust Stalin from the General Secretariat.  (Much earlier, as early as October 1923, Zinoviev and Kamenev had toyed with this idea and had even sounded Trotsky.  He, however, saw no advantage then in joining hands with Zinoviev, whom he regarded as the most vicious of his adversaries).  Stalin himself traces the beginning of this conflict to the end of the year 1924, when Zinoviev proposed Trotsky's expulsion from the party and Stalin replied that he was against "chopping off heads and blood letting."  When Trotsky left the Commissariat, Zinoviev proposed that he should be assigned to a minor job in the management of the leather industry; and Stalin persuaded the Politburo to make a less humiliating appointment.  In a pique, Zinoviev appealed to the Leningrad organization, charging Stalin and the other Politburo members with a leaning for Trotsky and with being "semi-Trotskyists" themselves.
Deutscher, Isaac. The Prophet Unarmed. London, New York: Oxford Univ. Press, 1959, p. 241
 
            Zinoviev and Kamenev moved at a plenary meeting of the Central Committee that Trotsky should be expelled from the Party--only to be opposed by Stalin.  To the amazement of his allies, who wanted blood, Stalin persuaded the Central Committee not to expel Trotsky, not even to remove him from the Politburo.
Radzinsky, Edvard.  Stalin. New York: Doubleday, c1996, p. 217
 
            [Stalin stated], "The method of lopping-off, the method of blood-letting (it was blood-letting they wanted) is dangerous and infectious.  Today, you lop off one limb; tomorrow another; the day after tomorrow a third--and what is left of the party?"
Levine, Isaac Don.  Stalin.  New York: Cosmopolitan Book Corporation, c1931, p. 242
 
            [In a November 1925 letter to a comrade Stalin stated] I am emphatically opposed to the policy of kicking out all dissenting comrades.  I am opposed to such a policy not because I am sorry for the dissenters, but because such a policy gives rise in the Party to a regime of intimidation, a regime of bullying, which kills the spirit of self-criticism and initiative.  It is not good when leaders of the Party are feared but not respected.  Party leaders can be real leaders only if they are not merely feared but respected in the Party, when their authority is recognized.
Stalin, Joseph. Works. Moscow: Foreign Languages Pub. House, 1952, Vol. 7, p. 45
 
            [In a letter to the Czechoslovak Commission on March 27, 1925 Stalin stated] Expulsion is not the decisive weapon in the struggle against the Rights.  The main thing is to give the Right groups a drubbing, ideologically and morally, in the course of the struggle based on principal and to draw the mass of the Party membership into the struggle.
Stalin, Joseph.   Works. Moscow: Foreign Languages Pub. House, 1952, Vol. 7, p. 66
 
ECONOMIC ACCOMPLISHMENTS AND INDUSTRIAL PROGRESS IN THE 30’S
 
The industrialization of a great community is by itself obviously not unique....  What is unique in the USSR is that a single decade saw developments which required half a century are more elsewhere.  Industrialization was achieved, moreover, without private capital, without foreign investments (save in the form of engineering skills and technical advice), without private property as a spur to individual initiative, without private ownership of any of the means of production, and with no unearned increment or private fortunes accruing to entrepreneurs or lucky investors.  Resources were developed, labour was recruited, trained and allocated, capital was saved and invested not through the price mechanism of a competitive market but through a consciously devised and deliberately executed national economic plan, drawn up by quinquennia, by years and by quarters for every segment of the economy, for every region, city, town, and village, for every factory, farm, mine and mill, for every store, bank and school, and even for every hospital, theater and sports club.
Schuman, Frederick L. Soviet Politics. New York: A.A. Knopf, 1946, p. 211
 
 
The adventure led from the illiteracy to literacy, from the NEP to socialism, from archaic agriculture to collective cultivation, from a rural society to a predominately urban community, from general ignorance of the machine to social mastery of modern technology.
            Between the poverty stricken year of 1924, when Lenin died, and the relatively abundant year of 1940, the cultivated area of USSR expanded by 74 percent; grain crops increased 11 percent; coal production was multiplied by 10; steel output by 18; engineering and metal industries by 150; total national income by 10; industrial output by 24; annual capital investment by 57.  During the First Five-year Plan, 51 billion rubles were invested; during the Second, 114; and during the Third, 192.  Factory and office workers grew from 7,300,000 to 30,800,000 and school and college students from 7,900,000 to 36,600,000.  Between 1913 and 1940, oil production increased from nine to 35 million tons; coal from 29 to 164; pig iron from 4 to 15; steel from 4 to 18; machine tools from 1000 to 48,000 units, tractors from 0 to over 500,000; harvestor combines from 0 to 153,500; electrical power output from two billion kWh to 50 billion; and the value of industrial output from 11 billion rubles to more than 100 billion by 1938.  If the estimated volume of total industrial production in 1913 be taken as 100, the corresponding indices for 1938 are 93.2 for France; 113.3 for England, 120 United States; 131.6 for Germany, and 908.8 for the Soviet Union.
Schuman, Frederick L. Soviet Politics. New York: A.A. Knopf, 1946, p. 212
 
The Soviet government has never defaulted and on any of its own obligations.
Schuman, Frederick L. Soviet Politics. New York: A.A. Knopf, 1946, p. 241
 
Much interest was aroused in both countries [the USSR and USA] by the 1944 summer journey of Eric Johnston, President of the U.S. Chamber of Commerce, who visited the Urals, Siberia, and Kazakhstan and declared that Soviet economic progress since 1928 was "an unexampled achievement in the industrial history of the whole world."
Schuman, Frederick L. Soviet Politics. New York: A.A. Knopf, 1946, p. 491
 
            Therefore to Stalin belongs the credit for having in the course of a decade lifted the largest country in the world, and the richest in natural resources, from a backward peasant state to an industrial state, and for having at the same time transformed its agriculture by American methods and carried culture, education, science, and, above all, the possibility of obtaining these, literally to every one of its cottages.
Ludwig, Emil, Stalin. New York, New York: G. P. Putnam's sons, 1942, p. 119
 
            The Soviets attained under Stalin's rule the first place in the world in regard to tractors, machines, and motor trucks; the second as to electric power.  Russia, 20 years ago the least mechanized country, has become the foremost....  In the same decade between 1929 in 1939, in which the production of all other countries barely mounted, while even dropping in some, Soviet production was multiplied by 4.  The national income mounted between 1913 in 1938 from 21 to 105 billion rubles.  The income of the individual citizen was increased by 370% in the last eight years--with only irrelevant income taxes and reasonable social security contributions imposed upon them--while it dropped almost everywhere else in the world.
Ludwig, Emil, Stalin. New York, New York: G. P. Putnam's sons, 1942, p. 129
 
            The arguments of the "left" and right opposition groups that their actions were justified because the Party policy was undermining the state are belied by the economic and social record.  Between 1928 and 1934 iron production rose from 3 million to 10 million tons, steel from 4 to 9 million, oil from 11 to 24 million.  The figures, though stark and simple, have social as well as economic significance.  "We inherited from the past," Stalin noted in 1935, "a technically backward, impoverished, and ruined country.  Ruined by four years of imperialist war, and ruined again by three years of civil war, a country with a semi-literate population, with a low technical level, with isolated industrial islands lost in a sea of dwarf peasant farms."  The figures show that this impoverished and largely feudal country was pulling out of the ruins and establishing the economic foundations of socialism.
            In 1933 Stalin could announce that (in the midst of the world capitalist depression) "unemployment has been abolished."  The following year he reported on the developing "new village":
            "The appearance of the countryside has changed even more.  The old type of village, with a church in the most prominent place, with the best houses--those of the police officer, the priest, and the kulaks--in the foreground, and the dilapidated huts of the peasants in the background, is beginning to disappear.  Its place is being taken by the new type of village, with its public farm buildings, with its clubs, radio, cinemas, schools, libraries, and creches; with its tractors, harvester combines, thrashing machines, and automobiles."
Cameron, Kenneth Neill. Stalin, Man of Contradiction. Toronto: NC Press, c1987, p. 73
 
            In 1939 Stalin reported that the iron and steel industry, which had been virtually non-existent in the early 1920s, had made great strides: "In 1938 we produced about 15 million tons of pig iron; Great Britain produced 7 million tons."  Agriculture had been mechanized.  In 1938 there were 483,500 tractors in use and 153,500 harvester combines--in a previously horse and plow countryside.  Wages had doubled, from an annual average of 1,513 rubles in 1933 to 3,447 in 1938.  Similar advances had been made in education; in a nation of centuries-old mass illiteracy there were now nearly 34 million "students of all grades"; in higher educational institutions there were 600,000 students; in 1938, 31,300 engineers, 10,600 agricultural specialists, and 35,700 teachers graduated.  A new "stratum" of professionals had been born:
Cameron, Kenneth Neill. Stalin, Man of Contradiction. Toronto: NC Press, c1987, p. 74
 
            When we consider Stalin's facts and figures, it becomes clear that we are witnessing the most concentrated economic advance ever recorded--greater even than those of the Industrial Revolution.  Within 10 years a primarily feudal society had been changed into an industrialized one.  And for the first time in history such an advance was due not to capitalism but to socialism.
Cameron, Kenneth Neill. Stalin, Man of Contradiction. Toronto: NC Press, c1987, p. 75
 
            In 1928 I wrote (It is I, Barbusse, who is speaking now) that: "In the Five-Year Plan now in progress, it was not a question of speculations on figures and words by bureaucrats and literary men, but one of a cut-and-dried programme; the figures of the State Plan should be considered more as accomplished victories than as indications and," I concluded, "when the Bolsheviks assure us that by 1931 Soviet industry will have increased by 8%, that 7 billion rubles will have been invested in economic revival, that their hydro-electric stations will reach a power of 3,500,000 kilowatts, etc.... we must admit that these things virtually exist already...."
            ...Now if, at the date indicated, the above figures were not exactly as had been foretold, it was because they were nearly all exceeded.
            ...If any of the prophesied figures have not been reached, their percentage is absolutely insignificant and negligible.  In a great many directions they have been exceeded.  The Soviet economic plans were realized to the extent of 109% in 1922-23 and 105% in 1923-25, on all the main heads, to speak only of the earlier Plans.
Barbusse, Henri. Stalin. New York:   The Macmillan company, 1935, p. 142
 
            By the time of the holding of the 17th Party Congress in January 1934, the Soviet people under the glorious leadership of the CPSU headed by Stalin, that resolute opponent of all reactionaries, had made the following unprecedented achievements:
            (a) Industrial production in the USSR now accounted for 70% of total production, and the country had been transformed from an agrarian country to an industrial one.
            (b) Capitalist elements in the sphere of industry had been completely eliminated and the socialist economic system had become the sole economic system in this sphere.
            (c) The kulaks had been eliminated as a class and the socialist economic system had become predominant in the sphere of agriculture.
            (d) The collective-farm system had put an end to the poverty and misery of millions of people in the countryside who now enjoyed material conditions hitherto unknown to them.
            (e) As a result of the development of socialist industry, unemployment had been abolished, and though the eight-hour day had been retained in certain industries, in the majority of the enterprises a seven-hour day had been instituted; in the case of industries representing special danger to health, the length of the working day was reduced to six hours.
            (f) The victory of socialism in all branches of the national economy had put an end to the exploitation of man by man.
            No wonder that the 17th Party Congress is known as the Congress of Victors.
Brar, Harpal.   Trotskyism or Leninism. 1993, p. 181
 
            The second five-year plan brought unprecedentedly high rates of industrial growth.  In 1934 gross industrial output rose by 19 percent, in 1935 by 23 percent, and in 1936 by 29 percent.  The majority of people's commissars and obkom secretaries in1935-1936 were awarded the Order of Lenin, which at that time was a rare and very high honor.  In 1936 no more than two or three hundred persons bore this honor....
            After several years of stagnation, agricultural production also began to increase: in 1935 gross industrial output was 20 percent higher than in 1933.  Soon after rationing was ended, collective farms were permitted to sell grain on the open market, which stimulated farmers' interest in his increasing grain production.  (The system of grain procurements did not create such a stimulus because of low procurement prices.) Consumer goods prices began to drop.  The acute food crisis of the early 30s was apparently over.  The standard of living, both urban and rural, rose appreciably.  It was at this time that Stalin uttered his famous phrase: "Life has become better, comrades; life has become more joyful."
            Life really did become a bit "more joyful," and this atmosphere engendered a certain enthusiasm.
Medvedev, Roy. Let History Judge. New York: Columbia University Press, 1989, p. 352
 
            It was only in the late 30s that the fruits of the second revolution began to mature.  Towards the end of the decade Russia's industrial power was catching up with Germany's.  Her efficiency and capacity for organization were still incomparably lower.  So was the standard of living of her people.  But the aggregate output of her mines, basic plants, and factories approached the level which the most efficient and disciplined of all continental nations, assisted by foreign capital, had reached only after three-quarters of a century of intensive industrialization.  The other continental nations, to whom only a few years before Russians still looked up, were now left far behind.  The Industrial Revolution spread from central and western Russia to the remote wilderness of Soviet Asia.  The collectivization of farming, too, began to yield positive results.  Towards the end of the decade agriculture had recovered from the terrible slump of the early '30s; and industry was at last able to supply tractors, harvester-combines, and other implements in great numbers and the farms were achieving a very high degree of mechanization.  The outside world was more or less unaware of the great change and the shift in the international balance of power which it implied.  Spectacular failures of the first five-year plan induced foreign observers to take a highly skeptical view of the results of the second and the third.  The macabre series of 'purge' trials suggested economic and political weakness.  The elements of weakness were undoubtedly there; and they were even greater than may appear when the scene is viewed in retrospect from the vantage point of the late '40s.  But the elements of strength were also incomparably greater than they were thought to be in the late 30s.
            [Footnote]: A detailed description of the achievements of the planned economy can hardly have its place in Stalin's biography.  Only a brief statistical summary can be given here, in which the strength of Russian industry in 1928-29 is compared with that of 1937-38, i.e., towards the end of the second and the beginning of the third five-year plan.  In the course of that decade the output of electricity per annum rose from 6 to 40 billion kwh, of coal from 30 to 133 million tons, of oil from 11 to 32 million tons, of steel from 4 to 18 million tons, of motor cars from 1,400 to 211,000.  The value of the annual output of machine-tools rose from 3 billion to 33 billion rubles (in 'stable prices').  (In 1941 the total output of the Soviet machine-building industry was 50 times higher than in 1913).  Between 1928 and 1937 the number of workers and employees rose from 11.5 million to 27 million.  Before the revolution the number of doctors was 20,000; it was 105,000 in 1937.  The number of hospital beds rose from 175,000 to 618,000.  In 1914, 8 million people attended schools of all grades; in 1928, 12 million; in 1938, 31.5 million.  In 1913, 112,000 people studied at university colleges; in 1939, 620,000.  Before the revolution public libraries possessed 640 books for 10,000 inhabitants; in 1939, 8610.
Deutscher, Isaac. Stalin; A Political Biography. New York: Oxford Univ. Press, 1967, p. 340
 
            The achievement was remarkable, even if measured only by the yard-stick of Russian national aspirations.  On a different scale, it laid the foundation for Russia's new power just as Cromwell's Navigation Act had once laid the foundation for British naval supremacy.  Those who still view the political fortunes of countries in terms of national ambitions and prestige cannot but accord to Stalin the foremost place among all those rulers who, through the ages, were engaged in building up Russia's power.  Actuated by such motives even many of the Russian White emigres began to hail Stalin as a national hero.  But the significance of the second revolution lay not only and not even mainly in what it meant to Russia.  To the world it was important as the first truly gigantic experiment in planned economy, the first instance in which a government undertook to plan and regulate the whole economic life of its country and to direct its nationalized industrial resources towards a uniquely rapid multiplication of the nation's wealth....  What was new in Stalin's planning was the fact that it was initiated not merely as a wartime expedient, but as the normal pattern of economic life in peace.  Hitherto governments had engaged in planning as long as they had needed implements of war.  Under Stalin's five-year plans, too, guns, tanks, and planes were produced in great profusion; but the chief merit of these plans was not that they enabled Russia to arm herself, but that they enabled her to modernize and transform society.
Deutscher, Isaac. Stalin; A Political Biography. New York: Oxford Univ. Press, 1967, p. 341
 
            The dam on the Dnieper was built by the firm of Col. Hugh Cooper, a prominent American hydraulic engineer; the majority of the largest Soviet power plants were equipped by the British firm Metropolitan-Vickers; Western companies designed, built, and equipped Magnitogorsk and Kuznetsk, the Urals Machinery Works, the Kaganovich Ball Bearing Plant in Moscow, an automobile plant in Nizhny Novgorod, and a truck plant in Yaroslavl, among others.  Ordjonikidze, the commissar of heavy industry, was able to state with full justification: "Our factories, our mines, our mills are now equipped with excellent technology that cannot be found in any one country....  How did we get it?  We bought the most highly perfected machinery, the very latest technology in the world, from the Americans, Germans, French, and English, and with that we equipped our enterprises."  And he added caustically, "Meanwhile, many of their factories and mines still have machinery dating from the nineteenth century, or the early part of the twentieth."
Nekrich and Heller.   Utopia in Power. New York: Summit Books, c1986, p. 231
 
            On the eve of World War II the Soviet Union held first place in the world for extraction of manganese ore and production of synthetic rubber.  It was the number one oil producer in Europe, number two in the world; the same for gross output of machine tools and tractors.  In electric power, steel, cast iron, and aluminum it was the second-largest producer in Europe and the third largest in the world.  In coal and cement production it held third place in Europe and fourth place in the world.  Altogether the USSR accounted for 10 percent of world industrial production.
Nekrich and Heller.  Utopia in Power. New York: Summit Books, c1986, p. 317
 
            There actually were certain grounds for claiming economic successes.  In 1935-36, Soviet industry reached tempos of growth in the productivity of labor which were unknown in the previous decade.
Rogovin, Vadim. 1937: Year of Terror. Oak Park, Michigan: Labor Publications, 1998, p. 291
 
[Report to the 18th Congress on March 10, 1939]
            As regards livestock farming, considerable advances have been made during the past few years in this, the most backward branch of agriculture, as well.  True, in the number of horses and in sheep breeding we are still below the prerevolutionary level; but as regards cattle and hog breeding we have already passed the prerevolutionary level.
            It is obvious that trade in the country could not have so developed without a certain increase in freight traffic.  And indeed during the period under review freight traffic increased in all branches of transport, especially rail and air.  There was an increase in water-borne freight, too, but with considerable fluctuations, and in 1938, it is to be regretted, there was even a drop in water-borne freight as compared with the previous year.
Franklin, Bruce, Ed.   The Essential Stalin; Major Theoretical Writings. Garden City, New York: Anchor Books, 1972, p. 359
 
[Report to the 18th Congress on March 10, 1939]
            The abolition of exploitation and the consolidation of the socialist economic system, the absence of unemployment, with its attendant poverty in town and country, the enormous expansion of industry and the steady growth in the number of workers, the increase in the productivity of labor of the workers and collective farmers, the securement of the land to the collective farms in perpetuity, and a vast number of first-class tractors and agricultural machines supplied to the collective farms--all this has created effective conditions for a further rise in the standard of living of the workers and peasants.  In its turn, the improvement in the standard of living of the workers and the peasants has naturally led to an improvement in the standard of living of the intelligentsia who represent a considerable force in our country and serve the interests of the workers and the peasants.
Franklin, Bruce, Ed.   The Essential Stalin; Major Theoretical Writings. Garden City, New York: Anchor Books, 1972, p. 363
 
            At the same time the large capital investments of the first five-year plan resulted in a huge increase in industrial capacity.  From approximately August 1933 to the summer or autumn of 1936 industrial and agricultural production grew rapidly, and the standard of living of a large section of the population increased above the very low level of the years of hunger and deprivation.
Shabad, Steven, trans.  The Stalin-Kaganovich Correspondence, 1931-1936. New Haven: Yale University Press, c2003, p. 10
 
            Beginning in the April-June quarter of 1933 the performance of heavy industry, including the crucial iron and steel and coal industries, considerably improved.  According to official statistics, production in December 1933 was 12% greater than in December 1932 and exceeded the low point of January 1933 by as much as 35%.  The confidential Annual Report of the British Foreign Office for 1933 stated that "there seems to be a certain justification, in the light of the progress made in the basic industries in the closing months, for the increasing optimism with which the authorities regard the future."
            Another reason for confidence in the economic situation was that the severe restrictions imposed on state expenditure from the end of 1932 succeeded in bringing about financial stability.  Currency in circulation declined by 19% between 1 January and 1 July, and did not increase during the rest of the year. And in every quarter of 1933 exports exceeded imports; a deficit of 135 million rubles in 1932 gave way to a surplus of 148 million rubles in 1933.
Shabad, Steven, trans. The Stalin-Kaganovich Correspondence, 1931-1936. New Haven: Yale University Press, c2003, p. 188
 
            The year 1934 was the calmest of the 13 years of Soviet history from the "great breakthrough" of 1929 to the German invasion.  In this year the economy began to yield some of the fruits of the painful struggle for industrialization in the previous five years.  For the first time the production of heavy industry exceeded the plan; and the production of the food industry also increased substantially.  Although the harvest was not outstanding, the amount of grain harvested was probably several million tons greater than in 1933.  After the disastrous decline in 1929-33, the number of cattle, sheep, and pigs increased for the first time since 1930.
Shabad, Steven, trans. The Stalin-Kaganovich Correspondence, 1931-1936. New Haven: Yale University Press, c2003, p. 236
 
            The new policy thus adopted amounted to nothing less than a second agrarian revolution, even greater in magnitude than that of 1917-1918.   The innumerable scattered strips and tiny holdings throughout the USSR were to be summarily amalgamated into several hundred thousand large farms, on which agriculture could be effectively mechanized.   Only in this way, it was finally concluded, could the aggregate production of foodstuffs be sufficiently increased, within the ensuing decade, to meet the requirements of the growing population; to rescue from inevitable poverty the mass of the peasants unable to produce even enough for their own families; and to build up a grain reserve adequate to provide against the periodic failure of crops, whilst meeting the needs of defense against ever-possible foreign invasion.
Webb, S. Soviet Communism: A New Civilisation. London, NY: Longmans, Green, 1947, p. 464
 
            When I had left for the Soviet Union, a relative had expressed the hope that the experience would cure my revolutionary illusions.  That did not happen.  I left the Soviet Union more convinced of communism than when I had arrived.  The Party had overcome one formidable obstacle after another and had succeeded in transforming the Soviet Union from a backward, semi-literate peasant country into a modern industrial state with a well-educated population, with equal opportunities for all, regardless of sex or ethnicity.  While production was stagnating or receding in the capitalist world, with unprecedented mass unemployment, the Soviet economy was expanding rapidly, with employment and social security for everyone.  While the utopian expectations of 1930 had been toned down by the difficulties of the three following years, there was confidence that progress would continue from year to year.  You knew what you were working for: a better society....
            Certainly there was not universal brotherhood, but there was much more warmth and openness in human relations than in the West;...
Blumenfeld, Hans. Life Begins at 65. Montreal, Canada: Harvest House, c1987, p. 173
 
            But let us begin by providing the reader a picture of the Soviet 1930-ies, as a matter of fact a decisive decade in the history of the Soviet Union.  Among other things, it was during the 1930-ies that the first and second five-year plan were realised and the collectivisation of the agriculture took place.  The national income, which was 29 million Roubles in 1929, grew to 105 millions 1938.  An increase by 360 per cent in ten years, a unique phenomenon in the history of industrialisation!  The number of workers and employees increased from 14,5  millions 1930 to 28 millions 1938.  The average, annual salary of industrial workers grew from 991 Roubles 1930 to 3,447 Roubles 1938.   The grants for cultural and social matters in the state budget increased from approximately 2 billion Roubles 1930 to 35 billions 1938....
            During the 1930-ies production in the Soviet Union grew at a rate never before seen in the history of mankind.  In the beginning of 1930 the total value of the industrial production was 21 million Roubles.  Eight years later the value of the industrial production was above 100 million Roubles.  (Both figures counted in the prices of 1926-27).  The industrial production of the country had multiplied almost five times in eight years!  In the beginning of 1930 the area sown with all kinds of crops was 118 million hectares.  1938 the area was 1369  million hectares.  Simultaneously, the country had carried through a total collectivisation of the agriculture and passed through and solved gigantic problems connected with the collectivisation and modernisation of the agriculture.  In the beginning of 1930 the number of tractors in the Soviet Union was 34,900.  In the year 1938 it was 483,500.  The tractors were multiplied almost fourteen times in eight years.  During the same period the combine-harvesters increased from 1,700 to 153,500 and the harvesters from 4,300 to 130,800.
Sousa, Mario.   The Class Struggle during the Thirties in the Soviet Union, 2001.
 
            On 7 January 1933, Stalin celebrated the completion of the First Five-Year Plan in agriculture and industry in a widely publicized address to the Central Committee.  Before the plan, he claimed, the Soviet Union lacked iron and steel, tractor, automobile, machine-tool, chemical, agricultural machinery and aircraft industries; in electrical power, coal and oil production the country had been 'last on the list'; it had only one coal and metallurgical base, one textile center.  All these deficiencies, asserted Stalin, had been rectified in the Five-Year Plan that had been completed in four years.  The effect of all this was to create factories that could be quickly switched to defense production, thus transforming the Soviet Union from 'a weak country, unprepared for defense, to a country mighty in defense, a country prepared for every contingency’.  Without this, he added, 'our position would have been more or less analogous to the present position of China, which has no heavy industry and no war industry of its own and which is being molested by anyone who cares to do so'.
McNeal, Robert, Stalin: Man and Ruler. New York: New York University Press, 1988, p. 141
 
GROUPS ALLIED AGAINST SU WERE RUTHLESS AND DETERMINED
 
The USSR was an arena in which the enemy met defeat in political warfare years before he failed in military warfare.  The secrecy of each maneuver and counter move makes it impossible as yet to reconstruct the intricacies of the plots within plots and wheels within wheels whereby the Soviet Citadel was attacked and defended.  Every aspect of this hidden war is still wrapped in a haze of speculation and controversy, save only the central fact that the attack was unscrupulous, merciless, and ineffective and that the defense was ruthless, relentless, and successful.  What is beyond question, although wholly ignored in most contemporary comments, is that fascist conspirators did all in their power during the 1930's to disrupt and weaken the Soviet Union, as they were doing simultaneously in other communities earmarked for subjugation.  Their arsenal of weapons, here as elsewhere, included assassination, sabotage, bribery, blackmail, treason, and rebellion.
Schuman, Frederick L. Soviet Politics. New York: A.A. Knopf, 1946, p. 257
 
            As the present century has amply and bloodily demonstrated, wherever the working class moves toward power, the bourgeoisie will work to destroy it by every means at its disposal, war, terrorism, massacre, counter-revolution, sabotage, subversion, lies.  If a working class in power is not able to thwart these attempts it will be defeated and socialism destroyed.
Cameron, Kenneth Neill. Stalin, Man of Contradiction. Toronto: NC Press, c1987, p. 132
 
 
TROTSKY  ADVOCATED KILLING STALIN
 
No one can know the precise time at which Trotsky made up his mind that Stalin's leadership of the party must be destroyed by violence.
            Footnote: but in the Bulletin of the Opposition, October 1933, Trotsky wrote: "the Stalin bureaucracy...  Can be compelled to hand over power to the proletarian vanguard only by FORCE"  He later told the New York American (Hearst), January 26, 1937: "Stalin has put himself above all criticism and the state.  It is impossible to displace him except by assassination."
Schuman, Frederick L. Soviet Politics. New York: A.A. Knopf, 1946, p. 264
 
Moral revulsion at assassination as a political weapon was a sentiment unknown to Trotsky, for all his initial Marxist objections to individual terrorism.
            "We were never concerned," wrote Trotsky, "with the Kantian-priestly and vegetarian-Quaker prattle about the sacredness of human life.  We were revolutionaries in opposition, and have remained revolutionaries in power.  To make the individual sacred we must destroy the social order which crucifies him.  And this problem can be solved only by blood and iron.”
Schuman, Frederick L. Soviet Politics. New York: A.A. Knopf, 1946, p. 267
 
            ...Trotsky made his papers available to an international commission that investigated and disproved the charge that he had supported the policy of assassination, and Sedov also answered the false charge in Livre sur Le Proces de Moscou.  His assistant while writing a book, which was published in 1937, was Mark Zborowsky, a penetration agent whose code name on his NKVD file was TULIP.
            Zborowsky had so successfully ingratiated himself into Sedov's circle by 1937 that he was regarded as totally loyal in Trotskyist circles.  The TULIP file reveals that it was from Zborowsky that Stalin, in January 1937, obtained material that was claimed to be evidence to renew his charges against Trotsky.  But TULIP, who can hardly have been unaware of Sedov's real views, appears simply to have relayed to Moscow information that he believed "The Boss" wanted to hear.  For example he wrote to the Center: "On Jan. 22 Sedov, during our conversation in his apartment on the subject of the second Moscow trial and the role of the different defendants, declared, 'Now we shouldn't hesitate.  Stalin should be murdered.' "
            "Stalin's deep fear of assassination would, therefore, have been inflamed by a more detailed report of the intentions revealed by Sonny--as Sedov was known by the NKVD--which Zborowsky dispatched to Moscow on Feb. 11:
            "Not since 1936 had SONNY initiated any conversation with me about terrorism.  Only about two or three weeks ago, after a meeting of the group, SONNY began speaking on this subject again.  On this occasion he only tried to prove that terrorism is not contrary to Marxism.  "Marxism", according to SONNY's words, "denies terrorism only to the extent that the conditions of class struggle don't favor terrorism.  But there are certain situations where terrorism is necessary."  The next time SONNY began talking about terrorism was when I came to his apartment to work.  While we were reading newspapers, SONNY said that the whole regime in the USSR was propped up by Stalin; it was enough to kill Stalin for everything to fall to pieces."
Costello, John and Oleg Tsarev.  Deadly illusions.  New York: Crown, c1993, p. 282
 
            The evidence showed that for a long while there existed in the Soviet Union the two groups of Oppositionists, that led by Trotsky from abroad, and the Zinoviev-Kamenev group.  They had hated each other almost as much as they had hated Stalin and the other leaders of the Soviet government.  With the success of Socialistic construction, however, both groups began to realize that what little mass support they might have had in the beginning had completely fallen away from them.  In desperation emissaries from Zinoviev and Kamenev went abroad to meet Trotsky's agents and Trotsky himself.  They hoped by joining forces to make up some of the ground they had lost.
            But Trotsky had no such illusions.  He knew that mass support could never be won again in the face of the triumphant success recorded by the Soviet Government.  Therefore he suggested, and insisted, that only the murder of the present leaders could pave the way to the return of the Trotsky-Zinoviev group to influence in the Soviet Union.
Shepherd, W. G.   The Moscow Trial. London: Communist Party of Great Britain, 1936, p. 7
 
            And then--this was a truly fascist touch--all those tools that they had used in the various Commissariats to help them carry through their plans were to be assassinated too, so that none would be left alive who could tell the world of their crimes.
            On one point all the accused men spoke with one voice: Every communication received from Trotsky harped on the theme: Kill Stalin.
            One of the defendants described a meeting in Kamenev's flat, with both Zinoviev and Kamenev present.  This defendant, Lurie, had expressed his qualms at working with the "Gestapo."  Zinoviev had brushed the objection aside.  "The ends justify the means," he declared.
Shepherd, W. G.  The Moscow Trial. London: Communist Party of Great Britain, 1936, p. 8
 
            Berman Yurin was another of the accused who confessed to having entered the USSR expressly for the purpose of murdering Stalin.
            "Stalin must be physically destroyed" was the point emphasized to me over and over again by Trotsky in personal conversation, said Yurin, narrating his conversations in Copenhagen with Trotsky.
            Mrachkovsky, one of Trotsky's closest confidents since 1923, told the court how Trotsky had made terrorism and assassination of basic condition on which he would agree to the merging of the groups.
            By the time the hearing had ended there was no doubt of the guilt of the men in the dock, and that they richly deserved the death penalty that awaited them.
Shepherd, W. G.  The Moscow Trial.  London: Communist Party of Great Britain, 1936, p. 9
 
NO EVIDENCE PROVING STALIN KILLED TROTSKY
 
On August 21, 1940, Trotsky died in Mexico City....  The assassin (sentenced April 16, 1943, to a 20 year prison term) was at once labeled by all Trotskyites and anti-Soviet groups as a paid killer of the GPU, hired by Stalin to slay his enemies.  No evidence has ever been adduced to substantiate this contention.  The murderer said, apparently in all sincerity, that he was a Trotskyite who had slain Trotsky for "betraying" Trotskyism. 
Schuman, Frederick L. Soviet Politics. New York: A.A. Knopf, 1946, p. 268
 
RIGHT OF SECESSION IS UNQUALIFIED
 
This right of secession is unqualified in the 1936 Constitution, whereas its exercise was subject to approval by all the Republics under the 1924 Charter.  The right to secede has never been formally granted in any other true federation.  The assertion of such a right in United States precipitated the Civil War.
Schuman, Frederick L. Soviet Politics. New York: A.A. Knopf, 1946, p. 310
 
            It was Stalin who, in April 1917, reported on the national question at the Conference of the Bolshevik Party....  Stalin proposed the adoption of the conception recommended during the Tsarist regime.  The theory was accepted, not without a struggle; a fairly powerful opposition came from Pyatakov, and a certain number of delegates, against the clause establishing the right of nations to independence, even to the length of separation; the possible consequences of this clause frightened them.
Barbusse, Henri. Stalin. New York:  The Macmillan company, 1935, p. 92
 
KAGANOVICH SAYS ALL POWER IS IN CLIQUE’S HANDS IN CAPITALIST COUNTRIES
 
Speaking in Tashkent, where he stood for election, Kaganovich assured his auditors (Pravda December 10, 1937) that no real popular rule was possible in the bourgeois countries where all power is in the hands of "a few hundred millionaires, bankers, factory owners...."
Schuman, Frederick L.  Soviet Politics.  New York:  A.A. Knopf, 1946, p. 319
 
 
SU DICTATORSHIP SAVED THE SU AND THE CAPITALIST DEMOCRACIES
 
Had the USSR been a political democracy of the Western type during the past 20 years, had its people been permitted to choose what was soft, easy, and pleasant, rather than what was hard, painful, and necessary, the Soviet Union would not exist today.  Its destroyers would also, in all likelihood, have destroyed the independence of Britain and the freedom of America as well, for the military collapse of Russia would have rendered the victors invulnerable and invincible.  Dictatorship has been the price of survival for the USSR and for the United Nations..  Herein lies its justification -- except in the eyes of those who are conccerned only with the propriety of means and never with the primacy of ends, or with the eternal verities to the exclusion of the tough tasks of the day, or with the virtues of national suicide under unrestricted freedom as against the vices of national survival by way of coercion.
Schuman, Frederick L. Soviet Politics. New York: A.A. Knopf, 1946, p. 326
 
Had nazi and Japanese forces effected a junction in India in 1942, the defense of Russia and Britain, and prospectively of America, would have become all but impossible.
Schuman, Frederick L. Soviet Politics. New York: A.A. Knopf, 1946, p. 559
 
            In World War II Russia saved the west by defeating the fascist powers.
Grey, Ian. Stalin, Man of History. London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1979, p. 7
 
 
STALIN DESCRIBES REAL LIBERTY
 
"Real liberty," declared Stalin to Roy Howard in 1936, "can be had only where exploitation is destroyed, where there is no oppression of one people by another, where there is no unemployment and pauperism, where a person does not shiver in fear of losing tomorrow his job, home, bread.  Only in such a society is it possible to have real, and not paper, liberty, personal and otherwise."
Schuman, Frederick L. Soviet Politics. New York: A.A. Knopf, 1946, p. 326
 
            My own prejudices are amply conveyed by the title of this book.  Though over half of it is devoted to a description of the controls by the Soviet state, I have chosen to call it Liberty under the Soviets because I see as far more significant the basic economic freedom of workers and peasants and the abolition of privileged classes based on wealth;...
Baldwin, Roger. Liberty under the Soviets, New York: Vanguard Press, 1928, p. 2
 
            For although I am an advocate of unrestricted civil liberty as a means to effecting even revolutionary changes in society with a minimum of violence, I know that such liberty is always dependent on the possession of economic power.  Economic liberty underlies all others.  In any society civil liberties are freely exercised only by classes with economic power--or if by other classes, only at times when the controlling class is too secure to fear opposition.
Baldwin, Roger. Liberty Under the Soviets, New York: Vanguard Press, 1928, p. 3
 
            Such an attitude as I express toward the relation of economic to civil liberty may easily be construed as condoning in Russia repressions which I condemn in capitalist countries.  It is true that I feel differently about them, because I regard them as unlike.  Repressions in western democracies are violations of professed constitutional liberties, and I condemn them as such.  Repressions in Soviet Russia are weapons of struggle in a transition period to socialism.  The society the Communists seek to create will be freed of class struggle--if achieved--and therefore of repression.
            I see no chance for freedom from the repressions which mark the whole western world of political democracy save through abolishing economic class struggle.
Baldwin, Roger. Liberty under the Soviets, New York: Vanguard Press, 1928, p. 4
 
 
            Though I found a few opponents who were fearful of speaking out, and many cautioned me not to quote them, I found nowhere such universal fear as marks opponents of the dictatorships in Italy or Hungary....  Speech is fairly free everywhere in Russia.  What the authorities land on is any attempt at organized opposition.
Baldwin, Roger. Liberty under the Soviets, New York: Vanguard Press, 1928, p. 9
 
 
            That civil liberties, generally speaking, have not existed in fact for any classes except those with economic or political power is usually ignored by those who proclaim their validity as social principles.
Baldwin, Roger. Liberty under the Soviets, New York: Vanguard Press, 1928, p. 18
 
 
            ...No one who has seen the new life in Russian villages can doubt the feeling of liberty, of released effort and of hope which marks the active peasants--save for the ambitious well-to-do class (the Kulaks) who resist the new order because it restricts their freedom to hire labor and rent land.
Baldwin, Roger. Liberty under the Soviets, New York: Vanguard Press, 1928, p. 25
 
 
INTELLECTUALS AND SCIENTISTS IN SU ARE FREE
 
Foreign critics readily conclude that the Soviet intelligentsia is in helpless bondage and consists of sycophantic automatons, reduced to complete sterility.  Nothing could be farther from the truth.  No government anywhere at any time has done more than the USSR to promote art and science by providing facilities for training, work, and publication, and by giving scientists and artists economic security through regular salaries plus generous rewards for achievement through royalties, prizes, and numerous privileges.  That this policy has paid dividends in shown by the striking accomplishments of Soviet music, drama, cinema, and literature as well as the biological and physical sciences.  Yet all of the contributors have lacked "freedom" in the Western sense.  And since freedom is commonly viewed in the West as the sine qua non of productivity, the enigma of Soviet culture seems to many quite inexplicable, particularly to those given to compiling cases (and there had been many) of Soviet intellectuals who have been dismissed, degraded, or even purged for political non-conformity.
Schuman, Frederick L. Soviet Politics. New York: A.A. Knopf, 1946, p. 332
 
PERSONAL PROPERTY RIGHTS OF THOSE IN COLLECTIVES
 
The political privileges guaranteed by the Constitution....
            Every household in a collective has a plot of land, including house, livestock, poultry, and tools, as its private property for family use (article seven)
            “Alongside the socialist system of economy,” every citizen has the right to carry on personal labor, “precluding the exploitation of the labor of others.” (Article 9)
            He likewise has a right to inherit personal property and is entitled (Art. 10) to personal ownership of income from work, savings, homes, furniture, and articles of personal use and convenience....
            Soviet citizens have as much right as people of other lands to cultivate the joy, pride, and responsibility which are commonly supposed to attend individual ownership of apartments, homes, and gardens.
Schuman, Frederick L. Soviet Politics. New York: A.A. Knopf, 1946, p. 335-36
 
STALIN SAYS THOSE WITH PARTY CARDS ABUSE THE PRIVILEGE
 
Zhdanov stated on March 18, 1939, “It has been repeatedly pointed out by Lenin and Stalin that a bureaucrat with a Party card in his pocket is the most dangerous and pernicious kind of bureaucrat, because, possessing a Party card, he imagines that he may ignore Party and Soviet laws and the needs and interests of the working people.
Schuman, Frederick L.  Soviet Politics. New York: A.A. Knopf, 1946, p. 347-48
 
TRAITS OF GOOD PARTY LEADERS
 
Other life histories of the highest ranking party leaders serve to confirm the pattern already suggested....  All in varying agree share with Stalin and their colleagues those traits and experiences which, thus far, are the prerequisites of political eminence in the USSR: peasant or proletarian origin, poverty stricken youth, little formal education, much informal education in the school of hard knocks, early conversion to the cause, fame won in revolutionary education and organization, and a generous measure of vision, courage, unflagging energy, relentless determination, and genius for holding many jobs simultaneously and for directing and inspiring subordinates to perform the impossible.  These leaders are not fawning yes-men or wordy agitators or arbitrary bureaucrats, but hard-driving executives.
Schuman, Frederick L.  Soviet Politics. New York: A.A. Knopf, 1946, p. 357
 
            In a speech to the Active Workers of the Moscow Organization of the CPSU (April 1928) Voroshilov quotes Stalin as having said, “To sit at the helm and keep watch, seeing nothing until some calamity overtakes us--this is no kind of leadership.  Bolshevism does not interpret leadership in this way.  To lead means to foresee; and to foresee, comrades, is not always so simple.  It is one thing when a dozen other leading comrades keep watch and notice defects in our work; but the working masses do not want to keep watch, or cannot do so; they therefore do not notice the defects.”
Life of Stalin,  A Symposium. New York: Workers Library Publishers, 1930, p. 45
 
            ...wherein lies the art of leadership.
            "The art of leadership," Stalin wrote, "is a serious matter.  One must not lag behind the movement, because to do so is to become isolated from the masses.  But neither must one rush ahead, for to rush ahead is to lose contact with the masses.  He who wants to lead a movement and at the same time keep in touch with the vast masses must wage a fight on two fronts--against those who lag behind and against those who rush on ahead."
Alexandrov, G. F.  Joseph Stalin; a Short Biography. Moscow: FLPH, 1947, p. 111
 
            Stalin has himself given what is probably the best characterization of what he tries to do in these words: "The art of leadership is a serious matter.  One must not straddle behind a movement, nor run in front of it, lest one become in both cases separated from the masses.  Whoever wants to lead and at the same time maintain his contact with the masses must fight on two fronts; against those loitering in the rear, and those speeding on ahead."
            Again, in April 1928, before the Moscow organization of the party, he declared that leaders often think they are watching but see nothing "until some calamity overtakes them--this is no kind of leadership.  Bolshevism does not interpret leadership in this way.  To lead means to foresee; and to foresee, Comrades, is not always so simple.
Davis, Jerome.  Behind Soviet Power. New York, N. Y.: The Readers' Press, Inc., c1946, p. 13
 
            [in a letter to Kaganovich on 11 August 1932 Stalin stated] Lenin was right in saying that a person who does not have the courage to swim against the current when necessary cannot be a real Bolshevik leader....
Shabad, Steven, trans. The Stalin-Kaganovich Correspondence, 1931-1936. New Haven: Yale University Press, c2003, p. 180
 
CHURCHILL SUPPORTS SU AGAINST NAZIS
 
Churchill said, “at four o'clock this morning Hitler attacked and invaded Russia....  No one has been a more consistent opponent of communism than I have for the last 25 years.  But all this fades away before the spectacle which is now unfolding....  Any man or state who fights against nazism will have our aid.  Any man or state who marches with Hitler is our foe.”
Schuman, Frederick L. Soviet Politics. New York: A.A. Knopf, 1946, p. 422
 
            An "off the record" story illustrates Churchill's attitude.  One of his friends said, "Winston, how can you support the Bolsheviks, you who led British intervention against Lenin and once admitted that you had spent 100 million British pounds to aid the 'White' armies of Kolchak and Denikin?"
            The premier replied curtly, "If seven devils rose from hell to fight against that man Hitler, I'd  shake them all by the hand and give each a bottle of brandy and a box of my best cigars."
Duranty, Walter.  Story of Soviet Russia. Philadelphia, N. Y.: JB Lippincott Co. 1944, p. 264
 
            In June 22, 1941, Churchill had said: 'No one has been a more persistent opponent of communism than I have been for the last 25 years.  I will unsay no word that I have spoken about it, but all this fades away before the spectacle which is now unfolding.'
Deutscher, Isaac. Stalin; A Political Biography. New York: Oxford Univ. Press, 1967, p. 505
 
 
LINDBERGH SUPPORTS NAZIS AGAINST SU
 
Lindbergh said, I would a hundred times rather see my country ally herself with England, or even with Germany with all her faults, than with the cruelty, the Godlessness and the barbarism that exists in Soviet Russia.
Schuman, Frederick L. Soviet Politics. New York: A.A. Knopf, 1946, p. 424
 
MACARTHUR PROFUSELY PRAISES THE RED ARMY’S DEFENSE AND COUNTERATTACK
 
Douglas MacArthur's anniversary tribute of February 23, 1942: "The hopes of civilization rest on the worthy banners of the courageous Russian army.  During my lifetime I have participated in a number of wars and have witnessed others, as well as studying in great detail campaigns of outstanding leaders of the past.  In none have I observed such effective resistance to the heaviest blows of a hitherto undefeated enemy, followed by a smashing counter attack which is driving the enemy back to his own land.  The scale and grandeur of the effort mark it as the greatest military achievement in all history."
Schuman, Frederick L. Soviet Politics. New York: A.A. Knopf, 1946, p. 432
 
 
            [As the Red Army fought the Wehrmacht in early 1942 MacArthur sent the following telegram to the Soviet leadership]. 
            “The world situation at the present time indicates that the hopes of civilization rest on the worthy banners of the courageous Russian army.  During my lifetime I have participated in a number of wars and have witnessed others, as well as studying in great detail the campaigns of outstanding leaders of the past.  In none have I observed such effective resistance to the heaviest blows of a hitherto undefeated enemy, followed by a smashing counterattack which is driving the enemy back to his own land.  The scale and grandeur of this effort marks it as the greatest military achievement in all history.”
Sherwood, Robert E.  Roosevelt and Hopkins.  New York: Harper, 1948, p. 497
 
LEADERS COMPLIMENT THE RED ARMY
 
It is the Russian army said Churchill on August second 1944 that has done the main work of tearing the guts out of the German Army.
Schuman, Frederick L.  Soviet Politics. New York: A.A. Knopf, 1946, p. 493
 
            The German Generals' impressions of the Red Army were interesting, and often illuminating.  The best appreciation in a concise form came from General Kleist: "The [Soviet] men were first-rate fighters from the start, and we owed our success simply to superior training.  They became first-rate soldiers with experience.  They fought most toughly, had amazing endurance, and could carry on without most of the things other armies regarded as necessities.  The Staff were quick to learn from their early defeats, and soon became highly efficient."
            I asked German General Rundstedt what he considered were the strong and weak points of the Red Army, as he found it in 1941.  His reply was: "The Russian heavy tanks were a surprise in quality and reliability from the outset.  But the Russians proved to have less artillery than had been expected, and their air force did not offer serious opposition in that first campaign."
            Talking more specifically of the Russian weapons Kleist said: "Their equipment was very good even in 1941, especially the tanks.  Their artillery was excellent, and also most of the infantry weapons--their rifles were more modern than ours, and had a more rapid rate of fire.  Their T-34 tank was the finest in the world."  In my talks with Manteuffel, he emphasized that the Russians maintained their advantage in tank design and that in the "Stalin" tank, which appeared in 1944, they had what he considered the best tank that was seen in battle, anywhere, up to the end of the war.
Hart, Liddell.  The German Generals Talk.  New York: W. T. Morrow, 1948, p. 220-221
 
            As regards the general characteristics of the Russian soldier, Dittmar gave me an illuminating sidelight when I asked him what he considered was the Russians' chief asset.  "I would put first, what might be called the soulless indifference of the troops--it was something more than fatalism.  They were not quite so insensitive when things went badly for them, but normally it was difficult to make any impression on them in the way that would happen with troops of other nations.  During my period of command on the Finnish front there was only one instance where Russian troops actually surrendered to my own.
            Dittmar added: "On Hitler's specific orders, an attempt was later made in the German Army to inculcate the same mental attitude that prevailed in the Red Army.  We tried to copy the Russians in this respect, while the Russians copied us, more successfully, in tactics.
Hart, Liddell.  The German Generals Talk. New York: W. Morrow, 1948, p. 223-224
 
            Blumentritt stated, "It was in this war, however, that we first learnt to realize what 'Russia' really means.  The opening battle in June, 1941, revealed to us for the first time the new Soviet Army.  Our casualties were up to 50 percent.  The 0GPU and a women's battalion defended the old citadel at Brest-Litovsk for a week, fighting to the last, in spite of bombardment with our heaviest guns and from the air.  Our troops soon learnt to know what fighting the Russians meant.  The Fuhrer and most of our highest chiefs didn't know.  That caused a lot of trouble.
            "The Red Army of 1941-45 was far harder than the Tsar's Army, for they were fighting fanatically for an idea.  That increased their doggedness, and in turn made our own troops hard, for in the East the maxim held good--'You or I.'
Hart, Liddell.  The German Generals Talk. New York: W. Morrow, 1948, p. 225
 
            During the month of July 1941 the course of contemporary history was to be decided.   Under the staggering blows of the Wehrmacht, already drawing upon the human and economic potential of the whole of Europe, the Red Army constantly retreated.   The whole structure of the Soviet edifice was shaken by the terrible blows.   A few fissures were showing in the western part of the country, where defections were taking place.   However, despite the defeats, the heavy losses, and the withdrawal from thousands of miles of the front--despite the overwhelming effect on the country's economy, as a whole the young State--and it was not 30 years old--was standing firm.   Like certain metals, whose molecular structure becomes closer, and whose coefficient of resistance increases under the vibrations of a violent hammering, Soviet Russia was forging itself.   There was no weakening of the military command or the government of the country; the industrial reorganization continued.   Contrary to the enemy's expectation, instead of sinking into anarchy the peoples of the USSR remained united under a central authority.   They persevered in the organized effort which enabled the USSR to sustain a modern, technical war, and without interruption to increase its military potential.
Delbars, Yves.  The Real Stalin. London, Allen & Unwin, 1951, p. 301
 
SU DID NOT SOCIALIZE EASTERN EUROPE WHEN IT COULD HAVE
 
What is surprising is not that so-called "totalitarian" methods of winning friends and influencing people were displayed in these lands during and after their liberation, but that dictatorial devices were not employed more extensively.  Moscow had the power (at the risk, to be sure, of a rupture with the Atlantic Powers) to give unqualified support to Communist groups and to Sovietize this whole vast region.  With judicious moderation, it refrained from doing so.  In no case did its program precipitate civil war within the lands freed by the Red Army, despite widespread resentment at requisitions by Soviet troops who lived off the land.
Schuman, Frederick L. Soviet Politics. New York: A.A. Knopf, 1946, p. 526
 
            Soon, it became clear that none of the ruined nations of East Europe could hope for reconstruction loans from Washington, unless they remade their governments to suit the USA.  To some extent they were willing to do this.  Bulgaria changed its cabinet at Washington's order and postponed an election when America protested its form.  All of the East European nations hoped for American loans and were willing to make adjustments.  They offered industrial concessions to foreign capital; they were ready to postpone socialism, as Lenin did in the days of NEP.  Nor did Moscow object to this; Moscow was not at all anxious to take on the economic problems of East Europe, in addition to her own.  If these lands could get American loans by concessions to capitalism, Moscow was not disposed to interfere.
            In the first years after victory– Moscow handled affairs in East Europe with a loose hand.  Americans supposed the arriving Red Army would at once "sovietize" these eastern nations, nationalize industry, collective farms.  American correspondents were amazed to discover that the Red Army did not even stop King Michael's jailing of Communists; they called it Romania's affair.  When I was in Poland in 1945, it was "treason" to urge collective farming, lest this alienate the peasant.  Moscow intended to have "friendly nations" on her border but many of Moscow's acts in 1945-46--the long tolerance of King Michael's brutally reactionary regime in Romania, the lack of Russian support to Communists fighting in Greece, the calling off of Bulgarian elections because of an American protest, the acceptance of three Poles from London into the Warsaw cabinet--indicated that Stalin would make many concessions in East Europe to keep his wartime friendship with Britain and the United States.
Strong, Anna Louise.   The Stalin Era. New York: Mainstream, 1956, p. 108
 
            I visited Rumania after the Russian occupation.  All the government authorities and the common people testified to the fact that Russia gave freedom to the democratic elements in Rumania to govern themselves.
            I also visited Finland.  An election was held after the Russians had freed it from the Germans.  As far as I could find out, no one charged that the election had been influenced by the Russians.  The electoral results showed the Finnish Communists to be in the minority.  Similarly in Hungary and Austria, the Soviets permitted governments to be formed which are not communist by any stretch of the imagination.
Davis, Jerome.  Behind Soviet Power. New York, N. Y.: The Readers' Press, Inc., c1946, p. 99
 
            Stalin does not wish to have a Communist government set up in the occupied areas now.  He would prefer a liberal democratic coalition of elements friendly to Russia--officials who would not be secretly plotting war against either Poland or the Soviet Union [as did the Germans].
Davis, Jerome.  Behind Soviet Power. New York, N. Y.: The Readers' Press, Inc., c1946, p. 102
 
            What, then, does the Soviet Union want in the countries which surround her?
            First of all, friendly governments.  Russia would prefer not to have communist governments now, but does not object to communist control if that is the genuine desire of the majority of the population of the country concerned.  I saw an example of this last in the Baltic states, Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia, now Soviet Republics.  On my visit there I found that the workers and peasants, who make up a majority of the population, were all in favor of being part of the Soviet Union.  The middle classes wanted to be independent, but admitted that they had an oppressive dictatorship before the present government.  The propertied classes wanted to do away with Soviet rule so that they could get back their factories and property.  Every person I met, without exception, preferred the Republics to the German occupation.  These countries prospered after they became Soviet republics, and it is likely that popular support for the present status will increase rather than lessen.
Davis, Jerome.  Behind Soviet Power. New York, N. Y.: The Readers' Press, Inc., c1946, p. 103
 
            ...But I can till you something about what it was like when the Red Army conquered  Rumania and from this you may… be able to piece together a pattern of a destiny soon to unfold throughout the Balkans.
            In Dorohoi and Botosani, two prefectures in Rumanian Moldavia which had been held by the Russians since April, 1944, I talked to mayors and to village officials, to trade unionists and to farmers, to Jewish refugees from Antonescu's concentration camps and to a Rumanian chief of police, to representatives of several large American business organizations and to a mother superior in a Rumanian convent.
            All these people, some with satisfaction and others with regret, agreed on one thing: they said the Russians had not instigated any revolutionary movements.  They said the Red Army had observed the Molotov declaration with disciplined correctness--and we saw the declaration posted wherever the hammer and sickle flew.
            There appeared to be no open effort by the Red Army to propagandize the masses in favor of communism or socialism.  Pictures of the King and Queen and of the late Dowager Queen Marie still hung on the walls of official buildings, while Stalin's portrait was strangely absent, except in offices of the Red Army.  On the surface of things, nothing suggested that the inhabitants did not enjoy a degree of liberty which, considering that Rumania was still a country at war against Russia, was astonishing.  In fact, many of the Rumanians apparently wanted to fight on the winning side now.  The handsome young Russian commandant of Dorohoi told me that peasants were coming to him every day, asking to enlist in the Red Army.
            "The loyalty of the population is remarkable," said he.  "Men wish to become soldiers and women wish to join up as nurses.  We have to refuse as politely as we can."
Snow, Edgar. The Pattern of Soviet Power, New York: Random House, 1945, p. 28
 
            ...Will Russia put her dearly won understandings with Britain and America in jeopardy by attempting to establish paramountcy of Communism?  I was speculating about this one day with an elderly Communist, and this is what he said: "If any one had told me a few years ago that there would be no revolution in Eastern Europe after this war, I would have called that man crazy.  But that's the way it is now.  Russia above all wants stability in this part of the world and where the Red Army goes there will be no revolution."
            It seemed true enough, if you applied traditional Marxist definitions of a working-class revolution.  In the liberated lands beyond Soviet borders one saw no proletarian uprisings of the conventional pattern.  There were no open exhortations to workers to overthrow the bourgeoisie; no demands for a "workers and peasants dictatorship"; no open denunciations of capitalism; no extravagant prophecies of an early Communist or socialist Europe.  The familiar terminology of class warfare seemed almost to have disappeared from the lexicon of Europe's Leftists.  If the Kremlin was fostering revolution it was doing so with a hand heavily gloved in velvet, and it was pointing rather than pushing.
            ..."But no one can say that the Comintern or the Soviet government is bolshevizing these countries," he [a loyal follower of Stalin] rejoined.
Snow, Edgar. The Pattern of Soviet Power, New York: Random House, 1945, p. 59
 
            At the same time, however, Stalin managed to establish and to obtain his allies sanction for two principles, both very hazy, by which political life in the Russian zone was to be guided.  One was that he should be free to intervene against pro-Nazi and fascist parties and groups and to establish a democratic order in the countries neighboring Russia.  The other was that the Governments of those countries should be 'friendly to Russia'.  For the first time Stalin applied these principles to the Polish issue, which stood at the center of allied diplomatic activity throughout the last part of the war.  His purpose was to prevail upon the western allies that they should abandon the Polish government in London, on the ground that it was neither democratic nor friendly to Russia....  Apart from the fact that he undoubtedly believed that what he did served a profoundly Democratic purpose, the strength of his argument was in the fact that the Polish Government in London had indeed been a motley coalition of half-Conservative peasants, moderate Socialists, and of people who could not by any criterion, 'eastern' or 'western', be labeled democrats.  The core of its administration consisted of the followers of the Polish dictators Pilsudski and Rydz-Smigly.  More important still, the members of that Government, democratic and anti-democratic, were, with very few exceptions, possessed by that Russophobia which had been the hereditary propensity of Polish policy, a propensity enhanced by what the Poles had suffered at Russian hands since 1939.  In truth, of all Polish parties, only the Communists were friendly to Russia'.
Deutscher, Isaac. Stalin; A Political Biography. New York: Oxford Univ. Press, 1967, p. 520
 
            The question must be asked whether Stalin, while he was bargaining for his zone of influence, already contemplated putting it under exclusive Communist control.  Had the scheme of revolution been in his mind at the time of Tehran or Yalta?  Had it finally taken shape at the time of Potsdam?  His detractors as well as his apologists concur on this point, for both want us to see an extremely shrewd and far-sided design behind his actions.  Yet Stalin's actions show many strange and striking contradictions which do not indicate that he had any revolutionary master-plan.  They suggest, on the contrary, that he had none.  Here are a few of the most glaring contradictions.  If Stalin consistently prepared to install a Communist government in Warsaw, why did he so stubbornly refuse to make any concessions to Poles over their eastern frontier?  Would it not have been all the same to him whether, say, Lvov, that Polish-Ukrainian city, was ruled from Communist Kiev or from Communist Warsaw?  Yet such a concession would have enormously strengthened the hands of the Polish left.  Similarly, if he had beforehand planned revolution for eastern Germany, why did he detach from Germany and incorporate into Poland all the German provinces east of the Neisse and the 0der, the acquisition of which even the Poles themselves had not dreamt?  Why did he insist on the expulsion of the whole German population from those lands, an act that could not but further embitter the German people not only against the Poles but also against Russia and communism.  His claim for reparations to be paid by Germany, Austria, Hungary, Rumania, Bulgaria, and Finland, understandable as it was in view of the devastation of the Ukraine and other Soviet lands, could not but have the same damaging effect on the Communist cause in those countries.  This was even truer of Stalin's demand for the liquidation of the bulk of German industry.  Already at Teheran, if not earlier, he had given notice that he would raise that demand; at Yalta he proposed that 80 percent of German industry should be dismantled within two years after the cease-fire; and he did not abate that demand at Potsdam.  He could not have been unaware that his scheme, as chimerical as ruthless, if it had been carried out, would have entailed the dispersal of the German working-class, the main, if not the only, social force to which communism could have appealed and whose support it might have enlisted.  Not a single one of these policies can by any stretch of the imagination be described as a stepping-stone towards revolution.  On the contrary, in every one of those moves, Stalin himself was laboriously erecting formidable barriers to revolution.  This alone seems to warrant the conclusion that even at the close of the war his intentions were still extremely self-contradictory, to say the least.
Deutscher, Isaac. Stalin; A Political Biography. New York: Oxford Univ. Press, 1967, p. 536
 
            Mikolajczyk reports a curious conversation with Stalin in August 1944.  Not without peasant-like slyness, the Polish politician tried to sound Stalin on his plans for Germany, and told him that German prisoners, captured by the Poles, allegedly expressed the hope that after the war Germany would embrace communism and, as the foremost Communist state, go on to rule the world.  Stalin, so Mikolajczyk reports, replied indignantly that 'communism fitted Germany as a saddle fitted a cow'.  This contemptuous aphorism undoubtedly reflected his mood.  It harmonized so perfectly with the whole trend of his policy vis-a-vis Germany, it was so spontaneous, so organic, so much in line with what we know of his old disbelief in western European communism, and it accorded so much with all that he said and did in those days, that it could not have been sheer tactical bluff.
Deutscher, Isaac. Stalin; A Political Biography. New York: Oxford Univ. Press, 1967, p. 537
 
            Early in 1947, he still hesitated whether he should carry to its conclusion the 'revolution from above' in eastern Europe, where he still tolerated non-Communist parties in the governments and allowed some scope to capitalist interests.
Deutscher, Isaac. Stalin; A Political Biography. New York: Oxford Univ. Press, 1967, p. 581
 
            Since the Allied Control Commissions had been established in the ex-Nazi satellite states of Rumania and Bulgaria as well as Hungary, Soviet control over these states was only to be 75-25, while Britain ("in accord with the USA") would enjoy 90-10 control in Greece.
Rose, Lisle Abbott.  After Yalta. New York: Scribner, 1973, p. 15
 
            At this stage, to avoid the charge of a Communist takeover, Stalin took care to see that the governments formed, with Soviet approval, were coalitions of radical and peasant parties with Communists holding key ministries, such the Ministry of the Interior responsible for the police.  In the case of Hungary, four non-Communist parties were represented and Communists held only two ministerial offices.  In Bulgaria a similar coalition had been formed under the umbrella of the Fatherland Front.
Bullock, Alan. Hitler and Stalin: Parallel Lives. New York: Knopf, 1992, p. 895
 
            In the first two years after the war, only Yugoslavia and Albania could be described as single-party Communist states, although even here the name was avoided in favor of the People's Front and Democratic Front.  The governments of the other five--Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Romania, and Bulgaria--were all coalitions.  In two cases at least (Czechoslovakia and Hungary) they were genuine coalitions in which several parties with their own organizations and very different views combined to carry out a short-term radical program with such reforms as the redistribution of land.  When elections were held in Czechoslovakia in May 1946 and Hungary in November 1945 they were generally regarded as fair, producing a Communist success in the first case with 38 percent of the vote, and a Communist defeat in the second, with 57 percent for the Small Farmers' party.
Bullock, Alan. Hitler and Stalin: Parallel Lives. New York: Knopf, 1992, p. 928
 
            ... and it was security infinitely more than any ideological considerations which determined Stalin to create in Eastern and part of Central Europe a  "friendly" cordon sanitaire, in place of that hostile cordon sanitaire which had been set up by the Western powers at the end of the First World War.
Werth, Alexander. Russia; The Post-War Years. New York: Taplinger Pub. Co.,1971, p. 56
 
            Finland, which no longer represented any danger to the Soviet Union after the Second World War, continues to be a Western-type democracy to this day, and so does Austria.   It has even been suggested by one American historian that Stalin would have been perfectly satisfied if half a dozen "Finlands" could have been set up in Eastern Europe.   But this was scarcely possible in a country like Poland, with its long tradition of Russo-phobia, nor very easy in countries like Romania and Hungary, once the Cold War, with its challenge to Russia's "sphere of influence," had got going in earnest--which it did from the very moment the Second World War had ended.
Werth, Alexander. Russia; The Post-War Years. New York: Taplinger Pub. Co.,1971, p. 56
 
            He [Stalin] also denied--and this was characteristic of 1946--that there were "totalitarian police states" in the East European countries--Poland, Romania, Yugoslavia, Bulgaria were governed by "a bloc of several parties ranging from four to six, and the more or less loyal opposition parties can take part in the government...."
            Obviously, Stalin was not on very solid ground here, but to keep in with the West he had been anxious since the war to meet the Western powers at least part of the way.   He had not--not yet--tried to impose all-communist governments on the Eastern countries, and at that time he valued the East/West coexistence as symbolized by Czechoslovakia and Finland.   Bulgaria, Romania, and Hungary, as ex-fascist powers, had to be dealt with rather more "vigilantly," but even here pro-forma appearances were still being kept up, as they were in the very special case of Poland.   If Yugoslavia was the most extremely communist country of the lot it was, in fact, against Stalin's wishes.
Werth, Alexander. Russia; The Post-War Years. New York: Taplinger Pub. Co., 1971, p. 113
 
            For the present [1947] Hungary was a strange amalgam of people's democracy and bourgeois democracy, and American imperialism had not yet given up hope a winning her over and turning her into an anti-Soviet base.
            ... there were still many strongholds of "bourgeois democracy" in Hungary.   A large part of industry and most of trade was still in private hands.  The kulaks, dodging their duties, were supplying the black market.   Many of the civil servants were still pre-war, and had served under Horthy.   Clerical reaction was still very strong, as were the reactionary and pro--fascist parties in parliament, and there were right-wing anti--communist elements among the government parties.
Werth, Alexander. Russia; The Post-War Years. New York: Taplinger Pub. Co., 1971, p. 323
 
            One of the troubles with the Hungarian CP had been that some of its older members had imagined that the experiment of 1919 would be resumed with the help of the Red Army, and that a Soviet Hungary would now be firmly set up.   It took some time to explain to them that there could be no question of restoring the dictatorship of the proletariat, and that a people's democracy, in which the CP cooperated with other progressive forces, was something quite different.
Werth, Alexander. Russia; The Post-War Years. New York: Taplinger Pub. Co., 1971, p. 324        
 
            Communism was triumphant and its leaders celebrated their victory.  A technical point, however, had to be clarified.  No one had yet explained how the new communist states were to be fitted into a Marxist-Leninist scheme of historical stages.  Stalin had insisted that they should remain formally independent countries (and he discouraged early proposals for them to be simply annexed to the USSR as had been done with Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania).
Service, Robert. Stalin. Cambridge, Mass.: Belknap Press of Harvard Univ. Press, 2005, p. 517
 
            On 28 January 1945 Stalin said, "We have no wish to impose anything on the other Slavic peoples.  We do not interfere in their internal affairs.  Let them do what they can.  The crisis of capitalism has manifested itself in the division of the capitalists into two factions-- one fascist, the other democratic.  The alliance between ourselves and the democratic faction of capitalists came about because the latter had a stake in preventing Hitler's domination, for that brutal state would have driven the working class to extremes and to the overthrow of capitalism itself.  We are currently allied with one faction against the other, but in the future we will be against the first faction of capitalist, too.
Dimitrov, Georgi, The Diary of Georgi Dimitrov, 1933-1949.  Ed. Ivo Banac. New Haven: Yale University Press, c2003, p. 358
 
            Perhaps we are mistaken when we suppose that the Soviet form is the only one that leads to socialism.  In practice, it turns out that the Soviet form is the best, but by no means the only, form.  There may be other forms--the democratic republic and even under certain conditions the constitutional monarchy....
Dimitrov, Georgi, The Diary of Georgi Dimitrov, 1933-1949.  Ed. Ivo Banac. New Haven: Yale University Press, c2003, p. 358
 
            On 7 June 1945 Stalin proposed that they declare categorically that the path of imposing the Soviet system on Germany is an incorrect one; an anti-fascist democratic parliamentary regime must be established.  The Communist Party proposes a bloc of anti-fascist parties with a common platform.  Don't speak so glowingly of the Soviet Union, and so on.
Dimitrov, Georgi,  The Diary of Georgi Dimitrov, 1933-1949.  Ed. Ivo Banac. New Haven: Yale University Press, c2003, p. 372
 
            On 6 December 1948 Stalin said to some Communist East European leaders, "In your country, where the working-class seized power not by means of an uprising but with help from outside--with the help of the Soviet army, in other words--the seizure of power was easier; you can do without the Soviet form, going back to the model of Marx and Engels-- i.e., the people's democratic parliamentary form.  We are of the opinion that you can do without the Soviet regime.  In your case, you will be able to carry out the transition from capitalism to socialism by means of a people's democracy.  The people's democracy will play the role of the dictatorship of the proletariat....
            As long as there are antagonistic classes, there will be dictatorship of the proletariat.  But in your country, it will be a dictatorship of a different type.  You can do without a Soviet regime.
Dimitrov, Georgi, The Diary of Georgi Dimitrov, 1933-1949.  Ed. Ivo Banac. New Haven: Yale University Press, c2003, p. 451
 
 
LENIN FIRST WANTED TO EQUALIZE INCOMES
 
Meanwhile, during the protracted socialist "transition" to communism, the equality of incomes is not, and never was, contemplated, since men and women differ markedly in their capacities to contribute to the welfare of the Commonwealth.  Lenin toyed for a time, to be sure, with the notion of a moderate leveling of incomes.  Under "War Communism," and to a lesser extent under the NEP, wage and salary scales were influenced by this idea.  Once the building of socialism was embarked upon in earnest, however, the gap between the best paid and the worst paid grew ever greater.
Schuman, Frederick L. Soviet Politics. New York: A.A. Knopf, 1946, p. 575
 
SU ABOLISHED PRIVATE PROPERTY AND EXPLOITATION
 
What distinguishes Soviet society from all others, past and present, is not the allocation of income but the distribution and form of ownership of property....  No one in the USSR owns corporate stocks or bonds, or possesses tangible property (save houses and gardens and objects of personal use), or leases real estate for private rentals, or employs labor to produce services or goods exclusively for personal profit.  If a "ruling class" be defined as a group at the peak of the social hierarchy, possessed of maximum deference, income, and power by virtue of private ownership of productive property, then the USSR has none and is already a truly "classless" society.  The socialization of the means of production signifies the end of the propertied classes which, in their various forms, have controlled all hitherto existing societies.
Schuman, Frederick L. Soviet Politics. New York: A.A. Knopf, 1946, p. 578
 
ALL WANT TO LIVE IN LUXURY WITHOUT WORK AND THAT THE SU ABOLISHES
 
But what is impossible for the Soviet intelligentsia is to become a propertied class or a leisure class living on unearned income.  These are the earmarks of every landed aristocracy.  To live without labor is the dream of every Western businessman, indeed the secret hope of almost all men and women everywhere, since the species is allergic to work, craves luxuries, preferably on a silver platter, and prefers a horizontal to a vertical position whenever possible.  The pecuniary elites of the West consist in part of hard-working and hard driving executives and managers, and in part of idle rich.  The latter indulge in conspicuous consumption and live without work by virtue of astute selection of ancestors, schools, colleges, fraternity brothers, wives/or business associates, affording access to adequate quantities of unearned increments.
Schuman, Frederick L.  Soviet Politics. New York: A.A. Knopf, 1946, p. 580
 
SU ELIMINATES LEISURE WITHOUT WORK BY OWNING PRIVATE PROPERTY
 
In the USSR, for better or for worse, leisure is all too scarce and no such group exists, or can come into being, so long as productive property may not be privately bought and sold, and so long as industrial capital is not raised by selling shares to individuals with private savings from which they hope to derive income without effort.
Schuman, Frederick L. Soviet Politics. New York: A.A. Knopf, 1946, p. 581
 
WEALTHY SOVIET ELITE DOES NOT EXIST
 
"Striking it rich" is impossible.  "Keeping up with the Joneses" is bad form.  Excelling the Ivanoviches in socialist competition to cut production costs, increase output, and raise profits beyond the Plan is always the order of the day.  Conspicuous success in such endeavors means prizes, bonuses, honors, and fame. 
            This elite bears little resemblance to any known aristocracy, plutocracy, or theocracy.
Schuman, Frederick L.  Soviet Politics. New York: A.A. Knopf, 1946, p. 581
 
 
            No private person may legitimately make a penny of profit out of this system of state and cooperative industry and trade, banking and transport.  There are no individual shareholders in the state industrial enterprises; and the financial columns of the Russian newspapers are restricted to brief quotations of the rates of the state loans.  All the normal means of acquiring large personal fortunes are thus pretty effectively blocked up in Russia; and if there are some Nepmen, or private traders who have become ruble millionaires through lucky dealings in commerce or speculation, they are certainly neither a numerous nor a conspicuous class.
Chamberlin, William Henry. Soviet Russia. Boston: Little, Brown, 1930, p. 131
 
            The new class of state managers, or "red directors" of factories, who have replaced the former capitalist owners, are mostly Communists and former workers.  But by the very nature of their position they must look at industrial life from a rather different angle from that of the workers.  Although they make no personal profit out of the enterprises which they manage, they are supposed to turn in a profit for the state.
Chamberlin, William Henry.  Soviet Russia. Boston: Little, Brown, 1930, p. 174
 
            But the general view of the Social Democratic and Anarchist critics of the Soviet regime, that there is a deep rift between a few Communist officeholders at the top and the working masses at the bottom, is, in my opinion, distorted, exaggerated, and quite at variance with the actual facts of the Russian situation.
Chamberlin, William Henry.  Soviet Russia. Boston: Little, Brown, 1930, p. 177
 
            The difference in the standard of life is only determined by the ability of the single man.  The external glamour of life, enjoyed in all other countries by a few big businessmen or rich heirs, has been sacrificed to a feeling of security guaranteed by no other state to its citizens.  In order to remove the fear of the vacuum endured by 90% of the citizens, the enjoyment of the other 10% must be curtailed.  Then the worker will not be filled any more by hate and jealousy, nor the owner by hate and fear of revolts.
            Such a state without classes must necessarily be a state without races.  Privileges for any race or color are explicitly denied by the Constitution.
Ludwig, Emil, Stalin. New York, New York: G. P. Putnam's sons, 1942, p. 167
 
            On the whole the men who remain in top leadership are the ablest of the 12 million government employees.  Although shouldering more responsibility they do not receive salaries anywhere near as large as those of corporation presidents in the United States.  They do receive decorations and they may have cities named after them.  They are all provided with automobiles, expense accounts and good houses or apartments.
Davis, Jerome.  Behind Soviet Power. New York, N. Y.: The Readers' Press, Inc., c1946, p. 39
 
            Even more important than these liberties is the fact that they labor not for the private profit of employers (save for the small proportion employed in private industry), but for the profit of the whole community.  State industries, like private, must show a profit to keep going, but the public use of that profit robs it of the driving force of exploitation.
            The liberties enjoyed by workers in Russia, whether or not in unions (less than 10 percent are outside), go far beyond those of workers in other countries, not only in their participation in controlling working conditions and wages, but in the privileges they get as a class.  The eight-hour day is universal in practice, alone of all countries in the world, with a six-hour day in dangerous occupations like mining.  Reduction of the eight-hour day to seven hours is already planned for all industries.  Every worker gets a two-week vacation with pay, while office workers and workers in dangerous trades, get a month.  No worker can be dismissed from his job without the consent of his union.  His rent, his admission to places of entertainment or education, his transportation--all these he gets at lower prices than others.  When unemployed he gets a small allowance from his union, free rent, free transportation, and free admission to places of entertainment and instruction.  Education and medical aid are free to all workers--or for small fees--extensive services being especially organized for and by them.
            ...There is in Russia no privileged class based on wealth.  Practically all rents for land or buildings are paid to the state or to cooperatives; only a little of it goes to line private pockets.  Money may be loaned at simple interest, the rate being limited.  Money deposited with the state earns a rate of interest even higher than in capitalist countries.  But nobody is getting rich off the interest on his savings and loans, for all incomes are both limited at their source, and, when much above the average, are heavily taxed.  Persons with higher incomes are also obliged to pay higher prices for some necessities--especially rent.  Inheritance of property is now theoretically unlimited, but so heavily taxed as in effect to destroy all above a moderate amount.
            The new bourgeoisie, which has grown-up with the new economic policy--private traders, richer peasants...--is too small to constitute a noteworthy exception to the general absence of a wealthy class.  And they are being increasingly restricted, despite the assertions to the contrary by the Communist Opposition and others.  The statistics of private versus public enterprises show it.  Earnings and incomes throughout Soviet Russia vary from the minimum of bare subsistence, 15 or 20 rubles a month, to 10 or 15 times that amount.  Few incomes run above that figure (300 rubles a month, $150), the highest in all Russia being those of a few concessionaires and foreign specialists on salaries ($5000-$10,000).  Even the few traders and concessionaires who have gotten rich are unable to invest money productively in Russia, except in state loans.  None can be invested for exploitation.  There is practically no chance for anyone to get rich under the Soviet system except a comparatively few traders, concessionaires, or the winners of some of the big state lotteries--and it is hard for any of them to stay rich under the heavy taxation.
Baldwin, Roger. Liberty Under the Soviets, New York: Vanguard Press, 1928, p. 29-30
 
            ...Even to tourists in Russia the absence of any moneyed class is at once apparent....  No fine shops, no gay restaurants, no private motors--none of the trappings of wealth that lend color and variety to the life of bourgeois countries.  Instead, a somewhat monotonous drabness and shabbiness, more than compensated for by the thought of its significance to the masses.
Baldwin, Roger. Liberty under the Soviets, New York: Vanguard Press, 1928, p. 30
 
            And to anyone who accepts the view of social action as a struggle of classes, the political democracy of capitalist countries is only an instrument for the rule in the last analysis of a comparatively small class--the big property owners.
            ...Tested by it, the Soviet system clearly represents the interests of the overwhelming majority of the population--the workers and peasants--as opposed to propertied classes,...
Baldwin, Roger. Liberty under the Soviets, New York: Vanguard Press, 1928, p. 35
 
            One should keep in mind, however, that big incomes are still extremely rare.  Earning power may vary in the Soviet Union, according to artistic or technical proficiency, but the extremes, as Louis Fisher has pointed out, are very close.  No such "spread" is conceivable in the USSR as exists in Britain or America between say, a clerk in a factory and its owner.  Among all the 165 million Russians, there are probably not ten men who earn $25,000 per year.
Gunther, John.  Inside Europe. New York, London: Harper & Brothers, c1940, p. 567
 
SOCIALISM RESTORED NATIONAL MEANING AND REMOVED LEISURE CLASS
 
Despite the blundering and cruelty which are constant companions of all pioneers, the adventure has led to 2 interdependent results which are pearls without price amid the self stultifications and social schizophrenia of other industrial societies.
            One is the cure of the mass neuroses of our time through the re-generation of personality around community values and purposes which afford escape from loneliness and, ultimately, from the class snobberies and mass envies characteristic of deeply divided societies.
            The other is the cure of economic paralysis and stagnation, with their concomitants of wholesale insecurity, frustration, and aggression, through the building of an institutional framework wherein all who are willing to work may find productive employment in a constantly expanding economy.
            The unpardonable sin of the Russian Revolution has been the liquidation of the old leisure class and the imposition of limitations on ownership which make the emergence of a new leisure class all but impossible.
Schuman, Frederick L. Soviet Politics. New York: A.A. Knopf, 1946, p. 582
 
            In the end it became clear that the whole economic system should be run by the State.
Basseches, Nikolaus. Stalin. London, New York: Staples Press, 1952, p. 206
 
 
STALIN’S FOCUS ON HEAVY INDUSTRY OVER CONSUMER GOODS SAVED THE DAY
 
The members of all three segments (collective farmers, urban workers and Soviet technocrats and managers) of the social hierarchy would have gained more (from a short run and shortsighted perspective) if the savings provided for in successive plans had been invested in the production of consumer goods rather than in heavy industry.  Such a decision, which would obviously have led to fatal consequences in 1941--1942, might very well have emerged from the free interplay of popular wishes and pressures during the preceding years.  It was the task and duty of the party to persuade enforce all strata of the population into accepting and carrying out a program of industrialization rendered imperative by military exigencies and future hopes of plenty.
Schuman, Frederick L. Soviet Politics. New York: A.A. Knopf, 1946, p. 583
 
            The ultimate aim of Soviet planning is abundance for the Soviet people, but the only way of reaching that aim was to temporarily sacrifice consumer goods in favor of building heavy industry.
Davis, Jerome.  Behind Soviet Power. New York, N. Y.: The Readers' Press, Inc., c1946, p. 45
 
 
            A Communist economist can give a Westerner a good battle over comparative statistics of growth.  He always returns, however, to his central point: Whatever Stalin's failures and whatever Stalin's exaggerated claims, he won World War II with war material that was plentiful enough and of high enough quality to defeat the German Army, not with inflated statistics.  The early Five Year Plans were not proved failures because Stalin produced only 18.3 million tons of steel a year instead of what he had predicted or because he may not even have produced that much; they were proved successes because Stalin won the war....
            Again, the essential case for Stalin centers on the war.  Had Stalin allocated more investment to the consumer goods industries total production might have been greater, but the number of tanks, heavy guns, airplanes, and machines to produce them, would have been significantly less, and Hitler's armies might have prevailed.  The margin of survival was not very large.  If Stalin had opted for more consumer goods, the Soviet people might have been better fed and better clothed as they watched the Nazi troops march through the ruins of better houses....
            One can distinguish three possible courses of action that Stalin might have pursued before World War II. There was the extreme and bloody course he did pursue--which did lead to victory over Hitler.  There was the opposite course of mild rule coupled with more consumer-oriented economic growth, which was discouragingly likely to have led to defeat at the hands of Hitler.  And there was the middle course: a strong coercive buildup of heavy industry and armaments sufficient to stop Hitler, without the foolish methods and self-defeating excesses of brutality that we can retrospectively separate from the core of Stalin's construction.
            Before we succumb to the temptation to approve the middle course, we should remember that there is no sure way of distinguishing between necessary and unnecessary brutality in building an economy until years and often decades later.  And if we approve the middle course, we are in effect supporting the undemocratic side of arguments over how to industrialize the backward countries of the world.
Randall, Francis.  Stalin's Russia. New York: Free Press, 1965, p. 180-182
 
 
SU DICTATORSHIP WAS NECESSARY AND SUCCESSFUL FOR WORKERS
 
"Dictatorship" in Soviet society is not a means (save in isolated instances, flowing from abuses of power) whereby a privileged and parasitic oligarchy exploits the community to its own advantage.  Neither is it a formula for " tyranny," Nor an institutionalization of the corruption which often goes with absolute power.  It is rather the means of integrating elite and mass, preserving the true faith, promoting high morale and group purpose, maintaining discipline and elan, and evolving and administering the broad All Union directives for serving the general welfare and the common defense.  Soviet planning involves cooperation and collaboration by millions at all levels and stages of the process.  But the necessary continuity, crusading fervor, and coordination from a common center are supplied, and at present can only be supplied, by maintaining the Party's monopoly of legality and leadership.
            Only those observers who are invincibly ignorant, or blinded by irrational fear and hatred, will deny that the Soviet system of business and power has, for all its abuses and crudities, promoted the liberation of men from impoverishment, exploitation, illiteracy, and prejudice and served the cause of human dignity and self respect on an immense scale.  These purposes are of the essence of the Democratic dream.  In this sense the USSR is a Democratic polity--in its ends and in its achievements, if not always in its means.
Schuman, Frederick L. Soviet Politics. New York: A.A. Knopf, 1946, p. 585
 
            The harsh word "dictatorship" is not pleasant.  Nevertheless, in the West they are getting used to it.  But it is being falsified there; they [presumably the Euro-Communist movement] don't comprehend that without the dictatorship of the proletariat, they will never be able to move forward.  However much they babble, the truth remains: either remain slaves of capitalism or, if you want to wrench yourself free, it is possible only with the aid of the dictatorship.
            It is not by chance that in the theory of the state there is no room for "state of all the people."  Nowhere has it ever existed in reality.
Chuev, Feliks. Molotov Remembers. Chicago: I. R. Dee, 1993, p. 398
 
            Poland and certain other states show that the concept of the "state of all the people" is not a particularly sound one.
Chuev, Feliks. Molotov Remembers. Chicago: I. R. Dee, 1993, p. 395
 
            A state of all the people does not and cannot exist.
Chuev, Feliks. Molotov Remembers. Chicago: I. R. Dee, 1993, p. 404
 
            The Soviet Union would never have been able to achieve what it has achieved if it had indulged in a parliamentary democracy according to the West European conception.  The establishment of socialism would never have been possible with an unrestricted right to abuse.  No government, constantly attacked in parliament and in the press and dependent on the result of elections, could ever have been able to impose on the population the hardships which alone made this establishment possible, and, faced with the alternatives either of using up a very great part of their strength in parrying foolish and malicious attacks, or of bending the whole of this strength to the completion of the structure, the leaders of the Union decided to restrict the right to abuse.
Feuchtwanger, Lion.  Moscow, 1937.  New York: The Viking Press, 1937, p. 66
 
 
STALIN FOLLOWED LENIN LOYALLY
 
I know -- and this isn't guess or historical reconstruction -- I know that Stalin's mainspring was and is devotion to Lenin.  He thought, and doubtless correctly, that Lenin was one of the great ones, the inspired teachers of humanity...  Who come once in a 1000 years.....
            He knew deep down in his heart that Lenin was always Lenin and what Lenin did was right.  I don't care what Trotsky has said or Trotsky's friends, like Max Eastman and meanor folk who don't write so well as Max Eastman and haven't half his brains.  I say that Stalin today, and always since Lenin died, has never made a decision nor even approached a decision without first asking himself, "what would Lenin have done in this case?"
Duranty, Walter.  The Kremlin and the People.  New York: Reynal & Hitchcock, Inc., 1941, p. 34
 
            That death should take Lenin at such a time is doubly tragic.  He was prevented from reaping the fruits of his life's work, and out of the many party leaders he had so carefully trained, only one remained unshakably a Leninist.
Cole, David M.   Josef Stalin; Man of Steel. London, New York: Rich & Cowan, 1942, p. 61
 
            Stalin was always a consistent Bolshevik and was one of Lenin's most trusted lieutenants in guiding the party work inside Russia....
Chamberlin, William Henry.  Soviet Russia. Boston: Little, Brown, 1930, p. 90
 
            Stalin...accepted Lenin's views as soon is he read them and supported Lenin staunchly thereafter.
Strong, Anna Louise.   The Stalin Era. New York: Mainstream, 1956, p. 15
 
            Stalin's enemies have vainly tried to create the story of a clash between Lenin and Stalin.  In actual fact, Stalin happened to be a blind follower of Lenin and has remained such....
Ludwig, Emil, Stalin. New York, New York: G. P. Putnam's sons, 1942, p. 54
 
What is the most prominent of Lenin's traits that you can recall?
            His purposefulness and his ability to fight for his cause.  You see, almost everyone in the Politburo was against him--Trotsky, Kamenev, Zinoviev, Bukharin.  In the Politburo, Lenin was supported only by Stalin and me.
Chuev, Feliks. Molotov Remembers. Chicago: I. R. Dee, 1993, p. 130
 
Unlike most of the Bolshevik leaders, Stalin never raised his voice in opposition to Lenin on any point at any time.  It was impossible, therefore, for him to forgive Trotsky's continuous criticism, which was further damned by his natural exasperation against this laborer who had been hired at the 11th hour....  Raymond Robbins once told me that he knew Stalin in the first winter of 1917-1918.  "He sat outside the door of Lenin's office like a sentry," said Robbins, "watching everyone who went in and out, no less faithful than a sentry and, as far as we then knew, not much more important."  In March 1922 Stalin received the reward of his faithful watching.  He was made General Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party....
Duranty, Walter.  I Write as I Please. New York: Simon and Schuster, 1935, p. 181
 
            ...But remember that even Dzerzhinsky voted for Trotsky.
            Gorky also made mistakes.  He came out against the October Revolution.  In the last analysis no one understood Leninism better than Stalin.
Chuev, Feliks. Molotov Remembers. Chicago: I. R. Dee, 1993, p. 132
 
            Then take Trotsky.  At first Lenin was favorably disposed toward him.  Take Zinoviev, Bukharin, Kamenev--they were closest to Lenin.  Temporarily, at a certain stage, they supported him, but they lacked consistency, so to speak, sufficient revolutionary character.
            With Marx, only Engels remained faithful.
Chuev, Feliks. Molotov Remembers. Chicago: I. R. Dee, 1993, p. 137
 
            Of all the members of the Politburo who worked under Lenin, Stalin alone remained.  All the others went into opposition at one time or another: Trotsky, Zinoviev, Kamenev, Rykov Tomsky, Bukharin....  Of course, for Stalin it was an unbearable situation--how to suffer criticism from all quarters, not to mention dissatisfaction, grumbling, and distrust.  He needed nerves of steel to withstand it.  Stalin too valued Bukharin highly.  Yes he did!  Bukharin was highly educated and cultured.  But what can you do?!
Chuev, Feliks. Molotov Remembers. Chicago: I. R. Dee, 1993, p. 262
 
            ...Among Lenin's closest friends, in the end not one of those around him remained sufficiently loyal to Lenin and the party except Stalin.  And Lenin had criticized Stalin.
Chuev, Feliks. Molotov Remembers. Chicago: I. R. Dee, 1993, p. 310
 
            During the critical period just before and after the Revolution, Stalin sat outside the door of Lenin's office like a faithful watchdog.  He always followed Lenin's lead without cavil or disagreement, but Trotsky was often quick to criticize or challenge.
Duranty, Walter. Story of Soviet Russia. Philadelphia, N. Y.: JB Lippincott Co. 1944, p. 105
 
            It was in 1929 that I first interviewed Stalin.  I was required to submit to him a copy of the dispatch I was going to send to the New York Times.  In it I had used the conventional phrase that Stalin was the "inheritor of Lenin's mantle."  He scratched out those words and replaced them with "Lenin's most faithful disciple and the prolonger of his work."  He also told me later that in any critical moment he tried to think what Lenin would've done in the circumstances, and to guide his own actions thereby.  Stalin is a great man now as the world reckons greatness, but Lenin was different--Stalin knows it--one of the very rare and greatest men.  Stalin always regarded his leader with deep, almost dog-like devotion, and never on any occasion challenged Lenin's views or failed to support him wholly.
Duranty, Walter.  Story of Soviet Russia. Philadelphia, N. Y.: JB Lippincott Co. 1944, p. 171
 
            Lenin was away--on orders of the Central Committee--from July to October.  In the meantime, the Party was run by the Central Committee and other top committees, whose minutes show that Stalin was one of the five or six top leaders.  Lenin was, of course, in touch by mail with the committee.  But the minutes also show that he was not regarded as a "boss" or an oracle but as "Comrade Lenin" (Ilyich), the most respected member of a collective whose affairs were conducted democratically, usually with considerable debate.  In these debates Stalin again seems to have been generally on Lenin's side.  For instance, when Lenin in September and October was urging the necessity of insurrection and some members, notably Zinoviev and Kamenev, disagreed, Stalin moved that Lenin's letters be distributed to the leading Party organizations.  And when Lenin returned, Stalin supported his position.
Cameron, Kenneth Neill. Stalin, Man of Contradiction. Toronto: NC Press, c1987, p. 31
 
            Lenin returned from Switzerland via Germany.  France had refused to let him through by another route.  (One knows the story of the "sealed wagon" and all the rest of that lying legend.).  He arrived at Petrograd on April 3rd, 1917.
Barbusse, Henri. Stalin. New York:  The Macmillan company, 1935, p. 49
 
            Indeed, at that time, "Lenin never let a day pass without seeing Stalin," writes Piestoffski.  "That is no doubt why our office at Smolny was next door to Lenin's office.  All day long Lenin would either speak to Stalin on the telephone or would come into our office and take him away with him.  In this way Stalin spent the greater part of the day with Lenin.  I witnessed a very interesting scene one day when I went to see Lenin.  A large-scale map of Russia was hanging on the wall.  Before it were two chairs on which Lenin and Stalin stood and followed a line to the north with their fingers."
Barbusse, Henri. Stalin. New York:  The Macmillan company, 1935, p. 60
 
            From the very first moment that the Soviets came into power, Stalin had been Lenin's understudy, and he continued to understudy him when he was no longer there.
Barbusse, Henri. Stalin. New York: The Macmillan company, 1935, p. 147
 
            Stalin too, placed himself beneath the banner of Leninism, in the campaign which followed, to defend passionately the unity of the Party which was imperiled by the rebellion of the minority.  To safeguard the unity of the Party became his great concern, as it had been Lenin's, as it had been Lenin's and Stalin's together, for, as we have already seen, these two never disagreed with one another on questions of either doctrine or tactics.
Barbusse, Henri. Stalin. New York:  The Macmillan company, 1935, p. 164
 
            ... Finally Lenin's demands were approved.  Bukharin voted against them.  Trotsky, unable to accept that his negotiations had failed or to realize the gravity of the situation, abstained.  Stalin supported Lenin, and it is unlikely that he ever forgot the vulnerability of the party and of the nation or the conflict within the Central Committee during these fateful days.
Grey, Ian. Stalin, Man of History. London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1979, p. 108
 
            As a member of the Bolshevik Central Committee Stalin took part in all the meetings of that body at which the Brest-Litovsk peace treaty and Russia's withdrawal from the imperialist war were discussed.  The minutes of the Central Committee meetings show clearly that Stalin almost always supported Lenin's position, although in the early stages of the discussion Lenin was in the minority....
            In all the voting on this question in the Central Committee Stalin supported Lenin's motions.  The intensity of the dispute is seen in the fact that the motion for immediate conclusion of a peace with Germany was adopted on Feb. 18, 1918, by a majority of only one vote.  Those voting for were Lenin, Smilga, Stalin, Sverdlov, Sokolnikov, Trotsky, and Zinoviev.  Opposed were Uritsky, Joffe, Lomov, Bukharin, Krestinsky, and Dzerzhinsky.
Medvedev, Roy. Let History Judge. New York: Columbia University Press, 1989, p. 51
 
            Stalin apparently did not keep a diary and he was careful about what he wrote down.  Many documents were destroyed on his orders, as on occasion were reports that his instructions to the NKVD had been carried out.  On the other hand, many documents remained in Stalin's private archive.  For instance, there is a copy of a paper, dated 1923 and headed 'Biographical Details on Stalin', located in the Commissariat of Nationalities.  Its author and purpose are not indicated, but it seems likely that it was prepared under Stalin's guidance.
            The file gives a detailed account of Stalin's 'revolutionary services' before October:
            "During the October days, Stalin was one of a team of 5 (a collective) whose task was to give political leadership in the uprising....  Like his pre-revolutionary work, Stalin's present revolutionary work is of enormous importance.  Distinguished by his tireless energy, his exceptional and outstanding mind and his implacable will, Comrade Stalin is one of the main, unseen, truly steel springs of the revolution, which with invincible force are turning the Russian revolution into a worldwide October.  An old follower of Lenin's, better than anyone else he has absorbed Lenin's methods and ideas on practical activity.
            Thanks to this, he is at present brilliantly deputizing for Lenin in the sphere not only of party activity, but also of state construction."
Volkogonov, Dmitri. Stalin: Triumph and Tragedy. New York: Grove Weidenfeld, 1991, p. 512
 
            ...Stalin's promotion was due to the dissidence of so many members of the Center Committee.  True, this time the dissidents did not leave the party, were not expelled, and even regained, later, their influence in the inner councils of Bolshevism.  But they remained in reserve for the time being.  This is not to say that Stalin was completely immune from the doubts and vacillations of the more moderate leaders; he had had his moment of hesitation on the eve of the October rising.  But he was essentially Lenin's satellite.  He moved invariably within Lenin's orbit.  Every now and then his own judgment and political instinct tempted him to stray; and on a few important occasions his judgment was sounder than Lenin's.  But at least in the first years after the Revolution, the master's pull on him was strong enough to keep him steadily within the prescribed orbit.
            It was by Lenin's side that Stalin spent the night from Oct. 27 to 28 at Petersburg military headquarters, watching the measures taken to repel General Krasnov's march on the capital.  He was by Lenin's side a few days later, when Lenin told the Commander-in-Chief, General Dukhonin, to offer an armistice to the German Command and to order the cease-fire, and when, after General Dukhonin's refusal, Lenin dismissed him and appointed Krylenko Commander-in-Chief.  This was the beginning of Stalin's military activity which was to grow in scope and importance with the progress of the civil war.
Deutscher, Isaac. Stalin; A Political Biography. New York: Oxford Univ. Press, 1967, p. 180-181
 
            "We are going to have not half a revolution but a whole revolution."  Lenin's policy was not without danger to those who espoused it.  The odium of a German invasion of the country might fall upon them.  It seems safer to seem to uphold Kerensky.  Kamenev, Zinoviev, Tomsky, Dzerzhinsky were all at first opposed to Lenin's policy.  Almost his sole supporter of any note was Stalin.
Graham, Stephen. Stalin. Port Washington, New York: Kennikat Press, 1970, p. 34
 
            [Duranty says that Stalin made him change a phrase in their interview, "inheritor of the mantle of Lenin," to "faithful servant of Lenin."  A dictator Stalin certainly is, but not a flaming egotist.
Gunther, John.  Inside Europe. New York, London: Harper & Brothers, c1940, p. 530
 
            Stalin was the only one of the exiles to agree with his leader [Lenin}.
Delbars, Yves.  The Real Stalin. London, Allen & Unwin, 1951, p. 70
 
            He [Lenin] was, therefore, obliged to seek allies.   Zinoviev and Kamenev followed him, but Sverdlov, the man who knew most about the Party organizations, was dead, and the insignificant Kalinin was inclined to support Trotsky.   The only useful ally to whom Lenin could turn was Stalin, with his numerous connections with all levels of the Party.
Delbars, Yves.  The Real Stalin. London, Allen & Unwin, 1951, p. 117
 
            The two of them conversed endlessly.  Stalin fitted Lenin's bill as a quintessential Bolshevik.  He was tough and uncomplaining....  He appeared to conform to a working-class stereotype.  He was also a committed revolutionary and a Bolshevik factional loyalist.  Stalin was obviously bright and Lenin, who was engaged in controversy with Zhordania and other Mensheviks on the national question, encouraged Stalin to take time out from his duties to write up a lengthy piece on the subject.
Service, Robert. Stalin. Cambridge, Mass.: Belknap Press of Harvard Univ. Press, 2005, p. 89
 
            Stalin bequeathed a consolidated system of rule to his successors.  Personally he had remained devoted to Lenin and his rule had conserved and reinforced the Leninist regime.
Service, Robert. Stalin. Cambridge, Mass.: Belknap Press of Harvard Univ. Press, 2005, p. 599
 
STALIN BELIEVES DECISIONS SHOULD BE MADE BY GROUPS
 
Stalin is not an an arrogant man, although he is master and lord of a large and populous country.  In meetings of the Politburo, he never says as Lenin used to say, "Here is the way things are and here is what we must do.  If any of you have better ideas and can prove to me they are better, go-ahead."  Stalin doesn’t act like that.  He says, "Here is the problem, and perhaps one of us" -- say, Voroshilov, if it's a military matter, or Mikoyan if its commerce, or Kaganovich for industry--"will tell us what he thinks."  After that, there is general discussion while Stalin sits and listens.  He may lead the conversation as a lawyer can "lead" a witness, but when the decision is reached it is, or appears to be, a joint not a single decision.
Duranty, Walter.  The Kremlin and the People. New York: Reynal & Hitchcock, Inc., 1941, p. 35
 
            For Stalin, whatever his later practice, gave the classic expression of the danger of individual decision, unchecked by collective thought.  When Emil Ludwig, and later Roy Howard, sought to learn how "the great man made decisions," Stalin impatiently replied: "With us, individuals cannot decide....  Experience has shown us that individual decisions, uncorrected by others, have a large percentage of error."  He added that the success of the USSR came about because the best brains in all areas--science, industry, farming, world affairs--were combined in the Central Committee, through which decisions were made.
            This standard he, more than anyone, instilled in the Soviet people.  For he always acted "through channels" and after building majorities....
            In all my years in the USSR, I never heard them speak of "Stalin's decision" or "Stalin's orders," but only of "government orders" or "the Party line," which are collectively made.  When speaking of Stalin, they praised his "clearness," his "analysis."  They said: "he does not think individually."  By this, they meant that he thought not in isolation but in consultation with the brains of the Academy of Science, the chiefs of industry, and trade unions.
Strong, Anna Louise.   The Stalin Era.  New York: Mainstream, 1956, p. 22
 
            It was nothing but the exceptional attitude adopted by Trotsky, whose public position had been a considerable one by Lenin's side, and who showed a tendency to place himself above the Central Committee, that brought the question of "the leadership" up before the Fourteenth Congress.  To Trotsky's exuberant personality Stalin opposed the principle of Community-leadership.  He declared: "One cannot direct the party without colleagues.  It is absurd to think that we can.  And now that we have lost Lenin it is stupid even to speak about it.  Common labor, collective leadership, a united front and unity among the Central Committee, with, as a vital condition, the subordination of the minority to the majority, are what we really need at the present time."
Barbusse, Henri. Stalin. New York:  The Macmillan company, 1935, p. 149
 
            Not so very long ago, Stalin said to a foreign visitor who was anxious, as are all intelligent tourists in the USSR (particularly those who visit important Soviet personalities), to go closely into this question of personal power in the Workers' and Peasants' State (looking meaningly at Stalin): "No, one must make no individual decision.  Individual decisions are always, or nearly always, biased.  In every association, in every community, there are people to whose opinions heed must be paid.  In every association, in every community, there are also men who may express erroneous opinions.  Experience of three Revolutions has shown us that out of 100 individual decisions which have not been examined and corrected collectively, 90 are biased.  The leadership organization of our Party in the Central Committee, which directs all the Soviet and communist organizations, consists of about 70 people and it is among those 70 members of the Central Committee that are to be found our best technicians, our cleverest specialists and the men who best understand every branch of our activities.  It is in this Supreme Council that the whole wisdom of our Party is concentrated.  Each man is entitled to challenge his neighbor's individual opinion or suggestion.  Each man may give the benefit of his own experience.  If it were otherwise, if individual decisions were admitted, there would be serious mistakes in our work.  But because each one may correct the errors of all the others and everyone considers these corrections seriously, our decisions have hitherto been as correct as it is possible for them to be."
Barbusse, Henri. Stalin. New York:  The Macmillan company, 1935, p. 150
 
            There was no question of personal dictatorship by Stalin in those days [after Lenin died]; to the contrary, Stalin came forward as the advocate of collective leadership.  He accused Trotsky of seeking to assume one-man rule and supported Zinoviev and Kamenev in their attacks on Trotsky.
Medvedev, Roy. Let History Judge. New York: Columbia University Press, 1989, p. 85
 
            When, at the Fourteenth Party Congress, Kamenev accused Stalin to his face of trying to set up one-man rule, Stalin blandly replied:
            "To lead the party otherwise than collectively is impossible.  Now that Ilich is not with us, it is silly to dream of such a thing [applause].  It is silly to talk about it.  Collective work, collective leadership, unity in the party, unity in the organs of the Central Committee, with the minority submitting to the majority--that is what we need now."
Bullock, Alan. Hitler and Stalin: Parallel Lives. New York: Knopf, 1992, p. 183
 
 
CONFESSIONS OF PYATAKOV AND MURALOV WERE FREELY GIVEN
 
But the statements of Pyatakov and Muralov (both shot like the rest of the culprits) were straightforward, clear, and unmistakable, and I think that few of those who heard them, whether Russians or strangers, could doubt that their words were true.  A lot of ink has been spilled about political trials in the USSR, and the silliest assertions have been made.  Hypnosis, hashish, torture--those are simple allegations, but some ingenious scribes let their imaginations fly still higher--to the mountains of Tibet, that land of mystery and distance.  In Tibet, they claimed, there was a drug unknown to Western science whose properties are such that those who have consumed it become as clay in the potter's hands, to be shaped as the potter pleases.
            What preposterous nonsense!  No one who heard Pyatakov or Muralov could doubt for a moment that what they said was true, and that they were saying it from no outer drag of force.  I don't speak of Kamenev or Zinoviev, because their Trial I did not see, but Pyatakov and Muralov I heard and believed.  Remember, please, that these were no mediocre citizens of the Soviet Union.  Pyatakov had a first-class mind and was a first-class executive; Muralov won Moscow for the Revolution in the hour of crisis, and had proved himself a doughty warrior for the Soviet cause.  Their words rang true, and it is absurd to suggest or imagine that men like this could yield to any influence, against their own strong hearts.  Why, then, it may be asked, did they confess so freely if, as I say, they were impervious to pressure?
Duranty, Walter.  The Kremlin and the People. New York: Reynal & Hitchcock, Inc., 1941, p. 48-49
 
WHY DID THEY CONFESS
 
The answer to that must be found in the difference between Russians and Western races....  Americans and  Englishmen have lost lives for proven crime without a word let past their lips.  The Russians are different.  When confronted with damning facts which they can't deny they seem to find satisfaction in “spilling the beans," a final move towards atonement, a feeling that somehow they can square themselves, not perhaps with their judges, but with their own consciences, by telling all the truth.  Why this is so I don't attempt to explain, but that it is so I am convinced.
Duranty, Walter.  The Kremlin and the People. New York: Reynal & Hitchcock, Inc., 1941, p. 50
 
            The conspiracy, however, for the removal of Stalin was steadily continued. 
            The confessions in the trials were partly due to the fact that Trotsky's supporters now in the dock rebelled against his policy, which had been a burden to them for years....
Basseches, Nikolaus. Stalin. London, New York: Staples Press, 1952, p. 294
 
            It is admitted that the Stalin regime was very much stronger in 1935 than it was in 1931.  This improvement in the situation is referred to many times in the course of the testimony of the principal defendants as justification for their change of heart and final reasons for repentance and confession.
Davies, Joseph E. Mission to Moscow. New York, New York: Simon and Schuster, c1941, p. 35
 
            The fact that the prisoners confessed, reply the Soviet people, can be explained very simply.  It was because they were so irrevocably convicted by witnesses and documents during the preliminary inquiry that denial would have been senseless.  The fact that they all confessed also has its explanation.  By no means all the Trotskyists who were implicated in the plot were brought up for trial, but only those whose guilt was proved up to the hilt.
Feuchtwanger, Lion.  Moscow, 1937. New York: The Viking Press, 1937, p. 129
 
            Observers sent to the trials by foreign newspapers found difficulty in understanding the "monotonous sequence of confession."  Why they confess was the typical journalistic question, and no one, except the Communist papers, supplied the obvious answer: "Because they were guilty."  Some newspapers suggested that mysterious "talking drugs" were used: others suggested hypnotism and torture.  Since, however, there was nothing in the demeanor of the prisoners to confirm that such influences had been used and since my examination I met no one who had been subjected to physical duress other than actual imprisonment, I consider that one should seek the fundamental reasons for the "guilty" pleas beyond the investigatory period.
Edelman, Maurice. G.P.U. Justice. London: G. Allen & Unwin, ltd., 1938, p. 211
 
 
SU WAS RIGHT ABOUT THE TRIALS AND HOW THEY PREPARED FOR NAZI INVASION
 
There's no denying that many of the ablest and best informed foreigners in Moscow were highly skeptical about the Kremlin's claim that a widespread murder and treason plot existed, with ramifications abroad involving the nazi Gestapo, and to a lesser degree the secret services of Britain and Japan.  They were no less skeptical, however, three years later about the Kremlin's other claim, that the occupations of East Poland, the Baltic states, Bessarabia, and southern Finland, were in reality measures of precaution against a danger which did in fact materialize, the danger of nazi invasion.
Duranty, Walter.  The Kremlin and the People. New York: Reynal & Hitchcock, Inc., 1941, p. 52
 
SU WOULD NOT HAVE CONVICTED FRIENDS UNLESS THE EVIDENCE WAS OVERWHELMING
 
Whatever doubt's there may be about the guilt of other accused in other Trials, it is unthinkable that Stalin and Voroshilov and Budenny and the Court-Martial could have sentenced their friends to death unless the proofs of guilt were overwhelming.  Then, too, there are other points, as follows:
            (a) The suicide of Gamarnik
            (b) The accused all confessed guilty, although their Trial was held so soon after their arrest that they could not have been subjected to the long, gruelling process of imprisonment and examination which later was said to have extracted confessions from civilian prisoners.
            (c) The Trial was attended by a hundred or more representative officers of the Red Army summoned from all over the country.  For them, too, the accused had been trusted colleagues or leaders.  They all accepted the verdict without question.
Duranty, Walter.  The Kremlin and the People.  New York: Reynal & Hitchcock, Inc., 1941, p. 65-66
 
WHY THE GENERALS’ TRIAL WAS NOT PUBLIC
 
This perhaps is the answer to the question that has been raised abroad, why, if the "Generals" were guilty beyond cavil, did the Kremlin not make public the full story?  I think, however, that there is another answer, that some of the facts must have been grave enough and far-reaching enough to involve not merely a "Palace Revolution" or coup d'etat, but the safety of the State itself.
Duranty, Walter.  The Kremlin and the People. New York: Reynal & Hitchcock, Inc., 1941, p. 67
 
            Little is known about the trial of the marshals and generals; it was a secret one....
Basseches, Nikolaus. Stalin. London, New York: Staples Press, 1952, p. 294
 
 
TROTSKY’S SUPPORTERS DO FAKE RECANTATION
 
Trotsky's supporters in Russia paid lip service to the victorious majority, and many of them were restored to posts of high importance, but in spirit they remained loyal to their exiled leader and were ready to do his bidding when the occasion should arise.
Duranty, Walter.  The Kremlin and the People. New York: Reynal & Hitchcock, Inc., 1941, p. 73
 
            A large number of Trotskyists were also re-integrated, including Preobrazhensky and Radek.
Martens, Ludo.   Another View of Stalin. Antwerp, Belgium: EPO, Lange Pastoorstraat 25-27 2600, p. 135 [p. 116 on the NET]
 
            In September 1928, Kamenev contacted some Trotskyists, asking them to rejoin the Party and to wait `till the crisis matures'.
Martens, Ludo.   Another View of Stalin. Antwerp, Belgium: EPO, Lange Pastoorstraat 25-27 2600, p. 135-136 [p. 117 on the NET]
 
            Just as the July 1928 plenum was taking place, about 40 Left Oppositionists, including Kamenev, were readmitted to the party and returned to Moscow.
Medvedev, Roy. Let History Judge. New York: Columbia University Press, 1989, p. 198
 
            Trotsky and Rakovsky were unrepentant and unyielding.  Zinoviev, Radek, Pyatakov, Sokolnikov, Smilga, and host of others were goaded on 'to sin in loving virtue'.  Throughout 1928 and 1929 there was a steady traffic of 'repenting' members of the opposition from their places of exile to Moscow.
Deutscher, Isaac. Stalin; A Political Biography. New York: Oxford Univ. Press, 1967, p. 316
 
            In April 1926, Evdokimov the only Zinovievite on the Secretariat, was removed.  In July, Zinoviev was expelled from the Politburo, being replaced by the Stalinist Rudzutak; in October, Trotsky and Kamenev were expelled in turn.  In October, the opposition submitted.  Zinoviev, Kamenev, Trotsky, Pyatakov, Sokolnikov, and Evdokimov denounced their own offenses, a most striking precedent for the long series of self-denunciations by the oppositionists.
Conquest, Robert.  The Great Terror. New York: Oxford University Press, 1990, p. 11
 
            Pyatakov capitulated as early as February 1928.  By mid-1929, Krestinsky, Radek, and most of the other "Trotskyites" had petitioned for readmission to the Party.  Of the leaders, Rakovsky alone held out (until 1934).
Conquest, Robert.  The Great Terror. New York: Oxford University Press, 1990, p. 17
 
            ...Rakovsky and Sosnovsky, the last leading oppositionists in exile, finally made their peace with the regime, giving the war danger as their main motive....  But now he [Rakovsky] was persuaded.  He was welcomed back by Kaganovich in person.  It was plain that an air of general reconciliation was prevalent.
Conquest, Robert.  The Great Terror. New York: Oxford University Press, 1990, p. 30
 
[Commentary by David Doyle]
            Footnote:  All three [Serebryakov, Preobrazhensky, and Krestinsky] were supporters of Trotsky and were expelled from the party in 1927 along with most of Lenin's former closest collaborators.  Serebryakov was exiled to Siberia in 1928, capitulated and returned in 1929.  He was tried in January 1937 and disappeared, probably shot.  [He was openly sentenced to be shot and never disappeared].
            ...The three were expelled from the Central Committee in 1921 for their sport of Trotsky.  In the early 1920s the Troika sent him [Krestinsky] to Berlin as ambassador.  In 1927 he was expelled from the Party, but in 1928 was one of the important Party leaders who recanted, his defection being one of the first signs that Trotsky had finally lost to Stalin.
Bazhanov, Boris.  Bazhanov and the Damnation of Stalin. Athens, Ohio: Ohio University Press, c1990, p. 243
 
            Paradoxically, Stalin viewed with some uneasiness the rush of the capitulators to Moscow, much though he benefited from it.  Many thousands of Trotskyists and Zinovievists were now back in and around the party, forming a distinctive milieu.  Stalin did not allow a single one of them to occupy any office of political importance.  But the administrators, the economists, and the educationists were assigned to posts on all rungs of the government, where they were bound to exercise an influence.  Although Stalin could not doubt their zeal for the left course, especially for industrialization, he knew what value to attach to the recantations he had extracted from them.  They remained Oppositionists at heart.  They considered themselves the wronged pioneers of the left course.  They hated him not merely as their persecutor, but as the man who had robbed them of their ideas.
Deutscher, Isaac.  The Prophet Outcast. London, New York: Oxford Univ. Press, 1963, p. 82
 
            Professions of repentance came pouring in, and Stalin graciously allowed the repentant "leftists" to return from exile.  Pyatakov, Smilga, Rakovsky, Beloborodov, and other notables condemned Trotsky and came back into the Party.
Radzinsky, Edvard.  Stalin. New York: Doubleday, c1996, p. 237
 
            The policy of the Soviet government after the hard fights against the opposition in the end of the 1920-ies giving a new chance to all those opposing the socialist construction was not very successful.  All these Trotskyists and others belonging to the political right and the so called left within of the party, which had fought the Soviet government, were allowed to keep or got back their highly positioned posts, which caused considerable damage to the Soviet union during the 1930-ies.
Sousa, Mario.  The Class Struggle during the Thirties in the Soviet Union, 2001.
 
TERRIBLE CONDITIONS BEFORE THE REVOLUTION
 
The fact is that some 90 and more percent of the Russian nation had little fun in the old days and were little better than slaves.  It was fun, I admit, for the nobles and generals and the rich and cultured people.  But not much fun for the masses who lived like pigs in the dirt and not like pigs in clover.
Duranty, Walter.  The Kremlin and the People. New York: Reynal & Hitchcock, 1941, p. 158
 
The Bolshevik Revolution was made, if you like, by Lenin.  But you can't "make" a revolution; you must have certain conditions.  The first and cardinal one is that the majority of your population does not like the way they live....  The 5 percent had fun, the 5 percent at the top; oh yes, they had marvelous fun.  But the others lived mostly like beasts and weren't even fed enough.
Duranty, Walter.  The Kremlin and the People. New York: Reynal & Hitchcock, 1941, p. 164
 
            The criminal Tsarist autocracy has brought our country to the brink of destruction.  The utter ruin of the hundred million Russian peasants, the oppressed and poverty-stricken condition of the working class, the excessive state debts and heavy taxes, the whole population's complete lack of rights, the endless tyranny and violence reigning in all spheres of life, lastly the citizens' utter lack of security in life and property--such is the terrible picture which Russia presents.  This cannot go on much longer!  The autocracy which is the perpetrator of these dark outrages must be destroyed!...  Besides those hundreds and thousands of peaceful citizens--workers, whom it has murdered on city streets--besides the tens of thousands of workers and intellectuals, the best sons of the people, languishing in prisons and in exile, besides those murders and acts of violence perpetrated day in and day out by the Tsarist bashi-bazouks in the villages, among the peasantry of the whole of Russia, the autocracy has devised new outrages to cap it all.  It has begun to sow enmity and bad feeling among the people themselves and to provoke sections of the population and whole nationalities against one another.
Stalin, Joseph.  Stalin's Kampf. New York: Howell, Soskin & Company, c1940, p. 19
 
AVERAGE RUSSIAN THINKS HE IS FREER THAN AMERICANS
 
It is one of the strangest things, that the average Soviet Russian honestly believes that the system under which he lives, which we consider a tyranny, or dictatorship, or totalitarian regime, or anything save freedom--the average Russian thinks that his regime is freer than "the plutocratic oligarchy" (as he terms it) under which, he says, Americans live, move, and have their being.  That's what the Russian says, and that's what the Russian thinks, and he doesn't believe in our freedoms, but he does believe in his own.  It's amazing, but that's how it is.
Duranty, Walter.  The Kremlin and the People. New York: Reynal & Hitchcock, 1941, p. 161
 
            When one talks with Soviet people on the subject [freedom], they maintain that they alone possess effective democracy and that it exists in the so-called democratic countries in form only.  And they ask how, if democracy means government by the people, the people can exercise this government if they are not in possession of the means of production.  In the so-called democratic countries, they assert, the people are rulers in name only and not in fact; the power is actually in the hands of those who have control of the means of production.  To what, they ask again, is this so-called democratic freedom reduced if one examines it more closely?  It is confined to the freedom of railing with impunity against the government and the opposing political parties and being able, once in every three or four years, to throw a little piece of paper into a ballot box without being spied upon.  But nowhere do these "liberties" afford a guarantee or even a possibility that the will of the majority will really be carried out.  What can be done with freedom of opinion, of the press, of meetings, if one has no control over the press, printing-works, and meeting halls?  And in what country have the people control over those things?  Where can be people express their opinions effectively and where find effective representation?...  And, the Soviet people conclude, all so-called democratic liberties will remain fictitious so long as they are not founded upon the true freedom of the people, which can exist only when the means of production are under the control of the community.
Feuchtwanger, Lion.  Moscow, 1937. New York: The Viking Press, 1937, p. 58
 
            I myself have held democratic liberties dear for most of my life, and freedom of opinion and of the press was to me, as to any author, very precious....  This democratic conviction of mine received its first blow during the War, when I was made to realize that, despite all democracy, war was continued against the will of the majority of the people.  In the years after the War, the gaps in the usual democratic constitutions became more and more evident to me, and today I incline towards the opinion that constitutional civil liberties are more or less a decoy to enable the will of a small minority to be carried out.
Feuchtwanger, Lion. Moscow, 1937. New York: The Viking Press, 1937, p. 61
 
RUSSIAN MASSES APPLAUDED WHEN THE DEFENDANTS WERE SHOT
 
The Russians are not like us; I mean they do not care about "rugged individualism."  The mass of the Russian people want things which Americans want, and many Americans have, but they do not like Tsars or landlords or bankers or Kulaks or traitors.  If you wish to know the truth, the Russian masses applauded when such folk were shot.  That's dreadful but it's true.
Duranty, Walter.  The Kremlin and the People. New York: Reynal & Hitchcock, 1941, p. 162
 
            [In 1937] the overwhelming majority of Soviet citizens indisputably believed that it was a struggle to the death with people who still wanted to restore capitalism.
Volkogonov, Dmitri. Stalin: Triumph and Tragedy. New York: Grove Weidenfeld, 1991, p. 280
 
            During the whole period of the trial, from the announcement on February 28, 1938, that it would take place until the actual executions, the papers had, of course, been full of the demands of workers' meetings that no pity should be shown to the "foul band of murderers and spies."... The verdict of the court was received with many expressions of public joy.
Conquest, Robert.   The Great Terror. New York: Oxford University Press, 1990, p. 396
 
 
SU-NAZI TREATY INVOLVED ECONOMIC EXCHANGES AND TRADE
 
The nazi-Soviet pact had also a strong economic aspect.  By this and later agreements, the USSR agreed to deliver great quantities of oil, grain, cotton, manganese, and other raw materials; but this was no mere tribute or sacrifice imposed by force.  The Soviet received in exchange, through a clearing system, German machines and spare parts, machine tools, instruments of precision, chemicals and drugs.  Soviet industry had run down badly during the purge, and most of its machines and tools needed replacement or repair.  It was already beginning to produce such things for itself, but of all machinery imported in the last ten years, more than 60 percent was of German origin.
            Thus Germany received much-needed raw materials, but the USSR benefited even more by the change,…
Duranty, Walter.  The Kremlin and the People. New York: Reynal & Hitchcock, 1941, p. 169
 
            Recently, much has been written about Soviet shipments to Germany, and Stalin has been rightly blamed for supplying Hitler with grain, oil, and rare metals and for helping the Nazis accumulate strategic reserves that they subsequently used in the war against the Soviet Union.  But at the same time, it should be pointed out that in return we also obtained much that we needed in the way of equipment and modern military hardware.  Only on those terms did the Soviet government agree to supply to Germany the resources it was requesting.  Among our acquisitions from the Germans was the Lutzov, a state-of-the-art cruiser of the same class as the cruiser Prinz Eugen.  Both ships were built by Germany for its own fleet.  The Germans also gave us the shop drawings for their newest battleship, the Bismarck, for thirty different combat aircraft, including Messerschmitt 109 and 110 fighters and Yunker 88 dive bombers, samples of field-artillery pieces, modern fire-support systems, tanks together with the formulas for their armor, and a variety of explosive devices.  In addition, Germany undertook to supply us with locomotives, turbines, diesel motors, merchant ships, metal-cutting machine tools, presses, press-forging and other equipment for heavy industry, including the oil and electric industries.
Berezhkov, Valentin.  At Stalin's Side. Secaucus, New Jersey: Carol Pub. Group, c1994, p. 75
 
            I saw clearly now why Soviet materials continued to be shipped into Germany on a regular basis even though the Germans didn't comply with their delivery schedules.  The idea was to gain time, to appease Hitler, and at the same time to demonstrate to him that it made no sense for Germany to go to war with the Soviet Union since this would effectively cut it off from a rich source of supplies.
Berezhkov, Valentin.  At Stalin's Side. Secaucus, New Jersey: Carol Pub. Group, c1994, p. 102
 
            The Soviet-German trade agreement, concluded a few days before the signing of the nonaggression pact, provided for deliveries of modern equipment and the latest technology to the Soviet Union.  Among others, our navy was very much interested in getting new equipment and technology.
Berezhkov, Valentin.  At Stalin's Side. Secaucus, New Jersey: Carol Pub. Group, c1994, p. 269
 
            By early evening [in August 1939], the complete text of the trade treaty had been agreed.  It was a complex document, allowing the Soviet Union to buy capital goods such as machinery and machine tools, construction and scientific equipment, chemical plants, ships and vehicles, to the value of 200 million Reichmarks over a two-year period.  In order to pay for them, the Soviet Union would export to Germany equivalent values of raw materials, semi-finished products, oil, grain, timber, ores, phosphates and so on.
Read, Anthony and David Fisher.  The Deadly Embrace. New York: Norton, 1988, p. 208
 
            Stalin, for his part, was as conscious of the military deficiencies revealed by the Winter War as any German general.  It was clear that something had to be done.  The question was what?
Read, Anthony and David Fisher.  The Deadly Embrace. New York: Norton, 1988, p. 422
 
 
            The assistance the Soviet Union was able to give Germany in Murmansk and in the transit of goods from other countries was welcome and undoubtedly of great value.  But the most important area of whole operation for both sides during the period of the pact was the direct trade between them.  There has long been a myth that in order to buy time and postpone the threat of invasion by the mechanized might of the Wehrmacht, Stalin was Hitler's dupe, prepared to pay any price he demanded.  The reality was entirely different.
            Stalin could have had no illusions about Hitler's ultimate ambitions.  Neither did he have any illusions, even before the debacle of the Red Army's performance in Finland, about the Soviet Union's ability to withstand a German attack.  But before he could prepare his country, and perhaps even increase its military strength to such an extent that Hitler would be deterred from attacking, Stalin needed to buy not only time but also technology.  The only people he could obtain either from were the Germans.
            For his part, Hitler needed vital raw materialsfor his arms industry in order to build up his forces to the level necessary for attacking the Soviet Union, and food to sustain his people while the military machine was made ready.  Once he had failed to keep Britain, and to a lesser extent France, out of the war, the only place he could obtain either of his needs was the Soviet Union.
            By September 1939, therefore, the two leaders found themselves in the ludicrous situation where Hitler needed food and raw materials from the Soviet Union in order to attack her, while Stalin needed machinery, arms, and equipment from Germany in order to be able to fight her off.  The question was, who needed what most?  Certainly, Stalin was perfectly well aware of Hitler's needs.  And while Germany still faced the allies in the west, he was able to drive a very hard bargain indeed.
Read, Anthony and David Fisher.  The Deadly Embrace. New York: Norton, 1988, p. 433
 
 
            Three days later, however, on Feb. 7, 1940, there was a message from Stalin, asking the German negotiators to call on him at the Kremlin at 1 a.m. the next morning.  When they arrived, they found him smiling and friendly, all sweetness and light.  Ribbentrop's letter, he said, had changed everything.  The Germans could have their treaty.  The Soviet Union would deliver commodities worth 420 to 430 million Reichmarks within 12 months, in addition to the 200 million Reichmarks worth agreed in the August 19 treaty.  For the following six months, the Soviets would make deliveries worth 200 to 230 million Reichmarks.  Germany would make deliveries to the same value over a period of 15 months for the first part, and 12 months for the second.
            Stalin, still playing his role of the reasonable man, politely asked the Germans not to ask too high prices as they had done before - 300 million Reichmarks for aircraft and 150 million Reichmarks for the cruiser Lutzow, he quoted as examples, was really far too much.  "One should not take advantage," he said gently, "of the Soviet Union's good nature."
            When Stalin had finished, Mikoyan, playing a friendly role after all the hard-man tactics of the preceding four months, raised another matter which the Germans had been vainly pursuing for months.  This was to station a mother ship in Murmansk for the fishing fleet, to process its catches.  Without a moment's hesitation, Stalin agreed to it.
Read, Anthony and David Fisher.  The Deadly Embrace. New York: Norton, 1988, p. 441
 
 
            On February 11, the new trade treaty was signed.  Germany was assured of all the raw materials and grain she wanted - but the price exacted by Stalin was a heavy one.  The list of war material to be given to him covered 42 closely typed pages.  At the top of the list was the cruiser formerly known as the Lutzow [after the Graf Spee incident Hitler had given the name Lutzow to the Deutschland, since it would have been unbearable for a ship with that name to be sunk), the hull of which was to be delivered to Leningrad after launching, for completion in the Soviet Union.  The complete drawings for the Bismarck were to be handed over after all, together with plans for a large destroyer and complete machinery for such a ship, and full details of performance of the other two cruisers.
            The aircraft list included 10 Heinkel He-100s, 5 Messerschmitt Bf-110s, 2 Junkers Ju-88 twin-engined dive-bombers, 2 Dornier Do-215s; 3 Buker Bu-131s and 3 Bu-133s; 3 Fokke-Wulf Fw-58-v-13s and 2 Fokke-Wulf Fa-255 helicopters, plus the experimental Messerschmitt 209.  All of these were regarded as test aircraft, which the Soviets could then buy in quantity or build under license later - they vigorously denied that they intended to copy them.
            On and on went the list of equipment, guns, machinery, instruments, other ships and shipbuilding gear, plus installations and plants for chemical and metallurgical processes, many of them highly secret.
            In return, the Soviet Union agreed to provide an impressive list of materials including:
            1,000,000 tons of feed grains and legumes
            900,000 tons of petroleum
            100,000 tons of cotton
            500,000 tons of phosphates
            100,000 tons of chromium ores
            500,000 tons of iron ore
            300,000 tons of scrap iron and pig iron
            2400 kilograms of platinum
            Manganese ore, metals, lumber, and numerous other raw materials.
Read, Anthony and David Fisher.  The Deadly Embrace. New York: Norton, 1988, p. 442
 
            Behind the facade, however, Stalin was thinking very hard about the situation.  On the economic front, he was prepared to continue the friendship - whatever it cost he had to have German tools and technology.  He ordered Mikoyan to take the breaks off the negotiations he was holding with Schnurre [a German trade Representative]....
Read, Anthony and David Fisher.  The Deadly Embrace. New York: Norton, 1988, p. 536
 
 
HITLER WAS NO FOOL
 
Because whether you like him or not, Hitler is far from a fool and never made a mistake until June 22, 1941.
Duranty, Walter.  The Kremlin and the People. New York: Reynal & Hitchcock, 1941, p. 181
 
            Hitler wasn't a fool.  On the contrary, he was a capable man.
Chuev, Feliks. Molotov Remembers. Chicago: I. R. Dee, 1993, p. 361
 
 
KREMLIN PREPARED FOR WAR FOR MANY YEARS
 
I know, as I said before, that the Kremlin has been preparing for this war for full seven years; that it has starved its people of consumer goods in order to equip the red army and build new munition and armament plants.
Duranty, Walter.  The Kremlin and the People. New York: Reynal & Hitchcock, 1941, p. 215
 
CHUEV:  For the day of the attack, for the hour of the attack--that's what we weren't prepared for.
MOLOTOV:  0h, but no one could have been ready for the hour of the attack, even God itself!  We'd been expecting the attack and we had a main goal--not to give Hitler a pretext for it.  He would have said, "Soviet troops are assembling at the border.  They are forcing me to take action!"
            Of course that was a slip up, a shortcoming.  And of course there were other slip-ups.  You just try to find a way to avoid mistakes on such a question.  But if you focus on them, it casts a shadow on the main point, on what decided the matter.  Stalin was still irreplaceable.  I am a critic of Stalin; on certain questions I did not agree with him, and I think he made some major, fundamental mistakes.  But no one talks about these mistakes; instead they keep criticizing things on which Stalin was right….
            In essence we were largely ready for war.  The five-year plans, the industrial capacity we had created--that's what helped us to endure, otherwise we wouldn't have won out.  The growth of our military industry in the years before the war could not have been greater!
            The people went through a colossal strain before the war.
Chuev, Feliks. Molotov Remembers. Chicago: I. R. Dee, 1993, p. 25
 
 
MOLOTOV:  We even abolished the seven-hour working day two years before the war!  We abolished the right of workers to move from one enterprise to another in search of better conditions, even though many of them lived poorly and were looking for better places to live....  We built no apartment houses, but there was great construction of factories, the creation of new army units armed with tanks, aircraft....
Chuev, Feliks. Molotov Remembers. Chicago: I. R. Dee, 1993, p. 26
 
            Stalin thus stimulated production in Soviet industry and agriculture because he was the first of world statesman to perceive that sooner or later Hitler's Nazi Germany would make a bid for world dominion.  Stalin saw that from the outset, from 1935, when Chamberlain, and Bonnet in France, and even the United States, had small idea of Hitler's wild ambition.  From then onwards Stalin swung Russia towards what I might call "preparedness," in the American sense.  Deliberately he reduced the production of consumer goods, which the Russian people so greatly needed, in favor of factories to produce the material of war, and located those factories in areas east of Moscow, far from hostile attack, in the Urals and mid-Siberia and along the east Siberian coast.
Duranty, Walter.  Story of Soviet Russia. Philadelphia, N. Y.: JB Lippincott Co. 1944, p. 175
 
            Russian factories and collective farms worked furiously in the fall and winter of 1940-41, aware that the breathing-space which Stalin's agreement with Hitler had won for them in 1939 was nearly at an end.  At this critical moment the Soviet state gained strength from its arbitrary system of centralization.  It was able to drive its workers and peasants to the limit of their effort because the idea of greater reward for greater service had been adopted, because they had the incentive of personal profit in addition to the no less powerful incentive of patriotic service.  By this time they all knew, the whole Soviet Union knew, that Germany was their enemy and that a clash with Germany could not long be averted.
Duranty, Walter.  Story of Soviet Russia. Philadelphia, N. Y.: JB Lippincott Co. 1944, p. 259
 
            The scheme of evacuation had been carefully prepared, not only of people, animals, and foodstuffs from the countryside, but of machines, even whole factories, from the towns and cities.  At Christmas, 1941, the Germans boasted that they had occupied the territory in which one-half of the heavy industry of the USSR was situated....  But Goebbels omitted to state how much machinery and tools were moved eastwards from the factories of the Donetz Basin, the Ukraine, White Russia, and Leningrad by the workers who had handled them, and how much more which could not be moved was deliberately demolished, like the great Dnieper dam and power stations, by the men and women who had built them.
Duranty, Walter.  Story of Soviet Russia. Philadelphia, N. Y.: JB Lippincott Co. 1944, p. 266
 
            The record shows that the tribute was deserved.  Had Stalin not won the fight for industrialization and defeated the Trotskyists and Bukharinites, the USSR would have become a Nazi province.  Had he not had the foresight to build a metallurgical industry in the Urals, the Red Armies could not have been supplied with arms.  Had he not industrialized the economy and introduced mechanized farming, he would have had neither a base for producing arms nor a mass of soldiers trained in the operation of machinery.  Had he not signed a nonaggression treaty with Germany, the USSR might have been attacked 22 months sooner.  Had he not moved the Soviet armies into Poland, the German attack would have begun even closer to Moscow.  Had he not subdued General Mannerheim's Finland, Leningrad would have fallen.  Had he not ordered the transfer of 1,400 factories from the west to the east, the most massive movement of its kind in history, Russian industry would have received a possibly fatal blow.  Had he not built up the army and equipped it with modern arms, it would have been destroyed on the frontiers.
            He did not, of course, do these things alone.  They were Party decisions and Party actions, and behind the Party throughout was the power, courage, and intelligence of the working class.  But Stalin stood at all times as the central, individual directing force, his magnificent courage and calm foresight inspiring the whole nation.  When some panic began in Moscow in October 1941 he handled it firmly.
Cameron, Kenneth Neill. Stalin, Man of Contradiction. Toronto: NC Press, c1987, p. 107
 
            ... our Red Army, Red Navy, Red Air Fleet and the Chemical and Air Defense Society must be increased and strengthened to the utmost.  The whole of our people must be kept in a state of mobilization and preparedness in the face of the danger of military attack, so that no "accident" and no tricks on the part of our external enemies may take us by surprise....
Stalin, Joseph.   Stalin's Kampf. New York: Howell, Soskin & Company, c1940, p. 163
 
            For years [this was stated in 1937], the Russian leaders have based all their actions on the belief that they will soon be involved in war.  They apparently started to build up a larger gold reserve in order to strengthen their military position.
Littlepage, John D.  In Search of Soviet Gold. New York: Harcourt, Brace, c1938, p. 271
 
            The 18th Party Conference of February 1941 was devoted almost entirely to defense matters....  Stalin proposed that in 1941 industrial output should increase by 17-18 percent.  That did not seem unrealistic.  In 1940, for instance, defense output had increased by 27 percent compared to 1939....  The people knew a war was coming and that they would have to perform the impossible.  By the time of Hitler's invasion, 2700 airplanes of a new type and 4300 tanks, nearly half of them a new model, had been built.
Volkogonov, Dmitri. Stalin: Triumph and Tragedy. New York: Grove Weidenfeld, 1991, p. 374
 
            A month before the German attack, Stalin, speaking to a close circle, said, 'The conflict is inevitable, perhaps in May next year.' By the early summer of 1941, acknowledging the explosiveness of the situation, he approved the premature release of military cadets, and young officers and political workers were posted, mostly without leave, straight to units which were below full strength.  After much hesitation, Stalin also decided to call up about 800,000 reservists, bringing up to strength 21 divisions in the frontier military districts....
            On 19 June 1941 troops were ordered to begin camouflaging aerodromes, transport depots, bases and fuel dumps, and to disperse aircraft around airfields.  The order came hopelessly late, and even then Stalin was reluctant in case 'all these measures provoke the German forces'.
Volkogonov, Dmitri. Stalin: Triumph and Tragedy. New York: Grove Weidenfeld, 1991, p. 393
 
            Despite all his miscalculations, Stalin was not unprepared to meet the emergency.  He had solidly armed his country and reorganized its military forces.  His practical mind had not been wedded to any one-sided strategic dogma.  He had not lulled the Red Army into a false sense of security behind any Russian variety of the Maginot Line, that static defense system that had been the undoing of the French army in 1940.  He could rely on Russia's vast spaces and severe climate.  No body of men could now dispute his leadership.  He had achieved absolute unity of command, the dream of the modern strategist.
Deutscher, Isaac. Stalin; A Political Biography. New York: Oxford Univ. Press, 1967, p. 461
 
            What conclusions, then, follow from the facts sighted?  How is one to assess what was done before the war, what we intended to do in the near future and what we did not have time to do or were unable to do in strengthening our country's defensive capacity?  How is one to make that appraisal today after everything has been gone through, critically interpreting the past and at the same time putting oneself once more on the threshold of the Great Patriotic War?
            I have thought long over this and here is the conclusion to which I came.
            It seems to me that the country's defense was managed correctly in its basic and principal features and orientations.  For many years everything possible or almost everything was done in the economic and social aspects.  As to the period between 1939 and the middle of 1941, the people and Party exerted particular effort to strengthen defense.
            ... The fact that in spite of enormous difficulties and losses during the four years of the war, Soviet industry turned out a colossal amount of armaments --almost 490,000 guns and mortars, over 102,000 tanks and self-propelled guns, over 137,000 military aircraft--shows that the foundations of the economy from the military, the defense standpoint, were laid correctly and firmly.
            Following once more in my mind's eye the development of the Soviet Armed Forces all the way from the days of the Civil War, I should say that here too we followed the right road in the main.  There was constant improvement along the right lines in Soviet military doctrine, the principles of educating and training the troops, the weapons of the army and navy, the training of commanding cadres and the structure and organization of the armed forces.  The morale and fighting spirit of the troops and their political consciousness and maturity were always exceptionally high.
            Of course, if it were possible to go over the whole road once more there are some things it would be better not to do.  But today I cannot name a single major trend in the development of our armed forces that should have been abolished, abandoned, and disclaimed.  The period between 1939 and the middle of 1941 was marked on the whole by transformations which in two or three years would have given the Soviet people a brilliant army, perhaps the best in the world.
            During the period the dangerous military situation was developing we army leaders probably did not do enough to convince Stalin that war with Germany was inevitable in the very near future and that the urgent measures provided for in the operational and mobilization plans must be implemented.
Zhukov, Georgii.  Memoirs of Marshal Zhukov. London: Cape, 1971, p. 226
 
            Other elements of the Soviet military effort were less affected by the purges.  The training schools increased their intake of new officer trainees.  The technological threshold still moved slowly forward.  The system of fortifications begun in the 1920s along the whole western frontier--the Stalin Line--continued to be constructed and extended.  Most important of all, the modernization and expansion of the Soviet heavy industrial base continued, and with it the large proportion allocated to military production.  Without the economic transformation, the Red Army would have been a feeble force in 1941, relying on a vast base of peasant manpower.  The industrial changes of the 1930s provided the planners, the scientists, engineers, and skilled labor necessary to cope with the demands of total mobilization made after the German invasion in 1941.  Whatever the weaknesses exposed by the modernization drive, it is inconceivable that the Soviet Union could have withstood the German attack without it.
Overy, R. J. Russia's War: Blood Upon the Snow. New York: TV Books, c1997, p. 51
 
            Of course considerable preparations were made.  For over a decade priority had been given to heavy industry, and the Soviet armed forces had first call on it.  The Red Army was enlarged by two and a half times between 1939 and 1941, war production was increased, troops and supplies transferred to the west, a 100,000 men put to work on the fortifications.
Bullock, Alan. Hitler and Stalin: Parallel Lives. New York: Knopf, 1992, p. 705
 
            In his speech in the Reichstag on 7 March 1936 Hitler said:  Nor do we doubt that Herriott. of France reported his information truly.  Now, according to this information it is established in the first place that the Russian Army has a peace strength of 1,350,000 men, and secondly, that its war strength and reserves amount to 17,500,000 men.  Thirdly, we are informed that it has the largest tank force in the world, and, fourthly that it has the largest air force in the world.  This most powerful military factor has been described as excellent in regard to mobility and leadership and ready for action at any time.
            HITLER'S SPEECHES by Norman Baynes, 1942, VOLUME 2, Page 1290
 
            What confirmed me in my decision to attack [the Soviet Union] without delay was the information brought by a German mission lately returned from Russia, that a single Russian factory was producing by itself more tanks that all our factories together.
Hitler, Adolph.  Hitler's Table Talk, 1941-1944.  Trans. by Cameron & Stevens.  New York:  Enigma Books, 2000, p. 182
 
            The more we see of conditions in Russia, the more thankful we must be that we struck in time.  In another 10 years there would have sprung up in Russia a mass of industrial centers, inaccessible to attack, which would have produced armaments on an inexhaustible scale, while the rest of Europe would have degenerated into a defenseless plaything of Soviet policy.
Hitler, Adolph.   Hitler's Table Talk, 1941-1944.  Trans. by Cameron & Stevens.  New York:  Enigma Books, 2000, p. 586
 
            The legend of the might of Germany's mechanized army, backed by a highly industrialized society and run with ruthless Teutonic efficiency, has been with us for so long that it is difficult to realize how poor were the German preparations for the Russian campaign.  The German army invaded Russia with 3,200 tanks and the monthly output of 80 to 100 was too low even to make good the wastage.  Although this rate later went up rapidly, it did not reach its peak until August 1944, when it was already too late, and even then was only a quarter of the Russian output.  The Germans had sufficient fuel for only a fraction of their transport to be motorized.  The rest was moved by horses!  The average German infantry division had about 1,500 horse-drawn vehicles and only about 600 motor-drawn ones, compared with some 3,000 in a British or American infantry division.  The German soldier had no winter clothing, and had to make do by wearing large cotton combat overalls over his uniform and stuffing the spaces in between with crumpled newspapers or, since newsprint was scarce, with German propaganda leaflets.
            The Russians, on the other hand, began the war with 20,000 tanks, more than were possessed by the rest of the world put together, and they produced no fewer than 100,000 during the war.  They, too, used horses, but their motorized transport was adapted for winter conditions, their winter uniforms were white and, being quilted, provided excellent protection against the cold, and they possessed an adaptability to the environment that the Germans lacked.  "Give a Russian an axe and a knife and in a few hours he will do anything, run up a sledge, a stretcher, a little igloo... make a stove out of a couple of old oil cans," a German medical officer wrote.  "Our men just stand about miserably burning precious petrol to keep warm."
Knightley, Phillip.   The First Casualty. New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1975, p. 252
 
            It would be unfair to accuse Stalin of neglecting the country's defense.   In 1940 new regulations lengthened the working day and week.   By 1941 the army was more than double the size it had been in 1939.   In a number of cases capable people were put in charge of vital departments.
Ulam, Adam.  Stalin; the Man and his Era. New York: Viking Press, 1973, p. 531
 
            It seems to me that the country's defense was managed correctly as regards its basic and principal features and orientations.  For many years, everything or almost everything possible was done in the economic and social fields.  As to the period from 1939 to the middle of 1941, the people and the Party applied special efforts to strengthen the country's defenses....
            Of course, if it were possible to go over that whole road once again, there are some things it would have been better not to do and some things that would have to be straightened out.  But today I cannot name a single major trend in the development of our armed forces that should have been written off, jettisoned, or repealed.  The period between 1939 and the middle of 1941 was marked on the whole by transformations which gave the Soviet Union a brilliant army, and that readied it well for defense.
Zhukov, Georgi.  Reminiscences and Reflections Vol. 1. Moscow: Progress Pub., c1985, p. 270
 
            Soviet economic might was so successfully dedicated to the war effort that in the last six months of 1942 it reached a level of production which the Germans attained only across the entire year.  The numbers were remarkable.  In that half-year the USSR acquired 15,000 aircraft and 13,000 tanks.
Service, Robert. Stalin. Cambridge, Mass.: Belknap Press of Harvard Univ. Press, 2005, p. 421
 
            At least four marshals--and many generals--deny Stalin's alleged failure to prepare for the German invasion.  In June 1941 Marshal Bagramyan says a 'titanic' effort had been made to prepare for the coming war.  Marshal Vasilevsky points to a 'whole number of very important measures' taken to counter the menace of aggression.  Marshal Zhukov goes farther, saying, 'every effort' and 'every means' was used to bolster the country's defenses between 1939 and 1941.  Marshal Rokossovsky says that the non-aggression pact with Hitler 'gave us the time we needed so much to build up our defenses'....
            Stalin's generals are virtually unanimous in pointing to Russia's accelerated pre-war industrial and military growth as the sine qua non for victory over Nazi Germany.  This build-up started between the two world wars when the West had in effect quarantined the Soviet state.
Axell, Albert. Stalin's War: Through the Eyes of His Commanders.  London, Arms and Armour Press. 1997, p. 189
 
            Djilas, a Yugoslav writer and activist who met Stalin several times during the war, says that, prior to the Nazi-Soviet War, Stalin spared nothing to achieve military preparedness; and the speed with which he carried out the transformation of the top army command in the midst of the war confirmed Stalin's adaptability and willingness to open careers to men of talent.  Djilas an uncompromising critic of Stalin, says that the sweeping military purges had less effect than is commonly believed.
Axell, Albert. Stalin's War: Through the Eyes of His Commanders.  London, Arms and Armour Press. 1997, p. 190
 
NEP HAD TO GO
 
The nepmen, as they were called, showed amazing ingenuity in evading government control and taxation alike.
            By 1925, however, NEP had served its purpose.
            It had become apparent to the Bolshevik leaders that if they really intended to form a socialist state, something must be done to check capital accumulation by Nepmen, no less than the steady growth of a prosperous peasant class, the kulaks, or labor-employing farmers.
Duranty, Walter.  Duranty Reports Russia. New York: The Viking Press, 1934, p. 9
 
Both sides [the two sides in the Party] were agreed that the kulaks required extermination as a class, and only quarreled about the right method and right moment.
Duranty, Walter.  Duranty Reports Russia. New York: The Viking Press, 1934, p. 10
 
By the autumn of 1929 the real issue was clearly defined -- collectivization must fail or the kulak must go -- no middle measures were conceivable.
Duranty, Walter.  Duranty Reports Russia. New York: The Viking Press, 1934, p. 11
 
CHUEV:  Lenin had proposed the continuation of the NEP for a longer period of time.  Did he not say that the NEP was to be pursued seriously and for a long time?
MOLOTOV:  No.  Lenin planned the NEP as a temporary retreat.  Only one year later, in 1922 in a speech he said it was time to end the NEP.  He said we have been retreating for a whole year.  On the party's behalf we can now say, "That's enough..."  The period of the NEP had ended, or was coming to an end.
Chuev, Feliks. Molotov Remembers. Chicago: I. R. Dee, 1993, p. 130
 
            I have already mentioned that the exceptional measures against the kulaks in 1928 meant the de facto end of NEP in the countryside....
            But by this time Stalin had no intention of continuing NEP....the Party had rejected the proposal of the Left Opposition (in 1926-1927) that private businessmen be taxed an additional 200 million rubles.  The Party had argued with good reason that such tax measures would amount to the expropriation of private capital and signify the abandonment of NEP.  In the early 30s, however, Stalin himself began a policy of increased taxation of private businessmen, forcing them in fact to close down their businesses.  It is true that Stalin did not call for the arrest and deportation of former Nepman and their families.  Instead, an unannounced decision was made to confiscate a goodly part of their wealth.
Medvedev, Roy. Let History Judge. New York: Columbia University Press, 1989, p. 289
 
            The NEP was producing tiresome results.  The various State enterprises were being frequently hindered, spoiled, and cleverly exploited by private commercial concerns.  As a general rule, the products of socialized industry were not reaching the consumer direct, but were falling into the hands of middle-men who passed them on at prices sometimes a hundred percent higher than those they paid.  A large amount of commercial capital was becoming available as a result of speculation, and of undercutting of nationalized industries by private initiative, which was freer and cleverer than the State-controlled concerns, and less troubled by questions of public welfare.  The importance of money in social life grew, and its effects were demoralizing. Gambling-houses and brothels made their appearance in the cities.  Communists, dependent on very mediocre salaries, often found themselves at a disadvantage compared to the specialists, the tradesmen, and the "Capitalists" who were appearing as a new element in the common-weal.  The unemployed were as badly off in Russia as they were in Berlin; the workers, unable to pay the comparatively high rents now demanded for the fine flats they had occupied during the Revolution, were, little by little, drifting back to the slums, and many a dwelling that had been handsome and clean a few years previously, was now poverty-stricken and dilapidated.
Barmine, Alexandre.  Memoirs of a Soviet Diplomat. London: L. Dickson limited,1938, p. 218
 
            It was this that brought this long period (1921-28) to an end.  One can imagine the effect of all this compromise on such ardent doctrinaires.  What a position for a government-- to hold the power on condition that you let the greater part of the population do the opposite to what you wished!  Meanwhile the compromise was having an enervating influence on the governing Party itself.  Over and over again, there were purges to get rid of the lukewarm, and yet the rot gained ground: it was particularly felt where it was most dangerous, in the Komsomol.  One is bound to feel the most respect for those who stood firmest for consistency.  The Party itself, and therefore the Government, was soon split endwise.  There were several groups; but the main distinction was between a right wing which said, give the country what it evidently wants and a left wing which said, practice what you preach.
Pares, Bernard. Russia. Washington, New York: Infantry Journal, Penguin books, 1944, p. 133
 
            Later when he was thinking over his disagreements with Stalin, Bukharin would recall an "economic" discussion they had back in 1925.  In the course of the discussion Stalin had said that if they gambled on NEP for long it would beget capitalism.
Radzinsky, Edvard.  Stalin. New York: Doubleday, c1996, p. 231
 
1921 FAMINE CAUSED BY DROUGHT NOT SOCIALISM
 
October 6, 1921--The Russian famine, which has brought upward of 15 million human beings to the verge of starvation today,...is perhaps the most important single factor in the internal and external life of Russia at present.
            The famine was caused by drought, not communism,…
Duranty, Walter.  Duranty Reports Russia. New York: The Viking Press, 1934, p. 18
 
1921 FAMINE WAS BEATEN
 
June 12, 1922--We have conquered the Vogel famine, said Col. Haskell, head of the American Relief Administration in Russia.  "The Soviets did their share," he declared, "and I for one am willing to go on record as an optimist on Russia."
Duranty, Walter.  Duranty Reports Russia. New York: The Viking Press, 1934, p. 31
 
            [Footnote]: It is less apparent why Western scholars should have ignored it [the 1921 famine].  E. H. Carr, for example, in his three-volume History of the Russian Revolution, where he finds space for the most esoteric information, dismisses this calamity in a single paragraph on the specious grounds that "estimates of those who perished are unreliable."...  At the time of writing [1993], there exists not one scholarly monograph on the 1921 famine.
Pipes, Richard. Russia Under the Bolshevik Regime.  New York: A.A. Knopf, 1993, p. 410
 
 
LENIN NOT AN ABSOLUTE DICTATOR
 
Lenin is not an absolute dictator, because he must get the agreement of the Communist Party to his policy.  Generally he does get it, but the limitation still remains.
Duranty, Walter.  Duranty Reports Russia. New York: The Viking Press, 1934, p. 42
 
January 16, 1923--Lenin has often been called the "red dictator."  This designation is wrong; Lenin never had the right to dictate, although in practice his opinion generally carried the day.
Duranty, Walter.  Duranty Reports Russia. New York: The Viking Press, 1934, p. 101
 
            Lenin was far from being a dictator in his Party.  Besides, a revolutionary party would not brook any dictatorship over itself!
Trotsky, Leon,  Stalin. New York: Harper and Brothers Publishers, 1941, p. 137
 
FEW SUPPORT THE LIVING CHURCH
 
On the other hand, though it may be reckoned that fully seven-tenths of the clergy and religious laity favor reform, it is doubtful whether more than a tenth is willing to support the "Living Church," which the majority [of the clergy] regards as having sold itself for a mess of Bolshevik pottage.
Duranty, Walter.  Duranty Reports Russia. New York: The Viking Press, 1934, p. 63
 
TIKHON IS INNOCENT
 
April 9, 1923--the trial of the patriarch Tikhon.  Regarding the first charge, it is true that he authorized the Archbishop of Tobolsk to administer the last sacrament to the czar; that is all.
            Regarding the second, he did, with the approval of the Soviet authorities, send a delegate to Karlovitz, but with no instructions to vote for the anti-Soviet resolutions.  Indeed, he publicly disavowed them on learning that he had done so.
Duranty, Walter.  Duranty Reports Russia. New York: The Viking Press, 1934, p. 64
 
 
On the other hand, some of his [Tikhon] proclamations, especially in the early years of the revolution, were more or less directly critical of the Bolshevik regime,....
Duranty, Walter.  Duranty Reports Russia. New York: The Viking Press, 1934, p. 65
 
TIKHON IS SUBVERSIVE
 
The All Russian Church Council defrocked patriarch Tikhon today.
            The resolution reads: "inasmuch as the Soviet government is the only one in the whole world fighting capitalism, which is one of the seven deadly sins, therefore its struggle is a sacred struggle.  The council condemns the counter revolutionary acts of Tikhon and his adherents, lifts the band of ex-communication he laid on the Soviet government, and brands him as a traitor to the church and to Russia.
Duranty, Walter.  Duranty Reports Russia. New York: The Viking Press, 1934, p. 67
 
COMMUNISTS PROVIDE HONEST LEADERSHIP
 
In a country rotten with corruption the communists are honest.  In a country where they are all-powerful they live meagerly and, like Lenin, work themselves beyond the limit of physical endurance.  So they tried to resusitate Russian industry despite the handicaps of civil and foreign war, treachery, and incompetence.
Duranty, Walter.  Duranty Reports Russia. New York: The Viking Press, 1934, p. 90
 
            John Reed brings as back to the human reality of the revolution….  Reed helps to show us how petty and how wrong is the scurrilous gossip-column approach to history, which depicts these leaders as self-serving conspirators mad for power for power's sake and each driven by personal ambition.  Not, of course, that personal ambitions were absent, but they were minuscule parts of an overwhelming collective dedication to the revolution.  And the spirit in which these men met, as even the scanty minutes reveal, was essentially one of good comradeship, in spite of some differences between them.
Cameron, Kenneth Neill. Stalin, Man of Contradiction. Toronto: NC Press, c1987, p. 34
 
            Finally, if Soviet society had been so shaken by the trials and purges and so corrupted as Khrushchev, Conquest, and Medvedev imply, the USSR could not have won the war.  Only a basically sound society could have achieved such a feat, a feat which required national cooperation, initiative, and morale.
Cameron, Kenneth Neill. Stalin, Man of Contradiction. Toronto: NC Press, c1987, p. 133
 
            "Politics based on principles are the only honest ones," said Stalin, repeating Lenin.  That is the declaration of basic principle, the major precept which, as Stalin again says, "Enables one to storm impregnable positions."
Barbusse, Henri. Stalin. New York: The Macmillan company, 1935, p. 16
 
            ...Dzerzhinsky himself was a revolutionary ascetic, known to be morally incorruptible and dedicated absolutely to the revolutionary cause.
Koenker and Bachman, Eds. Revelations from the Russian Archives. Washington: Library of Congress, 1997, p. 5
 
            As we were traveling back to Moscow, on the road, Stalin stopped the car for some fresh air.  Vacationers with their children immediately surrounded Stalin.  Stalin asked Vlasik to go and get some candies in order to give to the children.  Vlasik went to this Georgian man who was running a kiosk, got the candies, and gave them out to the children, while the parents were discussing every subject imaginable with Stalin.
            At night where we rested, Stalin asked Vlasik:
            Did you pay the man for the candies?
            No, I did not have the time.
            Return immediately to the kiosk and pay the man the money that we owe him!
            The kiosk man was very proud that he had sold candy to comrade Stalin.
Rybin, Aleksei. Next to Stalin: Notes of a Bodyguard. Toronto: Northstar Compass Journal, 1996, p. 54
 
            I confess that I approached Stalin with a certain amount of suspicion and prejudice.  A picture had been built up in my mind of a very reserved and self-centered fanatic, a despot without vices, a jealous monopolizer of power.  I had been inclined to take the part of Trotsky against him.  I had formed a very high opinion perhaps an excessive opinion, of Trotsky's military and administrative abilities, and it seemed to me that Russia, which is in such urgent need of directive capacity at every turn, could not afford to send them into exile.  Trotsky's Autobiography, and more particularly the second volume, had modified this judgment but I still expected to meet a ruthless, hard--possibly doctrinaire--and self-sufficient man at Moscow; a Georgian highlander whose spirit had never completely emerged from its native mountain glen.
            ... Everything I had heard in favor of the First Five Year Plan I had put through a severely skeptical sieve, and yet there remained a growing effect of successful enterprise.  I had listened more and more greedily to any first-hand gossip I could hear about both these contrasted men.  I had already put a query against my grim anticipation of a sort of Bluebeard at the center of Russian affairs.  Indeed if I had not been in reaction against these first preconceptions and wanting to get nearer the truth of the matter, I should never have gone again to Moscow.
Wells, Herbert George. Experiment in Autobiography. New York: Macmillan. 1934, p. 684
 
            All lingering anticipations of a dour sinister Highlander vanished at the sight of him.  He is one of those people who in a photograph or painting become someone entirely different.  He is not easy to describe, and many descriptions exaggerate his darkness and stillness.  His limited sociability and a simplicity that makes him inexplicable to the more consciously disingenuous, has subjected him to the strangest inventions of whispering scandal.  His harmless, orderly, private life is kept rather more private than his immense public importance warrants, and when, a year or so ago, his wife died suddenly of some brain lesion, the imaginative [people] spun a legend of suicide which a more deliberate publicity would have made impossible.  All such shadowy undertow, all suspicion of hidden emotional tensions, ceased forever, after I had talked to him for a few minutes.
            My first impression was of a rather commonplace-looking man dressed in an embroidered white shirt, dark trousers and boots, staring out of the window of a large, generally empty, room.  He turned rather shyly and shook hands in a friendly manner.  His face also was commonplace, friendly and commonplace, not very well modelled, not in any way "fine."  He looked past me rather than at me but not evasively; it was simply that he had none of the abundant curiosity which had kept Lenin watching me closely from behind the hand he held over his defective eye, all the time he talked to me.
            The conversation hung on a phase of shyness.  We both felt friendly, and we wanted to be at our ease with each other, and we were not at our ease.  He had evidently a dread of self-importance in the encounter; he posed not at all, but he knew we were going to talk of very great matters.  He sat down at a table and Mr. Umansky [the translator] sat down beside us, produced his notebook and patted it open in a competent, expectant manner.
            I felt there was heavy going before me but Stalin was so ready and willing to explain his position that in a little while the pause for interpretation was almost forgotten in the preparation of new phrases for the argument.  I had supposed there was about forty minutes before me, but when at that period I made a reluctant suggestion of breaking off, he declared his firm intention of going on for three hours.  And we did.  We were both keenly interested in each other's point of view.  What I said was the gist of what I had intended to say....
            I had never met a man more candid, fair, and honest, and to these qualities it is, and to nothing occult and sinister, that he owes his tremendous undisputed ascendancy in Russia.  I had thought before I saw him that he might be where he was because men were afraid of him, but I realize that he owes his position to the fact that no one is afraid of him and everybody trusts him.
Wells, Herbert George. Experiment in Autobiography. New York: Macmillan. 1934, p. 687-689
 
            Stalin's salary is about 1000 rubles per month, the equivalent of which, in Russia in 1939, was about $200.  He is completely uninterested in money.  Like all the Soviet leaders he is a poor man; no financial scandal has ever touched any of them.  Salaries of Communists are adjusted by category, this system having replaced the former rule whereby no man in the party could earn more than 225 rubles per month.  There is no upward limit; the average is 600.  No communist may accept a salary for more than one post, no matter how many he holds; and no member of the party is allowed in theory at least to retain royalties from books.
Gunther, John.  Inside Europe. New York, London: Harper & Brothers, c1940, p. 534
 
            "Their penal servitude is not a stigma," wrote a well-informed anonymous commentator, "but a token of their new nobility.  They are proud of their criminal record as the emblem of their new aristocracy.  Yet the leaders of the Bolshevist regime are 'good' men in the most ominous meaning of that word....  The comparison with the early Church militant and the Jesuit order is irresistible.  The Bolsheviks are latter-day saints and crusaders, but of a material not a spiritual world, and they are the most thoroughgoing reformers and moralists in history--in their own way.  Some of them drink, some have mistresses, but their morality is of another kind.  They are the first autocratic rulers in history who do not use their power for personal profit.  They do not graft;…  They have no castles, no titles, no purple robes; they live in a couple of rooms on a standard below that of an American bricklayer; they are pledged to personal poverty and service."
Gunther, John.  Inside Europe. New York, London: Harper & Brothers, c1940, p. 537
 
            If it were not for the dictatorship of the proletariat, Russia would probably have the dictatorship of a military clique or of certain bankers and financiers.   Whatever may be said for or against the Soviet regime it must be admitted by both friend and foe that the Soviet leaders have kept the great natural resources of the country 100% in Russian hands.   As much cannot be said for the rulers of many other backward countries.   The Soviet dictatorship is one of the few instances in history where a small group of men have seized the power of a great nation and used that power not for personal aggrandizement and selfish gain but for what they thought was the best interests of all the common people.
            The Communist Party is the vanguard of the new era.   It is the alert, conscious minority which is guiding the country forward.   If democracy and not dictatorship were in the saddle, would it be possible to continue the socialistic program long enough to give it a fair trial?   Would not a fickle populace be lured away by the bright promises of charlatans and demagogues and hand over the power to interests which were secretly controlled by selfish financial interests?
            ...Americans may or may not be grateful that they do not live under communism and a Soviet system, but they certainly cannot with justice throw many stones at the Soviet power.   Considering the illiteracy of the Russian masses, considering the backwardness of the country, who can be sure that any other party or any other structure of government would have done more for the genuine welfare of the people?
Davis, Jerome.  The New Russia.  New York:  The John Day company,  c1933, p. 130-131
 
LENIN IS ALWAYS RIGHT ABOUT RUSSIA
 
Lenin is always right about Russia, because he knows and others only think.
Duranty, Walter.  Duranty Reports Russia. New York: The Viking Press, 1934, p. 92
 
November 16, 1923--...Lenin, who possesses to the supreme degree the twofold quality of seeing clear to a heart of a problem and finding the formula that will reconcile its solution with the Marxist principles.
Duranty, Walter.  Duranty Reports Russia. New York: The Viking Press, 1934, p. 112
 
Bolitho possessed to a remarkable degree the same quality which proved the key to Lenin's success, namely, the gift of making a quick and accurate summary of facts and drawing therefrom the right, logical, and inevitable conclusions.
Duranty, Walter.   I Write as I Please. New York: Simon and Schuster, 1935, p. 95
 
            The fact that his [Lenin] plan had achieved success in Russia, where capitalism was only in a rudimentary stage of development, is somewhat against the Marxian law and was due to an extraordinary convergence of circumstances, the most important of which was that there had been a leader capable of understanding the situation and utilizing it.
Ludwig, Emil.  Leaders of Europe.  London: I. Nicholson and Watson Ltd., 1934, p. 363
 
BOLSHEVIKS KNOW PEASANTS ARE MORE BOURGEOIS THAN SOCIALIST
 
As the Bolsheviks well know, the peasants are individualists, not socialists; or, to put it differently, potential bourgeois rather than class-conscious proletariat.
Duranty, Walter.  Duranty Reports Russia. New York: The Viking Press, 1934, p. 95
 
Lenin, who knew well how utterly the individualistic land-grabbing of the peasants and the un-disciplined desire of the soldiers differed from the Bolshevik aim of Marxist collectivism....
Duranty, Walter.  Duranty Reports Russia. New York: The Viking Press, 1934, p. 270
 
            ...But as soon as the October Revolution triumphed Lenin proclaimed the decree on land--the peasants mandate on land was to be implemented!  Yes, the socialist revolutionary land program was to be implemented: take the land, immediately!  He had utilized the peasants and explained: we're not in agreement in a number of respects, but as the peasants have drawn up the policy, let them become convinced by experience in implementing it that not everything is right with it, and they will begin to see things our way.  But we must begin implementation of the decree; begin smashing the landlords to confiscate their land.  In this struggle the peasants will find the right path.
Chuev, Feliks. Molotov Remembers. Chicago: I. R. Dee, 1993, p. 150
 
            There is a certain article of mine, "Lenin in the years of the Revolution."  I published it...after Lenin's death.  In it I showed that Lenin had "stolen" the program of the Socialist-Revolutionaries....
Chuev, Feliks. Molotov Remembers. Chicago: I. R. Dee, 1993, p. 151
 
            We are told that our peasantry, by its very position, is not socialistic, and, therefore, is incapable of socialist development.  It is true, of course, that the peasantry, by its very position, is not socialistic.  But this does not prove that the peasant farms cannot develop along socialist lines, if it can be shown that the country follows the town, and that socialist industry is predominant in the town.  The peasants, by their position, were not socialistic at the time of the October Revolution and they did not by any means want the establishment of socialism in our country.  Their main striving then was for the overthrow of the power of the landlords and the cessation of the war, the establishment of peace.  Nevertheless, they followed the lead of the socialist proletariat.  Why did they do this?  Because there was no other way of ending the imperialist war, no other way of bringing peace to Russia than by overthrowing the bourgeoisie, and by establishing the dictatorship of the proletariat....  And so the peasants, at that time, in spite of their being non-socialistic, followed the lead of the socialist proletariat.
Stalin, Joseph.  Stalin's Kampf. New York: Howell, Soskin & Company, c1940, p. 166
 
            Here was a country...where the working-class with its revolutionary traditions was a tiny island in the midst of a sea of illiterate peasantry.
Campbell, J. R.  Soviet Policy and Its Critics. London: V. Gollancz, ltd., 1939, p. 11
 
            ...Russia is suited to large-scale farming and the mass production of wheat.
            The chief difficulty, if it could be overcome, solved both an economic and a political problem.  That difficulty was the petty ownership of land.  Nominally, the peasants were, for the most part, in possession of the land.  They believed they were the owners of it.  The peasants, in addition to their many religious and pagan superstitions, have also an economic one: it is that God made the land for the peasant.  Their avidity for ownership in land is inborn.  When the first revolution took place it interested them chiefly as an opportunity to snatch all the land they could from the sequestered landowners.  When the Whites marched North, all they asked for their support was legal title to the new lands [which the Whites refused--Ed.].  The Reds when they won the Civil War could not expropriate the peasants though private ownership of land was a contravention of their dogma.  They were forced to accept the status quo and wait their opportunity for the socialization of property in agricultural land.
Graham, Stephen. Stalin. Port Washington, New York: Kennikat Press, 1970, p. 112
 
            The chief agrarian problem for the Bolsheviks can be briefly stated.  In 1917 they were carried to power on the crest of the agrarian revolution.  In this revolution the peasants seized the land and divided it up among themselves, thereby achieving their sole objective.  This seizure and division of the land was the starting point for a new system of social differentiation.  Feudalism had been definitely destroyed.  But it had been destroyed by a revolution which laid the foundation for a capitalist class system.  While the agrarian revolution had thus been the condition for the victory of the Bolsheviks its result represented a permanent menace to their very existence and all their aims.  For them it was a question of life or death to overcome the "natural" capitalist tendencies of the peasantry.  They did this by something like a "permanent revolution" in the countryside.
            In addition, the Bolsheviks had to impose on the peasants special sacrifices in connection with the industrialization of the USSR.  The peasants had to make a double sacrifice: they had not only to sacrifice immediate consumption in order to make possible the mechanization of agriculture, but they had also to give up their products with little or nothing in return in order to supply food to the town workers during the period of the building up of the capital goods industries.  As a result, the Bolsheviks had constantly to coerce the peasants into growing and delivering up large quantities of grain, cattle, etc. at prices which they naturally regarded as inadequate.
Socialist Clarity Group.  The U. S. S. R., Its Significance for the West.  London: V. Gollancz, 1942, p. 34
 
LENIN LEADS BY BRAIN AND WILL
 
November 15, 1922--The power of brain and will.  By that power Lenin rules.  By it alone.  For he lacks Trotsky's eloquence and magnetism, Radek's persuasiveness, and Zinoviev's grim enthusiasm.  And, unlike western demagogues, he never seeks to flatter an audience or appeal to their preferences and emotions.  His authority is based on the more solid foundation of greater brain power--better judgment, deeper reasoning, truer analysis of facts.
Duranty, Walter.  Duranty Reports Russia. New York: The Viking Press, 1934, p. 97
 
The secret of Lenin's authority, which did in fact amount to dictatorship, was that long experience had proved him right far oftener than his colleagues.  It is said that once, at the beginning of the Revolution, Lenin, faced by general opposition, wrapped his head in his cloak, saying: "All right!  Argue it out for yourselves; but when you're reached the conclusion that my plan is the only possible one wake me up and say so.  I'm going to sleep."  An hour or two later they woke him up and said: "we don't like your plan much more than we did, but we agree that it's the only way.  You're right."  As the event proved, Lenin was right in this case, and scores of others like it gave him such ascendancy that by 1919 or 1920 his opinions were hardly questioned.
            But it was supremacy of brain, not of position....
            Trotsky is a great executive, but his brain cannot compare with Lenin's in analytical power.
Duranty, Walter.  Duranty Reports Russia. New York: The Viking Press, 1934, p. 102
 
            Now Lenin is portrayed as a monster, evil, and so forth.  This is because he was like a rock, armed with knowledge, science, and a colossal mind....  He had a vision.  Perhaps he didn't see everything, but he saw the main thing.
Chuev, Feliks. Molotov Remembers. Chicago: I. R. Dee, 1993, p. 137
 
            Of the men who have lived on earth, Lenin was one of the greatest. 
            It is a strange and paradoxical thing that the Bolsheviks, who had one of the greatest individual leaders of all time, profess to decry the importance of individual leadership.
Duranty, Walter.  Story of Soviet Russia. Philadelphia, N. Y.: JB Lippincott Co. 1944, p. 19
 
 
WHEN CAPITALISM IS ALLOWED STATE RETAINS CONTROL
 
Lenin says, "where we have admitted capitalism we remain its master.  There are mixed companies, half state and half foreign or native capitalists, but the state retains control of them and after using them to acquire commercial knowledge can dissolve them when it will.  Thus there is no danger in this close association with the capitalist enemy.
Duranty, Walter.  Duranty Reports Russia. New York: The Viking Press, 1934, p. 99
 
            There has been considerable debate over whether the USSR today can correctly be called a socialist state, and its critics have pointed to such apparently unsocialist factors as high salaries and other privileges for a section of the professional class, the use of the profit motive to increase production, the use of economic incentives such as bonuses, and the large area of private farming still in existence.  These factors must, however, be seen within an overall framework of state ownership of the means of production, distribution, communication, and finance, the dominance of collective and state farms, the existence of a mass-democratic system, which--bourgeois critics to the contrary--is much more extensive than capitalist "democracy" and ensures a primary working-class control over the economy....  The answer to those who deny the USSR socialist status is that they do not recognize socialism when they see it.
Cameron, Kenneth Neill. Stalin, Man of Contradiction. Toronto: NC Press, c1987, p. 135
 
            How is business to be done with Russia?  Just as the Government either owns or controls everything else in Russia, so also it regulates all trade.  The Government has a monopoly on its foreign trade.  You can't sell directly to or buy from Mr. John Petrov or Mr. Peter Ivanov of Russia, but you must of necessity deal with the Government.  They hand out this right or privilege and it is called a concession.  There are two kinds, either a trading concession or a manufacturing concession.  By the first you are granted the right to deal in certain goods, like the buying and selling of wheat or textiles.  By the second you are granted the right to come into the country and operate a plant to produce certain things, like a mine to get out the coal in a certain region or a plant to make tractors.
            We met with the Chief Concessions Committee in Moscow, which has the granting of these concessions.  So I had an opportunity to find out how one would proceed.  That there may be no mistake, I quote from my notes taken at this meeting.  My question: "What procedure does a foreign firm follow to secure a concession or trading privilege?  Answer by Comrade Kasandroff, First Assistant of said Committee: The concessionaire points out where and what he wants to receive and the scope of the undertaking.  Then the Government decides: Does the country need that thing?  If it is devised to serve the internal trade, may there not be an overproduction?  If it is concerning raw material for export, they determine the minimum amount that should be produced for export.  They take into consideration everything that is necessary to have the planned concession fit into the Gos Plan.  And if everything looks advisable you get the concession.
Dykstra, Gerald.  A Belated Rebuttal on Russia. Allegan, Mich.: The Allegan Press, 1928, p. 135
 
 
            Once having secured the grant, the details are set out in a contract.  The provisions vary with each individual case, but there are certain provisions that go in all trade agreements.  They gave us copies of the usual form of concession contract and a few of the things therein stated I want to mention, to give you an idea as to how the whole thing operates.  "Section 6--For the concession grant the Concessionaire pays to the Government a royalty fixed in the agreement.  Section 8--The Government guarantees to the Concessionaire that all properties included in the concession enterprise will not be subject to confiscation or requisition; likewise, the concession agreement may not be changed or canceled by the Government alone.  The Government guarantees to the Concessionaire the right to freely take out of the country net profits.  Section 9--After the expiration of the term of the agreement, the buildings, structures, and equipment of the concession enterprise passes to the Government."
Dykstra, Gerald.   A Belated Rebuttal on Russia. Allegan, Mich.: The Allegan Press, 1928, p. 139
 
 
            And so they grant concessions to German and American firms to come into Russia and set up industries for them.  By the concession program we go in and set up, for example, a typewriting plant.  We pay them a royalty for the privilege and it is so arranged that after a period of years we turn over to the government our plant.  Because they don't want private ownership of the agencies of production to exist any longer than is necessary to get the thing established, after that the Government is to take it over.  In the meantime, we have been selling our machines to the internal trade, and in accordance with the concessions contract are privileged to leave the country with our profits.  And you remember also that the concession contract guarantees you against confiscation of your property during the time of operation.
Dykstra, Gerald.  A Belated Rebuttal on Russia. Allegan, Mich.: The Allegan Press, 1928, p. 144
 
 
            Now, you say, this is rather a wild scheme.  Perhaps you think no one would take up with such a rainbow proposition.  Well, they have and they aren't sorry either.  Already there are in the United States four such trading organizations, the largest, the Amtorg Trading Corp.  It exports to Russia agricultural implements, machinery of all kinds, hardware and tractors.  It imports fur, veneer wood, caviar, skins, and flax.
            Then there is the Harriman concession to run for 20 years, covering rich magnesium fields in the Georgian Soviet Republic.  Under the contract Harriman & Co. gets the exclusive right for a term of 20 years to explore and exploit certain deposits of magnesium and export the same.
            One of the most interesting concessions is the pencil concession of Hammer's.  This man knew how to make pencils‚ and he went to Russia and built a plant.  He uses their raw products and turns out pencils cheaper than they could because he has the system.  This he is to do for the next ten years, paying them a royalty and planning to give them his plant when the time expires.
Dykstra, Gerald.  A Belated Rebuttal on Russia. Allegan, Mich.: The Allegan Press, 1928, p. 147
 
 
STALIN’S BRAIN HAD BIG ROLE IN CREATING THE SU
 
But during the last year [1922] Stalin has shown judgment and analytical power not unworthy of Lenin.  It is to him that the greatest part of the credit is due for bringing about the new Soviet Union, which history may regard as one of the most remarkable constitutions in human history.  Trotsky helped him in drawing up, but Stalin's brain guided the pen.
Duranty, Walter.  Duranty Reports Russia. New York: The Viking Press, 1934, p. 103
 
SOVIET PEOPLE MUCH BETTER OFF BY 1923
 
September 7, 1923--The essential fact is that everyone is so infinitely better off than during the "black years" of 1920 and 1921 that present conditions seen paradise by comparison.
            This fact naturally influences the political situation.  Taking five great sections of the Russian people -- the peasants, industrial workers, state officials and employees, artists and professional men, and business people, large and small--there's none not feeling that Russia has emerged from night into day.
Duranty, Walter.  Duranty Reports Russia. New York: The Viking Press, 1934, p. 106
 
STALIN UNDERSTANDS NEED TO LEAVE WAR COMMUNISM
 
Stalin shows all of Lenin's frankness in admitting party weaknesses.  The communists must get away from the system of militant communism (that of the 1918--1921period), he tells them, and make the party more democratic by increasing the knowledge and activities of the inferior groups.  Communists must not be content to let bureaucracy do their work for them, but must investigate things themselves and try to help the government machine.  The workers' groups must keep up their connection with the peasants and vice versa; all must collaborate toward the common end.
Duranty, Walter.  Duranty Reports Russia. New York: The Viking Press, 1934, p. 114
 
CHEKA KILLED FAR LESS THAN PEOPLE TURNING IN OPPONENTS
 
Where the vengeance of the Cheka claimed hundreds of victims, private spite took a toll of thousands and tens of thousands.  Just imagine what it meant in practice.  If a wife was tired of her husband or he of his wife, if a servant had a grudge against his former master or an employee against his former boss, it meant a few words to the Cheka and then--silence.
Duranty, Walter.  Duranty Reports Russia. New York: The Viking Press, 1934, p. 117
 
In point of fact, is doubtful whether the total number of Cheka executions throughout the whole period up to 1922 surpasses 50,000....
            Though lives were cheap in Russia and Cheka leaders pitiless in defending the revolution when in danger, they would have defeated their own object by the wholesale slaughter of workers and peasants on the scale reported abroad.  Nor are such men as Dzerzhinsky or Latsis, now head of the State Salt Trust, the bestial butchers they have been depicted.
Duranty, Walter.  Duranty Reports Russia. New York: The Viking Press, 1934, p. 118
 
            The "Chekists" soon came and took me off with them.  They cross-examined me without any of the tortures or "scientific methods" of which professional anti-Soviet writers abroad have told such alarming stories.
Tokaev, Grigori.  Betrayal of an Ideal. Bloomington, Ind.: Indiana University Press, 1955, p. 47
 
 
LENIN GOT PEOPLE TO WORK BY PERSUASION, NOT FORCE
 
Peter the Great made them work, too, but by brute force and Lenin by the force of personality. "That force," said Osinsky, "came from two qualities--first, the capacity to understand the real meaning of events; second, the ability to explain things to others."
Duranty, Walter.  Duranty Reports Russia. New York: The Viking Press, 1934, p. 145
 
The Bolsheviks can organize much, but is not their propaganda which draws these hundreds of thousands to Lenin's feet.
Duranty, Walter. I Write as I Please. New York: Simon and Schuster, 1935, p. 223
 
            To use an un-Bolshevik metaphor, Lenin had realized, and taught to his followers, that the Russian masses were a bank upon which any check could be drawn, provided that they were told what the money was for and that it was being spent for their benefit.  As Lenin said and repeated, the masses would do anything, suffer anything, and shrink from nothing, if they were rightly appealed to.
Duranty, Walter.  Story of Soviet Russia. Philadelphia, N. Y.: JB Lippincott Co. 1944, p. 139
 
 
LENIN LIVED SIMPLY
 
Semashko gives his explanation of this power.  He writes: "Lenin is really one with the people at heart.  He has always lived in extreme simplicity--one small room, an iron bed, and a work table.  This simplicity is innate in him, not a demagogic trick or bourgeois hypocrisy.  Later, as master of Russia, he was always annoyed by pomp and ceremony."
Duranty, Walter.  Duranty Reports Russia. New York: The Viking Press, 1934, p. 146
 
            This simplicity and modesty of Lenin's, which struck me the moment I met him, his desire to pass unnoticed, or any rate not to emphasize his superiority, was one of his strongest points as the new chief of the new masses, the great, simple, and profound masses of humanity...."
Barbusse, Henri. Stalin. New York: The Macmillan company, 1935, p. 35
 
 
TROTSKY OPPOSED THE NEP
 
Trotsky, one may assume, never believed that the communist lion could lie down peacefully in Russia with the capitalist lamb.  Lenin's opportunism decided that they must, and while he lived they did.
            From the summer of 1924 to December 1925, Trotsky conducted a vigorous campaign for the suppression of the "kulak," that is, the capitalist influence in the villages--to correspond with a campaign begun before Lenin’s death,in the winter of 1923, against “Nepman” elements in the towns.
Duranty, Walter.  Duranty Reports Russia. New York: The Viking Press, 1934, p. 152
 
WHY TROTSKY WAS EXPELLED FROM THE PARTY
 
But there could be no mercy for Trotsky and his followers because they had broken two cardinal rules of Communist discipline.
            First, although they had been within their rights in opposing the majority program until the decision was reached, they had committed the unpardonable breach of refusing to bow to that decision when the will of the majority was proclaimed and affirmed by vote.
            Second, as if that disobedience were not sufficient, they had committed the flagrant sin of "appealing" against the party line to the popular masses by attempted public demonstrations and by the dissemination of secretly printed documents.  This in the circumstances was sheer counter Revolution, and was punished as such.
            The clash between Trotsky's individualism and the rigid discipline of the Communist system could no longer be avoided.
Duranty, Walter.  Duranty Reports Russia. New York: The Viking Press, 1934, p. 154
 
            Trotsky, however, maintained his irreconcilable opposition to the Party and was expelled from the Soviet Union.
Martens, Ludo.   Another View of Stalin. Antwerp, Belgium: EPO, Lange Pastoorstraat 25-27  2600, p. 135 [p. 116 on the NET]
 
            The opposition presented their statement to the Central Committee with the demand that it be printed and circulated to all delegates to the Congress.  Expecting that their demand would be rejected, as indeed it was, they had set up a secret printing press, intending to print the statement for mass circulation.  The 0GPU knew in advance about their plans and seized the printing press.  All who were directly involved were arrested and at once expelled from the party, but the leaders remained free for the time being.  Desperate and frustrated in their efforts to publicize their views, they addressed meetings of workers.  The Central Committee, meeting jointly with the Central Control Commission on Oct. 21-23, 1927, again severely reprimanded them, but they remained members and at liberty.
            On Nov. 7, 1927, the 10th anniversary of the Revolution, Trotsky and Zinoviev promoted demonstrations in Moscow and Leningrad.  The demonstrations were thinly attended and ineffectual, but they were a grave breach of party rules.  Again the 0GPU was ready.  The police and organized bands of thugs broke up the demonstrations and many were arrested.  A week later Trotsky and Zinoviev were expelled from the party.  The Congress endorsed their expulsion and expelled in addition a further 75 oppositionists of the Trotsky-Zinoviev group, as well as 15 Democratic Centralists.  The Congress demonstrated with enthusiasm in support of the party leaders.
Grey, Ian. Stalin, Man of History. London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1979, p. 219
 
            A few months later, however, on the occasion of the 10th anniversary of the Russian Revolution, there was an opposition attempt to stage counter-demonstrations to the official demonstrations in Moscow and Leningrad--short-lived attempts which were broken up by the workers.
            The illegal printing press was discovered, as was also the fact that the opposition had entered into association with elements hostile to the Party, in order to get this press going.
            The limit of the Party's patience had been reached.  In spite of warning from the Party, in breach of their most solemn promises, the opposition was seeking to form a new party.  They had to be excluded from the Party and their organization broken up.
            But before this step was taken there was a Party referendum on the question of the opposition policy-- 724,000 members voted for the line of the Party, 4000 members voted for the Trotskyists and 2600 abstained from voting.  If the trotskyists had only wanted a democratic expression they had got it with its hobnailed boots on.
Campbell, J. R.  Soviet Policy and Its Critics. London: V. Gollancz, ltd., 1939, p. 40
 
            In the Party discussion of 1927, only 4000 people could be found to vote for Trotsky, as compared with the 724,000 who voted for the line of the Party.  The young administrators drawn from the working class were equally hostile, as Trotsky regretfully admits (The Revolution Betrayed, the page 276).
Campbell, J. R.  Soviet Policy and Its Critics. London: V. Gollancz, ltd., 1939, p. 233
 
            [in 1927] the opposition prepared a platform for the next Party Congress.  This was forbidden.  They then printed it illlegally, and this was represented as a plot--and indeed, it was a genuine underground operation.
            The hearings against Trotsky & Zinoviev were resumed, without even a pretense of judicial decency.  Trotsky's defense was met with curses, howls and the hurling of inkpots, books and glasses.  Stalin alone spoke in a controlled manner, though in a tone of 'coarse and cold hatred'.
            On Nov. 7, 1927 the 10th anniversary of the Revolution, the opposition made a last effort, joining the official demonstration groups but with their own slogans.  They were attacked by police, 'activists' and others who had been mobilized especially for this operation.  Then Trotsky and Zinoviev were expelled from the party, and Kamenev and the others from the Central Committee.
Conquest, Robert. Stalin: Breaker of Nations. New York, New York: Viking, 1991, p. 139
 
            0n Nov. 7, 1927, during the official celebration of the 10th anniversary of the October revolution, Trotsky and Zinoviev led their followers in separate processions through the streets of Moscow and Leningrad.  Though the processions were of a peaceful character and the banners and slogans carried by the demonstrators were directed against the ruling group only by implication, the incident brought the struggle to a head.  Trotsky and Zinoviev were immediately expelled from the party.  On December 15th Congress declared 'adherence to the opposition and propaganda of its views to be incompatible with membership of the party'.... The Congress demanded from the leaders of the opposition that they renounce and denounce their own views--this was to be the price for their continued membership of the party.... On Dec. 18 the Congress expelled 75 leading members of the opposition, in addition to many others already expelled or imprisoned.
            A day later the opposition split.  Its Trotskyist section refused to yield to the demands of the Congress.  Trotsky was deported to Alma-Ata, Rakovsky to Astrakhan.  Zinoviev, Kamenev, and their followers, however, issued a statement in which they renounced their views.
Deutscher, Isaac. Stalin; A Political Biography. New York: Oxford Univ. Press, 1967, p. 311
 
            In 1927, the Trotsky-Zinoviev bloc made one last effort.  Defeated and isolated in the ruling councils of the Party, they thought to appeal to the "Party masses" and workers.  (This was a measure of their lack of contact with reality: the masses were now wholly alienated.) In the autumn came the setting up of an illegal Trotskyite printing press, and illegal demonstrations in Moscow and Leningrad.  Mrachkovsky, Preobrazhensky, and Serebryakov accepted responsibility for the print shop.  They were all immediately expelled from the party, and Mrachkovsky was arrested.... Opposition demonstrations on Nov. 7 were a fiasco.  The only result was that on November 14 Trotsky & Zinoviev were expelled from the Party, and Kamenev, Rakovsky, Smilga, and Evdokimov from the Central Committee.  Their followers everywhere were also ejected.  Zinoviev and his followers recanted; Trotsky's, for the moment stood firm.  The effective number of Trotskyites and Zinovievites is easy to deduce: 2500 oppositionists recanted after the 1927 Congress, and 1500 were expelled.  The leading Trotskyites were sent into exile.  In January 1928, Trotsky was deported to Alma-Ata.  Rakovsky, Pyatakov, Preobrazhensky, and others of the Left followed him to other places in the Siberian and Asian periphery.
Conquest, Robert.  The Great Terror. New York: Oxford University Press, 1990, p. 11
 
            For the moment it looked as if the Opposition would be able to participate in the 15th congress and there make another appeal to the party.  The leaders prepared a full and systematic statement of policy, a Platform, such as they had never before been able to present.
            ...the Platform would then have to be produced and circulated clandestinely or semi-clandestinely.  The Opposition resolved to take the risk.  To protect itself against reprisals--to "spread the blow" once again--and also to impress the Congress, Trotsky & Zinoviev called on their adherents to sign the Platform en masse.  The collection of signatures was to reveal the size of the Opposition's following; and so the campaign was from the outset a trial of strength in a form the Opposition had not hitherto geared to undertake. 
            Stalin could not allow this to go on undisturbed.  All the night of 12-13 September 1927 the GPU raided the Opposition's "printing shop," arrested several man engaged in producing the Platform, and announced with a flourish that it had discovered a conspiracy.  The GPU maintained that they had caught the Oppositionists red-handed, working hand in glove with notorious counter-revolutionaries; and that a former officer of Wrangel's White Guards had set up the Opposition's printing shop.  On the day of the raid Trotsky had left for the Caucasus; but several leaders of the Opposition, Preobrazhensky, Mrachkovsky, and Serebryakov, attempted to come forward with a refutation and declared that they assumed full responsibility for the "printing shop" and the publication of the Platform.  All three were immediately expelled from the party and one of them, Mrachkovsky, was imprisoned. ___6 This was the first time that such punishment was inflicted on prominent men of the Opposition.
Deutscher, Isaac. The Prophet Unarmed. London, New York: Oxford Univ. Press, 1959, p. 356-357
 
            The 15th congress of 1927 was in session for three weeks; and it was wholly preoccupied with the schism.  The Opposition had not a single delegate with voting rights.  Trotsky did not attend; he had not even asked to be admitted in order to make a personal appeal against his expulsion.  Unanimously the congress declared that expression of the Opposition's views was incompatible with membership in the party.
Deutscher, Isaac. The Prophet Unarmed. London, New York: Oxford Univ. Press, 1959, p. 385
 
            Within a few days the printing shop was raided by the GPU, and its alleged founder, Mrachkovsky a noted partisan leader of the Civil War, was expelled from the Party and arrested [in 1927].
Ulam, Adam. Stalin; The Man and his Era. New York: Viking Press, 1973, p. 283
 
            In October 1927, that is, two months before the 15th Congress, the Central Committee of the Party announced a general Party discussion, and the fight began.  Its result was truly lamentable for the bloc of Trotskyites and Zinovievites: 724,000 Party members voted for the policy of the Central Committee; 4000, or less than 1%, for the bloc of Trotskyites and Zinovievites.  The anti-Party bloc was completely routed.  The overwhelming majority of the Party members were unanimous in rejecting the platform of the bloc.
Commission of the Central Committee of the C.P.S.U. (B.), Ed. History of the CPSU (Bolsheviks): Short Course. Moscow: FLPH, 1939, p. 285
 
            [In 1927] The united opposition did not waver.  It advanced with a new load of ammunition....  From this it advanced to a new method of warfare.  Its speakers would appear at various party meetings and without authority address the audiences.  This was met by furious counter-blows.  Reprisals, arrests followed.  Bands of whistlers were organized to disrupt such gatherings.  Strings of automobiles would suddenly appear and blow their sirens.
Levine, Isaac Don.  Stalin.  New York: Cosmopolitan Book Corporation, c1931, p. 258
 
            [In an article entitled "They Have Sunk to the Depths" Stalin stated] The open demonstration of the Trotskyists in the streets on November 7, 1927, was a turning-point, when the Trotskyist organization showed that it was breaking not only with the Party, but also with the Soviet regime.
            This demonstration was preceded by a whole series of anti-Party and anti-Soviet acts: the forcible seizure of a government building for a meeting (the Moscow Higher Technical School), the organization of underground printing plants, etc.
Stalin, Joseph. Works. Moscow: Foreign Languages Pub. House, 1952, Vol. 11, p. 327
 
            The Trotskyites, by themselves, were never a big force in our Party.  Call to mind the last discussion on Trotskyism in our Party in 1927.  This was a genuine party referendum.  Out of 854,000 Party members, 730,000 members voted at that time.  Among them 724,000 Party members voted for the Bolsheviks, for the Central Committee of the Party, against the Trotskyites, and 4000 Party members, or about one half of 1%, voted for the Trotskyites, while 2600 members of the Party refrained from voting.
            Add to this the fact that many out of this number became disillusioned with Trotskyism and left it, and you get a conception of the insignificance of the Trotskyite forces. 
Stalin, Joseph.  Mastering Bolshevism. San Francisco: Proletarian Publishers, 1972, p. 46
 
TROTSKYITES ARE READMITTED TO PARTY
 
January 11, 1929--is unlikely that the Trotskyists will be allowed to return or resume office in the near future, save at the price of complete submission.  Some of them, including, Kamenev, Zinoviev, Sokolnikov, and Pyatakov, already have submitted and received responsible positions.
Duranty, Walter.  Duranty Reports Russia. New York: The Viking Press, 1934, p. 161
 
            If Lenin had been the Caesar of the Soviet Union, then Stalin was becoming its Augustus, it's "augmenter," in every respect.  Stalin's building grew and grew.  But he could not be blind to the fact that there were still people who refused to believe in this visible, tangible work, and who had more faith in Trotsky's theses than in the evidence of their eyes.
            Even amongst the very men in whom Stalin was a good friend and whom he called to high positions, there were some who had more faith in Trotsky's word than Stalin's work.  They hindered this work, resisted it, sabotaged.  They were called to account and their guilt was established.  Stalin pardoned them and reinstated them in important positions.
            What must have been Stalin's thoughts and feelings when he found out that these, his colleagues and friends, despite the patent success of his work, still remained attached to his enemy Trotsky, were intriguing secretly with him and trying to sabotage his own work, the Stalin State, in order to bring back their old leader to the country?
Feuchtwanger, Lion.  Moscow, 1937. New York: The Viking Press, 1937, p. 104-105
 
            Some of the disgraced left-wingers, who had been associated with Trotsky, were also in favor of 'decisive measures' in the countryside, and supported Stalin.  Repentant declarations were submitted by Pyatakov, Krestinsky, Antonov-Ovseyenko, Radek, Preobrazhensky, and others and they were readmitted to the party.  Pyatakov became the head of the State Bank and later deputy Commissar for Heavy Industry.
Volkogonov, Dmitri. Stalin: Triumph and Tragedy. New York: Grove Weidenfeld, 1991, p. 164
 
            The real situation was quite different.  Even at its height, in the mid-1920s, Trotsky had very few supporters in the party.  After his deportation some of them remained loyal, but they amounted to only a few hundred at the most.  Some felt that Trotsky had long given up fighting for socialism and was conducting a personal vendetta verging on anti-Sovietism.  Others condemned Trotskyism and gave up political life altogether.  Those whom Stalin 'forgave' and permitted to return to Moscow--including Rakovsky, Preobrazhensky, Muralov, Sosnovsky, Smirnov, Boguslavsky and Radek--were given third-rate jobs in the economy and education ministries, but none of them was allowed back into the political fold.
            ... But he [Stalin] knew that deep in their hearts they were not reconciled, and that to him was a great danger.
Volkogonov, Dmitri. Stalin: Triumph and Tragedy. New York: Grove Weidenfeld, 1991, p. 261
 
            As he moved against the right, Stalin continued to strike at the left.  In February 1929 Trotsky, who refused to abjure political activity, was expelled from the Soviet Union.
            But meanwhile, the shift leftwards had begun to win over most of the more distinguished Bolsheviks who had followed Trotsky.  First Pyatakov and Krestinsky, then even the theorist of the left, Preobrazhensky, and a whole range of others almost as well known, such as Radek, made their peace with Stalin and were readmitted to the party.  They felt, and in a sense were justified in feeling, that their view had triumphed over the Bukharinites.  Zinoviev and most of his followers were also readmitted to the party.  Except for Zinoviev, Kamenev and Sokolnikov they were of little weight.  But Pyatakovs & Krestinskys had considerable value in the eyes of the second level of the party.
Conquest, Robert. Stalin: Breaker of Nations. New York, New York: Viking, 1991, p. 151
 
            Metigovsky, the director of the Saratov Raion power plant, is glad that Smirnov [expelled from the Party can 1927 for his ties to Trotsky, reinstated in 1930]....
Siegelbaum and Sokolov.  Stalinism As a Way of Life. New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, c2000, p. 118
 
            An early Trotskyite, he [Smirnov] was arrested, released in 1929, and made people's commissar of post and telegraph, but he was rearrested in 1933.  In 1936 he was a codefendant in the Zinoviev-Kamenev trial and was shot.
Laqueur, Walter. Stalin: The Glasnost Revelations. New York: Scribner's, c1990, p. 136
 
ILLEGAL UNDERGROUND TROTSKYIST GROUP DISCOVERED
 
February 1, 1929--authorities recently discovered that an active Trotskyist organization in Moscow was carrying on a vigorous propaganda in Moscow and other urban centers by means of hand bills and other methods, particularly among Communist youth and the Army.  The organization had arranged for an "underground railroad" for the transmission of letters to and from the exiled leaders and to sympathetic newspapers in Berlin, Riga, and elsewhere abroad.
Duranty, Walter.  Duranty Reports Russia. New York: The Viking Press, 1934, p. 163
 
Despite the clearly counter revolutionary character of their aims and methods, the offenders were treated with comparative leniency and deported to Siberia instead of being brought to trial on a capital charge.
Duranty, Walter.  Duranty Reports Russia. New York: The Viking Press, 1934, p. 163
 
STALIN IS INDISPENSABLE AND HE KNOWS IT
 
January 18, 1931 -- because his legend has grown too great, too real, he has become flesh and bone of the living organism; the horse and writer are transformed into Centaur; he is indispensable and they cannot remove him without a risk they dare not take.  That, today, is the last secret of Stalin's power; should opposition grow strong and noisy, he can meet it in the final instance, as Lenin once met it in the days of Brest-Litovsk, by the threat to retire and leave them to their own devices.  Which they cannot bring themselves to accept.  And he knows it, as Lenin knew it, and they know it,....
Duranty, Walter.  Duranty Reports Russia. New York: The Viking Press, 1934, p. 166
 
STALIN EXPLAINS WHY HE BECAME A REVOLUTIONARY
 
In the case of Stalin, this remote reticent Lord of all the Russians, he gave me the key himself.  He said he became a revolutionary because he could not stand the Jesuitic repression and martinet intolerance of the Orthodox church seminary where he spent some years.
            He had in him a fire of revolt against tyranny and would brook no master.
            Their Orthodox church, which was, in his land of superstitious peasants, a valuable tool of government.
Duranty, Walter.  Duranty Reports Russia. New York: The Viking Press, 1934, p. 167
 
            The Marxist conception is a scientific one.  It becomes confused with the scientific conception.  The Revolutionary always remains an apostle and a soldier, but he is, above all, a scholar who goes out into the highways and byways...
            It made me smile to hear the German writer Ludwig ask Stalin, as he did two years ago: "Perhaps you were ill-treated by your parents in your childhood, to have become such a Revolutionary?"
            The excellent Ludwig still firmly believed in the old adage of the wisdom of nations, which lays it down that, in order to be a Revolutionary, one must be vicious or embittered, and from one's earliest youth, have been beaten by one's parents.  A poor argument, too paltry to be harmful.  No doubt individuals and the masses are egged on by misfortune, but Revolutionaries are “far beyond any small personal grievances on the road to collective progress.  Stalin replied patiently to Ludwig: "Not at all.  My parents did not maltreat me.  The reason that I became a Revolutionary is simply because I thought the Marxists were right."
Barbusse, Henri. Stalin. New York:  The Macmillan company, 1935, p. 15
 
 
STALIN VOLUNTEERS TO RESIGN AFTER LENIN’S CRITICISM
 
So young Joseph -- Soso, they called him....
            Lenin criticized Stalin.  Stalin told this himself three years ago in open Congress of the Communist Party, and said quietly: "I told you then and I repeated now, that I am ready to retire if you wish."
Duranty, Walter.  Duranty Reports Russia. New York: The Viking Press, 1934, p. 168
 
            When Stalin came to speak [before the Central Committee in October 1927] he declared that he had twice offered his resignation as General Secretary, but that the Party had rejected it on both occasions.
Chamberlin, William Henry.  Soviet Russia. Boston: Little, Brown, 1930, p. 96
 
            When Lenin's testament became public property through having been spread furtively by word-of-mouth, Stalin submitted his resignation,...
Ludwig, Emil, Stalin. New York, New York: G. P. Putnam's sons, 1942, p. 95
 
            For nearly a year while he lived Lenin did nothing with his statement and it was only after his death that it was presented to the Party.  When it was presented, Stalin offered his resignation but the Party, including Trotsky, would not accept it.
Davis, Jerome.  Behind Soviet Power. New York, N. Y.: The Readers' Press, Inc., c1946, p. 25
 
            Stalin consequently offered to resign but the Central Committee refused to accept his resignation.
Cameron, Kenneth Neill. Stalin, Man of Contradiction. Toronto: NC Press, c1987, p. 49
 
            It must have come as a relief for him [Stalin] when it was decided that the Congress would be bypassed and the notes would not be published.  Nevertheless, when the newly elected Central Committee met, he offered his resignation.  He was probably confident that those he had carefully selected for election would not accept it.  In any event the committee, including Trotsky, voted unanimously not to accept his resignation.
Grey, Ian. Stalin, Man of History. London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1979, p. 197
 
            Right from the first session of the Central Committee, after the 13th Congress, I asked to be released from the obligations of the General Secretaryship.  The Congress itself examined the question.  Each delegation examined the question, and every delegation, including Trotsky, Kamenev and Zinoviev, voted unanimously in favor of Stalin remaining at his post.  What could I do then?  Abandon my post?  Such a thing is not in my character....  At the end of one year I again asked to be set free and I was again forced to remain at my post.  What could I do then?
Stalin, Joseph.  Stalin's Kampf. New York: Howell, Soskin & Company, c1940, p. 244
 
            [In 1927 Stalin stated], I asked the first plenary session of the Central Committee right after the Thirteenth Congress to relieve me of my duties as secretary-general.  The congress discussed the question.  Each delegation discussed the question.  And unanimously they all, including Trotsky, Kamenev, and Zinoviev, made it binding upon Stalin to remain in his post.  What could I do?  Run away from the post?  This is not in my character.  I never ran away from any post and I have no right to run away.  That would be desertion.  I do not regard myself as a free man, and I obey party orders.  A year later I again submitted my resignation, but again I was bound to remain.  What could I do?
Levine, Isaac Don.  Stalin.  New York: Cosmopolitan Book Corporation, c1931, p. 281
 
            It is said that in that "will" Comrade Lenin suggested to the congress that in view of Stalin's "rudeness" it should consider the question of putting another comrade in Stalin's place as General Secretary.  That is quite true.  Yes, comrades, I am rude to those who grossly and perfidiously wreck and split the Party.  I have never concealed this and do not conceal it now.  Perhaps some mildness is needed in the treatment of splitters, but I am a bad hand at that.  At the very first meeting of the plenum of the Central Committee after the 13th Congress I asked the plenum of the Central Committee to release me from my duties as General Secretary.  The congress itself discussed this question.  It was discussed by each delegation separately, and all the delegations unanimously, including Trotsky, Kamenev and Zinoviev, obliged Stalin to remain at his post.
            What could I do?  Desert my post?  That is not in my nature; I have never deserted any post, and I have no right to do so, for that would be desertion.  As I have already said before, I am not a free agent, and when the Party imposes an obligation upon me, I must obey.
            A year later I again put in a request to the plenum to release me, but I was again obliged to remain at my post.
            What else could I do?
            As regards publishing the "will," the congress decided not to publish it, since it was addressed to the congress and was not intended for publication....
Stalin, Joseph.  Works. Moscow: Foreign Languages Pub. House, 1952, Vol. 10, p. 180-181
 
            After the congress [May 1924], when the leading bodies of the party were being constituted, Stalin, referring to Lenin's testament, demonstratively declined to accept the post of general secretary.  But Zinoviev and Kamenev, and after them the majority of the central committee members, persuaded him to withdraw his resignation....
Medvedev, Roy. Let History Judge. New York: Columbia University Press, 1989, p. 85
 
            The United Opposition suffered total organizational and ideological defeat at the 15th Party Congress.  At the very first Central Committee plenum after that Congress, Stalin offered to resign as general secretary....  Addressing the Central Committee, he said:
            "I think that until recently there were circumstances that put the party in the position of needing me in this post as a person who was fairly rough in his dealings, to constitute a certain antidote to the opposition.... Now the opposition has not only been smashed; it has been expelled from the party.  And still we have the recommendation of Lenin, which in my opinion ought to be put into effect.  Therefore I ask the plenum to relieve me of the post of general secretary.  I assure you, comrades, that from this the party only stands to gain."
            At Stalin's insistence this proposal was put to a vote.  His resignation was rejected virtually unanimously (with one abstention).
            The noisy battle with the United Left Opposition had barely died down when a fight began with the so-called right deviation.
Medvedev, Roy. Let History Judge. New York: Columbia University Press, 1989, p. 183
 
            When Stalin heard about Lenin's letter, he announced his resignation.  Had it been accepted, things might well have been different.  He had made the right decision, as any Bolshevik in his position ought to have done, but it was not a determined act.  As a matter of fact, he twice offered his resignation in the 1920s.  The second time, after the 15th Congress in December 1927, he behaved more categorically.  The Trotskyite-Zinovievite Opposition had been defeated and the Congress noted this formally.  At the first plenum after the congress, Stalin submitted a request to the Central Committee:
            "I think recent circumstances have forced the party to have me in this post, as someone severe enough to provide the antidote to the opposition.  Now the opposition has been defeated and expelled from the party.  We have Lenin's instructions moreover and I think it is now time to carry them out.  I therefore request the plenum to release me from the post of General Secretary.  I assure you, comrades, the party can only gain from this."
            By this time, however, his authority had risen and he was seen in the party as the man who had fought for its unity and who had come out against various factionalists.  His resignation was again rejected.
Volkogonov, Dmitri. Stalin: Triumph and Tragedy. New York: Grove Weidenfeld, 1991, p. 93
 
            Lenin's Letter disappeared from the party's view for decades.  It was not published in Leninskii sbornik ('Lenin Miscellany'), despite Stalin's promise to do so.  To be sure, the Letter did surface a few times in the 1920s in connection with the internal party struggle.  It was even published in Bulletin No. 30 of the 15th Party Congress (printrun 10,000), stamped 'for party members only', and was distributed to provincial committees, Communist factions of the trade unions central committee, and part of it was printed in Pravda on November 2, 1927.
Volkogonov, Dmitri. Stalin: Triumph and Tragedy. New York: Grove Weidenfeld, 1991, p. 96
 
            The Committee decided that the Testament should not be read to the Congress (nor be published), and it was merely read to closed meetings of delegations from each province, with the comments of the Committee to the effect that Lenin had been ill and Stalin had proved satisfactory.  Stalin submitted his resignation as General Secretary, which was unanimously rejected.
Conquest, Robert. Stalin: Breaker of Nations. New York, New York: Viking, 1991, p. 111
 
            The 13th Congress of the Party took place in June, 1924 and shortly afterwards at a plenary session of the Central Committee; Stalin begged to be relieved of his duties.  Trotsky, Kamenev, and Zinoviev and all the delegates of the local parties asked him to remain.  Thus he remained by the will of the Party.  Next year Stalin repeated this gesture, knowing full well that he would not be taken at his word.
Graham, Stephen. Stalin. Port Washington, New York: Kennikat Press, 1970, p. 93
 
            On the basis of Lenin's testament he [Stalin] handed in his resignation but was again elected as head of the Party....
Ludwig, Emil.  Leaders of Europe. London: I. Nicholson and Watson Ltd., 1934, p. 365
 
            At the first Central Committee plenum after the 15th Congress, evidently in order to free his hands for the next stage of the struggle, Stalin unexpectedly asked to be relieved of his duties in the Party leadership:
            "I believe that until recently there were conditions confronting the party which made it necessary for me to be in this post [i.e., that of general secretary]--a man who tended to be rather blunt as a kind of anecdote to the Opposition.  But now these conditions have disappeared....  Now the Opposition has not only been defeated but also expelled from the Party.  And we do have the instructions of Lenin, which in my view must be put into effect.  Therefore I ask the Plenum to relieve me of the post of general secretary, I assure you, comrades, the Party will only gain."
            At Stalin's insistence this proposal was put to a vote, and it was rejected unanimously (with one abstention).
Medvedev, Roy. On Stalin and Stalinism. New York: Oxford University Press, 1979, p. 59
 
            At the First Central Committee Plenum after the 15th Congress Stalin offered to resign as general secretary.  Addressing the joint meeting, he said:
            "I think that until recently there were circumstances that put the party in the position of needing me in this post as a person who was fairly rough in his dealings, to constitute a certain antidote to the opposition....  Now the opposition has not only been smashed, it has been expelled from the party.  And still we have the recommendation of Lenin, which in my opinion ought to be put into effect.  Therefore I ask the Plenum to relieve me of the post of general secretary.  I assure you, comrades, that from this the party only stands to gain."
            Stalin insisted that his proposal should be put to the Plenum.  As he well knew it would be, his resignation was rejected by a vote that was unanimous except for one abstention.  At a single blow, Stalin had buried Lenin's Testament and secured an overwhelming vote of confidence to justify any measures he might now take.
Bullock, Alan. Hitler and Stalin: Parallel Lives. New York: Knopf, 1992, p. 205
 
            Following the 1924 13th Congress, Stalin offered his resignation to the Central Committee.   But it was almost a foregone conclusion that it would be rejected.   For Zinoviev and Kamenev, Stalin was still an indispensable ally: Who would keep Trotsky and the Oppositionists in check?   Trotsky did not want Stalin out since the job might go to a follower of Zinoviev-Kamenev.   Other members kept their peace.   And so Stalin was confirmed.
Ulam, Adam. Stalin; the Man and his Era. New York: Viking Press, 1973, p. 239
 
            [At the 13th Congress in May 1924] Stalin nonchalantly offered to resign his post in conformity with the testament.
Levine, Isaac Don.  Stalin.  New York: Cosmopolitan Book Corporation, c1931, p. 237
 
            His health, too, was poor.  Feeling humiliated, Stalin followed his usual course: he requested release from his duties.  In a letter to the Central Committee on 19 Aug 1924 he pleaded that “honorable and sincere” work with Zinoviev and Kamenev was no longer possible.  What he needed, he claimed, was a period of convalescence.  But he also asked the Central committee to remove his name from the Politburo, Orgbureau, and Secretariat:...
            “When the time [of convalescence] is at an end, I ask to be assigned either Turukhansk or Yakutsk Province or somewhere abroad in some unobtrusive posting....
            He would be going back to Turukhansk as an ordinary provincial militant and not as the Central Committee leader he had been in 1913.  Stalin was requesting a more severe demotion than even the Testament had specified.
Service, Robert. Stalin. Cambridge, Mass.: Belknap Press of Harvard Univ. Press, 2005, p. 223-224        
 
After all that had taken place during the preceding months, the Testament could not have been a surprise to Stalin.  Nevertheless he took it as a cruel blow.
Trotsky, Leon.  Stalin. New York: Harper and Brothers Publishers, 1941, p. 375