THE REAL STALIN BOOKLET SERIES
[In 10 Parts]
 
[This series is a  primography in which the prime events usually associated with an individual are discussed as opposed to a biography in which someone’s life in general is outlined]
 
[PART 1]

 
VAST STRENGTH OF SU
AGAINST ANTI-SEMITISM
STALIN WAS AGAINST ANTI-SEMITISM
STALIN IS GOOD LEADER
STALIN WAS GOOD DEBATER
GROUPS ARE NEEDED TO MAKE DECISIONS
DEPRESSING MILITARY STATUS OF WWI
AMERICAN ENGINEERS SUPPORT 5 YEAR PLAN
FAMINE DID NOT OCCUR
WISE TO SHIFT INDUSTRY TO INTERIOR
SET UP TERRITORY FOR THE JEWS
SOVIET MILITARY BUDGET GREW DRASTICALLY TO CONFRONT HITLER
SOVIETS TREAT WOMEN AS EQUALS
FIFTH COLUMNISTS
TRAITOR CHAMBERLAIN
VICTORS WRITE HISTORY
ENGINEER AND SPECIALIST SABOTAGE
MENNONITES PERSUADED TO LEAVE SU
TREATMENT OF WRECKERS
KIROV’S KILLING CHANGED ALL
FOREIGN AGENT INFILTRATION
ONE DEFENDANT DENOUNCES ANOTHER
KAMENEV ADMITS GUILT
ZINOVIEV DROPPED BECAUSE HE WOULD NOT TAKE ORDERS
PYATAKOV IMPLICATES TROTSKY WITH HESS
REPORTERS STATE DEFENDANT’S GUILT
GPU HEAD IS TRAITOR
TUKHACHEVSKY AND OTHER GENERALS WORKED WITH HITLER
TORTURE NOT USED ON GENERALS
YAGODA AND OTHER GPU PUNISHED JUSTIFIABLY
WHAT IS A PURGE
TRANSFERRING PARTY LEADERS
WILSON BORROWED FROM BOLSHEVIKS
LENIN WANTED PEACE AT ALL COSTS
SU AND GERMANY TREATED AS OUTLAWS
SU WANTS TO SIGN PEACE PACTS
SU AND MEXICO ONLY ONES TO AID SPAIN
BRITISH AIDED HITLER
CHURCHILL SUPPORTS SU MOVING INTO POLAND
SU DESERVED PART OF POLAND AND TAKING IT WAS JUSTIFIED
POLAND TREATS JEWS BADLY
EASTERN SUPPORT FOR SU MARCHING INTO POLAND
PROTECTING JEWS
PRIESTS WELCOME BOLSHEVIKS
PEOPLE EXPERIENCE FREEDOM WITH FURY
FINNISH INDEPENDENCE CAME FROM BOLSHEVIKS
FINLAND SERVED THE NAZIS
BOLSHEVIKS GAVE FINNS GOOD TERMS
EASTERN EUROPE SUPPORT FOR RED ARMY MARCHING IN
RUSSIAN-GERMAN NON-AGGRESSION PACT WAS NEEDED
SELFLESS AID TO OTHER COUNTRIES
AID TO GREEK GUERILLAS
CATHOLIC CHURCH SERVES REACTION
SOME CLERGY ARE PROGRESSIVE
ANTI-RELIGION BATTLE SHOULD BE KEPT ON POLITICAL PLANE
STALIN INSISTS ART REFLECT REALITY
HOXHA ATTACKS REVISIONISTS
STALIN READ CENSORED BOOKS
BOLSHEVIKS SUPERIOR TO MENSHEVIKS
TROTSKY OPPOSED BOLSHEVIKS
LENIN CHOSE STALIN TO SOLVE PROBLEMS
STALIN READ A LOT AND WROTE WHEN HE COULD
KAMENEV WAS TOO OFTEN A MENSHEVIK
STALIN PROPOSED TROTSKY BE ADMITTED TO THE PARTY
TROTSKY JOINED PARTY WITH ULTERIOR MOTIVES
STALIN SUPPORTS SOCIALISM IN ONE COUNTRY
STALIN AND TROTSKY CLASH OVER VOTING FOR THE REVOLUTION
LENIN DEMANDS ZINOVIEV AND KAMENEV BE EXPELLED
STALIN IS ONE OF THE MAJOR LEADERS OF REVOLT IN LENINGRAD
STALIN IS ONE OF TOP REVOLUTIONARY LEADERS
LENIN SENT STALIN WHEN HE WANTED A GOOD NEGOTIATOR
LENIN FOUGHT TROTSKY’S EVISCERATING THE PARTY
TROTSKY FOUGHT LENIN ON CONCLUDING PEACE
VAST EXPROPRIATIONS BEGIN IN 1918
DESCRIPTION OF BAD CONDITIONS AFTER THE REVOLUTION
TROTSKY’S HUGE EGO AND NOT A TEAM PLAYER
STALIN AND TROTSKY CLASH EARLY ON OVER USING CZARIST GENERALS
STALIN TOOK OVER GENERALSHIP WITH GOOD REASON
STALIN ALSO SETS UP CHEKA CONTROL
STALIN SELECTED THE BEST PEOPLE FOR THE JOB
KILLING BOLSHEVIKS ACTIVATED THE CHEKA AND TERROR
STALIN AND TROTSKY CLASH OVER MILITARY TACTICS
LENIN MISTAKENLY ADVOCATES ATTACK TOWARD WARSAW
STALIN REJECTS FILTH, IMMORALITY, AND SEXUAL CORRUPTION
WHAT THE RED ARMY FACED DURING THE INTERVENTION
FAMINE WAS CAUSED BY THE INTERVENTION NOT WAR COMMUNISM
TROTSKY TRIES TO MILITARIZE THE TRADE UNIONS
KRONSTADT AND RETREAT TO NEP
DESCRIPTION OF HOW BAD WHITE CONTROLLED AREAS WERE
WHAT IS NEP
STALIN IS NOT DICTORIAL BUT IS OPEN-MINDED
TESTAMENT DOES NOT DENOUNCE STALIN ON IDEOLOGY
GOOD JOB UNITING MANY NATIONALITIES
BUKHARIN AND TROTSKY OUTSIDE THE MAINSTREAM
STALIN REJECTS TURNING PEASANTS AGAINST PROLETARIAT AND FIGHTS TROTSKY INSTEAD
STALIN’S PATIENCE WITH TROTSKY WAS TREMENDOUS
STALIN AND LENIN OPPOSE TROTSKY
PERMANENT REVOLUTION THEORY IS BOGUS AND OPPOSED BY STALIN
STALIN SUPERIOR TO TROTSKY
STALIN DENOUNCED FOR RECRUITING
TROTSKY DROVE ZINOVIEV AND KAMENEV TO STALIN
BUKHARIN, RYKOV, AND TOMSKY WENT TO TROTSKY’S SIDE
SEVERAL EARLY SABOTAGE TRIALS LISTED
ZINOVIEV/KAMENEV TRIALS BRIEFLY OUTLINED
KIROV’S KILLING WAS FIRST SINCE 1918
THE TRIALS WERE JUSTIFIED, GENUINE AND WHAT HAPPENED AT THEM
NOT JUST RUSSIANS CONFESSED AT THE TRIALS
ALL THE CONSPIRATORS PUT TOGETHER FORMED A SMALL PART OF THE POPULATION
DEMOCRATIC CENTRALISM AND THE POLITBURO
STALIN SAYS IRON DISCIPLINE AND UNITY DOES NOT EXCLUDE CRITICISM
STALIN DID NOT RULE BY IMPOSING HIS WILL ON THE MASSES BUT BY PERSONALITY
STALIN’S STYLE OF LEADING DIFFERS FROM LENIN’S
BOLSHEVIKS RULE BY MASS SUPPORT
UNDER STALIN STUDENTS GOT INTO UNIVERSITIES BY ABILITY ONLY NOT WEALTH
STALIN REIGNS IN COLLECTIVIZATION EXCESS
THE HIGH COST OF INDUSTRIALIZATION
COMINTERN WAS NECESSARY REGARDLESS
STALIN WORKED VERY HARD AND SOUGHT OTHERS ADVICE
STALIN SIGNED WITH HITLER BECAUSE OF ALLIED REJECTION
SOVIETS BANKED ON CAPITALIST DISAGREEMENTS
STALIN TRIED TO AID THE WORLD’S WORKERS
STALIN’S AIDES ARE NOT YES MEN
STALIN FELT FULLY JUSTIFIED IN SIGNING THE PACT
STALIN MOVED INTO POLISH TERRITORY WHEN JUSTIFIED
SU INVADED BY THE BIGGEST ARMY EVER
STALIN WAS ONLY SURPRISED AS TO THE EXACT TIME OF THE INVASION
CHURCHILL COMPLIMENTS STALIN
PEOPLE COMPLIMENT STALIN’S MIND AND COMPOSURE
STALIN FEELS THE COMINTERN MUST BE DISBANDED
SU INVADED BY 14 COUNTRIES, INCLUDING  FINLAND
SU INVADED BY MANY COUNTRIES IN WWII
TROTSKY AND TUKHACHEVSKY CAUSE POLISH DEBACLE
WHITE ARMIES WERE LED BY PRE-FASCISTS
RAMZIN GETS A LIGHT SENTENCE AND REDEEMS HIMSELF
TROTSKY HEADED THE NAZI 5TH COLUMN IN THE SU
TROTSKY HAD A HUGE EGO
TROTSKY ATTACKED LENIN
TROTSKY ALLIED HIMSELF WITH EX CZARIST OFFICERS, SUBVERSIVES, AND SR’S
TROTSKY AND LEFT OPPOSITION ARE SUBVERSIVE
PARTY OUTLAWS FACTIONS AND DEMOTES TROTSKYISTS
TROTSKY TRIED TO SUCCEED LENIN AND FAILED BADLY
TROTSKY DENIES THERE IS A TESTAMENT
TROTSKY OPPOSED STALIN IN THE 1920S FROM WITHIN
OPPOSITION NEVER HAS ANY SIGNIFICANT SUPPORT
GREAT FREEDOM GIVEN TO THE OPPOSITION
TROTSKY TRIED TO TAKE OVER IN 1927
TROTSKY’S ATTEMPTED TAKEOVER COLLAPSES
TROTSKY IS EXILED IN COMFORT
BUKHARIN SWITCHES FROM LEFT TO RIGHT LEADER
TROTSKY WAS DEPORTED RATHER THAN IMPRISONED
HITLER PRAISES TROTSKY’S BOOK
PYATAKOV SPEAKS AGAINST TROTSKY
SHESTOV SPEAKS AGAINST SEDOV
TROTSKYITES MEET WITH SUBVERSIVE GROUPS
TROTSKYITE MRACHKOVSKY ADVOCATES TERROR AGAINST THE GOVERNMENT
ANTI-STALIN GROUPS FORM UNDER TROTSKY’S LEADERSHIP
KAMENEV UNHAPPY THAT STALIN WAS NOT KILLED
SU REPEATEDLY SEEKS TO UNITE ANTI-FASCIST NATIONS
TROTSKY MAKES HIS PEOPLE PAWNS OF THE GERMANS AND JAPANESE
TROTSKY TALKS WITH HESS AND WORKS WITH NAZIS
NEW EVIDENCE WARRANTS A SECOND TRIAL FOR ZINOVIEV AND KAMENEV
TOMSKY EXPOSES GENERALS AGREEING TO SURRENDER TO GERMANS
GUNTHER SAYS DEFENDANTS DID NOT WHIMPER BUT ARGUED
DAVIES COMPLIMENTS VYSHINSKY’S DEMEANOR AT THE TRIAL
DAVIES SAYS NEARLY ALL OBSERVERS AGREED THERE WAS A PLOT
MILITARY TRIAL KEPT SECRET BECAUSE OF SECRET INFORMATION
BUKHARIN REJECTS PEOPLE DEFENDING HIS CRIMINAL ACTS
BEALS RESIGNS FROM COMMISSION DENOUNCING ITS BIAS
STALIN OFFERED FINLAND VERY GOOD TERMS
STALIN EXTRACTED THE MINIMUM FROM FINLAND
STALIN IS NOT A DICTATOR
CRITICS OF SU GET THEIR INFO FROM SOVIET SOURCES
CRITICISM IS ENCOURAGED
SU CONSTITUTION GUARANTEES A JOB WHICH CAPITALISTS DON’T
SU CONSTITUTION GUARANTEES A RIGHT TO REST
SU CONSTITUTION GUARATEES SECURE RETIREMENT AND MEDICAL CARE
SU CONSTITUTION GUARANTEES FREE EDUCATION AND STIPENDS
SU CONSTITUTION GUARANTEES WOMEN EQUAL RIGHTS AND CHILD CARE
SU CONSTITUTION GUARANTEES EQUAL RIGHTS FOR ALL RACES AND NATIONALITIES
SU CONSTITUTION GUARANTEES SEPARATION OF CHURCH AND STATE
SU CONSTITUTION GUARANTEES FREEDOM OF PRESS AND SPEECH TO WORKING CLASS
LENIN PREACHED DEMOCRATIC CENTRALISM
LENIN SAYS A PARTY MUST PURGE AND STRUGGLE
LENIN SAYS PARTY MUST ENGAGE IN LEGAL PARLIAMENTS AND ILLEGAL WORK
TROTSKY’S EGO CAUSED HIM TO OPPOSE DEMOCRATIC CENTRALISM
TROTSKY DENOUNCED LENIN FOR BEING A REACTIONARY DICTATOR
BOLSHEVIKS TOOK OVER WITH VERY LITTLE VIOLENCE
OTHER PARTIES WERE ALLOWED TO OPERATE WHEN BOLSHEVIKS BEGAN
EXPROPRIATIONS PROCEEDED SLOWLY AT FIRST AFTER THE REVOLUTION
SU BECAME ONE-PARTY DICTATORSHIP IN SUM. 1918 BECAUSE OF ATTACKS
MIRBACH MURDER LED TO SUPPRESSION OF OTHER PARTIES
STALIN’S ANALYSES ARE BETTER THEN HIS OPPONENTS
PRIOR TO KIROV KILLING THERE WAS NO CRACKDOWN
STALIN SAVED THE SOVIET PEOPLE BY PUSHING THEM
TROTSKY HAD TIME TO GET TO LENIN’S FUNERAL
STALIN OPPOSED EXPELLING TROTSKY FROM THE PARTY
ECONOMIC ACCOMPLISHMENTS AND INDUSTRIAL PROGRESS IN THE 30’S
GROUPS ALLIED AGAINST SU WERE RUTHLESS AND DETERMINED
TROTSKY  ADVOCATED KILLING STALIN
NO EVIDENCE PROVING STALIN KILLED TROTSKY
RIGHT OF SECESSION IS UNQUALIFIED
KAGANOVICH SAYS ALL POWER IS IN CLIQUE’S HANDS IN CAPITALIST COUNTRIES
SU DICTATORSHIP SAVED THE SU AND THE CAPITALIST DEMOCRACIES
INTELLECTUALS AND SCIENTISTS IN SU ARE FREE
PERSONAL PROPERTY RIGHTS OF THOSE IN COLLECTIVES
STALIN SAYS THOSE WITH PARTY CARDS ABUSE THE PRIVILEGE
TRAITS OF GOOD PARTY LEADERS
CHURCHILL SUPPORTS SU AGAINST NAZIS
LINDBERGH SUPPORTS NAZIS AGAINST SU
MACARTHUR PROFUSELY PRAISES THE RED ARMY’S DEFENSE AND COUNTERATTACK
LEADERS COMPLIMENT THE RED ARMY
SU DID NOT SOCIALIZE EASTERN EUROPE WHEN IT COULD HAVE
LENIN FIRST WANTED TO EQUALIZE INCOMES
SU ABOLISHED PRIVATE PROPERTY AND EXPLOITATION
ALL WANT TO LIVE IN LUXURY WITHOUT WORK AND THAT THE SU ABOLISHES
SU ELIMINATES LEISURE WITHOUT WORK BY OWNING PRIVATE PROPERTY
WEALTHY SOVIET ELITE DOES NOT EXIST
SOCIALISM RESTORED NATIONAL MEANING AND REMOVED LEISURE CLASS
STALIN’S FOCUS ON HEAVY INDUSTRY OVER CONSUMER GOODS SAVED THE DAY
SU DICTATORSHIP WAS NECESSARY AND SUCCESSFUL FOR WORKERS
STALIN FOLLOWED LENIN LOYALLY
STALIN BELIEVES DECISIONS SHOULD BE MADE BY GROUPS
WHY DID THEY CONFESS
SU WAS RIGHT ABOUT THE TRIALS AND HOW THEY PREPARED FOR NAZI INVASION
SU WOULD NOT HAVE CONVICTED FRIENDS UNLESS THE EVIDENCE WAS OVERWHELMING
WHY THE GENERALS’ TRIAL WAS NOT PUBLIC
TROTSKY’S SUPPORTERS DO FAKE RECANTATION
TERRIBLE CONDITIONS BEFORE THE REVOLUTION
AVERAGE RUSSIAN THINKS HE IS FREER THAN AMERICANS
RUSSIAN MASSES APPLAUDED WHEN THE DEFENDANTS WERE SHOT
SU-NAZI TREATY INVOLVED ECONOMIC EXCHANGES AND TRADE
HITLER WAS NO FOOL
KREMLIN PREPARED FOR WAR FOR MANY YEARS
NEP HAD TO GO
1921 FAMINE CAUSED BY DROUGHT NOT SOCIALISM
1921 FAMINE WAS BEATEN
LENIN NOT AN ABSOLUTE DICTATOR
FEW SUPPORT THE LIVING CHURCH
TIKHON IS INNOCENT
TIKHON IS SUBVERSIVE
COMMUNISTS PROVIDE HONEST LEADERSHIP
LENIN IS ALWAYS RIGHT ABOUT RUSSIA
BOLSHEVIKS KNOW PEASANTS ARE MORE BOURGEOIS THAN SOCIALIST
LENIN LEADS BY BRAIN AND WILL
WHEN CAPITALISM IS ALLOWED STATE RETAINS CONTROL
STALIN’S BRAIN HAD BIG ROLE IN CREATING THE SU
SOVIET PEOPLE MUCH BETTER OFF BY 1923
STALIN UNDERSTANDS NEED TO LEAVE WAR COMMUNISM
CHEKA KILLED FAR LESS THAN PEOPLE TURNING IN OPPONENTS
LENIN GOT PEOPLE TO WORK BY PERSUASION, NOT FORCE
LENIN LIVED SIMPLY
TROTSKY OPPOSED THE NEP
WHY TROTSKY WAS EXPELLED FROM THE PARTY
TROTSKYITES ARE READMITTED TO PARTY
ILLEGAL UNDERGROUND TROTSKYIST GROUP DISCOVERED
STALIN IS INDISPENSABLE AND HE KNOWS IT
STALIN EXPLAINS WHY HE BECAME A REVOLUTIONARY
STALIN VOLUNTEERS TO RESIGN AFTER LENIN’S CRITICISM
STALIN CALLS HIMSELF LENIN’S DISCIPLE
STALIN STAYED AND FOUGHT RATHER THAN FLED LIKE OTHER BOLSHEVIKS
STALIN HATES THE WORD STALINISM
SU SELLS GOODS BELOW WORLD PRICES
SMALL PEOPLE CAN CRITICIZE BIG ONES
DURANTLY ADMITS HE IS A CAPITALIST REPORTER IN SU
SOVIET CENSORSHIP IS SENSIBLE AND BALANCED
SU RANK IS BASED ON MERIT, NOT WEALTH OR BIRTH
STALIN ADOPTED TROTSKY’S AGRARIAN PROGRAM BECAUSE TIME WAS RIGHT
STALIN SAYS THAT IN CAPITALISM STRONG PREY ON THE WEAK
STALIN SUPPORTS TRADE WITH CAPITALISTS
5 YEAR PLAN IS THE PARTY TRAINING THE MASSES TO MATURE
CAN CRITICIZE RUNNING OF SYSTEM BUT NOT THE SYSTEM ITSELF
PURGE REVEALS EXTENT OF WHITE PENETRATION OF GOVT
WHAT PERCENT OF POPULATION SUPPORTED AND OPPOSED COLLECTIVIZATION
BOLSHEVIKS CLAIM SYSTEM HAS PROVEN SUPERIORITY WHEN THERE IS NO SABOTAGE
NO RED TERROR
UPROOTING IS WORSE IN THE US
CLASS ENEMIES ARE NOT KILLED BUT RELOCATED
DURANTY SEES NO FAMINE IN 1933
PEASANTS HAVE ACCEPTED COLLECTIVIZATION
COLLECTIVIZATION HAS BEEN SUCCESSFUL
12 YEAR ADVANCE BY ALTRUISTIC BOLSHEVIKS HAS BEEN REMARKABLE
COLLECTIVIZATION OPPOSED ONLY BY A MINORITY
COMMUNISTS ARE THE MOST ENERGETIC AND SACRIFICING
SU  CHILDREN AND PIONEERS ARE THE GREATEST
SU WORKERS ARE TOO FREE TO MOVE AROUND WHICH CAUSES PROBLEMS
KILLING OF PRIEST WHO SUPPORTED COLLECTIVIZATION
STALIN OPPOSES EQUAL WAGES
HOW INVENTORS SHOULD BE TREATED
HOW ARE THE MOST ENERGETIC PEOPLE TREATED IN SU
VILLAGES DETERMINE IF LOCAL ARMIES ARE RED OR WHITE
TROTSKY COULD NOT FACE HIS DROP IN POPULARITY FOLLOWING LENIN’S FUNERAL
LENIN AND STALIN WERE SHOW NO MERCY REALISTS
STALIN’S SU WAS REAL SOCIALISM
DIFFERENCE BETWEEN SOCIALISM AND INDIVIDUALISM
MASSES SUPPORT BOLSHEVIKS AND STALIN’S SU
BOLSHEVIKS AND MENSHEVIKS CLASH OVER PARTY MEMBERSHIP REQUIREMENTS
STALIN MEETS LENIN AND TROTSKY FOR FIRST TIME
STALIN FIRMLY OPPOSED SECESSION BY NATIONALITIES
LENIN FIRMLY OPPOSED NATIONALISM
STALIN CHOSEN BY LENIN TO HEAD NATIONALITIES ISSUE
STALIN IS ALWAYS CONSISTENT AND PERSISTENT
REDS HAD NO 5TH COLUMN AMONG WHITES DURING CIVIL WAR
STALIN SAVES PERM AS HE SAVED TSARITSYN
STALIN WORKED WITH TROTSKY DEFENDING PETROGRAD
IN THE SOUTH STALIN DEMANDS COMPLETE CONTROL AND TROTSKY’S EXPULSION
STALIN’S SOUTHERN STRATEGY
STALIN WAS A VERY GOOD MILITARY LEADER
STALIN WAS A MEMBER OF THE FIRST POLITBURO
STALIN’S CONTRIBUTIONS TO CIVIL WAR VICTORY ARE UNDENIABLE
DESPITE SUCCESSES PARTY WILL NOT GIVE STALIN A MILITARY OR STATE ROLE
STALIN’S GOOD WAR RECORD HELPED GET GEN. SEC. POSITION
STALIN TRIED TO GET ALONG WITH TROTSKY BUT NOT VICE VERSA
ZINOVIEV AND LENIN PROPOSE STALIN FOR GENERAL SEC
STALIN DID NOT PACK PARTY WITH HIS SUPPORTERS
LENIN HATED POMP BUT AFTER HIS DEATH BECAME A CENTER OF SHOW
ZINOVIEV BACKED UP STALIN FOR GEN. SEC.
STALIN CONSIDERED LENIN TO BE THE GREATEST AND USED THE WORD LENINISM
STALIN INTERPRETS LENIN ON DESTROYING THE STATE
UNLIKE MENSHEVIKS AND SR’S LENIN SEEKS BOTH PEASANT AND WORKER SUPPORT
BOLSHEVIKS BELIEVE THE STATE MUST BE DESTROYED, NOT TAKEN OVER
ONLY STALIN WROTE THEORETICAL WRITINGS CONTINUING LENIN
LENIN LIVED ON PARTY MONEY WHILE TROTSKY SOLD ARTICLES
TROTSKY BETTER KNOWN THAN LENIN
TROTSKY WON’T ADMIT MISTAKES
TROTSKY WAS DEPOSED BY THE POLITBURO, NOT STALIN
TROTSKY MERELY ATTACKED BUT HAD NO PRACTICAL PROGRAM
TROTSKY PROPOUNDS PERMANENT REVOLUTION THEORY
HOW KULAKS AND PRIVATE TRADERS WERE TAKING OVER
KULAKS OPPOSED COLLECTIVIZATION WITH TERROR AND DESTRUCTION
DESPITE EVERYTHING INDUSTRIALIZATION MADE RAPID PROGRESS
TIKHON AND CHURCH ACCEPTED SEPARATION OF CHURCH AND STATE
OUTLINES OF THE SHAKHTY, INDUSTRIAL PARTY & METRO-VICKERS TRIALS
STALIN WARRED AGAINST ISLAM FORCING WOMEN TO WEAR VEILS [BURQA]
BUKHARIN WAS WEAK AND UNBALANCED
BUKHARIN WELCOMED NEP FROM THE START
BUKHARIN OPPOSED STALIN’S MAJOR PROGRAMS
BUKHARIN OPPOSED THE IDEA OF SOCIALISM IN ONE COUNTRY
PUNISHMENT OF THE RIGHT OPPOSITION WAS TOO LIGHT
STALIN’S SUPPORTERS TOOK THE OPPOSITION TOO LIGHTLY
STALIN LOSES VOTES AT TIMES
MOST RUSSIAN PEASANTS BY NATURE OPPOSE PRIVATE OWNERSHIP OF LAND
STALIN BEST REPRESENTED THE PARTY LOWER LEVEL LEADERS
COMMUNISTS LED A VERY RIGOROUS, SPARTAN LIFE
STALIN’S WIFE SHOWED NO SIGNS OF VIOLENT DEATH
STALIN IS SHAKEN AND DEPRESSED BY HIS WIFE’S DEATH
STALIN IS KIND, DECENT, FORGIVING AND NOT REVENGEFUL
STALIN TRIED TO RAISE HIS CHILDREN WELL
STALIN AGREES WITH LENIN THAT THE STATE MUST USE FORCE
STALIN ARGUED WITH SECRET POLICE OVER THEM HAVING MORE POWERS
STALIN EXERCISES MODESTY AND OPPOSES THE CULT OF THE INDIVIDUAL
CLERGY ARE MOSTLY REACTIONARY
RELIGION IS BEST FOUGHT BY IMPROVING THE LIVES OF PEOPLE
STALIN DEFENDED THE CLERGY’S RIGHT TO VOTE IN 1936
STALIN BELIEVED IN A CENTRALIZED STATE
RUSSIAN REVOLUTION LED TO CAPITALISTS LIGHTENING UP EVERYWHERE
STALIN CONTENDS NATIONS CAN PASS CAPITALISM AND GO STRAIGHT TO SOCIALISM
POLITBURO CHOSE KIROV AS STALIN’S SUCCESSOR
LENINGRAD SECRET POLICE PROSECUTED FOR NEGLECT
DESCRIPTION OF 4 MAIN GROUPS AGAINST STALIN AND WHO KILLED KIROV
FIRST GROUP OF CONSPIRATORS DISCOVERED WERE ZINOVIEV AND KAMENEV
TOMSKY COMMITTED SUICIDE WHEN BEING ARRESTED TAKING HIS SECRET
WHY ZINOVIEV AND KAMENEV CONFESSED
TROTSKY’S REASONS AND TACTICS FOR OPPOSING STALIN
LENN AND THE GERMANS USED EACH OTHER
TROTSKY ALSO WORKED WITH THE GERMANS BUT SOLD OUT HIS FOLLOWERS
BUKHARIN WAS CLEARLY GUILTY
TRIALS OCCURRED AT THE BEST TIME FOR STALIN
DEFENDANTS WANTED TO BE DICTATORS THEMSELVES
FOREIGN SPIES WORMED THEIR WAY INTO SOVIET GOVERNMENT
MANY HIGH GOVT OFFICIALS WERE FOREIGN AGENTS
WHY DID THE VAST INTERNAL CONSPIRACY FAIL
TROTSKY WAS RUTHLESS DURING THE CIVIL WAR AND INTERVENTION
PEOPLE UNJUSTLY ACCUSED AND DENOUNCED OTHERS TO GET AHEAD
STALIN AND LENIN SHARE SAME KEY BELIEFS
STALIN’S VIEWS OF NAZISM AND FASCISM
UNLIKE KERENSKY THE BOLSHEVIKS ALLOWED FINLAND TO BE INDEPENDENT
POLISH CLAIMS TO EASTERN REGIONS ARE NOT VALID
STALIN SOUGHT SENSIBLE, ETHNICALLY BASED WESTERN BORDERS
STALIN’S TREATMENT OF THE BALTIC STATES WAS FAIR AND SENSIBLE
LATVIANS AND LATVIAN TROOPS SUPPORTED THE BOLSHEVIKS
SU RECOGNIZED EARLY-ON THE INDEPENDENCE OF ESTONIA AND LATVIA
STALIN INVADED THE BALTIC STATES ON VERY VALID GROUNDS
STALIN’S INVASION OF FINLAND WAS NECESSARY BUT NOT ETHNICALLY JUSTIFIED
SU CLOSELY ADHERED TO THE RUSSO-GERMAN PACT
STALIN WAS A GOOD WWII SUPREME COMMANDER
EACH ALLY TRIES TO GET THE OTHER TO DO THE HARD WORK
STALIN CONTENDS ALLIES WANT SU BLED WHITE AND THEY AVOID SECOND FRONT
STALIN UNITED A LARGER AREA THAN THE CZARS EVER CREATED
STALIN AND THE BOLSHEVIKS HAVE GREATLY REDUCED CLASS DIFFERENCES
LENIN SHUT DOWN FACTIONALISM AND HAD MAJOR PURGE
STALIN DID NOT CAUSE TROTSKY’S FALL
HAVING BEEN RUTHLESS TROTSKY DECIDED TO BE SO AGAIN
STALIN PERMANENTLY FOLLOWED LENIN FROM THEIR FIRST MEETING
STALIN’S BANK EXPROPRIATIONS ARE NECESSARY AND SUCCESSFUL
LENIN’S RISE IS PARTLY ATTRIBUTABLE TO SELFLESS STALIN
BOLSHEVIKS WERE AS MORAL AS WAS REALISTIC TO BE
CONTRARY TO TROTSKY’S CLAIMS STALIN PERFORMED WELL BEFORE THE REVOLUTION
STALIN SET A GOOD EXAMPLE IN PRISON AND WAS BRAVE
LENIN HONORS STALIN WITH PROMOTIONS BEFORE WWI
TROTSKY ERRS AS COMMISSAR OF WAR
STALIN DOES AN EXCELLENT JOB WITH THE NATIONALITIES DEPT.
WHAT DOES THE TESTAMENT SAY
STALIN WAS CRUEL TO THOSE WHO DESERVED IT
NEP MEN ONLY WANT QUICK PROFITS
UNDERGROUND FINANCED BY NEP MEN
STALIN ONLY OPPOSED NEPMEN AS A CLASS, NOT INDIVIDUALLY
KULAKS OPPOSED THOSE BRINGING IN COLLECTIVIZATION
STALIN ONLY REACTED AGAINST THOSE OPPOSING COLLECTIVIZATION AS A LAST RESORT
STALIN HAD GREAT PATIENCE BUT IT WAS FINALLY EXHAUSTED BY ANTI-COLLECTIVISTS
STALIN HAD AN EFFECTIVE ANTI-RELIGIOUS PROGRAM
STALIN WAS NOT FOOLED BY FALSE PRAISE
STALIN WAS TOLERANT AND NOT BLOODTHIRSTILY ELIMINATING HIS ENEMIES
NIKOLAYEV SYMPATHIZED WITH TROTSKY AND KILLED KIROV
SCHEMERS ZINOVIEV AND KAMENEV SHIFTED BLAME TO TROTSKY FOR KILLING KIROV
STALIN SAID THE OPPOSITION HAD DESCENDED FAR IN 7 YEARS
STALIN WAS FAIR IN CHECKING CHARGES AGAINST PEOPLE
ZINOVIEV TRIAL REVEALS THE EXTENT OF TERRORIST PLOTTING
ELIMINATING TRAITOROUS GENERALS WAS WISE AND THEY WERE SENSIBLY REPLACED
DESPITE HARD TIMES STALIN AIDED CHINA REPEATEDLY
SU FULFILLED LEAGUE EFFORTS AGAINST AGGRESSORS
TO GET HELP THE OPPOSITION PROMISED THE NAZIS LAND LIKE THE UKRAINE
STALIN KNEW NAZI ATTACK WOULD RESULT IN MAJOR LAND LOST AT FIRST
TROTSKY WAS NOT DEFEATED BECAUSE STALIN UNDERMINED HIM
TROTSKYITE EASTMAN UNDERMINED TROTSKY
TROTSKY THINKS HE CAN TAKE OVER
ZINOVIEV BECAME THE LEADER OF THE SPLITTERS
KRUPSKAYA WAS A SPLITTER ALSO
STALIN CRITICIZES THE CHINESE COMMUNIST PARTY
STALIN ATTACKS ZINOVIEV’S WRITING
RIGHTISTS ARE DEFEATED BUT RETAIN HIGH GOVERNMENT POSITIONS
STALIN ATTACKS BUKHARIN WITH VICIOUS WORDS
WHEN THE RIGHTISTS WERE REMOVED FROM THE POLITBURO
BUKHARIN IS A SPLITTER
RYKOV HAS WRONG POSITIONS
STEN’S ARTICLE CONTINUES TRADITION OF UNDERMINING PARTY DISCIPLINE
STALIN ADVOCATES GETTING HELP FROM FOREIGN COMPANIES
CHIANG’S GOVT IS AN IMPERIALIST LACKEY
STALIN ADMITS HIS MISTAKES AND SOMETIMES RETREATS
STALIN SAYS HE IS NOT TOLERANT OF MEMBERS WHO HAVE DONE GRIEVOUS ERRORS
STALIN ATTACKS HIS OWN FOREIGN MINISTER
LITVINOV TALKS LIKE A SECRET TRAITOR TO THE SU
STALIN UNDERSTANDS THE TRICKS OF CAPITALIST GOVTS
STALIN DETECTED TRAITORS LONG BEFORE THE TRIALS
STALIN WANTS PYATAKOV REMOVED YET HE IS LATER MADE THE HEAD OF INDUSTRY
RYUTIN IS COUNTER-REVOLUTIONARY SCUM
THE PRESS IS TOO ALARMIST AND IGNORES THE REASONS FOR PROBLEMS
MOST WORKERS ARE IRRESPONSIBLE AND TRANSIENT
STALIN ATTACKS RIGHTIST GROUPS
STALIN’S VIEW OF CAUSE OF UKRAINIAN CROP FAILURES
TROTSKY REFUTES THE TESTAMENT
TROTSKY ATTACKS OTHER COMMENTS BY EASTMAN
KRUPSKAYA ATTACKS EASTMAN
DURING THE CIVIL WAR BOSHEVIK TERRITORY REDUCED TO VERY SMALL SIZE
PEASANTS SUPPORT BOLSHEVIKS OVER THE WHITES
LOCAL SOVIET OFFICIALS DECIDED TO KILL THE ROMANOVS
WEALTH OF PEOPLE IN STALIN’S SU IS RELATIVELY EQUAL
PARTY DOES NOT MAKE EVERY DECISION FOR LOCAL SOVIETS AND COOPS
BASIC PRINCIPLE OF LENINISM IS THAT POWER CAN’T BE GAINED PEACEFULLY
VERY DIFFICULT TO BECOME A PARTY MEMBER
POLITBURO IS THE SUPREME AUTHORITY IN THE SU
HIGH QUALITY OF PARTY MEMBERSHIP
LENIN ACCUSED OF BEING A GERMAN SPY
STALIN WAS EXILED MANY TIMES
SU HAS A PROGRESSIVE PRISON AND EXILE SYSTEM
THEY TRY TO GET MOSTLY WORKERS IN THE PARTY
PEOPLE’S CONDITIONS IMPROVED GREATLY SINCE THE REVOLUTION
STRIKES DO OCCUR ESPECIALLY AGAINST PRIVATE EMPLOYERS
PERCENTAGE OF JEWS AS REVOLUTIONARY LEADERS IS HIGHER THAN OTHER GROUPS
THE REVOLUTION SAVED THE JEWS AND GAVE THEM RIGHTS
LEADERS OF THE BOLSHEVIKS COME FROM THE INTELLIGENTSIA
SU PRESS MORE RELIABLE THAN FOREIGN REPORTERS
FOREIGN PRESS FREE TO ROAM THROUGHOUT SU
THE TWO OPPOSING VIEWS OF COLLECTIVIZATION
ALLIES SENT THE SU ALMOST NOTHING IN EARLY STAGE OF WWII
PEOPLE ENTER THE US FOR THE DOLLAR NOT FREEDOM
STALIN SHOWS DEEP SYMPATHY FOR ROOSEVELT’S CONDITION
ACTIVITIES DURING STALIN’S LAST DYING MOMENTS
US STOLE SOME ISLANDS IN VIOLATION OF THE UN CHARTER
GROMYKO JUSTIFIES THE HELP GIVEN TO HUNGARY
GROMYKO EXTOLS MOLOTOV’S ROLE IN THE GOVT
CAPITALIST SAYS THE SYSTEM MUST CHANGE RATHER THAN CHANGING INDIVIDUALS
WHAT IS FASCISM
HONESTY COMES FROM THE RIGHT SYSTEM NOT PREACHING
CLASSES EXIST WHETHER US PEOPLE WANT THEM OR NOT
LENIN MADE NO EFFORT TO KEEP GROUPS FROM SPLITTING OFF
LENIN AND STALIN DID NOT RELY ON STIRRING ORATORY FOR SUPPORT
WHAT IS A REAL DICTATORSHIP
POOR PEASANTS DETERMINED WHO WERE THE KULAKS
WORKERS OVER 18 CAN VOTE AND RUN FOR OFFICE
CENTRAL COMMITTEE IS THE SUPREME RULER OF THE SU
INDUSTRIALIZATION WAS ABSOLUTELY NECESSARY DESPITE HIGH COST
HUMAN NATURE IS NOT STATIC
ENVIRONMENT IS PRIMARY, TEACHING IS SECONDARY
LEGAL SYSTEM OF THE SU IS JUST
PRISONS IN SU REHABILITATE PEOPLE VERY WELL
PEOPLE IN THE SU ARE FREE AND INDIVIDUALS
FREEDOM IS DIFFERENT FOR DIFFERENT PEOPLE
MCCARTHY ERA EXHIBITED THE WORST US POLITICAL REPRESSION
PEOPLE IN US TRIED FOR THEIR LITERATURE NOT FOR ACTUAL DEEDS
US GOVT OFFICIALS SUPPRESSED PEOPLE REGARDLESS OF THE LAW
ROOSEVELT WAS QUITE REPRESSIVE WHEN HE WANTED TO BE
CPUSA LEADER WAS SENTENCED UNJUSTLY
LITTLE EVIDENCE AGAINST THE ROSENBERGS
ILLEGAL ACTIVITY WAS COMMITTED TO CONVICT THE ROSENBERGS
TRIAL AGAINST CPUSA LEADERS WAS UNJUST AND RIGGED
MCCARTHYISM WAS ACTUALLY HOOVERISM BECAUSE THE FBI RAN IT ALL
THE FBI WAS HIGHLY POLITICAL AND BIASED
FBI WORKED HARD TO HIDE ITS CRIMES
FBI USES DIRTY TRICKS IN COINTELPRO
MILITARY PEOPLE WERE TREATED UNJUSTLY
INFORMERS WERE USED ILLEGALLY BY THE FBI
FAIR HEARINGS INVOLVING SERIOUS TOPICS WERE DENIED
POLITICS RATHER THAN SECURITY RAN THE LOYALTY PROGRAM
SUPPRESSION OF FREE PRESS IN USA
OUSTER OF CPUSA MEMBERS DRAMATICALLY WEAKENED THE LABOR MOVEMENT
NOTED PEOPLE ARE BLACKLISTED UNJUSTLY
MEDIA IN MCCARTHY ERA WAS STERILE AND ESCAPIST
WHAT ARE KULAKS AND WHAT DO THEY DO
STALIN MOST QUALIFIED SUCCESSOR TO LENIN
COLLECTIVIZATION AND MODERNIZATION WERE DEFINITELY NEEDED
TWO VIEWS IN PARTY ON COLLECTIVIZATION AND KULAKS
STALIN DID NOT USE FORCEFUL COLLECTIVIZATION OR CAUSE FOOD SHORTAGES
PEOPLE DIFFER WIDELY ON THEIR VIEWS OF COLLECTIVIZATION
KULAKS SPREAD RUMORS ABOUT THE COLLECTIVES AND USE VIOLENCE
COLLECTIVIZATION WENT TO EXCESS AT TIMES
ONLY A MINORITY WERE COMPLAINING ABOUT COLLECTIVIZATION MISTAKES
A REPORTER NOTES THE GRAIN SHORTAGE BUT SAYS WORKING ALONE WILL BE WORSE
COLLECTIVE HARVESTS WERE NOT GOOD PRIOR TO 1933
1933 HARVEST WAS THE BEST SINCE 1930 WHICH WAS A RECORD
THE PROCESS BY WHICH THE 1936 CONSTITUTION CAME ABOUT AND MASS SUGGESTIONS
THE MAJOR TRIALS OUTLINED BRIEFLY
FIFTH COLUMN CAUSES INSECURITY AND ARRESTS IN 1930s
MUNICH SELL-OUT WAS TO GET NAZIS HEADED EASTWARD
SUMMARY OF BRITAIN AND FRANCE DRAGGING THEIR FEET IN SUMMER OF 1939
BENEFITS OF RUSSO-GERMAN NON-AGGRESSION PACT
SU HAD HINDERED NAZIS PRIOR TO BEING INVADED
STALIN SHOWS COURAGE AND BRAVERY IN EARLY DAYS OF THE INVASION
US TRIES TO DICTATE PEACE IN ASIA AND DETERMINE EAST EUROPE GOVTS
SU TOOK BACK AFTER WWII TERRITORY THAT WAS THEIRS
STALIN’S OVERALL ACCOMPLISHMENTS
SU REVIVES AFTER WWII BY INTEGRATING EASTERN EUROPE NOT EXPLOITING IT
STALIN SAYS SEMINARY TURNED HIM INTO A REVOLUTIONARY
STALIN STRONGLY OPPOSED USING EX-CZARIST OFFICERS
STALIN REPLIES TO THE TESTAMENT
RADEK DENOUNCES TROTSKY
STALIN FORESAW VICTORY AFTER NAZI ATTACK WHILE HIS ENEMIES FORESAW DEFEAT
STALIN’S SOCIAL PROGRAMS ARE FAR BETTER THAN THE NAZIS
SU FOSTERS CULTURE
RICH ARE NOT KIND GOOD GUYS
1936 SU CONSTITUTION AMONG THE GREATEST CONSTITUTIONS
PEOPLE CAN HAVE PRIVATE PROPERTY FOR PERSONAL USE
1936 CONSTITUTION WAS OVERWHELMINGLY ACCEPTED
STALIN SAVED ENGLAND FROM BEING ATTACKED BY THE NAZIS
STALIN DENOUNCES RULE BY TERROR
SU MEETS ITS FINANCIAL OBLIGATIONS WITH THE CAPITALISTS
DEFENDANTS FREELY AND NONCHALANTLY CONFESSED
OVERALL IMPRESSIONS OF 1937 DEFENDANTS
SENTENCES OF THE 1937 DEFENDANTS
WHY HAVE THE PUBLIC 1937 TRIAL SINCE THEY CONFESSED
1937 TRIAL LEFT NO DOUBT AS TO THEIR GUILT
1937 TRIAL TESTIMONIES WERE VERY CONVINCING
ROMM ADMITS HIS GUILT AND DESCRIBES HIS TROTSKYIST ROLE
SU WANTED PEACE SO BAD IT SIGNED A PACT WITH THE NAZIS
THE GENERALS WERE GUILTY
SOVIET OFFICIAL SAYS GOVT IS INFESTED WITH SPIES AND TRAITORS
THE CHARGES IN THE MARCH 1938 TRIAL
OBSERVERS CAN’T FATHOM THE 1938 DEFENDANTS’ CONFESSIONS UNLESS THEY WERE TRUE
1938 TRIAL DEFENDANTS ARE GUILTY AND WORKING WITH TRAITOROUS GENERALS
SU SHOT THE FIFTH COLUMNISTS
SOME DID NOT REALIZE THE FIFTH COLUMN WAS A SERIOUS THREAT
SUMMARY OF THE MAIN TRIALS
LOSS OF THE GENERALS WAS NO BIG LOSS
DAVIES SAYS WEST’S POLICY MAY DRIVE SU TO PACT WITH NAZIS
STALIN GIVES UP TRYING TO SIGN PACTS WITH THE WEST
SU DID NOT LIKE THE APPEASEMENTS
STALIN AIDED SMALL NATIONS AGAINST FASCIST AGGRESSION
RED ARMY INTELLIGENCE WAS READY FOR NAZI ATTACK
SU INTELLIGENCE REPORTS ON POTENTIAL NAZI ATTACK WERE INADEQUATE
STALIN SAW WORLD WAR II NAZI ATTACK COMING
SCOTT SAYS WRECKING WAS DEFINITELY GOING ON
SCOTT EXPLAINS WHY THE PURGE OCCURRED EAST OF URALS
SCOTT DESCRIBES TREATMENT OF MAGNITOGORSK PRISONERS
ARRESTS IN THE 1930S WERE NOT NEARLY AS MANY AS FOREIGNERS THINK
PEOPLE OF THE SU DID THE INDUSTRIALIZING THEMSELVES
STALIN SAVED LENIN IN SUMMER OF 1917
LENIN GOT STALIN RED BANNER AWARD FOR WAR PERFORMANCE
SURVIVAL OF CAPITALISM IN MEN’S MINDS PRODUCT OF NATIONALISM
STALIN DIRECTED THE DEFENSE OF MOSCOW IN WWII
PRIOR TO KIROV SHOOTING ARRESTS AND TRIALS ONLY USED FOR ANTI-SOVIET ACTS
STALIN INCENSED OVER ORDZHONIKIDZE’S DEATH
STALIN IS FLEXIBLE AND NOT HARD-HEADED
SECRET POLICE GATHERING EVIDENCE AGAINST AND INVESTIGATING STALIN ALSO
STALIN WAS A GREAT LEADER WHO FOUGHT CORRUPTION AND BUREAUCRACY
KHRUSHCHOV SWEARS NOT TO ATTACK THE DEAD BUT ATTACKS STALIN
STALIN AND MOLOTOV HAVE NO RESPECT FOR TRUMAN
ALLIED AID TO THE SU
STALIN TRIED TO HELP PEOPLE WHILE BERIA UNDERMINED THEM
STALIN DID NOT SIGN SENTENCING ORDERS ALONE
STALIN EXPRESSED HIMSELF BRIEFLY, CONCISELY, AND COMPREHENSIVELY
STALIN CONVENED THE 1952 PARTY CONGRESS
KHRUSHCHOV FEARED THE CONSEQUENCES OF STALIN’S DEATH
KIM IL SUNG STARTED THE KOREAN WAR NOT STALIN
UNLIKE STALIN KHRUSHCHOV AND BERIA ADMIRED TITO
KHRUSCHOV TALKS SOCIALISM BUT DOES NOT PRACTICE IT
STALIN PREDICTS CAPITALISTS WILL DEFEAT THE LEADERS FOLLOWING HIM
HARDLINE DULLES REFUSED TO MAKE ANY CONCESSIONS AND RAN US POLICY
TITO PUSHED THE HUNGARIAN INVASION
KHRUSCHOV SAYS HITLER’S SOCIALISM WAS A JOKE
KHRUSHCHOV AND STALIN WRESTLE WITH THE EAST GERMAN PROBLEM
KHRUSHCHOV CONSIDERED NIXON AN UNPRINCIPLED PUPPET OF MCCARTHY
WHAT TALLYRAND SAYS ABOUT THE TONGUE OF DIPLOMATS
STALIN ATTACKS MAO FOR RELYING ON PEASANTS ONLY AND NON-MARXISM
KHRUSCHOV IS AN ATHEIST WHO DECRIES PRAYER
KHRUSCHOV CONSIDERS HO CHI MINH A SAINT
KHRUSHCHOV COMPLIMENTS KENNEDY AND SAYS HE WOULD HAVE AVOIDED VIETNAM
KHRUSCHOV SAYS IN CAPITALISM THE DOLLAR COUNTS NOT PEOPLE
STALIN LIVED A VERY FRUGAL, SPARTAN LIFE WITHOUT WEALTH
STALIN HAD A SENSE OF HUMOR
STALIN STOOD FIRM WHEN OTHERS PANICKED
STALIN COULD BE WITTY AND ASK SHARP QUESTIONS
STALIN SUCCESSFULLY OVERCAME ONE CRISIS AFTER ANOTHER
STALIN DISLIKES ALL THE PRAISE HEAPED ON HIM
STALIN KEEPS VERY CLOSE WATCH ON PUBLIC OPINION
STALIN DENOUNCES THOSE REJECTING THE USE OF ARMS
STALIN SYMPATHIZED WITH THE PEASANTS AFTER LENIN’S DEATH
WRITER SAYS HE SAW DOCUMENTS PROVING SABOTAGE
WHEN STALIN AND HIS ALLIES TRIED TO BE LENIENT THEY WERE STABBED
STALIN EXPLAINS WHY THE CHEKA IS NEEDED
ZINOVIEV CONFESSED TO PLANNING KIROV’S MURDER
RADEK IMPLICATES TUKHASHEVSKY AND IMPLIES HE WORKS WITH TROTSKY
DEFENDANTS IN THE TRIALS HAD HIGH POSITIONS DESPITE LONG HISTORY OF OPPOSING STALIN
TRIALS ACTUALLY INVOLVE ON A VERY SMALL PART OF THE PEOPLE
CONFESSIONS WERE GENUINE AND NO COERCION WAS INVOLVED
WORKERS ARE EXPERIENCED FROM REVOLUTIONS
SPIES WERE EVERYWHERE UNDER THE CZARS
SUMMARY OF THE 1936 CONSTITUTION
WEAKNESSES OF SOME TOP LEADERS
STALIN DEMANDS POLITICAL COMMISSARS BE ATTACHED TO MILITARY UNITS
STALIN MADE HARD MILITARY DECISIONS
STALIN ARGUES FOR COLLECTIVIZATION AND CONTENDS IT WAS NECESSARY
WORKERS ARE BABIED BY THE TRADE UNIONS
STALIN CONTENDS ECONOMIC DEMOCRACY PREVAILS IN THE SU
CZAR USED NATIONAL SUPPRESSION AND OPPRESSION
IGNORANCE, PREJUDICE AND ILLITERACY WERE FOSTERED BY CZAR
LONDON POLES ARE HINDERING THE ANTI-NAZI WAR
GERMANS COMMITTED THE KATYN FOREST MASSACRE
SU DID WHAT IT COULD TO HELP THE WARSAW UPRISING
STALIN WAS AN ATHEIST
STALIN EXPELLED FROM SEMINARY FOR HIS POLITICAL ACTIONS
STALIN HELD LENIN IN THE HIGHEST REGARD
STALIN WAS AN EXCELLENT ORGANIZER OF THE PROLETARIAT
LENIN COMPLIMENTS AND CARES FOR STALIN
STALIN OFTEN OPPOSED KAMENEV IN THE PAST
RUMANIA CAUSED A LOT OF TROUBLE FOR THE SU
CHURCHILL DID EVERYTHING HE COULD TO DESTROY SOCIALISM
SU BUILT UP AUSTRIAN ECONOMY AFTER THE WAR
STALIN WAS NOT RESPONSIBLE FOR GOMULKA’S IMPRISONMENT
KHRUSHCHOV DEMEANS AND DEGRADES GYPSIES
STALIN KNOWS THERE ARE ALWAYS ENEMIES INSIDE THE PARTY
SOVIET GOVT OPPOSED BUREAUCRACY
NO SOVIET PRIVILEGED CLASS
VERY LITTLE PARTY CORRUPTION
WORKERS AND PEASANTS DO NOT MAKE UP MOST OF THE CRITICS
TORTURE NOT USED DURING QUESTIONING
SECRET POLICE ARE FAIR TOWARD PRISONERS
GREATER FREEDOM AND MORE LENIENCY ALLOWED WHEN THREATS ARE LESS SERIOUS
POLICE HAVE BROAD POWERS AS IF IN WARTIME
PUNISHMENTS OF POLITICAL OPPONENTS ARE RELATIVELY LIGHT
SOVIET PRISONS ARE DECENT FOR LIVING
SOVIET AND ITALIAN DICTATORSHIPS ARE TOTALLY DIFFERENT
WWII PRISONERS OF WAR WERE TREATED HUMANELY
CHINESE COMMUNISTS ARE REAL MARXISTS
STALIN NOT TO BLAME FOR YAGODA AND YEZHOV CRIMES
ANTI-SOVIET ELEMENTS WORMED THEIR WAY INTO THE PARTY
FASCISTS WERE REJECTED BY THE UKRAINIANS
BOLSHEVIK LEADERS COME FROM THE WORKING CLASS AND PEASANTRY
PEOPLE WORKED OVERTIME AND HARD FOR THE SYSTEM
CENTRALIZATION SAVED THE NATION, ESPECIALLY REGARDING INDUSTRIALIZATION
UPWARD SOCIAL MOBILITY UNDER STALIN
MOLOTOV TOLD HISTORY AS IT REALLY WAS
MOLOTOV CORRECTLY PREDICTED GORBACHOV WAS A BUKHARIN
MOLOTOV SAYS TAKING PART OF POLAND WAS NECESSARY TO KEEP NAZIS AWAY
IT IS BETTER TO BE CURSED THAN PRAISED BY CAPITALISTS
HITLER WAS AN EXTREME ANTI-COMMUNIST NATIONALIST
MOLOTOV FEELS THERE ARE STILL HITLERS TODAY
HITLER WAS SMART AND NARROW BUT NOT A MANIAC
HITLER ADMIRED STALIN’S PERSONALITY
MOLOTOV SAYS HITLER WANTED TO DIVIDE THE WORLD
MOLOTOV SAYS HITLER MET HIM TO GET THE SU TO ATTACK ENGLAND
MOLOTOV SHOWS NAZIS DON’T HAVE A PROGRAM, PARTY RULES OR A CONSTITUTION
STALIN WAS A GREAT POLITICAL TACTICIAN
MOLOTOV AND STALIN DID NOT EXPECT AN ATTACK UNTIL ENGLAND LOST
EVERYTHING WAS DONE TO DELAY OR PREVENT WAR COMING
KHRUSHCHOV AND BERIA WERE SECRET RIGHTISTS
SU SHOULD HAVE KNOWN JUNE WAS THE BEST MONTH FOR AN ATTACK
LACK OF BEING SUFFICIENTLY READY FOR NAZI ATTACK WAS NOT DECISIVE
SOURCES SAYING AN ATTACK WAS COMING COULD NOT BE TRUSTED
STALIN WAS NOT AS REPRESSIVE TOWARD SUBVERSIVES AS SOME OTHERS
NUMBERS GIVEN FOR THE NUMBER OF PEOPLE REPRESSED ARE FAR TOO HIGH
RADEK ATTACKED STALIN A LOT
OTHER GROUPS SUPPORTED THE BOLSHEVIKS STRINGENT METHODS
LARGE NUMBERS OF IMPRISONED PEOPLE CONTINUED TO SUPPORT STALIN & STRONG METHODS
STALIN WAS LESS STRINGENT TOWARD THOSE OPPOSED TO DEKULAKIZATION THAN OTHERS
SUBVERSIVES PLANNED TO ‘DISMISS’ STALIN
MEMBERS VOTED FOR STALIN BECAUSE THEY WANT HIM, NOT OUT OF FEAR
BUKHARIN DENOUNCES HIS PAST ACTS AND ALL FACTIONS
RADEK SAYS ZINOVIEV TOLD THE TROTS SMIRNOV WAS PROPOSING AN ANTI-STALIN GROUP
SMIRNOV EXPELLED FROM KEY POSITIONS BUT NOT PARTY
ARRESTS BEING MADE BY PEOPLE UNQUALIFIED TO DO SO
STALIN PROCLAIMS VICTORY AT THE 1934 CONGRESS
LIBRARY CENSORSHIP WAS REDUCED IN EARLY 1930’S
STALIN WANTS INTELLIGENTSIA AND SPECIALISTS TREATED EASIER
TOUGH LAWS PASSED AGAINST DESTROYING KULAKS ARE WEAKLY ENFORCED
STALIN HAD TO REIGN IN POLICE EXCESSES
BOLSHEVIKS BECAME MORE LENIENT AND LESSENED CONTROLS AROUND 1934
NO EVIDENCE STALIN KILLED KIROV
AGRANOV COULD NOT FIND EVIDENCE ZINOVIEV DIRECTLY KILLED KIROV
ZINOVIEV GROUP WAS THE FIRST TO WORK SECRETLY AGAINST THE PARTY
SENTENCING AND REPRESSION DID NOT HARDEN AFTER KIROV KILLING
TRIAL OF LENINGRAD ZINOVIEVISTS AFTER KIROV KILLING WAS RATHER LIGHT
YEZHOV DESCRIBES THE DEGREE OF SUBVERSIVE PENETRATION OF THE KREMLIN
YENUKIDZE TRIES TO ACT INNOCENT OF INTENTIONAL CRIMES
SPEAKER AFTER SPEAKER DENOUNCED YENUKIDZE
STALIN ADVOCATES GOING EASY ON YENUKIDZE
THE LESSER PUNISHMENT FOR THE FAMILIES OF KULAK SUBVERSIVES
EXILES COULD WORK IN THEIR TRADE IN EXILE AREAS
YEZHOV ADVOCATES GETTING TOUGH AND EVADING THE LAWS
VYSHINSKY OBJECTS TO REDUCING A DEATH SENTENCE TO 10 YEARS
YEZHOV DENOUNCES TROTSKYISTS INTERNAL ORGANIZATION AND TACTICS
PEOPLE ENGAGED IN SPYING AND ESPIONAGE AGAINST THE SU
AS SU GETS STRONGER OPPOSITION BECOME GREATER NOT SMALLER
SECRET POLICE SURVEILLANCE COULD NOT BE AS GREAT AS ALLEGED
PARTY LEADERS ADMIRED BY THE MASSES
VYSHINSKY ARGUES FOR JUST TREATMENT OF PRISONERS
POLITBURO ORDERS THAT JUSTICE BE DONE TO KOLKHOZ MEMBERS
STALIN PROPOSES A JUST METHOD TO REINSTATE EXPELLED PARTY MEMBERS
EARLY ON YAGODA TRIES TO EXONERATE TROTSKY FROM ANY GUILT
NO PROOF EXISTS TO PROVE ZINOVIEV AND KAMENEV CONFESSED TO AVOID EXECUTION
MRACHKOVSKY SAYS TROTSKY AGREED TO UNITY IF KILLING STALIN WAS THE GOAL
DREITZER SAYS TROTSKY DIRECTED HIM TO KILL STALIN AND VOROSHILOV
ZINOVIEV SAYS HE ACCEPTS M. LURYE’S TERRORIST GROUP WORKING WITH THE FASCISTS
THE TROT-ZINOVIEVIST CENTER STOLE GOVERNMENT MONEY
TROTS AND ZINOVIEVISTS WORMED THEIR WAY INTO GOVT FOR THEIR OWN AIMS
AFTER ZINOVIEV TRIAL TROTS ARE DEEMED NOT JUST POLITICAL OPPONENTS BUT SPIES
PYATAKOV’S TESTIMONY AS TO SABOTAGE AND TERRORISM
ORDJONIKIDZE WANTS LOMINADZE SHOT WHICH STALIN OPPOSES
YEZHOV SAYS ZINOVIEV SAID THERE WAS A BACKUP GROUP
TROTS ARE DIRECTED BY JAPANESE INTELLIGENCE THROUGH KNYAZEV
HYPOCRITICAL, DECEPTIVE BUKHARIN DENOUNCES SABOTAGE & OTHER ACTS OF SWINE
BUKHARIN SAYS: KAMENEV AND ZINOVIEV LUSTED FOR POWER
BUKHARIN SAYS PYATAKOV DOES NOT KNOW WHEN HE IS SPEAKING THE TRUTH
STALIN DENOUNCES BUKHARIN FOR DECEIVING WHEN HE SAID HE HAD CHANGED HIS VIEWS
STALIN DEFENDS & DRAGS HIS FEET AGAINST THOSE WHO WANT BUKHARIN’S HEAD
LITTLE PROOF STALIN WAS TRYING TO KILL HIS OPPONENTS IN THE 1930’S
SHEBOLDAEV SAYS HE CAUSED HARM BECAUSE OF THE ACTIVITIES OF TROTSKYISTS
STALIN ATTACKS POSTYSHEV FOR COVERING FOR TROTS IN THE GOVT
STALIN ATTACKS BAD EXPULSIONS AND DEMANDS THEY BE REINSTATED
STALIN STIFLES RESOLUTION CONDEMNING SHEBOLDAEV AND POSTYSHEV
ASTROV EXPOSES BUKHARIN IN FRONT OF STALIN AND THE POLITBURO
STALIN TOLD BUKHARIN PEOPLE SAID TESTIMONIES AGAINST HIM WERE FREELY GIVEN
RYKOV TELLS CC THAT HE CAN’T BE HELD RESPONSIBLE FOR TRAITORS ADMIRING HIM
VOROSHILOV DENOUNCES BUKHARIN AS A DECEPTIVE, VILE HYPOCRITE
ANDREEV SAYS TROTS AND RIGHTISTS ARE THE SAME & STALIN WAS EXTREMELY PATIENT
KABAKOV DENOUNCES BUKHARIN
MAKAROV SAYS MANY PERSONS TESTIFIED TO THE TROT-RIGHTIST-ZINOVIEV UNITY
KOSAREV DENOUNCES BUKHARIN AS A CRIMINAL CAUGHT RED-HANDED
MOLOTOV READS VOROSHILOV’S ATTACK ON BUKHARIN
KALININ ATTACKS BUKHARIN’S DEFENSE
UGAROV DENOUNCES BUKHARIN AND RYKOV AS LEADERS OF COUNTER-REV RIGHTISTS
ZHUKOV SAYS THE RIGHTIST LEADERS LIKE BUKHARIN SHOULD BE SHOT
KAGANOVICH GETS KULIKOV TO ADMIT HE WAS TRYING TO KILL STALIN AND HIMSELF
OSINSKY SAYS THE GUILT OF BUKHARIN AND RYKOV IS OBVIOUS
YAROSLAVSKY SAYS PROOF OF THE GUILT OF BUKHARIN AND RYKOV IS CLEAR
BUKHARIN & RYKOV WERE FAIRLY ALLOWED TO SPEAK 2ND TIME IN THEIR DEFENSE
BUKHARIN CONFESSES HE COMMITTED MANY POLITICAL SINS AND CRIMES
RYKOV DECIDES HE WILL BE TREATED BETTER IF HE CONFESSES
SUMMARY OF FACTS PROVING BUKHARIN AND RYKOV DESERVED TO BE TRIED
STALIN LISTS OPTIONS OF WHAT TO DO WITH BUKHARIN AND RYKOV
FOUR OPTIONS AND THE DECISION AS TO WHAT TO DO WITH BUKHARIN AND RYKOV
STALIN WAS LEADING THE LENIENT GROUP
STALIN REMOVED YEZHOV AND HAD MANY PURGERS ARRESTED
BUKHARIN DEFENDS HIMSELF POORLY
CCCP DISMISSES SHARANGOVICH FOR SABOTAGE AND SENDS HIS CASE TO THE SECRET POLICE
PARTY LEADERSHIP IN THE ENEMIES HANDS
POLITBURO ORDERS SHOW TRIALS TO EXPOSE MASS FARMING SABOTAGE
TROIKAS SENTENCED PEOPLE TO BE SHOT, NOT STALIN
CC ATTACKS PEOPLE UNJUSTLY REPRESSING OTHERS TO LOOK GOOD
STALIN AND POSTYSHEV WERE NOT ENEMIES
YEGOROV WAS HIDING THE ACTIONS OF THE GENERALS
YEZHNOV ADMITS MANY SUBVERSIVES WERE IN THE GOVT
BUKHARIN TELLS STALIN HE WILL NOT TAKE BACK ANY OF HIS CONFESSION
THERE IS NO SOFT LIBERAL GROUP OPPOSING STALIN AND KEEPING HIM IN CHECK
STALIN WAS PREPARED FOR THE ATTACK WHEN IT CAME
MOLOTOV DENIES ASKING GERMANS WHY SU DESERVED TO BE ATTACKED
STALIN DID NOT FALL APART AFTER THE ATTACK BUT WAS VERY DEPRESSED
MOLOTOV SAYS CHURCHILL WAS THE SMARTEST 100% IMPERIALIST
MOLOTOV DESCRIBES THE DULLES BROTHERS
STALIN WANTS SAFE, SENSIBLE BORDER WITH POLAND
THE MAIN ISSUE AT POTSDAM WAS REPARATIONS
STALIN AND MOLOTOV SAID FRANCE SHOULD GET ITS LAND FROM US-BRIT AREA
SU PAID BACK LEND-LEASE IN PART
MOLOTOV JUSTIFIES DECLINING MARSHALL PLAN AID
MOLOTOV AND STALIN SUPPORT THE CREATION OF ISRAEL
STALIN HELPED OTHERS AND PEOPLE GRUMBLED
MOLOTOV’S VIEW OF PEACEFUL COEXISTENCE
PARTY WORKERS AVOID DEBATES AND FOCUS NOWADAYS ON PETTY ISSUES
MOLOTOV SAYS MAO WAS NEVER A MARXIST AND HAD IMPRACTICAL IDEAS
CHOU EN-LAI WAS PRACTICAL AND CLEVER BUT NO THEORIST
MOLOTOV SPOKE AGAINST TITO BUT NO ONE SUPPORTED HIM
MOLOTOV SAYS KHRUSHCHOV IS A NATIONALIST BUT SUPPORTS NATIONALISM
MOLOTOV SAYS TITO IS A PETTY-BOURGEOIS OPPOSED TO SOCIALISM
MOLOTOV SAYS LENIN WANTED TO GO PAST A BOURGEOIS GOVT TO SOCIALISM
MOLOTOV SAYS STALIN ERRED BY SUPPORTING THE BOURGEOIS GOVT
MOLOTOV SAYS TROTSKY WAS AN ORGANIZER NOT AN AGITATOR
LENIN PROPOSED CALLING IT THE COUNCIL OF COMMISSARS NOT MINISTERS
TROTSKY’S ROLE JUST AFTER THE REVOLUTION STARTED WAS COMMENDABLE
LENIN RELEGATED BUKHARIN TO OBSCURE ROLE IN FIRST POLITBURO
CRITICS DON’T UNDERSTAND THE ACCURACY OF LENIN
IT WAS HARD FOR LENIN TO BELIEVE MALINOVSKY WAS A POLICE AGENT
LENIN KEPT BOLSHEVIK SPIRITS HIGH
LENIN PRACTICED SOME REALPOLITIK FACTIONALISM OF HIS OWN
ZINOVIEV WAS COWARDLY AND HIS SUBORDINATE KAMENEV ACTUALLY GUIDED HIM
LENIN KEPT DZERZHINSKY OFF THE POLITBURO
LENIN WAS MORE SEVERE AND LESS LENIENT THAN STALIN
LENIN FELT PUTTING CAPITALISTS AND PRIESTS IN THE GOVT WAS INSANITY
LENIN DEMANDS A STATE MONOPOLY OF FOREIGN TRADE
MOLOTOV SAYS KOLLONTAI IS NOT A REAL REVOLUTIONARY
LENIN SUPERIOR TO STALIN BUT NOT IN PRACTICAL POLITICS
LENIN SAYS BOLSHEVIKS MUST NOT BE CONCEITED
PREOBRAZHENSKY WANTS STALIN DISMISSED AS GEN. SEC. BECAUSE HE HAS TOO MANY JOBS
ORDJONIKIDZE WAS UNSTABLE, SPINELESS AND OPPOSED THE PARTY LINE
ORDJONIKIDZE’S FAMILY BLAMES STALIN FOR HIS SUICIDE
SOME TROTS WERE GOOD AND HAD TO BE USED
DZERZHINSKY FOLLOWED TROTSKY EARLY ON
LENIN WAS CLOSE TO STALIN AND MADE HIM HIGHER THAN BUKHARIN
STALIN VOLUNTEERED TO RESIGN SEVERAL TIMES
BUKHARIN SOUGHT UNITY WITH THE SR’S
BUKHARIN WAS DANGEROUS AND LENIN SPOKE OUT AGAINST HIM
TROTSKY WAS A BETTER SPEAKER THAN BUKHARIN, LENIN AND STALIN
SOME POLIBURO MEMBERS WERE KEPT OUT OF THE LOOP
MANY TURNED IN THEIR PARTY CARDS WHEN LENIN SET UP NEP
LENIN WANTED SILENCE DURING MEETINGS AND NO SMOKING
LEADERS CAN’T BE RUDE OR ABUSE SUBORDINATES
LENIN HAD DOUBTS THE REVOLUTION WOULD OCCUR
PARTY PLAGUED BY FACTIONS WITHIN
MOLOTOV SAYS TROTSKY ADMITS HE WAS NO BOLSHEVIK & PREDICTED THE PARTY’S DEFEAT
FROM DIFFERENT PERSPECTIVES BUKHARIN AND TROTSKY KEEP PREDICTING DEFEAT
LENIN SAYS THE CHURCHES SHOULD GIVE UP MONEY TO HELP BEAT THE FAMINE
KRUPSKAYA EVENTUALLY SUPPORTED THE PARTY LINE AFTER LENIN’S DEATH
WHY STALIN AND KRUPSKAYA ARGUED AND LENIN’S HEALTH CARE
ONLY LIARS CLAIM LENIN TOOK GERMAN MONEY
MOLOTOV DISTRUSTS ANY CRITICISM OF MARX AND ENGELS
EARLY ON THE PARTY TRIED NOT TO EXPEL TROTSKY
STALIN COMPLIMENTED TROTSKY FOR HIS CIVIL WAR RECORD
SVERDLOV LEFT NOTHING BUT WAS PRAISED BY LENIN
DZERZHINSKY DENOUNCED ZINOVIEV AND KAMENEV AS KRONSTADTERS
LENIN MADE MISTAKES
LENIN CRITICIZED ZINOVIEV AND BUKHARIN IN THE END
LENIN REALIZED STALIN AND TROTSKY WERE THE TWO MAIN LEADERS
WHEN NEP FORMED LENIN’S 3 SECRETARIES WERE ALL TROTS WHO WERE LATER EXPELLED
WAR COMMUNISM WAS NECESSARY
STALIN CRITICIZED LENIN FOR HIS STRONG ATTACKS AGAINST LIBERALS
MOLOTOV SAYS REPRESSIONS WERE TOO LIGHT AND MISSED SOME KEY PEOPLE
BERIA HELPED KILL STALIN ACCORDING TO SOME
STALIN WORKED HIS WAY TO THE TOP BY EARNING IT
LENIN WAS THE ONLY PARTY GENIUS
STALIN WAS THE BEST MAN TO REPLACE LENIN
INDUSTRIALIZATION HAD TO BE DONE AT THE RIGHT TIME NOT WHEN TROTSKY WANTED IT
STALIN AND ZHUKOV SAY THE RUSSIAN PEOPLE BROKE THE BACK OF FASCISM
STALIN SHOULD NOT HAVE RETIRED AFTER THE WAR
LENIN WANTS JEWS ON COMMISSIONS TO ASSURE PROGRESS
DEPORTATION OF NATIONALITIES DURING THE WAR WAS NECESSARY AND JUSTIFIED
LENIN FAVORED CENTRALISM
HIGH TAXES WERE NEEDED TO RAISE MONEY
STALIN WOULD NOT EXCHANGE HIS SON FOR A NAZI GENERAL
STALIN GAVE HIS CHILDREN NO SPECIAL PRIVILEGES AND DID NOT PLAY FAVORITES
MOLOTOV AGREES WITH LENIN’S TESTAMENT ON STALIN
TERRORISM STARTED EARLY-ON BY COUNTER-REVOLUTIONARIES
STALIN WAS ABRUPT BUT FAIR
STALIN WILL EVENTUALLY BE REHABILITATED AND HONORED BY THE SOVIET PEOPLE
STALIN WAS NOT SIGNIFICANTLY OPPOSED AT THE 17TH PARTY CONGRESS
KIROV WAS NOT MORE POPULAR THAN STALIN OR QUALIFIED TO REPLACE HIM
TUKHACHEVSKY WAS NOT QUALIFIED TO LEAD THE GOVT
ZHDANOV WAS SECOND TO KIROV AFTER STALIN
MANY BOLSHEVIKS BEGAN THINKING LIKE GENTRY ACCORDING TO MOLOTOV
BOLSHEVIKS HAD NO THEORETICIANS AFTER LENIN
ONLY MOLOTOV AND KAGANOVICH REMAINED LOYAL TO STALIN TO THE END
MOLOTOV ASSESSES THE MAJOR PARTY LEADERS
MOLOTOV IS THE ONE WHO REALLY SPOKE OF STALIN FROM THE HEART
STALIN LACKED CONFIDENCE IN THOSE AROUND HIM NEAR THE END
COLLECTIVIZATION SOMETIMES REQUIRED HARSH METHODS OF PERSUASION
MOLOTOV SAYS A TERRORIST ATTEMPT WAS MADE ON HIS LIFE IN 1932
FAMINE WAS NOT CAUSED BY THE COMMUNIST LEADERSHIP
FIGURES ON FAMINE DEATHS ARE ABSURD AND FAR TOO HIGH
KULAKS REFUSED TO HAND OVER THE GRAIN FOR TWO YEARS
LENIN WOULD HAVE CARRIED OUT COLLECTIVIZATION THE SAME WAY
FOR SOCIALISM KOLKHOZES MUST EVOLVE INTO SOVKHOZES
LIES DOMINATE NOWADAYS
PURGING IS A RISKY BUSINESS
REPRESSION WAS NECESSARY EVEN THOUGH IT GOT SOME INNOCENT PEOPLE
FIGHTING THE WAR REQUIRED TOUGH LEADERSHIP
LENIN CHOSE STALIN TO LEAD THE BATTLE AGAINST FACTIONS
STALIN AND MOLOTOV NEVER ISSUED ORDER FOR TORTURE
DISTRICT PARTY SECRETARIES COULD SENTENCE PEOPLE JUST BEFORE THE WAR
ONLY STALIN AND MOLOTOV WERE TRUE LENINISTS
STALIN REPRESSED THOSE WHO NEEDED TO BE REPRESSED
OVERSIGHT OF THE SECURITY AGENCIES WAS INADEQUATE
MISTAKENLY RELIED ON GPU’S WORD
EXCEPT FOR THE MILITARY TRIAL THE TRIALS WERE OPEN AND PUBLIC
THERE WAS NO SCRIPT FOR THE TRIALS
THE TALENTED PEOPLE KILLED WERE TALENTED THE WRONG WAY
DEFENDANTS WERE NOT PROMISED THEIR LIVES IF THEY CONFESSED
HIGH OFFICIALS LOST FAITH IN THE CAUSE
RUDZUTAK WAS A RIGHTIST WORKING WITH RYKOV AND TOMSKY
REPRESSIONS OF WIVES AND CHILDREN WERE NECESSARY
TROTSKY WORKED WITH THE NAZIS
PEOPLE REPRESSED BY STALIN SUPPORT AND COMPLIMENT STALIN
STALIN NOT RESPONSIBLE FOR ALL THE REPRESSIONS BY ANY MEANS
MOLOTOV WAS  KEPT IN THE DARK BY BERIA AND KHRUSHCHOV
GUS HALL SUPPORTS THE CZECH INVASION
STALIN SAYS THE BEST WAY TO CONVERT OTHER COUNTRIES TO SOCIALISM IS BY EXAMPLE
STANDARD OF LIVING IS HIGHER IN SOCIALIST EASTERN EUROPE THAN THE SU
STALIN’S RETURN COULD BRING BETTER TIMES
INTELLECTUALS SYMPATHIZE WITH THE KULAKS
STALIN’S JUDGMENT NEAR THE END WAS OCCASIONALLY POOR
STALIN CARRIED A HEAVY BURDEN AND BURNED OUT AT THE END
KIROV WAS NOT QUALIFIED TO BE GEN. SEC. OR STALIN’S SUCCESSOR
BERIA DID NOT CARE WHAT KIND OF GOVERNMENT EAST GERMANY HAD
KHRUSHCHOV WAS A BUNGLER
KHRUSHCHOV ATTACKS MOLOTOV IN REGARD TO FARMING
STALIN’S MISTAKE WAS IN NOT TRAINING A SUCCESSOR
20TH PARTY SPEECH BY KHRUSCHOV
TRIED TO GET RID OF KHRUSHCHOV IN 1957
TERROR IS NECESSARY AT TIMES
MOLOTOV WAS EXPELLED FROM THE PARTY FOR SPEAKING OUT
SOME WANTED MOLOTOV AS LEADER
FOOD WAS NEVER PURCHASED FROM ABROAD
KHRUSCHOV HID HIS CRIMES AND PROMISED AN EASIER LIFE
DUBCEK AND BUKHARIN ARE SIMILAR RIGHTISTS
STALIN SOMETIMES ERRED ON THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN SOCIALISM AND COMMUNISM
LENIN ERRED ON THE PAY STRUCTURE OF SOCIALIST SOCIETY
PEACEFUL COEXISTENCE IS NOT A MARXIST-LENINIST PHRASE
STATE OF THE WHOLE PEOPLE CONCEPT IS NOT SOUND
THE MAJOR PROGRESS OF THE SU WAS DONE UNDER STALIN’S LEADERSHIP
THE TRANQUIL LIFE IS NOT FOR REAL REVOLUTIONARIES
DIFFICULT PERIODS LIE AHEAD
MOLOTOV COMPLIMENTS CASTRO
KRIVITSKY KILLED HIMSELF AND THE SECRET POLICE DID NOT DO IT
STALIN WANTS TROTSKY OUT OF THE WAY BECAUSE WAR IS COMING
SECRET POLICE DID NOT KILL SEDOV
STALIN DEFINITELY WANTED TO AVOID A TWO FRONT WAR
ENGLAND AND FRANCE SENT LESSER FIGURES TO NEGOTIATE PRIOR TO THE WAR
THE MOLOTOV-RIBBENTROP SECRET PROTOCOLS WERE NOT SECRET
KHRUSCHOV’S DETENTION OF KOST-LEVITSKY WAS UNNECESSARY
STALIN ABANDONED HIS PLAN TO HAVE HITLER KILLED
NAZIS VIEWED SOVIET DEFENSES AS WEAK
PAVLOV WAS INCOMPETENT
CHECHENS WOULD NOT COOPERATE WITH THE RED ARMY
VLASOV WAS EXECUTED AS A TRAITOR
ROSENBERGS WERE NOTHING MORE THAN MINOR COURIERS
STALIN GETS SERIOUS ABOUT BUILDING AN ATOMIC BOMB
STALIN’S ATOMIC DIPLOMACY
HISS WAS NOT A PAID OR CONTROLLED SOVIET AGENT
STALIN TOLD THE SECRET POLICE TO NOT TRACK DOWN ORLOV
KHRUSHCHOV IS RESPONSIBLE FOR KILLINGS
BANDERA’S GUERRILLAS KILL THOSE WORKING FOR THE GOVERNMENT
BRITISH AND US PLANES GET IN FIGHTS OVER SOVIET AIRSPACE
TIMASHUK’S LETTER REGARDING THE DOCTOR’S PLOT
STALIN PROMOTES ZHUKOV
CHAOS SURROUNDED STALIN’S FUNERAL
MOLOTOV’S WIFE WAS CAUGHT UP IN THE ANTI-ZIONISM EFFORT
EAST GERMAN RIOTS CAUSED BY DISAGREEMENT IN GOVT
THOSE WHO FOLLOWED STALIN REPRESSED PEOPLE
STALIN’S DEAD WIFE TREATED HIM WELL AND STALIN WAS KIND TO HER FAMILY
STALIN’S WIFE, DAUGHTER, FAMILY AND AIDES HATED BERIA
STALIN LOVED HIS DEAD WIFE TREMENDOUSLY
STALIN’S WIFE’S PHILOSOPHY AND MENTAL STATE
STALIN WAS A GEORGIAN WHO LOVED RUSSIA
STALIN WAS A KIND FATHER RAISING HIS DAUGHTER
STALIN’S SONS ARGUED A LOT
STALIN DEVOTED HIMSELF TO THE CAUSE MORE THAN TO HIS FAMILY
MANY LIES HAVE BEEN WRITTEN ABOUT STALIN AND HIS FAMILY
STALIN LIKED CHURCHILL
STALIN STUDIED HISTORY A LOT
STALIN SAYS SVETLANA’S HUSBAND IS TOO CALCULATING
STALIN IS VERY UPSET WHEN GOES OUT AND SEES THE WAR’S DESTRUCTION
STALIN WAS KEPT ISOLATED BY HIS SECURITY PEOPLE
STALIN WAS ALIENATED FROM HIS DAUGHTER
STALIN CRITICIZES HIS DAUGHTER FOR BEING ANTI-SOVIET
STALIN LOVED HIS DAUGHTER
STALIN RECEIVED SO MANY GIFTS HE SET UP A MUSEUM FOR THEM
STALIN DID NOT BELIEVE THERE WAS SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE FOR A DOCTOR’S PLOT
TROTSKY AND BUKHARIN HAD MULTIPLE WIVES
BOLSHEVIKS REGARDED THE PARTY AS THE GUARDIAN OF THE PROLETARIAN STATE
STALIN AIDED THE CHINESE COMMUNISTS
BUKHARIN, RYKOV, AND TOMSKY RECANT AND ACCEPT THE PARTY LINE
STALIN FOOLED THE JAPANESE WHO WERE PREPARING TO ATTACK
STALIN HAD TO EXPROPRIATE GRAIN IN THE WEST TO PREPARE FOR WAR WITH JAPAN
MANY IN THE OPPOSITION WORKED WITH THE NAZIS
PURGE GOT RID OF THE FIFTH COLUMNISTS
WOMEN WERE NOT FOUND IN THE OPPOSITION
STALIN’S REACTION TO MUNICH SELL-OUT
STALIN’S POLICY TOWARD THE NAZIS PROVED CORRECT BECAUSE THEY STRUCK WESTWARD
STALIN WAS MUCH MORE REASONABLE AND LESS DOGMATIC THAN HIS CRITICS
STALIN IS GENEROUS TO HIS FRIENDS
STALIN JUSTIFIES THE EXCESSES OF HIS SOLDIERS
STALIN FORESAW A RAPID RECOVERY OF GERMANY
STALIN BORROWED MONEY FROM THE FASCISTS
SPANISH GOVT WOULD NOT RECOGNIZE THE SOVIET GOVT
REVOLUTION WAS CARRIED OUT BY THE MASSES NOT A SMALL GROUP
STALIN HAD FAR MORE SUPPORT THAN TROTSKY
THE TESTAMENT WAS NOT KEPT HIDDEN BY STALIN
LENIN ATTACKED STALIN ON THE GEORGIAN NATIONALITIES ISSUE BUT STALIN WAS RIGHT
STALIN SAYS THE LEFT OPPOSITION IS AS RIGHT AS THE RIGHTISTS
RIGHTS RESORTED TO TERROR & SABOTAGE AS THEIR SITUATION BECAME MORE DESPERATE
EVIDENCE OF THE DEFENDANTS’ GUILT IN THE TRIALS IS OVERWHELMING & NOT FRAUDULENT
LENIN WOULD HAVE ACTED AS STALIN DID
OPPOSITION CLAIM THAT A NEW BOURGEOISIE HAD ARISEN IS FALSE
STALIN PREDICTED THE FASCIST ATTACK 10 YEARS EARLIER
STALIN SAID THEY HAD TO CATCH UP IN 5 TO 10 YEARS OR PERISH
STALIN CONTENDED THE CP MUST WORK FIRST TO AID THE WORLD PROLETARIAT
SU DID NOT FORCE SOCIALISM ON EASTERN EUROPE BUT IT AROSE INTERNALLY
SU AIDED RATHER THAN EXPLOITED EASTERN EUROPE AFTER WWII
STALIN AIDED ALBANIA WHILE KHRUSCHOV STABBED HOXHA IN THE BACK
KHRUSHCHOV IGNORES STALIN’S ACCOMPLISHMENTS & GIVES THE BOURGEOIS DESCRIPTION
NUMBERS GIVEN FOR NUMBERS EXECUTED ARE FAR TOO HIGH
NUMBERS GIVEN FOR THOSE IN PRISON ARE FAR TOO HIGH
REPRESSION UNDER STALIN WAS GREATER THAN UNDER LENIN BECAUSE OF HIGHER NUMBERS
EVERYTHING CONSIDERED THE BOLSHEVIKS ACTUALLY MADE FEW MISTAKES
STALIN WAS PRECISE AND WANTED CLARITY AND PRECISION
OVERALL DESCRIPTION OF STALIN’S PERSONALITY
STALIN KNEW A LOT ABOUT ARMAMENTS, WEAPONRY, AND MILITARY MATERIAL
KHRUSHCHOV LIES ABOUT STALIN
STALIN CARRIED OUT SENSIBLE COLD WAR PREPAREDNESS
BERIA RELEASED DANGEROUS CRIMINALS AFTER STALIN DIED
KHRUSHCHOV INSTITUTED CAPITALIST PROGRAMS
KHRUSHCHOV ATTACKS CENTRALIZATION
KHRUSHCHOV CRITICIZES MAO
KHRUSHCHOV ACCUSES STALIN OF GIVING PART OF THE UKRAINE TO POLAND AFTER WWII
KHRUSHCHOV ADMITS STALIN SHOWED MORE TOLERANCE THAN HE DID
RED ARMY WAS IN NO POSITION TO IMMEDIATELY AID THE WARSAW UPRISING
STALIN WANTED TO HEAL WITH THE POLES THE RUSSO-NAZI TREATY WOUND
STALIN TELLS CHURCHILL HE WANTS ELECTIONS IN POLAND TO HEAL THE WOUNDS
MOST OF THE POLISH PEOPLE SUPPORTED THE SOCIALIZATION OF POLAND
KHRUSHCHOV OPPOSES COLLECTIVIZATION
KHRUSHCHOV REFUTES HIS OWN CRITICISM OF STALIN REGARDING GOMULKA
GOMULKA FAVORS A FORM OF SIMPLE CAPITALIST PRIVATE FARMS OVER COLLECTIVES
KHRUSHCHOV SAYS HE WAS FORCED TO RETIRE
KHRUSHCHOV EXPOSES HIS IGNORANT FOREIGN POLICY OF AIDING GOVTS INSTEAD OF MASSES
US DEMANDED LEND-LEASE SHIPS BE RETURNED AND THEN SUNK THEM
KHRUSHCHOV THINKS TRUMAN IS A FOOL
KHRUSHCHOV DENOUNCES REUTHER’S PEACEFUL-COEXISTENCE BETWEEN CLASSES
STALIN COULD PERSUADE WORKERS AND TALK TO THEM IN THEIR LANGUAGE
STALIN DID NOT ABUSE OPPONENTS OR TALK IN VIOLENT LANGUAGE
WHAT IT TAKES TO BE A REVOLUTIONARY AND STALIN HAD ALL OF IT
STALIN SAYS A GOOD LEADER MUST FIRST CONSULT THE MASSES BEFORE ACTING
STALIN WAS AN EDUCATOR IN MARXIST IDEAS AND ORGANIZED DEBATES IN PRISON
STALIN MAINTAINED MARXIST THEORY AGAINST REVISIONISTS
STALIN DESCRIBES HIS FIRST ENCOUNTERS WITH LENIN
LENIN COMPLIMENTS STALIN’S WRITINGS
SOME PEOPLE WANT TO DISTORT THE ROLE OF THE DICTATORSHIP OF THE PROLETARIAT
LENIN AND STALIN BEGAN TO CREATE A STATE WITHIN A STATE
RULING CLASS DID NOT REALIZE A NEW REVOLUTIONARY PERIOD WAS ARISING
LENIN REMAINED IMPASSIVE WHEN FACING THOSE STALIN CALLED THE HYSTERICS
LENIN CONSULTED WITH STALIN BEFORE SENDING TROTSKY BREST-LITOVSK ORDERS
STALIN SAVES THE DAY ON MILITARY FRONTS SUCH AS TSARITSYN
KILLING OTHERS FOR HUMANITY IS JUSTIFIED
COMPARED TO THE BLOOD SHED UNDER OPPRESSION THE BLOOD OF REVOLUTION IS MINIMAL
BOLSHEVIKS TRY TO RE-EDUCATE PRISONERS FIGHTING AGAINST THEIR OWN INTERESTS
REPRESSION SHOULD BE MINIMAL AND KEPT TO A BALANCE OF NOT TOO MUCH OR TOO LITTLE
BEING TOO LENIENT OR GENTLE REPEATEDLY COST THE BOLSHEVIKS
IF NOT FOR THE ATTACKS BY OUTSIDE POWERS STALIN WOULD FAVOR NO DEATH PENALTY
FEDERATION OF SOVIET NATIONS IS BETTER FOR ALL THAN INDEPENDENCE
STALIN FOUGHT GREAT RUSSIAN CHAUVINISM OVER OTHER NATIONALITIES
BULLITT SAYS PEOPLE WILL BE JUDGED BY THE EXTENT TO WHICH THEY DEFENDED THE SU
DESTRUCTION BY THE INTERVENTION WAS TERRIBLE
CONFISCATIONS DURING THE REVOLUTION MUST BE THOROUGH AND COMPLETE
LENIN AND STALIN OPPOSE A CONCESSION THAT ZINOVIEV AND KAMENEV FAVOR
NEP COULD NOT BE AVOIDED
RELATIVE POWER OF PRIVATE OWNERS AND THE STATE UNDER NEP
BOLSHEVIKS REALIZE POWER RESTS ON A BALANCE BETWEEN THE TOWNS AND PEASANTRY
THOSE OPPOSING NEP ARE THE OPPORTUNISTS
LENIN COMPROMISED IN AREAS OTHER THAN THE NEP
STALIN MADE THE RIGHT DECISIONS AT THE RIGHT TIME
LENIN WAS THE GREATEST AND EMBODIED THE REVOLUTION
DECISIONS MUST BE MADE AFTER CONSULTING THE MASSES
STALIN BELIEVES PERSUASION NOT FORCE SHOULD BE USED WITH THE MASSES
STALIN IS NOT THE MAN HE IS DEPICTED AS BEING
ECONOMIC ADVANCEMENTS IN THE 20’S
DIFFERENCES WITH THE OPPOSITION IN THE 20’S ARE NOT SMALL
OPPOSITION REFUSES TO ACCEPT THE MAJORITY VOTE AND BECOMES A FACTION
OPPOSITION UNITES AROUND TROTSKY
TROTSKY WAS AN ANTI-BOLSHEVIK MENSHEVIK AT HEART
TROTSKY WAS TOO INDECISIVE, IMPRACTICAL, AND VACILLATING TO LEAD
LENIN AND TROTSKY CLASH OVER THE IDEA OF SOCIALISM IN ONE COUNTRY
REGARDING SOCIALISM IN ONE COUNTRY TROTSKY ALIGNS WITH THE SOCIAL-DEMOCRATS
TROTSKYISM IS COUNTER-REVOLUTIONARY
STALIN SAYS THE FUNDAMENTAL QUESTION IS THE DICTATORSHIP OF THE PROLETARIAT
THE OPPOSITION’S FIGURES ARE INACCURATE & ITS PROGRAM IMPRACTICAL
LENIN ATTACKS THOSE ATTACKING THE GOVT UNDER THE GUISE OF REJECTING BUREAUCRACY
TROTSKY AND ZINOVIEV WERE GIVEN ONE LAST CHANCE TO RECANT IN 1927 BUT WOULD NOT
STALIN WAS A CONFIDENT MAN OF ACTION AND PROGRESS
OPPOSITION SPREADS DOOM AND GLOOM ABOUT THE REVOLUTION’S CHANCES
STALIN CONTINUED THE IDEAS OF LENIN AND PROTECTED THEM
HOW ARE THE ADVANCEMENTS FINANCED
GREAT ADVANCEMENTS AND SUCCESS OF THE FIVE YEAR PLAN
STATE FARMS CHANGED INTO SOVKHOZ AND PRIVATE FARMS INTO KOLKHOZES
STALIN FAVORS THE ARTEL FORM OF KOLKHOZ RATHER THAN THE COMMUNE
SOCIALISM FAVORS MAXIMUM OF GOOD OVER MINIMUM OF EFFORT
STALIN SAYS THE APPEARANCE OF VILLAGES HAS BEEN IMPROVED GREATLY
SOVIET INDUSTRIAL PROJECTS ARE A GREAT SUCCESS
MARXISTS HAVE SUFFERED AND DIED BY THE MILLIONS FOR THE CAUSE
STALIN SAYS MARXISTS ARE NOT TRYING TO EQUALIZE EVERYONE
CRITICISM OF THE SU SHOULD FOCUS ON THE POSITIVE AS WELL AS THE NEGATIVE
NO POLITICAL PARTIES HAVE AN HONEST POLICY EXCEPT THE BOLSHEVIKS
STALIN SAYS THE SU WILL NOT SEIZE OR YIELD LAND
GOODS ARE UNEQUALLY DISTRIBUTED BECAUSE OF ECONOMIC NATIONALISM
THE CAPITALIST DISGUISE OF FASCISM
MUSSOLINI IS THE LOUD-SPEAKER OF REACTION AND FASCISM
WAR IS THE ONLY RECOURSE FOR HITLER
GANDHI’S RESTRAINT HAS SOLD OUT INDIA IN A RIVER OF BLOOD
GREAT BRITAIN IS THE LAST STRONGHOLD OF REACTION
US AND JAPAN WILL ALWAYS BE ENEMIES
NOTHING CAN BE ACCOMPLISHED EXCEPT THROUGH INTERNATIONALISM
STALIN IS HUMBLE AND NOT DOMINATED BY PRIDE OR PERSONAL VANITY
TROTSKY TRIES TO BELITTLE STALIN’S ROLE IN THE REVOLUTION
TROTSKY DID NOT JOIN THE PARTY UNTIL AUG. 1917
SOCIALIST INDUSTRIALIZATION WAS FAR LESS PAINFUL THAN CAPITALIST INDUSTRIALIZATION
SU PROVED SOCIALISM IN ONE COUNTRY COULD WORK
WORKING CLASS CONTROL WOULD HAVE COLLAPSED IF THE KULAKS HAD PREVAILED
WHEN COLLECTIVIZATION IS CALLED FOR GROUPS RUSH TO HELP INSTALL IT
POOR PEASANTS WERE THE PRIMARY IMPLIMENTERS OF COLLECTIVIZATION
THE KULAK CLASS WAS TO BE ELIMINATED NOT THE KULAKS THEMSELVES
SOVIET GOVT TRIES TO SAVE FROM EPIDEMIC THE CHILDREN SENT INTO EXILE
CONQUEST’S FIGURES ARE ALL BUT WORTHLESS
MANY DEPORTED PEOPLE DIED BECAUSE PARTY DIRECTIVES WERE IGNORED
ABORTION WAS MADE ILLEGAL TO INCREASE THE POPULATION
CONQUEST IS A PAID PROPAGANDA AGENT AND LIED ABOUT STALIN
WHAT FAMINE THERE WAS IN THE EARLY 30’S WAS CAUSED BY THE KULAKS
ALL THE TROTS AND ZINOVIEVITES ARE EXPELLED
ZINOVIEV AND KAMENEV RECANT
BUKHARIN SUPPORTED THE KULAKS
BUKHARIN THE RIGHTIST UNITES WITH KAMENEV AND ZINOVIEV THE LEFTISTS
ZINOVIEV AND KAMENEV EXPELLED AGAIN FOR ACCEPTING THE RYUTIN PLATFORM
KIROV’S KILLING CAUSED DISARRAY IN THE PARTY WHICH THOUGHT EVERYONE WAS UNITED
NEAR THE END TROTSKY UNITES WITH ALL SORTS OF ANTI-SOVIET FORCES
TROTSKY USES THE ARGUMENT THAT OLD BOLSHEVIKS COULD NOT HAVE CHANGED SIDES
YET, MANY OLD BOLSHEVIKS HAD CHANGED EARLIER
TROTSKY CLAIMED COUNTER-REV COULD ONLY TAKE OVER BY A BLOODBATH NOT FROM WITHIN
EXPLOSIONS IN MINES LED TO DEBATE OVER USING BOURGEOIS SPECIALISTS
LITTLEPAGE SHOWED THE SABOTAGE CHARGES WERE VALID & NOT ANTI-0PPONENT EXCUSES
BUKHARIN IS ALERT AND LUCID AT HIS TRIAL AND DENIES SOME ACCUSATIONS
SOLZHENITSYN WORKED WITH REACTIONARIES AND SUPPORTED TRAITOROUS GENERALS
SOME PEOPLE ARE EXPELLED AND READMITTED MANY TIMES
INCOMPETENT PARTY LEADERS ARE EXPELLING AND PURGING THE WRONG PEOPLE
PEOPLE UNJUSTLY EXPELLED AND PURGED APPEALED AND WERE READMITTED
PURGES WERE NECESSARY AND SAVED THE SU FROM THE FIFTH COLUMNISTS AND DEFEAT
BEFORE HITLER BRITAIN LED THE ANTI-SOVIET CRUSADE
STALIN DISTRUSTS REPORTS OF GERMAN AGGRESSIVE ACTS
STALIN ORDERED THE ATTACK DIRECTIVE BE WRITTEN BUT THE ATTACK DID NOT HAPPEN
KHRUSHCHOV LIED WHEN HE SAID STALIN ORDERED NO RETURN FIRE
NAZIS VIEWED COMMUNISTS AND MARXISTS AS THE MAIN ENEMY
STALIN CONSULTED AND LISTENED TO OTHER GENERALS IN THE WAR
STALIN’S REASONS FOR NOT VISITING THE FRONT DURING THE WAR ARE JUSTIFIED
CHURCHILL BLASTS TROTSKY AND HIS IMMENSE EGO
REVOLUTIONARY INTELLECTUALS OFTEN PUT THEIR EGOS ABOVE THE CAUSE
1936 TRIAL WAS NO FRAME-UP
ALBANIAN ECONOMIC POLICY WAS SUCCESS WITHIN STALIN’S LINES
VYSHINSKY TELLS HOXHA THAT TITOISM IS NOT SOCIALISM
STALIN DISCOUNTS THE POPE AS AN ALLY AND CONSIDERS HIM REACTIONARY
MEETINGS WITH STALIN WERE MUCH FRIENDLIER THAN WITH KHRUSHCHOV & HIS ALLIES
HOXHA ATTACKS KHRUSHCHOV FOR WANTING TO COPY HITLER
HOXHA DESCRIBES THE CHANGES OF THE CHINESE LINE FROM ANTI TO PRO TO ANTI MARXIST
HOXHA DESCRIBES THE UNDERMINING OF HUNGARY
HOXHA TOLD SUSLOV THAT IMRE NAGY WAS A TRAITOR
HOXHA SAYS SUSLOV WAS A DEMAGOGUE
HOXHA ARGUES WITH KHRUSCHOV ABOUT WHO IS A MARXIST
HOXHA SAYS KOSYGIN IS A REVISIONIST MUMMY
EXPULSIONS & REINSTATEMENTS BY POLICE HELPED DETERMINE WHO WERE RELIABLE POLICE
EXILED PEOPLE WERE ALLOWED TO RETURN
THOSE ALLOWED TO RETURN STILL TALKED OF ASSASSINATION
CASE WAS BEING BUILT AGAINST YAGODA WHILE HE STILL WORKED FOR THE SECRET POLICE
REAL DESTRUCTION OF ZINOVIEV AND KAMENEV OCCURRED IN MAY 1935
YENUKIDZE HAD PLANNED TO DESTROY STALINISM ROOT AND BRANCH
SOVIET LEADERS DO NOT KNOW OF THE SECRET UNDERCOVER PILOTS
THERE WAS A RIGHT-WING MILITARY UNDERGROUND IN MOSCOW
BUKHARIN WAS BECOMING A SOCIAL-DEMOCRAT LIKE THOSE IN THE WEST
SUBVERSIVES AND TERRORISTS DECIDE IT IS TIME TO ACT
COMRADE X TURNS DOWN ASSASSINATION OF STALIN IDEA BECAUSE 15 HAVE FAILED
PEOPLE ARE EXPELLED AND REINSTATED REPEATEDLY
TOMSKY HAD MANY JOBS BESIDES BEING ON THE POLITBURO
PEOPLE TAKEN OFF THE POLITBURO STILL RETAINED HIGH POSITIONS
REMOVAL OF YAGODA COSTS THE OPPOSITION DEARLY
ANDREYEV AND MALENKOV WERE SECRET TROTSKYITES AND RADEK KNEW IT
OPPOSITION HAS NO MASS SUPPORT BECAUSE IT HAS NO PROGRAM
BOLSHEVIK PARTY WAS NOT MONOLITHIC
BERIA EXPOSES THE GREAT EXCESSES OF YEZHOV
SUBVERSIVES TRIED MANY TIMES TO KILL STALIN AND HIS ALLIES
KILLING STALIN BEFORE THE WAR WOULD HAVE BEEN STUPID AND SPELLED ENGLAND’S DOOM
SAYING THE SOVIET PEOPLE MET THE NAZIS WITH HAPPINESS OR RELIEF IS ABSURD
SOME PARTY MEMBERS WERE WORTHLESS
NAZIS RE-OPENED THE CHURCHES BUT THE PEOPLE REMAINED LOYAL TO SOVIET POWER
MILITARY OFFICERS WHO PLANNED TO OVERTHROW STALIN TURNED IN HIS FAVOR
THE PEOPLE STALIN PUNISHED WERE NOT INNOCENT BUT GUILTY
RUSSIAN REFUGEES HAVE NO SUBSTANCE
STALIN FURIOUS OVER TREATMENT OF FORMER NAZI SCIENTIST
WESTERN SPIES ARE IMMORAL AND UNSCRUPULOUS
STALIN COMPLIMENTS TOKAEV
TROTSKY STARTS BY WANTING TO END THE KULAKS AND LATER DEFENDS THEM
KHRUSHCHOVISM IS TROTSKYISM IN ESSENCE
TROTSKY DENOUNCES LENINISM
LENIN OPPOSES TROTSKY ON MAJOR ISSUES
MEDVEDEV IS A BOGUS SCHOLAR WHO RELIES ON GOSSIP RATHER THAN DOCUMENTATION
RUTHLESS STRUGGLE GAINING MIDDLE CLASS SUPPORT WAS NEEDED FOR COLLECTIVIZATION
DESCRIPTIONS OF ALL THE DEFENDANTS AT THE FOUR MAJOR TRIALS
TROTSKY ADVOCATED TERRORISM IN HIS PUBLICATION
OPPOSITIONISTS COMMITTED MANY DIFFERENT TYPES OF CRIMES
THE VERY PEOPLE WHO SHOULD HAVE PROTECTED THE STATE MOST WERE THE CRIMINALS
BOURGEOIS VERSION OF THE TRIALS HAS NOTHING TO DO WITH REALITY
BOURGEOIS EXPLANATION OF THE CONFESSIONS MAKES NO SENSE
SECRET POLICE PERSONNEL ARE ARRESTED FOR BEING UNJUST TO PEOPLE
TROTSKYISM HAS NEVER SUCCEEDED IN LEADING ANY NATION
THE PEASANTS SUPPORTED THE BOLSHEVIKS ON ONE ISSUE AFTER ANOTHER
STALIN SAYS FASCISTS ARE NOT NATIONALISTS BUT ARE IMPERIALISTS
LENIN ADVOCATED THE USE OF TERROR
DZERSHINSKY ACCUSES BUKHARIN OF BEING OPPOSED TO THE GPU
MANY SECRET POLICE ARE GUILTY OF GREAT ABUSES AND CRIMES AND PUNISHED
SUBVERSIVES PENETRATED THE GOVT AND WERE ELIMINATING BONA FIDE MARXISTS
STALIN TELLS BUKHARIN THAT TROTSKY, ZINOVIEV & KAMENEV ARE WORKING WITH HITLER
THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE ATTACKS THE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY’S RECORD
CC PLENUM COMPLAINS THAT PRISONS ARE TOO COMFORTABLE AND LIKE REST HOMES
CC PLENUM COMPLAINS THAT VETTING OF CHEKA PEOPLE IS LAX AND SUBVERSIVES GET IN
TIMASHUK SAYS SHE SAID ZHDANOV’S HEART WAS BAD BUT THE DOCTORS IGNORED HER
PRISONERS WHO HELPED CONSTRUCT THE BALTIC-WHITE SEA CANAL GET REDUCED TERMS
THOSE PRISONERS WHO FOUGHT FOR THE POLES IN SEPT 1939 RECEIVE FAIR TREATMENT
EFFORTS TO CENSOR FEUCHTWANGER’S BOOK ARE STOPPED
HUMANE RESETTLEMENT OF GERMANS FROM THE UKRAINE
HUMANE RESETTLEMENT OF CRIMEAN TATARS
HUMANE RESETTLEMENT OF CRIMEAN TATARS, BULGARIANS, GREEKS, & ARMENIANS
BERIA SAYS THE RESETTLED PEOPLE FOUND GOOD LIVING CONDITIONS AT THEIR DESTINATION
POLITBURO TELLS THE ENGLISH THEY WILL EXECUTE PRISONERS IF THE ENGLISH DO
LENIN SAYS BOURGEOIS INTELLECTUALS ARE NOT THE BRAINS OF THE NATION BUT ITS SHIT
LENIN TELLS STALIN WHO HE FEELS SHOULD BE DEPORTED
STALIN ALLOWED GREATER FREE SPEECH THAN HIS SUCCESSORS
CULTURE DIRECTOR SAYS SOLZHENITSYN PROVED HE WAS A SUBVERSIVE FROM THE START
EARLY REPORT SAYS OPPOSITION TO GRAIN REQUISITIONS CAUSED BY GOVT INEPTNESS
HUMANE EVICTION OF KULAKS FROM THE POLES REGION OF THE UKRAINE
UKRAINIAN PARTY ORDERS CAUSES OF FAMINE BE EXPOSED AND PEOPLE BE HELPED
INDUSTRIAL SUCCESS WAS THE KEY TO THE COMMUNIST SYSTEM AND NATIONAL PROSPERITY
LENIN ORDERS THE MOST REACTIONARY CLERGY TO BE SHOT AND THEIR PROPERTY TAKEN
GPU REPORTS ON THE CLERGY’S SUBVERSION OF THE PEASANTRY
AMERICAN SAYS THERE IS MORE INCORRECT INFO ABOUT THE SU THAN ANY OTHER TOPIC
TROTSKY WAS A PROLIFIC WRITER ALWAYS READY TO LIE ABOUT OPPONENTS
STALIN WAS DEFINITELY NOT THE GREY BLUR IN SOVIET HISTORY TROTSKY SAID HE WAS
STALIN WAS ONE OF THE EARLY OUTSTANDING LEADERS OF THE REVOLUTION
STALIN PROTECTS ZINOVIEV AND KAMENEV FROM LENIN’S WRATH
THE CONSTITUENT ASSEMBLY IS DISBANDED AS COUNTER-REV
STALIN WAS NOT GRASPING FOR POWER BUT WAS GIVEN IT BY LENIN
LENIN’S ILLNESS WAS AFFECTING HIS MENTAL BALANCE
STALIN IS DEEPLY HURT BY LENIN’S CRITICISM AT THE END
STALIN WAS QUIET, RESERVED, CALM THOUGHTFUL, PATIENT, RETICENT AND MODEST
STALIN WAS OFTEN MORE LENIENT THAN LENIN, ZINOVIEV, SECRET POLICE HEADS & OTHERS
KRUPSKAYA BRINGS FORTH THE TESTAMENT AT THE LAST MINUTE TO DAMAGE STALIN
ZINOVIEV & KAMENEV WANT TESTAMENT IGNORED SO STALIN IS IN POWER AGAINST TROTSKY
BUKHARIN WAS PUT ON THE POLITBURO TO FILL LENIN’S VACANCY
MEMBERS OF THE OPPOSITION ATTACK ONE ANOTHER AS MUCH AS THEY ATTACK STALIN
MAJOR OPPOSITION LEADERS RECANT THEIR FACTIONALISM TO RETAIN SOME PARTY POWER
BERIA DISLIKES SEROV IMMENSELY
STALIN WAS VERY PATIENT, LENIENT, AND TOLERANT OF THE OPPOSITION
IN MID-20’S THE OPPOSITION SWEARS AN OATH OF ALLEGIANCE
STALIN’S GENERALS IN 1941 LED HIM TO BELIEVE WAR IS NOT IMMINENT
STALIN TRIES TO FORESTALL AN ATTACK UP TO THE LAST MINUTE BUT STILL PREPARES
STALIN HONORED WITH A CEREMONIAL BRITISH SWORD AT TEHRAN
CHURCHILL IS MAD ABOUT STALIN’S JOKE OF SHOOTING 50,000  GERMAN OFFICERS
STALIN TRIES TO GET ALONG WITH THE WEST AFTER WWII
POLISH UNDERGROUND FOUGHT THE SU BUT ITS LEADERS WERE TREATED LENIENTLY
MILLIONS MOURNED AT HIS FUNERAL AFTER STALIN’S DEATH
BERIA WAS A TRAITOR, CAPITALIST AGENT, CAREERIST, AND LIAR TO STALIN
MOLOTOV SAYS THERE ARE ANTI-SOVIET TRAITORS IN THE POST-STALIN GOVT
STALIN MADE MISTAKES AND ADMITTED AS MUCH
BERIA HAD A POOR KNOWLEDGE OF MARXIST IDEOLOGY
VYSHINSKY WAS VERY INTELLIGENT
VYSHINSKY DEFENDS HIMSELF IN THE TRIALS
ADVANCEMENTS AND ACCOMPLISHMENTS OF THE REVOLUTION
THE NUMBER OF WORLD POWERS HAS STEADILY GONE DOWN FOR OVER 100 YEARS
SURROUNDING WORLD CAPITALISM HAS MADE SOVIET SOCIALISM SOMETHING IT IS NOT
DUMA TRIES TO LULL PEOPLE AND DIVERT THEM FROM THE REAL BATTLE IN THE STREETS
STALIN SAYS LAND MUST BE TAKEN FROM NOBLES AND GIVEN TO PEASANTS
STALIN CONTRASTS MARXISM WITH ANARCHISM
STALIN REJECTS POSITION THAT PROLETARIAT MUST BE A MAJORITY FOR THE REVOLUTION
MARXISTS SAY FIGHT FASCIST VIOLENCE WITH FORCE
RULING CLASS WILL NOT LEAVE VIA REFORMS AND CONCESSIONS
DICTATORSHIP OF THE PROLETARIAT CAN ONLY COME ABOUT THROUGH VIOLENT REVOLUTION
STALIN SAYS THE DIC, OF THE PROL. IS THE ENTIRE PERIOD FROM CAPITALISM TO COMMUNISM
STALIN SAYS IT IS MASSES, PEOPLE, THAT COUNT, NOT LEADERS
STALIN SAYS FREEDOM MUST BE ACCOMPANIED BY GOODS IF IT IS TO BE WORTHWHILE
PARTY PEOPLE MUST NOT BE FAVORED OVER NON-PARTY PEOPLE FOR JOBS
STALIN SAYS THEY MUST NOT AUTOMATICALLY ASSUME EVERY EXPERT IS GUILTY
STALIN SAYS RESTORATION OF CAPITALISM IS POSSIBLE BECAUSE OF SMALL PRODUCTION
VICTORY OF THE RIGHT IN THE SU WOULD MEAN A CAPITALIST VICTORY
CAPITALIST ENCIRCLEMENT ALWAYS MEANS POSSIBLE FASCIST ATTACK
SOMETIMES FORCE AGAINST THE KULAKS WAS NECESSARY
TRYING TO MERELY PERSUADE SOME KULAKS TO YIELD THEIR GRAIN IS STUPID
BECAUSE EXCESSES HAPPEN DOES NOT MEAN A CORRECT POLICY SHOULD BE ABANDONED
STALIN’S NATIONALITIES PROGRAM HAS DEGREES OF INDEPENDENCE AND AUTONOMY
CONSTITUTION PRESERVES THE DICTATORSHIP OF THE PROLETARIAT
THE EXTERNAL ENEMIES CAUSE NEED FOR THE CHEKA NOT THE INTERNAL ENEMIES
RELIGION IS THE OPPOSITE OF SCIENCE AND MUST BE FOUGHT
NOWADAYS WARS ARE NOT DECLARED BUT JUST BREAK OUT
NATIONAL SELF-DETERMINATION IS SECONDARY TO PROLETARIAN DICTATORSHIP
STALIN SAYS THE REVOLUTION CAN BEGIN IN LESS RATHER THAN MORE DEVELOPED NATIONS
ENGLISH WERE THE PRIME OPP0NENTS OF PEOPLE GAINING FREEDOM
INDIVIDUAL & COLLECTIVE, SOCIALIST, INTERESTS WORK IN HARMONY NOT CONFLICT
AMERICAN PRESIDENTS LIKE ROOSEVELT SERVE AT THE WHIM OF THE CAPITALIST CLASS
MARXISTS SUPPORT REFORMS, COMPROMISE AND AGREEMENTS
STALIN PREDICTS AN ECONOMIC CRISIS IN THE US AND THE END OF WORLD CAPITALISM
STALIN SAYS COMINTERN LEADERS ARE NOT DIRECTING THE WORLD’S COMMUNIST PARTIES
STALIN REFUSES TO LECTURE THE CAPITALISTS ON MORALITY WHEN THEY HAVE NONE
STALIN’S EXILE, IMPRISONMENT, AND ESCAPE CAREER SHOWS GREAT DETERMINATION
SPECULATIONS ON STALIN’S MENTAL STATE AND PRIVATE ATTITUDES ARE BASELESS
NUMBERS GIVEN FOR PEOPLE REPRESSED ARE FAR TOO UNRELIABLE AND BIASED
EVERYBODY SUPPORTED STALIN AT THE 17TH CONGRESS
BUKHARIN AND RYKOV RECANT BUT OTHER RIGHTISTS DO NOT
CENTRALIZATION AND TOTALITARIANISM DID NOT RULE IN THE SU OF THE 30’S
THE PURGE OR PROVERKA WAS NOT A RESULT OF THE KIROV MURDER
KIROV WAS NOT LESS REPRESSIVE OR MORE LENIENT THAN STALIN
STALIN AND KIROV WERE ALLIES
NEW EVIDENCE DIRECTLY IMPLICATES ZINOVIEV AND KAMENEV IN KIROV MURDER
STALIN URGES TREATING TROTSKYISTS AND FORMER TROTSKYISTS FAIRLY
STALIN SAYS LEADERS SHOULD JUDGE PEOPLE AS INDIVIDUALS NOT AS PART OF A GROUP
IN 1937 STALIN WARNED AGAINST EXCESSES AGAINST MANAGEMENT AND LEADERS
STALIN AND HIS ALLIES TRIED TO CONTROL EXCESSES AND UNJUST EXPULSIONS
PURGES DECREASED THROUGH THE 30’S AND DIFFER FROM THE EZHOVSHCHINA
THERE IS NO EVIDENCE OF A STALIN MASTER PLAN TO ELIMINATE OPPONENTS IN THE 30’S
SOME PEOPLE ARE OBSESSED WITH WRITING AGAINST STALIN
RUMOR, GOSSIP, AND HEARSAY DOMINATE ANTI-STALIN PROPAGANDA WRITINGS
STALIN DENOUNCED OPPOSITIONISTS BUT THEY REMAINED IN HIGH POSITIONS
BREZHNEV SOUGHT TO REHABILITATE STALIN RATHER THAN FORGET OR IGNORE HIM
BOLSHEVIKS SUPPORT NATIONAL INDEPENDENCE UP TO COMPLETE SECESSION
OPPOSITION PRESS SHUT DOWN IN SUMMER OF 1918 BECAUSE OF RUMOR-MONGERING & LYING
LENIN ADMITS HE WAS WRONG AND STALIN WAS RIGHT
TROTSKY SAYS LENIN LIKED STALIN’S FIRMNESS & CHARACTER NOT HIS CREATIVITY & IDEAS
LENIN WAS VERY WORRIED ABOUT STALIN’S HEALTH
SVERDLOV WAS THE ORIGINAL LEADER UNDER LENIN
LENIN PROPOSED THAT STALIN BE TRANSFERRED FROM GEN. SEC. NOT REMOVED
TROTSKY WAS A MILITARY BUNGLER AND INCOMPETENT
TROTSKY REFUSES TO TAKE A LEADING ROLE WHILE LENIN IS INCAPACITATED
TROTSKY REFUSES TO HELP LENIN CRITICIZE STALIN ON THE GEORGIAN QUESTION
TROTSKY SAYS THE PARTY IS ALWAYS RIGHT AND MUST ALWAYS BE SUPPORTED
OPPOSITION EXAGGERATED THE POWER OF THE CAPITALISTS UNDER NEP
TROTSKY WAS UNPOPULAR BUT WAS ALLOWED FREEDOM TO PUBLISH
TROTSKY WAS RELIEVED OF MANY POSITIONS BUT REMAINED ON THE POLITBURO
ZINOVIEV AND KAMENEV BEGIN LEFT OPPOSITION AGAINST STALIN AFTER TROTSKY’S DEFEAT
LENIN WAS HARSH IN DEBATES WITH OPPONENTS
DURING AN EARLY TRIAL KAMENEV DENOUNCED PART OF LENIN’S PROGRAM
ZINOVIEV AND KAMENEV TRY TO TAKE OVER THE PARTY AFTER SPLIT WITH STALIN
TROTSKY AND ZINOVIEV UNITE AND FORGIVE EACH OTHER
UNITED OPPOSITION IS REJECTED BY THE PARTY’S MAJORITY
OPPOSITION LIED WHEN IT SAID IT WOULD END FACTIONALISM
1927 TROTSKY DEMONSTRATION FAILED BADLY
TROTSKY CONTENDS THE OPPOSITION IS STRONG AND GROWING WHEN IT ISN’T
TROTSKY DID NOT UNDERSTAND THE SU OR WHAT WAS GOING ON
BUKHARIN GIVES THE MEMORIAL SPEECH ON LENIN’S DEATH
IN DIZZY WITH SUCCESS STALIN CRITICIZES THOSE CLOSING CHURCHES
KULAKS IN EXILE SETTLEMENTS WERE GIVEN FREEDOM BECAUSE THEY FOUGHT IN THE WAR
POOR LEADERS OF EARLY STATE FARMS WERE FIRED OR BROUGHT TO TRIAL
BOLSHEVIKS PARDON FORMER ENEMIES AND WORK WITH THEM
RADEK PRAISES STALIN FOR BEING LENIENT AND NOT TAKING REVENGE
BUKHARIN MAKES A COMPLETE CAPITULATION AT THE 17TH PARTY CONGRESS
TROTSKY SAYS THE TRIAL RESULTS AGAINST A COUPLE OF PARTIES WERE TOO LENIENT
DEFENDANTS AT THE ZINOVIEV TRIAL IMPLICATED MANY OTHERS NOT YET ARRESTED
RADEK AND OTHERS INCRIMINATE BUKHARIN AFTER THE ZINOVIEV TRIAL
STALIN CALLS AND TELLS BUKHARIN TO CHASE THE CHEKISTS OUT OF HIS APARTMENT
BUKHARIN IS ATTACKED BY ALL AT THE FEB. 1937 PLENUM
STALIN DID NOT WANT TO SHOOT BUKHARIN WHEN THE OTHERS DID
KRESTINSKY IS THE ONLY ONE TO DENY GUILT AND CRIMINAL INVOLVEMENT
EHRENBURG SAYS IT WAS NOT BOGUS PEOPLE IN THE DOCK AND THERE WAS NO TORTURE
STALIN SAYS ONLY CURRENT TROTS SHOULD BE PUNISHED NOT FORMER ONES
ORDJONIKIDZE COULD NOT HAVE BEEN MURDERED BY AN ASSASSIN
STALIN WANTED CRIMINAL ACTIVITY OF THE INTELLIGENCE AGENCIES INVESTIGATED
MANY INTELLIGENCE AGENTS WERE KILLED FOR COMMITTING CRIMINAL ACTS
STALIN COMES DOWN HARD ON THE CRIMINAL YEZHOV
STALIN SET UP COMMISSION TO INVESTIGATE SECRET POLICE CORRUPTION
THOUSANDS OF ARMY COMMANDERS WERE REHABILITATED AND SERVED IN WWII
ONLY A MINORITY OF CHEKISTS USED EXTREME METHODS AND DESERVED TO BE SHOT
MANY TIMES STALIN SEEMED TO NOT KNOW WHAT SUBVERSION WAS HAPPENING
STALIN SOMETIMES PROTECTED PEOPLE AGAINST THE SECRET POLICE
STALIN COMPLIMENTED PEOPLE EXECUTED FOR THEIR CRIMES
STALIN WAS THOROUGHLY ANTI-CAPITALIST
SOME LOCAL LEADERS ABUSED PEOPLE AND BECAME A LAW UNTO THEMSELVES
POSITIVE CHANGES FAR EXCEEDED THE NEGATIVE SIDE EFFECTS OF SOCIAL CHANGE
IN 1918 OTHER PARTIES EXPELLED FROM THE ASSEMBLY BUT REMAIN LEGAL & LATER ALLIES
SU INTELLIGENCE MISLED STALIN ON PROSPECTS FOR WAR
KHRUSHCHOV LIED WHEN HE SAID STALIN WENT INTO SECLUSION WHEN WWII STARTED
IN 1943 MUCH OF THE ANTI-RELIGION ACTIVITIES WERE ENDED
INCOMPETENCE RATHER THAN WRECKING WAS OFTEN THE PROBLEM
THE SOVIET PEOPLE WERE UNITED AND OPTIMISTIC FOR SEVERAL REASONS
RISING STANDARD OF LIVING GENERATES GREATER PATRIOTISM
INTELLECTUALS, ARTISTS AND WRITERS ARE PAMPERED AND GIVEN FUNDS
THE DIFFERENCES BETWEEN SOVIET DICTATORSHIP AND FASCIST DICTATORSHIP
THE PEOPLE PRAISE STALIN WHETHER HE WANTS IT OR NOT BECAUSE THEY ARE THANKFUL
JEWISH CULTURE AND YIDDISH ARE FOSTERED IN THE SU
SOVIET MASSES COULD SEE WWII COMING
SU TRYING TO POSTPONE THE WAR AS LONG AS POSSIBLE TO BUILD ITS STRENGTH
LACK OF WRITTEN DOCUMENTS DOES NOT SHOW THE DEFENDANTS ARE INNOCENT
STALIN TRIED FOR YEARS TO WIN OVER TROTSKYISTS RATHER THAN ELIMINATE THEM
1937 TRIAL TESTIMONY REGARDING TROTSKY IS BELIEVABLE AND VERY UNDERSTANDABLE
IF THE TRIALS WERE STAGED IT WOULD HAVE TAKEN A LONG TIME TO PREPARE THE PLAY
RADEK SAYS HE TORTURED THE QUESTIONER NOT VICE VERSA
WRITERS MUST DECIDE WHICH CLASS THEY’LL SERVE AND WHOSE FREEDOM THEY’LL FOSTER
CRITICS OF THE TRIALS SHOULD NOTICE THE BIG THINGS AND NOT THE MINUTIA
STALIN SAYS BY LAW FOREIGNERS ARE TREATED VERY WELL AND FAIRLY IN THE SU
POLICE METHODS OF OBTAINING EVIDENCE AND CONFESSIONS ARE EXCELLENT AND ENVIABLE
DEFENDANTS CONFESS AND IMPLICATE OTHERS IN THE METRO-VICKERS TRIAL
GUSSEV CONFESSES AND IMPLICATES MACDONALD WHO IMPLICATES THORNTON
GUSSEV AND MACDONALD DESCRIBE IN DETAIL THE WRECKING THEY DID
CILIGA BACKS UP CLAIMS OF METRO-VICKERS WRECKING ACTS
GUSSEV AND SOKOLOV RECEIVE MONEY FROM MACDONALD FOR WRECKING
THORNTON ADMITS ENLISTING AND PAYING MACDONALD FOR ESPIONAGE
VITVITSKY SAYS THORNTON PAID HIM BRIBES FOR ESPIONAGE INFORMATION
KOTLYAREVSKY SAYS HE ENGAGED IN WRECKING FOR MACDONALD AT ELECTRIC POWER PLANT
LOBANOV & ZIVERT SAY NORDWALL & THORNTON PAID THEM FOR WRECKING
SUKHORUCHKIN, KRASHENINNIKOV & ZORIN ADMIT BEING PAID BY THORNTON TO DO WRECKING
THORNTON ADMITS TO KUTUZOVA THAT HE IS BRIBING RUSSIANS FOR SECRET INFORMATION
KUTUZOVA ADMITS MAKING PAYMENTS FOR THORNTON & HEARING HIM PLAN WRECKING ACTS
THORNTON SAYS ENGINEER ALBERT GREGORY GAVE BRIBES
ALL 12 RUSSIANS CONFESS WHILE THE ENGLISH CONFESS IN VARYING DEGREES
CONFESSIONS AND MUTUAL ACCUSATIONS OF PRISONERS MADE THE PROSECUTION CASE
THE SOVIETS PRODUCED A PRIMA FACIE CASE FOR INDICTMENT AND PUBLIC INQUIRY
BRITISH PAPER CAN’T GET THE FREED BRITISH PRISONERS TO SAY THEY WERE TORTURED
ALL OF THE BRITISH ACCUSED WERE ASSIGNED SOVIET LAWYERS & SO WERE THE RUSSIANS
THE CENSORS WERE FAIR AND REASONABLE WITH REPORTERS AT THE TRIAL
REPORTERS ARE SHOCKED THAT THE BRIT MACDONALD ADMITS HIS GUILT
MACDONALD ADMITS ASKING GUSSEV FOR MILITARY INFORMATION
GUSSEV ADMITS BEING PAID BY MACDONALD TO WRECK AND MACDONALD ADMITS PAYING HIM
MACDONALD ADMITS GETTING THE MONEY TO PAY GUSSEV FROM THORNTON
GUSSEV ADMITS HE MET WITH MACDONALD AND THORNTON TO PLAN WRECKING ACTS
MACDONALD ADMITS ENGAGING IN ECONOMIC, POLITICAL AND MILITARY ESPIONAGE
MACDONALD ADMITS TELLING GUSSEV HOW TO WRECK A 1400 HP MOTOR
MACDONALD REPEATEDLY CONFESSES AND IMPLICATES THORNTON
MACDONALD SAYS THORNTON ASKED HIM TO GET MUNITIONS INFO AND THORNTON DENIES IT
MACDONALD ADMITS TO VIRTUALLY EVERYTHING INCLUDING ESPIONAGE AND WRECKING
THORNTON ADMITS TO BRIBING FOR ESPIONAGE INFORMATION AND WRECKING
THORNTON TRIES TO DENY HIS EARLIER CONFESSIONS BUT ADMITS THEY WERE FREELY GIVEN
THE USE OF TIBETAN DRUGS TO OBTAIN CONFESSIONS WAS ABSURD
THORNTON ADMITS IN DEPOSITION THAT ALL SU SPYING WAS DONE BY BRITISH INTELLIGENCE
DURANTY IS A FAIR SOVIET CRITIC
FIRST WITNESS DOLGOV SAYS THORNTON GAVE HIM 3000 RUBLES
KOTLYAREVSKY & MACDONALD ADMIT THE LATTER PAID HIM FOR ESPIONAGE & WRECKING
LOBANOV WAS A COLD-BLOODED WRECKER AND TRAITOR WARRING AGAINST THE SU
THE COMMENTS OF GUSSEV, LOBANOV, ZORIN & OTHERS DEFINITELY PROVE THEIR GUILT
THE STORY OF THE TREASON OF ONE MAN, KONAR, SETS THE STANDARD AND SAYS IT ALL
LOBANOV ADMITS NORDWALL RECRUITED HIM FOR EXTENSIVE WRECKING
SUKHORUCHKIN DESCRIBES WHAT HE DID AS A WRECKER WORKING WITH THORNTON
KRASHENINNIKOV ADMITS HE ENGAGED IN WRECKING WHICH WAS TREASON
ENGINEER ZORIN ADMITS HE ENGAGED IN SABOTAGE AND SCHEMING WITH THORNTON
OLEINIK ADMITS ENGAGING IN MILITARY WRECKING & ESPIONAGE FOR THORNTON & MONKHOUSE
KUTUZOVA SAYS SHE HEARD THORNTON & MONKHOUSE PLAN WRECKING & DIVERSION ACTS
THORNTON & KOTLYAREVSKY ADMIT RUINING A GENERATOR WITH A BOLT
VYSHINSKY NOTES THAT THORNTON NEVER REJECTED HIS ORIGINAL TESTIMONY
THORNTON REPEATEDLY SAYS HE WAS NOT PRESSURED OR TORTURED
WHEN ALL THE EVIDENCE IS CONSIDERED IT SHOWS THE ENGLISHMEN WERE CLEARLY GUILTY
THERE WAS NO BULLYING OF DEFENDANTS AND THEY WERE SHOWN COURTESIES IN COURT
VYSHINSKY ATTACKS THORNTON FOR NOT SHOWING HOW HE WAS BROWBEATEN & TRICKED
QUESTIONING WAS SPEEDED UP FOR THE BRITISH BUT NOT FOR THE RUSSIAN DEFENDANTS
MACDONALD’S LAWYER SAYS HE WAS TAKEN IN BY GUSSEV
LAWYERS FOR THE DEFENSE GAVE A GOOD, STRONG DEFENSE WITH ZEAL AND EFFICIENCY
RUSSIANS WHO PLED GUILTY ASKED FOR MERCY AND PROMISED LOYALTY
MONKHOUSE & NORDWALL SAID THEY WERE TREATED FAIRLY AND CONSIDERATELY IN PRISON
US BUSINESSMEN SAID REPEATEDLY THEY KNEW THE BRITISH USED SPIES
DELIBERATIONS OF THE RUSSIAN JUDGES WAS SECRET AND USED STRICT GUIDELINES
THE LENIENCY OF THE SENTENCES SHOCKED THE SPECTATORS AND THE PRISONERS
STRANG VISITED THE PRISONERS, FOUND THEM IN COMFORTABLE QUARTERS & LOOKING WELL
BRITISH THOUGHT DEFENDANTS WOULD BE SHOT BUT NO RECORD OF FOREIGNERS BEING SHOT
RETALIATION OF THE BRITISH GOVT FOR THE VICKERS TRIAL WAS STUPID AND EXCESSIVE
SOVIET’S PROGRAM CAME FROM THE MASSES THEMSELVES
LENIN WAS AN EXCELLENT DEBATER
LENIN TRANSLATES ENGLISH INTO RUSSIAN
ATTEMPT TO KILL LENIN ALMOST SUCCEEDED
LENIN WAS FIERCE TOWARD HIS ENEMIES IN DEBATE AND ARGUMENTS
PROPERTY IS PROTECTED NOT DESTROYED BY THE MASSES WHO REVOLT
WHITES WERE TREATED WELL WHEN TAKEN PRISONER
RELEASED PRISONERS BROKE THEIR WORD AND JOINED THE OTHER SIDE
SOME FORMER WHITES JOINED THE BOLSHEVIKS
THE MASSES WERE MORE RESOLUTE AND IRON-WILLED THAN THEIR LEADERS
UNLIKE THE RICH THE MASSES VIEW THE REVOLUTION AS FREEDOM
LITTLE IS KNOWN ABOUT STALIN’S YOUTH AND EARLY DAYS
STALIN OFTEN STAYED ALOOF AND LET SUBORDINANTS MAKE KEY DECISIONS
STALIN WAS NOT GENERATING FEAR BY ARRESTS BECAUSE THEY WERE KEPT SECRET
SOVIET STUDENTS TREATED WELL UNDER SOCIALISM
PEOPLE TURNED AGAINST THE CHURCH BECAUSE OF ITS WEALTH AND HOARDING
SOME CLERGY ACCEPT THE REVOLUTION AND LOSING THEIR WEALTH
PEOPLE DECEPTIVELY ACT LIKE THEY ACCEPT THE PARTY LINE WHILE UNDERMINING IT
ORLOV ATTACKS ALL THE RIGHT-WING OPPOSITION LEADERS
DESPITE HIS OPPOSITION BUKHARIN RETAINED HIGH POSITIONS
WHILE IN THE PARTY TOKAEV ADMITS HE BEGAN UNDERGROUND ILLEGAL ACTIVITY IN 1932
TOKAEV DESCRIBES THE NEEDED VERBAL DECEPTIONS OF A GOOD SUBVERSIVE
TITO WAS THE HERO OF THE SUBVERSIVES AND RIGHTISTS
OPPONENTS OF STALIN ARE THROUGHOUT THE COUNTRY
AT THE 17TH PARTY CONGRESS OPPOSITION LEADERS ADMIT THEIR ERRORS
TOKAEV IN A SECRET MEETING OF ANTI-STALIN MILITARY LEADERS PLANNING KIROV’S MURDER
MANY IMPORTANT PARTY LEADERS HAD OPPOSED STALIN AND LENIN FOR YEARS
SECRET POLICE HEAVILY INFILTRATED BY SUBVERSIVES WHO PROTECT OTHER SUBVERSIVES
FARMS GIVEN TO MILLIONS OF PEASANTS IN 1933
RYKOV HELD MANY HIGH POSITIONS
HOW DID COLLECTIVIZATION WORK
HOW WERE THE KULAKS TREATED DURING COLLECTIVIZATION
THERE WAS NO WORKER URGE TO REVOLT IN THE EARLY 1930’S
FOREIGN ENGINEERS & SPECIALISTS CORROBORATE TRIAL TESTIMONY FROM THEIR EXPERIENCES
SOVIET GOVT WORKS TO TURN NOMADS INTO SETTLED PROLETARIANS
LIKE THE KULAKS SOME NOMADS DESTROYED THEIR HERDS RATHER THAN COLLECTIVIZE
GOVT COMPROMISED ON COLLECTIVIZATION WITH THE FARMERS IN FAR EAST
SIBERIA IS FINE LAND WITH UNJUST REPUTATION
LITTLEPAGE HATES PEOPLE WHO SABOTAGE
NOMADS GIVEN SPECIAL TREATMENT BY THE RUSSIANS
SPECULATORS ENGAGE IN CRIMINAL ACTIVITY
CRACKDOWN BECAME MUCH STIFFER AFTER THE PLOT TO KILL STALIN WAS REVEALED IN 1936
WIVES AND DAUGHTERS OFTEN ACCOMPANIED KULAKS IN LABOR CAMP WORK
SOVIET GOVT FOSTERS INTEGRATION AND RACE AND NATIONALITY MIXING
PEOPLE IN FAR EASTERN SIBERIA PREFER SOVIET RULE OVER JAPANESE OPPRESSION
LITTLEPAGE GIVES A GOOD SUMMARY OF WHY SUBVERSION DEVELOPED FROM 1924 TO 1939
YEZHOV AND HIS HENCHMEN ARE ARRESTED
STALIN DID NOT DEMAND THE DEATH OF RYUTIN
BALLOT WERE NOT DELIBERATELY LOST IN THE 1934 CONGRESS VOTING
STALIN OBJECTS TO THE LARGE NUMBER OF PEOPLE YEZHOV IS PURGING
DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCE SHOULD BE A MAIN SOURCE FOR FACTS
DEKULAKIZATION WAS DONE POORLY AT THE LOCAL LEVEL NOT FROM THE CENTER
CENTER OPPOSED LOCAL USE OF GENEALOGIES TO DETERMINE WHO WAS A KULAK
CENTER ORDERS NO DEKULAKIZATION OF TEACHERS BY LOCAL OFFICIALS
CENTER CONDEMNS LOCALS MISTREATING & CONDEMNING UNFORTUNATES AS KULAKS
MILITARY UNFAIRLY TREATED AT THE LOCAL LEVEL ARE FAIRLY TREATED BY THE CENTER
NUMBERS PURGED FROM THE MILITARY ARE EXAGGERATED & MANY WERE READMITTED
PURGES IN THE MILITARY HELPED AS THEY DID IN CIVILIAN LIFE
PARTY & MILITARY LEADERS REPRESSED MORE THAN INTELLIGENTSIA & SCIENTISTS
NUMBERS GIVEN FOR REPRESSED KULAKS ARE FAR TOO HIGH
FIGURES GIVEN FOR DEATHS IN THE SU IN THE 30S ARE MUCH TOO HIGH
EDELMAN LIKES BEING IN THE SU
PERSON SAYS LIFE IN THE SU MUCH BETTER THAN IN GERMANY
SECRET POLICE WERE NOT THAT SECRET
SEMEONOV TELLS OF HIS PAST TROTSKYISM AND WHY HE NOW REJECTS IT
POLICE ARE FAIR AND FORGET THE TROTS PAST ALLEGIANCE TO TROTSKY
AKULOV TELLS CRITICAL STALINIST FELLOW PRISONERS WHY HE IS A TROT
SOVIET BORDERS ARE JUSTIFIABLY SEALED TO YOU IF YOU ARE EXPELLED
HARDSHIPS OF THE FIRST 5 YEAR PLAN PROVIDED GRIST FOR THE OPPOSITIONISTS
SUCCESS OF COLLECTIVIZATION ENERVATED AND WEAKENED THE OPPOSITION
IN DEC. 1936 YEZHOV PROVIDES EVIDENCE AGAINST PYATAKOV, BUKHARIN & THE TROT BLOC
ORDJONIKIDZE SHAKEN BY PYATAKOV ADMITTING GUILT & SAYING HE TESTIFIED VOLUNTARILY
THOUSANDS OF PRISONERS WERE RELEASED
SECRET POLICE WORKED HARD TO ROOT OUT AND UNMASK SUBVERSIVES
SECRET POLICE ARRESTED PEOPLE NEARLY ALWAYS FOR GOOD REASONS
SECRET POLICE DID NOT AUTOMATICALLY ARREST THOSE EXPELLED FROM THE PARTY
VYSHINKY DEMANDS FAIRER AND MORE JUST TREATMENT OF PRISONERS
INFILTRATED SECRET POLICE CARRIED OUT UNJUST ARRESTS UNDER YEZHOV
LAWS ARE STRENGTHENED TO REGULATE SECRET POLICE BEHAVIOR
YEZHOV RESIGNS FOR INCOMPETENCE AND ADMITS HIS FAILINGS
THE OLD BOLSHEVIKS RETAINED HIGH PARTY MEMBERSHIP & POSITIONS EVEN IN LATE 1930’S
NO EVIDENCE OF A MASTER PLANNER PLANNING THE TERROR
EVIDENCE SHOWS THE TERROR LASTED AT MOST FROM SPRING 1937 TO LATE 1938
ONLY A SMALL PERCENTAGE OF PEOPLE FELT ANY TERROR
LOCAL LEADERS OFTEN DID NOT LIKE CRITICISM AND SCRUTINY FROM ABOVE
FEW PEOPLE IN THE SU WELCOMED THE NAZIS AS LIBERATORS
STALIN IS STILL POPULAR AMONG THE MASSES AND HAS A GOOD LEGACY
EVERY TIME SOVIET GOVT TRIED TO BE MORE LENIENT EVENTS PREVENTED IT
WHY THE NAZIS AGREED TO TRADE WITH THE SU
SU USED NAZIS TECHNOLOGY PLANS SOLD TO THEM TO IMPROVE THEIR EQUIPMENT
CONDITIONS WERE BETTER AFTER THE REVOLUTION THAN NOW UNDER PERISHSTROIKA
HITLER DECEIVED BY LETTING SOVIET AGENTS SEE SECRET NAZI FACILITIES
REPORTS OF PEOPLE AROUND STALIN BEING CHECKED FOR WEAPONS ARE LIES
STALIN WAS TACTFUL BUT DIRECT IN CORRECTING THE WRITINGS OF OTHERS
MOLOTOV WAS A MUCH BETTER & MORE RESPONSIBLE LEADER THAN HE IS GIVEN CREDIT FOR
AS A RESULT OF THE 5 YEAR PLANS CONDITIONS IMPROVED GREATLY BY THE MID-1930’S
STALIN TELLS THOREZ TO HIDE THEIR WEAPONS RATHER THAN SURRENDER THEM
CHURCHILL ASKS STALIN TO FORGIVE HIM FOR LEADING THE INTERVENTION
STALIN LIKED AND TRUSTED ROOSEVELT MORE THAN CHURCHILL
STALIN SAYS HE DOES NOT KNOW WHY THE WIVES OF PARTY LEADERS ARE IN PRISON
LENIN SHOWERS OPPONENTS WITH INVECTIVE AND INSULTING LABELS
FOOD SHORTAGES CAUSED BY SELLING FOOD ABROAD TO GET MONEY TO INDUSTRIALIZE
TROTSKY’S “THE REVOLUTION BETRAYED” HAS NO FACTS TO SUPPORT IT
TROTSKY USES LEFTIST RHETORIC BUT IS ACTUALLY DEFEATIST AND PESSIMISTIC
STALIN DID NOT ADOPT TROTSKY’S INDUSTRIALIZATION PROGRAM
COLLECTIVIZATION COULD ONLY WORK WHEN THE MIDDLE PEASANT WAS READY TO JOIN
RIGHTISTS MORE DANGEROUS AND SUBTLE THAN THE LEFTS LIKE TROTSKY
OPPOSITION INTENSIFIES AS SOCIALISM GETS STRONGER
SUBVERSIVES INFILTRATED COLLECTIVES’ LEADERSHIP AND DID SABOTAGE
TROTSKY’S ARGUMENT THAT PARTY LEADERS CAN’T BE REMOVED IS FALSE
CAPITALISTS IGNORE PROOF AGAINST THOSE REMOVED AND PAINT IT AS AN UNJUST PURGE
AS THE TROTS ARE UNEARTHED IN 1936 THERE IS A PUSH TO SPEED UP THE COUP
TROTSKY AND BUKHARIN ARE AFRAID THE MILITARY WILL TAKE OVER IN A COUP
WHAT KINDS OF GROUPS ARE IN THE SUBVERSIVE OPPOSITION
SPIES AND WRECKERS WERE SENT TO THE SU AS TECHNICIANS AND ENGINEERS
WHY HAVE FRAME-UP TRIALS AS TROTSKY CLAIMS THEY ARE WHEN THE WORLD IS WATCHING
THE CHARGE OF NO DOCUMENTS OR MATERIAL EVIDENCE AT THE TRIALS IS BOGUS
TROTSKY TRIES TO DISCREDIT THE TRIALS WITH 3 MAIN ARGUMENTS ABOUT FACTS
TROTSKY’S EXPLANATION FOR THE TRIALS OCCURRING IS A PATHETIC JOKE
DEWEY COMMISSION’S REASONS FOR THE TRIALS ARE WORTHLESS
THE FALLACIES OF TROTSKY’S MAJOR ARGUMENTS IN THE 1930’S
WHO IS ALEXANDRE BARMINE AND WHAT ARE HIS CREDENTIALS
LEFT SR’S ADMIT ASSASSINATING LEADERS
KAMENEV PROPOSES STATE CAPITALISM OVER SOCIALISM IN 1925
TROTSKY REFUSED TO STOP SUBVERSIVE WORK DURING EXILE
SU PAID ITS DEBTS ON TIME AND NEVER DEFAULTED
DEFECTIONS WERE NOT FOR IDEOLOGICAL OR POLITICAL REASONS BUT FOR MONEY
PRISON LABOR WAS A GREAT HELP IN INDUSTRIALIZATION AND PROGRESS
HISTORY OF THE LENIENT SENTENCES OF THE TRIALS OF THE 20’S AND EARLY 30’S.
STALIN HELD MANY HIGH POSITIONS FROM THE START OF THE REVOLUTION
STALIN SAYS THE SU WILL INDUSTRIALIZE BUT NOT AT THE EXPENSE OF OTHERS
LITERACY INCREASED DRAMATICALLY IN THE 1920’S AND AFTERWARD
STALIN ATTACKS TROTSKY AT A 1927 JOINT MEETING
STALIN DENIES BEING THE ONLY AUTHOR OF DIZZY WITH SUCCESS
STALIN AND BUKHARIN WERE CLOSE FRIENDS FOR YEARS
STALIN PROTECTED BUKHARIN FROM LEFTIST ATTACKS IN THE 1920’S
STALIN COMPLIMENTED BY OTHERS AT THE 1934 CONGRESS
STALIN GETS OFF TRAIN AND STRIKES NKVD LEADER IN LENINGRAD
STALIN ASSURES BUKHARIN NOT TO WORRY ABOUT THE ACCUSATIONS AGAINST HIM
MIKOYAN CHALLENGES BUKHARIN TO CONFESS
STALIN SAYS PEOPLE ARE WHAT COUNT AND HE SHOWS CONCERN FOR THEM AND CADRES
STALIN GAVE PEOPLE THE BENEFIT OF THE DOUBT AND WAS NOT QUICK TO CONDEMN
PRIMAKOV CONVICTS THE OTHER MILITARY LEADERS OF WORKING FOR GERMANY
STALIN ORDERS A COUNTERATTACK AT THE RIGHT TIME
RETURNING CAPTURED SOLDIERS WERE INTERNED BUT COULD PROVE LOYALTY
STALIN LOVED GEOGRAPHY
STALIN FEARS ZHUKOV IS DISPLAYING NAPOLEONIC TENDENCIES
STALIN KEPT BERIA AROUND BECAUSE HE NEEDED HIS SKILLS BUT DID NOT TRUST HIM
CONTRARY TO PROPAGANDA STALIN DID VISIT THE FRONT DURING THE WAR
SOVIET ALLIES WANT A BIGGER PIECE OF EASTERN EUROPE AFTER WWII
STALIN CALLS OFF ATTACKING NORTHERN JAPAN IN 1945
COST TO THE SU OF WWII
BERIA NOT LIKED BY STALIN IN THE LAST MONTHS
STALIN LOWERS CONSUMER PRICES IN 1949 WHICH HELPED THE ELDERLY GREATLY
POLITICAL SITUATION IN THE SU AFTER WWII WAS PRETTY GOOD AND STABLE
BOTH SIDES WANTED TO TAKE OVER ALL OF KOREA
STALIN AGREED TO A KOREAN COMPROMISE TO END THE WAR
SCIENTISTS WHO CONTRIBUTE TO SOCIETY FROM PRISON HAVE THEIR SENTENCES REDUCED
VOLKOGONOV SAYS HE IS NOT WRITING TO AVENGE HIS FAMILY
BERIA FELL OUT OF FAVOR WITH STALIN
NO EVIDENCE STALIN WAS AN AGENT OF THE CZARIST SECRET POLICE
STALIN PUT ON FIRST CENTRAL COMMITTEE IN APRIL 1917
STALIN DELIVERS THE MAIN REPORT AT THE SIXTH CONGRESS
STALIN WAS ONE OF THE FIRST RUSSIAN DELEGATES TO THE COMINTERN
STALIN A’TTACKS KHRUSHCHOV
CZAR KILLED BY LENIN AND SVERDLOV
STALIN EFFECTIVELY ROSE IN THE PARTY
STALIN HELD THE COUNTRY TOGETHER DURING A DIFFICULT PERIOD
STALIN LOOKED IN GOOD HEALTH SHORTLY BEFORE HIS DEATH
FOREIGN AID SAVED THE WHITES DURING THE INTERVENTION
ARMENIANS WELCOMED THE RED ARMY TO PROTECT THEM FROM THE TURKS
SU IS FIRST COUNTRY TO LEGALIZE ABORTION AND DIVORCE
CAPITALIST INVESTMENT AND CONCESSIONS IN THE SU WERE MINIMAL
SENTENCES IN THE SOCIAL-REVOLUTIONARY/MENSHEVIK TRIAL OF 1922 ARE LENIENT
LENIN SUPPORTS CAPITALIST INVESTMENT AND CONCESSIONS
LENIN IS CLOSEST TO STALIN AND FAVORS HIM OVER TROTSKY
TROTSKY REFUSES TO TAKE LEADING POSITIONS OFFERED BY LENIN AND STALIN
SICK LENIN IS KEPT AWAY FROM EVERYONE
SUBVERSIVES GOT HOLD OF THE LIBRARY CENSORSHIP
PEOPLE ARE FORGIVEN AND GO ON TO DO GOOD WORK FOR THE PARTY
SABOTAGE IN THE EARLY 30’S ON THE RAILROADS
WHAT WAS NOTED, ANALYZED AND STUDIED DURING PURGE HEARINGS
WHAT IT TAKES TO BE A KOLKHOZ LEADER AND WHAT SUBVERSION YOU MUST LOOK FOR
HEAVY INFILTRATION OF HIGHER EDUCATIONAL INSTITUTIONS BY TROTS AND SUBVERSIVES
STUDENTS OPENLY EXPRESSED ANTI-SOVIET, ANTI-STALIN ATTITUDES AND BELIEFS
HIGHER EDUCATIONAL INSTITUTIONS ARE INFECTED WITH SUBVERSIVE TEACHERS
UPON ENTERING KOLKHOZS KULAKS OFTEN WERE JUST PLAIN LAZY
POLES UNDERGOING DEKULAKIZATION WERE TREATED WELL BY RUSSIANS
STALIN SAYS HE FOLLOWS JESUS MORE THAN THOSE WHO CLAIM THEY DO
SOKOLNIKOV DIED IN PRISON
PLAYING CHESS AT POLITBURO MEETINGS
YEZHOV WAS A BAD HEAD OF THE SECRET POLICE
MALENKOV AND ZHUKOV GET INTO AN ARGUMENT
BUDU SAYS LENIN’S BODY IN THE TOMB IS A FAKE
STALIN’S HEALTH GOT WORSE AFTER WWII
STALIN TURNED LEADERSHIP OVER TO OTHERS TO SEE WHAT THEY WOULD DO
STALIN IS VERY WELL READ IN LITERATURE AND IS AN INTELLECTUAL
FOREIGN AGENTS WORK TO OVERTHROW THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT
KOSYGIN SAYS KHRUSHCHOV HAS A ROTTEN LINE
STALIN WAS WORSHIPPED BY HIS INTERPRETER, PAVLOV
BUDU SVANIDZE AND HIS BOOK ON HIS UNCLE JOE ARE BOTH FAKES
HOW DID STALIN’S WIFE DIE
STALIN MERELY FOLLOWED LENIN
STALIN’S DAUGHTER ADMITS NOT PLANNING AHEAD
STALIN’S DAUGHTER DENOUNCES HIPPIES
STALIN WAS A MATERIALIST WITH NO BELIEF IN THE SUPERNATURAL OR PRAYER
STALIN’S DAUGHTER DOES NOT KNOW MUCH ABOUT RUSSIA
POLINA MOLOTOV DENOUNCES BERIA AND KHRUSHCHOV WHILE PRAISING STALIN
YALTA DID NOT GIVE THE SU AND STALIN ANYTHING THEY DID NOT ALREADY HAVE
SU AND STALIN QUITE GENEROUS AT YALTA
ROOSEVELT SAID AT YALTA THAT STALIN WAS NO IMPERIALIST
STALIN WAS A GOOD UNDERGROUND WORKER
HOW STALIN GOT THE NAME KOBA
TROTSKY LIED WHEN HE SAID STALIN BEGAN AS A MENSHEVIK
LENIN’S SHUT HIMSELF IN LIBRARY TO WRITE MATERIALISM AND EMPIRIO-CRITICISM
TROTSKY LED MANY ANTI-BOLSHEVIK GROUPS PRIOR TO WWI
STALIN UNITED WITH LENIN SHORTLY AFTER THE THESES CAME OUT
STALIN WAS NOT A COWARD OR A SCHEMER AS TROTSKY CLAIMS IN OCT 1917
OTHER PARTIES ALLOWED AFTER THE REVOLUTION WERE UNDERMINING THE CAUSE
LENIN TRIES TO MEDIATE BETWEEN STALIN AND TROTSKY
LENIN OPPOSED WORKERS’ OPPOSITION AND ANARCHO-SYNDICALISTS
LENIN CHOSE STALIN AS GEN. SEC.
CONTROL COMMISSION SET UP IN 1921 TO ADMINISTER PURGES
PEOPLE LIED ABOUT OTHERS TO GET THEM PURGED AND EXPELLED
STALIN & TROTSKY EACH TRY TO GET THE OTHER TO GIVE THE KEY SPEECH WHEN LENIN LEFT
STALIN WAS THE MEAN BETWEEN THE TWO EXTREMES
LEFT AND RIGHT DIFFER ON HOW FAST SOCIALIZATION SHOULD PROCEED
ZINOVIEV’S AIDE CAUSES TROUBLE IN THE MILITARY
SOME PEOPLE ARE BEING READMITTED TO THE PARTY WHILE OTHERS ARE BEING EXPELLED
MOST MENSHEVIKS EVENTUALLY WORKED WITH THE BOLSHEVIK GOVERNMENT
AFTER TRIALS FOLLOWING KIROV KILLING EVERYONE SEEMED TO BE GETTING ALONG FINE
STALIN’S PROGRAM WAS BETTER AND MORE ACCEPTED THAN ROBESPIERRE’S
GREAT EDUCATIONAL ADVANCEMENTS UNDER STALIN IN THE 1930’S
SU AND GERMANY WORKED TOGETHER ON MILITARY MATTERS IN THE 1920’S
NO EVIDENCE STALIN ENCOURAGED GERMAN COMMUNISTS TO SURRENDER TO NAZIS
SU SHOWS IT IS READY TO STAND BEHIND ITS TREATY COMMITMENTS
STALIN STALLED AND PROLONGED WWII AS LONG AS HE COULD BY EVERY MEANS POSSIBLE
STALIN PERMITS THE POLISH BOUNDARY TO BE SHIFTED EASTWARD TO INCLUDE POLES
LEAGUE OF NATIONS EXPELS THE SU BUT NOT JAPAN OR GERMANY
TUKHACHEVSKY WAS GIVEN A FREE HAND BY STALIN PRIOR TO 1937
STALIN ALLOWS HIS GENERALS TO MAKE THEIR OWN DECISIONS
SU AND THE US BOTH GOT 3 VOTES IN THE UNITED NATIONS
STALIN SEES NO POSSIBILITY OF SOCIALIZING GERMANY AFTER THE WAR
MANY SOVIET LEADERS OBJECTED TO PRESERVING CAPITALISM IN LANDS THEY FREED
ALLIED POWERS COULD NOT AGREE ON WHAT SYSTEM WAS TO PREVAIL IN GERMANY
STALIN WAS HELD HIGH AND LOVED BY SOVIET PEOPLE AFTER WINNING THE WAR
SU INDUSTRIALIZATION WAS PAINFUL AND PROTECTIONISM WAS NEEDED
SU MADE RAPID INDUSTRIAL ADVANCEMENTS AFTER WWII
POST WWII AGRICULTURAL SITUATION WAS TERRIBLE & MORE WIDESPREAD THAN 1921 FAMINE
WEST SEEKS TO REDUCE SOVIET GAINS IN EASTERN AND WESTERN EUROPE AFTER WWII
SU HAD TO KEEP LARGE MILITARY AFTER WWII TO DETER US NUCLEAR THREAT
STALIN REACTS TO EJECTION OF MARXISTS FROM WESTERN GOV’TS BY DOING THE SAME
CONSUMERS AND CONSUMER INDUSTRY WERE IN BAD SHAPE AFTER WWII
STALIN GAVE IN TO THE ALLIES BUT KNEW WHERE TO DRAW THE LINE
CONQUEST ADMITS HIS FIGURES LACK PRECISION
THE TESTAMENT IS CRITICAL OF TROTSKY AND TROTSKY FAILED LENIN
OLD OPPOSITIONISTS PUT ON THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE AT THE 17TH PARTY CONGRESS
SOME KOMSOMOL MEMBERS FREELY AND OPENLY EXPRESS ANTI-SOVIET VIEWS
OLD BOLSHEVIK WOMEN EXISTED THROUGHOUT THE ENTIRE PERIOD OF STALIN’S LEADERSHIP
KEY MEMBERS SUPPORTED THE RYUTIN PLATFORM
ALL ADMIT THEIR GUILT EXCEPT SMIRNOV
THOSE LATER CONVICTED TRY TO HIDE BY STRONGLY DENOUNCING ZINOVIEV AND KAMENEV
MRACHKOVSKY ADMITS HE SHOULD BE SHOT
TROTSKYITE MRACHKOVSKY HELPED ORGANIZE THE 1927 REVOLT WITH THE PRINTING PRESS
NOT EVERYONE FULLY CONFESSED IN THE AUG. 1936 TRIAL
STALIN’S OPPONENTS PRACTICED THE VERY SUPPRESSION THEY ACCUSED STALIN OF
PRISONERS CHANGED THEIR VIEWS OF MARXISM IN PRISON
IN SEPT 1936 CHARGES AGAINST BUKHARIN & RYKOV DROPPED FOR LACK OF PROOF
PYATAKOV WILLING TO DENOUNCE TROTS AND HIS EX-WIFE
MANY PEOPLE GAVE EVIDENCE AGAINST BUKHARIN
PYATAKOV ADMITS ORGANIZING TERRORIST & SABOTAGE GROUPS BUT DENIES DOING ACTS
SEREBRYAKOV SAYS RAILWAYS BEFORE KAGANOVICH WERE INTENTIONALLY SABOTAGED
DROBNIS ADMITS TO MINING SABOTAGE
SHESTOV SAYS TROTS NOT THE GOVERNMENT ARE MAKING THE WORKERS’ LIVES MISERABLE
MURALOV ADMITS TRYING TO KILL MOLOTOV BUT NOT ORDJONIKIDZE
KNYAZEV ADMITS HAVING 33 MEN AS CADRES IN HIS TROTSKYITE RAILWAY ORGANIZATION
RATAICHAK ADMITS CAUSING THE DEATHS OF 17 WORKERS
DEFENDANTS HAVE NOT ADMITTED ALL THAT THEY HAVE DONE SAYS VYSHINSKY
BOURGEOIS COURTS CONSIDER A CONFESSION ALONE SUFFICIENT BUT SU COURTS DID MORE
VYSHINSKY SAYS DOCUMENTS ARE NOT NEEDED IN CONSPIRACY CASES
DEFENSE LAWYER BRAUDE FREELY ADMITS THE PROSECUTOR PROVED HIS CASE
RADEK SAYS MANY PERSONS AND GROUPS ARE TRYING TO KILL SOVIET LEADERS
SOME PEOPLE HAD TO BE CONVINCED TO WITHDRAW THEIR CAPITAL CONFESSIONS
KEY PEOPLE SAY TUKHASHEVSKY WAS INVOLVED IN THE PLOT
RAKOVSKY WAS A TROT TRAITOR FROM THE START AND DID A FAKE 1934 RECANTATION
BUKHARIN SAYS TROTSKY SPOKE OF CEDING THE UKRAINE BUT DID NOT CONSIDER IT BINDING
MENZHINSKY, KUIBYSHEV, PESHKOV AND GORKY MURDERED JUST BEFORE KIROV
BULANOV TESTIFIED AGAINST FORMER NKVD HEADS AND HOW YAGODA COVERED UP
YAGODA COVERED UP FOR OTHERS, PUT TRAITORS IN HIGH PLACES & FRAMED OTHERS
YAGODA ADMITS KILLING MENZHINSKY
KAZAKOV ADMITS TO HELPING KILL MENZHINSKY
YAGODA HELPED KILL KIROV
YAGODA ADMITS HELPING TO KILL KUIBYSCHEV AND GORKY
EVEN AS LATE AS 1930 TROTSKY ONLY WANTED TO IMPROVE STALIN’S PROGRAM
PARTY MUST REBUFF THOSE ATTACKING EXPOSERS & ATTACK THOSE DECRYING GOOD PEOPLE
BAKAEV SAYS ZINOVIEV GAVE HIM ORDERS TO KILL STALIN
PIKEL STATES THAT BAKAEV WAS ORGANIZING PEOPLE TO KILL STALIN
REINGOLD SAYS KAMENEV ADVOCATED KILLING THE TOP LEADERS
REINGOLD SAYS ZINOVIEV SAID THEY SHOULD DENY EVERYTHING, ESPECIALLY TERRORIST ACTS
REINGOLD SAYS ZINOVIEV AND KAMENEV DID FAKE RECANTATIONS, ESP AT 17TH CONGRESS
EXPELLING PEOPLE FROM THE PARTY CREATES RESENTMENT AND ENEMIES
CAREERISTS WERE EXPELLING PEOPLE ON FALSE CHARGES TO ADVANCE THEMSELVES
STALIN SAYS THE ARMY IS THE ONLY POWER THAT CAN RESTRAIN THE ROTTEN THIRD REICH
STALIN FORGAVE PEOPLE WHO CRITICIZED AND ATTACKED HIM
STALIN REMINDS RADEK OF A TUKHACHEVSKY-TROTSKY TAKEOVER PLOT IN THE PAST
TUKHACHEVSKY CONDUCTS HIS OWN FOREIGN POLICY
STALIN DID NOT PLAY FAVORITES WITH HIS SUBORDINATES
YAGODA UNCOVERS CRIMINAL PLANS BY RADEK
RADEK REMINDS THE COURT THAT HE IS THE ONE WHO REVEALED THE TROT CONSPIRACY
VYSHINSKY TRIES TO GLOSS OVER MENTION OF TUKHASHEVSKY’S NAME AT THE RADEK TRIAL
STALIN ASSURES TUKHACHEVSKY THAT RADEK MENTIONING HIS NAME IS JUST UNFORTUNATE
STALIN COVERS FOR TUKHACHEVSKY WHEN YEZHOV PRESENTS EVIDENCE AGAINST HIM
STALIN ORDERED FRONTIER TROOPS NOT TO GIVE NAZIS ANY EXCUSE TO ATTACK FIRST
NAZI INVASION OF THE SU WAS FAR LARGER THAN NORMANDY INVASION FORCES
SU WARNS AGGRESSIVE POLAND NOT TO TAKE NORTHERN PART OF CZECHOSLOVAKIA
HEAVY GERMAN/SOVIET TRADE WAS CUT DOWN WHEN FASCISTS TOOK OVER
SU FOLLOWED A CONSISTENT ANTI-NAZI LINE FROM THE START
STALIN GENTLY REPLACED LITVINOV WITH MOLOTOV
HITLER OPENLY ADMITS HIS WAS FOCUSED ON THE SU FIRST
STALIN CONSULTED POLITBURO MEMBERS BEFORE MAKING DECISIONS
STALIN WAS A PHYSICALLY FIT LEADER AT THE START OF WWII
STALIN IS OUTSMARTING HITLER WHEN HITLER THINKS HE IS THE SMARTER ONE
AFTER SIGNING THE RUSSO-NAZI PACT STALIN DID NOT CARE IF WAR BROKE OUT IN WEST
SOVIET SOLDIERS TREAT POLISH PEOPLE FAR BETTER THAN NAZIS
STALIN DID NOT SEIZE UKRAINE & BYELORUSSIA UNTIL POLAND’S GOVT FELL
NAZIS UNDERESTIMATED SOVIET MILITARY STRENGTH
TROTSKY WILLING TO SACRIFICE HIS PROJECTS TO GAIN YOUNG PEOPLE OPPOSING STALIN
JOFFE HAD A DISEASE AND DID NOT COMMIT SUICIDE
BUKHARIN CALLS STALIN A GENGHIS KHAN AND CRITICIZES HIM
MIKOYAN SUPPORTS ARRESTS OF HIS STAFF WORKING WITH THE OPPOSITION
ROSA KAGANOVICH IS A FRAUD
SOCIALISM SAVED THEM IN WWII
MUSSOLINI ATTACKS HITLER
POLITBURO LEFT THE TRIAL DECISIONS TO THE COURT MEMBERS
STALIN DESCRIBES DIMITROV AS A POOR MARXIST VERSION OF AN ANARCHIST
YEZHOV RULES OVER STALIN ON SOME ISSUES
VOROSHILOV DETESTS YEZHOV
YEZHOV WORKED FOR THE CZARIST SECRET POLICE
STALIN SAYS MAO UNDERSTANDS MARXISM WELL
LENIN KNOWS HE NEEDS PEASANT SUPPORT BUT HE CAN ALSO TAKE BACK THE LAND
STALIN REPLIES TO THOSE WHO CLAIM HE IS NOT DEMOCRATIC ENOUGH
SU AND GERMANY HAD A LOT OF EXCHANGES IN THE 1920’S
PEASANTS ARE THE BULK OF THE POPULATION
BALTIC STATES ADVANCED UNDER THE SOVIETS AFTER WWII
CONSUMER PRICES ROSE AFTER STALIN’S DEMISE
STALIN’S CORRECT POLICY PREVENTED THE REVOLTS IN POLAND THAT LATER OCCURRED
DEFENDANTS MISTAKENLY THINK PARDON OF OTHERS WILL BE APPLIED TO THEM
1937 DEFENDANTS WERE GIVEN THE RIGHT TO APPEAL FOR CLEMENCY
SEDOV SAYS SMIRNOV WORKED WITH GROUPS TO FORM AN ANTI-STALIN BLOC
PYATAKOV & RADEK STRONGLY ATTACK THE ZINOVIEV DEFENDANTS TO COVER THEMSELVES
BUKHARIN DENOUNCES THOSE SHOT AT THE 1937 TRIAL TO COVER HIMSELF
STALIN CRITICIZES HIMSELF AND HIS ALLIES FOR PUTTING TOO MUCH TRUST IN RECANTATIONS
STALIN SAYS BUKHARIN CAN’T SAY HE HAS NOT BEEN TRUSTED AND RYKOV AGREES
STALIN SAYS CONSPIRATORS DON’T LEAVE DOCUMENTS AND WRITTEN STATEMENTS
RYKOV REALIZES HE IS FINISHED WHEN HIS CLOSEST ALLIES TESTIFY AGAINST HIM
SARKISOV AND BAGIROV SAY EXPLOSIONS WERE DONE DELIBERATELY NOT BY NEGLIGENCE
SCOTT EXPLAINS WHY PEOPLE CAME TO MAGNITOGORSK TO WORK
KHRUSHCHOV WAS A TROTSKYIST
SPANISH CP AND SOVIET GOVT WANT A BOURGEOIS DEMOCRACY NOT THE DIC OF THE PROL.
GENERALS HAD STALIN AND SOVIET GOVT CONFIDENCE RIGHT UP TO THE LAST
TUKHACHEVSKY AND OTHER GENERALS ADMIT THEIR GUILT
STALIN EXPLAINS DIFFERENCE BETWEEN SOCIALISM AND COMMUNISM
BY THE TIME WEST STARTED THE SECOND FRONT THE SU HAD ALREADY DEFEATED THE NAZIS
FOR GOOD REASON STALIN WAS AMONG THE MOST HATED OF BOURGEOIS ENEMIES
ELIMINATION OF SPIES AND TRAITORS HELPED THE NATION RATHER THAN DEMORALIZED IT
CLASSICS WERE NOT MEANT TO KNOW ALL & PROVIDE SOLUTIONS TO ALL LATER PROBLEMS
STALIN SAYS THE SU IS A UNION OF NATIONS
FROM REVOLUTION ONWARD THE SU WAS ALWAYS AT WAR AND HAD TO RESTRICT FREEDOM
EVEN FOREIGNERS AGREE WITH THE SU SUPPRESSING A POSSIBLE RETURN TO CAPITALISM
BESEIGED CZECHS LIMITED FREEDOM IN THE SUDENLAND SO THE SU SHOULD LIMIT AS WELL
THE SU PROLETARIAT IS CENTRAL TO LENIN’S THOUGHTS EVEN THOUGH IT IS SMALL
PRESS COULD CRITICIZE AT WILL AS LONG AS IT DID NOT ATTACK THE SYSTEM ITSELF
THE SYSTEM REALLY CARES FOR THE PEOPLE
SHORT SUMMARY OF EVENTS BEFORE, DURING AND AFTER TROTSKY’S EXPULSION
PARES COMPLIMENTS THE SYSTEM BUT IT NOT AN ADMIRER OF IT
BALTIC WHITE SEA CANAL WAS A GREAT ACCOMPLISHMENT
KIROV DOES HIS BEST TO PROVE YAGODA AND HIS MEN WERE INCOMPETENT OR TROT AGENTS
STALIN ADHERES TO THE POST WWII AGREEMENTS BUT HIS SUPPORTERS OBJECT
STALIN WAS LESS HARD TOWARD THE WEST AFTER WWII THAN HIS SUPPORTERS
ZINOVIEV AND KAMENEV ADMIT ONLY MORAL GUILT AT THE FIRST TRIAL
TROTSKY OPPOSED THE PARTY FROM LENIN’S DEATH TILL 1927
ZINOVIEV AND KAMENEV FAVOR A COALITION GOVT WHICH LENIN OPPOSES
TESTAMENT HITS TROTSKY MUCH HARDER THAN STALIN
TROTSKY SAYS HE CAME FROM THE UPPER CLASS
TROTSKY DESCRIBES THE MISERY OF CZARIST PRISON LIFE
A TRUE REVOLUTIONARY MUST HAVE A SIXTH SENSE ABOVE MERE KNOWLEDGE
TROTSKY DENIES DISCOUNTING THE PEASANTRY’ KEY ROLE
TROTSKY CRITICIZES PYATAKOV
TROTSKY DOES NOT DENY THERE IS A TESTAMENT
EUROPE AND AMERICA OWN THE WORLD
TROTSKY WRONGLY BLAMES STALIN & ZINOVIEV FOR THE FAILED 1923 GERMAN REVOLUTION
STALIN SAYS IT IS WHO COUNTS THE VOTES THAT MATTERS NOT WHO HAS THEM
BAZHANOV SAYS TROTSKY ERRS SAYING LENIN WAS ALIVE WHEN TESTAMENT WAS READ
BAZHANOV SAYS MARX ERRED IN DOWNPLAYING THE PEASANT ROLE IN REVOLUTION
SOLKOLNIKOV WAS THE ONLY 1926 SPEAKER TO URGE REMOVAL OF STALIN AS GEN. SEC.
THE TOP GENERALS OF THE 20’S WERE SEEN AS POTENTIALLY SUBVERSIVE
DID STALIN HAVE PHYSICAL DEFECTS, ESPECIALLY IN HIS ARMS
TROTSKY WAS A FANATICAL DOGMATIST WHO REFUSED TO RECANT WHEN WRONG
TROTSKY NEVER UNDERSTOOD PEOPLE
SOME TROTS STAYED IN HIGH POSITIONS EVEN THOUGH THEY WERE KNOWN AS TROTS
STALIN REFUSED TO GIVE LENIN POISON
STALIN COMPARED THE PARTY LEADERSHIP TO LEVELS IN THE MILITARY
STALIN CLOSELY WATCHED GOVT MONEY AND HOW MUCH FOREIGN PARTIES RECEIVED
KHRUSHCHOV THREW AWAY THE LARGE GOLD RESERVES STALIN HAD BUILT UP
STALIN DOES NOT TRUST FLYING IN AIRPLANES SINCE HIS FRIENDS WERE KILLED IN A PLANE
TOLERATION OF TROUBLE MAKERS CAUSED THE HUNGARIAN REVOLT
GORBACHOV CRITICIZES REAGAN
GORBACHOV STABS NAJIBULLAH IN THE BACK
GORBACHOV WAS DETESTED AT HOME BY MANY
COLLECTIVIZATION WAS THE SECOND REVOLUTION AS IMPORTANT AS THE FIRST
MERCADER SAYS HE KILLED TROTSKY BECAUSE HE CONCLUDED HE WAS A CAPITALIST AGENT
RUSSIAN EMIGRES DID EVERYTHING TO OVERTHROW THE SOVIET GOVT
SMIRNOV’S WIFE, SAFANOVA, SAYS HE IS GUILTY
STALIN WAS NOT AFRAID TO MIX WITH THE MASSES
STALIN’S SERVANTS LOVED AND APPRECIATED HIM
STALIN’S RELATIVES DEFENDED HIM
SOME BOURGEOIS WRITERS COMPLIMENT STALIN
RADEK TELLS HIS WIFE THAT HE WILL ADMIT HIS GUILT IN COURT
PRIMAKOV ADMITS HIS GUILT AND TESTIFIES AGAINST OTHERS
KORK ADMITS HIS GUILT AND TESTIFIES AGAINST OTHERS
FELDMAN TESTIFIES AGAINST ABOUT 40 ACCOMPLICES
VOROSHILOV REASSIGNS AND DEMOTES COMMANDERS DEEMED QUESTIONABLE
RADEK TESTIFIES AGAINST THE RIGHTISTS AND ZINOVIEVISTS AND SAYS WHO KILLED KIROV
MANY PEOPLE MAKE DEPOSITIONS AGAINST BUKHARIN
A SPECIAL TYPE OF BUREAUCRACY THAT IS NOT A NEW CLASS IS NECESSARY
SPECIALISTS HAD TO BE FAVORED AT TIMES
FREEDOM UNDER THE BOURGEOISIE IS FRAUDULENT AND AT THE BIDDING OF A FEW
FASCIST ARMIES WERE NOT AS STRONG AS THE FASCISTS THOUGHT
HARD FOR SPIES TO SPY ON A CENTRALLY PLANNED SYSTEM LIKE IN THE SU
STALIN DID MAKE MILITARY MISTAKES AND HE TOOK THE BLAME
STALINGRAD WAS THE TURNING POINT OF WWII
NAZI GENERALS BLAME HITLER FOR THEIR DEFEAT
STALIN REFUSES TO COMPROMISE WITH HITLER NEAR THE WAR’S END
THE SU BORE THE MAIN FASCIST ATTACK OF WWII
STALIN TELLS ZHUKOV TO LEAD THE VICTORY PARADE IN BERLIN WHEN THE ALLIES REFUSE
STALIN COMPLAINS THAT THE ALLIES ARE NOT DISARMING THE GERMAN PRISONERS
ZHUKOV NOTES THAT EISENHOWER, NOT MONTGOMERY, FOLLOWS THE YALTA AGREEMENT
ZHUKOV NOTES THAT NAZI INDUSTRY TIED TO WESTERN FAT CATS WAS NOT BOMBED
ZHUKOV SAYS ALLIES ARE WORKING TO GET SOVIET PRISONERS TO DEFECT
EISENHOWER ADMITS SOVIET’S OFFENSIVE RELIEVED THE PRESSURE ON THE US AT NORMANDY
LENIN WANTED THE PENAL CODE TO GIVE A BROAD DEFINITION OF COUNTER-REV. ACTIVITY
SEDOV BEGAN REVOLUTIONARY WORK AT A VERY YOUNG AGE
IMPORTANT PEOPLE ARE SPIED ON BY THE US GOVT
HOOVER INSTITUTED CENSORSHIP
AMERICAN LEFTISTS ARE ILLEGALLY ROUNDED UP AND DEPORTED
AMERICAN SECRET POLICE COMMIT ILLEGAL ACTS
AMERICAN SECRET POLICE RETALIATE AGAINST THOSE WHO CHALLENGE THEIR ILLEGALITIES
AMERICAN SECRET POLICE RIDDLED WITH BAD PEOPLE
HOOVER BECOMES DICTATOR OVER THE SECRET POLICE
ROOSEVELT AND HIS ATTORNEY GENERAL SET UP PROCEDURE TO SMEAR THOUSANDS
AMERICANS KILL SUBVERSIVES WHO HAVE NOT ACTUALLY DONE ANYTHING
AMERICAN LEGAL SYSTEM AND JUDGES ARE ROTTEN
HOOVER WAS A CROOK
FBI AGENTS ARE THE BIGGEST OF THE MOBSTERS
AMERICAN LEADERS SPY ON THEIR OWN SUBORDINATES AND HIGH OFFICIALS
DISRUPTION OF PARTY ACTIVITIES TOOK MANY FORMS
STALIN WAS BEING UNDERMINED SHORTLY BEFORE HE DIED
STALIN’S BODYGUARDS HATED BERIA
MALENKOV, NOT STALIN, WAS RESPONSIBLE FOR BERIA’S RISE IN POWER
MOLOTOV SAYS SOME POLITBURO MEMBERS ARE CONTROLLED BY BERIA
BULANOV SAYS HE AXED PEOPLE ILLEGALLY UNDER THE ORDERS OF TROTSKY & BUKHARIN
YAGODA WORKED HARD TO UNDERMINE THE SYSTEM AND GOVERNMENT
YEZHOV WORKS TO UNDERMINE THE SOVIET GOVT
STALIN STOOD BEHIND LOYAL AND DEDICATED MARXISTS WHO WERE ATTACKED
STALIN DID NOT DRINK AND WAS NO DRUNKARD
STALIN WAS NOT PARANOID BY ANY MEANS
MEMORIAL SHOULD BE BUILT FOR THOSE FIGHTING FOR SOCIALISM NOT AGAINST IT
PRAVDA ARTICLE CONTENDS THE DOCTOR’S PLOT IS REAL
STALIN WAS STRIPPED OF HIS PROTECTION IN THE LAST MONTHS
BERIA UNDERMINED STALIN IN THE LAST MONTHS
NEARLY ALL STALIN’S 1952 POLITBURO APPOINTEES ARE REMOVED
BERIA OPPOSED STALIN’S POLICY OF HAVING DIFFERENT NATIONALITIES AS HEADS OF REGIONS
AFTER STALIN’S DEATH BERIA STARTS REMOVING STALIN’S ALLIES FROM POSITIONS
AFTER STALIN’S DEATH BERIA STARTS ACTING LIKE HE IS IN CHARGE OF EVERYTHING
BERIA IS RESPONSIBLE FOR THE POST-WAR CRIMES OF THE SECRET POLICE IN THE SU
STALIN ORDERED SECRET POLICE ARRESTED WHO WITHHELD INFO ON ZHDANOV’S DEATH
KHRUSHCHOV SAYS ABAKUMOV WAS BERIA’S MAN
TITO CAN THANK THE RED ARMY FOR THE LIBERATION OF YUGOSLAVIA
IMPERIALISTS NEVER STOPPED TRYING TO OVERTHROW THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT
US HAS ADOPTED THE RUTHLESS METHODS OF THE BRITISH & THE NAZIS TO FIGHT SOCIALISM
BRITISH ARE A RUTHLESS COLONIAL OPPRESSOR
FASCISTS SUPPRESS ALL LEFTIST WRITINGS EXCEPT THOSE OF TROTSKY
CONTRARY TO TITO’S CLAIMS THE SU DID NOT EXPLOIT EASTERN EUROPE AFTER WWII
CAPITALISTS WANTED TO REINSTALL THE SAME RIPOFF SYSTEM IN EAST EUROPE AFTER WWII
FAMINE LIES BEGAN WITH HEARST AGENT WALKER
WALKER ROUTINELY LIED AND WAS A CRIMINAL
HERRIOT TRAVELED THE UKRAINE AND SAID HE SAW NO FAMINE
FAKE PHOTOS OF EARLY 20’S FAMINE WERE APPLIED TO EARLY 30’S
NAZIS TRY TO BLAME SOVIET FOR MASS EXECUTIONS IN THE UKRAINE
NYT CORRESPONDENT DENNY SAYS HE SEES NO FAMINE IN THE UKRAINE
DAIRYMPLE SAYS FAMINE DENIERS ARE LYING BUT OFFERS NO PROOF
USING DEMOGRAPHICS TO PROVE FAMINE IS BOGUS
REAL NATURAL CAUSES OF THE FAMINE ARE IGNORED BY CRITICS
THERE WAS A FAMINE FOR MANY REASONS
HOW ARE STALIN AND TROTSKY DIFFERENT
STALIN WAS COURTEOUS WITH GOOD MANNERS
STALIN HAS VERY LITTLE PROTECTION BY BODYGUARDS
STALIN CARES LITTLE FOR POMP AND CEREMONY AND DRESSES PLAINLY
THE WIVES OF MOST SOVIET LEADERS HAD JOBS AND WORKED
GPU ARE THE HAND-PICKED BEST MEN FOR THE JOB
KIROV KILLING WAS THE FIRST KILLING OF COMMUNIST LEADER SINCE ATTEMPT ON LENIN
103 PERSONS ALREADY CONVICTED WERE EXECUTED AFTER THE KIROV KILLING
THE 1937 TRIAL WAS FAIR TOWARD THE DEFENDANTS
1937 TRIAL SHOWS THAT SABOTAGE DID OCCUR IN MANY AREAS
POPULATION OF THE SU INCREASED GREATLY BETWEEN 1918 AND 1922
SU CONSTITUTION COMMITTEE LED BY SOME OF THE BIGGEST NAMES IN THE PARTY
NO MATTER WHO WINS IN A WAR BETWEEN THE CAPITALISTS THE SU WILL GAIN
THE CONFESSIONS AT THE 1936 TRIAL WERE GENUINE AND VOLUNTARY
IF SOVIET LEADERS WANTED TO KILL RIVALS THE KILLING OF KIROV GAVE THEM THE CHANCE
IT WOULD BE ABSURD FOR THE SU TO HAVE TRIALS UNLESS THEY WERE DEFINITELY GUILTY
IN LIGHT OF CONSPIRACIES THE SOVIET GOVT COULD HAVE ENDED THE NEW CONSTITUTION
THERE WAS NO PANIC IN EVACUATING MOSCOW
MIKOYAN DESERTED MOSCOW AFTER THE INVASION
A LOT OF POST WWII SUBVERSIVE AND TRAITOROUS ACTIONS BY HIGH OFFICIALS
STALIN SAYS THEY HAVE EVIDENCE AGAINST BUKHARIN
STALIN EXPLAINS HOW SPYING GOT GOING AND HOW IT SHOULD HAVE BEEN PREVENTED
STALIN EXPLAINS TO BLUKER HOW HE SHOULD TELL THE MILITARY ABOUT FINDING TRAITORS
STALIN SAYS ENTANGLED SPIES MUST BE ENCOURAGED TO COME FORWARD AND CONFESS
KHRUSHCHOV HATED STALIN BECAUSE STALIN WOULD NOT INTERVENE TO SAVE HIS SON
STALIN SAYS CAPITALISTS SURROUND THE SU & ALWAYS READY TO ATTACK OR STRANGLE
TROT TRAITORS ARE MUCH BETTER DISGUISED THAN THE OPENLY BOURGEOIS AGENTS
STALIN WARNS ABOUT SUCCESSES PRODUCING COMPLACENCY
STALIN SAYS IT TAKES MANY TO BUILT BUT ONLY A FEW TO DESTROY
ANTI-STALIN WRITERS HAD AN AX TO GRIND AND WERE BIASED
LAWSUITS FILED AGAINST ANTI-STALINISTS FOR LYING ABOUT STALIN
GORBACHOV SHOWS HIS HATRED OF STALIN AND SOCIALISM
CORRUPTION TOOK OVER THE PARTY ONLY AFTER THE DEMISE OF STALIN
YELTSIN WAS AS ROTTEN AS GORBACHOV
WHEN GORBACHOV & YELTSIN TOOK OVER THE SOVIET PEOPLE FELT TRAPPED & OPPRESSED
ANTI-STALIN WRITERS ADMIT THEIR BIAS AND PREJUDICE
GORBACHOV WAS A ROTTEN BOURGEOIS AGENT
CPSU LEADER PREDICTS COMMUNISM WILL WIN EVENTUALLY
SUMMARY OF CONQUESTS DECEPTIONS IN THE GREAT TERROR
CONQUEST MAKES ANTI-STALINIST ACCUSATIONS FOR WHICH NO PROOF IS PROVIDED
CONQUEST MAKES ALLEGATIONS RESTING ON GUESSES, ASSUMPTIONS, & SPECULATIONS.
MANY COMMENTS BY CONQUEST ARE PURE SLANDERS
MANY STATEMENTS BY CONQUEST ARE PATENTLY FALSE
MEDVEDEV MAKES UNQUALIFIED PSYCH JUDGMENTS OF STALIN WHOM HE HAS NEVER MET
MEDVEDEV LIED FAR TOO OFTEN TO BE CONSIDERED A CREDIBLE SOURCE
MEDVEDEV MAKES ONE STATEMENT AFTER ANOTHER WITHOUT A SHRED OF EVIDENCE
MEDVEDEV QUOTES NOVEL AND POETRY AS IF THEY WERE REAL HISTORY
MEDVEDEV’S SOURCES ARE UNRELIABLE
ADMITS HISTORICAL ACCOUNTS ARE HIGHLY DUBIOUS BUT QUOTES THEM ANYWAY
MEDVEDEV LEVELS OUTRIGHT LYING SLANDERS AGAINST STALIN
MEDVEDEV’S WRITINGS REEK WITH HEARSAY, INNUENDO, AND RUMOR
MEDVEDEV PRESENTS SPECULATIVE HISTORY AS REAL HISTORY
MEDEVEDEV TRIES TO CRITICIZE SU BUT ENDS UP COMPLIMENTING ITS PRODUCTION FIGURES
MEDVEDEV CITES FROM ALLEGED SOURCES WHICH HE REFUSES TO REVEAL
IN THE ENTIRE BOOK THE ONLY TORTURE PERSONALLY TESTFIED TO IS ANEMIC
MEDVEDEV’S BOOK DOES NOT EVEN HAVE A BIBLIOGRAPHY BUT HE SAYS IT DOES
LAQUEUR RELIES ON SPECULATION AND ADMITS HE IS RELYING ON A RUMOR
LAQUEUR CITES PERVERSIONS OF JUSTICE BUT AVOIDS MENTIONING WHO CAUSED THEM
ROGOVIN REPEATEDLY MAKES ACCUSATIONS WITHOUT A SHRED OF PROOF
ROGOVIN OFTEN USES CONJECTURAL WORDS SUCH AS ASSUME, EVIDENTLY & APPARENTLY
ROGOVIN GIVES ADVICE REGARDING GOOD SCHOLARSHIP WHICH HE HIMSELF IGNORES
REMNICK REPEATEDLY MAKES ACCUSATIONS WITHOUT PROVIDING A SHRED OF PROOF
NEKRICH AND HELLER CONSTANTLY MAKE UNPROVEN, SLANDEROUS ALLEGATIONS
GOVT OFFICIALS WERE ATTACKED AND KILLED FOR IMPLIMENTING COLLECTIVIZATION
DESTRUCTION BY THE KULAKS ALONG WITH DROUGHT CAUSED THEIR OWN STARVATION
KULAKS ADMIT THEY HID GRAIN FROM THE GOVT AND BROKE THE LAW IN 2 WAYS
SOVIET GOVT OPPOSED ZIONISM AND THE ZIONISTIC ASPECTS OF JUDAISM
US AND USSR ARE EQUALLY REPRESSIVE WHEN THEY FEEL CONDITIONS WARRANT IT
A GREATER PERCENTAGE OF PEOPLE FLED THE AMERICAN REV. THAN THE RUSSIAN
NEWSPAPERS WERE SUPPRESSED IN THE US WHEN DEEMED NECESSARY
US DEPORTED LEFTIST PEOPLE IN MASS WITHOUT SO MUCH AS A HEARING AS TO GUILT
US ALSO DEPORTED NATIONALITIES WHEN DEEMED NECESSARY
DEMANDS OF THE KRONSTADTERS AMOUNT TO SURRENDER TO THE CAPITALISTS
SOVIET LEGAL TREATMENT OF REBELLING KULAKS WAS FAIR
NOT ALL HIGH LEVEL REMOVALS WERE PURGES
PHYSICAL PRESSURE APPLIED TO POLITICAL PRISONERS IS LEGALIZED IN 1937
TIGHT NEW RULES ADOPTED AT THE 18TH CONGRESS REGARDING EXPULSIONS & PURGES
WHITE TERROR IS ALWAYS MUCH WORSE THAN RED TERROR
US CLIENT STATES COMMIT FAR MORE REPRESSION THAN THE SU EVER DID
MAO DOES NOT THINK YOU CAN BE A LEFTIST IF YOU HAVE NEVER SUFFERED
STALIN’S POST WWII DEMANDS WERE REASONABLE AND MODERATE
STALIN DID THE INTELLIGENCE ANALYSIS HIMSELF AFTER KNOWING THE FACTS & SOURCE
STALIN DEFEATED MAJOR CHALLENGES
THE MASSES LOVED STALIN
THE SOVIET LEADERS HAD GOOD REASONS TO FEAR IMMINENT ATTACKS
RUSSO-GERMAN PACT IS JUSTIFIED BECAUSE OF THE MUNICH SELL-OUT
STALIN DID EVERYTHING HE COULD THINK OF TO AVOID WAR WITH HITLER
THE SOVIET ARMIES WERE ORDERED NOT TO RETREAT REGARDLESS
POLISH ARMY LAUNCHES HOPELESS ATTACKS WITHOUT WORKING WITH RED ARMY
GORBACHOV WAS ALLIED WITH TRAITORS EARLY ON
KHRUSHCHOV AND GORBACHOV JOIN HANDS TO STAB STALIN BY REMOVING HIS BODY
GRISHIN ALMOST CHOSEN OVER GORBACHOV
GORBACHOV GOT ELECTED BY DEVIOUS MEANS
PUTNA ADMITS HIS GUILT
COMMANDER MEDVEDEV TESTIFIES AGAINST THE OTHER GENERALS
UBOREVITCH ADMITS HIS GUILT
YAKIR ADMITS HIS GUILT AND SAYS TUKHASHEVSKY GOT HIM INVOLVED
SOME TOP GENERALS TESTIFY AGAINST GAMARNIK
SOCIAL DEMOCRAT DAN FINALLY AGREES THAT THE BOLSHEVIKS DID IT RIGHT
POLITBURO INTERVENES TO PREVENT A GRAVE INJUSTICE TO BASMACHI
SOON AFTER LENIN DIED STALIN ORDERED ALL OF HIS WRITINGS COMBINED IN ONE INSTITUTE
ZINOVIEV ADMITS HIS GUILT
STALIN WANTED TO BE LET OUT OF WATCHING LENIN’S HEALTH BUT THEY SAID NO
DEUTSCHER WAS EXPELLED FROM THE POLISH CP FOR ANT-SOVIET ACTS
TROTSKY PROPOSES COMPROMISES WITH LIBERALS AND ENTERING BOURGEOIS GOVTS
STALIN REFUSES TO ACCEPT TROTSKY’S RESIGNATION AS WAR COMMISSAR
TROTSKY IS DECEPTIVE, CUNNING, NON-BOLSHEVIK, DIVISIVE AND INDIVIDUALISTIC
KRUPSKAYA OBJECTED TO CC VOTING TO SUPPRESS THE TESTAMENT & TROTSKY WAS SILENT
MENDELEEV SUPPORTS THE DIALECTICAL IDEA OF QUANTITATIVE CHANGES CAUSING LEAPS
TROTSKY SHOWED NO INTEREST IN TAKING OVER WHEN THE TRIUMVIRS SPLIT
TROTSKY ACTED LIKE HE WAS ON THE MASSES SIDE BUT SIDED WITH THE PARTY LEADERS
STALIN HOPED TO ENLIST THE LEFT OPPOSITION IN HIS BATTLE WITH THE KULAKS
SOME ZINOVIEVISTS RECANT
HEALTH PROBLEMS OF TROTSKY’S FAMILY ARE AGGRAVATED BY EXILING SON IN LAW
STALIN OFFERED MANY INDUCEMENTS TO GET THE OPPOSITION TO RECANT
THE IMAGE PEOPLE ARE GIVEN OF STALIN HAS NOTHING TO DO WITH REALITY
LUDWIG COMPARES STALIN TO TROTSKY
RADEK RECANTS, ACCEPTS STALIN’S PROGRAM AND ADVISES TROTSKY TO DO THE SAME
STALIN DOES NOT BELIEVE IN DESTINY
WHEN EXILED TO TURKEY THE GPU TREATED TROTSKY LIKE ROYALTY
COMINTERN DEMANDS NO UNITING WITH THE SOCIAL-FASCISTS
TROTSKY SAID THE SU WAS STILL SOCIALIST EVEN THOUGH HE SAID IT WAS DEFORMED
ON SOME CRUCIAL SOVIET LEADERSHIP ISSUES TROTSKY SIDES WITH STALIN
TROTSKY URGED HIS FOLLOWERS TO STAY IN GOVT POSITIONS WHEN THEY WANTED TO LEAVE
BLUMKIN WAS 1ST PARTY LEADER EXECUTED BUT OTHER MORE VOCAL TROTS WERE NOT
TROTSKY OPPOSED DIRECT WORKERS CONTROL OF FACTORIES
TROTSKY NEGLECTED THE ILLS OF HIS CHILDREN VERSUS THOSE OF THE WORLD
TROTSKY STILL SUPPORTS AND DEFENDS THE SU  BECAUSE IT IS STILL A WORKERS STATE
TROTSKY CONSTANTLY MADE WRONG PREDICTIONS
TROTSKY LIED ABOUT STALIN AND UNJUSTLY ACCUSED HIM
TROTSKY CONTENDED STALIN’S INVASION OF FINLAND WAS JUSTIFIED
CAPITALISTS WOULD NEVER ALLOW SOCIALISM TO DEVELOP IN PEACE
CAPITALIST GOVT OFFICIALS ARE RUTHLESS AND EGOTISTIC
GORBACHOV DID NOT KNOW HOW TO RUN THE SU
GORBACHOV BEGINS THE UNDERMINING OF THE SU AND SOCIALISM
STALIN SAYS MARX DID NOT TOTALLY DISCOUNT HEROES MAKING HISTORY
MEDVEDEV SAYS SOLZHENITSYN’S GULAG BOOK IS VERY CONTRADICTORY
MEDVEDEV SAYS BAZHANOV LIED ABOUT STALIN CHEATING IN THE CONGRESS VOTING
TROTSKY WAS FAR TOO UNPOPULAR WITH THE PEASANTS TO TAKE OVER AFTER LENIN
FIGURES GIVEN BY SOLZHENITSYN REGARDING DEATHS IN THE SU ARE ABSURDLY HIGH
DESPITE DEVESTATION THE SU EMERGED FROM WWII AS THE 2ND STRONGEST NATION
KRHRUSHCHOV HATED STALIN AND LIED ABOUT HIM
LENINGRAD NKVD FACILITATED THE KIROV MURDER
EARLY ON LENIN CHOSE STALIN FOR A LOT OF IMPORTANT JOBS
SU HAD A GOOD TEACHING SYSTEM WITH GOOD METHODS AND TEACHERS
BUKHARIN OPPOSES COLLECTIVIZATION
STALIN WORKED HARD TO INDUSTRIALIZE THE SU AND INCREASE THE PROLETARIAT
STALIN FELT THE PROLETARIAT SUPPORTED HIS GOVERNMENT
POLAND’S NOV 1939 ATTACK ON THE SU CHANGED THE STATUS OF POLISH PRISONERS
20,000 POLISH PRISONERS COULD NOT BE RELEASED UNTIL THEIR CASES WERE JUDGED
POLISH CASES WERE JUDGED BY A SPECIAL COMMISSION AND THE RESULTS WERE AS FOLLOWS
AT THE START OF THE WAR NAZIS HAD MILITARY SUPERIORITY OVER THE SU
ROOSEVELT SUPPORTS MOVING THE PRUSSIANS OUT OF EAST PRUSSIA
HULL RECOMMENDS THE NAZI LEADERS BE SHOT QUIETLY WITHOUT A PUBLIC TRIAL
HOPKINS DENIES THERE WAS ANY YALTA AGREEMENT THE RUSSIANS WERE TO TAKE BERLIN
STALIN JUST WANTS A FRIENDLY POLISH GOVT THAT WILL NOT SERVE THE GERMANS
STALIN SAYS THEY CAME DOWN ON THE CHURCH BECAUSE OF ITS OPPOSITION
HITLER COMPLIMENTED STALIN’S EFFECTIVENESS
LIFE UNDER THE BOLSHEVIKS WAS DRASTICALLY BETTER THAN UNDER THE CZAR
PEASANT REVOLTS IN THE EARLY 1930’S
KIROV WOULD NOT ACCEPT MOSCOW JOB OFFERED BY STALIN
EFFORTS TO PROVE STALIN WAS NOT LEGALLY THE GENERAL SECRETARY ARE BASELESS
STALIN ARGUES FOR SENSIBLE GUIDELINES FOR PURGING PEOPLE
STALIN SAYS SON DOESN’T ANSWER FOR THE FATHER WITH REGARD TO KULAKS & WHITES
STALIN DID GO OUT AMONG THE MASSES
STALIN ASKS BUKHARIN TO REVIEW THE PARADE WITH HIM ON THE TOMB ON NOV. 7, 1936
MOLOTOV SAYS THERE IS GREAT WRECKING IN INDUSTRY LED BY PYATAKOV & TRAITORS
TRAITORS IN THE GOVT IS PROVEN BY THE LARGE NUMBER OF STALIN SUPPORTERS IN JAIL
STALIN DENOUNCES ALLOWING BASSECHES TO CONSTANTLY ATTACK SU ECONOMIC POLICIES
STALIN WANTS TOUGHER LAWS ON STEALING BY KULAKS
STALIN ADVOCATES USING FOREIGN SPECIALISTS WHO SPY RATHER THAN EXPELLING THEM
STALIN COMPLAINS THAT THE UKRAINE HAS TOO MANY SUBVERSIVE ELEMENTS
KAGANOVICH DEMANDS DEATH FOR TROTSKY, ZINOVIEV AND KAMENEV
SEVERAL LEADERS TESTIFY AGAINST PYATAKOV
1936 DEFENDANTS ADMIT THEIR GUILT AND TESTIFY AGAINST OTHERS
STALIN SAYS KAMENEV WAS PLOTTING WITH FOREIGN GOVTS AGAINST SU
KAGANOVICH WRITES LETTER TO NORWAY DEMANDING IT EXPEL TROTSKY FOR TERRORISM
STALIN FAVORS SENDING A NOTE TO NORWAY/GERMANY DEMANDING THEY EXPEL LEON/SEDOV
STALIN VOTES TO EXPEL PYATAKOV FROM THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE FOR TERRORISM
AT QUESTIONING RYKOV WANTED TO KNOW FROM SOKOLNIKOV WHO ELSE KNEW OF HIS ACTS
STALIN DEMANDS THAT YAGODA BE REPLACED FOR INCOMPETENCE AND INEFFECTIVENESS
STALIN ASKS YAGODA TO TAKE OVER COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSARIAT AND LEAVE NKVD
STALIN & HIS WIFE WRITE LOVING LETTERS TO HIS MOTHER INVITING HER BUT SHE REFUSES
STALIN WAS MORE MODERATE THAN OTHERS IN THE 20’S.
EVIDENCE SHOWS TROTSKY LIES WHEN HE SAYS STALIN POISONED LENIN
RYUTIN ACTUALLY WROTE WORDS OF SUPPORT FOR STALIN
STALIN WAS NOT PARANOID
BUKHARIN EXPRESSES LOVE FOR STALIN
STALIN NEVER PROMISED TO PARDON BUKHARIN
NO RECORDS KEPT OF PRESIDIUM MEETINGS IN 1953
THE FINAL SELLOUT OCCURRED IN 1986 WHEN GORBACHOV INVITED SAKHAROV
TROTSKY UNFAIRLY DESCRIBED STALIN’S ROLE IN THE EARLY DAYS OF THE REVOLUTION
STALIN WAS NOT GRASPING FOR POWER AND SACRIFICED HIMSELF
STALIN DISPENSED JUSTICE FAR MORE FAIRLY THAN TROTSKY
LENIN DID NOT REPRIMAND STALIN EVEN WHEN HIS METHODS WERE ROUGH
SOME SELF-INDULGENCE BY THE REVOLUTIONARY LEADERS WAS JUSTIFIED
STALIN WAS REASONABLE AND NON-PARTISAN
STALIN DEVELOPED INTO A SHREWD, EFFECTIVE, REALISTIC POLITICIAN
POLITBURO FOLLOWED STALIN BECAUSE HIS JUDGMENT WAS BEST AND MOST CORRECT
STALIN WAS A GOOD PLODDING ADMINISTRATOR WHO KEPT AT THE JOB
STALIN COULD SEE TRAITORS HIDE THEIR FACE UNTIL THEY SEE AN OPPORTUNITY TO ACT
KHRUSHCHOV AND BREZHNEV DID NOT KNOW MARXIST IDEOLOGY
AFTER THE JUNE 1941 ATTACK STALIN STILL SUSPECTED IT MIGHT BE JUST A PROBE
STALIN ALLOWED MULTIPLE PARTIES IN EASTERN EUROPE CONTRARY TO CHURCHILL CLAIMS
KHRUSHCHOV WAS A LIAR
STALIN WAS A BETTER LINGUIST THAN MARR
ONLY INCOMPETENT FIGURES CAME TO POWER IN THE SU AFTER STALIN
STALIN AND BREZHNEV MET
STALIN SAID HE WOULD LIKE VOZNESENSKY TO BE HIS SUCCESSOR
NO ONE WAS QUALIFIED TO TAKE OVER FROM STALIN
KHRUSHCHOV WAS AN IGNORANT COUNTRY HICK
STALIN TOOK POLITICS OUT OF SCIENCE AND VIEWED IT OBJECTIVELY
GENERALS DEFEND STALIN’S MILITARY DECISIONS IN THE EARLY PART OF WWII
STALIN AND ZHUKOV ISSUE LAST MINUTE DIRECTIVES FOR MILITARY PREPAREDNESS
SEVERAL MEN TESTIFIED AGAINST BUKHARIN IN A CONFRONTATION
COLD WAR BEGAN IN 1917 NOT 1945
AFTER WWI EAST & CENTRAL EUROPEAN GOVTS WERE ALL DICTATORSHIPS EXCEPT CZECH.
CONDITIONS AFTER WWII WERE PRETTY BAD & AGGRESSION DEFINITELY WAS NOT CONSIDERED
MARSHALL PLAN AID HINGES OR EXPELLING COMMUNISTS FROM THE GOVTS
STALIN DID NOT SET OUT TO DESTROY TITO BUT TRIED TO GET ALONG WITH HIM
STALIN INTERVENED TO PREVENT LENIN FROM GIVING GEORGIA TO THE TURKS
STALIN WAS CONVINCED ROOSEVELT WAS ASSASSINATED
US USED ATOMIC BOMB NOT FOR MILITARY REASONS BUT TO INTIMIDATE THE SU
MOLOTOV WAS THE ONLY ONE WHO SINCERELY WEPT AT STALIN’S FUNERAL
STALIN’S WIFE TREATED HIM RUDELY IN PUBLIC AT TIMES
STALIN GAINED SUPPORT BY CHARM NOT FEAR
STALIN CRITICIZES HIS WIFE’S BROTHER FORGIVING STALIN’S WIFE A PISTOL
NIKOLAEV PUTS THE BLAME FOR KIROV’S DEATH ON THE LENINGRAD SECRET POLICE
STALIN WATCHED THE ZINOVIEV TRIAL FROM A FAR DISTANCE
STALIN DID NOT KILL ZHDANOV
STALIN REJECTS HIS OBVIOUS SUCCESSOR, MOLOTOV
STALIN MIGHT HAVE BEEN POISONED BECAUSE HIS STOMACH WAS BLEEDING
KHRUSHCHOV SAYS ALL OF THEM ARE NOT WORTH STALIN’S SHIT
JEWISH NATIONALIST DOCTOR, ETINGER, ADMITS HE KILLED SHCHERBAKOV
STALIN SUPPORTS RYUMIN
ABAKAMOV WAS GUILTY OF HIDING AND NOT INVESTIGATING CRIMES
ETINGER ADMITS A CONSPIRACY TO MURDER HIGH SOVIET OFFICIALS WHICH ABAKAMOV HID
EVIDENCE PROVES SHCHERBAKOV WAS MURDERED BY DOCTORS
VOVSI ADMITS HE AND KREMLIN DOCTORS SET OUT TO KILL SOVIET LEADERS
VINOGRADOV ADMITS HE ENDANGERED THE HEALTH OF SOVIET LEADERS
SOME JEWS ADMIT WORKING AS ZIONISTS TO EFFECT SOVIET GOVT POLICY
SHVARTSMAN SAYS ABAKUMOV KNEW HE & ZIONIST BROVERMAN COOKED ABAKUMOV’S BOOKS
SHVARTSMAN ADMITS HE AND ZIONIST PLOTTERS TRIED TO KILL MALENKOV SEVERAL TIMES
BROVERMAN SAYS HE FORGED/FALSIFIED DOCUMENTS ABOUT CATCHING SPIES FOR ABAKUMOV
BROVERMAN SAYS SHVARTSMAN WAS KNOWN TO HIM AS A VICIOUS JEWISH NATIONALIST
GOGLIDZE TOLD STALIN OF DOCTORS OUT TO KILL SOVIET LEADERS
SEVERAL DOCTORS ADMIT WORKING TO KILL ZHDANOV
GROUP OF TERRORISTS DOCTORS WERE WORKING IN THE KREMLIN
EVIDENCE AS TO HOW STALIN DIED
LENIN FIGHTS TO CHANGE THE PARTY’S NAME TO COMMUNIST PARTY
STALIN CHOOSES CREATIVE MARXISM OVER DOGMATIC MARXISM
TROTSKY AND HIS SON UNITE WITH OTHERS & CALL FOR AN OVERTHROW WHILE IN EXILE
HEAVY INDUSTRIALIZATION PRIOR TO WWII ACCOUNTED FOR VICTORY
STALIN WAS OFTEN MORE LENIENT THAN OTHERS ON THE POLITBURO
STALIN’S PRESENCE INTIMIDATES CAPITALIST GOVERNMENTS
ABAKUMOV AND HIS SUPPORTERS ARE ARRESTED AND RYUMIN TAKES OVER
MIKHOELS COMPLIMENTED THE SU AND FLOURISHED IN THE SU
JEWS SUPPORTED SU IN THE WAR & THEIR SOLDIERS RECEIVED THE 4TH HIGHEST # OF MEDALS
STALIN WAS ELECTED TO THE SIXTH PARTY CONFERENCE WHICH EXPELLED THE MENSHEVIKS
TROTSKY ALMOST UNDERMINED THE OCT. 1917 VOTE TO START THE REVOLUTION
CERTAIN PARTY MEMBERS PROPOSED THAT OTHER PARTIES BE IN THE FIRST SOVIET GOVT
LENIN UPHOLDS THE RIGHT OF NATIONALITIES TO SECEDE
COLLECTIVES MADE MANY MISTAKES AT FIRST AND HAD LOTS OF KULAK SABOTAGE
1936 CONSTITUTION MADE VOTING: MORE DIRECT, OPEN TO MORE PEOPLE AND SECRET
THE MOST DANGEROUS ENEMIES ARE SUBVERSIVES WITHIN THE STATE
STALIN WAS A BEACON OF HOPE IN A TIME OF GREAT TURMOIL AND DEPRIVATION
SOCIAL CONDITIONS IMPROVED GREATLY UNDER SOCIALISM ESP. FOR CHILDREN
REBUILDING THE SOVIET FINANCIAL STRUCTURE HAS BEEN HARD BUT SUCCESSFUL
SOME PEOPLE ADMIT BEING IN A ZIONIST/AMERICAN ANTI-SOVIET ORGANIZATION
GOOD PRISON ADMINISTRATORS WITH A GOOD KNOWLEDGE OF MARXISM WERE HARD TO FIND
BUKHARIN IS EXPELLED FROM 3 MAJOR POSITIONS IN 1929
STALIN REPEATEDLY SHOWED HIS FRIENDSHIP TOWARD BUKHARIN
STAND-INS AND FAKES WERE NOT USED AT THE TRIALS A SOME ALLEGE
YAGODA WAS A BUKHARIN/RYKOV ALLY FROM THE 1920’S
BUKHARIN SAYS HE MET WITH TROTSKY IN OSLO
HALLGREN RESIGNED FROM THE TROTSKY COMMITTEE BECAUSE IT WAS AN ANTI-STALIN FARCE
THE BOLSHEVIKS REPRESSED THOSE WHO EARLIER HAD REPRESSED THEM
PARTY LEADERS OF COLLECTIVES SUCCUMB TO BAD KULAK INFLUENCE AND DO BAD THINGS
CONSPIRING BY THE CONSPIRATORS IS EASY TO SEE BECAUSE OF THEIR LONG HISTORY IN IT
MISMANAGEMENT BY SOVIET OFFICIALS WAS A MAJOR CAUSE OF THE FAMINE
STALIN SEVERS TIES WITH POLISH GOVT BECAUSE IT SUPPORTS WITH HITLER ON KATYN
NAZI ARMY IS MUCH WEAKER ON THE WESTERN FRONT THAN ON THE EASTERN IN 1945
STALIN REFUSES TO SIGN A SEPARATE PEACE WITH THE NAZIS
RED ARMY WORKED WITH RELEASED ANTIFASCIST PRISONERS AFTER WWII
NAZIS KILLED MANY GERMAN COMMUNISTS
ALLIED GENERALS DECLINE TO VIEW THE VICTORY PARADE IN BERLIN SO ZHUKOV DOES IT
SOVIET LEADERS WANTED TO GET EVEN WITH THE NAZIS BUT DECIDED NOT TO
STALIN HAD A STRONG SENSE OF JUSTICE AND FAIR PLAY
STALIN STRONGLY OPPOSED THE MENSHEVIKS
STALIN DID MORE TO CREATE THE SOVIET UNION THAN ANYONE
STALIN DEBUNKS TROTSKY’S ALLEGED GREAT MILITARY LEADERSHIP
STALIN WAS ONE OF 7 REFUSING TO ACCEPT TROTSKY’S RESIGNATION AS MILITARY LEADER
STALIN DID THE MILITARY LEADERSHIP BUT TROTSKY GOT THE CREDIT
STALIN CONTENDS THAT TO BUILD ONE MUST LEARN AND LEARN FROM EVERYBODY
STALIN IS HONEST AND REALLY CARES ABOUT THE WELFARE OF THE PEOPLE
COLLECTIVIZATION AND THE SCISSORS CRISIS PRODUCE REAL HARDSHIP
TROTSKY ATTACKS AND STALIN DEFENDS THE OLD GUARD AGAINST BUREAUCRACY CHARGE
STALIN SAYS TROTSKY DID NOT PLAY A SPECIAL ROLE IN STARTING THE REVOLUTION
STALIN SAYS LEADING AND IMPLIMENTING SOCIALISM IS A ROUGH BUSINESS
STALIN OPPOSES EXPULSION EXCEPT FOR THOSE WHO REFUSE TO RECANT & ONLY THROW MUD
STALIN SAYS PARTY WILL NOT TOLERATE STARTING FACTIONS BECAUSE PEOPLE LOSE VOTES
STALIN SAYS HISTORY PROVES THE EASIEST THEORIES ARE FROM FROM BEING ALWAYS TRUE
STALIN SAYS SELF-CRITICISM BY THE PARTY IS REQUIRED
STALIN SAYS YOU HAVE TO DO WHAT IS RIGHT NOT WHAT IS POPULAR
CAPITALISTS SPY ON ONE ANOTHER SO CLEARLY THEY WOULD SPY ON THE SU
STALIN WARNS PARTY LEADERS AGAINST BECOMING CONCEITED
IN EARLY COLLECTIVIZATION CENTER UNLEASHED FORCES AND LOST CONTROL
SOVIET GOVT CRACKS DOWN ON KULAKS DESTROYING LIVESTOCK
APPEARS LOCAL PEASANTS RATHER THAN THE RED ARMY CRUSHED MOST KULAK REVOLTS
SU HIRED SPECIALISTS FROM ALL OVER THE WORLD DURING THE FIRST FIVE YEAR PLAN
GERMAN COMMUNISTS WANT TO UNITE WITH SOCIAL-DEMS AGAINST NAZIS BUT ARE REJECTED
STRONG ECONOMIC RECOVERY BEGAN AFTER 1932 AND 1933
SU WAS THE ONLY COUNTRY AGAINST NAZISM AND FASCISM
THERE WAS EVIDENCE OF A CONSPIRACY
PURGES WERE NOT BLOODY REMOVALS BY A POWER HUNGRY DICTATORSHIP
SUBVERSIVES CONCOCT GOOD REPORTS WHILE DESTROYING FROM WITHIN
SEPT 1937 LAW GETS TOUGHER ON WRECKERS AND SUBVERSION
SUBVERSIVES HEAVILY INFILTRATED INDUSTRY AND WHILE UNDERMINING PROTECTED OTHERS
STUPID COMMENTS BY ROBERT SERVICE
STALIN DID NOT BLINDLY FOLLOW LENIN
STALIN WAS A STRONG STUDENT OF ESPERANTO
STALIN WAS MORE CORRECT THAN LENIN WHEN HE OPPOSED THE ATTACK ON POLAND
STALIN AND LENIN AGREE ON ALMOST EVERY ISSUE
OPPOSITION COMPLAINED THAT THE PARTY WAS NOT HARD ENOUGH
SU DID NOT MOVE INTO POLAND IN 1939 UNTIL AGREEMENT WITH GERMANY
STALIN WORKED HARD AND KEPT LONG HOURS DURING WWII
FAILURE OF POLITBURO TO ACT IMPLIES THEY MIGHT HAVE LET STALIN DIE
AFTER STALIN DIED HIS WRITINGS WERE EITHER DESTOYED OR GIVEN TO LIBRARIES
CONSPIRATORS DESTROY LETTERS AND KEEP MEETINGS SECRET
LENIN COMPLIMENTS STALIN AS A SPLENDID GEORGIAN
STALIN WORKED VERY HARD IN THE EARLY YEARS TO BUILD THE PARTY
STALIN FILLED IN AS LEADER IN THE SUMMER OF 1917
TROTSKY SAYS HE DOES NOT TAKE ORDERS FROM LENIN AND ADMITS THEY CLASH OFTEN
STALIN WAS GIVEN MILITARY AUTHORITY TO STRAIGHTEN EVERYTHING OUT
LENIN WANTS ORDZHONIKIDZE EXPELLED FROM THE PARTY FOR A YEAR OR TWO
TROTSKY SAYS STALIN IS HIS ENEMY
STALIN LOVED AND WAS CARING TOWARD HIS MOTHER
LOT OF AMATEUR PSYCHOLOGISTS ANALYZING STALIN
LOTS OF LIES BEING WRITTEN ABOUT STALIN BY PEOPLE WHO NEVER MET OR KNEW HIM
SOME WORKING GROUPS ADMIT SABOTAGE
TROTSKY STILL SUPPORTS THE SOCIALIST NATURE OF THE SU AFTER BEING EXILED
CAPITALIST REPRESSION AND EXPLOITATION
THE SKILLFUL TRICKS AND DECEPTIONS OF CAPITALIST PROPAGANDA
STALIN IS AN IMPORTANT FIGURE ON THE WORLD STAGE
WHICH COUNTRY HAS THE MOST PEOPLE IN PRISON
VOLGA GERMANS WORKED WITH THE NAZIS
TARTARS AND CHECHENS WORKED WITH THE NAZIS
DEPORTATIONS AND RESETTLEMENTS WERE LEGALLY JUSTIFIED
KARACHAI PEOPLE IN CAUCASUS WORKED WITH THE NAZIS
THE BALKARS WORKED WITH THE NAZIS
KHRUSHCHOV UNDERMINED THE POLITBURO AND USURPED POWER
PEOPLE WERE REPRESSED FOR THEIR ACTS NOT THEIR IDEAS
WHICH COUNTRY HAS THE MOST PEOPLE IN PRISON
STALIN SUPPORTS LISTENING TO THE LITTLE PEOPLE FOR IDEAS
USSR PROGRESS ON MORTALITY UNDER SOCIALISM
FAMINE WAS CAUSED BY DROUGHT, INFESTATIONS, WEATHER AND FUNGUSES
PEASANTS WORKED EVEN HARDER AND PRODUCED MORE AFTER THE 1932 FAMINE
SOVIET FARMING MORE SUCCESSFUL THAN CRITICS ARE WILLING TO ADMIT
SOVIETS DID NOT INTENTIONALLY PRODUCE BOGUS HARVEST STATISTICS
SOVIET GOVT TRIED TO AID FAMINE VICTIMS
SOVIET GOVT AIDED THE UKRAINE IN ITS TIME OF NEED IN 1928-29
PURGES OCCURRED DURING SEVERAL YEARS
LOCAL LEADERS IGNORED PARTY ORDERS AND EXPELLED PEOPLE FOR WRONG REASONS
THE PURGES AND POLITICAL TRIALS ARE SEPARATE, DIFFERENT, AND UNRELATED
THE MYTH OF THE EXPULSIONS OF 1937
FINLAND WAS AIDED BY ENGLAND AND FRANCE
STALIN CONDONES TORTURE IN EXTREME CASES WITH TIGHT RESTRICTIONS
SPIES ARE ALL THROUGH SOVIET SOCIETY
ORDER TO PARTIES TO EXPLAIN THE KILLINGS AFTER KIROV MURDER
SOME PEOPLE ADMIT TRYING TO OVERTHROW THE SOVIET GOVT
ECCI LEADERS CONDEMN TROTSKY’S ALLIANCE WITH HEARST
PEOPLE UNJUSTLY TREATED STILL DEFENDED STALIN
DEPORTATIONS FOLLOWING KIROV KILLING ARE LIMITED
ARRESTS DECLINED EACH YEAR FROM 1933 TO 1936
LOCAL OFFICIALS MADE THE DECISIONS ON WHO DIED MORE THAN THE CENTER
YEZHOV ADMITS BEING IN THE OPPOSITION EARLIER
YEZHOV DOES NOT KNOW WHEN TO STOP
YEZHOV WORKED FOR GERMAN INTELLIGENCE
YEZHOV DIRECTED MANY ABUSES AND CRIMES OF THE NKVD
IN 1938 PARTY EXPULSIONS WENT DOWN AND ADMISSIONS WENT UP
YEZHOV ADMITS HE AND OTHERS PLANNED A COUP TO TAKE OVER THE GOVT
WHEN YEZHOV FELL MANY OF HIS ACCOMPLICES FELL WITH HIM
STALIN PROMOTED BUKHARIN UP THROUGH THE RANKS
STAIN WAS NOT THE CAUSE OF THE COLLECTIVIZATION EXCESSES
NEW EVIDENCE PROVES THERE WAS AN UNDERGROUND BLOC LED BY TROTSKY
STALIN HAD GOOD REASON TO BELIEVE THE ALLIES WERE TRICKING HIM INTO ATTACKING
STALIN NOT RESPONSIBLE FOR TOMSKY’S DEATH
STALIN COULD NOT HAVE HUMILIATED YEZHOV AT THE 18TH CONGRESS
KOLKHOZES HAD GOOD LIVING CONDITIONS
STALIN SAID JOINING KOLKHOZ COLLECTIVES WAS TO BE VOLUNTARY
BEFORE AND DURING THE WAR THE ALLIES AIDED NAZIS ECONOMICALLY MORE THAN THE SU
SOVIET SOLDIERS DID NOT TAKE REVENGE OR RAPE AFTER THE WAR
FINLAND SHOULD GIVE UP LAND BECAUSE IT IS TOO WEAK TO DEFEND ITSELF
RUSSO-GERMAN PACT DID NOT MAKE THEM FRIENDS OR CREATE TRUST
STALIN SAYS THE WARSAW UPRISING WAS FOOLISH AND POORLY TIMED
STALIN AND HIS GENERALS ARE BOTH RESPONSIBLE FOR FAILURE TO MOBILIZE SOON ENOUGH
STALIN OUTLINES THE STRATEGY FOR EXPLAINING THE 1930’s TRIALS
 
 
 
 
 
*************************************************************************
*************************************************************************
*************************************************************************
 
THIS IS A PRIMOGRAPHY
 
VAST STRENGTH OF SU
 
The first mighty stimulus to the Soviet people's courageous fighting is the public ownership of all the vast resources of 1/ 6 of the world.
Strong, Anna L. The Soviets Expected It. New York, New York: The Dial press, 1941, p. 28
 
AGAINST ANTI-SEMITISM
 
The Soviet Union is the only country in the world in which it is a crime for any person to give or receive any "direct or indirect privileges on account of race or nationality" and where any preaching of "race or national exceptionalism or hatred or contempt" is punishable by law.  This was a " fighting point" enshrined in the Soviet Constitution, which was adopted after the rise of Hitler Germany across the border.  Acts of race prejudice are severely dealt with in the Soviet Union.  Ordinary drunken brawls between Russians may be lightly handled as misdemeanors, but let a brawl occur between a Russian and a Jew in which national names are used in a way insulting to national dignity, and this becomes a serious political offense.
Strong, Anna L. The Soviets Expected It. New York, New York: The Dial press, 1941, p. 40
 
"At bottom every Jew is a Bolshevik!" was the constant theme of Rosenberg's tirades.
Sayers and Kahn. The Great Conspiracy. Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1946, p. 117
 
The idea of of a holy crusade against Soviet Russia dominated all of Rosenberg's writings.
Sayers and Kahn. The Great Conspiracy. Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1946, p. 118
 
            The official Communist Party and Soviet attitude toward anti-Semitism, or indeed toward any stirring up of racial animosity, is one of uncompromising hostility.
Chamberlin, William Henry. Soviet Russia. Boston: Little, Brown, 1930, p. 228
 
            How much discrimination there was against Jews in educational institutions is hard to tell.  It was never general but certainly there was some.  It was evasive and struggles always developed against it.  My best friend felt for a time undermined in her university job, because she refused to yield to the anti-Semitism which seemed to be promoted by the Party secretary at the university.  One day she came home exultant.  "Now I know the party doesn't stand for anti-Semitism," she said.  "They removed A...  He was in charge of universities here for the Central Committee, and was behind much of this anti-Semitism."
Strong, Anna Louise.  The Stalin Era. New York: Mainstream, 1956, p. 112
 
            ...The comment frequently made that the hostility of the Party leaders to the Opposition minority was partly due to the fact that most of the Opposition leaders are Jews is unjustified on grounds of race prejudice....
            Jews are not discriminated against in public employment, and most employment is public.  Anti-semitism is expressed rather in social slights, sometimes in open insults.  But offenders may be, and are, arrested and tried in the courts, which universally penalize them.
Baldwin, Roger. Liberty Under the Soviets, New York: Vanguard Press, 1928, p. 76
 
            Reference is occasionally made to the arrest and exile of Zionists as an expression of anti-semitism in Russia.  Numbers of Zionists have been exiled, it is true, but only in political cases involving either Zionist Socialists opposed to the Communist regime, or Zionists alleged to have connections with bourgeois agencies or individuals abroad.  Since the Zionist movement is essentially bourgeois, and dependent on friendly relations with Great Britain as the power controlling Palestine, those connections have been inevitable.
Baldwin, Roger. Liberty Under the Soviets, New York: Vanguard Press, 1928, p. 77
 
            The Communist Party is officially opposed to Zionism, and no Communist may be a Zionist.
Baldwin, Roger. Liberty Under the Soviets, New York: Vanguard Press, 1928, p. 78
 
            You see, Zionism and anti-Semitism are blood brothers.  Both are reactionary and inimical to the interests of the working class.  It sometimes happens that people of non-Jewish nationality trip up on this slippery ground and slide either toward favoring the Zionists, who are reactionaries, or toward becoming anti-Semites, who are equally reactionary.
Talbott, Strobe, Trans. and Ed. Khrushchev Remembers. Boston: Little Brown, c1970, p. 202
 
            I met all sorts of Jews in the Soviet Union, and, being interested in Jewish questions, I discussed matters with them exhaustively.  The amazing tempo of production calls for men, hands, and brains: the Jews willingly harnessed themselves to this process, and thus assimilation made further progress there than anywhere else in the world.  I met Jews who said to me: "For many years I have never given a thought to the fact that I am a Jew; it was only your questions which reminded me of it again."  I was moved by the unanimity with which the Jews I came across emphasized how completely they felt in harmony with the new state.  Formerly they had been despised, persecuted, without a calling, their life without meaning, Luftmenschen rootless people of the air; now they were peasants, workers, intellectuals, soldiers, all deeply grateful for the new order.
Feuchtwanger, Lion. Moscow, 1937. New York: The Viking Press, 1937, p. 82
 
 
            The Bolsheviks did not tolerate on their territory overt manifestations of anti-semitism, least of all pogroms, for they well realized that anti-semitism had become a cover for anti-communism.
Pipes, Richard. Russia Under the Bolshevik Regime. New York: A.A. Knopf, 1993, p. 101
 
            The Sovnarkom is said on July 27, 1918, to have issued an appeal against anti-semitism, threatening penalties for pogroms.
Pipes, Richard. Russia Under the Bolshevik Regime. New York: A.A. Knopf, 1993, p. 111
 
            In addition, there were few genuine Russians among the moderate Socialists--most of them were Jews or Georgians, whereas the overwhelming majority of the Bolsheviks were pure Russians.  'Somebody among the Bolsheviks remarked jestingly that since the Mensheviks were the faction of the Jews and the Bolsheviks that of the native Russians, it would become us to make a pogrom in the party.'  Anti-semitism could hardly be read into this heavy jocular aside, because nobody had been more blunt than Koba in the condemnation of racial hatred.
Deutscher, Isaac. Stalin; A Political Biography. New York: Oxford Univ. Press, 1967, p. 91
 
            Immediately after the Bolshevik revolution expressions of anti-Semitism became a crime.  In July 1918, the Council of People's Commissars called for the destruction of 'the anti-Semitic movement at its roots' by forbidding 'pogromists and persons inciting to pogroms'.  In 1922, the Russian Criminal Code forbade 'agitation and propaganda arousing national enmities and dissensions' and specified a minimum sentence of one year's solitary confinement (and 'death in time of war') as punishment.  In 1927, the Russian Republic passed legislation outlawing the dissemination, manufacture, or possession of literature calculated to stir national and religious hostility....
            During the Civil War and throughout the 1920s there was an active official government campaign against anti-Semitism.  Incidents involving and actions taken against were frequently reported in the Soviet press.  In this period the Party published over 100 books and brochures opposing anti-Semitism.
Szymanski, Albert. Human Rights in the Soviet Union. London: Zed Books, 1984, p. 88
 
            For two years following the Bolshevik takeover, new laws against anti-Semitism helped to prevent overt attacks on Jews....  By the end of the 1930s, Jews had assumed prominent roles throughout Soviet society, particularly as party activists, editors, and journalists and as leaders of industrial enterprises and cultural institutions.
            ...The visibility of Jews was noticeable enough to complicate relations between Nazi Germany and the Soviet Union.
Naumov & Teptsov. Stalin's Secret Pogrom. New Haven, London: Yale Univ. Press, 2001, p. 34
 
STALIN WAS AGAINST ANTI-SEMITISM
 
            Stalin was surrounded by Jewesses--from Polina Molotova and Maria Svanidze to Poskrebysheva and Yezhova.
Montefiore, Sebag. Stalin: The Court of the Red Tsar. New York: Knopf, 2004, p. 267
 
            Stalin has repeatedly condemned, along with other forms of race prejudice, anti-semitism.  Russia has steadily been building a society which is free of the dangerous germs of race hate.  Jews, as well as all others, are free to live where they wish, go to universities and technical schools, and secure any job for which they are fitted.  Since the Jews were a scattered people and could not properly preserve their language and culture when a minority among other groups, the District of Biro-bijan, a fertile area as large as Holland and Belgium combined, has been established for those who wish to live there.
Davis, Jerome.  Behind Soviet Power. New York, N. Y.: The Readers' Press, Inc., c1946, p. 73
 
            Stalin was not an anti-Semite, as he is sometimes portrayed.  He appreciated many qualities in the Jewish people: capacity for hard work, group solidarity, and political activeness.  Their political activeness is unquestionably higher than average.
Chuev, Feliks. Molotov Remembers. Chicago: I. R. Dee, 1993, p. 192
 
            This makes me believe that humor directed at any nationalist group was pleasing to Stalin, and that he was neither anti-Semitic nor anti-Muslim, only opposed to any nationalist enclave of power.
Sudoplatov, Pavel. Special Tasks. Boston: Little, Brown, c1993, p. 295
 
            To the end Stalin maintained that he opposed Jews who were Bundists, or religious activists, or 'cosmopolitans', or secessionists, or Zionists, or agents of American-Israeli organizations, but was not against Jews as such.  On the contrary he had provided them with the Jewish autonomous region (in an inhospitable corner of Siberia, which attracted only a few thousand hopeful immigrants).
Conquest, Robert. Stalin: Breaker of Nations. New York, New York: Viking, 1991, p. 290
 
            Stalin's attitude was unequivocal.  Personally free from crude racial prejudice, he was wary of openly offending against the party canon which was hostile to anti-Semitism.  Jews were quite prominent in his entourage, though far less so than they had been in Lenin's.  Litvinov stood for over a decade at the head of the Soviet diplomatic service; Kaganovich was to the end Stalin's factotum; Mekhlis was the chief political Commissar of the army; and Zaslavsky and Ehrenburg were the most popular of Stalin's sycophants.
Deutscher, Isaac. Stalin; A Political Biography. New York: Oxford Univ. Press, 1967, p. 605
 
            Yet, while Hitler's Armies were advancing, the Soviet authorities did their best to evacuate the Jews from the threatened areas, even though in some towns--the case of Taganrog was notorious--the Jews, disbelieving the warnings about what awaited them under Nazi occupation, refused to budge.  With Stalin's authorization, a Jewish Anti-Fascist Committee, headed by well-known personalities was formed; he called upon the Jews of the West to support the Soviet Union....  Jews serving with the armed forces fought bravely, were decorated, and promoted even to the highest ranks.  But qua Jews they were not accorded any merit....  After the war Soviet citizens guilty of collaboration with the Nazis and of Jew-baiting were punished as traitors.
Deutscher, Isaac. Stalin; A Political Biography. New York: Oxford Univ. Press, 1967, p. 606
 
            Koba too does not like Jews, but in my opinion he understands the absurdity of anti-Jewish measures.
Litvinov, Maksim Maksimovich. Notes for a Journal. New York: Morrow, 1955, p. 54
 
            Trotsky also saw an obvious anti-Semitic orientation in the Moscow trials, at which a disproportionately high number of the defendants were Jewish.  At the first show trial, 10 (out of 16) of the defendants were Jews, at the second, 8 (out of 17).  Trotsky felt that it was particularly monstrous that, of the terrorists supposedly sent by him into the USSR, who were simultaneously working for the Gestapo, all, as if by selection, turned out to be Jews.  In all this, Trotsky saw an attempt by Stalin to exploit the anti-Semitic moods that still existed in the country in the struggle against the Opposition.
            The statements by Trotsky were met with indignation abroad not only by pro-Stalinists but also by bourgeois-liberal Jewish circles.  Thus the famous American Zionist activist, Stephen Wise, explained his refusal to participate in the commission to investigate the Moscow Trials by the fact that Trotsky was not acting in good faith by raising the Jewish issue in connection with these trials.  "If his other charges," declared Wise, "are as unsubstantiated as his complaint on the score of anti-Semitism, then he has no case at all."
            Rejecting Trotsky's statements about the continued existence of anti-Semitism in the USSR, B. Z. Goldberg, a journalist who had contributed to the New York newspaper, Der Tog wrote: "In order to beat Stalin, Trotsky considers it right to make Soviet Russia anti-Semitic....  Is this the truth, Mr. Trotsky?  Is it honest to write this when it is not true?...  We are accustomed to look to the Soviet Union as our sole consolation as far as anti-Semitism is concerned....  It is therefore unforgivable that Trotsky should raise such groundless accusations against Stalin."
            For many years, accusations that Stalin was anti-Semitic were refuted not only by foreign Jewish circles, but by members of the Russian emigration.  The Israeli historian Nedava reports that even in 1952, that is at the culmination of state anti-Semitism in the USSR, Kerensky told him that in the Soviet Union anti-Semitism had long since been eradicated, and that statements about the existence of anti-Semitism there were invented by supporters of the Cold War.
Rogovin, Vadim. 1937: Year of Terror. Oak Park, Michigan: Labor Publications, 1998, p. 154
 
            Also he [Stalin] retained Dzerzhinsky as an ally in the coming struggle for power.  Dzerzhinsky, as a Pole naturally hated Russians, and he was not warm towards the Jews.  An association with a Georgian was not intolerable to him and he felt that Stalin must naturally share his own antipathies.  In the latter surmise he was wrong, for Stalin has no racial prejudices.
Graham, Stephen. Stalin. Port Washington, New York: Kennikat Press, 1970, p. 58
 
            I wondered how Stalin, being [allegedly--Ed.] anti-semitic, could have two Jewish secretaries: Mekhlis and Kanner.
Bazhanov, Boris. Bazhanov and the Damnation of Stalin. Athens, Ohio: Ohio University Press, c1990, p. ___w59
 
            It was said later that Stalin was hostile to Kapler because he was Jewish, but when this was happening that did not matter.
Beria, Sergo. Beria, My Father: Inside Stalin's Kremlin. London: Duckworth, 2001, p. 150
 
            As I have said, my father [Beria] did not believe that Stalin was anti-Semitic, even after his struggle against Trotskyism.  He had many Jewish friends....   In 1947 he sent Kaganovich to the Ukraine because of the virulent anti-semitism which had developed there and which risked discrediting the USSR, whereas Khrushchev encouraged these anti-Semitic tendencies in the Party in the Ukraine.  Calculation governed all of Stalin's actions.  He realized that the Jews were needed in that period.  Mekhlis [a Jew] was for a long time his personal secretary, and became editor of Pravda before being given charge of propaganda in the Army and, finally, charge of State Control.  Stalin kept him close to himself and retained his services for years.
Beria, Sergo. Beria, My Father: Inside Stalin's Kremlin. London: Duckworth, 2001, p. 211
 
            When they gathered at his apartment for Svetlana's 11th birthday on 28 Feb 1937, Yakov, Stalin's gentle Georgian son, brought Julia, his Jewish wife, for the first time.
Montefiore, Sebag. Stalin: The Court of the Red Tsar. New York: Knopf, 2004, p. 268
 
            On the other hand, most of the women around him and many of his closest collaborators, from Yagoda to Mekhlis, were Jewish.  The difference is obvious: he hated the intellectual Trotsky but had no problem with the cobbler Kaganovich....
            Stalin was aware that his regime had to stand against anti-Semitism and we find in his own notes a reminder to give a speech about it: he called it "cannibalism," made it a criminal offense, and regularly criticized anti-Semites.   Stalin founded a Jewish homeland, Birobizhan, on the inhospitable Chinese border but boasted, "The Tsar gave the Jews no land, but we will."
Montefiore, Sebag. Stalin: The Court of the Red Tsar. New York: Knopf, 2004, p. 305
 
            Stalin then attacked anti-Semitism: he [Stalin] had lately insisted that Jewish writers must have their Semitic names published in brackets after their Russian pseudonyms.  Now he asked the surprised Committee: "What's this for?  Does it give pleasure to someone to underline that this man is Jewish?  Why?  To promote anti-Semitism?"
Montefiore, Sebag. Stalin: The Court of the Red Tsar. New York: Knopf, 2004, p. 623
 
            [Footnote]: Yet Stalin still remembered his loyalest retainer Mekhlis [a Jew], who had suffered a stroke in 1949.  Now dying at his dacha, all he longed for was to attend the 1952 Congress.  Stalin refused, muttering that it was not a hospital but when the new Central Committee was announced, he remembered him.  Mekhlis was thrilled--he died happy and Stalin authorized a magnificent funeral.
Montefiore, Sebag. Stalin: The Court of the Red Tsar. New York: Knopf, 2004, p. 627
 
            Simonov, then editor-in-chief of Literaturnaiia Gazeta, a major organ for literary affairs, was present at a Politburo meeting on February 26, 1952,...when the list of candidates for the Stalin prizes were presented for consideration to Stalin.  Next to certain names, Simonov recounted, were other names in brackets.  In each case the bracketed name had a noticeably Jewish appearance such as " Rovinsky."
            Stalin was irritated.  "Why does it say Maltsev, but in brackets "Rovinsky"?   For what purpose?   For how long will this continue?....." he demanded.   "Why is this being done?   Why are two names being written?"  Stalin appeared offended.   He proceeded to instruct his amazed audience: "If a man chose a literary pseudonym--that's his right.   We're not speaking about anything other than elementary decency...   But apparently someone thought to underline the fact that this man had a double name, to underline that he was a Jew.   Why would you underline this?   Why would you do this?   For what purpose instill anti-semitism?  Who needs this?"
            According to Simonov, Stalin's comment astounded the important literary and government figures who attended the February meeting and had an impact on Soviet literary society.   News of this incident spread by word-of-mouth in upper echelon cultural circles, the effect of which was to distance Stalin himself from the crude anti-Semitic campaign still underway that was the cause of the parentheses in the first place.   It made people think twice about their own accusations.   How could ordinary citizens expose Jews as Jews if Stalin himself could not support such invidious considerations?
Naumov and Brent. Stalin's Last Crime. New York: HarperCollins, c2003, p. 201-202
 
            In 1943 the Jews were useful to him [Stalin], and he sent Mikhoels and others to America to raise money and goodwill for the Soviet war effort; in 1947, he supported the establishment of the state of Israel and allowed, if unwillingly, his daughter to marry Morozov a Jew.
Naumov and Brent. Stalin's Last Crime. New York: HarperCollins, c2003, p. 217
 
            As early as September 1948 he [Ehrenburg] publicly demonstrated his support for Stalin's view of the State of Israel, in his Pravda article, "The Union of the Snub-nosed".   Ehrenburg argued that the charge of anti-semitism, discrimination, and the suppression of the rights of Jews in the Soviet Union was nothing more than malicious fabrications by enemies of the Soviet order.   He argued that Israel was nothing but a bourgeois state, incompetent to decide the Jewish question; nor could it unite Jews around the world.
Naumov and Brent. Stalin's Last Crime. New York: HarperCollins, c2003, p. 306
 
            The Hungarian Jew Karl Pauker commanded Stalin's personal security detail for a time in the 1930s and used to shave the dictator with an open razor....
Naumov & Teptsov. Stalin's Secret Pogrom. New Haven, London: Yale Univ. Press, 2001, p. 33
 
            Once in power, Stalin...found it opportune to denounce anti-Semitism, as in his famous statement to the Jewish Telegraph Agency in January 1931: "Anti-Semitism is an extreme expression of racial chauvinism and as such is the most dangerous survival of cannibalism."   In the 1920s and 1930s, Stalin permitted Jewish settlements to flourish in the Crimea, supported the creation of a secular Yiddish culture, and established a Jewish autonomous region in Birobidzhan to rival Palestine for the allegiance of Jewish masses inside and outside the country.   He was once reported saying, "The czar gave the Jews no land.   Kerensky gave the Jews no land.   But we will give it."   Stalin, it seemed, was ready to help the Jews become a "normal" national minority with a territory of their own.
Naumov & Teptsov. Stalin's Secret Pogrom. New Haven, London: Yale Univ. Press, 2001, p. 33
 
            [In replying on January 12, 1931 to an inquiry by the Jewish News Agency in the United States Stalin stated] Anti-semitism, as an extreme form of racial chauvinism, is the most dangerous vestige of cannibalism.
            ...Anti-semitism is dangerous for the working people as being a false path that leads them off the right road and lands them in the jungle.  Hence Communists, as consistent internationalists, cannot but be irreconcilable, sworn enemies of anti-semitism.
            In the USSR anti-semitism is punishable with the utmost severity of the law as a phenomenon deeply hostile to the Soviet system.  Under USSR law active anti-semites are liable to the death penalty.
Stalin, Joseph. Works. Moscow: Foreign Languages Pub. House, 1952, Vol. 13, p. 30
 
            Dzhughashvili’s comments were later used against him as proof of anti-semitism.  They were certainly crude and insensitive.  But they scarcely betoken hatred of all Jews--or indeed of all Georgians.  He, a Georgian, was repeating something that a Russian Bolshevik had said about Russians and Jews.  For many years into the future he would be the friend, associate, or leader of countless individual Jews.
Service, Robert. Stalin. Cambridge, Mass.: Belknap Press of Harvard Univ. Press, 2005, p. 77
 
            Stories also surfaced that Stalin made anti-semitic remarks in private.  Against this is the incontrovertible fact that Jews were among Stalin's friends and associates before and after the Great War.
Service, Robert. Stalin. Cambridge, Mass.: Belknap Press of Harvard Univ. Press, 2005, p. 101
 
            In the light of his continued association with Jewish friends, it would be difficult to call him an anti-semite;   
Service, Robert. Stalin. Cambridge, Mass.: Belknap Press of Harvard Univ. Press, 2005, p. 326
 
            He did not refuse to allow Jewish people the right to cultural self-expression after the October Revolution; indeed his People’s, Commissariat for Nationalities’ Affairs gave money and facilities to groups promoting the interests of Jews.  Within his family he had opposed his daughter’s dalliance with the Jewish film-maker Kapler.  As a father, he had much reason to discourage Svetlana from having anything to do with the middle-aged, womanizing Kapler.
Service, Robert. Stalin. Cambridge, Mass.: Belknap Press of Harvard Univ. Press, 2005, p. 568
 
            His campaign against “rootless cosmopolitanism” cannot be automatically attributed to hatred of Jews as Jews.  He moved aggressively against every people in the USSR sharing nationhood with peoples of foreign states.  The Greeks, Poles, and Koreans had suffered at his hands before the Second Were War for this reason.  Campaigns against cosmopolitanism started up when relations between the Soviet Union and the USA drastically worsened in 1947.  At first Jews were not the outstanding target.  But this did not remain true for long.  A warm reception was accorded by 20,000 Jews to Golda Meir at a Moscow synagogue in September 1948 after the foundation of Israel as a state.  This infuriated Stalin, who started to regard Jewish people as subversive elements.  Yet his motives were of Realpolitik rather than visceral prejudice    .
Service, Robert. Stalin. Cambridge, Mass.: Belknap Press of Harvard Univ. Press, 2005, p. 568
 
            Stalin's attitude toward this growing anti-Semitism was one of friendly neutrality.  But matters went so far that he was forced to come out with a published statement which declared, "We are fighting Trotsky, Zinoviev and Kamenev not because they are Jews, but because they are Oppositionists," and the like.
Trotsky, Leon, Stalin. New York: Harper and Brothers Publishers, 1941, p. 399
 
            When speaking at a session of the Moscow City Soviet (Council) on November 6, 1941, Stalin said, "The reactionary Nazi Party with their brutal anti-Jewish pogroms are no better than the Russian tsarist regime that allowed the Black Hundred pogroms."
Korolyov, Anatoly.  Soviet Jewish Doctors Dissected Hitler, Novosti, Russian News and Information Agency, 7/5/05.
 
Furthermore, Stalin's inner circle included four Jewish ministers (people's commissars): Lazar Kaganovich, Boris Vannikov, Semyon Ginzburg and Isaak Zaltsman.  These men were responsible for the railroads, ammunition, military construction and the tank industry.
Korolyov, Anatoly.  Soviet Jewish Doctors Dissected Hitler, Novosti, Russian News and Information Agency, 7/5/05.
 
            And, Stalin, what can be said about him?
            I [Kaganovich] will tell you something about Stalin.  There are Stalin's statements on this question that anti-semitism is criminally punishable.  He was not an anti-semite.  But life is such a paradox that all his opponents were Jews.  Zinoviev, Kamenev, Trotsky... what could he do if all his enemies were Jews?
            Then he was very scrupulous and careful by nature on political and nationality matters.
THUS SPAKE KAGANOVICH by Feliks Chuyev, 1992
 
            Both Dovator and Kreizer excelled as Soviet military commanders and are applauded in the memoirs of Stalin's most famous marshals.  Both were among the highest Jewish officers in Stalin's armies....
            Colonel-General Dragunsky, who was wounded four times during the war and achieved fame as a tank commander, told me that during the war more than a hundred generals of Jewish ancestry served in the Red Army.  This figure is also mentioned in an official booklet, Jews in the USSR--Figures, Facts, Comment, published in Moscow in 1982.  The existence of these generals complicates the conventional impression of Stalin as anti-Semite.  A look at Red Army rosters shows that many soldiers who were members of minorities, including Jews, Georgians and Armenians, were able to climb to the top of the ladder of command.
Axell, Albert. Stalin's War: Through the Eyes of His Commanders. London, Arms and Armour Press. 1997, p. 115
 
            On the subject of anti-Semitism, the three generals had almost identical views.  They hadn't encountered bigotry in the military; all the men they mixed with in the Army were impervious to prejudice.  Dragunsky said that after the Berlin operation was completed in mid-1945 only a handful of military persons were awarded the country's highest decoration--the Gold Star Hero Medal.  'I, a Jew, was one of those few.  Stalin himself approved the order, knowing I was a Jew."  According to Dragunsky, political indoctrination in the Army had weeded out bigotry.
Axell, Albert. Stalin's War: Through the Eyes of His Commanders. London, Arms and Armour Press. 1997, p. 117
 
            ...some of the best-known Soviet war correspondents were Jews, such as Ehrenburg and Grossman, both of whom wrote highly acclaimed novels.  Meanwhile, there was the presence of over 100 Russian Jews who attained the rank of general in Stalin's army.
Axell, Albert. Stalin's War: Through the Eyes of His Commanders. London, Arms and Armour Press. 1997, p. 118
 
STALIN IS GOOD LEADER
 
When I'm met Stalin, I did not find him enigmatic.  I found him the easiest person to talk to I ever met.  He is far and away the best Committee Chairman of my experience.  He can bring everybody's views out and combine them in the minimum of time.
Strong, Anna L. The Soviets Expected It. New York, New York: The Dial press, 1941, p. 47
 
If I should explain Stalin to politicians, I should call him a superlatively good committee man.  Is this too prosaic a term for the leader of 200 million people?  I might call him instead a farseeing statesman; this also is true….
Strong, Anna L. The Soviets Expected It. New York, New York: The Dial press, 1941, p. 52
 
Stalin brings certain important qualities to these joint decisions.  People who meet him are first of impressed by his directness and simplicity, his swift approach.  Next they noticed his clearness and objectivity in handling questions.  He completely lacks Hitler's emotional hysteria and Mussolini cocky self-assertion; he does not thrust himself into the picture.  Gradually one becomes aware of his keen analysis, his colossal knowledge, his grip of world politics, his willingness to face facts, an especially his long view, which fits the problem in the history, judging not only its immediate factors, but its past and future too.
Strong, Anna L. The Soviets Expected It. New York, New York: The Dial press, 1941, p. 54
 
            "I [A.L. Strong] was hardly conscious of the part played by Stalin in helping us to reach a decision.   I thought of him rather as someone superlatively easy to explain things to, who got one's meaning half through a sentence, and brought it all out very quickly.   When everything became clear, and not a moment sooner or later, Stalin turned to the others: 'Well?'   A word from one, a phrase from another, together accomplished a sentence.   Nods--it was unanimous.   It seemed we had all decided, simultaneously, unanimously.  That is Stalin's method and greatness.  He is supreme analyst of situations, personalities, tendencies.  Through his analysis he is supreme combiner of many wills.  A creator of collective will--such is supposed to be every Communist, though by no means all of them measure up to this high calling.  The greatness of the man is known by the range over which he can do this.  "I can analyze and plan with the workers of one plant for a period of several months," said a responsible Communist to me.  "Others, much wiser than I, like men on our Central Committee, can plan with wider masses for years.  Stalin is in this our ablest.  He sees the interrelations of our path with world events, and the order of each step, as a man sees the earth from the stratosphere.  But the men of our Central Committee take his analysis not because it is Stalin's but because it is clear and convincing and documented with facts."
            When Stalin reports to a congress of the party, or of the farm champions, or the heads of industry, none of his statements can be ranked as new.  They are statements heard already on the lips of millions throughout the land.  But he puts them together more completely than anyone else.  He analyzes them, shows the beginning, the end and all the stages to that end.  He shows the farm champions the long, hard path to collective farming and just where they are on that path today.  He shows the heads of industry what and why are the fundamental tasks in industry at the moment.  He shows the party congress the chief tasks for the Soviet Union in the next few years.  All of this he shows out of their own reports and knowledge, combining and relating these to the situation in the country and the world.  It is not the statements or the policies that are new but the combining of them, so that they become a collective program, unanimously and understandingly adopted.  It is for this capacity that men cheer Stalin....
            Men never speak in the Soviet Union of "Stalin's policy" but always of the "party line," which Stalin "reports" in its present aspects, but does not "make."
Strong, Anna Louise. Dictatorship and Democracy in the Soviet Union. New York: International Pamphlets, 1934, p. 17-18
 
            What Lenin valued in Stalin was his knowledge of details and of persons, his working power and the swiftness of his decisions, qualities which only a supreme character would appreciate in a subordinate.
Ludwig, Emil, Stalin. New York, New York: G. P. Putnam's sons, 1942, p. 71
 
            Everyone knows about Stalin's own revolutionary spirit and about his other virtues which have been cited by the party over and over again.  His pretensions to a very special role in our history were well founded, for he really was a man of outstanding skill and intelligence.  He truly did tower over everyone around him, and despite my implacable condemnation of his methods and his abuses of power, I have always recognized and acknowledged his strengths.
Talbott, Strobe, Trans. and Ed. Khrushchev Remembers. Boston: Little Brown, c1970. p. 4
 
  
[HOXHA STATED  On the occasion of the centenary of the birth of great Marxist-Leninist Joseph Stalin]
            All this villainy emerged soon after the death, or to be more precise, after the murder of Stalin.  I say after the murder of Stalin, because Mikoyan himself told me and Mehmet Shehu that they, together with Khrushchev and their associates, had decided to carry out a “pokushenie”, i.e., to make an attempt on Stalin's life, but later, as Mikoyan told us, they gave up this plan.  It is a known fact that the Khrushchevites could hardly wait for Stalin to die.  The circumstances of his death are not clear.
            An unsolved enigma in this direction is the question of the “white smocks”, the trial conducted against the Kremlin doctors, who, as long as Stalin was alive were accused of having attempted to kill many leaders of the Soviet Union.  After Stalin's death these doctors were rehabilitated and no more was said about this question!  But why was this question hushed up?!  Was the criminal activity of these doctors proved at the time of the trial, or not?  The question of the doctors was hushed up, because had it been investigated later, had it been gone into thoroughly, it would have brought to light a great deal of dirty linen, many crimes and plots that the concealed revisionists, with Khrushchev and Mikoyan at the head, had been perpetrating.  This could be the explanation also for the sudden deaths within a very short time, of Gottwald, Bierut, Foster, Dimitrov and some others, all from curable illnesses, about which I have written in my unpublished memoirs, “The Khrushchevites and Us”.  This could prove to be the true reason for the sudden death of Stalin, too.  In order to attain their vile aims and to carry out their plans for the struggle against Marxism-Leninism and socialism, Khrushchev and his group liquidated many of the main leaders of the Comintern, one after the other, by silent and mysterious methods.  Apart from others, they also attacked and discredited Rakosi, dismissed him from his post and interned him deep in the interior of the steppes of Russia, in this way.  In the “secret” report delivered at their 20th Congress, Nikita Khrushchev and his associates threw mud at Joseph Vissarionovich Stalin and tried to defile him in the filthiest manner, resorting to the most cynical Trotskyite methods.  After compromising some of the cadres of the leadership of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, the Khrushchevites exploited them thoroughly and then kicked them out and liquidated them as anti-party elements.  The Khrushchevites headed by Khrushchev, who condemned the cult of Stalin in order to cover up their subsequent crimes against the Soviet Union and socialism raised the cult of Khrushchev sky-high.  Those top functionaries of the party and Soviet state attributed to Stalin the brutality, cunning perfidy and baseness of character, the imprisonments and murders which they themselves practised and which were second nature to them.  As long as Stalin was alive it was precisely they who sang hymns of praise to him in order to cover up their careerism, and their underhand aims and actions.  In 1949 Krushchev described Stalin as the “leader and teacher of genius”, and said that “the name of Comrade Stalin is the banner of all the victories of the Soviet people, the banner of the struggle of the working people the world over”.  Mikoyan described the Works of Stalin as a “new, higher historical stage of Leninism”.  Kosygin said, “We owe all our victories and successes, to the great Stalin”, etc., etc.  While after his death they behaved quite differently.  It was the Khrushchevites who strangled the voice of the party, strangled the voice of the working class and filled the concentration camps with patriots; it was they who released the dregs of treachery from prison, the Trotskyites and all the enemies, whom time and the facts had proved and have proved again now with their struggle as dissidents to be opponents of socialism and agents in the service of foreign capitalist enemies. It is the Khrushchovites who, in conspiratorial and mysterious ways, tried and condemned not only the Soviet revolutionaries but also many persons from other countries.
            Khrushchev, Mikoyan and Suslov first defended the conspirator Imre Nagy, and then condemned and executed him secretly somewhere in Rumania!  Who gave them the right to act in that way with a foreign citizen?  Although he was a conspirator, he should have been subject only to trial in his own country and not to any foreign law, court or punishment. Stalin never did such things.
            No, Stalin never acted in that way.  He conducted public trials against the traitors to the party and Soviet state.  The party and the Soviet peoples were told openly of the crimes they had committed.  You never find in Stalin's actions such Mafia-like methods as you find in the actions of the Soviet revisionist chiefs.  The Soviet revisionists have used and are still using such methods against one another in their struggle for power, just as in every capitalist country.  Khrushchev seized power through a putsch, and Brezhnev toppled him from the throne with a putsch.
            Brezhnev and company got rid of Khrushchev to protect the revisionist policy and ideology from the discredit and exposure resulting from his crazy behaviour and actions and embarrassing buffoonery.  He did not in any way reject Khrushchevism, the reports and decisions of the 20th and 22nd Congresses in which Khrushchevisrn is embodied.  Brezhnev showed himself to be so ungrateful to Khrushchev, whom he had previously lauded so high, that he could not even find a hole in the wall of the Kremlin to put his ashes when he died!
            Stalin was not at all what the enemies of communism accused and accuse him of being.  On the contrary, he was just and a man of principle.  He knew how to help and combat those who made mistakes, knew now to support, encourage and point out the special merits of those who served Marxism-Leninism loyally, as the occasion required.  The question of Rokossovsky and that of Zhukov are now well known.  When Rokossovsky and Zhukov made mistakes they were criticized and discharged from their posts.  But they were not cast off as incorrigible.  On the contrary, they were, warmly assisted and the moment it was considered that these cadres had corrected themselves, Stalin elevated them to responsible positions promoted them to marshals and at the time of the Great Patriotic War charged them with extremely important duties on the main fronts of the war against the Hitlerite invaders.  Only a leader who had a clear concept of and applied Marxist-Leninist justice in evaluating the work of people, with their good points and errors, could have acted as Stalin did.
            Following Stalin's death, Marshal Zhukov became a tool of Nikita Khrushchev and his group; he supported the treacherous activity of Khrushchev against the Soviet Union, the Bolshevik Party and Stalin.  Eventually, Nikita Khrushchev tossed Zhukov away like a squeezed lemon.  He did the same with Rokossovsky and many other main cadres.  Many Soviet communists were deceived by the demagogy of the Khrushchevite revisionist group and thought that after Stalin's death the Soviet Union would become a real paradise, as the revisionist traitors started to trumpet.  They declared with great pomp that in 1980 communism would be established in the Soviet Union!!  But what happened?  The opposite, and it could not be otherwise.
            Khrushchev himself admitted to us that Stalin had said to them that they would sell out the Soviet Union to imperialism.  And this is what happened in fact.  What he said has proved true.
            Any person who assesses Stalin's work as a whole can understand that the genius and communist spirit of this outstanding personality are rare in the modern world.
Hoxha, Enver. With Stalin: Memoirs. Tirana: 8 N‘ntori Pub. House, 1979.
 
GOLOVANOV:  I heard from Stalin many times and I say categorically that the way people live is the basis of everything....
            Unless we have another Stalinist hand firmly on the helm, we won't build communism.  I hold that Stalin took the correct road and that we must continue this line.
Chuev, Feliks. Molotov Remembers. Chicago: I. R. Dee, 1993, p. 303
 
            Stalin and Khrushchev.  As for Khrushchev, he is not worth one of Stalin's fingernails.  Stalin's achievements, despite everything, are enormous.  He was the great transformer....  While they strive to efface his colossal achievements.
Chuev, Feliks. Molotov Remembers. Chicago: I. R. Dee, 1993, p. 364
 
            The end of the war is still vivid in my memory as a glorious event that washed away all my doubts about the wisdom of Stalin's leadership.  All heroic and tragic events, losses and even purges, seemed to be justified by the triumph over Hitler.  I remember the grand reception in the Kremlin where I had the privilege of being seated in the Georgian Hall at table No. 9 together with Admiral Isakov, deputy commander of the Navy....  I remember when Stalin came to our table to greet Isakov, who had lost a leg in a German air raid in the Caucasus in 1942, and pronounced a toast in his honor.  Isakov could not appear before an audience on crutches, and we were all moved by Stalin's gesture.
            You must realize the emotion of every officer in the high command when Stalin admitted in his speech to us that mistakes were made and that we had been helpless in dreadful situations in the war.  He said that another people and another nation would have asked the government to conclude a peace treaty with the Germans, but the Russian people had displayed confidence and patience in their government, and he thanked the Russian nation for that confidence.
            Stalin was quite a different man that night from the one I had met in his Kremlin office.  This time he displayed deep emotion, and it seemed to me that he looked at us young generals and admirals as the generation he had raised, his children and his heirs.
            In retrospect, what is remarkable is that Stalin displayed such emotion and devoted such special attention to the mid-level military leaders who were much younger than Zhukov, Voroshilov, and others of the old guard.  He was definitely addressing himself to my generation, which had come of age in the war, and we were thrilled to bask in his proud and approving glances in our direction.
Sudoplatov, Pavel. Special Tasks. Boston: Little, Brown, c1993, p. 170
 
            If Stalin had accomplished for the world bourgeoisie what he did for the world proletariat, he would have long been hailed in bourgeois circles as one of the "greats" of all time, not only of the present century.  The same general criteria should apply to Stalin's reputation from the Marxist point of view.  Stalin advanced the position of the world proletariat further than any person in history with the exception of Lenin.  True, without the base Lenin laid, Stalin could not have built, but using this base he moved about as far as was possible in the existing situation.
            In short a new class of world leader has emerged, and Stalin is in its highest rank.
Cameron, Kenneth Neill. Stalin, Man of Contradiction. Toronto: NC Press, c1987, p. 120
 
            His [Stalin] history is a series of victories over a series of tremendous difficulties.  Since 1917, not a single year of his career has passed without his having done something which would have made any other man famous.  He is a man of iron....  He is as strong and yet as flexible as steel.  His power lies in his formidable intelligence, the breadth of his knowledge, the amazing orderliness of his mind, his passion for precision, his inexorable spirit of progress, the rapidity, sureness, and intensity of his decisions, and his constant care to choose the right men.
            In many ways, as we have seen, he [Stalin] is extraordinarily like Lenin: he has the same knowledge of theory, the same practical common sense, the same firmness.
            Among all the sources of his genius, which is the principal one?  Bela Kun said, in a fine phrase: "He knows how not to go too quickly.  He knows how to weigh the moment."  And Bela Kun considers that to be the chief characteristic of Stalin, the one which belongs to him in particular, much more than any other; to wait, to temporize, to resist alluring temptations and to be possessed of terrible patience.  Is it not this power that has made Stalin, of all the Revolutionaries of history, the man who has most practically enriched the spirit of Revolution, and who has committed the fewest faults?  He weighs the pros and cons and reflects a great deal before proposing anything (a great deal does not mean a long time).  He is extremely circumspect and does not easily give his confidence.  He said to one of his close associates, who distrusted a third party: "A reasonable amount of distrust is a good basis for collective work."  He is as prudent as a lion.
Barbusse, Henri. Stalin. New York: The Macmillan company, 1935, p. 275-276
 
            Whoever you may be, the finest part of your destiny is in the hands of that other man [Stalin], who also watches over you, and who works for you--the man with a scholar's mind, a workman's face, and the dress of a private soldier.
Barbusse, Henri. Stalin. New York: The Macmillan company, 1935, p. 283
 
            By the mid 1920s, Stalin's main opponents would come to realize that this 'outstanding mediocrity' [to quote Trotsky] was an exceptional politician,...
Volkogonov, Dmitri. Stalin: Triumph and Tragedy. New York: Grove Weidenfeld, 1991, p. 108
 
            Sklyansky knew Stalin well enough himself.  He wanted my definition of Stalin and my explanation of his success.  I thought for a minute.
            "Stalin," I said, "is the outstanding mediocrity in the party."
Trotsky, Leon. My Life. Gloucester, Massachusetts: P. Smith, 1970, p. 512
 
            Koba is cautious, but his is the caution of a statesman.  He does not want to begin anything without being 100 percent certain of success.  That is characteristic of him.
Litvinov, Maksim Maksimovich. Notes for a Journal. New York: Morrow, 1955, p. 127
 
            But there was much more to him [Stalin].  He had the potential of a true leader.  He was decisive, competent, confident, and ambitious.  The choice of him rather than Zinoviev or Kamenev to head the charge against Trotsky at the 13th Party Conference showed that this was beginning to be understood by other Central Committee members.
Service, Robert. Stalin. Cambridge, Mass.: Belknap Press of Harvard Univ. Press, 2005, p. 228
 
First Meeting of Hoxha with Stalin
July 1947
            The attention with which he followed my explanations about our new economy and its course of development made a very deep impression on us.  Both during the talk about these problems, and in all the other talks with him, one wonderful feature of his, among others, made an indelible impression on my mind: he never gave orders or sought to impose his opinion.  He spoke, gave advice, made various proposals, but always added: This is my opinion, this is what we think.  You, comrades, must judge and decide for yourselves, according to the concrete situation on the basis of your conditions.. His interest extended to every problem.
Hoxha, Enver. With Stalin: Memoirs. Tirana: 8 N‘ntori Pub. House, 1979.
 
 
Premier Stalin left upon me an impression of deep, cool wisdom and a complete absence of illusions of any time.  Said by Sir Stafford Cripps
Murphy, John Thomas. Stalin, London, John Lane, 1945, p. 12
 
            ...He [Stalin] was mainly a politician.  He played a great historic role in the affairs of the nation.  It's being hushed up now.  The riffraff do their job, that's for sure.
Chuev, Feliks. Molotov Remembers. Chicago: I. R. Dee, 1993, p. 176
 
            How did he exercise his power while presiding over the commissariat for nationality affairs?  In his own department, Stalin was neither imperious nor hard.  He was not a thunderer.  His close collaborator in this work, Pestkovsky, described Stalin's relations with the collegium or council governing his commissariat
            "... Stalin faced the difficult task of fighting within his own organization.  I am almost certain that Trotsky, who accuses Stalin of 'dictating,' would in three days have dispersed the oppositional council and surrounded himself with his own followers.  But Stalin acted differently.  He decided to educate us by slow and persistent efforts, and displayed much discipline and self-control.  He had his conflicts with individual members of the council, but was loyal to the body as a whole, submitted to its decisions even when he disagreed, with the exception of such cases where there was a violation of party discipline."...
            "Sometimes Stalin would grow weary at the conferences with his department chiefs, but he would never lose his temper."
            Pestkovsky continues, "Lenin could not get along without Stalin for a single day.  It was probably because of that that our office in the Smolny was next to that of Lenin.  In the course of the day, Lenin would telephone Stalin innumerable times, or he would drop in and take Stalin with him.  Stalin spent most of his time with Lenin."
Levine, Isaac Don.  Stalin.  New York: Cosmopolitan Book Corporation, c1931, p. 160-161
 
            Conventionally it has been supposed that Stalin was put in office because he was an experienced bureaucrat with an unusual capacity for not being bored by administrative work.  The facts do not bear this out.
Service, Robert. Stalin. Cambridge, Mass.: Belknap Press of Harvard Univ. Press, 2005, p. 190
 
            All of this meant that Stalin was well adapted to survival in the environment of bureaucracy that inevitably grew up as the Soviet-Bolshevik regime adapted to the task of ruling a large country.
McNeal, Robert, Stalin: Man and Ruler. New York: New York University Press, 1988, p. 49
 
            But a capacity for antagonistic working relations was not the only aspect of Stalin's personality as a boss.  Those who were loyal and hard-working in Stalin's interest, received his protection.  Testimony that Stalin displayed this valuable and by no means contemptible characteristic comes from a witness who was not partial to Stalin, Trotsky.
McNeal, Robert, Stalin: Man and Ruler. New York: New York University Press, 1988, p. 49
 
STALIN WAS GOOD DEBATER
 
He was a fearless debater, and preferred organized debates to any other form of public speaking.
Murphy, John Thomas. Stalin, London, John Lane, 1945, p. 46
 
The debates with the Mensheviks were to him as much a part of the war against Czardom as a conflict with the police, and far more important.
Murphy, John Thomas. Stalin, London, John Lane, 1945, p. 61
 
            Stalin was a genius, but Dimitrov was hardly a nobody.
Djilas, Milovan. Conversations with Stalin. New York: Harcourt, Brace & World, 1962, p. 117
 
            His ability as an organizer was not in question; he was a man who could get things done, and while Stalin as a Marxist never showed anything like Lenin's originality, he was an effective debater who knew his Marxist texts well enough to be able to support his arguments with quotations from Marx and Engels as well as Plekhanov and Lenin.  But even in controversies that were conducted with no regard for civility on either side, he gave offense by his rudeness and sarcasm.
Bullock, Alan. Hitler and Stalin: Parallel Lives. New York: Knopf, 1992, p. 33
 
 
GROUPS ARE NEEDED TO MAKE DECISIONS
 
Single persons cannot decide.  Experience has shown us that individual decisions, uncorrected by others, contain a large percentage of error.
Strong, Anna L. The Soviets Expected It. New York, New York: The Dial press, 1941, p. 53
 
            Indeed, Stalin's stock phrase at the time was that not a single one of Lenin's disciples was worthy of Lenin's mantle and that only as a team could they aspire to leadership.
Deutscher, Isaac. Stalin; A Political Biography. New York: Oxford Univ. Press, 1967, p. 298
 
            The famous article by Stalin entitled "Dizziness from Success," which appeared in Pravda on March 2, 1930, two months after the address to the Agrarian Marxists, and which called a sudden halt to the widespread excesses of Communist action in rural districts, was regarded by foreign correspondents and wide masses of peasants alike as an "order by Stalin."  Stalin himself immediately disclaimed any personal prestige therefrom accruing, stating publicly in the press: "Some people believe that the article is the result of the personal initiative of Stalin.  That is nonsense, of course.  The Central Committee does not exist in order to permit the personal initiative of anybody in matters of this kind.  It was a reconnaissance undertaken by the Central Committee."  There is no need to assume, as many foreigners did, that this was a disingenuous disclaimer of personal rule.  It was a very exact statement of fact.
Strong, Anna Louise. Dictatorship and Democracy in the Soviet Union. New York: International Pamphlets, 1934, p. 18
 
DEPRESSING MILITARY STATUS OF WWI
 
It was attacked by the armies of all the capitalist world.  Moscow and Leningrad and the central part of Russia were separated by attacking armies from their chief food and fuel bases for two and a half years.  The granary of the Ukraine, the coal of the Donetz, the oil of Baku, the mines of the Urals, the cotton of Turkestan were in enemy hands.  At the height of the foreign intervention Soviet Russia was invaded by armies of 14 countries.
Strong, Anna L. The Soviets Expected It. New York, New York: The Dial press, 1941, p. 65
 
The factories were empty, the land unplowed, transport at a standstill.  It seemed impossible that such a country could survive the fierce onslaught of an enemy with large, well-equipped armies, vast financial reserves, ample food, and other supplies.
            Besieged on all sides by foreign invaders, imperiled by endless conspiracies at home, the Red Army retreated slowly across the countryside, fighting grimly as it went.  The territory controlled by Moscow dwindled to 1/16 of Russia's total area.  It was a Soviet Island in an anti-Soviet sea.
Sayers and Kahn. The Great Conspiracy. Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1946, p. 81
 
 
            By the end of May 1918 only 1/6 of Russian territory was still under Bolshevik rule.
Cole, David M.  Josef Stalin; Man of Steel. London, New York: Rich & Cowan, 1942, p. 46
 
AMERICAN ENGINEERS SUPPORT 5 YEAR PLAN
 
American engineers who came to help build the new industries often said that the five-year plan was "utterly logical," but added, "if the people will stand for the sacrifices."
Strong, Anna L. The Soviets Expected It. New York, New York: The Dial press, 1941, p. 68
 
            For five years I worked in the Urals, helping to build Magnitogorsk.
Scott, John. Behind the Urals Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1942, p. viii
 
            At every stage of production the shortage of trained workers was acute.  Engineers and technicians were engaged from the United States, Germany, and France.  In March 1931 a director of the Supreme Council of National Economy stated that about 5000 foreign specialists were employed in Soviet industry.  Hundreds of Soviet engineers and students were trained abroad, especially in the United States, and returned to their country to act as instructors and leaders of industry.
Grey, Ian. Stalin, Man of History. London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1979, p. 253
 
            Conditions were reported to be especially bad in the copper mines of the Ural Mountain region, at that time Russia's most promising mineral-producing area, which had been selected for a lion's share of the funds available for production.  American mining engineers had been engaged by the dozens for use in this area, and hundreds of American foreman had likewise been brought over for instruction purposes in mines and mills.  Four or five American mining engineers had been assigned to each of the large copper mines in the Urals, and American metallurgists as well.
Littlepage, John D. In Search of Soviet Gold. New York: Harcourt, Brace, c1938, p. 87
 
 
FAMINE DID NOT OCCUR
 
For two years farming was dislocated, not, as often claimed, by Moscow's enforcement of collectivization but by the fact that local people eager to be first at the promised tractors, organized collective farms three times as fast as the plan called for, setting up large-scale farming without machines even without bookkeepers.  In 1932-33 the whole land went hungry; all food everywhere was rigidly rationed.  (It has been often called a famine which killed millions of people, but I visited the hungriest parts of the country and while I found a wide-spread suffering, I did not find, either in individual villages or in the total Soviet census, evidence of the serious depopulation which famine implies.)
Strong, Anna L. The Soviets Expected It. New York, New York: The Dial press, 1941, p. 69
 
            As far back as late August, 1933, the New Republic declared:
            "... the present harvest is undoubtedly the best in many years--some peasants report a heavier yield of grain than any of their forefathers had known"since 1834.  Grain deliveries to the government are proceeding at a very satisfactory rate and the price of bread has fallen sharply in the industrial towns of the Ukraine.  In view these facts, the appeal of the Cardinal Archbishop [Innitzer] of Vienna for assistance for Russian famine victims seems to be a political maneuver against the Soviets."
            And, contrary to wild stories told by Ukrainian Nationalist exiles about "Russians" eating plentifully while deliberately starving "millions" of Ukrainians to death, the New Republic notes that while bread prices in Ukraine were falling, "bread prices in Moscow have risen."...
            It is a matter of some significance that Cardinal Innitzer's allegations of famine-genocide were widely promoted throughout the 1930s, not only by Hitler's chief propagandist Goebbels, but also by American Fascists as well.  It will be recalled that Hearst kicked off his famine campaign with a radio broadcast based mainly on material from Cardinal Innitzer's "aid committee."  In Organized Anti-Semitism in America, the 1941 book exposing Nazi groups and activities in the pre-war United States, Donald Strong notes that American fascist leader Father Coughlin used Nazi propaganda material extensively.  This included Nazi charges of "atrocities by Jew Communists" and verbatim portions of a Goebbels speech referring to Innitzer's "appeal of July 1934, that millions of people were dying of hunger throughout the Soviet Union."
Tottle, Douglas. Fraud, Famine, and Fascism. Toronto: Progress Books,1987, p. 49-51
 
            ...Sir John Maynard, a former high school… official in the Indian government was a renowned expert on famines and relief measures.  On the basis of his experience in Ukraine, he stated that the idea of 3 or 4 million dead "has passed into legend.  Any suggestion of a calamity comparable with the famine of 1921-1922 is, in the opinion of the present writer, who traveled through Ukraine and North Caucasus in June and July 1933, unfounded."  Even as conservative a scholar as Warren Walsh wrote in defense of Maynard, his "professional competence and personal integrity were beyond reasonable challenge."
Tottle, Douglas. Fraud, Famine, and Fascism. Toronto: Progress Books,1987, p. 52
 
            Cold War confrontation, rather than historical truth and understanding, has motivated and characterized the famine-genocide campaign.  Elements of fraud, anti-semitism, degenerate Nationalism, fascism, and pseudo- scholarship revealed in this critical examination of certain key evidence presented in the campaign...and historical background of the campaign's promoters underline this conclusion.
Tottle, Douglas. Fraud, Famine, and Fascism. Toronto: Progress Books,1987, p. 133
 
 
            QUESTION: Is it true that during 1932-33 several million people were allowed to starve to death in the Ukraine and North Caucasus because they were politically hostile to the Soviets?
            ANSWER: Not true.  I visited several places in those regions during that period.  There was a serious grain shortage in the 1932 harvest due chiefly to inefficiencies of the organizational period of the new large-scale mechanized farming among peasants unaccustomed to machines.  To this was added sabotage by dispossessed kulaks, the leaving of the farms by 11 million workers who went to new industries, the cumulative effect of the world crisis in depressing the value of Soviet farm exports, and a drought in five basic grain regions in 1931.  The harvest of 1932 was better than that of 1931 but was not all gathered; on account of overoptimistic promises from rural districts, Moscow discovered the actual situation only in December when a considerable amount of grain was under snow.
Strong, Anna Louise. “Searching Out the Soviets.” New Republic: August 7, 1935, p. 356
 
            Opposing the tendency of many Communists to blame the peasants, Stalin said: "We Communists are to blame"--for not foreseeing and preventing the difficulties.  Several organizational measures were at once put into action to meet the immediate emergency and prevent its reoccurrence.  Firm pressure on defaulting farms to make good the contracts they had made to sell 1/4 their crop to the state in return for machines the state had given them (the means of production contributed by the state was more than all the peasants' previous means) was combined with appeals to loyal, efficient farms to increase their deliveries voluntarily.  Saboteurs who destroyed grain or buried it in the earth were punished.  The resultant grain reserves in state hands were rationed to bring the country through the shortage with a minimum loss of productive efficiency.  The whole country went on a decreased diet, which affected most seriously those farms that had failed to harvest their grain.  Even these, however, were given  state food and seed loans for sowing.
            Simultaneously, a nationwide campaign was launched to organize the farms efficiently; 20,000 of the country's best experts in all fields were sent as permanent organizers to the rural districts.  The campaign was fully successful and resulted in a 1933 grain crop nearly 10 million tons larger than was ever gathered from the same territory before.
 
 
            QUESTION: Is there a chance of another famine this year, as Cardinal Innitzer asserts?
            ANSWER: Everyone in the Soviet Union to whom I mentioned this question just laughs.
            Reasons for the laughter are:
            Two bumper crops in 1933 and 1934.
            A billion bushels of grain in state hands, enough to feed the cities and non-grain farmers for two years.
            A grain surplus in farmers' hands that has sufficed to increase calves 94% and pigs 118 percent in a single year.
            The abolition of bread rationing because of surplus in grain.
            The abolition of nearly half a billion rubles of peasant debts incurred for equipment during the organizing of collective farms--this as the result of an actual budget surplus in the government.
            Tales of continued famine are Nazi propaganda on which to base a future invasion of the Ukraine [which did occur by the way].
Strong, Anna Louise. “Searching Out the Soviets.” New Republic: August 7, 1935, p. 357
 
WISE TO SHIFT INDUSTRY TO INTERIOR
 
The Soviet leaders met what they considered an imminent danger of war by shifting the emphasis of the Five-Year Plan toward building a main center of heavy industry in the Ural Mountains and the Kuznetsk Basin -the practically impregnable part of the coountry. 
            With the conclusion of the First Five-Year Plan, the Soviet Union plunged into the second, which did three times as much new construction as the First Five-Fear Plan had done and did it with much less strain.  Soviet industry was completely reorganized and equipped throughout with the latest machines and methods.  Greater emphasis was given than previously to producing goods of consumption.  This, together with the rapid improvement of farming, caused a fairly swift rise in the general standard of living.
Strong, Anna L. The Soviets Expected It. New York, New York: The Dial press, 1941, p. 70-71
 
SET UP TERRITORY FOR THE JEWS
 
Small industries were already starting in the Jewish autonomous territory.
Strong, Anna L. The Soviets Expected It. New York, New York: The Dial press, 1941, p. 94
 
            The region's  [Birobidjan] chief destiny is to become an industrial district producing consumer goods for the whole Soviet far east, a task which especially fits the capacities of the great belt of Jews that live on the Soviet Union's western borders.  (Since Hitler's invasion, many Jewish refugees have gone to Birobidjan.)
Strong, Anna L. The Soviets Expected It. New York, New York: The Dial press, 1941, p. 95
 
            The Union knew another way [to treat the Jews].  It has assimilated the greater part of its 5 million Jews, and it has placed at the disposal of the remainder a vast autonomous territory [District of Biro-bijan] and the means for its colonization, thereby creating for itself several millions of active and intelligence citizens, fanatically devoted to the regime.
Feuchtwanger, Lion. Moscow, 1937. New York: The Viking Press, 1937, p. 82
 
            And now today in the Biro-Bidjan territory one sees a proper town with schools, hospitals, government buildings, and a theater, and one can travel there from Moscow in the through coach of an express.  Although the Plan provides for the immigration of more than 100,000 Jews over the next three years, the authorities have to maintain strict supervision, so numerous are those willing to immigrate.
Feuchtwanger, Lion. Moscow, 1937. New York: The Viking Press, 1937, p. 86
 
SOVIET MILITARY BUDGET GREW DRASTICALLY TO CONFRONT HITLER
 
Probably the best indication to the layman of the Red Army's growth since the rise of Hitler is the fact the money allotted to it in the Soviet budget grew nearly 40 fold.  From 1.5 billion rubles in 1933 it grew to 57 billion in 1940.
Strong, Anna L. The Soviets Expected It. New York, New York: The Dial press, 1941, p. 95
 
            Of course he [Stalin] and his entourage always kept in mind the possibility of war with the capitalist countries, and in the late 30s this meant specifically Germany and Japan.  Preparations for such a war were made by creating a modern defense industry, military aviation, an up-to-date navy, civil-defense training for the whole population, and so on.  In 1939-1941 the army increased by 2.5 times, many troops and supplies were transferred to the western districts, war production increased, and the number of military schools grew.  Especially after the war with Finland, a great deal of work was done toward retraining the Army.  The development of new weapons was speeded up.  More than a 100,000 men were put to work on the fortification of the new western borders.  Airfields were modernized, ordnance depots and ammunition dumps set up, and military exercises for troops and commanders carried out.
Medvedev, Roy. Let History Judge. New York: Columbia University Press, 1989, p. 735
 
            Zhukov also wrote:
            "The period between 1939 and the middle of 1941 was marked on the whole by trans-formations that within two or three years would have given the Soviet people a brilliant army."
Medvedev, Roy. Let History Judge. New York: Columbia University Press, 1989, p. 736
 
            In 1940, the Soviet government spent 56 billion rubles on defense, more than twice as much as in 1938, and over 25 percent of all industrial investment.  As a result, the defense industry developed at three times the rate of all other industries.  During the time between the signing of the pact and the Nazi invasion, the value of the Soviet Union's material resources was nearly doubled, an impressive achievement, even allowing for the low starting figure.
Read, Anthony and David Fisher. The Deadly Embrace. New York: Norton, 1988, p. 482
 
SOVIETS TREAT WOMEN AS EQUALS
 
...The famous "Red Amazons" and "Death Battalions" are fiction, not fact.  But the Army medical services is full of women.
Strong, Anna L. The Soviets Expected It. New York, New York: The Dial press, 1941, p. 115
 
            Stalin took over a Party with scarcely 5% women--including a handful of real distinction, such as Krupskaya and Kollontai.  He left the Party with over 21 percent women, all of them politically faceless.
Randall, Francis. Stalin's Russia. New York: Free Press,1965, p. 104
 
            The wife of our host listened to her husband and made timid protests.  One day when he was out, she opened her heart to us.  "The Bolsheviks want to build up a new life; that can't be done in a day..  But look, in the past women had no rights at all, they were proper slaves; the Bolsheviks have given us liberty, have made us the equals of men.  That is what annoys my old man."
Ciliga, Ante, The Russian Enigma. London: Ink Links, 1979, p. 42
 
FIFTH COLUMNISTS
 
What is the fifth column?  It commonly consists of a fairly large group of the so-called "best people" who object to their country's government and are ready to overthrow it even, if necessary, with the aid of foreign powers.  Country after country in Europe collapsed at the first touch of the Nazi Army -- sometimes before the arrival of the Army -- because the upper officialdom had rotted from within.
Strong, Anna L. The Soviets Expected It. New York, New York: The Dial press, 1941, p. 121
 
            All governments have the problem of "subversion" by enemy agents or disaffected citizens.  Seldom is it handled quite sanely by due process of law.  Often--we note our own land--it becomes a source of which-hunts and neighborhood terror.  This lack of balance doubtless comes from the fact that the offenders are not ordinary criminals, easy to catalogue, with penalties to match.  They are men of different loyalties from those demanded by the state.  A stable or confident regime is not greatly worried by them; for they are a small minority.  But in times of war, or to any regime under stress, they are more disturbing than ordinary criminals.
Strong, Anna Louise.  The Stalin Era. New York: Mainstream, 1956, p. 58
 
            The Quislings and Lavals were not all in the West: the Soviet Union provided many collaborators and traitors of its own.  Only 20-odd years had elapsed since the revolution and there were still many people who felt aggrieved by the regime.  Many others were motivated by fear of the Nazis or the desire to adapt and survive, while yet others, especially in 1941, believed that the Germans had come for good.  Finally there were weak, venal or just plain criminal types who were prepared to commit treason.
Volkogonov, Dmitri. Stalin: Triumph and Tragedy. New York: Grove Weidenfeld, 1991, p. 440
 
 
            ...Later, Hitler's "fifth column" so penetrated many governments of Europe that they collapsed at the first touch of war.  Broadly speaking, this fifth column included men like Prime Minister Chamberlain and Premier Daladier, who weakened the defenses of their nations by destroying democracy in Spain and, later, by giving the Czech fortifications to Hitler, in order to tempt his armies eastward.  It included American industrialists who sold scrap iron to Japan, and strengthened her against the USA.  None of these people considered themselves traitors.  Nor, probably, did Quisling and Laval and others who, with various excuses, took part in puppet governments serving the invader.
Strong, Anna Louise.  The Stalin Era. New York: Mainstream, 1956, p. 58
 
            ...The picture is clearly not a simple one of Stalin, as despot, getting rid of his enemies.  It is a complex picture, combining the acts of many groups.  Stalin's responsibility was that, being "distrustful and suspicious"--a not unnatural state in a man whose close friend has been assassinated and who has heard in open court that his own assassination was planned--he appointed Yezhov, gave orders to hurry up the investigations and sentences, and devised the theory that enemies multiplied as socialism nears success.  Yezhov, later found to be a madman, gave the affective orders.  The Central Committee, convinced by Stalin's argument and Yezhov's reports, also approved the acts.  The actual initiators, as stated by Khrushchev, were "provocateurs"--i.e., agents of Nazi-fascism--and "conscienceless careerists"--i.e., men who invented plots to advance their own jobs.
            This analysis by Khrushchev does not greatly differ from that of my exiled friend, who said that the Nazi fifth-column "penetrated high in the GPU and arrested the wrong people."...   The Soviet investigators who are reviewing the cases will, I think, eventually get to the bottom of them.  They will find the key, most probably, in actual, extensive penetration of the GPU by a Nazi fifth-column, in many actual plots, and in the impact of these on a highly suspicious man who saw his own assassination plotted and believed he was saving the Revolution by drastic purge.
Strong, Anna Louise.  The Stalin Era. New York: Mainstream, 1956, p. 68
 
            ... In Dniepropetrovsk, the NKVD had discovered that such 'born scoundrels" as Generalov (Shura's husband), though they took formal oaths of loyalty to the Party, had in fact organized 'spy nests and Trotskyist underground groupings'.  They were working for 'world capitalism'.
Tokaev, Grigori. Comrade X. London: Harvill Press,1956, p. 47
 
            Volodya continues, "The country was approaching war, and an opposition party had been formed with an underground regional committee, printing press and so on.  It had a relatively large army which was ready to act at any moment.  All this forced Stalin to take measures to liquidate what we called the fifth column.
Richardson, Rosamond.  Stalin’s Shadow. New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1994, p. 141
 
TRAITOR CHAMBERLAIN
 
Chamberlain weakened the British Empire in order to smash democracy in Spain.
Strong, Anna L. The Soviets Expected It. New York, New York: The Dial press, 1941, p. 121
 
VICTORS WRITE HISTORY
 
What the 21st century will call them [acts which could be considered treasonous] will depend on who are the victors.  The victors always write the history books.
Strong, Anna L. The Soviets Expected It. New York, New York: The Dial press, 1941, p. 122
 
ENGINEER AND SPECIALIST SABOTAGE
 
The Russian revolution, however, had produced like all revolutions numbers of bitter, discontented, people who hated the government in power.  The first two years of the five-year plan, for instance, were marked by an epidemic of sabotage in the higher engineering staff, many of whom had formerly worked for the foreign capitalist owners of large properties now nationalized by the Revolution.  Any American who worked in Soviet industry in the years of the first five-year plan can give you dozens of examples of sabotage by engineers.
Strong, Anna L. The Soviets Expected It. New York, New York: The Dial press, 1941, p. 122
 
            Russia in 1920 was only half socialist.  Most of industry was socially owned but farming was in the hands of peasant proprietors, the stronger of whom were petty capitalists, struggling not only to survive but to grow.  Class strife went on between these emerging rural capitalists and impoverished farmhands....
            It was a bitter fight, carried through against the upper sections of the peasantry and part of the middle class.  An epidemic of sabotage broke out in the industries among the higher engineering staff, who had consciously or half-consciously expected to advance towards privilege and wealth.
Strong, Anna Louise. This Soviet World. New York, N. Y: H. Holt and company, c1936, p. 52
 
            With this as background we consider Russia....  The first two years of the Five-Year Plan saw an "epidemic of sabotage" by the higher engineering staff, many of whom had contacts with former foreign owners of industries now nationalized.  Let us glance at this sabotage; any American who in those years worked in Soviet industry can give you examples.
Strong, Anna Louise.  The Stalin Era. New York: Mainstream, 1956, p. 58
 
            Many Americans told me of sabotage they found in industry.
Strong, Anna Louise.  The Stalin Era. New York: Mainstream, 1956, p. 60
 
            As more Russians learned the technical side of industry, sabotage lessened for it was more easily detected....  The "epidemic of sabotage" thus passed but the deeper sabotage inspired by foreign agents remained.  This, when it reached the courts, was treated with increasing leniency in 1931-34.  The economy was advancing; the few saboteurs were not greatly feared.  Earlier "wreckers," most of whom had been sentenced to work in their own profession on some construction under the GPU, reappeared in normal occupations, sometimes with the Order of Lenin, which they had won while working under duress.
            The GPU still justified itself by turning up plots, but sentences lessened.  The 52 engineers and technicians in the Shakhty case, convicted in 1928 of wrecking coal mines, were given death sentences, and five were actually executed.  A similar conviction two years later, in the Industrial Party case, brought automatic death sentences but these were commuted "in view of repentance."  Those convicted soon had good jobs again.  The Mensheviks convicted in 1931 of "inspiring peasant uprisings in connivance with foreign powers; were only given prison terms; it was stated that they were no longer dangerous enough to be executed.
            This growing leniency was due to the country's growing confidence....  As the first Five-Year Plan passed into the second, the good feeling we noted in the previous chapter grew.  Especially after the 1933 harvest, the Soviet people felt confident in their growing strength.
            The assassination of Kirov, on December first, 1934, smashed this dream of security.
Strong, Anna Louise.  The Stalin Era. New York: Mainstream, 1956, p. 61
 
            Some specialists, however, actually became involved in anti-Soviet activity, including conspiratorial work.  In the early 30s several counter-revolutionary organizations and groups sprang up inside the Soviet Union as well as abroad....  The overwhelming majority continued to work honestly trying to help the party leaders in charge of the various economic organizations.  Many of the specialists were genuinely inspired by the tremendous scope of the first five-year plans.
Medvedev, Roy. Let History Judge. New York: Columbia University Press, 1989, p. 257
 
            ...Worst of all, thousands of tons of high-grade ore had been irretrievably lost by the introduction into two mines of methods which I had specifically warned against during my previous visit.
            We American engineers had evolved for some of the mines at Kalata a more productive system of working the stopes, and had managed to introduce it....
            But I now learned that almost immediately after the American engineers were sent home, the same Russian engineers whom I had warned about the danger, had applied this [destructive] method in the remaining mines, with the result that the mines caved in and much ore was lost beyond recovery.
Littlepage, John D. In Search of Soviet Gold. New York: Harcourt, Brace, c1938, p. 97
 
            Men high in the canning industry put broken glass, animal hair and fish tails into food destined for industrial workers.  A township veterinarian who hated collectivization inoculated 6000 horses with the plague.  An irrigation engineer tried to discourage the policy of settling nomad races on the land by using 30-year-old surveys that he knew were incorrect and that would not deliver the water.  All of these and thousands more confessed.
            What were the causes?  Resentment of the highly aristocratic Russian engineer against workers' rule; resentment of new technique that made their knowledge out of date; actual bribes by foreign firms; anger at the final drive against capitalism embodied in the Five-Year Plan.  This led in 1928-30 to what Stalin called "an epidemic of sabotage" among the higher engineering staff.
            Scapegoats for failure were not needed, for the Five-Year Plan did not fail.  The energy and sacrifice of loyal workers and technicians carried it through.  Its success won over many earlier saboteurs, so that by 1931 Stalin was able to report that "these intellectuals are turning towards the Soviet government," and should be met "by a policy of conciliation."  Thereafter sabotage cases rapidly diminished both in number and seriousness.
Strong, Anna Louise. “Searching Out the Soviets.” New Republic: August 7, 1935, p. 358
 
MENNONITES PERSUADED TO LEAVE SU
 
Later the local farmers told me that German agents had been a factor in the sudden decision which seized large numbers of Mennonite farmers, German by descent, to "flea from the accursed atheist land."  Whole villages sold or merely abandoned their houses and cattle and came in hordes to Moscow, demanding the right to go abroad.
Strong, Anna L. The Soviets Expected It. New York, New York: The Dial press, 1941, p. 124
 
TREATMENT OF WRECKERS
 
A township veterinarian who hated collectivization innoculated 6000 horses with plague.
            All these cases, and thousands more like them, can be found in confessions of men who later repented, or in the tales of American engineers experienced in Soviet industry.
            If a man made the same "mistake" more than once, and had enough engineering knowledge to "know better," they called him a wrecker and put him where he could do no harm.  This does not mean that they shot him; they usually sent him to work on a construction job in his own profession, but under the direct control of the GPU.  As more Russians learned the technical side of industry, sabotage became more difficult, for it was more easily detected.
Strong, Anna L. The Soviets Expected It. New York, New York: The Dial press, 1941, p. 125
 
Even such sabotage, when a came to light in Soviet courts, was treated with increasing leniency in the years from 1931 to 1934.  The condition of the country was improving, and the occasional saboteurs were not considered especially dangerous.
Strong, Anna L. The Soviets Expected It. New York, New York: The Dial press, 1941, p. 126
 
In the famous Shakhty case in 1928, for instance, 52 engineers and technicians were convicted of wrecking coal mines in the interest of foreign powers, chiefly Germany; 11 were sentenced to death, and five were actually executed.  Two years later in the "Industrial Party" case, a group of engineers admitted conspiracy to wreck state industry in order to put a sort of technocratic party of engineers in control.  They were sentenced to death as the law required, but were then immediately given a computation of sentence "in view of their repentance"; shortly after this they were holding good jobs again.
Strong, Anna L. The Soviets Expected It. New York, New York: The Dial press, 1941, p. 126
 
Similarly, a group of Mensheviks convicted in 1931 of inspiring peasant uprisings in connivance with foreign powers were given prison sentences for the announced reason that they were no longer dangerous enough to be executed.  In the Metro-Vickers case in 1933, a group of Russian engineers and one Englishman admitted several minor acts of sabotage in power plants which were intended to get their hand in for a widespread wrecking of power plants in case of war.  I sat less than 10 feet away from the defendants and watched their faces; it was clear that most of the Russians expected the death sentence.  Most of them got only nominal sentences, while the three principal offenders were given ten years.
Strong, Anna L. The Soviets Expected It. New York, New York: The Dial press, 1941, p. 127
 
The increasing leniency in all these cases was due to the lessened tension in the country.  As the first five-year plan passed into the second, as Soviet workers became more skilled, an era of good feeling seemed to dawn.
Strong, Anna L. The Soviets Expected It. New York, New York: The Dial press, 1941, p. 127
 
KIROV’S KILLING CHANGED ALL
 
The assassination of Kirov in early December, 1934 fell like a bomb into this dream of security.
Strong, Anna L. The Soviets Expected It. New York, New York: The Dial press, 1941, p. 128
 
The murder of Kirov at Leningrad in December 1934 was a turning point in Soviet history, if not in the history of Europe and the world.
Duranty, Walter. The Kremlin and the People. New York: Reynal & Hitchcock, Inc., 1941, p. 21
 
 
Kirov had been Stalin's man from the start, and Stalin had made him party chief in Leningrad to counteract the influence of the opposition leaders....
Duranty, Walter. The Kremlin and the People. New York: Reynal & Hitchcock, Inc., 1941, p. 25
 
 
FOREIGN AGENT INFILTRATION
 
The Soviet secret police had long guarded against routine foreign espionage.  In 10 years they caught no less than 10,000 agents of foreign powers, creeping illegally across their borders.  But the investigation of the Kirov murder led into higher and higher ranks of the Communist party, and seemed to indicate connection with the enemy even in these ranks.  It was the first time that any nation in Europe began to glimpse the tactics that the world today knows as the Nazi fifth column -- the penetration by the enemy into the citadel of power itself.
Strong, Anna L. The Soviets Expected It. New York, New York: The Dial press, 1941, p. 128
 
            QUESTION: Why were so many people executed after the Kirov assassination?  Were any of them punished because they were political opponents of the present regime?
 
            ANSWER:  One hundred and three persons were executed as members of murder gangs who crossed the Soviet border with revolvers and hand grenades to commit murder and other acts of violence against Communists and Soviet officials.  Such gangs have existed ever since the revolution drove out the White Guard armies, but Berlin gave them shelter after Hitler came to power.  They have for two years been bragging in newspapers published in Berlin and Yugoslavia of their successes in murder and destruction beyond the Soviet frontier.  Today the whole world knows about Nazi terrorist tactics across frontiers.
            These cases were handled by border guards until the assassination of Kirov aroused a storm of popular resolutions calling for drastic action against terrorists.  A court martial composed of well-known members of the Supreme Court thereupon made a rapid clean-up of all these cases in several cities, publishing the fact that the terrorists had been armed when arrested, had run the border from Poland and Rumania and had plotted and carried out murders.  The trials were in camera, since open discussion of details was tantamount to accusing several governments of acts that rank as causes of war.
Strong, Anna Louise. “Searching Out the Soviets.” New Republic: August 7, 1935, p. 357
 
            Domestic realities were crucial.  The VKP's membership screenings in 1933-1935 provided "evidence"--real or perceived--that "enemy agents" posing as emigres had infiltrated the USSR and the party.  The possibility that a fifth column existed within the VKP prompted a shift in party attitudes toward foreign comrades.  From that assumption flowed the concern that "enemy agents" "masked" as students and political emigres had infiltrated party schools, factories, and other Soviet institutions.
Chase, William J., Enemies Within the Gates?, translated by Vadim A. Staklo, New Haven: Yale University Press, c2001, p. 411.
 
ONE DEFENDANT DENOUNCES ANOTHER
 
My own deepest impression at the trials I attended was that of the moral disintegration of the defendants and the process by which it had been reached.  It had begun far back in honest differences of opinion; it had degenerated into naked lust for power and a hatred that enveloped everything, even the fellow conspirators.  "Let him not pretend to be such an innocent," cried Reingold in court of his co-defendant, Kamenev.  "He would have made his way to power over a mountain of corpses."
Strong, Anna L. The Soviets Expected It. New York, New York: The Dial press, 1941, p. 130
 
Bakayev, was slated to be chief of the GPU and would use the post to liquidate the agents who had done the actual murders, thus burying all evidence of a higher-ups' crime.  Some of the lesser agents apparently first learned in court the fate that their chiefs had reserved for them, and this greatly added to the venom with which they denounced those chiefs.
Strong, Anna L. The Soviets Expected It. New York, New York: The Dial press, 1941, p. 130
 
            After the reading of the indictment, the accused pleaded guilty on all counts, with the exception of Smirnov & Holtzman.  Smirnov admitted to having belonged to the "Center" and to having received terrorist instructions from Trotsky, but again denied participation in preparing or executing terrorist acts.  Holtzman, too, though admitting having brought terrorist instructions from Trotsky, denied himself participating in terrorism.
            ...Zinoviev, called on to confirm the story (Smirnov's direct implication in terrorist activity), added that the murder of Kirov had been a joint enterprise involving both Zinovievites and Trotskyites, including Smirnov.  Kamenev also confirmed this.  The joint terror network was thus sketched out right at the start of the trial.  For good measure, Mrachkovsky also implicated Lominadze (who had committed suicide the previous year), and a Red Army group of assassins headed by Divisional Commander Schmidt....
            Mrachkovsky was followed by Evdokimov, who said he had deceived the court in January 1935.  He then explained how he, Bakayev, Zinoviev, and Kamenev had organized the Kirov assassination.  The plan had been to get Stalin at the same time: "... Bakayev warned Nikolayev and his accomplices that they must wait for Zinoviev's signal," said Evdokimov, "that they must fire simultaneously with the shots to be fired in Moscow and Kiev."  (Mrachkovsky had been quoted in the indictment as having said at the preliminary examination that "Stalin was to be killed first," but in any case Kirov was not supposed to precede the general secretary to the grave).   Evdokimov for the first time involved the Old Bolshevik Sokolnikov, former candidate member of the Politburo and still a candidate member of the Central Committee.
Conquest, Robert. The Great Terror. New York: Oxford University Press, 1990, p. 94
 
            But the trial showed that the guilty perpetrators started to point fingers at each other and to tell the truth on each other in order to save their own necks.
Rybin, Aleksei. Next to Stalin: Notes of a Bodyguard. Toronto: Northstar Compass Journal, 1996, p. 95
 
KAMENEV ADMITS GUILT
 
The reason for the conspiracy was given by Kamenev, brother-in-law of Trotsky.
            Kamenev said that by 1932 it became clear that Stalin's policies had been accepted by the people and that all hopes of over-throwing him by political means had failed.  "There remained two roads, either honestly to end the struggle against the government, or to continue it by means of individual terror.  We chose the second road.
Strong, Anna L. The Soviets Expected It. New York, New York: The Dial press, 1941, p. 130
 
            Next morning, Aug. 20, Kamenev gave his evidence.  He spoke at first with a certain dignity, but as the cross-questioning went on, this began to collapse.  He made an almost complete confession, repudiating only the idea that the plotters had intended to cover the traces of their crimes by physically exterminating NKVD men and others who might know about them.  About Smirnov's denials, he said, "It is ridiculous wriggling, which only creates a comical impression."
Conquest, Robert. The Great Terror. New York: Oxford University Press, 1990, p. 95
 
            As Kamenev said, "Even with Stalin we, by our policy of double-dealing, had obtained, after all, forgiveness of our mistakes by the Party and had been taken back into its ranks....
            No documentary evidence (except Olberg's Honduran passport and Tukhachevsky's visiting card) was produced [at the Aug. 1936 Zinoviev trial].
Conquest, Robert. The Great Terror. New York: Oxford University Press, 1990, p. 107
 
            Another member of the counter-revolutionary Zinovievite grouping--Kamenev--recounting in detail how the Trotskyite-Zinovievite bloc was organized and giving the practical plans of the center, testified at the July 23, 1936 interrogation:
            "...We, i.e., the Zinovievite center of the counter-revolutionary organization whose membership I have given above, and the Trotskyite counter-revolutionary organization consisting of Smirnov, Mrachkovsky, and Ter-Vaganyan, agreed in 1932 to the unification of both, i.e., the Zinovievite and Trotskyite, counter-revolutionary organizations for joint preparation of terrorists acts against the Central Committee leaders, principally against Stalin and Kirov.
            The essential thing is that both Zinoviev and we--I, Kamenev, Evdokimov, Bakayev, and the Trotskyite leaders, Smirnov, Mrachkovsky, Ter-Vaganyan, decided in 1932 that the only technique through which we could hope to attain power was to organize terrorist acts against the Communist party leaders, principally against Stalin.
            The negotiations between ourselves and the Trotskyites on unification were conducted on precisely the basis of a terrorist struggle against the Communist party leaders."
            (Kamenev, Record of Interrogation, July 23-24, 1936)
McNeal, Robert. Resolutions and Decisions of the CPSU--The Stalin Years: 1929-1953. Vol. 3. Toronto, Buffalo: University of Toronto Press, 1974, p. 170
 
            When asked if the 1932 negotiations between the Zinoviev-Kamenev and Trotskyite groupings were brought to a conclusion, Kamenev answered as follows during the interrogation:
            "We did bring to a conclusion the negotiations with the Trotskyites on uniting the Trotskyites and Zinovievite counter-revolutionary organizations, and between us, that is--the Zinovievite center consisting of Zinoviev, Kamenev, Evdokimov, Bakayev, and Kuklin, and the Trotskyite center consisting of Smirnov, Mrachkovsky, and Ter-Vaganyan--an agreement was reached on a bloc for joint struggle against the Communist Party, using, as I have already testified above, terror against the Communist party leaders."
            (Kamenev, Record of Interrogation, July 23-24, 1936)
McNeal, Robert. Resolutions and Decisions of the CPSU--The Stalin Years: 1929-1953. Vol. 3. Toronto, Buffalo: University of Toronto Press, 1974, p. 171
 
            Kamenev, the other leader of the united center, gave the following answer to the investigator's question: did he know of the center's decision to kill comrades Stalin and Kirov:
            "Yes, I must admit that even before the meeting in Ilinsk Zinoviev told me about the decisions contemplated by the center of the Trotskyite-Zinovievite bloc with respect to preparing terrorist acts against Stalin and Kirov.  At the time he told me that this decision was categorically insisted upon by the Trotskyite representatives in the center--Smirnov, Mrachkovsky, and Ter-Vaganyan--that they had a direct order on this from Trotsky, and that they demanded the de facto adoption of this measure in implementation of the principles on which the bloc was based...."
            (Kamenev, Record of Interrogation, July 23-24, 1936)
McNeal, Robert. Resolutions and Decisions of the CPSU--The Stalin Years: 1929-1953. Vol. 3. Toronto, Buffalo: University of Toronto Press, 1974, p. 172
 
            Here, for example, is what one of the leaders of the united Trotskyite-Zinovievite bloc, Kamenev, testified at the investigation:
            "At the very outset of our investigations with the Trotskyites there were still some pale attempts to discuss the possibility of putting together a positive platform.
            However, we soon became convinced that this was a pointless task and that we did not have any ideological platform at all.
            Our wager on the insurmountability of the difficulties through which the country was passing, on the critical state of the economy, on the collapse of the economic policy of the party leadership in the second half of 1932, had already clearly been lost.
            Under the guidance of the Communist Party Central Committee and overcoming difficulties, the country was successfully following the course of economic growth.  This we could not fail to see.
            It would have seemed proper for us to end the struggle.  However, the logic of the counter-revolutionary struggle, the naked usurpation of power--devoid of any ideas--drove us in the other direction.
            The way out of the difficulties, the victory of the policies of the Communist Party Central Committee, aroused in us a new upsurge of bitterness and hatred of the party leadership, in particular, of Stalin."
            (Kamenev, Record of Interrogation, July 24, 1936)
McNeal, Robert. Resolutions and Decisions of the CPSU--The Stalin Years: 1929-1953. Vol. 3. Toronto, Buffalo: University of Toronto Press, 1974, p. 177
 
            Kamenev at the investigation discussed with unconcealed cynicism the possible alternatives for achieving power.
            To the investigator's question--did the Trotskyite-Zinovievite center discuss plans for seizing power?--he answered as follows:
            "We discussed this question several times.  We had settled upon and worked out two alternative ways for the leaders of the Trotskyite-Zinovievite bloc to attain power:
            The first, and seemingly most realistic, alternative was that, after the commission of the terrorist act against Stalin, there would be confusion in the leadership of the party and government, and this leadership would engage in negotiations with the leaders of the Trotskyite-Zinovievite bloc, and primarily with Zinoviev, Kamenev, and Trotsky.
            Zinoviev and I counted on taking the dominant position in the party and country in these negotiations, since by our two-faced policy under Stalin we had, in any case, succeeded in having the party pardon our errors and accept us back into its ranks, whereas our participation, that of myself, Zinoviev, and Trotsky, in terrorist acts, would remain a secret to the party and the country.
            The other alternative for seizing power, which seemed to us less reliable, was that the leadership of the party and the country would be disorganized and uncertain of itself after a terrorist act had been committed against Stalin.
            The leaders of the Trotskyite-Zinovievite bloc would succeed in exploiting the confusion and in compelling the remaining party leaders to bring us to power, or even in forcing them to yield us their places.
            Trotsky's appearance and his participation in the struggle for power were taken as self-evident.
            In addition, we considered it as not out of the question that the Rightists--Bukharin, Tomsky, and Rykov--would also participate in reorganizing the new governmental power."
            (Kamenev, Record of Interrogation, July 23-24, 1936)
McNeal, Robert. Resolutions and Decisions of the CPSU--The Stalin Years: 1929-1953. Vol. 3. Toronto, Buffalo: University of Toronto Press, 1974, p. 179
 
 
ZINOVIEV DROPPED BECAUSE HE WOULD NOT TAKE ORDERS
 
Zinoviev, former chief of the Communist international and later dropped because unwillingness to follow the Stalin policy of non-interference by the Soviet government in other nations internal affairs, said that he had grown so accustomed to giving orders to large groups of people that he could not endure life without it.
Strong, Anna L. The Soviets Expected It. New York, New York: The Dial press, 1941, p. 130
 
PYATAKOV IMPLICATES TROTSKY WITH HESS
 
Pyatakov, former chief of Soviet state industry, said that he had met Trotsky abroad in 1935 and learned that the latter had made a deal with Rudolph Hess for Nazi support in the overthrow of the Stalin regime.
Strong, Anna L. The Soviets Expected It. New York, New York: The Dial press, 1941, p. 132
 
REPORTERS STATE DEFENDANT’S GUILT
 
Most of the foreign press at the time denounced the trials as a frame up.  Most of foreign observers who sat at the trials found them credible, even if shocking.  D. N. Pritt, a British member of Parliament, wrote a pamphlet stating his convictions that the men were guilty as charged.  Edward C. Carter, Secretary-General of the Institute of Pacific relations, wrote: "It makes sense and is convincing.  The confessions seem both normal and purposeful.  The theory that it was a frame up is untenable.  It was not a device to secure removal of critics.  The Kremlin's case was genuine, terribly genuine."
Strong, Anna L. The Soviets Expected It. New York, New York: The Dial press, 1941, p. 132
 
 
In retrospect the portrait of conspiracy spread on the Soviet court record appears to the present writer, as it did at the time, to be closer to reality then any alternative explanation....  The culprits failed in their larger purposes because they became ever more muddled, desperate, and self-defeated with each passing year.  They perceived, contrary to their hopes and beliefs, that the Second Five-Year Plan, as it developed under Stalin's leadership, was not failing but was accomplishing its objectives.  They also perceived that the Stalinist analysis of the international situation was essentially correct while their own expectations were as false as their plans were fatal.  For these reasons they failed.  For these reasons also they finally confessed out of a subjective necessity of redeeming themselves in their own eyes by serving anew, even in disgrace and in the face of death, the cause they had served all their lives.  In many of its other aspects, however, the purge became "dizzy with success," after the manner of 1930, and produced shocking abuses and injustices.  But the denials and counter-accusations of Trotsky and his supporters, despite the doubt they cast on the time or place of certain episodes, do not invalidate the major theses of the Prosecutor and the accused.  Neither do they lend credibility to the hypotheses of a "frame up" based on false confessions.
            Those who have read the preceding chapters will have no difficulty in understanding how and why Trotsky, for all his denials, came to play the role of Judas.
Schuman, Frederick L. Soviet Politics. New York: A.A. Knopf, 1946, p. 264
 
 
GPU HEAD IS TRAITOR
 
In the Far East, the chief of the G.P.U. fled to Japan, and many of his subordinates were arrested as Japanese spies and wreckers.
Strong, Anna L. The Soviets Expected It. New York, New York: The Dial press, 1941, p. 134
 
TUKHACHEVSKY AND OTHER GENERALS WORKED WITH HITLER
 
The Moscow press announced that they [the primary Generals on trial] had been in the pay of Hitler and had agreed to help him get the Ukraine.  This charge was fairly widely believed in foreign military circles, and was later substantiated by revelations made abroad.  Czech military circles seemed to be especially well informed.  Czech officials in Prague bragged to me later that their military men had been the first to discover and to complain to Moscow that Czech military secrets, known to the Russians through the mutual aid alliance, were being revealed by Tukhachevsky to the German high command.
Strong, Anna L. The Soviets Expected It. New York, New York: The Dial press, 1941, p. 134
 
CHUEV: Now some think you appointed such untrained people as Pavlov, but if it had been Tukhachevsky....
MOLOTOV:  Take someone like Tukhachevsky.  If trouble started, which side would he have been on?  He was a rather dangerous man.  I doubted he would have been fully on our side when things got tough, because he was a right-winger.  The right wing danger was the main danger at the time.
Chuev, Feliks. Molotov Remembers. Chicago: I. R. Dee, 1993, p. 26
 
            The right wing already had a channel to Hitler even before this.  Trotsky was definitely connected to him, that's beyond any doubt....  Many of the ranking military officers were also involved.  That goes without saying.
Chuev, Feliks. Molotov Remembers. Chicago: I. R. Dee, 1993, p. 275
 
            Nevertheless, he [Tukhachevsky] organized an anti-Soviet group in the army.
Chuev, Feliks. Molotov Remembers. Chicago: I. R. Dee, 1993, p. 279
 
CHUEV:  He [Tukhachevsky] was accused of being a German agent.
MOLOTOV:  He hurried with plans for a coup.  Both Krestinsky and Rosengoltz testified to that.  It makes sense.  He feared he was at the point of being arrested, and he could no longer put things off.  And there was no one else he could rely on except the Germans.  This sequence of events is plausible.
            I consider Tukhachevsky a most dangerous conspirator in the military who was caught only at the last minute.  Had he not been apprehended, the consequences could have been catastrophic.  He was most popular in the army.
            Did everyone who was charged or executed take part in the conspiracy hatched by Tukhachevsky?  Some were certainly involved....
            But as to whether Tukhachevsky and his group in the military were connected with Trotskyists and rightists and were preparing a coup, there is no doubt.
Chuev, Feliks. Molotov Remembers. Chicago: I. R. Dee, 1993, p. 280
 
 MOLOTOV:  Take Tukhachevsky, for example.  On what grounds was he rehabilitated?  Did you read the records of the trial of the right-wing and Trotskyist bloc in 1938?  Bukharin, Krestinsky, Rosengoltz, and others were on trial then.  They stated flat out that in June 1937 Tukhachevsky pressed for a coup.  People who have not read the record go on to say that the testimony was given under duress from the Chekists.
            But I say, had we not made those sweeping arrests in the 1930s, we would have suffered even greater losses in the war.
Chuev, Feliks. Molotov Remembers. Chicago: I. R. Dee, 1993, p. 285
 
CHUEV:  At the 22nd Congress Khrushchev alleged that Molotov, Voroshilov, and Kaganovich recognized the court's ruling on Tukhachevsky and others to be incorrect and welcomed the rehabilitation of Tukhachevsky and others....
MOLOTOV:  Emphatically no.
Chuev, Feliks. Molotov Remembers. Chicago: I. R. Dee, 1993, p. 286
 
            Bolstering Khrushchev's version of this affair, that Stalin swallowed German disinformation designed to destroy Tukhachevsky, is a legend that Stalin was warned of a conspiracy with the Germans.  In 1939 the Soviet defector Krivitsky, who had worked for the NKVD and GRU in Western Europe, published his book In Stalin's Secret Service, in which he claimed that the NKVD received secret information about such a conspiracy from Czech President Benes and from its agent Skoblin,....  Krivitsky accused Skoblin of providing the Soviets with disinformation from the Germans about secret contacts with Tukhachevsky.  Later General Schellenberg, chief of Hitler's foreign intelligence service, in his memoirs also claimed that the Germans fabricated documents pointing to Tukhachevsky as their agent.  Before the war, he said, they passed these documents to the Czechs, and Benes reported the information to Stalin.
            For me, this is a self-serving fairytale.  The documents have never been found in the KGB or Stalin archives.  The criminal case against Tukhachevsky is based entirely on his confession, and there's no reference to any incriminating evidence received from German intelligence.  If such documents existed, I, as deputy director and the man responsible for the German desk in the intelligence directorate, would have seen them or found some reference to their existence.
Sudoplatov, Pavel. Special Tasks. Boston: Little, Brown, c1993, p. 90
 
            The case of the generals was different from that of the accused civilians.  Not only was it held in camera, but the "Court" of a presiding judge and two assistants was reinforced by eight of the highest officers in the Red Army.  In addition, more than 100 high-ranking officers from all over the country were summoned as spectators, in order later to give an eye-witness account of proceedings to the troops under their command.  It is a matter of record that none of them ever expressed doubts about the genuineness of the charge or the justice of the verdict.  In this case at least, there was no possibility that the accused had been "worked on" during a long period of preliminary examination, as they were tried within three days after their rest, confessed their guilt, were condemned by unanimous verdict, and shot without delay.
            ...The charges against them, and the exact nature of their offense, had never been made public officially, but they can be surmised with a reasonable degree of accuracy.  The night before Tukhachevsky and the others were arrested, Marshall Gamarnik, Vice Commissar of War and chief of the Political Department of the Red Army, committed suicide, which gives the key to the puzzle.  The Political Department had been originally intended by Lenin as a means of civil control over the Army, but in the course of time it had gradually become a part or appanage of the General Staff, owing allegiance to the Army rather than to the Kremlin.  The danger of war, and perhaps doubts provoked by the murder of Kirov and subsequent investigation, led Stalin to decide that a radical change should be made in the status of the Political Department, that it must henceforth revert to its original function as an instrument of civilian control.  The Army leaders resented this "interference," and finally decided to prevent it by violent action....   Accordingly, Tukhachevsky, Gamarnik, and their colleagues appealed to the German General Staff for support in their projected coup d'etat or "palace revolution" against Stalin.  They hoped to affect the coup through the Kremlin Guard and the students of the military academy in the Kremlin, who, they believed, would obey their orders; but they had the gravest doubts about the mass of the Army and the nation as a whole, which prompted them to seek German aid in return, it is said, for an offer of territory and for economic and political advantages in the Ukraine and North Caucasus.
Duranty, Walter. Story of Soviet Russia. Philadelphia, N. Y.: JB Lippincott Co. 1944, p. 220
 
            I gave him [Spiegelglass] the contents of a brief confidential dispatch from one of my chief agents in Germany.  At a formal reception tendered by high Nazi officials, at which my informant was present, the question of the Tukhachevsky affair came up.  Captain Fritz Wiedemann, personal political aide to Hitler --appointed subsequently to the post of Consul-General at San Francisco --was asked if there was any truth in Staliin's charges of espionage against the Red Army generals.  My agent's report reproduced Wiedemann's boastful reply:
            "We hadn't nine spies in the Red Army, but many more.  The 0GPU is still far from on the trail of all our men in Russia."
Krivitsky, Walter G. I was Stalin's Agent, London: H. Hamilton, 1939, p. 242
 
            But how could generals of the Red Army have envisaged collaborating with Hitler?  If they were not good Communists, surely these military men were at least nationalists?
            This question will first be answered with another question.  Why should this hypothesis be any different for the Soviet Union than France?  Was not Marshal Petain, the Victor at Verdun, a symbol of French chauvinist patriotism?  Were not General Weygand and Admiral Darlan strong defenders of French colonialism?  Despite all this, these three became key players in the collaboration with the Nazis.  Would not the overthrow of capitalism in the Soviet Union and the bitter class struggle against the bourgeoisie be, for all the forces nostalgic for free enterprise, be additional motives for collaborating with German `dynamic capitalism'? 
            And did not the World War itself show that the tendency represented by Petain in France also existed among certain Soviet officers?
            General Vlasov played an important role during the defence of Moscow at the end of 1941.  Arrested in 1942 by the Germans, he changed sides.  But it was only on September 16, 1944, after an interview with Himmler, that he received the official authorization to create his own Russian Liberation Army, whose first division was created as early as 1943.  Other imprisoned officers offered their services to the Nazis; a few names follow.
            Major-General Trukhin, head of the operational section of the Baltic Region Chief of Staffs, professor at the General Chiefs of Staff Academy. Major-General Malyshkin, head of the Chiefs of Staff of the 19th Army.  Major-General Zakutny, professor at the General Chiefs of Staff Academy.  Major-Generals Blagoveshchensky, brigade commander; Shapovalov, artillery corps commander; and Meandrov. Brigade commander Zhilenkov, member of the Military Council of the 32nd Army.  Colonels Maltsev, Zverev, Nerianin and Buniachenko, commander of the 389th Armed Division.
            What was the political profile of these men?  The former British secret service officer and historian Cookridge writes:
            “Vlasov's entourage was a strange motley.  The most intelligent of his officers was Colonel Mileti Zykov (a Jew)....  He had a been a supporter of the “rightist deviationists'‘ of Bukharin and in 1936 had been banished by Stalin to Siberia, where he spent four years.  Another survivor of Stalin's purges was General Vasili Feodorovich Malyshkin, former chief of staff of the Far East Army; he had been imprisoned during the Tukhachevsky affair.  A third officer, Major-General Georgi Nicolaievich Zhilenkov, had been a political army commissar.  They and many of the officers whom Gehlen recruited had been “rehabilitated'‘ at the beginning of the war in 1941.'...”
            E. H. Cookridge, Gehlen: Spy of the Century (New York: Random House, 1972), pp. 57--58.
 
            So here we learn that several superior officers, convicted and sent to Siberia in 1937, then rehabilitated during the war, joined Hitler's side!  Clearly the measures taken during the Great Purge were perfectly justified.
            To justify joining the Nazis, Vlasov wrote an open letter: “Why I embarked on the road of struggle against Bolshevism.”
            What is inside that letter is very instructive.
            First, his criticism of the Soviet regime is identical to the ones made by Trotsky and the Western right-wing.
Martens, Ludo.  Another View of Stalin. Antwerp, Belgium: EPO, Lange Pastoorstraat 25-27  2600, p. 169 [p. 155 on the NET]
 
            Towards Tukhachevsky he was said to have harbored resentment and jealousy because of disagreements during the Civil War.  He had, however, recognized his ability and instead of sending him to some distant command, he had appointed him to high office in 1935 making him a Marshal of the Soviet Union.  But then, suddenly, he became convinced that Tukhachevsky was a traitor.
            On May 1, 1937, Tukhachevsky stood at Stalin's side on the Lenin Mausoleum, reviewing the parade on Red Square.  He was nearing the peak of his career, for in the event of war with Germany--and he was convinced that it was eminent--he would probably be made deputy to the Commander-in-Chief.  He had been appointed to represent the Soviet government in London at the coronation of King George VI.  A few days before he was to depart, however, his appointment was canceled  He was relieved of office as Deputy Commissar of War on May 20 and sent to command the Volga military district.  He arrived there on May 25 and was arrested the next day.
            Pravda announced on June 11, 1937, that he and seven others with the rank of general were to be tried in secret.  The military court, which took only one day to hear the evidence and find them guilty, included four Marshals of the Soviet Union....  Their crime, according to the press, was that they had spied on behalf of Germany and Japan and had conspired to surrender Soviet territory in the Ukraine and the Far East in return for military support to overthrow Stalin and his regime.
Grey, Ian. Stalin, Man of History. London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1979, p. 280
 
            There are many rumors and speculations about the Tukhachevsky Affair.  In the absence of primary sources, speculations of memoirists and politicians have variously accused Hitler and Stalin of framing Tukhachevsky.  Others have suggested that the generals were actually plotting a coup against Stalin, who beat them to the punch.  With no credible sources and so many contradictory rumors, the entire affair must remain mysterious.
Getty, A. Origins of the Great Purges. Cambridge, N. Y.: Cambridge Univ. Press, 1985, p. 167
 
            [Stalin said in a June 1937 speech], Gamarnik.  Although he did not spy, he was the organizer of the spying program, overseeing Uborevitch, Yakir, Tukhachevsky who were involved in gathering systematic information for the German High Command.
Lucas and Ukas. Trans. and Ed. Secret Documents. Toronto, Canada: Northstar Compass, 1996, p. 109
 
STALIN [In a June 1937 speech]:  Further, Tukhachevsky.  You read his statement?
VOICE FROM AUDIENCE: Yes, we read it.
STALIN: He gave away our operative plan--our sacred plans for defense of our Motherland; he gave it to the German High Command.  He always met with the representative of the German Reich Intelligence Agency.  A spy?  Yes, a spy!  The Western countries, so-called "civilized countries," call these people "informers," but we in Russia know that this is an outright spy.  Yakir --systematically informed the German High Command.  He pretended that he had this sickness "kidney ailment."  He traveled to Germany to get treatment. 
            Uborevitch... singly informed Germans about our defense potential. 
            Karakhan--German spy. 
            Eideman--German spy. 
            Karakhan--informed the German High Command, starting from that time when he was our Military Attache in Berlin, Germany. 
            Rudzutak--I already spoke about this that he admitted that he was a spy, but we have all the information about his activities.  We know to whom he gave the secrets.  There is one Secret Agent in Germany, in Berlin.  If sometimes you will have the opportunity to be in Berlin, Dzhosefina Genzi is the lady that will charm you.  Maybe some of you here know this charmer.  She is a first class intelligence agent with much experience.  She ensnared Enukidze.  She helped to ensnare Tukhachevsky.  She holds in her hands Rudzutak.  She is a very clever agent... Dzhosefina Genzi.  She is supposed to be a Dutch national working in Germany.  Beautiful, and she's willing to go to all lengths on all proposals made by men, and then she buries you.  You might have read an article in "Pravda" about some covert operations which included this lady.  Well, she is one of the most efficient, masterfully getting you into her clutches, the best that German intelligence has.  Here, you have people!  Nine spies and three organizers who were involved in supplying the German High Command with the plans that were made for saving our Motherland.  These are the people!
Lucas and Ukas. Trans. and Ed. Secret Documents. Toronto, Canada: Northstar Compass, 1996, p. 110-112
 
            [In a June 1937 speech Stalin said], They [the Soviet traitorous generals] did not depend on their own strength, they depended on the might of Germany.  The Germans told them that they will help them.  But the Germans in the end did not help them.  The Germans thought: you fellows cook the porridge, we'll just look.  The Germans wanted these traitors to show them concrete results;...
Lucas and Ukas. Trans. and Ed. Secret Documents. Toronto, Canada: Northstar Compass, 1996, p. 133
 
            Stalin maintained that ten of the 13 leaders of the conspiracy he had named, that is all of them except Rykov, Bukharin, and Gamarnik, were spies for German intelligence, and some for Japanese intelligence.  Talking of Tukhachevsky and other commanders under arrest, Stalin charged: "He handed our operations plan--the operations plan, that holy of holies--to the German's Reichswehr.  A spy?  Yes, a spy....  Yakir provided systematic information to the German staff....  Uborevitch personally, as well as with his friends, his cronies, supplied information.  Karakhan is a German spy, Eideman is a German spy.  Kork had been informing the German staff since he was military attache in Germany."
            In Stalin's words, Rudzutak, Karakhan, and Enukidze had been recruited by Josephine Hensie (Jensen), a German spy of Danish origin who was on the payroll of the German Reichswehr.  She had "helped to recruit Tukhachevsky."
            ... He [Stalin] accused them of spying and told the Military Council: "This is a military-political conspiracy.  It was created by the hands of the German Reichswehr's hands.  The Reichswehr wanted a conspiracy to exist here, and these gentlemen built up a conspiracy.  The Reichswehr wanted these gentlemen to systematically supply them with military secrets and these gentlemen did supply them with military secrets.  The Reichswehr wanted the present government to be ousted and slaughtered, and they attempted to do so but failed.  The Reichswehr wanted everything to be ready, in the event of war, for the army to engage in sabotage and be unprepared for defense; the Reichswehr wanted that and they prepared for it.  These are agents, the guiding nucleus of the military-political conspiracy in the USSR, consisting of 10 patent spies and three patent instigators of the spies.  They are agents of the German Reichswehr.  This is the main thing.  The conspiracy, therefore, is rooted not so much in domestic soil as in external conditions.  It is not so much a policy in our country's domestic line as a policy of the German Reichswehr.  They wanted to make another Spain out of the USSR, so they found and recruited spies who operated in this matter.  Such is the situation!"
            Stalin said that 300 to 400 military men had already been arrested and charged with military conspiracy, that "we overlooked it and exposed too few of the military ourselves."  He said Soviet military intelligence was doing a poor job, it was contaminated with spies, and inside the Cheka intelligence a group had worked for Germany, Japan, and Poland.  Having voiced dissatisfaction that no exposure signals were coming from local authorities, and having demanded that there be such signals, Stalin said: "Even if this were 5% true, it would be business enough."
            ... Primakov and Putna, who had indeed supported Trotsky's views prior to 1927, were included in this group.
Political Archives of the Soviet Union (Vol. 1, No. 2) Commack, New York: Nova Science Publishers, 1990, p. 227
 
            The indictment claimed that in April and May 1937 the NKVD had uncovered and eliminated a military Trotskyite conspiracy in Moscow, which have been led by Gamarnik, Tukhachevsky, and others.  The military Trotskyite organization, to which all the accused had belonged, had been formed in 1932-1933 on direct instructions from the German general staff and Trotsky.  It had been in contact with the Trotskyite center, and the rightist group of Bukharin and Rykov.  It had engaged in sabotage, subversion, and terrorism, and had planned to overthrow the government and seize power with a view to restoring capitalism in the USSR.
Political Archives of the Soviet Union (Vol. 1, No. 2) Commack, New York: Nova Science Publishers, 1990, p. 228
 
            The scope of the repressive measures in the Red Army can be judged from Voroshilov's speech to his Military Council on Nov. 29, 1938: "When a group of contemptible traitors to our country and the Red Army led by Tukhachevsky was uncovered and wiped out by a revolutionary court last year, none of us could have imagined, and unfortunately did not imagine, that this filth, this rot, this treachery had penetrated our army so widely and so deeply; in 1937 and 1938 we had to ruthlessly purge our ranks, mercilessly severing the contaminated parts of the body from the living and healthy flesh, ridding ourselves of that filthy, treacherous rot....
Political Archives of the Soviet Union (Vol. 1, No. 2) Commack, New York: Nova Science Publishers, 1990, p. 230
            Altogether the Military Collegium of the USSR Supreme Court tried 408 high-ranking officials and commanders of the Army and Navy, of whom 386 were party members; 401 were sentenced to death and 7 to various terms in labor camps.
Political Archives of the Soviet Union (Vol. 1, No. 2) Commack, New York: Nova Science Publishers, 1990, p. 231
 
            I was to meet Tukhachevsky for the last time on the day after the funeral of King George V.  At a dinner at the Soviet Embassy, the Russian general had been very conversational with Politis, Titulescu, Herriot, Boncour, Potemkin, and Madame Potemkin.  On that occasion his eyes had been alive, and his melancholy had disappeared in constructive talk.  For he had just returned from a trip to Germany, and was heaping glowing praise upon the Nazis.  Seated at my right, he said over and over again, as he discussed an air pact between the great powers and Hitler's country: "They are already invincible, Madame Tabouis!"
            Why did he speak so trustfully?  Was it because his head had been turned by the hearty reception he had found among German diplomats, who found it easy to talk to this man of the old Russian school?  At any rate, I was not the only one that evening who was alarmed at his display of enthusiasm.  One of the guests--an important diplomat-- grumbled into my ear as we walked away from the Embassy: "Well, I hope all the Russians don't feel that way!"
            And two years later, when the Soviets were to accuse and convict Tukhachevsky of complicity in a military plot hatched by Germany, my thoughts often reverted to his attitude during that dinner.
Tabouis, Genevive. They Called Me Cassandra. New York: C. Scribner's sons, 1942, p. 257
 
            As time passed, however, there came a change in the relation of the Political Department, as it was now termed, to the Red Army, and in 1937 the matter of military versus civilian control grew into a sharp and perilous issue.  By then, after 17 years of peace, the Political Department was little more than an appanage of the General Staff.  The commissars still looked after the education and morale welfare of the troops, and still held classes for Communist instruction, but they no longer regarded themselves as civilians, and the head of their Department, Gamarnik, was a marshal, a soldier every inch of him.
            This change had occurred gradually, but sometime in 1935-1936 its importance and implications were brought to Stalin's attention, I was told, by Voroshilov himself.  He is said to have asked for a special meeting of the Politburo to discuss conditions which he described as alarming and in direct contradiction to Lenin's view that the Political Department should be the channel and instrument of civilian control over the army.  Without much noise or fanfare steps were taken to divert the political Department back from the General Staff to the Kremlin.  In the lower echelons this was not so difficult, but it met stiff and obstinate resistance at the top.  Military commands invariably and traditionally dislike a division of powers or "interference" by civilians in the workings of an army....
            A powerful group of Red Army leaders, headed by the brilliant Marshal Tukhachevsky, resented Stalin's "interference" and after several months of increasingly acrimonious controversy, decided to prevent it by violent and conspirative action.  During the 10 years between the Treaty of Rapallo (1922) and rise of Hitler, relations between the Russian and German armies had been intimate and friendly.  On one occasion in the late twenties the Chief of the German Reichswehr, General von Hammerstein, is said to have conducted Red Army maneuvers in the region of Kiev.  Accordingly, Marshals Tukhachevsky and Gamarnik and the militarist clique in the army appealed to the German General staff for support in a coup d'etat, or "Palace revolution" against Stalin.  They hoped to effect the coup through the Kremlin Guard and the students of the Military Academy in the Kremlin, whose commanders belonged to their clique.  But they had grave doubts about the mass of the army and the nation as a whole, which prompted them to seek German aid, in return, it was said, for an offer of territory and for economic and political advantages in the Ukraine and North Caucasus.
            The Kremlin acted with speed and vigor.  Tukhachevsky and seven other generals were arrested early in June, 1937, and put on trial within three days, in sharp contrast to proceedings in other treason trials where the accused were held for preliminary examination during a period of weeks or months.  The night before the arrests  Marshal Gamarnik committed suicide.  Like other treason trials, this was a court-martial, judged by the Supreme Military Tribunal of the USSR, but there were two important differences.  First, this case was tried in camera whereas the others were public.  Second, the court of three judges was reinforced by eight high-ranking officers of the Red Army.  More than 100 prominent soldiers were summoned from various parts of the country to attend the trial.  All the accused confessed their guilt and were condemned to death.  Their sentences were carried out within 48 hours....
            I was told by Troyanovsky, former Ambassador to the United States, who had many friends among the spectators, that none of them had any doubts about the guilt of the accused.  From other sources I received an explanation of the whole affair which I believe to be reasonably authentic, although I have not been able to confirm it in detail.  It appears that the GPU first got wind of treasonable conversations between the German General Staff and Tukhachevsky, who had just visited Prague and Berlin, from information supplied by the Czech Secret Service.  In Prague, Tukhachevsky had a meeting with Foreign Minister Benes, the Czech Commander in Chief, General Sirovy, and one other Czech leader, to discuss measures for the defense of the country in case Hitler should attack it.  Although no secretaries were present at the meeting and no minutes were kept, the Czech Secret Service in Berlin, where Tukhachevsky stayed for two days after leaving Prague, reported that high German military circles were fully informed about the Tukhachevsky-Benes-Sirovy conversations.  The report gave facts and details which Mr. Benes recognized as correct, and he was therefore forced to the conclusion that no one but Tukhachevsky could have conveyed this information to the Germans.  There was no suggestion that Mr. Benes was aware of any conflict between Tukhachevsky and the civil authorities in the Kremlin, but he was so angry that Tukhachevsky had given the Germans the substance of the ultrasecret talks in Prague that he promptly passed the report on to Moscow.  Tukhachevsky had been scheduled to leave Berlin for London to attend the coronation of King George VI, but was promptly recalled to Moscow and arrested on arrival.
            As a result of this trial and the ruthless purge of high military officers which followed, the Politburo control over the army was completely reestablished, though at heavy cost in army efficiency and prestige.  For a term of years, the position of the political commissars in Red Army units was restored to something near the level of Civil War days, so that they had the same authority as that of equivalent regimental ranks and, in the event of death or disablement of the commanding officer, he would be succeeded, at least temporarily, by the commissar.
Duranty, Walter. Stalin & Co. New York: W. Sloane Associates, 1949, p. 214-217
 
TORTURE NOT USED ON GENERALS
 
The G.P.U. has always disclaimed -- I think truthfully -- the use of Gestapo forms of torture, and even of the American third degree.  (Gedye, Prague correspondent for the New York Times, also cabled on June 18, 1937, that " two of the highest officials in Prague told him they had definite knowledge for at least six months that secret connections between the German General Staff and certain high Russian generals had existed ever since the Rapallo treaty.")
Strong, Anna L. The Soviets Expected It. New York, New York: The Dial press, 1941, p. 134
 
(Harold Denny, in the New York Times, January 15, 1939, wrote: "In almost five years residence, trying to learn the facts, I have found no evidence which I consider trustworthy that physical torture is applied to prisoners.  I am convinced that there does not occur, unless in isolated and exceptional instances, the sadistic cruelties reported from German prison camps or even the beating with rubber hoses bestowed, as every American police reporter knows, in the back rooms of many American police stations.")
Strong, Anna L. The Soviets Expected It. New York, New York: The Dial press, 1941, p. 134
 
            In the majority of historical works devoted to the Tukhachevsky case, these confessions are explained exclusively by the use of physical torture.  However, such an explanation is inadequate for a number of reasons.
            First of all, the defendants at the trial of the generals were strong and healthy people, most of whom had only recently crossed the threshold of their 40th birthday.  Unlike the main defendants at the open trials, they had not spent long years before their arrest engaged in endless acts of self-deprecation and humiliation.  For this reason, one might expect significantly greater resistance from them, than, for instance, from Zinoviev or Bukharin.
            Second, the stunning speed with which the confessions were obtained draws our attention.  The majority of the defendants at the open trials did not give such confessions for several months.  The trial of the generals, however, was prepared in record-setting time.  From the arrest of the main defendants to the trial itself, slightly more than two weeks passed.  Such a time period was clearly insufficient to break these courageous men who had many times looked death in the eye.
            Third, unlike the defendants at the open trials, where the judges were faceless bureaucrats, the defendants at the trial of the generals were appearing before their former comrades-in-arms.  This fact should have filled them with hope that the truth, if spoken in their presence, would inevitably make it beyond the courtroom's walls.
Rogovin, Vadim. 1937: Year of Terror. Oak Park, Michigan: Labor Publications, 1998, p. 446
 
 
YAGODA AND OTHER GPU PUNISHED JUSTIFIABLY
 
 In connection with the arrest of Yagoda, other arrests of local G.P.U. officials occurred in many cities, on the charge of "arresting innocent citizens" and "using improper methods to export confessions."  They were given the severest sentences, for the crime was considered of the very gravest nature.
Strong, Anna L. The Soviets Expected It. New York, New York: The Dial Press, 1941, p. 134
 
            On the terror side, they [Defendants in the Bukharin trial] had been responsible for the assassination of Kirov, which Yagoda had facilitated through Zaporozhets.  But in addition, they had caused the deaths of Kuibyshev and of Maxim Gorky, hitherto regarded as natural (and of the former 0GPU chief, Menzhinsky, and of Gorky's son Peshkov into the bargain).  This had been done by medical murder.  Yagoda was also charged with an attempt to poison Yezhov.
Conquest, Robert. The Great Terror. New York: Oxford University Press, 1990, p. 343
 
            In August 1936 I saw Yagoda....  He looked embarrassed.  He said that Stalin was surrounded by rumor-mongers and slanderers, that there were reports which implicated every member of the Government.... He gave me a peculiar look and said, "I have information regarding Mekhlis.  It will not be believed if I submit it.  It concerns his contacts abroad."  I realized he wanted to involve me in some plan of his to compromise his enemies who are close to Stalin.
Litvinov, Maksim Maksimovich. Notes for a Journal. New York: Morrow, 1955, p. 236
 
 
WHAT IS A PURGE
 
The entire membership of the Communist Party was therefore subjected to what is called a "cleansing" or "purge" in the presence of large audiences of their non-Communist fellow workers.  (This is the only connection in which the Soviet people use the term "purge."  Its application by Americans to all the Soviet treason trials and in general to Soviet criminal procedure is resented by the Soviet people.)
            Each Communist had to relate his life history and daily activities in the presence of people who were in a position to check them.  It was a brutal experience for an unpopular president of a Moscow university to explain to an examining board in the presence of his students why he merited the nation's trust.  Or for a superintendent of the large plant to expose his life history and daily activities -- even to his wife's use of one of the factory automobiles for shopping -- in the presence of the plants workers, any one of whom had the right to make remarks.  This was done with every Communist throughout the country; it resulted in the expulsion of large numbers from the party, and in the arrest and trial of a few.
Strong, Anna L. The Soviets Expected It. New York, New York: The Dial press, 1941, p. 136
 
The purge--in Russian "chiska" (cleansing)--is a long-standing institution of the Russian Communist Party.  The first one I encountered was in 1921, shortly after Lenin had introduced "NEP," his new economic policy, which involved a temporary restoration of private trade and petty capitalism and caused much heart burning amongst his followers.  In that purge nearly one-third of the total membership of the party was expelled or placed on probation.  To the best of my recollection, the reasons then put forward for expulsion or probation were graft, greed, personal ambition, and "conduct unbecoming to communists," which generally meant wine, women, and song.
Duranty, Walter. The Kremlin and the People. New York: Reynal & Hitchcock, 1941, p. 116
 
            Kirov's murder brought a change, but even so the Purge that was held that winter was at first not strikingly different from earlier Purges.
Duranty, Walter. The Kremlin and the People. New York: Reynal & Hitchcock, 1941, p. 116
 
 
The Central Committee organized a "purge" and expelled barely 170,000 members in order to improve the party quality.
            Stalin has frequently been held responsible for the "purge."  He was not its author.  This party-cleansing was done under Lenin's leadership.  It is a process which is unique in the history of little parties.  The Bolsheviks however, do not regard it as an extraordinary measure for use only in a time of crisis, but a normal feature of party procedure.  It is the means of guaranteeing Bolshevik quality.  To regard it as a desperate move on the part of leaders anxious to get rid of rivals is to misunderstand how profoundly the Bolshevik party differs from all others, even from the Communist Party's of the rest of Europe.
Murphy, John Thomas. Stalin, London, John Lane, 1945, p. 144
 
Lenin initiated the first great "cleansing" of the Bolshevik party just as the transition had begun from "war communism" to the new economic policy.  In 1922, when, as Lenin put it, "the party had rid itself of the rascals, bureaucrats, dishonest or waivering Communists, and of Mensheviks who have re-painted their facade but who remained Mensheviks at heart," another Congress took place; and it was this Congress which advanced Stalin to the key position of Bolshevik power.
            It brought him into intimate contact with every functionary of the organization, enabling him to examine their work as well as their ideas.
Murphy, John Thomas. Stalin, London, John Lane, 1945, p. 145
 
            The party maintains its quality by imposing a qualifying period before granting full membership, and by periodical " cleanings" of those who fail to live up to the high standard set.
Murphy, John Thomas. Stalin, London, John Lane, 1945, p. 169
 
In all fairness I must add that no small proportion of the exiles were allowed to return home and resume their jobs after the Purge had ended.
Duranty, Walter. The Kremlin and the People. New York: Reynal & Hitchcock, 1941, p. 122
 
            Besides examining Communists against whom definite complaints are made, the Control Commission at long intervals resorts to wholesale "purges" of the Party.  In 1929 it was decided to institute such a purge, with a view to checking up on the rapid numerical growth of the Party, which has been increasing at the rate of about 200,000 a year during the last few years, and eliminating undesirable elements.  It was estimated in advance that about 150,000 Communists, or 10 percent of the total membership (including the candidates) would be expelled during this process.  In a purge every party member, regardless of whether any charges have been preferred against him or not, must appear before representatives of the Control Commission and satisfy them that he is a sound Communist in thought and action.  In the factories non-party workers are sometimes called on to participate in the purge by offering judgment on the Communists and pointing out those who are shkurniki or people who look after their own skins, a familiar Russian characterization for careerists.
Chamberlin, William Henry. Soviet Russia. Boston: Little, Brown, 1930, p. 68
 
            From time to time the party "cleans out" its membership, and this is always done an open meetings to which all workers of the given institution are invited.  Each communist in the institution must give before this public an extended account of his life activities, submit to and answer all criticism, and prove before the assembled workers his fitness to remain in the "leading Party."  Members may be cleaned out not only as "hostile elements, double-dealers, violators of discipline, degenerates, career-seekers, self-seekers, morally degraded persons" but even for being merely "passive," for having failed to keep learning and growing in knowledge and authority among the masses.
Strong, Anna Louise. This Soviet World. New York, N. Y: H. Holt and company, c1936, p. 31
 
            I have in the course of 15 years in the Soviet Union met an occasional Communist who was a grafter, and many more who were stubborn bureaucrats and unenlightened fanatics.  But I have also seen how the party throws out dead wood--not always accurately--and renews itself from the working class it leads.
Strong, Anna Louise. This Soviet World. New York, N. Y: H. Holt and company, c1936, p. 37
 
            It would be a mistake to regard the 1933 chistka as having been directed solely against members of the opposition.  The largest single group expelled were "passive" party members: those carried on the roles but not participating in party work.  Next came violators of party discipline, bureaucrats, corrupt officials, and those who had hidden past crimes.  Members of dissident groups did not even figure in the final tallies.  Stalin himself characterized the purge has a measure against bureaucratism, red tape, degenerates, and careerists, "to raise the level of organizational leadership."  The vast majority of those expelled were fresh recruits who had entered the party since 1929, rather than Old Bolshevik oppositionists.  Nevertheless, the 1933 purge expelled about 18 percent of the party's members and must be seen as a hard-line policy or signal from Moscow.
Getty & Naumov, The Road to Terror. New Haven, Conn.: Yale Univ. Press, c1999, p. 127
 
"Not everyone who wishes can belong to the party," said Stalin; "it is not given to everyone to brave its labors and its torments."
Barbusse, Henri. Stalin. New York: The Macmillan company, 1935, p. 280
 
            Western students have applied the word "purge" to everything from political trials to police terror to nonpolitical expulsions from the party.  The label "Great Purges," which encompasses practically all party activities between 1933 and 1939, is an example of such broad usage.  Yet the Communist Party defined and used the word quite specifically.  The term "purge" (chistka--a sweeping or cleaning) only applied to the periodic membership screenings of the ranks of the party.  These membership operations were designed to weed the party of hangers-on, nonparticipants, drunken officials, and people with false identification papers, as well as ideological "enemies" or "aliens."  In the majority of purges, political crimes or deviations pertained to a minority of those expelled.
            No Soviet source or usage ever referred to the Ezhovshchina (the height of police arrests and terror in 1937) as a purge, and party leaders discussed that event and purges in entirely separate contexts.  No political or nonpolitical trial was ever called a purge, and under no circumstances were operations, arrests, or terror involving nonparty citizens referred to as purges.  A party member at the time would have been mystified by such a label.
Getty, A. Origins of the Great Purges. Cambridge, N. Y.: Cambridge Univ. Press, 1985, p. 38
 
            It is to these operations [periodic cleansings] and not to trials, arrests, or prosecutions, that the Soviet usage of the term "purge" applies.  The 1919 operation was called pereregistratsiia, "reregistration."  The 1921 purge, and each subsequent purge, was called proverka (verification) or chistka (a cleaning, cleaning out, combing out, or sweeping).  For consistency and accuracy, the term "purge" will be applied below only to a membership-accounting operation.
Getty, A. Origins of the Great Purges. Cambridge, N. Y.: Cambridge Univ. Press, 1985, p. 40
 
            The reasons for which one could be expelled in a purge varied throughout the '20s, but there were some constant themes.  One category consistently marked for expulsion was that of "class-alien," "counter-revolutionary," or "hostile" elements.  This group of offenders included former officers (but not always soldiers) of the White Armies, "regenerate bourgeois elements," kulaks, and other elements of the pre-revolutionary power structure.  There was no official stricture against persons of bourgeois or kulak origin entering the party, as long as such origins were not kept secret.  Hiding one's origins, however, was always grounds for expulsion.
            Another category for expulsion was that encompassing official misconduct or corruption.  This might be phrased "acts unworthy of a party member," "violations of party discipline," or "self-seeking careerism" in cases of continued violations.  This "abuse of position" category often included theft, embezzlement, and the like.  A third group of offenses providing grounds for expulsion centered on nonparticipation or "passivity."  This group always accounted for a large percentage of those expelled in a purge, as did a fourth group--the morally corrupt.  Offenses such as drunkenness, sexual crimes, and financial corruption were taken as signs of "personal corruption."
Getty, A. Origins of the Great Purges. Cambridge, N. Y.: Cambridge Univ. Press, 1985, p. 41
 
 
            The largest of these operations was the 1921 purge following the Civil War, which expelled one in four party members.  At no time in the 20s did an all-union purge embrace even one-half that rate of expulsion.
Getty, A. Origins of the Great Purges. Cambridge, N. Y.: Cambridge Univ. Press, 1985, p. 45
 
 
            If 1929 is typical of a 1920s-era purge in its causes and criteria for expulsion, then membership operations seem to have been implemented to rid the party of corrupt, inactive, undisciplined, class-alien, or criminal persons.  The idea was to "clean" the party of those who were not full-time, dedicated, honest party members according to Lenin's strict code.  It was not done, at least explicitly, to rid the party of all ideological dissenters or suspected oppositionists....
            Nationally, 1,530,000 members went through the 1929 purge.  Of these, 170,000 (or 11 percent) were expelled.  Subsequently, however, 37,000 of these expellees (22 percent of them) were reinstated into the party on appeal.  In Smolensk, the figure was 43 percent restored to membership and in Voronezh 33 percent.  These readmissions eventually reduced the impact of the 1929 purge from 11 to 8% nationally and comprised the greatest number of reversals for a purge to date.  Subsequent clarifications show that the vast majority of those reinstated to membership had been expelled for "passivity" (nonparticipation) and that most of these were rank-and-file members of working-class origin.
Getty, A. Origins of the Great Purges. Cambridge, N. Y.: Cambridge Univ. Press, 1985, p. 47
 
 
            Accordingly, the party was to purge itself in 1933 of the following categories:
            1.  Class-alien, hostile elements who try to deceitfully demoralize the party
            2.  Double dealers, who deceitfully undermine party policy
            3.  Violators of discipline who fail to carry out party decisions and who are pessimistic about the "the impractibility" of party measures
            4.  Degenerates who merged with and do not struggle against kulaks, loafers, thieves, etc..
            5.  Careerists and self-seekers who are isolated from the masses and disregard the needs of people
            6.  Moral degenerates whose unseemly behavior discredit the party
 
 
            These categories were slightly more ideological than those for the 1929 purge.  There was more emphasis on "double dealers," "underminers," and "violators of discipline" who refused to "struggle against the kulak," but the main focus of the 1933 chistka was on weeding out undesirables who had flooded the party since 1929 and not on persecuting members of the opposition, many of whose leaders remained in the party.
Getty, A. Origins of the Great Purges. Cambridge, N. Y.: Cambridge Univ. Press, 1985, p. 49
 
 
            The chistka of 1933 was to take place in a "comradely atmosphere," was to tolerate no "petty and captious digging into the personal lives of people," and was not to be used to settle personal accounts.
            Local purge officials were warned not to expel large numbers of rank-and-file members on such flimsy pretexts as "passivity" or simple political illiteracy.  The 1933 announcement enjoined those conducting the purge to take into account the "overall development" of the member--not to try to trick him or her with technical questions on the intricacies of the party program and not to expel loyal workers and collective farmers just because they had not had time to improve their level of ideological education.  Moreover, a member found to lack sufficient political knowledge (or discipline) was to be reduced from a member to a candidate, or from a candidate member to a sympathizer, reflecting an attempt to prevent some of the abuses encountered in 1929 relating to unjustified expulsions.
Getty, A. Origins of the Great Purges. Cambridge, N. Y.: Cambridge Univ. Press, 1985, p. 50
 
            As head of the Control Commission, Yezhov now became responsible for overseeing the purges, the operations within the party to remove anyone unworthy of membership.  Exactly what that phrase [purges] meant is hotly debated in the West; as noted, one point of view argues that Stalin aimed to crank up political tension and root out political opponents in 1935-36; another maintains that the purges were not largely political operations but, rather, mundane housecleaning, through which party members who had demonstrated incompetence or lack of interest in socialist affairs were removed.
Thurston, Robert. Life and Terror in Stalin's Russia, 1934-1941. New Haven: Yale University Press, c1996, p. 28
 
            These documents suggest that the situation was ripe for a new party purge, and this is precisely what was announced in January 1933.  Member categories subject to expulsion were specified: class-alien elements and enemies, "two-faced ones"--that is, those who say they are for but are actually against the basic party line--those who openly and covertly violate strict party discipline, those who jabber about the lack of realism in prescribed party plans, careerists, self-seekers, morally depraved members, and politically ignorant members unfamiliar with party rules, regulations, and programs.  In the course of the purge, 18 percent of the party's members were expelled, and a further 15 percent left the party out of fear.
Siegelbaum and Sokolov. Stalinism As a Way of Life. New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, c2000, p. 125
 
            On the party purge--April 28, 1933
            On the basis of this Comintern directive our party conducted a party re-registration in 1920, a party purge in 1921, a purge of non-production cells in 1924, a verification of village cells in 1925, and a purge in 1929-30.  As is known, these purges and re-registrations reinforced the ranks of our party, improved its fighting efficiency, and intensified the feeling of responsibility of each party member for the work of the party.
            The function of the party purge is to elevate the ideological level of the party members, to strengthen the party politically and organizationally, and further to intensify the confidence in the party of the millions of non-party masses.
            During a purge this task is accomplished: (a) by the open and honest self-criticism of party members and members of party organizations, (b)  by verifying the work of each party cell to ascertain how it has executed decisions and instructions of the party, (c) by involving the toiling non-party masses in the purge, and (d) by ridding the party of those persons who have not justified the lofty name of party member.
McNeal, Robert. Resolutions and Decisions of the CPSU--The Stalin Years: 1929-1953. Vol. 3. Toronto, Buffalo: University of Toronto Press, 1974, p. 125
 
            In Soviet Party history a 'purge' refers to a membership screening designed to rid the Party of lackadaisical, theoretically backward, ill disciplined, passive, opportunist, and so on, members.  Purges were implemented either by a process of systematic expulsions organized by special 'purge' commissions, or by local Party leaders, in which charges were brought against unreliable members, or by a process of validation or exchange of Party cards in which members had to prove themselves.  Such 'purges' had been a regular part of Party life since 1919.  Interestingly, the Party purges of 1935 and 1937 resulted in significantly fewer expulsions than the previous four purges that had taken place in 1919, 1921, 1929, and 1933.  All the purges mainly affected rank and file party members.
Szymanski, Albert. Human Rights in the Soviet Union. London: Zed Books, 1984, p. 229
 
            Communist Party membership involved both special obligations and access to special benefits such as jobs (reserved for politically reliable people), as well as a certain prestige.  As a result many people secured and maintained membership in the Party for other reasons than agreement with the Party's goals and political activism; many people even secured Party cards illlegally....  The periodic purges (1919, 1921, 1929, 1933, 1935, 1937) were all designed to deal with this problem and, in the words of Party instructions, were directed to ensure 'iron  proletarian discipline in the Party and to cleanse the Party's ranks of all unreliable, unstable, and hanger-on elements.   ‘In the 1919 're-registration' 10-15% of the Party's total membership lost their Party cards; in the 1921 Party purge 25%; in the 1929 purge, 11% (25 percent of whom were reinstated after appeals); in the 1933 chistka 17% were expelled; in the 1935 proverka 9%; and in the famous 1937 Ezhovshchina again about 9% (the 1935 and 1937 purges were the smallest in terms of numbers affected).
            The decree setting up the rules of the 1933 validation of Party members specified that all Party members must present themselves before open proceedings (attended by both Party and non-Party members), give an account of the facts of their lives, explain how they fulfilled Party tasks, and discuss the efforts made to raise their 'ideological and theoretical level.'  Each member was then questioned by the validation commissioners and by rank and file Party and non-Party members.
Szymanski, Albert. Human Rights in the Soviet Union. London: Zed Books, 1984, p. 230
 
            ...The problem of inactive and irresponsible Party members, as well as the loose system of controls over membership, was largely a result of the emphasis, during the 1920s, on the recruitment of large numbers of working-class members, with little attention given to criteria other than class background.
            In the membership screening of 1929, 22% were expelled for 'defects in personal conduct,' 17% for passivity, 12% for criminal offenses (mostly involvement in petty crimes), 10% for violations of Party discipline (which includes those accused of factional activity) and 17% for being 'alien elements' or having lied about class background.  Similarly in the 1933 chistka, in which 15% were expelled for personal degeneracy, 14% for violating Party discipline, 16% for political reasons, including concealing class background, and 18% for abuse of position.  According to Rigby's analysis of the 1933 membership screening,
            "... political considerations play a relatively small part in this sample of expulsions, however, and the great majority were removed either because they made unscrupulous use of their Party membership to secure personal benefits, were immoral, or undisciplined in their personal lives or at their job, or simply failed to participate in Party activities."
 
            Data for the 1935 purge (which occurred immediately after the Kirov assassination) reveals that the reasons for expulsions were similar to those in the pre-1934 membership screenings; more than 20% were expelled for petty crimes or 'moral turpitude,' and most of the remainder for political passivity, 'degeneracy' or abuse of position.  To quote Getty:
            "The information on the incidence of the proverka suggests that it was not a hysterical, political witchhunt, in which helpless rank-and-file Party members fell in droves for the slightest infraction.  Rather, it seems that the proverka of 1935 was more careful, and less political, in that there is evidence of investigation and of a policy in which a consistent pattern of problems or violations was necessary for expulsion."
 
            Results for one city in the Smolensk Region show that only 18% of the members against whom charges have been brought were actually expelled, and less than one-third of those formally criticized at meetings received any form of disciplinary treatment at all.  The records of the Smolensk City Party Committee reveal that 7% were expelled for passivity, 21% were being petty criminals or degenerates, or corrupt; 28% for un-trustworthiness, 22% for being 'class alien persons' who had hidden their class origins, and only 8% for political unreliability.  Undoubtedly there was a higher percentage of expulsions for political reasons in the 1937 purge owing to the hysteria engendered by the spy and 'wrecker' mania current at the time.  Nevertheless, given the results of previous purges, especially that of 1935, there's no doubt that the reasons for the majority of purges were not political.
Szymanski, Albert. Human Rights in the Soviet Union. London: Zed Books, 1984, p. 231
 
 
            IN SHORT, THE VAST MAJORITY OF THOSE WHOSE PARTY CARDS WERE WITHDRAWN BOTH IN THE PRE AND POST 1934 MEMBERSHIP SCREENINGS WERE EXPELLED NOT FOR ASSOCIATION WITH ANY POLITICAL OPPOSITION, BUT RATHER FOR BEING 'CAREERISTS,' 'OPPORTUNISTS, ' ILL-DISCIPLINED, 'DEGENERATES,' POLITICALLY PASSIVE, 'POLITICALLY ILLITERATE,' 'WEAK WILLED,' AND SO ON.
Szymanski, Albert. Human Rights in the Soviet Union. London: Zed Books, 1984, p. 232
 
            A member of the Communist Party becomes such not only through his own selection, but by the approval of the working class among whom he lives and toils.  Not only must he come with recommendations from older party members of from 5 to 10 years standing, recommendations taken so seriously that a member may be expelled for endorsing an unworthy candidate.  Not only must he undergo a period of probation ranging from one to two years, but admission may be refused, or a member once admitted may be expelled not only by the judgment of other Communists, but in response to accusations from non-party workers as well.  The list of offenses for which expulsion is possible include not merely "alien elements, double dealers, breakers of discipline, moral degenerates, careerists, self-seekers," but even "passive elements who do not carry out their duties and who have not mastered the program, rules, and most important decisions of the party."
            Steady, consistent efforts are made to improve the quality of membership and to weed out through the periodical "cleansing's" the unfit material.  It is the common requirement made of all applicants for membership in the Communist Party who may be engaged in intellectual or office work, that they spend a year or two in "social work" in some large factory, before even making their application for membership, and are judged by the workers' view of their capacity to lead.  A member who ceases to interpret and lead the workers around him, or who has merely become passive in this task, may be disciplined up to the point of rejection from the party.  And this may happen not only to individual members, but to whole "city committees" if a situation develops which shows that they have failed to interpret and lead the masses....
            Members of the party have their regular jobs by which they earn their living; they may be machine hands or People's Commissars.  But their unpaid job as party members takes precedence over every other work, and of all family relations.  At the very least they must expect to give several evenings a week to routine "party work," in some of the multitudinous, unexciting tasks of organizing masses in industry and government.  This may be some dull job like collecting trade union duties, assembling material for a wall newspaper, checking up subscriptions to government loans; it may also include leading groups of youth or teaching classes in politics.
Strong, Anna Louise. Dictatorship and Democracy in the Soviet Union. New York: International Pamphlets, 1934, p. 11-12
 
            [At the 13th Congress of the Party in May 1924 Stalin stated] Preobrazhensky’s profound mistake is his failure to understand that the Party cannot strengthen its ranks without periodical purges of unstable elements.  Comrade Lenin taught us that the Party can strengthen itself only if it steadily rids itself of the unstable elements which penetrate, and will continue to penetrate, its ranks.  We would be going against Leninism if we were to repudiate Party purges in general.  As for the present purge, what is wrong with it?  It is said that individual mistakes have been made.  Certainly they have.  But has there ever been a big undertaking that was free from individual mistakes?  Never.  Individual mistakes may and will occur; but in the main the purge is correct.
            The chief thing about the purge is that it makes people of this kind feel that there exists a master, that there is the Party, which can call them to account for all sins committed against it.  It seems to me absolutely necessary that this master go through the Party ranks with a broom every now and again.
Stalin, Joseph. Works. Moscow: Foreign Languages Pub. House, 1952, Vol. 6, p. 239-240
 
            The first of the 1930s purges, in 1933, was officially justified by the need to reduce the number of Party numbers, which had almost tripled by the often unregulated admission of new and poorly motivated members.  However, the decree from the Central Committee ordering it gave a list of reprehensible offenses, allowing action to be taken against a good many officials.  Alongside elements with "alien" social backgrounds, it was aimed at "double-dealers" who swore oaths of allegiance to the Party line but worked for its failure, those who broke the "iron discipline" by not carrying out their duties or discrediting the plans through calling them impossible, "renegades" who had "closed ranks with bourgeois elements" and did not struggle against embezzlers, "careerists, self-seekers and bureaucratic elements" who neglected the interests of the people and used their power to make profits, and finally "moral degenerates" who brought the party into disrepute.  It was not by chance that local officials were accused of trying to sabotage the purge and save their friends.  It was the so-called "passive elements," one category the official instructions did not mention, who were purged in great numbers.  Most of these were workers.  This practice caught on, and the new Party rules approved by the 17th Congress added "passive elements" to the list of categories to be purged.
Rittersporn, Gabor. Stalinist Simplifications and Soviet Complications, 1933-1953. New York: Harwood Academic Publishers, c1991, p. 44
 
 
            The general criteria for the purging of party members were corruption, passivity, breaches of party discipline, alcoholism, criminality and anti-Semitism.  For bourgeois individuals and kulaks who hid their class origin expulsion was certain.  (But not for those who had been accepted into the party and who had admitted their class background.)  For the former tsarist officers who hid their past were also inevitably expelled.  All those who had been expelled could in their turn appeal to the Central control commission, and then their cases were reviewed at a higher level.
Sousa, Mario.  The Class Struggle During the Thirties in the Soviet Union, 2001.
 
            The "purges" (in Russian, chistki or "cleansings") were periodic attempts by the central CPSU leadership, the Central Committee and the Politburo, to find out who was in the Party, and to strengthen it organizationally. they never included imprisonment (much less executions), and only rarely resulted in many expulsions; the "purges" of the 1930s resulted in even fewer expulsions than those of the 1920s had. They were not aimed at rooting out oppositionists (supporters of Trotsky, Bukharin, or any of the other ex-opposition groupings of the 1920s), but rather at getting rid of the dissolute, drunks, careerists, and others who clearly had no place in a disciplined Communist party.
            “Cleaning House in the Bolshevik Party,” Progressive Labor Magazine, Vol. 14, No. 1 (Spring 1981), pp. 70-73.
 
            [11 August 1936 memorandum from Kotelnikov to Dimitrov, Manuilsky, and Moskvin about the work of exposing "the wreckers in the ECCI,"]
            During the exchange of party documents, four members and three candidate members of our organization were expelled from the party.  The reason for the expulsion of Gurevich, Gurianov, and Neibut was their affiliation with Trotskyism in 1923 and 1927, and [their] concealment of this during the verification of party documents.  Nikolaeva [was expelled] for continuing to defend the innocence of her husband who had been arrested and sentenced to 10 years for wrecking.  Candidate members: Romanov [was expelled] for being a moral degenerate [he was married five times] and for violating [the rules of] conspiracy; Arakcheev, for concealing from the party the fact of the arrest and exile of his father, an active SR;....
Chase, William J., Enemies Within the Gates?, translated by Vadim A. Staklo, New Haven: Yale University Press, c2001, p. 138.
 
TRANSFERRING PARTY LEADERS
 
The arrests affected chiefly the upper party circles and those officials dealing with foreigners; hence they seemed to foreigners more extensive than they were.  None of the arrests was as wanton as the foreign press portrayed them; evidence of some sort was indicated.  The common sentence was not execution, but swift removal to another job in another part of the country.  Fairly large numbers of such transfers seemed to have occurred merely on suspicion, on the theory that if suspects were guilty, or had guilty connections, the transfer would break these up; if they were innocent they would not suffer much from a job transfer and would come back to Moscow eventually if they chose.  Naturally such people did not hasten to communicate with their foreign acquaintances during their absence, and this often led the latter to assume that the Russians had been "liquidated."  A year or two later, large numbers of such people returned, none the worst for their temporary job in the "sticks."
Strong, Anna L. The Soviets Expected It. New York, New York: The Dial press, 1941, p. 137
 
WILSON BORROWED FROM BOLSHEVIKS
 
Such a peace they described as a "peace without annexations and without indemnities," a phrase later made famous by President Woodrow Wilson, who borrowed it from the Bolsheviks.
Strong, Anna L. The Soviets Expected It. New York, New York: The Dial press, 1941, p. 142
 
LENIN WANTED PEACE AT ALL COSTS
 
Lenin agreed to this incredible holdup because the Russian people were dying by millions of starvation, pestilence, and war.  "We will retreat to the Urals if need be," was Lenin's decision.  Even on these terms the powers at Versailles refused to grant peace to the Bolsheviks, choosing rather to destroy them utterly.
Strong, Anna L. The Soviets Expected It. New York, New York: The Dial press, 1941, p. 144
 
SU AND GERMANY TREATED AS OUTLAWS
 
The first admission of the young state to any international conference was at the Genoa Conference of 1922, called by the victorious allies in the hope of dumping the burden of a bankrupt, postwar Europe on the backs of Soviet Russia and vanquished Germany.  The prospective victims had to be present in order to accept the burden.
Strong, Anna L. The Soviets Expected It. New York, New York: The Dial press, 1941, p. 144
 
SU WANTS TO SIGN PEACE PACTS
 
The Soviets were the first to sign the Kellogg Pact, proposed by United States; they were the first to sign any international peace pact or proposal, sometimes before they were invited.
Strong, Anna L. The Soviets Expected It. New York, New York: The Dial press, 1941, p. 146
 
            In an August 22, 1939, letter to Sumner Wells, Acting American Secretary of State, Ambassador Davies said in reference to the Soviet-German Nonaggression Pact, "During the Litvinov tenure in the Foreign Office, there was to be sure a very strong moral impulse of hostility toward Germany and the aggressor powers beginning with the accession of Hitler to power.  During that period the Soviet regime, in my opinion, diligently and vigorously tried to maintain a vigorous common front against the aggressors and were sincere advocates of the "indivisibility of peace."
            Litvinov's able battle for peace and democratic ideas at the League of Nations and the vigorous attitude of the Soviet government in being prepared to fight for Czechoslovakia were indications of real sincerity of purpose and a marked degree of high-mindedness.
            Beginning with Munich, and even before, however, there has been an accumulation of events which gradually broke down this attitude on the part of the Soviet government.
            During my tenure in Moscow I was much impressed with the fact that the Russians were undoubtedly severely irked by what appeared to be a policy of "pinpricking" and an attitude of superiority and "talking down" which diplomatic missions of the Western powers assumed toward the Soviet government.  The Soviets are proud and resented this deeply.
Davies, Joseph E. Mission to Moscow. New York, N. Y.: Simon and Schuster, c1941, p. 454
 
            In his conduct of foreign policy, Stalin showed great caution, restraint, and realism.  He needed time to build up Russia's industries and military strength.  He was constantly provoked in the east and west, and in ways that must have infuriated him, but he never lost sight of the overriding need to delay the outbreak of war as long as possible.  It was for this reason that he placed the greatest emphasis on peace and disarmament in world affairs.
Grey, Ian. Stalin, Man of History. London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1979, p. 296
 
            Each of the future allies sold space for time and let down allies and friends, until no space was left to be sold and no time to be bought.
            In the course of 1934 Stalin set out on his search for protective alliances.  Gradually, but not imperceptibly, he switched over from opposition to the system of Versailles to its defense.  In September Russia joined the League of Nations.  Hitherto the Kremlin and the League had boycotted each other.  To Lenin the League had been the 'robbers' den', the organization designed to enforce the peace of Versailles, to perpetuate colonial domination and to suppress movements of emancipation all over the world.
Deutscher, Isaac. Stalin; A Political Biography. New York: Oxford Univ. Press, 1967, p. 417
 
            Yet, in spite of all this, one feels justified in asserting that in those years, 1935-37 and even later, Stalin was genuinely striving for an anti-Hitler coalition.  This course of action was dictated to him by circumstances....  At the Nuremberg rally of September 1936 Hitler spoke about the Ukraine and Siberia as belonging to the German Lebensraum in terms so emphatic and fiery that they seemed to exclude even a transient understanding between himself and Stalin.  Later in the year the leaders of the Axis came together to announce the conclusion of the anti-Comintern pact.  Throughout all that period clashes, some of them serious, were occurring between Russian and Japanese frontier troops.  The storm seemed to be gathering over Russia in Asia and Russia in Europe.  If not anti-fascist virtue, then the demands of self-preservation drove Stalin to seek security in a solid system of alliances.
Deutscher, Isaac. Stalin; A Political Biography. New York: Oxford Univ. Press, 1967, p. 420
 
(Sinclair’s comments only)
            Again and again Russia came into the conferences of Europe and proposed complete disarmament.  Our reactionary newspaper columnists are quite sure that this was a bluff; but what a simple matter it is to call a bluff if you have the cards!  Why didn't the warlords of the militarist nations accept Litvinov's propositions?  Why didn't they pretend to accept them?
            The answer is because every one of them understood clearly that a collectivist economy can get along without colonies and foreign trade, whereas a profit economy must have these things and must increase them, and therefore is driven continually to fresh aggressions under penalty of revolution at home.
            It is my belief that the disarmament proposals repeatedly made by the Soviet Union enable that country to stand before the world with clean hands, and place the blame for the wars which are coming upon the nations which refused the proposals and have gone on ever since to prepare for worse aggressions against the Soviet Union.
Sinclair and Lyons.  Terror in Russia?: Two Views. New York: Rand School Press, 1938, p. 23
 
 
SU AND MEXICO ONLY ONES TO AID SPAIN
 
The Soviet Union shared with Mexico the honor of being the only governments that aided the Democratic government of Spain.
Strong, Anna L. The Soviets Expected It. New York, New York: The Dial press, 1941, p. 147
 
            As week succeeded week, it became obvious that the governments of Britain and France were prepared to give nothing to the Spanish people except advice.  Once Stalin was convinced of this, he declared the intention of the Soviet state to give all the help it could to the Spanish loyalists.
Cole, David M.  Josef Stalin; Man of Steel.  London, New York: Rich & Cowan, 1942, p. 96
 
            Three countries participated directly in the Spanish Civil War: Germany, Italy, and the Soviet Union.
Krivitsky, Walter.  I was Stalin's Agent, London: H. Hamilton, 1939, p. 88
 
            It was late in August 1936 and the Franco forces were firmly organized and marching successfully on Madrid, when three high officials of the Spanish Republic were finally received in Russia.  They came to buy war supplies, and they offered in exchange huge sums of Spanish gold.  Even now, however, they were not conveyed to Moscow but kept incognito in a hotel in Odessa.  And to conceal the operation, Stalin issued, on Friday, Aug. 28, 1936, through the Commissar of Foreign Trade, a decree forbidding "the export, re-export, or transit to Spain of all kinds of arms, munitions, war materials, airplanes, and warships.  The decree was published and broadcast to the world on the following Monday.  The fellow travelers of the Comintern, and the public, roused by them, already privately dismayed at Stalin's failure to rush to the support of the Spanish Republic, now thought that he was joining Leon Blum's policy of non-intervention.  Stalin was in reality sneaking to the support of the Spanish Republic.  While its high officials waited in Odessa, Stalin called an extraordinary session of the Politburo, and presented his plan for cautious intervention in the Spanish Civil War - all this under cover of his proclamation of neutrality.
Krivitsky, Walter G. I was Stalin's Agent, London: H. Hamilton, 1939, p. 91
 
            Two days later a special courier, who came by plane to Holland, brought me instructions from Moscow: Extend your operations immediately to cover Spanish Civil War.  Mobilize all available agents and facilities for prompt creation of a system to purchase and transport arms to Spain.  A special agent is being dispatched to Paris to aid you in this work.  He will report to you there and work under your supervision.
Krivitsky, Walter G. I was Stalin's Agent, London: H. Hamilton, 1939, p. 93
 
            In plain terms, it was Captain Oulansky's job to organize and operate a ring of arms smugglers, and to do this so cleverly that no trace could be discovered by the spies of foreign governments.
            "If you succeed," Yagoda told him, "come back with a hole in your lapel for the Order of the Red Banner."
Krivitsky, Walter G. I was Stalin's Agent, London: H. Hamilton, 1939, p. 96
 
            We all met in Paris in perfect secrecy on September 21.  Zimin brought explicit and emphatic instructions that we must not permit the slightest possibility of the Soviet government's becoming in any way associated with our traffic in arms.  All cargos were to be handled "privately" through business firms created for the purpose.
Krivitsky, Walter G. I was Stalin's Agent, London: H. Hamilton, 1939, p. 97
 
 
            We made large purchases from the Skoda works in Czechoslovakia, from several firms in France, from others in Poland and Holland.  Such is the nature of the munitions trade that we even bought arms in Nazi Germany.
Krivitsky, Walter G. I was Stalin's Agent, London: H. Hamilton, 1939, p. 98
 
 
            By the middle of October, shiploads of arms began to reach republican Spain.  The Soviet aid came in two streams.  My organization used foreign vessels.  Captain Oulansky's "private syndicate" in Odessa began by using Spanish boats but found their number limited.  Moscow, held by Stalin's insistence on absolute secrecy lest he become involved in a war, would not permit the use of ships sailing under Soviet papers.
            With these false papers, Soviet boats loaded with munitions would sail from Odessa under new names, flying foreign colors, and they would clear the Bosphorus, where German and Italian counter-espionage agents were keeping a sharp look-out.  When they had entered loyalist ports and delivered their cargo, their names would be changed back to Russian ones and they would return to Odessa under their own colors.
Krivitsky, Walter G. I was Stalin's Agent, London: H. Hamilton, 1939, p. 99
 
 
            My agent had bought the 50 government planes for 4,000 pounds each, subject to inspection.  When the question of the consignee came up, he offered a choice of a Latin-American country or China.  The dealer preferred China.
Krivitsky, Walter G. I was Stalin's Agent, London: H. Hamilton, 1939, p. 102
 
 
            I was ordered to send the planes to Alicante.  But that port was blockaded by Franco's vessels.  The master of the ship made for Alicante, but had to turn back to save the ship and cargo.  He attempted to head for Barcelona, but was prevented by my agent on board.  My shipload of aircraft plied back and forth in the Mediterranean.  Franco kept it from Alicante.  Stalin kept it from Barcelona.
            ...The Norwegian ship finally slipped through Franco's blockade and discharged its planes at Alicante.  At the same time, other war supplies, including tanks and artillery, arrived from the Soviet Union.  All loyalist Spain saw that tangible aid was actually coming from Russia.  The Republicans, Socialists, anarchists, [and Trotskyists], and syndicalists had only theories and ideals to offer.  The Communists were producing guns and planes to use against Franco.  Soviet prestige soared.
Krivitsky, Walter G. I was Stalin's Agent, London: H. Hamilton, 1939, p. 103
 
 
            While this International Brigade - the army of the Comintern - was taking shape in the foreground, purely Russian units of the Red Army were quietly arriving and taking up their posts behind the Spanish front.  This Soviet military personnel in Spain never reached more than 2,000 men, and only pilots and tank officers saw active duty.  Most of the Russians were technicians--general staff men, military instructors, engineers, specialists in setting up war industries, experts in chemical warfare, aviation mechanics, radio operators, and gunnery experts.  These Red Army men were segregated from the Spanish civilians as much as possible, housed apart, and never permitted to associate in any way with Spanish political groups or figures.  They were ceaselessly watched by the 0GPU, both to keep their presence in Spain a secret and to prevent any political heresy from corrupting the Red Army.
            This special expeditionary force was under the direct control of General Berzin, one of the two leading Soviet figures assigned by Stalin to captain his intervention in Spain.  The other was Arthur Stashevsky, officially the Soviet trade envoy stationed in Barcelona.
Krivitsky, Walter G. I was Stalin's Agent, London: H. Hamilton, 1939, p. 107
 
 
            Berzin was selected by Stalin to organize and direct the Loyalist Army.
            Stalin's chief political commissar in Spain was Arthur Stashevsky.
Krivitsky, Walter G. I was Stalin's Agent, London: H. Hamilton, 1939, p. 108
 
 
            Dr. Negrin, of course, saw the only salvation of his country in close co-operation with the Soviet Union.  It had become obvious that active support could come only from that source.
Krivitsky, Walter G. I was Stalin's Agent, London: H. Hamilton, 1939, p. 112
 
 
            The splendid feats of the International Brigade, and the material help received from the Soviet Union, so prompted the growth of the Communist Party of Spain that by January 1937 its membership was more than 200,000.  The saving of Madrid enormously enhanced Soviet prestige.
Krivitsky, Walter G. I was Stalin's Agent, London: H. Hamilton, 1939, p. 114
 
 
            The successful defense of Madrid with Soviet arms gave the 0GPU new opportunities to extend its powers.
Krivitsky, Walter G. I was Stalin's Agent, London: H. Hamilton, 1939, p. 115
 
            By February 15th, however, they [the Fascists] were forced to retreat by the newly-reorganized republican army... and the support of 40 Soviet warplanes--moscas and chatos--that had just arrived in Spain: not as many in number as the German warplanes, but technically superior.
Brar, Harpal.  Trotskyism or Leninism. 1993, p. 327
 
            Airplanes provided by the Soviet government, 500 pieces of artillery, and 10,000 machine guns were held up in France.
Brar, Harpal. Trotskyism or Leninism. 1993, p. 336
 
            The people of Spain had a loyal friend in the Soviet Union, which could be relied upon to do everything in its power to promote their cause and to frustrate the designs of every imperialist power.
Brar, Harpal. Trotskyism or Leninism. 1993, p. 338
 
 
            And henceforth the Soviet government did all it could to supply the Republicans with everything they needed, from men (through the international brigades who sent some 35,000 men to Spain), to military advisers from its own army, to armaments and food.
Brar, Harpal.  Trotskyism or Leninism. 1993, p. 440
 
            It is common knowledge that soon after the fascist rebellion and the beginning of the civil war in Spain the Soviet Union began to aid and support the Spanish Republic....
            By the end of 1936 the Soviet Union had supplied Spain with 106 tanks, 60 armored cars, 136 airplanes, more than 60,000 rifles, 174 field guns, 3,727 machine guns, and an unspecified amount of ammunition.
Medvedev, Roy. Let History Judge. New York: Columbia University Press, 1989, p. 724
 
VYSHINSKY:  In his message to the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Spain addressed to Comrade Jose Diaz, Comrade Stalin said: "The toilers of the Soviet Union are merely fulfilling their duty in giving all the assistance they can to the revolutionary masses of Spain.  They fully realize that the liberation of Spain from the yoke of the fascist reactionaries is not the private affair of the Spaniards, but the common cause of the whole of advanced and progressive humanity."
Report of Court Proceedings: The case of the Anti-Soviet Trotskyite Centre--1937, Moscow: Military Collegium of the Supreme Court of the U.S.S.R, p. 506
 
            The experience of the Civil War in Spain--where no country except the Soviet Union provided assistance to the legal government of the Republic,...
Berezhkov, Valentin.  At Stalin's Side. Secaucus, New Jersey: Carol Pub. Group, c1994, p. 10
 
            In the summer [of 1936] the Spanish Civil War started.  Stalin became involved to the extent of sending supplies including 648 aircraft and 407 tanks.  Three thousand Soviet military 'volunteers' served in Spain, and the Comintern organized the 42,000 volunteers of the International Brigade commanded by the supposed Canadian 'Kleber ', in fact Red Army Corps Commander, Shtern.
Conquest, Robert. Stalin: Breaker of Nations. New York, New York: Viking, 1991, p. 219
 
            ...Stalin, while professing Soviet adherence to non-intervention [in the Spanish Civil War], secretly approved the immediate dispatch of trained Soviet pilots to fly fighter aircraft supplied by the French.
Costello, John and Oleg Tsarev.  Deadly illusions. New York: Crown, c1993, p. 254
 
            Sixteen Soviet freighters put to see from the Black Sea port of Odessa, heading for the Mediterranean.  By early November they had safely reached the Republican-held port of Cartagena, where they unloaded more than 800 tanks and aircraft along with thousands of gallons of badly needed fuel.  Although military aid on a far more massive scale was needed to defeat Franco, Stalin's first grudging commitment of Soviet support proved an important morale booster for the Spanish Republicans.  Soviet supplies meant that the Loyalists were no longer battling alone against a Nationalist army being supplied with an increasing flood of arms from Germany and Italy.
            "Madrid will not now fall," declared Prime Minister Caballero, "now the war will begin, because we now have the necessary materials."  His defiant words were reinforced later that month with the arrival of hundreds of Soviet military personnel and more arms.  Orlov and his comrades in the Red Air Force and Army units in Spain resented Stalin's order that military personnel were to "keep out of range of artillery fire".  Their T-10 tanks and Mosca and Chato fighter aircraft proved more than a match for the German and Italian opposition.  Even in the hands of hastily trained Republican pilots and crews the firepower and maneuverability of the Soviet weapons proved superior to Nationalist tanks and aircraft during the December battles for Madrid.
Costello, John and Oleg Tsarev.  Deadly illusions. New York: Crown, c1993, p. 256
 
            Stalin was as good as his word.  Twenty years later, when Orlov testified in 1957 before the Senate Internal Security Sub-Committee and recounted how he had organized the looting of the Spanish treasury, Radio Moscow announced that the $420 million worth of Spanish gold smuggled to Russia in 1937 had been sent legitimately to "finance the Republican cause".  Franco's government was pressing the Soviets to send back the bullion after Negrin's heirs had returned to Madrid the official receipt for "510 million grams of gold" which the bank of Moscow had given to the cashiers of the Bank of Spain in 1938.
            Khrushchev, the Soviet president in 1957 certainly was not going to return a single peseta of Republican money to the Fascist regime of Franco.  This was made clear in a broadcast by Radio Moscow in which the USSR reminded the world that the value of Soviet aid delivered to the Spanish Government during the Civil War amounted to much more than the value of 510 metric tons of gold.  According to the statement the Spanish account with the USSR was still overdrawn because of the Republicans' failure to repay $50 million of an additional $85 million in supplies which they had allegedly been loaned officially.
Costello, John and Oleg Tsarev.  Deadly illusions. New York: Crown, c1993, p. 263
 
            After all, we had to intervene in Spain because of the fear of agitation on the part of Trotskyites.  The Instantsia [Politburo] fears accusations of liquidation--accusations that we have let down the Spanish Left.  This is absurd; questions of policy must be decided according to the demands of the State, and not from the point of view of [dissidents, critics, and traitors]....
Litvinov, Maksim Maksimovich.  Notes for a Journal. New York: Morrow, 1955, p. 268
 
            Stalin's role in the Spanish Civil War likewise comes under fire from the "left."  Again taking their cue from Trotsky and such professional anti-Communist ideologues as George Orwell, many "Socialists" claim that Stalin sold out the Loyalists.  A similar criticism is made about Stalin's policies in relation to the Greek partisans in the late 1940s, which we will discuss later.  According to these "left" criticisms, Stalin didn't "care" about either of the struggles, because of his preoccupation with internal development and "Great Russian power."  The simple fact of the matter is that in both cases Stalin was the only national leader any place in the world to support the popular forces, and he did this in the face of stubborn opposition within his own camp and the dangers of military attack from the leading aggressive powers in the world (Germany and Italy in the late 1930s, the U.S. 10 years later).
            Because the USSR, following Stalin's policies, had become a modern industrial nation by the mid 1930s, it was able to ship to the Spanish Loyalists Soviet tanks and planes that were every bit as advanced as the Nazi models.  Because the USSR was the leader of the world revolutionary forces, Communists from many nations were able to organize the International Brigades, which went to resist Mussolini's fascist divisions and the crack Nazi forces, such as the Condor Legion, that were invading the Spanish Republic.  The capitalist powers, alarmed by this international support for the Loyalists, planned joint action to stop it.  In March 1937, warships of Germany, Italy, France, and Great Britain began jointly policing the Spanish coast.  Acting on a British initiative, these same countries formed a bloc in late 1937 to isolate the Soviet Union by implementing a policy they called "non-intervention," which Lloyd George, as leader of the British Opposition, labeled a clear policy of support for the fascists.  Mussolini supported the British plan and called for a campaign "to drive Bolshevism from Europe."  Stalin's own foreign ministry, which was still dominated by aristocrats masquerading as proletarian revolutionaries, sided with the capitalist powers.  The New York Times of October 29, 1937, describes how the "unyielding" Stalin, representing "Russians stubbornness," refused to go along: "A struggle has been going on all this week between Josef Stalin and Foreign Commissar Litvinov," who wished to accept the British plan.  Stalin stuck to his guns, in the Soviet Union refused to grant Franco international status as a combatant, insisting that it had every right in the world to continue aiding the duly elected government of Spain, which it did until the bitter end.
Franklin, Bruce, Ed.  The Essential Stalin; Major Theoretical Writings. Garden City, New York: Anchor Books, 1972, p. 22
 
(Sinclair’s comments)
            Whenever you may think about them you can hardly dispute the fact that Russia is for all practical purposes at war today.  Russian technicians are helping the democratic people of Spain to defend their existence.  Russian technicians are helping the people China to the same end.  Russia is fighting not merely Franco, but Hitler and Mussolini in Spain.
Sinclair and Lyons.  Terror in Russia?: Two Views. New York: Rand School Press, 1938, p. 22
 
            Those of us who are over 50 today remember well that the Soviet Union, fulfilling its internationalist duty, helped the legitimate Government and the people of Spain with everything it could--arms, provisions, and medicines.  Imbued with revolutionary enthusiasm and the spirit of romanticism Soviet tankmen, pilots, artillerymen, rank-and-file soldiers and prominent military leaders volunteered to fight in Spain.
Zhukov, Georgi.  Memoirs of Marshal Zhukov. London: Cape, 1971, p. 141
 
            In the winter of 1936-37 most Russian planes in Spain were flown by Russian pilots, and the attack to drive the Nationalists back from Madrid was opened on Oct. 29 by Russian tanks, driven by Russians, led by the tank specialist General Pavlov and supported by Russian planes.
            ...Nonetheless, Soviet support was decisive in the autumn of 1936, preventing the Nationalists from winning the war in a few months.  Russian advisers and the International Brigades brought order and discipline into the Republican army,...
Bullock, Alan.  Hitler and Stalin: Parallel Lives. New York: Knopf, 1992, p. 540
 
            [In December 1936] Stalin had sent a letter to the Spanish Prime Minister, Caballero, signed by Molotov & Voroshilov as well as himself, in which he urged the Republican government to avoid social radicalism, enlist the support of the middle class, and broaden the basis of his government "in order to prevent the enemies of Spain from presenting it as a communist republic."
            The fact that the Soviet Union through the Comintern was the only reliable source of arms and supplies gave Stalin the power to intervene in Spanish politics as well as in the war.
Bullock, Alan. Hitler and Stalin: Parallel Lives. New York: Knopf, 1992, p. 541
 
 
"... the Soviet Union sent to the Spanish Government 806 military aircraft, mainly fighters, 362 tanks, 120 armored cars, 1,555 artillery pieces, about 500,000 rifles, 340 grenade launchers, 15,113 machine-guns, more than 110,000 aerial bombs, about 3.4 million rounds of ammunition, 500,000 grenades, 862 million cartridges, 1,500 tons of gunpowder, torpedo boats, air defense searchlight installations, motor vehicles, radio stations, torpedoes and fuel".
('International Solidarity'; op. cit; p.329-30).
 
and under the new Soviet policy,
"... a little more than 2,000 Soviet volunteers fought and worked in Spain on the side of the Republic throughout the whole war, including 772 airmen, 351 tank men, 222 army advisers and instructors, 77 naval specialists, 100 artillery specialists, 52 other specialists, 130 aircraft factory workers and engineers, 156 radio operators and other signals men, and 204 interpreters".
('International Solidarity': op. cit. p.328).
 
            In Berlin on 30 may 1937 Hitler stated: After Red airplanes bombed British, German, and Italian ships lying in the harbor of Majorca a few days ago and killed six officers on an Italian ship, German ships were forbidden to remain in the harbor any longer.  On Saturday, May 29, 1937, the pocket battleship Deutschland was lying in the roadstead of Ibiza.  The ship belongs to the forces assigned to the international sea patrol.  In spite of this, the pocket battleship was suddenly bombed between 6 and 7 p.m. by two planes of the Red Valencia Government in a gliding attack....  The result of this criminal attack is that 20 were killed and 73 wounded.
Domarus, Max , Ed.  Hitler’s Speeches and Proclamations, 1932-1945.  Vol. 2.  Wauconda, Illinois:  Bolchazy-Carducci,  c1990, p. 899
 
            As it became clear that Italy, Germany, and Portugal would not abide by the nonintervention formula and that the insurgent forces were winning, Stalin decided to intervene.
Tucker, Robert. Stalin in Power: 1929-1941. New York: Norton, 1990, p. 351
 
            [In a letter to Kaganovich and Chubar on 18 August 1936 Stalin stated] I consider it necessary to sell oil to the Spaniards immediately on the most favorable terms for them, at a discounted price, if need be.  If the Spaniards need grain and foodstuffs in general, we should sell all that to them on favorable terms.  Let me know how much oil we have already delivered to the Spaniards.  Make it incumbent on the People's Commissariat of Foreign Trade to act quickly and decisively.
Shabad, Steven, trans.  The Stalin-Kaganovich Correspondence, 1931-1936. New Haven: Yale University Press, c2003, p. 327
 
            [in a letter to Stalin on 18 August 1936 Kaganovich, Ordzhonikidze, and Chubar stated] We heard Comrade Sudin's progress report on the sale of oil to the Spaniards.  It was determined that 6000 tons of fuel oil have been sold as of 18 August, and another tanker has been ordered to fill up with oil.
            In accordance with your [Stalin] telegram, the People's Commissariat of Foreign Trade has been instructed to sell oil to the Spaniards immediately at a reduced price in the necessary amount on the most favorable terms.
Shabad, Steven, trans. The Stalin-Kaganovich Correspondence, 1931-1936. New Haven: Yale University Press, c2003, p. 327
 
            [In a letter to Kaganovich on 6 September 1936 Stalin stated] It would be good to sell Mexico 50 high-speed bombers, so that Mexico can immediately resell them to Spain.  We could also pick about 20 of our good pilots to perform combat functions in Spain and at the same time give flight training on the high-speed bombers to Spanish pilots.  Think this matter over as quickly as possible.  It would be good to sell by the same means 20,000 rifles, 1000 machine guns, and about 20 million rounds of ammunition.  We just need to know the calibers.
Shabad, Steven, trans. The Stalin-Kaganovich Correspondence, 1931-1936. New Haven: Yale University Press, c2003, p. 351
 
            [Footnote to a letter by Kaganovich on 11 October 1936 to Stalin].  On 29 September the Politburo had decided to begin arms deliveries.  By 22 October 5 ships had been dispatched to Spain containing 50 tanks, plus fuel and ammunition, 30 hi-speed bombers, and artillery.  Further Soviet arms shipments to Spain were made in larger quantities.
Shabad, Steven, trans. The Stalin-Kaganovich Correspondence, 1931-1936. New Haven: Yale University Press, c2003, p. 368
 
            In the cruel Spanish Civil War which followed, anti-fascists all over the world helped the Republican army.  Stalin's reaction was instantaneous and, once again, enlightened: Soviet advisers, tanks, and planes were rushed to the aid of democracy in Spain--together with a large number of NKVD agents.
Radzinsky, Edvard.  Stalin. New York: Doubleday, c1996, p. 337
 
            ... Stalin's Russia was the only country to provide real help to Republican Spain.
Ulam, Adam.  Stalin; The Man and his Era. New York: Viking Press, 1973, p. 426
 
            The fact remained that Russia was doing something to try to stop the march of fascism, that communism appeared to extend a helping hand to an embattled democracy, while the French and British statesmen prattled on about nonintervention in Spain, where German planes and pilots and fascism legions were openly assisting Franco.
Ulam, Adam.  Stalin; The Man and his Era. New York: Viking Press, 1973, p. 427
 
            While Russian military, air, and naval personnel helped the Republican side and the USSR furnished it with supplies, Soviet participation in the Spanish Civil War was veiled in much more mystification than that of the fascist powers.
Ulam, Adam.  Stalin; The Man and his Era. New York: Viking Press, 1973, p. 468
 
            My father also wondered why the British had not supported the Spanish Republicans, since they had every interest in preventing the expansion of Italy and Germany into Spain.   Germany and Italy had sent many troops.   France and Britain acted as though neutral and blocked the approaches, and the Soviet Union alone sent arms via the Black Sea.   I know this from Admiral Kuznetsov, whom my father met at this time.   He commanded a cruiser which escorted the convoys.
Beria, Sergo. Beria, My Father: Inside Stalin's Kremlin. London: Duckworth, 2001, p. 31
 
            On 15 Oct 1936 Soviet tanks, planes and "advisors" started arriving in Spain to support the Republican government against General Francisco Franco, backed by Hitler and Mussolini.
Montefiore, Sebag.  Stalin: The Court of the Red Tsar. New York: Knopf, 2004, p. 200
 
            ...more than 2000 Soviet volunteers fought and worked in Spain on the side of the Republic throughout the whole war, including 772 airmen, 351 tank men, 222 army advisors and instructors, 77 naval specialists, 100 artillery specialists, 52 other specialists, 130 aircraft factory workers and engineers, 156 radio operators and other signals men, and 204 interpreters....
            The total extent of Soviet military supplies may be seen from the following figures: the Soviet Union sent to the Spanish Government 806 military aircraft, mainly fighters, 363 tanks, 120 armored cars, 1,555 artillery pieces, about 500,000 rifles, 340 grenade launchers, 15,113 machine guns, more than 110,000 aerial bombs, about 3.4 million rounds of ammunition, 500,000 grenades, 862 million cartridges, 1500 tons of gunpowder, torpedo boats, air defense searchlight installations, motor vehicles, radio stations, torpedoes and fuel".
International Solidarity With the Spanish Republic, 1936-39. Moscow: Progress Publishers, c1974, p. 328-330
 
            Among the more salient denunciations [of the Soviet Union's assistance to Spain during the Spanish Civil War] are the following: That military aid to Spain came too late and too little; that a large part of the arms were obsolete; that they were given only to communist-led units; that the arms were fed, piece-meal, as it were, to the Governments of Caballero and Negrin in direct proportion to reciprocal controls and influence purportedly granted the Soviets; that the Soviets limited their aid to appease Britain and France; that Russian officers controlled and directed the Madrid armies; that as early as autumn, 1937, the Soviet Union "gave up" on the Spanish revolution and ceased all arms shipments....
            And so on, and so on.
            The tragedy of the above is that a great part of this quite malicious and self-serving, right-wing propaganda was put forth by both capitulationists and ultras alike....  The word "malicious" is apropos in this case, since each and every point can be easily proven a skillfully perpetrated lie.
Landis, Arthur H. Spain, The Unfinished Revolution, Baldwin Park, California: Camelot Pub. Co. [1972], p. 231
 
            To all those who fault the USSR for not having sent sufficient arms to the Republic the following data should be interesting.  The Franco Admiral, Bastarreche, at a conference in Zaragoza in 1960 stated that, "The Nationalist Navy sunk during the period of our war 53 merchant ships with a total of 129,000 tons; captured on the high seas were another 324 ships of some 484,000 tons.  Twenty-four foreign ships were also seized, and as many as 1000 detained on the high seas for examination and later released....
            Interesting, isn't it?  Among the known Russian ships sunk were the Komsomol, Timiriazev and the Blagoev, all in the Autumn of 1936.  A number of others were torpedoed in 1937, as were many Spanish ships of the Republican fleet.
            ...The evidence then is more than sufficient to conclude that despite the tremendous losses of men, ships, and material along the thousand-mile, submarine-infested run from the Black Sea to Spain, the Soviets had never faltered in their aid to Spain....
            Indeed, with 53 merchant ships loaded with Russian arms for Spain torpedoed and sent to the bottom of the Mediterranean, the Soviets have a right to suggest to their unconscionable attackers of the ultra-left, and others, that they not be so hasty with their quite self-serving accusations.
Landis, Arthur H. Spain, The Unfinished Revolution, Baldwin Park, California: Camelot Pub. Co. [1972] page 242-244
 
            The Spanish government rallied all the forces it could on the political left.  Spain’s communists in particular stood by it.
                The revolutionary tradition impelled Stalin to look favorably on the request from Madrid for help.  So too did the awareness that if no resistance to German assertiveness were shown, Europe as a whole would be exposed to the expansionist aims of the Third Reich.  Failure to act would be taken as a sign that the policy of the popular front had no substance.  Finance and munitions were dispatched by boat to Spain from Leningrad.  Simultaneously the Communist International sent the Italian Communist Party leader Togliatti under the alias Ercoli to direct the activities of the Spanish communists.
Service, Robert. Stalin. Cambridge, Mass.: Belknap Press of Harvard Univ. Press, 2005, p. 387
 
            But he [Stalin] and the Comintern at least did something, and it is hardly likely that the Republicans would have held out so long if he had not sanctioned the Spanish Communist Party’s participation.  His Trotskyist critics accused him of excessive pragmatism in his management of the Soviet foreign policy.  They ignored the limited resources available to the USSR.  Economically, militarily, and ‘above all’ geographically there was no serious chance for him to do more than he achieved at the time.
Service, Robert. Stalin. Cambridge, Mass.: Belknap Press of Harvard Univ. Press, 2005, p. 389
 
BRITISH AIDED HITLER
 
British diplomacy granted to Hitler Germany everything that it had refused for more than a decade to the German republic: the remilitarization of the Rhineland, the Nazi -- terrorized plebiscite in the Saar, German rearmament and naval expansion....  British finance, which had strangled the struggling German democracy with demands for impossible war reparations, supported Hitler's regime with heavy investments and loans.  It was no secret to any intelligent world citizen that the British Tories made these concessions to Hitler because they saw in him their "strong--arm gangster" who would eventually fight the Soviets, which important sections of British finance capital have always seen as their greatest foe.
Strong, Anna L. The Soviets Expected It. New York, New York: The Dial press, 1941, p. 147
 
 
If any doubt remained as to the motives of the British and French foreign offices, it was removed at the Munich conference.  Munich -- with its cynical sell out of Czechoslovakia -- was the trump card of the Tory ruling cllass in its game of driving Germany toward the east.  The British Prime Minister chamberlain posed as "appeasing" Hitler, while actually egging him on.  Chamberlain suggested that the Sudetenland might be given to Hitler before anyone in Germany had dared to express such a desire.
Strong, Anna L. The Soviets Expected It. New York, New York: The Dial press, 1941, p. 148
 
 
Almost as soon as the Nazi troops marched into the Czech territory, it was discovered that representatives of London finance had agreed with German industrialists some weeks earlier about the financing of the great Enterprises thus seized.
Strong, Anna L. The Soviets Expected It. New York, New York: The Dial press, 1941, p. 149
 
CHURCHILL SUPPORTS SU MOVING INTO POLAND
 
Americans still talk as if Stalin and Hitler jointly and cynically divided the unfortunate Poles.  But Winston Churchill, then First Lord of the Admiralty, said in a broadcast on October 1, 1939: "The Soviets have stopped the Nazis in eastern Poland; I only regret that they are not doing it as our allies."  A few weeks later, on October 26, Prime Minister Chamberlain himself rather sourly admitted in the House of Commons that "It had been necessary for the Red Army to occupy part of Poland as protection against Germany."
Strong, Anna L. The Soviets Expected It. New York, New York: The Dial press, 1941, p. 164
 
There can be little doubt but that Moscow would've fallen had the blitz been launched from the old Polish-Soviet and Baltic-Soviet frontiers, rather than from the line which Berlin had been obliged to accept in 1939.
Schuman, Frederick L. Soviet Politics. New York: A.A. Knopf, 1946, p. 429
 
In December 1944 Churchill said, “I cannot feel that Russian demands for reassurance about her western frontiers go beyond limits of what is reasonable or just.”
Schuman, Frederick L. Soviet Politics. New York: A.A. Knopf, 1946, p. 509
 
 
SU DESERVED PART OF POLAND AND TAKING IT WAS JUSTIFIED
 
The chaos that reigned throughout Poland was rapidly becoming civil war in the eastern part of the country.  This territory, which Molotov called "Western Ukraine and Byelo--Russia" was inhabited by Ukrainian and Byelo--Russian peasants under Polish landlords.  It was not given to Poland by the Versailles Treaty; both Woodrow Wilson and the British Lord Curzon left it outside their "ethnic Poland."  The Polish landlords thrust the new Polish State into a war of aggression in 1920 and took the lands.  Through the Warsaw government, which they dominated, the landlords treated their peasants more brutally than had the Russian tsar....  In an effort to Polonize the territory by force they settled demobilized Polish soldiers along the frontier, often by dispossessing whole villages of natives.  For 20 years the League of Nations reports indicated that Eastern Poland had one of the most brutally handled minority problems anywhere in Europe.
Strong, Anna L. The Soviets Expected It. New York, New York: The Dial press, 1941, p. 165
 
            Special attention must be paid to the secret protocols signed at the same time as the nonaggression pact.  They provided for the division of Poland into German and Soviet spheres of influence "in the event of territorial and political changes on the territory belonging to the Polish state."  Some historians regard these agreements as totally wrong and speak of the "fourth partition of Poland."  In their view the Soviet Union could simply have liberated the Polish-occupied parts of Byelorussia and the Ukraine without any preliminary agreement with Germany.  England and France had already declared war on Germany, they argue, and Germany would have had to resign itself to the actions of the Red Army.  The fact is, however, that at the end of August 1939 no one could have said for certain how England and France would act after Germany's invasion of Poland.  They might still have refrained from declaring war.  Both the prospect of German troops emerging on the Soviet border after occupying all of Poland and that of Soviet troops entering Polish territory without prior agreement with Germany entailed great dangers.  I must agree that the secret protocols attached to the nonaggression pact were a natural extension of that pact.  The Soviet Union was unable to prevent Germany's invasion of Poland, but it could see to the strengthening of its own defensive positions in case of possible complications --especially since the territory involved was not strictly Polish but where the local Byelorussians and Ukrainian populations had long been struggling for national liberation.
Medvedev, Roy. Let History Judge. New York: Columbia University Press, 1989, p. 729
 
            The outbreak of the Polish-Russian war is commonly blamed on the Poles and it is indisputable that their troops started it by invading, at the end of April 1920, the Soviet Ukraine.
Pipes, Richard. Russia Under the Bolshevik Regime. New York: A.A. Knopf, 1993, p. 178
 
            Both [Germany and Russia] were agreed that the new Poland had no right to exist - but the Poles made quite sure of the Russians continuing hatred by invading the Ukraine on April.5, 1920, capturing Kiev, the capital, on May 6.  They were only driven out a month later and forced to retreat to Warsaw by a Red Army brilliantly commanded by Tukhachevsky, the man Stalin was to execute in 1937.
Read, Anthony and David Fisher. The Deadly Embrace. New York: Norton, 1988, p. 14
 
            Polish leaders eager to take advantage of what they perceived to be the exhaustion of the Red Army invaded the Ukraine and occupied Kiev that May [1920]....  A treaty signed at Riga in March 1921 gave Poland a slice of the western Ukraine and pushed the Soviet frontier 100 miles further to the east.
Overy, R. J. Russia's War: Blood Upon the Snow. New York: TV Books, c1997, p. 23
 
            The Katyn story must begin with the character of the Polish elitist officer corp.  Poland was created as an independent country from the ruins of the Germanic, Austrian and Russian empires.  The new Polish ruling elite was arrogant and opportunistic.  As part of the all out imperialist assault against Soviet Russia, the newly created Polish state launched an unprovoked invasion into its neighboring countries in 1920.  The new Soviet Russia was powerless against the Polish invaders, operating in conjunction with a dozen more imperialist countries.  Poland annexed a large part of Ukraine, Byelorussia and Lithuania, even taking away its present capital, Vilnius.  Some 20 million non-Poles were placed under the rule of the Polish landlords and gentry.  Assured the support of England and France, Poland become the gangster of Eastern Europe.  It took a fiercely anti-Soviet attitude, becoming an active base for all sorts of anti-Soviet political and terrorist groups that conducted raids and inserted agents into the USSR.
Mukhin, Y.I., Katyn Detective,1995
 
            The Soviet Union had genuine territorial claims on Poland since the period of the Civil War when Poland took advantage of the weakness of the Russian Federation and in 1920 attacked the newly formed Ukrainian and Byelorussian republics as well as Lithuania.  As a result of the defeat of the Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic (RSFSR.) in this war, Poland annexed the western regions of the Ukraine, Byelorussia, and Lithuania, including the cities of Lvov, Brest, Grodno, and Vilnius.
Medvedev, Roy & Zhores. The Unknown Stalin. NY, NY: Overlook Press, 2004, p. 235
 
POLAND TREATS JEWS BADLY
 
The frictions were complicated by the fact that the cities and trading towns of the region are largely Jewish....  Not even Hitler treated the Jews more brutally than did the "Poland of the Pans" as the minor nationalities called it, using the Polish term for "Lord."  "A Jew-child is a future Jew; twist its neck when it is born," read one of the Anti---Semitic posters the Red Army found when it marched into Poland.  Frictions between all the minor nationalities had been kept at boiling heat by pogroms.
Strong, Anna L. The Soviets Expected It. New York, New York: The Dial press, 1941, p. 165
 
EASTERN SUPPORT FOR SU MARCHING INTO POLAND
 
The Red Army's march was seen in Eastern Europe as a check to this plan of the Nazis, preventing the organization of the East Poland chaos into a Nazi Ukraine.
Strong, Anna L. The Soviets Expected It. New York, New York: The Dial press, 1941, p. 165
 
 
The arrival of the Red Army was not only unopposed by the population; there are evidences that it was hailed with passionate joy.  "Russian troops went into Poland without firing a shot and were seen marching side-by-side with the retiring Polish troops," said the first Associated Press dispatch.
Strong, Anna L. The Soviets Expected It. New York, New York: The Dial press, 1941, p. 165
 
 
Ukrainian girls hung flowers on the tanks of the arriving Red Army.
Strong, Anna L. The Soviets Expected It. New York, New York: The Dial press, 1941, p. 168
 
 
Few people who know the racial composition of Eastern Poland doubted that the population had resented the rule of Warsaw and felt "liberated" when the Red Army came....  Even the Polish Government--in--Exile did not venture to declare the Red Army's march an act of war.
Strong, Anna L. The Soviets Expected It. New York, New York: The Dial press, 1941, p. 169
 
 
Deputies from Grodno told how the Jewish and Byelo-Russian workers of the city had organized their own militia before the Red Army came and had rushed out and helped build a bridge for it into the city under the fire of Polish officers.
Strong, Anna L. The Soviets Expected It. New York, New York: The Dial press, 1941, p. 169
 
 
Poles in fairly large numbers were deported to various places in the Soviet Union.  Letters received by their relatives in Europe and America showed that they were scattered all over the USSR; the sending of the letters also indicated that they were not under surveillance but merely deported away from the border district.  The Soviet authorities claimed that former Polish officers and military colonists had done considerable sabotage and kept the people disturbed by rumors of imminent invasions by Romanian and British troops....  Most of them then stated that they fully understood the necessity of the Red Army's march into Poland.
Strong, Anna L. The Soviets Expected It. New York, New York: The Dial press, 1941, p. 170
 
There is no question that the peasants preferred Russians to Germans along their border.
Strong, Anna L. The Soviets Expected It. New York, New York: The Dial press, 1941, p. 175
 
The way was prepared by the Soviet refusal of the boundary line which Hitler first offered in Poland, and which would have given to the Soviets territory in "ethnic Poland" as far as Warsaw.  This refusal not only preserved Soviet neutrality in the eyes of Britain but helped convince East European powers that the Soviets were not only strong but just.
Strong, Anna L. The Soviets Expected It. New York, New York: The Dial press, 1941, p. 176
 
Next the Soviets presented Lithuania with her ancient capital Vilno, seized 20 years earlier by the Poles.  It was an important gift, being twice the size of the present capital Kaunas; its 550,000 population increased Lithuania's total population by 20 percent.  Molotov later stated that it was not given because Vilno had a Lithuanian population; after 20 years of Polish domination, most of Vilno's inhabitants were Poles and Jews.  "The Soviet government took into consideration...the historic past and...the national aspirations of the Lithuanian people."  In other words that gift was made, not for the sake of Vilno, which didn't particularly want to be transferred, but for the psychological effect on the Lithuanians.
Strong, Anna L. The Soviets Expected It. New York, New York: The Dial press, 1941, p. 176
 
They added that the Soviets could have demanded anything up to annexation and complete Sovietization of their countries and neither Germany nor the Allies could have stopped it.”  Their internal organization was no more affected by the new alliance than the governments in South America are affected by the acquisition of naval bases by the United States.  The countries were not even required to join in the defense of the USSR unless the attack upon it came directly across their territory.  Baltic diplomats and press therefore commented on the shrewdness and reasonableness of Moscow and on the expected trade advantages; they much resented the term "vassal" applied to them by the Anglo-American press.
Strong, Anna L. The Soviets Expected It. New York, New York: The Dial press, 1941, p. 177-178
 
They [the Baltic Germans--ed.] formed the upper class in the Baltic states.  For centuries they had been the outpost of German imperialism eastward; they owned the big estates and dominated the industries.  At the time of the Russian revelation, much of the native population sided with the Bolsheviks; it was the Baltic Germans who overthrew the local Red governments, calling the troops of the Kaiser to their aid.  The removal of these Baltic Germans by Soviet pressure on Hitler scattered what was, for the USSR the most dangerous Nazi fifth column anywhere in Europe.  Baltic newspapers expressed regret mingled with pleasure at their going, and remarked that it gave the natives a chance at the better -- paid jobs.
Strong, Anna L. The Soviets Expected It. New York, New York: The Dial press, 1941, p. 178
 
In a sense, the expulsion of the Baltic Germans and the Soviet penetration into the Baltic countries seem to have been direct retribution for the German assault on Poland.  A careful reading of the declarations of both Hitler and von Ribbentrop makes this evident.
Strong, Anna L. The Soviets Expected It. New York, New York: The Dial press, 1941, p. 225
 
            Americans still speak of Stalin as "Hitler's accomplice" in cynically dividing Poland.  But Winston Churchill said in a radio broadcast October 1st: "The Soviets have stopped the Nazis in Eastern Poland; I only wish they were doing it as our allies."  Bernard Shaw, in the London Times, gave "three cheers for Stalin," who had given Hitler "his first set-back."  Even Prime Minister Chamberlain sourly told the House of Commons, October 26: "It has been necessary for the Red Army to occupy part of Poland as protection against Germany."  The Polish government-in-exile, which was in flight through Romania at the time but reached London some weeks later, never ventured to declare that Soviet march an act of war.
            The population of the area did not oppose the Russian troops but welcomed them with joy.  Most were not Poles but Ukrainians and Byelorussians.  U.S. Ambassador Biddle reported that the people accepted the Russians "as doing a policing job."  Dispatches told of Russian troops marching side-by-side with retiring Polish troops, of Ukrainian girls hanging garlands on Russian tanks.  The Polish commander of the Lvov garrison, who for several days had been fighting against German attacks on three sides, quickly surrendered to the Red Army when it appeared on the fourth side, saying: "There is no Polish government left to give me orders and I have no orders to fight the Bolsheviks."
Strong, Anna Louise.  The Stalin Era.  New York: Mainstream, 1956, p. 80
 
            The American view that Stalin and Hitler had petitioned Poland in advance is not borne out by the way the partitioning occurred.  The boundary between Germans and Russians changed three times before it was fixed at a conference, September 28.  It is unlikely that German troops drove all the way to Lvov and attacked it for several days in order to give the city to the USSR.  Nor is it likely that the Russians would have incurred casualties by rushing to Vilna, if the city had been allocated to them in advance.
            "Respect for Russia has greatly increased; the peasants unquestionably prefer Russians to Germans along the border," read an AP cable from past Europe, September 27th.
            The march into eastern Poland, thus, seems not a connivance with Hitler but the first great check the Soviets gave to Hitler under the Non-Aggression Pact.
Strong, Anna Louise.  The Stalin Era. New York: Mainstream, 1956, p. 81
 
            When it became absolutely clear that the Polish state had collapsed, then the Soviet forces entered Poland (on September 17) in order to safeguard her defenses and the people of territories invaded by Soviet forces alike.  The truth is that the Soviet army was greeted by the local population as liberators and heroes.
Brar, Harpal.  Trotskyism or Leninism. 1993, p. 572
 
            And indeed, the invading Red Army units were welcomed by many Ukrainian, Belorussian, and Jewish inhabitants of this territory where the dominant Poles were an ethnic minority living mainly in the towns and the non-Polish population suffered discrimination.
Tucker, Robert. Stalin in Power: 1929-1941. New York: Norton, 1990, p. 601
 
PROTECTING JEWS
 
Tens of thousands of Jewish refugees were also shipped into the interior of the USSR in what seems to have been a rough and inefficient manner, causing many complaints to go abroad.  Theirs was a somewhat different case.  They were people without homes or jobs in the new territories.  They had fled thither to escape from Hitler and were clogging the housing facilities of cities and towns along the Soviet border.  They were given about nine months to find jobs; failing this, at a moment when the Nazi menace was growing, they were deported to other areas where jobs were available.  When Hitler's forces later marched into Lvov and all the surrounding territories, basic deportees may have been glad that they had been shipped away.
Strong, Anna L. The Soviets Expected It. New York, New York: The Dial press, 1941, p. 170
 
            ... Jews were given priority in evacuation from areas about to be overrun by the Nazi invaders.  Virtually all Polish Jews who survived the Holocaust (250,000) survived by fleeing to the Soviet Union and being evacuated East.  In the immediate post-World War II period, Yiddish culture thrived in the USSR.  The Jewish State Theatre continued to prosper in Moscow; a tri-weekly paper, Aynikayt, was published, also in Moscow; between 1946 and 1948 110 books were published in Yiddish.  The Soviet Union was the first country to accord diplomatic recognition to Israel.
Szymanski, Albert. Human Rights in the Soviet Union. London: Zed Books, 1984, p. 89
 
PRIESTS WELCOME BOLSHEVIKS
 
Dovzhenko laughed when I asked him about the attitude of the Ukrainian priests.  "It is probably the first place where priests welcomed the Bolsheviks," he said....  Under the Poles they were constantly being arrested for such crimes as "false registry of names," which meant that they registered children in the Ukrainian language instead of in Polish.
Strong, Anna L. The Soviets Expected It. New York, New York: The Dial press, 1941, p. 173
 
PEOPLE EXPERIENCE FREEDOM WITH FURY
 
There is no fury greater than that of people who, after centuries of oppression, have glimpsed freedom for a little while.
Strong, Anna L. The Soviets Expected It. New York, New York: The Dial press, 1941, p. 174
 
FINNISH INDEPENDENCE CAME FROM BOLSHEVIKS
 
Finnish independence was a gift from the Bolshevik revolution.  Any schoolteacher in present-day Finland would lose her job if she mentioned this incontrovertible historic fact.  When Kerensky came to power, Finland applied for independence.  The Kerensky government refused.  Neither Britain, France, America, nor any foreign power approved of Finland's independence in those days.  Only the Bolsheviks approved.
Strong, Anna L. The Soviets Expected It. New York, New York: The Dial press, 1941, p. 180
 
FINLAND SERVED THE NAZIS
 
This early democratically elected Finland was quickly suppressed.  Baron Mannerheim, a tsarist general, called in German troops to overthrow the government.
Strong, Anna L. The Soviets Expected It. New York, New York: The Dial press, 1941, p. 180
 
 
Finland was therefore known to the Soviet leaders as the most hostile of all the Baltic states.
Strong, Anna L. The Soviets Expected It. New York, New York: The Dial press, 1941, p. 182
 
With the aid of German officers and engineers, Finland had been converted into a powerful fortress to serve as a base for the invasion of the Soviet Union.  Twenty-three military airports had been constructed on Finnish soil, capable of accommodating 10 times as many planes as there were in the Finnish Air Force.
Sayers and Kahn.  The Great Conspiracy.  Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1946, p. 332
 
 As for the Finns, they carried out unrestrained propaganda against the Soviet Union.  There can be no doubt that Finland was eager to join in a campaign against the Soviet Union.
Schecter, Jerrold. Trans & Ed. Khrushchev Remembers: the Glasnost Tapes. Boston: Little, Brown, c1990, p. 51
 
 
BOLSHEVIKS GAVE FINNS GOOD TERMS
 
Moscow first proposed an alliance such a she had with her other Baltic states, but almost at once dropped the proposal in view of Finland's clear unwillingness....  The Soviets wanted the frontier moved back far enough to take Leningrad out of gunshot from Finland; they did not ask, as some have thought, for the Mannerheim Line.  They also wanted some small islands that covered Leningrad's sea approach.  They offered in return twice as much equally good but less strategic land; later they raised the offer.  They also asked a 30 year lease of Hangoe, or some other point at the entrance to the Gulf of Finland, as a naval base.
Strong, Anna L. The Soviets Expected It. New York, New York: The Dial press, 1941, p. 183
 
 
In the peace terms the Soviet Union exacted from Finland considerably more territory adjacent to Leningrad than had originally been asked....The naval base at Hangoe was secured.  But the Soviets returned Petsamo and the nickel mines near it, which they had captured.  They asked no indemnities but agreed on a treaty whereby they supplied Finland with food.  As terms go these were not excessive.
Strong, Anna L. The Soviets Expected It. New York, New York: The Dial press, 1941, p. 191
 
 
Sir Stafford Cripps, British ambassador to Moscow, thinks that the terms might have been stiffer.  He told me that all the Soviet annexations from Finland to Bessarabia had been necessary strategic moves against the coming attack by Hitler.  He added: "the Soviets may be sorry someday that they didn't take more of Finland when they could."
Strong, Anna L. The Soviets Expected It. New York, New York: The Dial press, 1941, p. 191
 
 
Sir Stafford was wrong.  Stalin's sense of timing is better than Sir Stafford's.
Strong, Anna L. The Soviets Expected It. New York, New York: The Dial press, 1941, p. 191
 
EASTERN EUROPE SUPPORT FOR RED ARMY MARCHING IN
 
The most applauded folk in all Lithuania during my visit were the Red Army Boys.  At concerts, dances, trade union meetings, I heard them mentioned scores of times and never without cheers.
Strong, Anna L. The Soviets Expected It. New York, New York: The Dial press, 1941, p. 200
 
 
Old-time Lithuanians said: "we have seen in our lives three armies -- the old tsarist Army, the German Army of occupation during the first World War, and now these Soviet troops.  This is by far the most cultured Army we have ever known."  As boosters for the Soviet Union's reputation, the Red Army did an excellent job.
Strong, Anna L. The Soviets Expected It. New York, New York: The Dial press, 1941, p. 202
 
 
At the American Legation they explained that [Lithuanian] people were afraid not to come to the elections.  But Smetona [right-wing Lithuanian president] had openly used police terror to make the peasants come to previous elections, yet they had not come.  It was not terror that brought them to the places I visited; it was new hope.
Strong, Anna L. The Soviets Expected It. New York, New York: The Dial press, 1941, p. 208
 
On July 21, 1940, Lithuania became a Soviet Socialist Republic by unanimous vote of the People's Sejm....  A few hours later, on the same day, Latvia and Estonia followed.
Strong, Anna L. The Soviets Expected It. New York, New York: The Dial press, 1941, p. 212
 
 
What is the use of all these little nations?  They only put on heavy taxes for big armies and then their armies are no good anyway.  We see what is happening in Europe to all the little countries.
Strong, Anna L. The Soviets Expected It. New York, New York: The Dial press, 1941, p. 214
 
 
They secured a wide buffer belt from the coast of Finland to the Black Sea.
Strong, Anna L. The Soviets Expected It. New York, New York: The Dial press, 1941, p. 220
 
            Summing up, it seemed that life was no worse in Rumania for those who had stayed behind to greet the Russians, and that there were definite improvements for most people.  The conservative peasant still had his land and kept more of the product of his labor.  There were still plenty of cattle about.  The worker had freedom and a sense of new power.  The Jew was out of the concentration camps.  He had equal rights and a chance to live.  All had religious freedom; churches and their institutions were not being molested.
Snow, Edgar. The Pattern of Soviet Power, New York: Random House, 1945, p. 38
 
            In his speech to the supreme Soviet on October 31, 1939, Molotov said:
            "When the Red Army marched into these regions it was greeted with general sympathy by the Ukrainian and Byelorussian population who welcomed our troops as liberators from the yoke of the gentry, from the yoke of the Polish landlords and capitalists."
Brar, Harpal.   Trotskyism or Leninism. 1993, p. 572
 
            Some writers have condemned the "division of Poland" between Hitler and Stalin, the "occupation" of the Baltic states, and the "immoral collusion" of the two dictators.  But the situation was more complicated.  As a witness to the events that unfolded in the fall of 1939, I cannot forget the atmosphere in western Byelorussia and western Ukraine in those days.  The people there met us with flowers, they held bread-breaking ceremonies to welcome us, gave us fruits and milk.  Owners of small cafes offered free meals to Soviet officers.  Those were genuine feelings.  The people believed that the Red Army would protect them from Hitler's terror.  Similar things were happening in the Baltic countries.  As the Wehrmacht units marched nearer, many people fled to the east, looking for safety in the territory controlled by the Red Army.
Berezhkov, Valentin.  At Stalin's Side. Secaucus, New Jersey: Carol Pub. Group, c1994, p. 278
 
            Units of the Byelorussians and Kiev special military districts met no resistance in crossing the Polish frontier.  Stalin read dispatches from Timoshenko, Vatutin, Purkaev, Gordov, Khrushchev and others.  One from Mekhlis drew his special attention:
            "The Ukrainian population is meeting our army like true liberators....  The population is greeting our troops and officers; they bring out apples, pies, drinking water and try to thrust them into our soldiers’ hands.  As a rule, even advance units are being met by entire populations coming out on to the streets.  Many weep with joy.
Volkogonov, Dmitri. Stalin: Triumph and Tragedy. New York: Grove Weidenfeld, 1991, p. 359
 
            The troops were allowed to use their weapons only if attacked.  Only isolated armed clashes took place.  There was in fact no resistance.  The ethnic majority, being Ukrainians and Byelorussians, sincerely welcomed the arrival of the Soviet forces.
            ...In June 1940 the Soviet government succeeded in recovering Bessarabia and the northern Bukovina by peaceful means, and by agreement with the Rumanian government the frontier was re-established along the rivers Prut and Danube.  The Moldavian Soviet Republic had been formed.
Volkogonov, Dmitri.  Stalin: Triumph and Tragedy. New York: Grove Weidenfeld, 1991, p. 361
 
 
            The decision to take over Western Ukraine and Byelorussia, in the face of advancing German Armies, was in my view justified, and it was broadly in accord with the desire of the local working-class population.
Volkogonov, Dmitri. Stalin: Triumph and Tragedy. New York: Grove Weidenfeld, 1991, p. 386
 
            I phoned the General Headquarters at once.  Stalin told me:
            "Don't disarm the Bulgarian troops.  Let them be while they are waiting for orders from their government."
            By this simple act the General Headquarters of the Supreme High Command expressed its full confidence in the Bulgarian people and army who gave a fraternal welcome to the Red Army as their liberator from Nazi occupation and from the Tsarist pro-Fascist regime.
Zhukov, Georgi.  Memoirs of Marshal Zhukov. London: Cape, 1971, p. 548
 
RUSSIAN-GERMAN NON-AGGRESSION PACT WAS NEEDED
 
The non-aggression pact was not an alliance....  Without violating the pact, the Soviet Union was free to oppose, even by armed force, a German attack on Turkey or Yugoslavia.  She agreed not to take part in aggression against Germany, but had promised nothing about resisting an aggression that the Nazis might start....  The pact did more; the Soviet Union, acting as a neutral, blocked Nazi expansion on several important occasions more effectively than could have been done by engaging in war.
Strong, Anna L. The Soviets Expected It. New York, New York: The Dial press, 1941, p. 220
 
 
The pact was accompanied by a trade agreement in which the USSR agreed to supply Germany with certain raw materials in exchange for German machines.  No estimates ever made of this trade place it as high as that carried on in 1931 between the USSR and German Republic -- in other words, normal commercial trade.  The USSR never became the "arsenal" for Germany in anything like the sense in which America, while still technically neutral, became the arsenal for Great Britain.  America has even been the arsenal for Japan in her war against China to a far greater extent then be USSR ever was for Germany.  The only commodity sent by the Soviets to Germany that could be classed as a war commodity was oil; the highest foreign guesses assume that the Soviets may possibly have sent as much as a million tons.  America's supply of oil to Japan even under the government licensing system was more than three times as much.  In the second year of the pact, the Soviets signed a trade treaty with Romania up by which they got Romanian oil that Hitler presumably wanted.
Strong, Anna L. The Soviets Expected It. New York, New York: The Dial press, 1941, p. 220
 
 
There is no proof of the often--made assertion that the non-aggression pact provoked Hitler's march into Poland.
Strong, Anna L. The Soviets Expected It. New York, New York: The Dial press, 1941, p. 220
 
 
The boundary between Germany and the USSR in Poland was changed three times.  This suggests a rapid improvising by two powers that do not wish to fight each other, rather than a pre-determination of boundaries.
Strong, Anna L. The Soviets Expected It. New York, New York: The Dial press, 1941, p. 222
 
 
The Soviet Union, in the 22 months of the pact's duration, had checked Nazi expansion more than it was checked by all of Europe's Armed Forces -- Polish, Norwegian, Dutch, Belgian, French, Greek, Yugoslav, and British -- combined.
Strong, Anna L. The Soviets Expected It. New York, New York: The Dial press, 1941, p. 234
 
Chamberlain spoke of the pact as a "bomb shell" and "a very unpleasant surprise."  But this was pretense.  He was not surprised save at the sudden realization that he had been outplayed in the game of "lets you and him fight."
Schuman, Frederick L. Soviet Politics. New York: A.A. Knopf, 1946, p. 373
 
In the last analysis neither the USSR nor the western democracies won the diplomatic game of 1939.  Both lost.  Only Hitler won.  The fact remains that Anglo-French policy gave Stalin and Molotov no viable alternative to the course they finally adopted.
Schuman, Frederick L. Soviet Politics. New York: A.A. Knopf, 1946, p. 379
 
            If Stalin himself did not want to go under, he must fight for the existence of British-American 'capitalism.’  To such a paradoxical result had the law of historical development led.  Stalin had meant to be the leader of a world revolution.  The destiny of his success forced him to become simply a Russian statesman.  As such he had procured for the Soviet Union a respite of nearly 18 months.  His policy did not lead to the onset of the world revolution, but it did bring Russia into the Second World War under the most favorable conditions that could be secured.  The feared war on two fronts, which would probably had been the end of Russia, had been avoided.   The danger had existed all the time that Russia might be faced alone with an enemy of superior strength, or even a number of enemies.  Now the Soviet Union entered the war at the side of the most powerful states in the world.  As head of the Russian state, Stalin had made good.
Basseches, Nikolaus.  Stalin. London, New York: Staples Press, 1952, p. 358
 
            From that time on, Russia used the breathing-space granted by the Pact, not only to prepare for defense but to block Hitler's penetration of East Europe through measures short of war.  Hitler revealed this later in his declaration of war against the USSR and bitterly listed the Russian acts that blocked him.           
            Moscow's first move was to build a wide buffer belt along her western border by alliances....  Moscow invited Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia to send foreign ministers to Moscow to discuss an alliance.  One by one, they went and signed....  The Baltic states, themselves, resented the term "vassal" applied to them by the Anglo-American press.  They thought themselves not badly off.  Their internal organization was not at the time affected; they merely gave bases to the USSR in return for help in their defense.
            The dramatic expulsion of half a million Germans from the Baltic States followed.  How bitterly Hitler resented this was shown in his declaration of war when he told how "far more than 500,000 men and women...were forced to leave their homeland....  To all this I remained silent, because I had to."  These are not words of a complacent victor.  The Baltic Germans were the upper class in the Baltic States; some had been there as landed barons for centuries.  It was they who, at the time of the Russian Revolution, brought in the German troops to overthrow local red governments.  Their expulsion scattered what was for the USSR the most dangerous fifth-column in Europe.
Strong, Anna Louise.  The Stalin Era.  New York: Mainstream, 1956, p. 82
 
            Many say that the treaty with Hitlerite Germany allowed us to do what we wanted with Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Finland, and Romania.  Naturally, we understood that there were concessions to us in the Treaty and that they were to our advantage.  I want to say this straightforwardly.  The access we gained to the Baltic Sea significantly improved our strategic situation.  By reaching the shores of the Baltic, we deprived the Western powers of a foothold that they might use against us--and that they actually had used during the civil war--for establishing a front against the USSR.
Schecter, Jerrold. Trans & Ed. Khrushchev Remembers: the Glasnost Tapes. Boston: Little, Brown, c1990, p. 51
 
            At half-past-six on the afternoon of July 3, 1941, the day after his return to Moscow, Stalin spoke to his people:
            "One must ask how could it have happened that the Soviet Government consented to conclude the Pact of Non-Aggression with such felons and monsters as Hitler and Ribbentrop.  Had not the Soviet government thereby made a mistake?  Of course not.  A Pact of Non-Aggression is a pact of peace between two countries.  It was just such a Pact that Germany offered us in 1939.  Could the Soviet Government reject such an offer?  I think no peace-loving country should reject an agreement with a neighboring State, even if at the head of that state stand such monsters and cannibals as Hitler and Ribbentrop.  This, naturally, depends on the indispensable conditions that the peace agreement does not infringe either directly or indirectly the territorial integrity, independence, and honor of the peace-loving country."
Fishman and Hutton.  The Private Life of Josif Stalin.  London: W. H. Allen, 1962, p. 141
 
SELFLESS AID TO OTHER COUNTRIES
 
Second Meeting of Hoxha with Stalin
March-April 1949
 
            I mention this, Stalin continued, to show how important it is to bear in mind the concrete conditions of each country, because the conditions of one country are not always identical with those of other countries.  That is why no one should copy our experience or that of others, but should only study it and profit from it by applying it according to the concrete conditions of his own country.
            “The chief of your General Staff,” Comrade Stalin told me, “has sent us some requests for your army.  We ordered that all of them should be met.  Have you received what you wanted?”
            “We have not yet received any information about this,” I said.
 
            At this moment Stalin called in a general and charged him with gathering precise information about this question.  After a few minutes the telephone rang.  Stalin took up the receiver and, after listening to what was said, informed me that the materiel was en route.
 
            “Did you get the rails?” he asked.  “Is the railway completed?”
            “We got them,” I told him, “and we have inaugurated the railway, and continued to outline the main tasks of the plan for the economic and cultural development of the country and the strengthening of its defenses.”
            On this occasion I also presented our requests for aid from the Soviet Union.
            Just as previously, Comrade Stalin received our requests sympathetically and said to us quite openly:
            “Comrades, we are a big country, but you know that we have not yet eliminated all the grave consequences of the war.  However, we shall help you today and in the future, perhaps not all that much, but with those possibilities we have.  We understand that you have to set up and develop the sector of socialist industry, and in this direction we agree to fulfill all the requests you have presented to us, as well as those for agriculture.”
            Then, smiling, he added:
            “But will the Albanians themselves work?”
            I understood why he asked me this question. It was the result of the evil-intended information of the Armenian huckster, Mikoyan, who, at a meeting I had with him, not only spoke to me in a language quite unlike that of Stalin, but also used harsh terms in his criticisms about the realization of plans in our country, alleging that our people did not work, etc.  His intention was to reduce the rate and amount of aid.  This was always Mikoyan's stand.  But Stalin accorded us everything we sought.
            “We shall also send you the cadres you asked for,” he said, “and they will spare no effort to help you but, of course, they will not stay in Albania forever.  Therefore, comrades, you must train your own cadres, your own specialists, to replace ours.  This is an important matter.  However many foreign cadres come to your country, you will still need your own cadres.  Therefore, comrades,” he advised us, “you must open your university, which will be a great centre for training your future cadres.”
            “We have opened the first institutes,” I told Comrade Stalin, “and work is going ahead in them, but we are still only at the beginning.  Apart from experience and textbooks, we also lack the cadres necessary for opening the university.”
            “The important thing is to get started,” he said.  “Then step by step, everything will be achieved.  For our part, we shall assist you both with literature and with specialists, in order to help increase the number of higher institutes which are the basis for the creation of the university in the future.”
            “The Soviet specialists,” Comrade Stalin went on, “will be paid by the Albanian government the same salaries as the Albanian specialists.  Don't grant them any favor more than your specialists enjoy.”
            “The Soviet specialists come from far away,” I replied, “and we cannot treat them the same as ours.”  Comrade Stalin objected at once:
            “No, no, whether they, come from Azerbaijan or any other part of the Soviet Union, we have our rules for the treatment of the specialists we send to the assistance of the fraternal peoples.  It is their duty to work with all their strength as internationalist revolutionaries, to work for the good of Albania just as for the good of the Soviet Union.  The Soviet Government undertakes to make up the necessary difference in their salaries.”
Hoxha, Enver. With Stalin: Memoirs. Tirana: 8 N‘ntori Pub. House, 1979.
 
            We assisted Spanish democracy, which had not yet become Socialist.  We assisted China in her struggle against Japanese imperialism, although China is not yet a Socialist country.
Murphy, John Thomas. Stalin, London, John Lane, 1945, p. 241
 
AID TO GREEK GUERILLAS
 
Second Meeting of Hoxha with Stalin
March-April 1949
            In conclusion, I mentioned to Comrade Stalin the threats the external enemies were making towards Albania.
            He listened to me attentively and, on the problems I had raised, expressed his opinion:
            “As for the Greek people's war,” he said among other things, “we, too, have always considered it a just war, have supported and backed it whole-heartedly.  Any people's war is not waged by the communists alone, but by the people, and the important thing is that the communists should lead it.”
Hoxha, Enver. With Stalin: Memoirs. Tirana: 8 N‘ntori Pub. House, 1979.
 
            Here [Greece] we meet another "left" criticism of Stalin, similar to that made about his role in Spain but even further removed from the facts of the matter.  As in the rest of Eastern Europe and the Balkans, the Communist had led and armed the heroic Greek underground and partisan fighters.  In 1944 the British sent an expeditionary force commanded by general Scobie to land in Greece, ostensibly to aid in the disarming of the defeated Nazi and Italian troops.  As unsuspecting as their comrades in Vietnam and Korea, who were to be likewise "assisted," the Greek partisans were slaughtered by their British "allies," who used tanks and planes in all-out offensive, which ended in February 1945 with the establishment of a right-wing dictatorship under a restored monarchy.  The British even rearmed and used the defeated Nazi "Security Battalions."  After partially recovering from this treachery, the partisan forces rebuilt their guerrilla apparatus and prepared to resist the combined forces of Greek fascism and Anglo-American imperialism.  By late 1948 full-scale civil war raged, with the right-wing forces backed up by the intervention of U.S. planes, artillery, and troops.  The Greek resistance had its back broken by another betrayal, not at all by Stalin, but by Tito, who closed the Yugoslav borders to the Soviet military supplies that were already hard put to reach the landlocked popular forces.  This was one of the two main reasons why Stalin, together with the Chinese, led the successful fight to have the Yugoslav "Communist" Party officially thrown out of the international Communist movement.
Franklin, Bruce, Ed.   The Essential Stalin; Major Theoretical Writings.  Garden City, New York: Anchor Books, 1972, p. 34
 
CATHOLIC CHURCH SERVES REACTION
 
Third Meeting of Hoxha with Stalin
November 1949
            “The Vatican is a centre of reaction,” Comradely Stalin told me among other things, “It is a tool in the service of capital and world reaction, which supports this international organization of subversion and espionage.  It is a fact that many Catholic priests and missionaries of the Vatican are old-hands at espionage on a world scale.  Imperialism has tried and is still trying to realize its aims by means of them.”
            Then he told me of what had happened once in Yalta with Roosevelt, with the representative of the American Catholic Church and others.  During the talk with Roosevelt, Churchill and others on problems of the anti-Hitlerite war, they had said: We must no longer fight the Pope in Rome.  What have you against him that you attack him?!
            “I have nothing against him,” Stalin had replied.
            “Then, let us make the Pope our ally,” they had said”, let us admit him to the coalition of the great allies.”
            “All right”, Stalin had said, “but the anti-fascist alliance is an alliance to wipe out fascism and nazism.  As you know, gentlemen, this war is waged with soldiers, artillery, machine-guns, tanks, aircraft.  If the Pope or you can tell us what armies, artillery, machine-guns tanks and other weapons of war he possesses, let him become our ally.  We don't need an ally for talk and incense.”
            After that, they had made no further mention of the question of the Pope, and the Vatican.
            “Were there Catholic priests in Albania who betrayed the people?” Comrade Stalin asked me then.
            “Yes,” I told him. “Indeed the heads of the Catholic Church made common cause with the nazi-fascist foreign invaders right from the start, placed themselves completely in their service and did everything within their power to disrupt our National Liberation War and perpetuate the foreign domination.”
            “What did you do with them?”
            “After the victory,” I told him, “we arrested them and put them on trial and they received the punishment they deserved.”
            “You have done well,” he said.
Hoxha, Enver. With Stalin: Memoirs. Tirana: 8 N‘ntori Pub. House, 1979.
 
SOME CLERGY ARE PROGRESSIVE
 
Third Meeting of Hoxha with Stalin
November 1949
            “But were there others who maintained a good stand?” he asked.
            “Yes,” I replied, “especially clergymen of the Orthodox and Moslem religion.”
            “What have you done with them?” he asked me.
            “We have kept them close to us.  In its First Resolution our Party called on all the masses, including the clergymen. to unite for the sake of the great national  cause, in the great war for freedom and independence.  Many of them joined us, threw themselves into the war and made a valuable contribution to the liberation of the Homeland.  After Liberation they embraced the policy of our Party and continued the work for the reconstruction of the country.  We have always valued and honored such clergymen, and some of them have now been elected deputies to the People's Assembly or promoted to senior ranks in our army.  In another case, a former clergyman linked himself so closely with the National Liberation Movement and the Party that in the course of the war he saw the futility of the religious dogma, abandoned his religion, embraced the communist ideology and thanks to his struggle, work and conviction we have admitted him to the ranks of the Party.
            “Very good,” Stalin said to me.  What more could I add?  “If you are clear about the fact that religion is opium for the people and that the Vatican is a centre of obscurantism, espionage and subversion against the cause of the peoples, then you know that you should act precisely as you have done.”
Hoxha, Enver. With Stalin: Memoirs. Tirana: 8 N‘ntori Pub. House, 1979.
 
ANTI-RELIGION BATTLE SHOULD BE KEPT ON POLITICAL PLANE
 
Third Meeting of Hoxha with Stalin
November 1949
            “You should never put the struggle against the clergy, who carry out espionage and disruptive activities, on the religious plane,” Stalin said, “but always on the political plane. The clergy must obey the laws of the state, because these laws express the will of the working class and the working people.  You must make the people quite clear about these laws and the hostility of the reactionary clergymen so that even that part of the population which believes in religion will clearly see that, under the guise of religion, the clergymen carry out activities hostile to the Homeland and the people themselves.  Hence the people, convinced through facts and arguments, together with the Government, should struggle against the hostile clergy.  You should isolate and condemn only those clergymen who do not obey the Government and commit grave crimes against the state.  But, I insist, the people must be convinced about the crimes of these clergymen, and should also be convinced about the futility of the religious ideology and the evils that result from it.
Hoxha, Enver. With Stalin: Memoirs. Tirana: 8 N‘ntori Pub. House, 1979.
 
            "You should never put the struggle against the clergy, who carry out espionage and disruptive activities, on the religious plane," Stalin said, "but always on the political plane.  The clergy must obey the laws of the state, because these laws express the will of the working-class and the working people....  But, I insist, the people must be convinced about the crimes of these clergyman, and should also be convinced about the futility of the religious ideology and the evils that result from it."
Hoxha, Enver.  The Artful Albanian. London: Chatto & Windus, 1986, p. 134
 
STALIN INSISTS ART REFLECT REALITY
 
Fifth Meeting of Hoxha with Stalin
April 1951
            Some days after this meeting, on April 6, I went to the Bolshoi Theatre to see the new opera ‘From the Depths of Heart’ which, as I was told before the performance, dealt with the new ”life in the collective farm village.  That same evening Comrade Stalin, too, had come to see this opera.  He sat in the box of the first floor closest to the stage, whereas I, together with two of our comrades and two Soviet comrades who accompanied us, was in the box in the second floor, on the opposite side.
            The next day I was told that Stalin had made a very severe criticism of this opera, which had already been extolled by some critics as a musical work of value.  I was told that Comrade Stalin had criticized the opera, because it did not reflect the life in the collectivized village correctly and objectively.  Comrade Stalin had said that in this work life in the collective farm had been idealized, truthfulness has suffered, the struggle of the masses against various shortcomings and difficulties was not reflected, and everything was covered with a false lustre and the dangerous idea that everything is going smoothly and well.
Hoxha, Enver. With Stalin: Memoirs. Tirana: 8 N‘ntori Pub. House, 1979.
 
            The great idea is to confer upon the writer (while at the same time enlarging the scope of his work), the mission of setting out, as clearly as possible, the scientific and moral evidences of socialism--but without paralyzing literary activity by pinning it down exclusively to political propaganda.  This application of the social sense to creative work implies the definite abolition of "art for art's sake," and of individually selfish art with its narrowness and its pessimism.
Barbusse, Henri. Stalin. New York: The Macmillan company, 1935, p. 207
 
 
HOXHA ATTACKS REVISIONISTS
 
            The Yugoslav revisionists preached the withering away of the state in socialism, denied the fundamental Marxist-Leninist thesis about the need for the existence of the dictatorship of the proletariat during the whole period of the transition from capitalism to communism.
 
            Sentimentality, liberalism, the tendency to seek numbers in order to give the impression that the ranks of the party are increasing with new members, are harmful and have grave consequences.  Such admissions without strictly applying the Marxist-Leninist norms not only do not hinder the influence and pressure of the bourgeoisie from attacking the party from outside but allow the party to be infiltrated by various elements which divide and liquidate it.
 
            Such vigorous revolutionary action ensures two important objectives: on the one ”hand, it tempers the party itself in action together with the masses and raises its authority and influence, and on the other hand, it creates possibilities for the party to see the most politically and ideologically sound and advanced elements of the working class in action, those who will be the best and the most resolute militants of the party in the future.  From these elements, the Marxist-Leninist parties secure the new blood for their ranks, and not from a few discontented intellectual elements, or some unemployed workers who demand justice, who are revolted, but are not so stable and do not accept the iron discipline of a Marxist-Leninist proletarian party.
Hoxha, Enver.  Eurocommunism is Anti-communism. Toronto: Norman Bethune Institute, 1980.
 
STALIN READ CENSORED BOOKS
 
This was the 13th time books deemed subversive had got him into trouble.
Murphy, John Thomas. Stalin, London, John Lane, 1945, p. 18
 
            There are some very interesting entries in the conduct book of the theological seminary:
            "It appears that Djugashvili has a ticket to the Cheap Library, from which he borrows books.  Today I confiscated Victor Hugo's Toilers of the Sea, in which I found the said library ticket—Father Germogen, Supervisor."
            The report bears the notation:
            "Confine him to the punishment cell for a prolonged period.  I have already warned him once about an unsanctioned book, Ninety-Three by Victor Hugo."    (Entry made in November 1896.)
            "At 11 p.m. I took away from Djugashvili Letourneau's Literary Evolution of the Nation's, which he had borrowed from the Cheap Library....  This is the 13th time this student has been discovered reading books borrowed from the Cheap Library.
Yaroslavsky, Emelian.   Landmarks in the Life of Stalin. Moscow: FLPH, 1940, p. 16
 
            Djugashvili was discovered reading the same book on the chapel stairs.  This is the 13th time the student has been discovered reading books borrowed from the Cheap Library.  I handed over the book to the Father Supervisor.
Deutscher, Isaac. Stalin; A Political Biography. New York: Oxford Univ. Press, 1967, p. 18
 
            Stalin's biographers, official or hostile, dispute whether Stalin first became a Marxist in those years [his adolescent years in seminary] (which is probable), whether he first became a Leninist in any sense (highly improbable)….  They agree in portraying his life as a round of reading forbidden books, discussing forbidden ideas, and attending forbidden meetings, along with consequent clashes with the monks.  No doubt such activities were the best and most intense parts of Stalin's adolescent life.
Randall, Francis.   Stalin's Russia.  New York: Free Press, 1965, p. 25
 
BOLSHEVIKS SUPERIOR TO MENSHEVIKS
 
The 150,000 members with which they began 1907 dwindled to a few thousand, while the correspondingly depressing movement among the leaders gave rise to a variety of opinions concerning policy -- even to decrying the revolution and pleading for the liquidation of the party and a revision of Marxism.
            Here was a test for the new philosophers who would change the world.  To all superficial appearances the 12 years of effort had been of no avail, and the Philistines were scathing.  In every great crisis such views recur.  Nevertheless, Dan, a Menshevik opponent of the Bolsheviks, felt compelled in after-years to write of the Bolsheviks of this period of blackest depression: while the Bolshevik section of the party transformed itself into a battle phalanx held together by iron discipline and cohesive guiding resolutions, the ranks of the Menshevik section became ever more seriously disorganized by dissension and apathy.
Murphy, John Thomas. Stalin, London, John Lane, 1945, p. 62
 
And it was always the Mensheviks of varying shades who received the maximum of Stalin's attention.  This may seem like an obsession on his part, and the Bolsheviks in general, unless it is realized that the Mensheviks were their greatest rivals for the confidence of workers. The Bolsheviks regarded them as an extraordinary danger because they gave coherence and a certain rationality to the mood of the masses.
            At one time they were classified as "softs" and the Bolsheviks as "hards"; and there was much that was appropriate in these respective characterizations.  For it invariably happened that the Mensheviks expressed all the doubts and fears and weaknesses which beset the workers and the peasants.
Murphy, John Thomas. Stalin, London, John Lane, 1945, p. 67
 
            Stalin was in prison, in 1903, when he heard a great piece of news.  At the Second Congress of the Russian Social Democratic Party, a split began to appear, on Lenin's initiative, between the Bolsheviks and Mensheviks.  The Bolsheviks were the extremists, the wagers of uncompromising class warfare, the iron militants.  The Mensheviks were the reformers, the adapters, the arrangers, the technicians of compromise and combination....
            The split grew wider.  There came a definite parting of the ways....  Stalin did not hesitate.  He chose Bolshevism, and decided for Lenin.
            A moment always arrives at which a man of action must make a decision of this sort which is destined to affect the whole future course of his life.  One is reminded of the old Greek myth, impressive because of its antiquity, of Hercules being compelled to choose, at the beginning of his divine and sportive career, between Vice and Virtue.  But were there not, in this case, reasons for and against?  Reform is very tempting.  It has an atmosphere of wisdom and prudence, and seems to avoid the shedding of blood.  But far-seeing people, who understand the great principles of logic and social arithmetic and, in an ever-increasing degree, historical experience, know that on the path of opportunistic resignation and reformist vassalage lie first mirages, then snares, and finally betrayal--and that it is the path of destruction and of massacre.  People may say that it is only a question of degree.  But no, it is a crucial question, a question of life and death, because minimalism (which is also called the "lesser evil") is really conservatism.
Barbusse, Henri. Stalin. New York:  The Macmillan company, 1935, p. 24
 
            After his sixth escape, Kobi carried on a campaign against the Georgian Mensheviks.  "From 1904 to 1905," writes Ordjonikidze, "Kobi was, for the Mensheviks, the most hated of the Caucasian Bolsheviks, whose recognized leader he became."
            One day an Olibadze workman addressed him:
            "Anyway, damn it, Comrade Sosso, the Mensheviks have got a majority in the Party, after all!"
            And this workman remembers quite well today that Sosso answered him:
            "Majority?  Not as regards quality.  Only wait a few years and you will see who was right and who was wrong."
Barbusse, Henri. Stalin. New York:  The Macmillan company, 1935, p. 25
 
TROTSKY OPPOSED BOLSHEVIKS
 
Trotsky's experience in the Russian working-class movement prior to 1917 was essentially the experience of an emigre.  From the outset of his acquaintance with Lenin he became an opponent of the Bolsheviks in general and of Lenin in particular.  At first he was definitely on the side of the Mensheviks.  Then he broke with them to take up a position between the two contending forces, calling for unity where unity was impossible, while reserving for Lenin and the Bolsheviks the most bitter of his polemics.  On the wave of the revolution of 1917 he capitulated to Lenin as the master Revolutionary, in the hope that in due time the Master's mantle would fall upon him.
Murphy, John Thomas. Stalin, London, John Lane, 1945, p. 67
 
Yet it had occurred to me that Trotsky, who was essentially an intellectual aristocrat, not to say an intellectual snob, was somewhat out of place in the Bolshevik milieu.
Duranty, Walter. I Write as I Please. New York: Simon and Schuster, 1935, p. 199
 
            In point of fact, I was resisting art as I had resisted revolution earlier in life, and later, Marxism; as I had resisted, for several years, Lenin and his methods.
Trotsky, Leon.  My Life. Gloucester, Massachusetts: P. Smith, 1970, p. 148
 
LENIN CHOSE STALIN TO SOLVE PROBLEMS
 
I well remember that in one of my conversations with Lenin in 1921 he referred to Stalin as "our Nutcracker" and explained that if the "political bureau were faced with a problem which needed a lot of sorting out Stalin was given the job."
Murphy, John Thomas. Stalin, London, John Lane, 1945, p. 72
 
            ...wherever the situation seemed most hopeless, wherever incompetence and disloyalty were weakening the cause, on no matter what front and under any conditions, there Stalin was sent, with the results we have seen outlined above.
Cole, David M.   Josef Stalin, Man of Steel.  London, New York: Rich & Cowan, 1942, p. 50
 
            ...Taking advantage of the traditional hatred felt in the province for everything Russian, the social revolutionaries and their Mensheviks allies were agitating for secession from the USSR and the setting up of an independent state of Georgia.
            As usual the task of cleaning up other peoples failures descended on Stalin.  Taking Ordjonikidze with him, he hurried to Tiflis to settle the problem once and for all.
Cole, David M.   Josef Stalin; Man of Steel. London, New York: Rich & Cowan, 1942, p. 59
 
            Voroshilov states, "During 1918-1920, Comrade Stalin was probably the only person whom the Central Committee dispatched from one fighting front to another, choosing always those places most fraught with danger for the revolution.  Where it was comparatively quiet, and everything going smoothly, where we had successes, Stalin was not to be found.  But where for various reasons the Red Army was cracking up, where the counterrevolutionary forces through their successes were menacing the very existence of the Soviet Government, where confusion and panic might any moment develop into helplessness, catastrophe, there Stalin made his appearance.  He took no sleep at night, he organized, he took the leadership into his own strong hands, he relentlessly broke through difficulties, and turned the corner, saved the situation."
Life of Stalin, A Symposium. New York: Workers Library Publishers, 1930, p. 49
 
            In 1919 Stalin, then Commissar of Nationalities, was also made Commissar of the Workers' and Peasants' Inspectorate, an organization created by Lenin to have teams of workers and peasants inspect government functioning in order to check corruption and bureaucracy.  This method of mass democratic control embodied the essence of Lenin's concept of how a proletarian state should function.  The fact that he appointed Stalin as its director shows his faith in him--as he testified in 1922 when Stalin's control of two commissariats was questioned.
            "We are [Lenin wrote] solving these problems, and we must have a man to whom any representative of the nationalities may come and discuss matters at length.  Where are we to find such a man?  I think that even Preobrazhensky could not name anybody else but Comrade Stalin.
            This is true of the Workers' and Peasants' Directorate.  The work is gigantic.  But to handle the work of investigation properly, we must have a man of authority in charge, otherwise we shall be submerged in petty intrigues."
            That the Inspectorate could ever have worked, given the state of the inherited bureaucratic apparatus, is doubtful, and the degree of Stalin's responsibility for its failures is not clear.  But Lenin's open attack, regardless of his motive, could not but serve to undermine Stalin's authority as General Secretary and hence disrupt the Party.
Cameron, Kenneth Neill. Stalin, Man of Contradiction. Toronto: NC Press, c1987, p. 49-50
 
            Lenin made no bones about his support of Stalin in that ministry of the ministries, when, replying to the objections of oppositionists, he said:
            "Now about the Workers'-Peasants' Inspection.  It's a gigantic undertaking....  It is necessary to have at the head of it a man of authority, otherwise we shall sink in a morass, drown in petty intrigues.  I think that even Preobrazhensky could not name any other candidature than that of Comrade Stalin.
Trotsky, Leon, Stalin. New York: Harper and Brothers Publishers, 1941, p. 346
 
            ... But while Trotsky won fame by his speeches, Stalin was sent to one critical front after another as the representative of the Central Committee, and was determining policy by short and concise telegrams to Lenin.
Pritt, Denis Nowell. The Moscow Trial was Fair. London: "Russia To-day," 1937, p. 10
 
            Stalin was directly involved in all of the major events of this time.  He was already influential and indispensable to Lenin.  He had signed the statement warning the right-wing members, who were agitating for coalition, and he had rejected the Menshevik proposal that Lenin and Trotsky should be excluded from a coalition government.  He was to support Lenin strongly during the party crisis over the peace treaty with Germany.  At the same time he was demonstrating his capacity for handling numerous responsibilities.
Grey, Ian. Stalin, Man of History. London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1979, p. 102
 
            "Lenin could not get along without Stalin even for a single day," Pestkovsky wrote.  "Probably for that reason our office in the Smolny was under the wing of Lenin.  In the course of the day he would call Stalin out an endless number of times, or would appear in our office and lead him away.  Most of the day Stalin spent with Lenin."
Grey, Ian. Stalin, Man of History. London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1979, p. 105
 
            The same Pestkovsky refers to close collaboration between Lenin and Stalin.  "Lenin could not get along without Stalin even for a single day.  Probably for that reason our office in the Smolny was 'under the wing" of Lenin.  In the course of the day, he would call Stalin out an endless number of times, or would appear in our office and lead him away.  Most of the day Stalin spent with Lenin.  What they did there, I don't know, but on one occasion, upon entering Lenin's office, I discovered an interesting picture.  On the wall hung a large map of Russia.  Before it stood two chairs.  And on them stood Ilyich and Stalin, moving their fingers over the northern part, I think across Finland.
  ...At that period, Lenin had great need of Stalin.  There can be no doubt about that.  Zinoviev and Kamenev had been waging a struggle against Lenin;... He [Stalin], therefore, played the role of chief-of-staff or of a clerk on responsible missions under Lenin.
Trotsky, Leon, Stalin. New York: Harper and Brothers Publishers, 1941, p. 247
 
            Trotsky made speeches [in the spring and summer of 1919] which were so violent one could see he was frightened.  Defeat, capture and death began to menace the Soviet leaders.  Lenin however, kept calm.  He did not indulge in the histrionics of Trotsky but instead called Stalin to the rescue, to put things right at the chief point of danger--Petrograd.
            What he had accomplished at Tsaritsyn and Viatka he was asked to repeat at Kronstadt and Petrograd.
Graham, Stephen. Stalin. Port Washington, New York: Kennikat Press, 1970, p. 59
 
            Stalin was a first-rate administrator, the only one Lenin could rely on.  His judgment had been proved by now [1917]...he was a useful man to have beside one in a tight corner.  Of Lenin's colleagues he had emerged as the only man, Trotsky excepted, fit for the highest places.
Snow, Charles Percy.  Variety of Men. New York: Scribner, 1966, p. 249
 
            While Lenin remained in Moscow to hold all the strings in his hand and Trotsky rose to new heights as commissar of war, the other Soviet leaders were sent on special missions to one crisis spot after another as need arose.  Lenin showed the same confidence in Stalin as a troubleshooter as he had in 1917, choosing him to deal with some of the most critical situations.  Nor was his confidence misplaced.  In the chaotic conditions that were general in 1918-19 Stalin did not lose his nerve but showed he could exercise leadership and get things done, however rough his methods, including summary execution without trial.
            Stalin's first assignment was to the key position of Tsaritsyn, on the Volga (later renamed Stalingrad, and now Volgograd), with the responsibility of making sure that the food supplies to Moscow and Petrograd were not cut off.  Twenty-four hours after his arrival on June 6, he reported that he had dealt with a "bacchanalia of profiteering" by fixing food prices and introducing rationing.  On July 7, the day after the attempted Socialist Revolutionary coup he reassured Lenin:
            "Everything will be done to prevent possible surprises here.  Rest assured that our hand will not tremble.  I'm chasing up and bawling out whoever requires it.  We shall spare no one, neither ourselves nor others.  But we'll send you the food."
Bullock, Alan. Hitler and Stalin: Parallel Lives. New York: Knopf, 1992, p. 98
 
STALIN READ A LOT AND WROTE WHEN HE COULD
 
Some people have asked, "Where are the theoretical works of Stalin in this period?" as if he had been deported to the Reading Rooms of the British Museum instead of a peasant's hut in the Arctic.
Murphy, John Thomas. Stalin, London, John Lane, 1945, p. 78
 
Accordingly, Joseph Stalin read a great deal.  He read so much that he aroused suspicion in ”the minds of the authorities of the seminary,”... and he was expelled from the seminary.
Basseches, Nikolaus.  Stalin. London, New York: Staples Press, 1952, p. 22
 
Trotsky made much of the fact that during those years of continuous exile Stalin did not write a line or attempt any literary work, but for this, too, no blame attaches to Stalin.  Not every political captive, even though an intellectual, wrote anything in such exile.  Some did, but when a man is living in a small village in a wilderness of snow, the conditions are naturally not encouraging.  Even the newspapers took weeks or months to arrive.  The exiled intellectuals asked their friends and relations to send them books.  Stalin, the shoemaker’s son, had no relations who could do him that service.  And his few friends were naturally without the means to send him parcels of books; moreover, the books that interested him would not have reached him, for there was a very severe censorship of the material sent by post to the exiles.
Basseches, Nikolaus. Stalin. London, New York: Staples Press, 1952, p. 43
 
            Stalin likes both hunting and fishing, and occasionally will play chess.  His favorite relaxation, however, is reading, of which he does as much as demands upon his time permit. Starting from a good foundation in such literary classics as Shakespeare, Schiller, and Tolstoy, his favorite authors are Saltykov-Shchedrin, Gogol, and Chekov.  He has read the works of many American and English authors in translation, including James Fennimore Cooper, Upton Sinclair, Mark Twain, and Sinclair Lewis, and, on one occasion, used the term "Babbitt" in a speech.  He has read widely in the history of civilization and Marxian literature, but his first love in reading was and is poetry.  When he was young he wrote poetry, and at the age of 16 a few of his poems were published in the newspaper Iberia....
            Stalin reads all the best works of the contemporary Soviet writers and takes real personal interest in them, frequently receiving authors for personal chats.  It is not infrequent that, enthusiastic about a new work, he telephones the author in the middle of the night to congratulate him on the achievement.  His interest in culture is well reflected by the fact that the government awards for outstanding work in the fields of literature, art, music, and science have been titled the Stalin prizes, and Stalin, as head of the government, takes an active part in choosing the award winners....
Davis, Jerome.  Behind Soviet Power.  New York, N. Y.: The Readers' Press, Inc., c1946, p. 10
 
            Books were Joseph's inseparable friends; he would not part with them even at meal times....
Yaroslavsky, Emelian.  Landmarks in the Life of Stalin.  Moscow: FLPH, 1940, p. 14
 
            It is widely supposed abroad that Stalin is a poorly educated and uncultured man, a notion fostered especially by Trotsky in his followers.
Snow, Edgar. The Pattern of Soviet Power, New York: Random House, 1945, p. 155
 
            I read a great deal, for my father had a vast library of books....
Alliluyeva, Svetlana.  Twenty Letters to a Friend. New York: Harper & Row, 1967, p. 142
 
            He was neither unintelligent nor devoid of common sense.
            ... Stalin hardly ever signed a document without reading it over very carefully.  He read a great deal; he read the party press, the most significant literary works, material from the Western press translated especially for him, and even emigre literature, not to mention various diplomatic documents, materials relating to the internal party disputes, etc..  In addition, he often attended performances at the Moscow Art Theatre and the Bolshoi Theatre.
            ...he was by no means an entirely unskilled polemicist.  Igor Sats, a veteran party member, writes in his memoirs:
            "I must add a few words to try to explain in part Stalin's effectiveness as a writer and orator, what gave him an edge over other orators and writers who were far more skilled.  Kamenev, Zinoviev, Bukharin, even Trotsky were much less familiar with the text of Lenin's writings than Stalin.  These men had interacted with the living Lenin much more closely and more often than Stalin.  They had listened to him, argued with him, and read what he had just published, but they hardly ever reread his writings....  Unlike them, Stalin studied Lenin's texts and knew the printed Lenin intimately.  He had no trouble selecting a quotation from Lenin if he needed it...."
            It should be added that 1924 was the year of Stalin's most creative activity.  His writings of that year occupy an entire volume of his works (Volume 6).  In 1924 Stalin published his two most important theoretical pamphlets, Foundations of Leninism and The October Revolution and The Tactics of the Russian Communists.  In these writings Stalin showed himself to be, if not a continuator, at least a rather skillful systematizer of Lenin's views.
Medvedev, Roy. Let History Judge. New York: Columbia University Press, 1989, p. 90
 
            It is worth noting in this connection that Stalin's regular reading included extracts from all the nine main emigre journals, and that his library had copies of many of the emigre books, including Trotsky's.
Conquest, Robert. Stalin: Breaker of Nations. New York, New York: Viking, 1991, p. 210
 
            Nearly all the memoirists, whether friendly or hostile to Stalin, agree with the impression of him given by Glurdjidze, one of the school-fellows who said, "...Books were Joseph's inseparable friends; he would not part with them even at meal times....
            Another writer, Iremashvili...describes Djugashvili as one of the chief debaters among the seminarists, more knowledgeable than most of his comrades, and able to advance his argument with much stubbornness and political skill.
Deutscher, Isaac. Stalin; A Political Biography. New York: Oxford Univ. Press, 1967, p. 17
 
            As his daughter remarks, in spirit Stalin was completely Russianized.  He had not learned Russian until he was eight or nine, and always spoke it with an accent.  But he spoke it well and his conversation was often rich and vivid in a course way.  Although not well-educated, he was widely read in the Russian classics--in particular, the satirists Shchedrin and Gogol.  He had also read when young a number of foreign authors in Russian translation--in particular, Victor Hugo--and popular works on Darwinism and social and economic matters.  Gendarmerie reports on the Tiflis Theological Seminary in the last part of the 19th-century mention the reading by students of "seditious" literature of this sort, and Stalin's name appears in the seminary bad-conduct book a number of times for the discovery of such works from the local "Cheap Library," showing that he was engaged in absorbing this sort of self-education.
Conquest, Robert. The Great Terror. New York: Oxford University Press, 1990, p. 62
 
            A discussion followed.  Koba surprised me by his thorough knowledge of the subject.  He had obviously done some researching.  He asked Yagoda, a little slyly, about masonic degrees.  Yagoda got muddled and spoke of the degrees of the Scottish Ritual.  Koba said, "You are obviously not familiar with the subject.  The degree of the Scottish Ritual, which at one time numbered 25, became 33 degrees in the Grand Orient on September 22, 1804.  The Grand Orient took eight additional degrees from the Lodge at Charleston, U.S.A..  An example, of course, of American exports to Europe"....
Litvinov, Maksim Maksimovich. Notes for a Journal. New York: Morrow, 1955, p. 86
 
            From other sources, information became available about Stalin's intellectual interests.  In the year 1926, he composed a list for Tovstukha, his then Secretary, to buy a personal library covering all major fields of human knowledge.  He was particularly interested in historical literature….  But he also read historical textbooks and from time to time he would send a short note to one of his favorite writers....  Stalin devoured newspapers.  In 1936, he subscribed to no fewer than nine emigre Russian newspapers and periodicals from Paris, Prague, and New York--including Vremya, published in Harbin.
Laqueur, Walter. Stalin: The Glasnost Revelations. New York: Scribner's, c1990, p. 150
 
            His formal education was admittedly defective; he criticized it himself with customary savagery.  But at some point in his adolescence Stalin acquired a taste for reading--whether Karl Marx or Victor Hugo--and for the wider world that books uncover.  Stalin seems to have read all the literature, all the science, social science, and philosophy that he could get hold of in Tbilisi.  He thereby became a kind of European intellectual.  He became, more specifically, one of the intelligentsia of the Russian Empire--one of that extraordinary body of men and women who, regardless of national or class origin, read and treasured a large body of Russian and European writings and felt that the injustices of the Tsarist regime could not be allowed to continue.
Randall, Francis. Stalin's Russia. New York: Free Press,1965, p. 23
 
            As Stalin earned his status as an intelligent he grew in the eyes of workers and peasants, in the eyes of his fellow students, and eventually in the eyes of the regime.
Randall, Francis.  Stalin's Russia.  New York: Free Press, 1965, p. 24
 
            A voracious reader, Stalin once told a visitor who noted a pile of books on his office table that his "daily norm" was 500 pages.
Tucker, Robert. Stalin in Power: 1929-1941. New York: Norton, 1990, p. 51
 
            He became pensive, seemed gloomy and introspective, was never without a book," wrote one of his contemporaries later.  He was never without a new book, to be precise.
Radzinsky, Edvard.  Stalin. New York: Doubleday, c1996, p. 36
 
            He [Stalin] was, as we have already seen, a voracious reader, with a considerable stock of historical and philosophical knowledge.
Ulam, Adam. Stalin; The Man and his Era. New York: Viking Press, 1973, p. 119
 
            Stalin was a well-read man;....
Ulam, Adam. Stalin; The Man and his Era. New York: Viking Press, 1973, p. 704
 
            The private library of a person in power serves as an additional special source of authority and information.  Stalin was always a great reader, particularly during his exile....
            Visitors to Stalin's apartment in the Kremlin were always struck by the extensive range of his library.
Medvedev, Roy & Zhores.   The Unknown Stalin. NY, NY: Overlook Press, 2004, p. 95
 
            Zolotukhina describes the Kremlin apartment [of Stalin]: Clearly Stalin was an educated person.  He got extremely irritated whenever he came across grammar or spelling mistakes, which he would carefully correct with a red pencil.
Medvedev, Roy & Zhores. The Unknown Stalin. NY, NY: Overlook Press, 2004, p. 97
 
            In view of the fact that Stalin always read with a pencil in his hand, never simply for pleasure or relaxation, there should be thousands of books containing his notes and comments, but, unfortunately for historians, it seems that most of his private library has simply vanished forever.
Medvedev, Roy & Zhores. The Unknown Stalin. NY, NY: Overlook Press, 2004, p. 99
 
            If Stalin's personal archive had not been destroyed, selected items certainly would have surfaced and been used to support the moves to rehabilitate Stalin in 1965.
Medvedev, Roy & Zhores,. The Unknown Stalin. NY, NY: Overlook Press, 2004, p. 101
 
            Surreptitiously and voraciously he read books on sociology, natural sciences, and the labor movement.
Levine, Isaac Don.  Stalin.  New York: Cosmopolitan Book Corporation, c1931, p. 10
 
            Verestchak continues, He always carried a book.  Of more than medium- height, he walked with a slow catlike tread.
Levine, Isaac Don.  Stalin.  New York: Cosmopolitan Book Corporation, c1931, p. 79
 
            He read voraciously and actively.
Service, Robert. Stalin. Cambridge, Mass.: Belknap Press of Harvard Univ. Press, 2005, p. 9
 
            Determination stimulated both aptitude and memory.  Another school comrade, Kapanadze, testifies that throughout the 13 years of tutelage and throughout the later 35 years of activity as a teacher he never had occasion once "to meet such a gifted and able pupil" as Joseph Djugashvili.  Yet even Iremashvili, who wrote his book not in Tiflis but in Berlin, maintains that Soso was the best pupil in the theological school.  In other testimonies there are, however, substantial shadings.  "During the first years, in the preparatory grades," relates Glurdzhidze, "Joseph studied superbly, and with time, as he disclosed increasingly brilliant abilities, he became one of the best pupils."
            ...Identical in nature are the recollections of another schoolmate, Elisabedashvili.  Joseph, says he, "was one of the most indigent and one of the most gifted...."
            Without being definite as to Joseph's exact rating in his class, Gogokhiya states that in development and knowledge he ranked "much higher than his schoolmates."  Soso read everything available in the school library, including Georgian and Russian classics, which were, of course, carefully sifted by the authorities.  After his graduation examinations Joseph was rewarded with a certificate of merit, "which in those days was an extraordinary achievement, because his father was not a clergyman and plied the shoemaking trade."  Truly a remarkable touch!
            "Usually he was serious, persistent," writes Gogokhiya, "did not like pranks and mischief.  After his schoolwork he hurried home, and he was always seen poring over a book."
Trotsky, Leon, Stalin. New York: Harper and Brothers Publishers, 1941, p. 10-11
 
            "The book was Joseph's inseparable friend, and he did not part with it even while eating," testifies Glurdzhidze.
Trotsky, Leon, Stalin. New York: Harper and Brothers Publishers, 1941, p. 16
 
KAMENEV WAS TOO OFTEN A MENSHEVIK
 
Kamenev, who in all crises proved himself more a Menshevik and than a Bolshevik,
Murphy, John Thomas. Stalin, London, John Lane, 1945, p. 88
 
            Kamenev was a rightist, a typical 100 percent rightist.  Sometimes he concealed this, but most of the time he spoke quite openly.  And against Lenin, too....  But Lenin never trusted Zinoviev...and he was extremely unsteady.  Lenin kept correcting him, putting him in his place....
Chuev, Feliks.  Molotov Remembers. Chicago: I. R. Dee, 1993, p. 106
 
 
STALIN PROPOSED TROTSKY BE ADMITTED TO THE PARTY
 
At the sixth Congress of the Bolshevik party, it was here on Stalin's proposal, obviously with the approval of Lenin, that Leon Trotsky was admitted to the party.
Murphy, John Thomas. Stalin, London, John Lane, 1945, p. 101
 
When Stalin proposed that Trotsky and his colleagues be admitted to the party he was little concerned about the personal relations between Trotsky and himself.
            Here was the issue which was to form the great divide in the Bolshevik ranks.  Could Russia advance to socialism without a revolution in the West?
Murphy, John Thomas. Stalin, London, John Lane, 1945, p. 102
 
From 1898, when Trotsky was 19, to 1917, he had hardly been in Russia; and until, on Stalin's proposal, he and his group were accepted into the Bolshevik party in July, 1917, he had fought the Bolsheviks with voice and pen.
Murphy, John Thomas. Stalin, London, John Lane, 1945, p. 124
 
            And while Stalin was only the executor of the union [with the left wing--the Internationalists], it is one of the many ironies of the revolution that under his guidance Trotsky was admitted into the Bolshevist sanctum, and elected for the first time a member of the new Central Committee, where he stayed until Stalin, in a different role, expelled him.
Levine, Isaac Don.  Stalin.  New York: Cosmopolitan Book Corporation, c1931, p. 130
 
TROTSKY JOINED PARTY WITH ULTERIOR MOTIVES
 
            When he joined the Bolshevik party he did not regard it as a collective body which would have any power over him.  On the contrary Trotsky regarded his joining as a means of acquiring power over the party and becoming second in command to Lenin.
Murphy, John Thomas. Stalin, London, John Lane, 1945, p. 101
 
 
Characteristically Trotsky made a spectacular entry into the Bolshevik Party.  He brought with him into the Party his entire motley following of dissident leftists.
            First as Foreign Commissar and then as War Commissar, Trotsky was the chief spokesman of the so-called Left Opposition within the Bolshevik Party.
            Footnote:  Following his removal from the post of Foreign Commissar, Trotsky publicly admitted the error of his opposition to Lenin at Brest-Litovsk and again offered unreserved co-operation with Lenin.
Sayers and Kahn.  The Great Conspiracy. Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1946, p. 191
 
In August 1917 Trotsky made a sensational political somersault.  After 14 years of opposition to Lenin and the Bolsheviks, Trotsky applied for membership in the Bolshevik Party.
Sayers and Kahn.  The Great Conspiracy. Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1946, p. 190
 
I had been told, for instance, that Trotsky as a former Menshevik did in a sense represent a kind of minority section in the Bolshevik party, which he had joined only in 1917,...
Duranty, Walter.  I Write as I Please. New York: Simon and Schuster, 1935, p. 213
 
 
STALIN SUPPORTS SOCIALISM IN ONE COUNTRY
 
At the same time it is true to say that had Stalin's statement [that the SU will lead the road to socialism and not Europe] been broadcast to the world, the whole Socialist and Labor movement would have laughed it out of court.  All the "Marxist" schools of Western Socialism, as well as the other schools of Socialist thought, held the view that socialism must come first in the most highly developed capitalist countries; and the majority of them held the view that it would come through parliamentary democracy.  The Bolshevik Party was comparatively unknown to the Western Socialists.
Murphy, John Thomas. Stalin, London, John Lane, 1945, p. 103
 
When Stalin made his statement concerning socialism in one country it never entered his head that this was a denial of the international significance and character of the Russian Revolution.  Nor was he accused of such a denial.  it was only later, when Trotsky took his stand on the principal that at least a European revolution must precede the possibility of socialism in Russia that Stalin's statement was turned into a denial of world revolution.
Murphy, John Thomas. Stalin, London, John Lane, 1945, p. 103
 
This was precisely the basis of his disagreement with Trotsky at this time.  Trotsky insisted that the revolution must reach to the boundaries of Western Europe or perish, and question of accomplishing this task governed all his views of policy within Russia.
Murphy, John Thomas. Stalin, London, John Lane, 1945, p. 114
 
June 17, 1931--the essential feature of Stalinism...is that it frankly aims at the successful establishment of socialism in one country without waiting for world Revolution.
Duranty, Walter.  Duranty Reports Russia. New York: The Viking Press, 1934, p. 195
 
Pravda's expressions of opinion are carefully prepared and fully authoritative.  The earlier editorial for the first time enunciated clearly what has become known as the Stalinist doctrine--that a successful socialist state can be established in the USSR irrespective of what happens abroad, with the important corollary that Soviet example--but not interference in the affairs of other countries--shall be true to the ultimate ideal of universal socialism.  In other words, the results in Russia shall count more than propaganda abroad.
Duranty, Walter.  Duranty Reports Russia. New York: The Viking Press, 1934, p. 367
 
Lenin shared the view that a simultaneous Revolution in a number of countries was unlikely.
Basseches, Nikolaus.  Stalin. London, New York: Staples Press, 1952, p. 113
 
            However, for reasons which have never been altogether cleared up, Trotsky in the early summer of 1926 entered into a bloc with Zinoviev and Kamenev.  Common jealousy of Stalin's predominant position and belief that their combined efforts might shake it probably influenced the formation of this alliance.  Then Trotsky, as far back as 1905, had proclaimed his so-called theory of permanent revolution, which fitted in easily with the line of criticism adopted by Zinoviev and Kamenev....
            Throughout 1926 and 1927 a furious theoretical controversy between the Stalinite majority and the opposition, headed by Trotsky, Zinoviev, and Kamenev raged around the questions whether socialism could be successfully built up in a single country, whether the Soviet economic system could properly be called socialist or state-capitalist, and how far the Russian Revolution was dependent upon the international revolutionary movement for permanent survival.  Conflicting texts from Lenin were hurled back and forth; and sometimes different meanings were extracted from the same text.  The balance of quotations from Lenin during the period of the War, when he was convinced that the day of general socialist revolution was not far off, would tend to establish a close connection between the success of the Bolshevik Revolution Russia and similar upheavals in other countries.  But one of the last things which Lenin wrote, a pamphlet on Cooperation, contains the statement that "we have all the means for the establishment of a socialist society."  (Collected works, Volume 33, page 468)
            [The actual quote is as follows:
            “Indeed, the power of the state over all large-scale means of production, political power in the hands of the proletariat, the alliance of this proletariat with the many millions of small and very small peasants, the assured proletarian leadership of the peasantry, etc.--is this not all that is necessary to build a complete socialist society out of co-operatives, out of cooperatives alone, which we formerly ridiculed as huckstering and which from a certain aspect we have the right to treat as such now, under NEP?  Is this not all that is necessary to build a complete socialist society?  It is still not the building of socialist society, but it is al that is necessary and sufficient for it.”
            To further destroy Trotsky’s theory of permanent revolution Stalin could also have quoted Lenin’s Collected Works, Volume 21, page 342 (August 23, 1915) wherein Lenin states:
            “Uneven economic and political development is an absolute law of capitalism.  Hence, the victory of socialism is possible first in several or even in one capitalist country alone.  After expropriating the capitalists and organizing their own socialist production, the victorious proletariat of that country will arise against the rest of the world--the capitalist world--attracting to its cause the oppressed classes of other countries, stirring uprisings in those countries against the capitalists and in case of need using even armed force against the exploiting classes and their states.”
            And Stalin could have quoted Lenin’s Collected Works, Volume 23. page 79 (written in September 1916) which states:
            “Thirdly, the victory of socialism in one country does not at one stroke eliminate all war in general.  On the contrary, it presupposes wars.  The development of capitalism proceeds extremely unevenly in different countries.  It cannot be otherwise under commodity production.  From this it follows irrefutably that socialism cannot achieve victory simultaneously in all countries.  It will achieve victory first in one or several countries, while the others will for some time remain bourgeois or pre-bourgeois.  This is bound to create not only friction, but a direct attempt on the part of the bourgeoisie of other countries to crush the socialist state’s victorious proletariat.  In such cases a war on our part would be a legitimate and just war.  It would be a war for socialism, for the liberation of other nations from the bourgeoisie.  Engels was perfectly right when, in his letter to Kautsky of September 12, 1882 he clearly stated that it was possible for already victorious socialism to wage “defensive wars.”  What he had in mind was defense of the victorious proletariat against the bourgeoisie of other countries.
            Only after we have overthrown, finally vanquished and expropriated the bourgeoisie of the whole world, and not merely of one country, will wars become impossible.”
            This citation was a powerful weapon for the Stalinites in their contention that it was possible to build up socialism in a single country.
Chamberlin, William Henry. Soviet Russia. Boston: Little, Brown, 1930, p. 72
 
            On larger issues, too, Stalin proved to be in the right as against Lenin and Trotsky.  He did not subscribe to their faith in an impending world revolution, and planned the defense of Russia without reference to any such illusory hopes.
Ludwig, Emil, Stalin. New York, New York: G. P. Putnam's sons, 1942, p. 63
 
            For five long years Stalin nowhere achieved independence.  In the war he was officially Trotsky's subordinate; in the state he was one among the 19 members of the Central Committee, and one among the five members of the Politburo; in both he was always overshadowed by Lenin and Trotsky.  But in one respect he always had a clearer vision than those two leaders.  For years both of them believed in the imminence of the world revolution, particularly in Germany.  Stalin denied this, and therefore demanded action of Draconian severity in Russia.  Long after the triumph of the Bolsheviks, Lenin declared that his own revolution was lost if Russia was to remain the only socialist country.  We may call this error heroic.
Ludwig, Emil, Stalin. New York, New York: G. P. Putnam's sons, 1942, p. 73
 
            Fundamentally Stalin and Trotsky both wanted the same things, namely, to build up the industrial state and to carry on the fight against the rich peasant, the kulak, who had survived in the middle position between the land-owning nobility and the un-liberated peasant.  But they wanted these things in different tempos, and the tempo was in each case related to the man's temperament.  Looking back today (1942) on what Stalin later achieved, we are inclined to admit that the spirit of history has vindicated him....  Furthermore, Stalin kept one eye fixed on Asia, the place of his origin, derived thence his standards and his tempo, and did not believe Europeans capable of the social revolution, whereas he already saw this dawning in China.
            On this decisive point Stalin proved to be in the right.  Trotsky, every inch the western European, had, with all his knowledge of peoples and languages, erred in the matter of Europe's revolutionary tempo.  What he called the permanent, meaning the world, revolution came neither in his day nor in ours, at least not in revolutionary forms; in spite of which Stalin did build up this individual state.
Ludwig, Emil, Stalin. New York, New York: G. P. Putnam's sons, 1942, p. 93
 
            Stalin who, in contrast to Lenin and Trotsky, never believed the world revolution imminent, really understood the utterly antirevolutionary character of the Germans.
Ludwig, Emil, Stalin. New York, New York: G. P. Putnam's sons, 1942, p. 124
 
            After the death of Lenin in 1924, a struggle developed among the leaders for the succession....  Stalin apparently, even in those days, was disposed to a program of the development of the communistic idea in Russia as "the first thing to do first," leaving the world revolution to take care of itself, whereas Trotsky was then and is now the ardent proponent of the idea that the world revolution was foremost.
Davies, Joseph E. Mission to Moscow. New York, New York: Simon and Schuster, c1941, p. 34
 
            Stalin gave a severe rebuff to the enemies of the proletarian revolution--Bukharin and Preobrazhensky.  These opportunists asserted at the Congress that Russia could not be the first country to achieve a successful Socialist revolution.  To this assertion Comrade Stalin replied: "We must abandon the antiquated idea that only Europe can show us the way.  There is dogmatic Marxism and creative Marxism.  I stand by the latter."  ("Reply to Preobrazhensky on Point 9 of the Resolution on the Political Situation,"  Lenin and Stalin, 1917.)
Yaroslavsky, Emelian.  Landmarks in the Life of Stalin. Moscow: FLPH, 1940, p. 90
 
            Stalin stated, "There is such a thing as dogmatic Marxism and creative Marxism.  I stand on the latter ground."
Levine, Isaac Don.  Stalin.  New York: Cosmopolitan Book Corporation, c1931, p. 132
 
            Lenin also made mistakes and admitted to them.  At the 18th Congress Stalin declared communism could be built in one country.  That conclusion certainly runs counter to Marxism-Leninism.  At that time I didn't agree, but I didn't speak out.
Chuev, Feliks.  Molotov Remembers. Chicago: I. R. Dee, 1993, p. 284
 
            Stalin whole-heartedly supported Lenin.  At the Sixth (illegal) Congress of the Party, in August, 1917, Stalin reported upon the political situation.  He strongly opposed the addition to the ninth point of the Resolution on the political situation, of an amendment, inspired by Trotsky and proposed by Preobrazhensky, making the construction of the Socialist State dependent on the outbreak of proletarian revolution in the West (this question of "establishing Socialism in one country only" is one of those around which the Opposition and the majority of the Party have fought one another most bitterly--even until quite recent years).
Barbusse, Henri. Stalin. New York: The Macmillan company, 1935, p. 52
 
            ...Nevertheless, this discussion seems to us to be strange enough, even for its time.  For to what other methods could the Russian Revolution have recourse, since it was evidently incapable of immediately imposing the proletarian Revolution upon the other countries of the world, than to build up socialism to the best of its ability in the only territory occupied by it?  What else could it do?  Leave the conquered territory to stagnate whilst it devoted itself to the future conquest of the rest of the world?
Barbusse, Henri. Stalin. New York: The Macmillan company, 1935, p. 174
 
            Trotsky, Zinoviev, Kamenev and those other gentlemen who later became spies and agents of fascism, denied that it was possible to build socialism in our country unless the victory of the socialist revolution was first achieved in other countries, in the capitalist countries.  As a matter of fact, these gentlemen wanted to turn our country back to the path of bourgeois development, and they concealed their apostasy by hypocritically talking about the "victory of the revolution" in other countries.  This was precisely the point of controversy between our Party and these gentlemen.  Our country's subsequent course of development proved that the Party was right and that Trotsky and Company were wrong.  For during this period we succeeded in liquidating our bourgeoisie, in establishing fraternal collaboration with our peasantry, and in building, in the main, a socialist society, notwithstanding the fact that the socialist revolution has not yet been victorious in other countries.
Stalin, Joseph. Stalin's Kampf. New York: Howell, Soskin & Company, c1940, p. 158
 
            What Stalin told the party was, roughly, this: Of course we are looking forward to international revolution.  Of course we have been brought up in the school of Marxism; and we know that contemporary social and political struggles are, by their very nature, international.  Of course we still believe the victory of the proletariat in the West to be near; and we are bound in honor to do what we can to speed it up.  But--and this was a very big, a highly suggestive 'but'--do not worry so much about all that international revolution.  Even if it were to be delayed indefinitely, even if it were never to occur, we in this country are capable of developing into a full-fledged, classless society.  Let us then concentrate on our great constructive task.  Those who tell you that this is Utopia, that I'm preaching national narrow-mindedness, are themselves either adventurers or pusillanimous Social Democrats.  We, with our much despised muzhiks, have already done more for socialism than the proletariat of all other countries taken together; and, left alone with our muzhiks, we shall do the rest of the job.
Deutscher, Isaac. Stalin; A Political Biography. New York: Oxford Univ. Press, 1967, p. 290
 
(Sinclair’s comments only)
            I think it was the part of wisdom for him [Stalin] to withdraw from the effort to make a Bolshevik revolution throughout the rest of the world, according to the formula to which Trotsky is still adhering.
Sinclair and Lyons.  Terror in Russia?: Two Views. New York : Rand School Press, 1938, p. 53
 
            ... Was it possible or impossible to build Socialism in one country, particularly Russia?
            Stalin answered this question by declaring: "Yes, it is possible, and it is not only possible, but necessary and inevitable."
            Zinoviev and Kamenev disputed this answer, and by July of 1926 had openly joined Trotsky in one united opposition bloc against the policy of Stalin and the Central Committee of the Communist Party.
            When this opposition to the Central Committee's policy had been rebuffed and rejected by the overwhelming majority of the Communist Party, Trotsky, Zinoviev, and Kamenev resorted to secret factional activities on a large scale.  For this Zinoviev and others were brought to book by the Party.  Following the 1926 July meeting of the Central Committee, Zinoviev was expelled from the Party.
Shepherd, W. G.  The Moscow Trial. London: Communist Party of Great Britain, 1936, p. 11
 
            The central “ideological” issue between them [Stalin and Trotsky] had been socialism in one country--the question whether the Soviet Union would or could achieve socialism in isolation, on the basis of national self-sufficiency, or whether socialism was conceivable only as an international order of society.
Deutscher, Isaac. The Prophet Outcast. London, New York: Oxford Univ. Press, 1963, p. 515
 
            Stalin, while insisting that revolutions were about to break out in Europe, continued to stipulate that the Russian Communist Party should concentrate on building “socialism in one country.”  There was no fundamental paradox in Stalin’s change of policy.  His controversial commitment to socialism in one country did not imply a basic disregard for the necessity of international revolution.  Stalin had never ceased to accept that the USSR would face problems of security until such time as one or more of the globe’s great powers underwent a revolution of the Soviet kind.  This did not mean, however, that he was willing to risk direct intervention in Europe; he still feared provoking a crusade against the USSR.  But he no longer sought to restrain the communist parties in Germany, France, and Italy which had made no secret of their frustration with the Comintern’s insistence that they should collaborate with social-democratic and labor parties in their countries.
Service, Robert. Stalin. Cambridge, Mass.: Belknap Press of Harvard Univ. Press, 2005, p. 262
 
STALIN AND TROTSKY CLASH OVER VOTING FOR THE REVOLUTION
 
Two members, Kamenev and Zinoviev, voted against the resolution outright, denouncing it as adventurism.  And then came the first dispute between Stalin and Trotsky -- not a big affair, but a forerunner of much to follow.  Trotsky moved an amendment proposing that the uprising should not be started before the second Congress of Soviets met.  Stalin was opposed to any delay.
Murphy, John Thomas. Stalin, London, John Lane, 1945, p. 109
 
            Zinoviev and Kamenev did not take part in the rising.  "At that moment," says Stalin, "they openly declared that in organizing the rising, we were rushing to our own destruction, that we should wait for the Constituent Assembly, that the conditions necessary for Socialism were not yet ripe and would not be so for some time....  Zinoviev and Kamenev joined the rising out of fear: Lenin drove them to it with a stick....  They were obliged to drag themselves into the rising....  Trotsky joined it willingly enough, but with a reservation which already, at that time, brought him nearer to Zinoviev and Kamenev....  He declared that if the Revolution did not break out and was not successful in Western Europe, revolutionary Russia would not be able to hold out against conservative Europe, and that to doubt this Trotskyist opinion was to give proof of national narrow-mindedness.
Barbusse, Henri. Stalin. New York: The Macmillan company, 1935, p. 52
 
LENIN DEMANDS ZINOVIEV AND KAMENEV BE EXPELLED
 
The defection of, Kamenev and Zinoviev, and the publication of their denunciation of the proposed uprising gave full publicity to the preparations already afoot and much which should have been kept secret.  Lenin angrily denounced them as "traitors" and " strike-breakers," and demanded their expulsion from the party.  The central committee denounced them, but refrained from the drastic course of expulsion.
Murphy, John Thomas. Stalin, London, John Lane, 1945, p. 110
 
            Zinoviev lacked decision and, but for Lenin's personal influence, would have left the Party altogether in 1917 because he refused to concur in the decision to revolt, on the grounds that the revolutionary movement was not yet strong enough....
Cole, David M.   Josef Stalin: Man of Steel.  London, New York: Rich & Cowan, 1942, p. 66
 
            Lenin was now more and more insisting on the necessity of preparing for insurrection, of passing on to revolution.  In his letters, "The Bolsheviks Must Assume Power" and "Marxism and Insurrection," he severely condemned the capitulators, Kamenev, Zinoviev, and the other opponents of insurrection.
            At a meeting of the Central Committee on September 15th, the traitor, Kamenev went so far as to propose that a statement be inserted in the resolution to the effect that the Bolsheviks were opposed to all street actions whatsoever, and further that Lenin's letters be burnt, only one copy of each being preserved in the files.
Yaroslavsky, Emelian.  Landmarks in the Life of Stalin.  Moscow: FLPH, 1940, p. 93
 
            ...Infallible people do not exist, Lenin used to say....
            In 1917 Lenin called Zinoviev and Kamenev prostitutes for their treachery in the October Revolution.  And not only prostitutes but strikebreakers as well.  They were impeding us and directly helping the enemy.
Chuev, Feliks.  Molotov Remembers. Chicago: I. R. Dee, 1993, p. 139
 
Zinoviev and Kamenev committed an act of betrayal yet remained in the party, and they were even admitted into the Politburo.
            Certainly.  Stalin helped Zinoviev and Kamenev.  Why?  Because there were very few trained people.  They could not be trusted, but it was very difficult to do without them.  Politics is a complicated matter.  At that time Lenin demanded their expulsion from the party, but Stalin and Sverdlov objected.
            Zinoviev and Kamenev remained in the Politburo for several years following their treachery.  There were only five members--Lenin, Stalin, Zinoviev, Kamenev, and Trotsky.  Two of the five Lenin had called prostitutes, and before that he had often called Trotsky "Little Judas."  He had also called him an irreconcilable enemy, and so forth.  But Trotsky remained in the Politburo and was head of the army during the civil war.  So Lenin made use of him.
Chuev, Feliks.  Molotov Remembers. Chicago: I. R. Dee, 1993, p. 139
 
            Both Zinoviev and Bukharin were certainly against Lenin, but they could not be dealt with at once.  Everything depends on stages....
Chuev, Feliks.  Molotov Remembers. Chicago: I. R. Dee, 1993, p. 143
 
            ...Both [Zinoviev and Kamenev] claimed we did not have a dictatorship of the proletariat but a dictatorship of the party.  That's how the Mensheviks reasoned: you Bolsheviks are well organized, you seized power, and you are cut off from the people....  But Lenin said, "No, we have a dictatorship of a class, a dictatorship of the proletariat headed by communists.  We are not cut off from the people, from the working class, we are part of it, the leading, guiding, directing force."
Chuev, Feliks. Molotov Remembers. Chicago: I. R. Dee, 1993, p. 146
 
            "But," adds Stalin, "apart from these three, Lenin and the Party went forward without reservations."
            Zinoviev and Kamenev carried hostility and lack of discipline to the point of publicly attacking, in a newspaper article, the decision to rise--which, naturally, was a secret.  This betrayal allowed Kerensky to take armed offensive measures.  Lenin treated Zinoviev and Kamenev as "strikebreakers," and spoke of excluding them from the Party.  As a result, they both left the Central Committee.
            During October, the Central Committee appointed Stalin a member of the Assembly of Five (for the political management of the Revolution) and of the Assembly of Seven (for the organization of the Revolution).
Barbusse, Henri. Stalin. New York: The Macmillan company, 1935, p. 53
 
            Only Zinoviev and Kamenev now voted against insurrection, and on October 18th published their well-known letter in Gorky's Novaya Zhizn, saying so.
            Lenin's fury was intense, and he demanded their expulsion from the party as 'strike-breakers'.  Zinoviev wrote to the party paper Rabochii Put, edited by Stalin (which had temporarily replaced the now illegal Pravda), denying Lenin's charges and saying that the matter could be discussed later.  Stalin published this, and even added an editorial comment expressing the hope that the matter might 'be considered closed' as, in spite of Lenin's 'sharp tone', the Bolsheviks were 'fundamentally' in agreement.  When the Central Committee met again on Oct. 20, Stalin opposed the expulsion of Zinoviev and Kamenev.  When criticized, he offered his resignation as editor.
Conquest, Robert. Stalin: Breaker of Nations. New York, New York: Viking, 1991, p. 68
 
            A new meeting of the Central Committee on Oct. 16, which was attended by prominent non-members of the Committee, confirmed the previous decision in favor of insurrection.  On the morrow Zinoviev and Kamenev carried the struggle against Lenin into the open and warned public opinion against the insurrection in Gorky's newspaper Novaya Zhizn (New Life), which stood halfway between Bolshevism and Menshevism.  Lenin, furious at the indiscretion, branded his two colleagues as 'strike-breakers', 'traitors to the revolution', and demanded their immediate expulsion from the party.  The penalty seemed too harsh to the other members of the Committee.  Stalin published Lenin's denunciation in the Bolshevik newspaper, but softened its effect by a conciliatory editorial comment meant to bridge the gap between the opposed viewpoints.
Deutscher, Isaac. Stalin; A Political Biography. New York: Oxford Univ. Press, 1967, p. 164
 
            One cannot expect the millionaire press, or the Daily Herald of today, to present to their readers the real facts about this "Old Guard."  But here they are:
            Zinoviev and Kamenev were not the leaders and inspirers of the Russian Revolution which began in Petrograd in 1917.  In point of fact, as members of the Central Committee of the Bolshevik Party at the time, they opposed and voted against the uprising.  What is more, they took the step of making public the plans of the Bolsheviks by publishing them in the newspaper Novaya Zhizn ("New Life") in Petrograd.  There and then Lenin denounced these two, demanding their expulsion from the Party, classing them as "strike-breakers" of the Revolution.  But Zinoviev and Kamenev recanted and were allowed to remain members.
Shepherd, W. G. The Moscow Trial. London: Communist Party of Great Britain, 1936, p. 11
 
STALIN IS ONE OF THE MAJOR LEADERS OF REVOLT IN LENINGRAD
 
Stalin was directing the revolutionary armed contingents to all the decisive points of the city [Petrograd].  He was not in the limelight, but in his hands were the reins which guided forces in accordance with the collective will.
            ...Kerensky dived into an American motor-car and fled.
Murphy, John Thomas. Stalin, London, John Lane, 1945, p. 111
 
            Early in August 1917, the Sixth Party Congress met secretly in Petrograd.  In the absence of Lenin, Stalin delivered the Central Committee's report to the 267 delegates, displaying great skill and persuasiveness...
Grey, Ian. Stalin, Man of History. London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1979, p. 95
 
            On the afternoon of 24 October, the day the struggle for the city [Leningrad] began, Stalin reported on the current situation to a caucus of Bolshevik delegates, who had assembled in preparation for the opening on the next day of the Congress of Soviets.  This report, along with the continuing responsibility for the editorial line of the party organ, disposes of the idea that Stalin was inactive during the seizure of power.  In the speech he displayed a knowledge of the details concerning both the political and military aspects of the insurrection, which indicates that he was in close touch with the headquarters of the operation in Smolny Institute.
McNeal, Robert, Stalin: Man and Ruler. New York: New York University Press, 1988, p. 39
 
STALIN IS ONE OF TOP REVOLUTIONARY LEADERS
 
There were three definite trends within the Bolshevik party at the very moment that it became the leading party of the revolution and took the reins of the newly formed Soviet government.  The leaders in the central committee were Lenin, Stalin, Sverdlov, and Dzerzhinsky, representing Lenin's version of Marxism.  Kamenev, Zinoviev, and Rykov formed a group with a policy at times indistinguishable from that of the Mensheviks, and Bukharin, Radek, Shliapnikov headed a group of "left communists."  Trotsky vacillated from group to group.
            Lenin regarded the Bolshevik party as the general staff of the proletariat waging an age long war.
Murphy, John Thomas. Stalin, London, John Lane, 1945, p. 113
 
            ... so that to ensure a speedy victory, an organized military force would be needed when the actual insurrection began.  With special orders to prepare for this eventuality, the Party appointed a Military Revolutionary Center, consisting of Stalin, Sverdlov, Bubnov, Uritsky, and Dzerzhinsky, placing in its hands the entire military direction of the rising.  Once more Lenin's choice fell upon the "wonderful Georgian" when he needed organizing ability and tactical sense.
Cole, David M.  Josef Stalin; Man of Steel. London, New York: Rich & Cowan, 1942, p. 40
 
            The enlarged meeting of the Bolshevik Central Committee of October 16th placed Comrade Stalin at the head of the Party Center for the direction of the uprising.
Yaroslavsky, Emelian. Landmarks in the Life of Stalin. Moscow: FLPH, 1940, p. 94
 
            In October 1924 Stalin, for the first time, started to denigrate, though not yet to dismiss entirely, Trotsky's role in the October Revolution....  Trotsky, Stalin noted, had not even been a member of the five-man 'center' appointed to conduct the seizure of power, though Stalin himself was on it.
Conquest, Robert. Stalin: Breaker of Nations. New York, New York: Viking, 1991, p. 121
 
            He [Stalin] distinguished himself in his practical capacities; and, with the exception of Trotsky who led the Petersburg Soviet from autumn 1905, he had a much more influential role in the events of that turbulent year [1917] than any other member of the first Party Politburo formed after the October Revolution.  Dzhughashvili debated frequently with the Georgian Mensheviks.  He talked at workers' meetings.  He was one of the most productive writers for Proletarians Bzdzola.
Service, Robert. Stalin. Cambridge, Mass.: Belknap Press of Harvard Univ. Press, 2005, p. 59
 
 
            His jobs in the Central Committee and at Pravda involved so much writing with pen or pencil that calluses appeared on the fingers of his right hand.  With the work came authority.  Lenin and Zinoviev were fugitives.  Trotsky, Kamenev, and Kollontai were in prison.  The party leadership fell into the hands of Stalin and Sverdlov since they were the only members of the inner core of the Central Committee who were still at liberty.  Such a situation would have disconcerted many.  But Stalin and Sverdlov overbrimmed with confidence as they sought to repair the damage caused to the party by the July Days--and Stalin relished the chance to show that he had political skills which few in the party had as yet detected in him....
            By the start of the clandestine Sixth Party Congress in late July there was no doubt about Stalin's eminence among Bolsheviks.  He was chosen by the Central Committee to give its official report as well as another 'on the political situation'.
Service, Robert. Stalin. Cambridge, Mass.: Belknap Press of Harvard Univ. Press, 2005, p. 135
 
            Presumably it was his editorial duties that prevented him [Stalin] from attending the Central Committee on the same day.  Trotsky too was absent, but this did not inhibit him from denigrating Stalin as a man who avoided participation in the decisions and activities connected with the seizure of power.  The story got around--and has kept its currency--that Stalin was 'the man who missed the revolution'.  Proof was thought to lie in the assignments given by the Central Committee to its own members.  Here is a list of assignments:
            Bubnov-- railways
            Dzerzhenski --post and telegraph
            Milyutin--food supplies
            Sverdlov --surveillance of Provisional Government
            Kamenev and Vinter--negotiations with left SR's
            Lomov and Nogin--information to Moscow
 
            Trotsky thought this demonstrated the marginality of Joseph Stalin to the historic occasion being planned.
            Yet if inclusion on the list was crucial, why were Trotsky and Lenin omitted?  And if commitment to the insurrection was a criterion, why did the Central Committee involve Kamenev?  The point was that Lenin had to remain in hiding and Trotsky was busy in the Military-Revolutionary Committee.  Stalin as newspaper editor also had tasks which preoccupied him, and these tasks were not unimportant.  As soon as he had time, he returned to the Smolny Institute and rejoined his leading comrades.  There he was instantly given a job, being sent with Trotsky to brief the Bolshevik delegates who had arrived in the building for the Second Congress of Soviets.
Service, Robert. Stalin. Cambridge, Mass.: Belknap Press of Harvard Univ. Press, 2005, p. 144
 
            The fact that Stalin was not asked to direct any armed activity has perpetuated a legend that he counted for nothing in the Central Committee.  This is to ignore the broader scope of the meeting.  The Military-Revolutionary Committee had already made its dispositions of the garrisons and Red Guards.  Stalin’s functions had previously precluded him from involvement in such activity and it would have been folly to insert him at the last moment.
Service, Robert. Stalin. Cambridge, Mass.: Belknap Press of Harvard Univ. Press, 2005, p. 146
 
            He had done his jobs, important party jobs, with diligence and efficiency.  With Sverdlov he had run the Central Committee in July and August.  He had edited the central party newspaper through to the seizure of power in October.  Since April he had helped to bring about the pragmatic adjustment of party policy to popular demands.  He felt at home in the environment of revolutionary Russia; and when he came back to the Alliluev flat he was greeted by admirers.  He wrote, edited, discussed, and planned with eagerness.
Service, Robert. Stalin. Cambridge, Mass.: Belknap Press of Harvard Univ. Press, 2005, p. 147
 
            Far from fitting the bureaucratic stereotype, he was a dynamic leader who had a hand in nearly all the principal discussions on politics, military strategy, economics, security, and international relations.  Lenin phoned or telegraphed Politburo members whenever a controversial matter was in the air.  There were few corners of high public affairs where Stalin’s influence was unknown; and the Politburo frequently turned to him when a sudden emergency arose.
Service, Robert. Stalin. Cambridge, Mass.: Belknap Press of Harvard Univ. Press, 2005, p. 174
 
            To Koba was ascribed direct leadership of the Baku "militant activities".
Trotsky, Leon, Stalin. New York: Harper and Brothers Publishers, 1941, p. 124
 
            On the 24th of March, 1910, the gendarme Captain Martynov stated that he had arrested Joseph Djugashvili, known under the alias of "Koba," a member of the Baku Committee, "a most active Party worker who occupied a leading position."
Trotsky, Leon, Stalin. New York: Harper and Brothers Publishers, 1941, p. 125
 
LENIN SENT STALIN WHEN HE WANTED A GOOD NEGOTIATOR
 
Kamenev had been sent to confer, but without avail, and Stalin was dispatched--with complete success.  It was Stalin whom Lenin sent to Finland to aid the Finnish revolution; it was Stalin who was sent as plenipotentiary of the Soviet government to negotiate with the Ukrainian Rada and bring about its collapse in favor of the Ukrainian Soviet government.
Murphy, John Thomas. Stalin, London, John Lane, 1945, p. 117
 
            All his foreign visitors were impressed by his mastery of the factual material related to the case at hand.  Above all, he knew what goals he considered essential in any negotiation and struggle with unyielding determination to obtain them.
McNeal, Robert, Stalin: Man and Ruler. New York: New York University Press, 1988, p. 216
 
 
LENIN FOUGHT TROTSKY’S EVISCERATING THE PARTY
 
The events had revealed again that the Bolshevik party was far from being thoroughly united.  The old struggle which had marked the history of the social Democratic Labor Party until the split of 1912 was now raging furiously within the Bolshevik party itself.  And as before, Lenin not only won the struggle but raised his prestige enormously.  Again in a decisive hour he had saved the revolution when Trotsky and his supporters had nearly lost it.
Murphy, John Thomas. Stalin, London, John Lane, 1945, p. 119
 
            The polemics between Lenin and Trotsky were ceaseless after 1902.  After the Revolution Lenin knew Trotsky had split off but still kept him in the Politburo, along with Zinoviev and Kamenev.  The people he had to work with!  Lenin took to anyone who supported him in the slightest.
Chuev, Feliks. Molotov Remembers. Chicago: I. R. Dee, 1993, p. 121
 
            Just because in those years conciliationism became epidemic, Lenin saw in it the greatest menace to the development of a revolutionary party.... in his crusade against that dangerous tendency he felt he had the right not to make any distinction between its objective sources.  On the contrary, he attacked with redoubled ferocity those Conciliators whose basic positions were closest to Bolshevism.  Avoiding public conflict with the conciliationist wing of the Bolshevik faction itself, Lenin chose to direct his polemics against "Trotskyism," especially since I, as has already been said, attempted to provide a "theoretical foundation" for conciliationism.  Quotations from that violent polemic were later to render Stalin a service for which they were certainly not intended.
Trotsky, Leon, Stalin. New York: Harper and Brothers Publishers, 1941, p. 113
 
TROTSKY FOUGHT LENIN ON CONCLUDING PEACE
 
Lenin said in so far as Trotsky's tactics were directed towards playing for time, they were correct; they became wrong when the state of war was declared to be at an end and peace was not signed.
Murphy, John Thomas. Stalin, London, John Lane, 1945, p. 120
 
 
Trotsky's attempt to impose the arbitrary dimensions of Europe as a prerequisite of victory within Russia had jeopardized the revolution and cost Soviet Russia a loss of considerable territory and people.
Murphy, John Thomas. Stalin, London, John Lane, 1945, p. 121
 
Trotsky would not have been Trotsky without a special standpoint of his own.  He was the leader of the Russian delegation for the peace negotiations at Brest-Litovsk.  He did not comply with Lenin's desire for the immediate conclusion of peace.
Basseches, Nikolaus. Stalin. London, New York: Staples Press, 1952, p. 124
 
            As was to be expected, the Germans took Trotsky’s declaration as a breaking off of the negotiations.  They denounced the armistice and advanced.  The result was the occupation not only of the whole of the Ukraine, but of the Baltic provinces, the Caucasus, and southern Russia.  Peace had to be signed under new and much worse conditions.  Trotsky never admitted his error.
Basseches, Nikolaus. Stalin London, New York: Staples Press, 1952, p. 124-126
 
            Viewed from this angle, Trotsky's error of judgment [his negotiating delays allowed the Germans to seize ever more Russian territory] was to a great extent the cause of the Civil War and the Allied intervention which plunged a Russia into miseries never before endured by any nation.
Cole, David M.  Josef Stalin; Man of Steel. London, New York: Rich & Cowan, 1942, p. 44
 
            The position of the Soviet state was further weekend by Trotsky's attempt to deal with advancing troops by clever phrases.  He refused to sign terms but protested in the formula: "Neither war nor peace"--an appeal to the conscience of the German people.  But general staffs are not expected to have a conscience, and no Germans acted to save the Russians.  The invading army marched far into the Ukraine and took possession, giving in the end worse terms than those originally offered....
            If Germany offered the Bolsheviks only a robber's… peace, their former allies gave them no peace at all.
Strong, Anna Louise. This Soviet World. New York, N. Y: H. Holt and company, c1936, p. 139
 
            "Never, it seems," Comrade Stalin says in "On the Opposition," "did the struggle in the Party among the Bolsheviks reach such a pitch of ferocity as during this period, the period of the Brest-Litovsk peace."
Yaroslavsky, Emelian.  Landmarks in the Life of Stalin. Moscow: FLPH, 1940, p. 100
 
 
            Trotsky was cunning.  During the vote on whether to except the Brest peace treaty, he said he would adhere to his own opinion, non-acceptance.  But Lenin said he would resign from the Central Committee and go to the masses to struggle against the Central Committee if it should vote to reject signing the peace.  Trotsky said that inasmuch as this would lead to a split in the party, he would abstain.  Lenin then got a majority by one vote.
Chuev, Feliks. Molotov Remembers. Chicago: I. R. Dee, 1993, p. 142
 
            ...Trotsky's attitude was equivocal.  He propounded the formula "Neither peace nor war," but did not explain what this meant in practical terms.  His attitude served only to embitter the discussion, whose memory remained to become a nail in many a coffin.
Duranty, Walter. Story of Soviet Russia. Philadelphia, N. Y.: JB Lippincott Co. 1944, p. 42
 
 
VAST EXPROPRIATIONS BEGIN IN 1918
 
Beyond the nationalization of the banks and the land no more than 500 individual enterprises had been nationalized by July 1918.  But an unprecedented storm was gathering that was to force the Soviet government into what has been designated "War communism," when nationalization, requisitioning, and rationing were to become drastic political weapons for the maintenance of Soviet power.
Murphy, John Thomas. Stalin, London, John Lane, 1945, p. 122
 
 
DESCRIPTION OF BAD CONDITIONS AFTER THE REVOLUTION
 
            Shortly after the great days after the beginning of November 1917, General Alexiev, the Chief of Staff of Kerensky’s army, made his way to the Don region and began the organization of the “Volunteer People’s Army” to fight the Soviet Government.  Then, in December, the Mensheviks of Tiflis captured the local arsenal.  Alexiev was joined by Generals Kornilov and Denikin.  The Ukrainian National Government supported the Don Cossacks against the Ukrainian Soviet Government, with its headquarters in Kharkov.  The Russian Soviet Government moved from Petrograd to Moscow as the German forces threatened to march on Petrograd.  During February and March, 1918, British troops were landed at Murmansk.  General Mannerheim invited the Germans to send him military assistance to crush the Finnish Revolution.  Thirty thousand troops under General Von der Goltz arrived, and during March the Finnish Revolution was crushed.  In the first week of July the “Left” Social Revolutionaries and the anarchists staged an armed revolt in Moscow, denouncing the Bolsheviks as “betrayers of the Revolution.”  A corps of Czecho-Slovaks (Austro-Hungarian prisoners of war) seized Chelyabinsk on the trans-Siberian railway.  The Social Revolutionaries murdered V. Volardarsky, the People’s Commissar of the Press.  The Germans were in control of the Ukraine.  The Turks were invading the Caucasus.  The food situation was becoming increasingly serious as the forces of counter-revolution closed in from every side.  They were threatening Tzaritsyn (now Stalingrad) and the whole system of food-supply from the south when Stalin was charged with the task of securing the Republic’s larder.
Murphy, John. Stalin, London, John Lane, 1945, p. 123
 
            It was not the introduction of Socialism by Lenin which produced this ghastly poverty and want; it was the war lost by the Czar, it was the ensuing civil war, which so disorganized the country that in the year 1922 only 51 million dessiatine were sown with crops as against 100,000.000 in 1913.  The harvest amounted to 2.8 billion pud as against 6 billion in 1913.  The production in industry in 1920 was 15 percent of that in 1913.  The World War cost Czarist Russia $40 billion; the cost of the civil war was another 50 billion.  Lenin had to construct his new state in the midst of a catastrophic collapse, and to sign a peace after a war conducted by the Czar,....
Ludwig, Emil, Stalin. New York, New York: G. P. Putnam's sons, 1942, p. 70
 
            Not through the Communists, but through the violent inroads of western powers, who had no business in Russia, the country had become involved in ever greater wars and disasters....  It was not a handful of doctrinaires and dreamers who ruined the country, but the heads of international banks and industrial establishments who, by means of the governments they controlled, sent their armies to the country of dangerous experiments in order to save their oil and their investments and at the same time suppress any imitations at home.
Ludwig, Emil, Stalin. New York, New York: G. P. Putnam's sons, 1942, p. 147
 
            The Soviet Union of the early 1920s was a land of deprivation.  Hunger was everywhere, and actual mass famines swept across much of the countryside.  Industrial production was extremely low, and the technological level of industry was so backward that there seemed little possibility of mechanizing agriculture.  Serious rebellions in the armed forces were breaking out, most notably at the Kronstadt garrison in 1921.  By 1924 large-scale peasant revolts were erupting, particularly in Georgia.  There was virtually no electricity outside the large cities.  Agriculture was based on tiny peasant holdings and medium-sized farms seized by rural capitalists (the kulaks) who forced the peasants back into wage labor and tenant farming.  Health care was almost non-existence in much of the country.  The technical knowledge and skills needed to develop modern industry, agriculture, health, and education were concentrated in the hands of a few, mostly opposed to socialism, while the vast majority of the population were illiterate and could hardly think about education while barely managing to subsist.  The Soviet Union was isolated in a world controlled by powerful capitalist countries, physically surrounding it, setting up economic blockades, and officially refusing to recognize its existence while outdoing each other in their pledges to wipe out this Red menace.
Franklin, Bruce, Ed. The Essential Stalin; Major Theoretical Writings.  Garden City, New York: Anchor Books, 1972, p. 7
 
TROTSKY’S HUGE EGO AND NOT A TEAM PLAYER
 
The disagreement [between Trotsky and the Bolsheviks] was fundamental and was never eliminated.  It was now to appear again in quarrels with Stalin concerning the Red Army.  The fact is, he [Trotsky] never really accepted the principal governing the relationship of Lenin's party with the masses because he was incapable of believing in the creative power of the proletariat.  He was an egotist, with all the over-confidence of the egotist.  He was of the stuff of which dictators are made, and his conception of leadership had as its premise the recognition of his abilities plus a proletariat which would do as he ordered.  They had to be organized.  He would organize them as part of a machine under the control of a staff drawn from the middle classes--the intelligentsia and the Army officers, with himself at the head.  He was efficient.  He admired efficiency.  But he could never surrender himself to the idea of integrating himself with the proletariat, or believe that the qualities he saw in the middle-classes were latent in the proletariat also and that the revolutionary struggle would bring the working-classes into the ranks of leadership.  They could be educated in the long run, he thought, but not in the short.  His intellectual snobbery ruined him as a revolutionary.
Murphy, John Thomas. Stalin, London, John Lane, 1945, p. 125
 
 
In his memoirs British agent Bruce Lockhart writes, "we had not handled Trotsky wisely.  At the time of the first Revolution he was in exile in America.  He was then neither a Menshevik nor a Bolshevik.  He was what Lenin called a Trotskyist -- that is to say, an individualist and an opportunist.  A revolutionary with the temperament of an artist and physical courage, he had never been and never could be a good party man."
Sayers and Kahn. The Great Conspiracy. Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1946, p. 190
 
Before the Revolution the Bolshevik and Menshevik wings of the Russian social democracy were in perpetual conflict.  The head of the former was Lenin, the highest authority among the latter was held by Plekhanov.  Trotsky could recognize no other authority than his own.  His temperament and his whole nature drove him to radicalism.
            It is remarkable that everything in Trotsky’s character and career that helped him forward also contributed to his fall.  Why?  Because everything promoted his radical defect, his vanity.
Basseches, Nikolaus. Stalin. London, New York: Staples Press, 1952, p. 119
 
It was entirely intelligible that the young Trotsky should join the revolutionaries....  Very soon, however, he lost the vivid concrete love and compassion for the individual human being.  More and more he saw only the masses in whose name and for whose benefit he pursued his social and political ideas.  The sense of being an intellectual revolutionary leader lifted Trotsky in his own estimation above the masses.  He felt his superiority to all whom he met; he never felt close to the masses, whether Russian or Jewish, but enthroned himself, quite unconsciously, in Olympian aloofness above real life, above the masses.  He remained essentially an aristocrat.
Basseches, Nikolaus. Stalin. London, New York: Staples Press, 1952, p. 121
 
Trotsky's habit of always taking up a standpoint of his own and his clearly paraded sense of his own superiority were bound, when Lenin died, to lead to trouble.  His first personal conflict then came in the Politbureau, and it was with Zinoviev.
            Kamenev was entirely loyal to Zinoviev, and in politics almost servile.
Basseches, Nikolaus. Stalin. London, New York: Staples Press, 1952, p. 129
 
            Perusal of those articles which have survived from Stalin's writings in Turukhansk shows that their author's distaste for the methods and the personality of Trotsky was not dimmed since their last clash.  In one of these he suggests with some truth that as a result of the years spent in pretending to stand above the Party squabbles, Trotsky had become congenitally incapable of sharing anyone else's position but must at all costs differentiate himself from all other groups.  In view of the fact that Trotsky had adopted such a pointless stand on the war question, this suggestion is perhaps the most charitable of all.
Cole, David M.  Josef Stalin; Man of Steel. London, New York: Rich & Cowan, 1942, p. 36
 
            Two more completely contrasting personalities cannot be imagined.  Trotsky, the revolutionary per excellence, brilliant as an orator and the ablest polemical writer of his time, but deficient in constructive ability and congenitally incapable of working in harmony with others.
Cole, David M.  Josef Stalin; Man of Steel. London, New York: Rich & Cowan, 1942, p. 62
 
            One further point in Stalin's favor was the personal relations existing between Trotsky and the other leading figures.  For this Trotsky had only himself to blame.  Arrogant, cynical, contemptuous of mediocrity, his whole career had been dotted with violent outbursts directed against innumerable lesser personages.
Cole, David M.  Josef Stalin; Man of Steel. London, New York: Rich & Cowan, 1942, p. 63
 
            Both temperamental and political factors were involved in Trotsky's fall.  Throughout his long revolutionary career, up to 1917, Trotsky was a man of such strong individuality that he could never remain long within the ranks of an organized political party or group.  He had to be leader or nothing.  He came into frequent and bitter clashes with Lenin, whom, as late as 1913, he called "that professional exploiter of every backwardness in the Russian labor movement," adding: "the whole edifice of Leninism at the present time is based on lies and falsifications, and contains within itself the poisonous beginning of its own disintegration."
Chamberlin, William Henry. Soviet Russia. Boston: Little, Brown, 1930, p. 94
 
            In this process, the factor of purely individual interest plays a much less important role than we ourselves might be tempted to believe.  Animosity between individuals, though it may often have resulted from Opposition, has never in any circumstances been the cause of it.  And it is only in the case of Trotsky that we have to take into account a certain amount of strictly personal element, namely Trotsky's opinion of his own importance, which he possesses in a very high degree.  His very self-willed nature, his intolerance of any form of criticism ("He never forgets an attack on his ambition," said Lenin) and his disappointment at not being put at the head of affairs without any associates, have a great deal to do with his hostility.  Ideology is the arsenal in which this hostility naturally equips itself with a perfect armament.
Barbusse, Henri. Stalin. New York: The Macmillan company, 1935, p. 159
 
            ...he [Trotsky] finds the support and complicity of a motley collection of enemies of the Soviet regime, and even without referring to his present political activities, one cannot blind one's eyes to the dagger-thrusts which have been aimed by him and his followers at the USSR and at the Communist International.  They really constituted an attempt to assassinate them, an effort to destroy them.
            Need one repeat that the personal factor undoubtedly very largely influenced Trotsky's attitude?  Even during Lenin's lifetime, his incompatibility with all the other leaders became apparent.  "It is very difficult to work with this comrade," grumbled Zinoviev, who, however, was more than once to be found in his camp.  Trotsky was much too much of a Trotskyist!
            Up to what point was it Trotsky's despotic character, his rancor at being supplanted, at being neglected among the others instead of shining alone, his "Bonapartism," that induced him to break with the Party and to construct for himself a sort of patchwork imitation Leninism, and to start a political war with the more or less implicitly expressed object of the formation of a new Party, namely a Fourth International?  It is very difficult to say.  One cannot, however, avoid remarking that Trotsky led an intensive Opposition against the Party in 1921 and again in 1923 and that, in the interval, in the year 1922, in a speech before the Fourth Congress, he defended all the points of view of the majority on the thorny question of the NEP in a very concise manner.  This did not prevent the Trotskyist Opposition, brandishing the theory of permanent Revolution, from endeavoring to show, on the morrow of the Congress, that the Revolution had come to a standstill and that the NEP was a capitalist degeneration, a kind of Thermidor.  These contradictory attitudes which followed one another at such a short interval of time seem to show the intervention of some artificial factor of an exclusively personal nature.
Barbusse, Henri. Stalin. New York: The Macmillan company, 1935, p. 165
 
            Nor was Trotsky's personality an asset.  He was widely disliked for arrogance and lack of tact: as he himself admitted, he had a reputation for "unsociability, individualism, aristocratism.  Even his admiring biographer concedes he "could rarely withstand the temptation to remind others of their errors and to insist on his superiority and insight.  Scorning the collegiate style of Lenin and the other Bolshevik leaders, he demanded, as commander of the country's armed forces, unquestioned obedience to himself, giving rise to talk of "Bonapartist" ambitions.  Thus in November 1920 angered by reports of insubordination among Red Army troops facing Wrangel, he issued an order that contained the following passage: "I, your Red leader, appointed by the government and invested with the confidence of the people, demand complete faith in myself."  All attempts to question his orders were to be dealt with by summary execution.  His high-handed administrative style attracted the attention of the Central Committee, which in July 1919 subjected him to severe criticism.  His ill-considered attempt to militarize labor in 1920, not only cast doubts on his judgment, but reinforced suspicions of Bonapartism.  In March 1922 he addressed a long statement to the Politburo, urging that the party withdraw from direct involvement in managing the economy.  The Politburo rejected his proposals and Lenin, as was his wont with Trotsky's epistles, scribbled on it, "Into the Archive," but his opponents used it as evidence that Trotsky wanted to "liquidate the leading role of the Party."
            Refusing to involve himself in the routine of day-to-day politics, frequently absent from cabinet meetings and other administrative deliberations, Trotsky assumed the post of a statesman above the fray.  "For Trotsky, the main things were the slogan, the speaker's platform, the striking gesture, but not routine work.  His administrative talents were, indeed, of a low order.  The hoard of documents in the Trotsky archive at Harvard University, with numerous communications to Lenin, indicate a congenital incapacity for formulating succinct, practical solutions: as a rule, Lenin neither commented nor acted on them.
            For all these reasons, when in 1922 Lenin made arrangements to distribute his responsibilities, he passed over Trotsky.  He was much concerned that his successors govern in a collegial manner: Trotsky, never a "team player," simply did not fit.  We have the testimony of Lenin's sister, Maria Ulianova who was with him during the last period of his life, that while Lenin valued Trotsky's talents and industry, and for their sake kept his feelings to himself, "he did not feel sympathy for Trotsky": Trotsky "had too many qualities that made it extraordinarily difficult to work collectively with him."  Stalin suited Lenin's needs better.  Hence, Lenin assigned to Stalin ever greater responsibilities, with the result that as he faded from the scene, Stalin assumed the role of his surrogate, and thus in fact, if not in name, became his heir.
            [Footnote]: According to her [Lenin's sister] Trotsky, in contrast to Lenin, could not control his temper, and at one meeting of the Politburo called her brother a "hooligan."  Lenin turned white as chalk but made no reply:...
Pipes, Richard. Russia Under the Bolshevik Regime. New York: A.A. Knopf, 1993, p. 459-460
 
            "But how about Trotsky [Budu said]?  He never was corrupt, was he?  He always led an orderly private life with his wife, Natalie Sedov."
            He [Stalin] looked me straight in the eyes and said, "With Trotsky it's different.  He's not corrupt, that's true.  But he carries within himself another danger that a popular revolution can't tolerate: He's an individualist to his fingertips, a hater of the masses, a revolutionary Narcissus.  Read his books.  He writes about us, about men, as 'those tailless, evil, cruel monkeys called men.'  He hated us and he despised us because he thought himself the most intelligent and the most brilliant of us all for the sole reason that he knew how to wield his hand and his tongue cleverly.  What was he doing in a revolutionary party?  He represented only that dying civilization which we are charged with replacing by another, a more fruitful one."
            If humanity ever reaches the stage of humanism, it will only get there through a civilization of the masses.  Either that, or it will arrive nowhere!  It will be destroyed en route!"
Svanidze, Budu. My Uncle, Joseph Stalin. New York: Putnam, c1953, p. 130-131
 
            There was little of that subtlety in Trotsky, who could rarely withstand the temptation to remind others of their errors and to insist on his superiority and foresight.
            His very foresight, no less real because of its ostentatiousness, was offensive.... He was the born troublemaker.
Deutscher, Isaac. The Prophet Unarmed. London, New York: Oxford Univ. Press, 1959, p. 34
 
            Trotsky was full of his own personality....   My father [Beria] found him [Trotsky] extremely arrogant.   In that respect the contrast with Stalin was striking.  "In Trotsky's company one felt like an insignificant worm.   Stalin, on the contrary, knew how to listen to someone and make him feel he was important."   That was his strength.
Beria, Sergo. Beria, My Father: Inside Stalin's Kremlin. London: Duckworth, 2001, p. 290
 
            Yet Trotsky lacked Stalin’s day-to-day accessibility.  He had the kind of hauteur which peeved dozens of potential supporters.  He was also devoid of Stalin’s tactical cunning and pugnacity, and there was a suspicion among Trotsky’s followers that their idol’s illnesses at crucial junctures of factional struggle had a psychosomatic dimension.
Service, Robert. Stalin. Cambridge, Mass.: Belknap Press of Harvard Univ. Press, 2005, p. 227
 
STALIN AND TROTSKY CLASH EARLY ON OVER USING CZARIST GENERALS
 
            But to staff a proletarian class war army with officers drawn from its class enemies without first ensuring their political reliability, was to ask for trouble of a most fatal kind.  This Trotsky did not see.           
            The results were to lead, among other things, to Trotsky's first big conflict with Stalin.  It arose from Stalin's appointment as Commissar in charge of securing food supplies from the south of Russia.
Murphy, John Thomas. Stalin, London, John Lane, 1945, p. 125
 
            Cautious as ever, Stalin had refrained from commenting on the recruitment of Czarist specialists until he had had time to test the scheme in operation.  Two factors convinced him that the small gains in loyal servants did not compensate for the risk of treachery....
            Due to the influence of Trotsky and his associates in the War Commissariat, Stalin's attack upon the military specialists had been ignored.  At Trotsky's recommendation the supreme command of the Red Army was given to the 28 year old ex-lieutenant of the Guards, Mikhail Tukhachevsky.
Cole, David M.  Josef Stalin; Man of Steel. London, New York: Rich & Cowan, 1942, p. 104
 
            Nosovich's treachery, and that of a number of other former tsarist officers, reinforced Stalin's suspicions of the military experts which he had made no effort to hide.
Volkogonov, Dmitri. Stalin: Triumph and Tragedy. New York: Grove Weidenfeld, 1991, p. 40
 
            "Now I understand," General Chtchadenko said, "how Comrade Stalin succeeded in solving our troubles at Tsaritsyn.
            The telephone rang again.
            "Who's bothering us now?"  Stalin asked.  "Some idiot from the Commissariat, I suppose!  Nadia, run upstairs and find out what it's about."
            As she started up the stairs, Mdvani asked, "Are you going to stay in Moscow for a while, Koba, or are you going to keep on being Lenin's traveling salesman?"
            "I don't know yet," said my Uncle Joe.  "I don't ask anything better than to stay in Moscow, but the Old Man [Lenin] doesn't seem to want me here.  That's Trotsky's influence.  He [Trotsky] hopes that I'll break my neck in Tsaritsyn some day or that the Whites will capture me and hang me in the public square."
            Nadejda came hurrying down the stairs.
            "They need you right away at Lenin's, Sosso!  Trotsky wants Voroshilov and Minin court-marshaled for insubordination to his orders; and he has named Sytin commander-in-chief on the southern front, and you are to take orders from him."
            Stalin's face flushed scarlet.
            "The S.O.B.!" he exploded.  "Sytin!  One of the Czar's generals--and one of the shiftiest of them, too!  I'm not taking any orders from him!  I'm going to tell the Old Man [Lenin] what I think about that!"
            How right my uncle's instinct was history was to demonstrate later, when Sytin was discovered to be linked with the White Russian General Denikin.
Svanidze, Budu. My Uncle, Joseph Stalin. New York: Putnam, c1953, p. 45
 
            To appease Trotsky Lenin had decided that Stalin be sent to the Eastern front to inquire into the question of drunkenness in the army.  Kolchak's army had invaded European Russia and taken Perm.  The Third Army had fled in confusion, losing 18,000 men and a vast number of guns, especially machine guns, abandoning stores, ammunition, and transport.  Trotsky's pet ex-officers had deserted en mass to the side where their true sympathies lay.
            And so, although going ostensibly to close up vodka shops and patch up discipline, Stalin was in reality setting off to perform the same service to the Soviet as when he went to Tsaritsyn the year before.
Graham, Stephen. Stalin. Port Washington, New York: Kennikat Press, 1970, p. 55
 
Stalin: Trotsky held to old officers, specialists, who often turned traitor.
            We, on the contrary, selected people= loyal to the Revolution, people connected with the masses, by and large, noncommissioned officers from the lower ranks, although we were clearly aware of the enormous value of honest specialists.
            Lenin had the impression at first that I did not give a damn for specialists.  He called me in to see him in Moscow.  Trotsky and Pyatakov tried to prove that and interceded for two specialists who had been fired by me.  At that very moment, a report came in from the front that one of them had turned traitor and the other had deserted.  Lenin, after reading the telegram, exposed Trotsky and Pyatakov and acknowledged the correctness of our actions.
Dimitrov, Georgi, The Diary of Georgi Dimitrov, 1933-1949. Ed. Ivo Banac. New Haven: Yale University Press, c2003, p. 132
 
STALIN TAKES OVER MILITARY LEADERSHIP
 
            By May 1918 the Soviet government was surrounded within a sixth of the territory of the country.  But eight armies were defending the encircled Republic.  They were not well equipped armies....
            When Stalin was appointed to his new post he had no intention, nor had the government, that he should interfere with military affairs.
            He had none of Trotsky's inhibitions concerning the workers, and rejected outright Trotsky's ideas about the Army.
Murphy, John Thomas. Stalin, London, John Lane, 1945, p. 126
 
But, using a plan of attack drawn up by Stalin as a member of the Revolutionary Military Committee, the Red Army initiated a sudden counter-offensive [against Denikin’s sweep toward Moscow].
Sayers and Kahn. The Great Conspiracy. Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1946, p. 91
 
            Voroshilov states, "The position became more and more strained.  Comrade Stalin exercised enormous energy, and in the shortest possible time developed out of extraordinary plenipotentiary for food supplies, into the actual leader of all the Red forces in the Tsaritsyn front.
Life of Stalin, A Symposium. New York: Workers Library Publishers, 1930, p. 53
 
            Voroshilov states, "And only Stalin, with his magnificent organizational capacities was able, having had no previous military training (Comrade Stalin had never served in any army!) so well to understand special military questions in the then extremely difficult circumstances.
Life of Stalin, A Symposium. New York: Workers Library Publishers, 1930, p. 59
 
 
STALIN TOOK OVER GENERALSHIP WITH GOOD REASON
 
To suggest that he now began to interfere with military affairs because he disliked Trotsky is absurd.
Murphy, John Thomas. Stalin, London, John Lane, 1945, p. 127
 
On arrival at Tsaritsyn Stalin found a very perilous military situation.  The armies of the counter-revolution were investing [infesting] Tsaritsyn; and at the same time the city had become a place of refuge for counter-revolutionary elements.  Large numbers of enemies of the Bolshevik Revolution had fled thither--officers of the Imperial army, high officials, and wealthy merchants.  The enemy was not only beleaguering the city but within it as well, preparing to strike.  Stalin, special plenipotentiary of the party, saw that his real task, the safeguarding of food supplies, could not be achieved unless the military problem was first solved.  He assumed full powers for this purpose on his own responsibility.  Strictly, in doing this he was incurring the guilt of what amounted to a punishable unauthorized initiative.  He appropriated the supreme military authority, without any express instructions to do so from the center.
            Within the city he set up a terrorist police organization which ruthlessly pursued the enemies of Bolshevism.  Anyone who might be dangerous, anyone who might be open to suspicion, was eliminated.  Stalin reported over the head of the local authorities, and over the head of the appointed Peoples Commissar, Trotsky, direct to the party executive and to Lenin.  Formally he was infringing the laws of subordination in force even in the Red Army.  He intervened also with iron resolution in matters of army personnel, with an energetic purge at the local headquarters.  The enemies within the city were destroyed, the staffs of the Red troops subjected to a new and sharp discipline.  The military plans came under his influence.  And Tsaritsyn was saved.  The first round of the civil war was won. 
            This brought Stalin's first conflict with Trotsky.
Basseches, Nikolaus. Stalin. London, New York: Staples Press, 1952, p. 69
 
When he was sent to Tsaritsyn to carry out a commission quite un-connected with the military command, he seized the opportunity for a relentless initiative.
Basseches, Nikolaus. Stalin. London, New York: Staples Press, 1952, p. 85
 
Trotsky whole behavior showed that he regarded himself as above Stalin.  And he made no secret of his displeasure....  Stalin made no attempt at self-defense, bowing before the storm of indignation of the supreme commander of the red army.  Stalin maintained throughout a conciliatory attitude.  The cause, he considered, mattered more than any personal issue.
            Trotsky demanded Stalin's recall, and protested against Stalin's interference in military matters.  Lenin, as usual, tried to smooth away the trouble.  He acknowledged the reports and proposals of both parties, and then did nothing.  He simply kept silent.  It is stated that Stalin was nevertheless recalled at Trotsky's instance; but not until he had done his job.  In any case, Stalin had shown his military capacity.  From then on he held a new post until the end of the Civil War: he was the party's special plenipotentiary at the fronts.
            One thing was clear: Stalin's activity at Tsaritsyn had brought military success.
Basseches, Nikolaus. Stalin. London, New York: Staples Press, 1952, p. 70
 
            In the summer of 1918 Stalin saved Russia and the Revolution.
            British and French troops, united with White Russians, had made common cause with Muscovite counterrevolutionaries in order to destroy the Bolsheviks for all time.  The stricken land lay in ruins: no railways, no weapons, and above all not enough bread--for the wheat belts of the Ukraine and Siberia had been cut off by the enemy.  The only available wheat came from the Volga and Northern Caucasus, but had to be shipped on this river by way of the town of Tsaritsyn.  In that district the small peasants were oppressed by the Kulaks and wheat speculators.  Everything depended on the possibility of having Red troops--consisting mostly of badly armed workers with a cap on their head and a gun--transport the wheat into the country's interior.  The fate of the Revolution literally hung for several weeks on the defense of this town.
            Stalin, arriving there with a few thousand workers, mistrusted the old Czarist officers who were playing a double game or at least under suspicion.  But Trotsky, as Minister of War, opposed Stalin's strategy and cabled other orders.  Stalin threw them into the wastepaper basket or wrote on the top: "To be laid aside."  He saved the town, reconstructed this part of the disrupted army, and hindered the enemy from joining his allies in the Urals and on the Volga....
Ludwig, Emil, Stalin. New York, New York: G. P. Putnam's sons, 1942, p. 63
 
            Voroshilov states, "The chief work given to Stalin was the organization of food supplies to the northern provinces, and he was possessed of unlimited powers for the carrying out of his task....
Life of Stalin, A Symposium. New York: Workers Library Publishers, 1930, p. 55
 
            On May 29, 1918, in connection with the increasingly grave food situation in Moscow and the central provinces of Russia, the Sovnarkom appointed Stalin general director for food supplies in the south of Russia and granted him extraordinary powers.  In this capacity, on June 4 Stalin left for Tsaritsyn.  There he found confusion and chaos not only in food and military matters but in transport, finance, and so on.  Utilizing the authority granted him, Stalin took full power in the entire Tsaritsyn Region.
            There is no doubt that he did significant work in restoring order and supplying food to the industrial centers of Russia....
            Gradually Stalin assumed all the main military functions in the Northern Caucasus.  He wrote to Lenin:
            There's a lot of grain in the south.  In order to get it, we must have a smoothly functioning apparatus that will not encounter any obstacles from trains, army commanders, etc..  Also the military men have to help the food-supply people.  The food question naturally gets intertwined with the military question.  For the good of the cause I need military powers.  I already wrote about this but received no answer.  Very well, in that case I myself, without formalities, will remove those commanders and commissars who are ruining the cause.  The interests of the cause prompt me to do this and the absence of any papers from Trotsky will not stop me.
Medvedev, Roy. Let History Judge. New York: Columbia University Press, 1989, p. 56
 
            In 1919 Stalin was sent as a special plenipotentiary to the key Volga city of Tsaritsyn.  His mission was simply to assure the delivery of food supplies from this entire region.  What he found was a disastrous military situation, with the city not only surrounded by the White Army but heavily infiltrated by counter-revolutionary forces.  He saw that the food supply could not be safeguarded unless the military and political situations were dealt with.  He instituted an uncompromising purge of counter-revolutionary elements within both the officer corps and the political infrastructure, took personal command of the military forces over the heads of both the local authorities and Trotsky, and then proceeded to save the city, the region, and the food supply.  Trotsky, furious, demanded his recall.  As for the citizens of Tsaritsyn, their opinion became known six years later, when they renamed their city Stalingrad.
            After this episode, rather than being recalled, Stalin was dispatched far and wide to every major front in the Civil War.  In each and every place, he was able to win the immediate respect of the revolutionary people and to lead the way to military victory, even in the most desperate circumstances.  Certain qualities emerged more and more clearly, acknowledged by both friends and enemies.  These were his enormous practicality and efficiency, his worker-peasant outlook, and the unswerving way he proceeded to the heart of every problem.  By the end of the war, Stalin was widely recognized as a man who knew how to run things, equality sorely lacking among most of the aristocratic intellectuals who then saw themselves as great proletarian leaders.
Franklin, Bruce, Ed. The Essential Stalin; Major Theoretical Writings. Garden City, New York: Anchor Books, 1972, p. 12
 
            It was apart from Lenin, at the front in the Civil War, that Stalin first distinguished himself in a remarkable way.
            Stalin saved Tsaritsyn and the wheat.  The defense of Tsaritsyn against the Whites has been called in an exaggerated way the "Red Verdun."  It was Stalin who organized it, and for that reason the city bears today the name of Stalingrad.
Graham, Stephen. Stalin. Port Washington, New York: Kennikat Press, 1970, p. 43
 
 
STALIN ALSO SETS UP CHEKA CONTROL
 
With him, Kaganovich, and others whom he knew to be reliable Bolsheviks, Stalin established a cheka or committee to deal with counter-Revolution in the rear....  Nosovitch, the chief of military direction appointed by Trotsky, went over to the enemy.
Murphy, John Thomas. Stalin, London, John Lane, 1945, p. 128
 
STALIN SELECTED THE BEST PEOPLE FOR THE JOB
 
Stalin brought to the front such men as Frunze, Voroshilov, Budienny, Timoshenko, and many others,....
Murphy, John Thomas. Stalin, London, John Lane, 1945, p. 129
 
            Voroshilov states, "Comrade Stalin was extremely strict on the question of the selection of personnel.  Regardless of position, and genuinely being 'no respecter of persons,' he swept away in the roughest way all useless experts, commissars, Party and Soviet workers.  But at the same time, Stalin, more than anyone, always supported and defended those who, in his opinion, justified the revolutionary confidence in them.  Comrade Stalin acted in this way with well-known Red Army commanders who were known to him personally.  When one of the true proletarian heroes of the Civil War, afterwards Commander of the 14th Cavalry Division, Comrade Parhomenko, killed in the struggle against the Makhno bandits, was at beginning of 1920, sentenced through a misunderstanding to capital punishment, Comrade Stalin, hearing of it, demanded his immediate, unconditional release.  Similar cases could be given in numbers.  Comrade Stalin, better than any of the other big leaders, knew how to appreciate deeply workers who had devoted their lives to the proletarian revolution; and the commanders knew this, as everyone else knew it who at any time under his leadership had carried on the struggle for our cause.
Life of Stalin, A Symposium. New York: Workers Library Publishers, 1930, p. 82
 
            But, above all, Stalin is a consummate political strategist, with an almost uncanny knack for selecting the right man for the right job.  He studies those who work with him until he knows their strong points and weaknesses better than they do themselves.  His subordinates respond with a deep loyalty to their chief.  During the recent war he seldom made a mistake in appointing leaders, and if unsuspected weaknesses cropped up the man was speedily recalled.  His real flair for military strategy aided him in working with the generals and selecting the right man to lead campaigns.
Davis, Jerome. Behind Soviet Power. New York, N. Y.: The Readers' Press, Inc., c1946, p. 12
 
            But the degree to which Stalin's personal sagacity affected Russia's military success is, after all, not the most important thing.  What mattered was that he had the wisdom to pick capable marshals and to give them very great authority, and that he knew how to pool their advice and coordinate it in the mobilization of all the broad political and economic and moral means at his disposal, in order to win victory.
Snow, Edgar. The Pattern of Soviet Power, New York: Random House, 1945, p. 160
 
            At first Tsiurupa was Lenin's only deputy, the vice-chairman of the Council of People's Commissars.  But he was not a member of the Central Committee.  Stalin brought him in later.  Krzhizhanovsky was chairman of Gosplan and Lenin's personal friend...but he was not on the Central Committee.  Only Stalin let him into the Central Committee.  Take the third figure--Krasin, also an old friend and comrade of Lenin.  He played a large part in the 2nd party congress, where Bolshevism was formed.  He was the people's commissar of foreign trade under Lenin.  But Lenin didn't let him, a party worker, into the Central Committee....  Chicherin was Commissar of foreign affairs under Lenin.  Lenin quite often praised him as an outstanding figure of Soviet power, and yet he didn't admit him to the Central Committee.  But Stalin let him in.  It was a different time.  Stalin knew how to choose people; he even advanced those whom Lenin did not allow inside.
Chuev, Feliks. Molotov Remembers. Chicago: I. R. Dee, 1993, p. 139
 
            Stalin had carried out sweeping purges, especially in the higher commanding echelons, but these had had less effect than is sometimes believed, for he did not hesitate at the same time to elevate younger and talented men;...  The speed and determination with which he carried out the transformation of the top command in the midst of the war confirmed his adaptability and willingness to open careers to men of talent.  He acted in two directions simultaneously: he introduced into the army absolute obedience to the government and to the Party...and he spared nothing to achieve military preparedness, a higher standard of living for the army, and quick promotions for the best men.
Djilas, Milovan. Conversations with Stalin. New York: Harcourt, Brace & World, 1962, p. 49
 
            Shrewd, observant, and honest, he knew the qualities he wanted in his officers.  They included modesty, humility, and discipline, which, speaking soon after Lenin's death, he had impressed on the cadets of the Kremlin Military Academy.  But he wanted also manners and breeding.
Grey, Ian. Stalin, Man of History. London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1979, p. 423
 
            Thus he [Stalin] went on, day after day, throughout four years of hostilities--a prodigy of patience, tenacity, and vigilance, almost omnipresent, almost omniscient.
            ...In October Hitler formally opened the battle of Moscow, 'the greatest offensive ever known'.  Leningrad had been cut off and blockaded.  Nearly the whole of the Ukraine and the coast of the Azov Sea had been conquered by the Wehrmacht.  Budienny's armies had been routed--the Germans took half a million prisoners on the Dnieper.  Stalin dismissed both Voroshilov and Budienny from the command--the men of Tsaritsyn, the 'NCO's', as Trotsky used to call them, were not equal to this motorized warfare.  New commanders, Zhukov, Vasilevsky, Rokossovsky, were soon to replace them.
Deutscher, Isaac. Stalin; A Political Biography. New York: Oxford Univ. Press, 1967, p. 467
 
            As General Secretary of the Party, he [Stalin] was in a position to pick out men for preferment and service.  He proved to be a good judge of character.  He knew exactly on what human elements in the Communist Party he could build.
Graham, Stephen. Stalin. Port Washington, New York: Kennikat Press, 1970, p. 81
 
            Still again, one must mention his ability to handle men.  He is a good political tactician, a party boss and organizer par excellence.  Friends told me in Moscow in 1935 that Stalin possessed great magnetism, that you felt his antenna as soon as he entered a room.  His personal as well as political intuition is considerable...he chooses men with great perspicacity.
Gunther, John. Inside Europe. New York, London: Harper & Brothers, c1940, p. 518
 
            Lenin used to say that selection of personnel is one of the cardinal problems in the building of socialism.
Stalin, Joseph. Works.  Moscow: Foreign Languages Pub. House, 1952, Vol. 11, p. 61
 
KILLING BOLSHEVIKS ACTIVATED THE CHEKA AND TERROR
 
            The social Revolutionaries turned again to terrorism.  Two Bolshevik leaders, Uritsky and Volodarsky, were assassinated, and Dora Kaplan attempted the assassination of Lenin.  He was severely wounded, and undoubtedly the event shortened his life by years.
            In the days immediately following the attempt on Lenin thousands were shot for merely looking bourgeois.
Murphy, John Thomas. Stalin, London, John Lane, 1945, p. 129
 
            The masses, enraged that the dark forces of reaction had struck down the man who stood as the symbol of all their liberties and aspirations, struck back at the bourgeoisie and at the monarchists with the Red Terror.
            Many of the bourgeoisie had to pay with their lives for the assassinations of the commissars and the attempt upon Lenin.  So fierce was the wrath of the people that hundreds more would have perished had not Lenin pleaded with the people to restrain their fury.  Through all the furor it is safe to say that he was the calmest man in Russia.
Williams, Albert R.  Through the Russian Revolution. Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1967, p. 37
 
            [In 1918] the demise of the Soviet regime seemed imminent, especially as it appeared that open season had been declared on its commissars.  In Petrograd, the SR, Kanegisser shot and killed Uritsky; in July, commissar of the Latvian Riflemen, Nakhimson, was killed; food commissar of the Turkestan Republic, Pershin, died at the hands of insurgents in Tashkent; in May 1918, Podtelkov and Krivoshlykov, well known Bolsheviks of the Don Region, were hanged on a Cossack gallows; Lieutenant-General Alexander Taube, who had gone over to the Bolsheviks from the tsarist army to become commander of the Siberian headquarters, fell into White hands and was tortured.  But the worst blow fell in Moscow, when, after speaking in front of the Mikhelson factory workers, Lenin were shot by the SR Fannie Kaplan.
Volkogonov, Dmitri. Stalin: Triumph and Tragedy. New York: Grove Weidenfeld, 1991, p. 38
 
            But already in July the left Social Revolutionaries provoked the first real outburst of Bolshevik terror.  In an attempt to disrupt the peace and to force the Bolsheviks back into war against Germany, the left Social Revolutionary Jacob Blumkin assassinated the German Ambassador Count von Mirbach.  A series of insurrections staged by the same party broke out in various places including Moscow, to which the Government transferred its seat after the conclusion of peace.  On August 30 Lenin was wounded and two other Bolshevik leaders, Uritsky and Volodarsky, were assassinated by Social Revolutionaries.  Trotsky narrowly escaped an attempt on his life.  The Bolsheviks officially retorted with mass reprisals; and their self defense was at least as savage as the onslaught to which they had been subjected.
Deutscher, Isaac. Stalin; A Political Biography. New York: Oxford Univ. Press, 1967, p. 191
 
            When Bolshevik leader Uritsky was assassinated in St. Petersburg, and Fanny Kaplan wounded Lenin, in an effort to assassinate him, a system of hostages was introduced, mass executions of innocent "class enemies" took place as reprisals and a "red terror" regime began.
Fishman and Hutton. The Private Life of Josif Stalin. London: W. H. Allen, 1962, p. 49
 
            Yet we did not interfere with public expression of dissident views, although the Mensheviks deliberately sabotaged vital defense activity through their hold on the railway unions, and others elsewhere--until the assassination of Volodarsky and Uritsky and the murderous attempt on the life of Lenin, August 30, 1918.  It was in those tragic days that something snapped in the heart of the revolution.  It began to lose its "kindness" and forbearance.  The sword of the Party received its final tempering.  Resolution increased and, where necessary, ruthlessness, too.
Trotsky, Leon, Stalin. New York: Harper and Brothers Publishers, 1941, p. 338
 
            Having deprived the parties and the Mensheviks and the Social Revolutionaries of the Right and Center of Soviet legality in June, 1918, after their direct participation in the Civil War against the Soviet government had been established not only through acts of individual terror, but sabotage, diversion, conspiracy and other overt acts of war, the Bolsheviks were compelled to add the Left Social Revolutionaries to the proscription list after the latter attempted their treacherous coup d'etat in July.
Trotsky, Leon, Stalin. New York: Harper and Brothers Publishers, 1941, p. 338
 
STALIN AND TROTSKY CLASH OVER MILITARY TACTICS
 
Should Kolchak be pursued and his forces completely smashed, or should all attention be diverted to defeat Denikin?  Trotsky, who in his memoirs fully admits his blunder, decided on leaving Kolchak to concentrate on Denikin.  Stalin was emphatically opposed to this plan, and the central committee supported him in his contention that such a decision would leave Kolchak time to recuperate....  The Red Army, he urged, must advance and "liquidate" him and his Army.  It did advance, and Kolchak and his Army were liquidated.
Murphy, John Thomas. Stalin, London, John Lane, 1945, p. 131
 
Stalin now urged Lenin to remove Trotsky from his position as War Commissar.  [Stalin wanted Trotsky out.  Trotsky resigned.  Lenin and the Central Committee refused his resignation.  Stalin agreed and backed down].  But one thing is certain -- by this time Stalin had become convinced that Trotsky was a danger to the Revolution.
Murphy, John Thomas. Stalin, London, John Lane, 1945, p. 132
 
 
Trotsky was given a new post which suited to his organizational and oratorical talents.  He was made War Commissar....  Trotsky repeatedly opposed the military decisions of the Bolshevik Central Committee and flagrantly exceeded his authority.  In several cases, only the direct intervention of the Central Committee prevented Trotsky from executing leading Bolshevik military representatives at the front who objected to his autocratic conduct.
            In the summer of 1919 Trotsky, stating that Kolchak was no longer in menace in the East, proposed shifting the forces of the Red Army into the campaign against Denikin in the South.  This, Stalin pointed out, would have given Kolchak a much needed breathing spell and the opportunity to reorganize and re-equip his Army and launch a fresh offensive.  "The Urals with their works," declared Stalin as military representative of the Central Committee, "with their network of railways, should not be left in Kolchak hands, because he could there easily collect the big farmers around him and advance to the Volga."  Trotsky's plan was rejected by the Central Committee, and he took no further part in the campaign in the East, which led to the final defeat of Kolchak's forces.
Sayers and Kahn. The Great Conspiracy. Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1946, p. 191
 
 
In the fall of 1919 Trotsky drew up a plan for a campaign against Denikin.  This plan called for a march through the Don Steppes, an almost roadless region filled with bands of counter revolutionary Cossacks.  Stalin, who had been sent to the Southern Front by the Central Committee, rejected Trotsky's plan and proposed instead that the Red Army advance across the Donetz Basin with its dense railroad network, coal supplies, and sympathetic working-class population.  Stalin's plan was accepted by the Central Committee.  Trotsky was removed from the Southern Front, ordered not to interfere in with operations in the South, and "advised" not to cross the line of demarcation of the Southern Front.  Denikin was defeated according to Stalin's plan.
Sayers and Kahn. The Great Conspiracy. Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1946, p. 191
 
Trotsky was trying to form a regular army.  That required men of experience; so he enrolled officers of the old Imperial army.  But they were unreliable.  So were the army commanders who had risen from obscurity.  Some of these proved traitors, some changed sides, among these latter the commander in the Caucasus....  The military specialists were also unreliable.  At that time the whole Soviet State was decentralized.  "All power to the local soviets", ran the slogan.
Basseches, Nikolaus. Stalin. London, New York: Staples Press, 1952, p. 68
 
            Quoting Nosovich Voroshilov states, "When Trotsky, worried because of the destruction of the command administrations formed by him, with such difficulty, sent a telegram concerning the necessity of leaving the staff, and the war commissariat on the previous footing and giving them a chance to work, Stalin wrote a categorical, most significant inscription on the telegram: 'To be ignored’!”
Life of Stalin, A Symposium. New York: Workers Library Publishers, 1930, p. 58
 
            The same message in which he [Stalin] asked for military powers gave the first hint of his conflict with Trotsky.  It contained the following remark: 'If only our war "specialists" (the shoemakers!) had not slept and been idle, the [military] line would not have been cut; and if the line is restored this will be so not because of the military but in spite of them.' This was the point over which the famous Tsaritsyn dispute started.
Deutscher, Isaac. Stalin; A Political Biography. New York: Oxford Univ. Press, 1967, p. 197
 
            The food transports from the northern Caucasus arrived in Moscow as Stalin had promised.  Thus the Council of People's Commissars had reason to be grateful to its envoy at Tsaritsyn.  Stalin, having failed to receive an answer to his first and somewhat timid request for special military powers, insistently repeated his demand in a cable to Lenin dated July 10, 1918.  The message, which was first published only in 1947, contained a violent attack on Trotsky, an attack which by implication was also a remonstrance with Lenin.  If Trotsky continued to send his men to the northern Caucasus and the Don without the knowledge of the people on the spot, Stalin stated, then 'within a month everything will go to pieces in the northern Caucasus and we shall irretrievably lose that land....  Rub this in to Trotsky....  For the good of the cause military plenary powers are indispensable to me here.  I have written about this but received no reply.  All right, then.  In that case I alone shall, without any formalities, dismiss those commanders and commissars who ruin the job....  The lack of a paper mandate from Trotsky will, of course, not stop me.'
Deutscher, Isaac. Stalin; A Political Biography. New York: Oxford Univ. Press, 1967, p. 202
 
            By the end of the summer of 1918 the danger that threatened Moscow from the east had been removed.  As long as it existed the General Staff attached only secondary importance to the southern front.  But in October the Czechs had been thrown back to the Urals, and Trotsky could turn his whole attention to the south, brooking no interference with his battle orders.  The southern front was now too small for both antagonists.  One of them had to go, and it was Stalin.  Lenin did his best to sweeten the pill.  He sent the President of the Republic Sverdlov to bring Stalin back to Moscow in a special train with all the necessary honors.  The episode was characteristic of Lenin's handling of the man: he had a shrewd eye for his weaknesses and was very careful not to offend needlessly his touchiness and amour propre.  Trotsky's manner was the exact opposite.  The underrated his opponent, made no allowance for his ambition, and offended him at almost every step.  This flowed from his natural manner rather than from deliberate intention.  On its way to Moscow the train that carried Sverdlov and Stalin met Trotsky's train which was bound for Tsaritsyn.  Prepared by Sverdlov's diplomatic labors, the meeting between the antagonists took place in Trotsky's carriage.  According to Trotsky's version, Stalin somewhat meekly asked him not to treat the 'Tsaritsyn boys' too severely.  Trotsky's answer was sharp and haughty: 'The fine boys will ruin the revolution which cannot wait for them to grow up.'  Subsequently Voroshilov was transferred from Tsaritsyn to the Ukraine.
Deutscher, Isaac. Stalin; A Political Biography. New York: Oxford Univ. Press, 1967, p. 205
 
            Then Trotsky, in his capacity as War Minister, launched his first serious attack against his enemy Stalin, by ordering the Tsaritsyn comma­nders to obey only the orders of their Superior Sytin, but Stalin refused to accept Trotsky's order.  He left for Moscow to talk over matters with Lenin and six days later returned to Tsaritsyn and, backed by Voroshilov, took over again.  The Whites once more managed to encircle the town but the so-called "Steel Division" succeeded in saving Tsaritsyn.  Trotsky again, stung by his enemy's tremendous success, induced Lenin to recall his "Miraculous Georgian" to Moscow, but Stalin stalled, and eventually established his claim to the victory.
Fishman and Hutton.  The Private Life of Josif Stalin. London: W. H. Allen, 1962, p. 49
 
            The rising importance and prestige of Stalin may be understood by the fact that before accepting the invitation of the revolutionary council to go to the Southern Front he stipulated that Trotsky should not be allowed to interfere in any way with the campaign there.  He also obtained permission to retire the officers of Trotsky's choice and replace them with men of his own choosing.  This was the first great rebuff to Trotsky in the revolution and he received it at the hands of Stalin.
Graham, Stephen. Stalin. Port Washington, New York: Kennikat Press, 1970, p. 63
 
            The Soviet gave Stalin carte blanche.  Trotsky's plan of campaign was shelved.  Stalin took matters into his own hands, being nevertheless careful to keep in personal touch with Lenin by telegraph, informing him of his proposed changes and his plan of action.  He poured scorn on Trotsky's pet idea of an attack over the Steppes, calling it stupidity and obstinacy... "what does this cockerel know of strategy?"  An advance through Cossack country could have but one effect, that of rousing the whole Cossack population to fury.
            The new plan of campaign was for an advance through the center toward Little Russia with Kharkov as an objective, thence to threaten Rostov on the Don.  "Here," he wrote Lenin, "we would find ourselves among a friendly and not a hostile population which must facilitate our advance.  We should find ourselves in possession of an important railway artery and cut the line Voronezh--Rostov which has been vital for Denikin's supplies.  We outflank the Cossacks and threaten them from the rear.  If we are successful in our advance Denikin will most probably wish to reinforce his center with Cossacks which they will not want to do, and we could count on that breeding trouble among the Whites.  Then we should get supplies of coal (from the Donetz Basin) and Denikin would be deprived of coal."
            Stalin urged Lenin to approve this plan of attack as the only one promising success, declaring that his presence on the Southern front would be a waste of time, "futile, criminal, useless" if the plan were over-ridden, and that he would in that case rather go to the devil than remain there.
Graham, Stephen. Stalin. Port Washington, New York: Kennikat Press, 1970, p. 64
 
            On this Voroshilov comments: "The road from Tsaritsyn to Novorossisk might have turned out to be much longer because it went through an environment of class enemies.  On the other hand the way from Tula to Novorossisk might prove much shorter because it went through working-class Kharkov and the mining region of the Donetz Basin.  In Stalin's estimation of the correct line of attack can be seen his chief quality as a proletarian revolutionary, the real strategist of the Civil War." 
            Lenin signed the order for the cancellation of Trotsky's instructions and the Central Soviet advised Stalin to go ahead.  His judgment was at once confirmed by success.
Graham, Stephen. Stalin. Port Washington, New York: Kennikat Press, 1970, p. 65
 
LENIN MISTAKENLY ADVOCATES ATTACK TOWARD WARSAW
 
            Indeed, the whole conception of advancing on Warsaw was an error.  For this Lenin was primarily responsible, and time and again he referred to it publicly as his mistake.
Murphy, John Thomas. Stalin, London, John Lane, 1945, p. 135
 
            Lenin had demanded the disastrous Warsaw campaign.  Stalin has been blamed for not abandoning Lemberg, but the real mistake was Lenin's insistence on pushing the Polish invaders back as far as Warsaw.
Davis, Jerome. Behind Soviet Power. New York, N. Y.: The Readers' Press, Inc., c1946, p. 23
 
            Lenin was carried away by the vision of the Red Army in Warsaw and of a communist Poland giving its full support to the revolutionary movement.  He felt acutely the isolation of Russia, which with all its internal problems was bearing the socialist banner alone.  This vision was shared by many within the party and gave rise to a wave of enthusiasm, as members rallied to the cry "Onwards to Warsaw!"  But there were realists, Stalin foremost among them, who saw the dangers of this policy.  In June 1920 he wrote that "the rear of the Polish forces is homogeneous and nationally united.  Its dominant mood is 'the feeling for their native land.'... The class conflicts have not reached the strength needed to break through the sense of national unity."  It was a clear warning against accepting Lenin's facile belief that the Polish proletariat was ready for revolution.
Grey, Ian. Stalin, Man of History. London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1979, p. 136
 
            The issues at stake were momentous.  Lenin hoped that the entry of the Red Army into Poland would spur on the Polish working-class to Communist revolution.  His main interest, however, was not in Poland but in Germany, which at the time was in a state of revolutionary ferment.  His objective was to affect a junction between the Russian and the German revolutions....
            Lenin was supported by Zinoviev and Kamenev, who, now as in 1917, saw little hope for communism in Russia without a revolution in the west.  Underlying their policy was a gross under-estimation of the resistance which the Polish people, including the Polish working classes, enjoying the honeymoon of their national independence, were to put up to Soviet invasion.
            A clearer view of the mood in Poland prompted both Trotsky and Stalin to oppose talk about a march on Warsaw.  Even before the recapture of Kiev by the Reds, Stalin warned the party in Pravda that 'the hinterland of the Polish forces is...to Poland's advantage, very different from that of Kolchak and Denikin...  It is nationally uniform and coherent....  Its predominant attitude is... patriotic....  If the Polish forces were to operate in Poland it would undoubtedly be difficult to fight against them.' He repeated the warning in much blunter terms after the beginning of the Russian offensive: 'I think that the bragging and the harmful complacency of some comrades are out of place: some of them are not content with the successes on the front but shout about a "march on Warsaw"; others, not satisfied with defending our republic against hostile aggression, boastfully declare that they could make peace only with "Red Soviet Warsaw".  I need not point out that this bragging and complacency conform neither with the policy of the Soviet Government, nor with the balance of forces on the front.' After all the sober warnings, he cast his vote with the 'bragging and complacent' adherents of the offensive.  The opponents of the march on Warsaw, Trotsky and the two Poles Dzerzhinsky and Radek (the famous Polish-German revolutionary pamphleteer who had joined the Bolsheviks) were defeated.  As sometimes in the past, so now, Stalin was swayed by his master's view, this time against his own better judgment.
Deutscher, Isaac. Stalin; a Political Biography.  New York: Oxford Univ. Press, 1967, p. 215
 
            The mutual criticisms were well justified, though the chief cause of the defeat lay not so much in the mistakes committed during the offensive as in the very decision to carry it deep into Poland.
Deutscher, Isaac. Stalin; a Political Biography. New York: Oxford Univ. Press, 1967, p. 217
 
            The battle turned into a complete Soviet rout, with the Red Armies fleeing in disorder.   In October an armistice was signed, in 1921 confirmed as the Peace of Riga.   Far from becoming a Soviet republic, Poland now secured frontiers far to the east of the Curzon Line and including substantial Ukrainian and Byelorussian populations-a fact that would be of enormous importance in European politics between 1921 and the end of World War II.
            ...Who was responsible for this disastrous debacle for the Soviet Army?   The primary political responsibility was undoubtedly Lenin's, since he had persuaded himself that Polish workers and peasants were dying with impatience to greet Dzerzhinsky and his fellow Polish Bolsheviks (many of them also employees of the Cheka), while, as Stalin had correctly predicted, the Communist offensive in fact generated a patriotic upsurge among all classes of the population....
Ulam, Adam. Stalin; The Man and his Era. New York: Viking Press, 1973, p. 188
 
STALIN REJECTS FILTH, IMMORALITY, AND SEXUAL CORRUPTION
 
Those who search for sexual scandal in Stalin's life will search in vain.  I recall Radek speaking to me of Stalin's reaction to the vagaries and often abominable aberration's in the sexual life of modern civilization.  Several illustrated German books dealing with the subject lay on Radek's table, which was as usual piled with volumes newly arrived from Europe and America.  Stalin was just about to leave Radek's room when he noticed these books and began thumbing over their pages.  Turning to Radek he asked: "are there really people in Europe who do these kinds of things?"  "Yes, of course," answered Radek.  "Stalin," Radek said to me, "looked utterly disgusted, shrugged his shoulders, and walked away without saying another word."  To Stalin they reflected a diseased way of life, and he was a normal healthy man in his reactions to disease whether of the mind or of the body.
Murphy, John Thomas. Stalin, London, John Lane, 1945, p. 137
 
            The Soviet leader’s recreational likes and dislikes are quite in keeping with his character.  All Stalin's associates say that he is quite puritanical in his personal habits.  He never permits smutty stories to be told in his presence.  He rarely drinks vodka, preferring the mild Caucasian red wine.  He smokes a pipe, never gambles and never drinks to excess.
Davis, Jerome. Behind Soviet Power. New York, N. Y.: The Readers' Press, Inc., c1946, p. 10
 
            Stalin has no vices.  He smokes a pipe.  Like all Georgians, he drinks wine with his dinner.  But he is not addicted to alcohol.  Women, gambling, and similar pleasures do not exist for him.
Levine, Isaac Don.  Stalin.  New York: Cosmopolitan Book Corporation, c1931, p. 323
 
            Despite such occurrences, one must not think that Stalin staged drinking orgies in the manner of Peter the Great.  Actually, parties were held rather infrequently, inasmuch as the major Soviet leaders were beavers for work, with Stalin a good example.
Tuominen, Arvo, The Bells of the Kremlin: Hanover: University Press of New England, 1983, p. 163
 
            But my father took a puritanical view of what he called "foreign luxury" and refused to tolerate even the scent of perfume.  In his opinion the only fragrance that was becoming to a woman was her own freshness and cleanliness.  And so my mother had to enjoy these presents surreptitiously, although she did wear the perfume.
Alliluyeva, Svetlana. Twenty Letters to a Friend. New York: Harper & Row, 1967, p. 53
 
            So it was that Lesakov [the escort of Djilas through Leningrad] told me "in confidence" that Marshall Zhukov had been ousted for looting jewelry in Berlin--"You know, Comrade Stalin cannot endure immorality!"
Djilas, Milovan. Conversations with Stalin. New York: Harcourt, Brace & World, 1962, p. 170
 
            Unbridled sexual appetites also caused Dekanozov's first fall from grace.  After the war, he seduced a girl who turned out to be the daughter of a ranking government official close to Molotov.  When that happened, Stalin didn't step in to cover his protege.  Dekanozov was reprimanded by his Party cell and was fired from the Peoples Commissariat for Foreign Affairs.
Berezhkov, Valentin.  At Stalin's Side. Secaucus, New Jersey: Carol Pub. Group, c1994, p. 349
 
            My uncle [Stalin] and aunt bowed to the custom, but after their embrace was over, Nadejda [Stalin’s wife] told her guests, "You know, you really shouldn't treat us as newlyweds.  It's true we only registered our marriage today, but we're going to have a child shortly."
            "Why did you bother to register it, Koba?"  Mdivani asked.  "Why didn't you and Nadia go on living in free union like the rest of us?"
            "Do you want me to be like that idiot Yenukidze who has got to his fourth wife?  Or Makhardze whose had three?" Stalin demanded.  "Remember, we're not members of a little underground party any more.  We are the government.  If we live lives of indulgence and dissipation, our enemies are going to find it difficult to attack us on our weak points.  We must be responsible, comrades!
Svanidze, Budu. My Uncle, Joseph Stalin. New York: Putnam, c1953, p. 42
 
            Stalin said, "Ilyich [Lenin] married Comrade Krupskaya in church.  I married my first wife in church.  The heads of the government must have faithful wives, not women to be married and dropped again in a few months.  A wedding should be celebrated as an important event in our lives.  We shouldn't mate like dogs in the street!"
Svanidze, Budu. My Uncle, Joseph Stalin. New York: Putnam, c1953, p. 43
 
            "I know," he [Stalin] said, "that people criticize me for marrying Rosa.  She's 27 years younger than I.  But I had to marry to set the example of an orderly life, free of any moral degeneration, to all our comrades who have come to power.  The danger of loose morals is the gravest there is for revolutionary leaders who have passed all the earlier part of their lives in prison or exile, or simply in want and poverty.  It's a more serious danger then you might think.
Svanidze, Budu. My Uncle, Joseph Stalin. New York: Putnam, c1953, p. 127
 
            "The French Revolution collapsed because of the degeneration of the morals of its leaders, who surrounded themselves with loose women from the Palais Royal, that ignoble cesspool which drowned the Revolution!  I am determined to bear down with a white-hot iron to burn in the bud the loosening of morals.  Everyone thinks that I am pursuing the faulty because I want another Thermidor here.  That's a stupid slander!  It's the others who would have brought on a Thermidor if they had been allowed to stay in power without being subjected to the effective control of the Party."  Thermidor 9, 1794, was the date of Robespierre's overthrow.  Thermidor was the month July-August in the republican calendar.
            He paused for a moment, and then resumed.  "Zinoviev and Kamenev will be rooted out soon.  Do you know, Budu, when Zinoviev was president of the municipal government of Leningrad, he introduced the most abject practices there!  He surrounded himself with loose women, some of whom were spies.  His intimate friend, Slivkin, whom he made a diplomatic courier, smuggled in silk stockings, perfumes, and drugs from abroad.  When I found that out, in 1924, I knew that some time or other I would have to cauterize that wound with a white-hot iron!  As for Kamenev, I've never known a man as cynical as he, as ready to make jokes in the worst of taste about things which are most sacred to us revolutionaries.  He became enamored of an Englishwoman who came here purporting to be a journalist and a sculptor and introduced her to Comrade Lenin.  He brought her here, to the Crimea, among our comrades, and amused himself by writing love sonnets on Bank of England notes intended to be sent to Great Britain to help striking workers.
Svanidze, Budu. My Uncle, Joseph Stalin. New York: Putnam, c1953, p. 128
 
            "And Muralov, a former worker-revolutionary!  He married an obscene creature from those sewers, the Sandunov baths and paraded her at his side at youth meetings.  Pah!  It's disgusting!"  The Sandunov baths had a very bad reputation in Moscow as a place of debauchery.
            I gazed at him closely.  His eyes were filled with hatred and rage which he seemed to find it difficult to restrain.  He stopped near a bush of kizil, tore off a branch with an angry gesture, and cried, "I'll break the backs of all the rotten riff raff who want to plunge our country into corruption!  I'll have no mercy on them!  None of them!  None of them!"
            I was amazed that he had worked himself up into such a state, he who was usually so calm and reflective.
            He continued, "I once read a splendid speech of Robespierre's, which he delivered to the Convention shortly before his death.  That caught me hatred for the vermin which revolutions, unfortunately, bear with them on their crest-- vermin which have to be destroyed without mercy in order not to see the same thing happen as at Paris, where the dregs of the Palais Royal became the mistresses and the wives of the republican chiefs--and even empresses!  What a pity that Robespierre was overthrown!  The struggle of humanity toward happiness would have been shortened by centuries if he had stayed in power!"
Svanidze, Budu. My Uncle, Joseph Stalin. New York: Putnam, c1953, p. 129
 
            "Your Uncle Sosso was overwhelmed by Nadia's death," he said (that was hardly news to me).  "But he insisted that the interests of the state made it necessary to continue to repress the opposition.  He married Kaganovich's sister after Nadia's death, but he divorced her again almost immediately."
            This was not quite news to me either.  Even in far-off Siberia, I had heard that my uncle had divorced his third wife, and, remembering what little I had seen of her, I was not particularly surprised.  I had heard no details, however, so I was curious to know what reasons were being given for the extreme brevity of my Uncle Joe's third marriage.
            "Why didn't it last?"  I asked.
            "She interfered in governmental matters.  Besides, you know, there's a lot of anti-Semitism around now.  She's Jewish."
            Privately, I thought that the first reason was probably the more important.  I could very well imagine that Rosa would have interfered in governmental matters--in fact, my own contact with her had come pretty much under that head.  I could not imagine my uncle putting up very long with that sort of conduct in his wife--particularly in a wife whom he had married more or less as an act of policy, not because he was especially fond of her, if I might base that opinion on the conversation I had had with him on the beach at Saki.
Svanidze, Budu. My Uncle, Joseph Stalin. New York: Putnam, c1953, p. 139
 
            Nothing could be more unlikely than the story spread in the West about "Stalin's third wife"--the mythical Rosa Kaganovich.  Aside from the fact that I never saw any "Rosa" in the Kaganovich family, the idea that this legendary Rosa, an intellectual woman (according to the Western version, a doctor), and above all a Jewess, could have captured my father's fancy shows how totally ignorant people were of his true nature; such a possibility was absolutely excluded from his life.
Alliluyeva, Svetlana. Only One Year. New York: Harper & Row, 1969, p. 382
 
            Often, and also in front of others, he would criticize my [Svetlana] appearance, my clothes, reducing me, a teenager, to tears with such remarks as, "Why do you wear that tight-fitting sweater?  You are a grown girl now, wear something lose!"
Alliluyeva, Svetlana. Only One Year. New York: Harper & Row, 1969, p. 384
 
            Women didn't interest him.  His own woman was enough for him, and he paid scant attention to her.
Bazhanov, Boris. Bazhanov and the Damnation of Stalin. Athens, Ohio: Ohio University Press, c1990, p. 106
 
            From the end of July to the 3rd of November, we visited Sochi often.  The summer cottage was located near Matsesta in the mountains.  In 1932, I was assigned to this place as a personal guard to Stalin.  We, the personnel, lived near this cottage.  Stalin many times took salt baths in the small Matsesta --he had serious polyarthritis.  Pain in his legs did not give him the opportunity to sit for a long time.  If he was standing, he always had to move from one leg to another.  He felt much better that way.  When he walked, he felt better.  Therefore, during working hours or meetings, he was always walking around in the office.  He received this sickness from earlier revolutionary work, exile, deprivation, cold, and freezing discomfort.
            Voroshilov, Kirov, and Kalinin were frequent visitors.  Stalin liked very much to receive guests, but­ he hardly ever drank himself.  He never touched vodka, cognac--not often.  He only drank wine, called "Tsinandali" or "Teliani".
Rybin, Aleksei. Next to Stalin: Notes of a Bodyguard. Toronto: Northstar Compass Journal, 1996, p. 6
 
            His attitude to sex is quite normal and healthy.  He has married twice.  He is supposed now to be living with the sister of Kaganovich, his first assistant.  He is rather naive, apparently.  One evening, dropping in to see his friend Radek, he noted on the table a volume by a German man named Fuchs, called Sitten Geschichte (History of Morals), a pseudo- scientific picture-book.  Stalin turned the pages idly, saw one of the more fantastic illustrations.  He turned to his friend: "Tell me, Radek: do people really do this sort of thing?"
Gunther, John. Inside Europe. New York, London: Harper & Brothers, c1940, p. 532
 
            Stalin was no womanizer: he was married to Bolshevism and emotionally committed to his own, in the cause of Revolution.   Any private emotions were bagatelles compared to the betterment of mankind through Marxism-Leninism.
Montefiore, Sebag. Stalin: The Court of the Red Tsar. New York: Knopf, 2004, p. 15
 
            Everyone who knew Stalin insists that he was no womanizer and he was famously inhibited about his body.
Montefiore, Sebag. Stalin: The Court of the Red Tsar. New York: Knopf, 2004, p. 292
 
            Stalin has a decided puritan bend, and prefers "clean" plays and stories.  On one occasion, after reading a story by a well-known young writer in a leading monthly magazine, Stalin was shocked by the author’s "obscenity."  The following morning he telephoned the editor and severely reprimanded him for printing pornographic matter.  The editor tried to argue in vain that it was literature of a high order.  To Stalin, it was a "smutty" story.
Levine, Isaac Don.  Stalin.  New York: Cosmopolitan Book Corporation, c1931, p. 325
 
            Kyra said, "Your [Svetlana] mother was jealous of him [Stalin]; not only was he very busy with politics, but he said once in passing that he liked a particular singer at the opera.  He had a good ear and liked to go regularly.  Nadya [Stalin's wife] had a fit of jealousy and everybody knew about it; she couldn't stand it if a word was said about another woman.  She had this burning passion, which dated from her childhood, from when she was 16 and met the hero from Siberian exile.  She couldn't cope with it: it was too much for her."
            "But," Svetlana adds, "my mother was not a fool.  She was very young; she fell in love, and they lived together for 14 years.  There were happy moments to remember, and my father was absolutely loyal to her.  He was not a ladies' man, he was never chasing women.  To say that a singer was good and that he liked her voice was enough to make her jealous.  But there was never anything more than that.
Richardson, Rosamond.  Stalin’s Shadow. New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1994, p. 86
 
WHAT THE RED ARMY FACED DURING THE INTERVENTION
 
            The intervention war did not the end until the closing months of 1922, when the last Japanese soldier left Vladivostok promising to return.  By the end of 1920, however, all Russia in Europe and a part of Siberia were free from the foreign foe, and a counter-Revolution had been mastered....  I saw Regiment's march through the streets of Leningrad and Moscow in 1920 clad in the uniforms of almost every country in Europe--French, British, Italian, German, Polish, Russian, and many others.  If ever there was an Army which fought "with sweat and blood and tears," clothed in rags and tatters, on a minimum of food, and pan with a minimum of equipment, it was this army of the Revolution between 1918 and 1922....  It is doubtful if at any period during these years the Red Army had rifles for more than 600,000 to 700,000 men, or more than 1000 guns and 3000 machine guns.
            But one and all made the same mistake.  They supported the forces which were for the restoration of the power of the landlords and for depriving the peasants of their new freedom of possession of their own land.  This alone doomed intervention to disaster....  Not one government declared war on Soviet Russia, but 14 governments sent armies to make war or on her, to destroy her administration, to re-establish the landlords in possession of the land and the capitalists in possession of the factories, the mills, the mines, and the State.
Murphy, John Thomas. Stalin, London, John Lane, 1945, p. 138-139
 
            Scarcely was the 1917 revolution concluded than civil war and armed intervention began.  British, French, and American troops invaded northern Russia through Murmansk, and the port of Archangel was captured.  British, Japanese, and American troops occupied Vladivostok.  British armed forces seized the Georgian oil centers of Baku and Batum, where the young Stalin had led the oil workers' struggles.  The French army occupied Odessa.  Polish forces invaded and occupied the Ukraine.  In the meantime, reconstituted tsarist armies, supported by the imperialist governments, had begun a full-scale civil war.  An army of 150,000 led by Gen. Denikin advanced into South Russia, seizing Kiev and Kharkov.  Gen. Yudenich menaced Petrograd.  In Siberia, Adm. Kolchak, with an army of 125,000, seized Perm and other towns, proclaimed himself Supreme Ruler of Russia, and threatened to advance upon Moscow.
Cameron, Kenneth Neill. Stalin, Man of Contradiction. Toronto: NC Press, c1987, p. 34
 
            Let us draw near to what Mr. Winston Churchill, as Stalin recently recalled, defined as "The invasion of the fourteen nations."
            The Army of the White adventurer, Kolchak, champion of the Tsar, received from the French Government 1,700 machine guns, 30 tanks, and dozens of field guns.  In Kolchak's offensive thousands of Anglo-American soldiers, 70,000 Japanese soldiers and about 60,000 Czechoslovakian soldiers took part.
            Denikin's army of 60,000 men was entirely equipped in arms and munitions of war by England.  It received 200,000 rifles, 2,000 guns, 30 tanks.  Several hundred English officers acted as either advisers or instructors to Denikin's Army.
            The disembarkation of the Allies at Vladivostock comprised two Japanese divisions, two English battalions, 6,000 Americans, 3,000 French and Italians.
            England's spent in the Civil War in Russia 140 million pounds and (a less important item for the people meddling with the world) the lives of 50,000 soldiers.
            From 1918 to 1921 England and France never ceased killing Russians and laying Russia waste.  Let us just note, in parentheses, that, at the end of 1927, there were still 450 engineers and 17,000 workmen employed in repairing the damage done in one single oilfield in the Caucasus by the passage of Western civilization.  And the destruction wrought in Russia by the monstrous interference of the great European and American countries may be estimated at about 44 billion gold rubles.
Barbusse, Henri. Stalin. New York: The Macmillan company, 1935, p. 112
 
            Let us remember that the Whiteguards were mobilized in France, and made an armed state within the State, developing their various organizations and their military formations under the benevolent eye of the authorities....  These hired desperados of Czarism marched, fully armed, beneath the Arc de Triomphe,...
Barbusse, Henri. Stalin. New York: The Macmillan company, 1935, p. 113
 
            The summer of 1918 brought further threats to Lenin and his government.  The Allied intervention, instigated primarily by Winston Churchill, but supported by the United States, France, Japan, and Italy, had led to detachments of British, French, and American troops occupying Murmansk, Archangel, Vladivostock, and other Russian towns.
Grey, Ian. Stalin, Man of History. London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1979, p. 120
 
 
            To these famished, frozen, typhus-stricken Russians sailed no ships of goodwill laden with books, tools, teachers, and engineers but grim ships of war and transports laden with troops and officers, guns, and poison-gas.  Landings were made at strategic points on the coast of Russia.  Monarchists, landlords, and Black Hundreds flocked to these rallying centers.  New White armies were conscripted, drilled, and equipped with hundreds of millions of dollars of supplies.  The Interventionists started their drive on Moscow, seeking to plunge the sword into the heart of the Revolution.
            Out of the East rolled the hordes of Kolchak following the trail of the Czechs across Siberia.  Out of the West struck the armies of Finland, the Letts, and Lithuanians.  Down from the forests and snowfields of the North moved the British, French, and Americans.  Up from the seaports of the South plunged the tanks, airplanes, and Death Battalions of Denikin.  Out of the Estonian marshes--Yudenich.  Out of Poland-- the veteran legions of Pilsudski.  Out of the Crimea--the cavalry of Baron Wrangel.
Williams, Albert. Through the Russian Revolution. Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1967, p. 234
 
 
FAMINE WAS CAUSED BY THE INTERVENTION NOT WAR COMMUNISM
 
The number who perished from famine and decease in the bitterly cold winters of 1921 and 1922 has been variously estimated between five end ten millions....  Yet there are persons stupid enough to declare that the "War Communism" of these years corresponds to the real aims of the Bolsheviks and to hold them responsible for the sufferings of the country.
Murphy, John Thomas. Stalin, London, John Lane, 1945, p. 140
 
            The middle-class machinery being violently cast aside, "War Communism" was instituted, that is to say the utilization of only a portion of all the economic elements which the state had appropriated to itself: "A clumsy, centralized machine, destined to extract from industry disorganized by war, by revolution, and by sabotage the minimum of produce necessary in order that the towns and the Red Army should not die of hunger."
            It was necessary, so far as wheat was concerned, to proceed with the "compulsory removal of the excess of peasant labor."  It was a system of State rationing, "a besieged fortress regime."
            So that, after the last violent upheaval, the remnants of middle-class power were really definitely eliminated and cast into the past, at the same time that the majority of the Whites and the foreigners were cast beyond the frontiers.  The Revolution and peace remained alone on the historical and economic ruins.  But public life was in its death-throes.  Commerce and industry had gone still further downhill.  Then Nature took a hand in the game: one of the most appalling famines of modern times, caused by an exceptional drought, descended on the most fertile Russian territories.  The peasants who had, willingly or compulsorily, ensured as much as possible the supply of the gigantic two years' battle, were everywhere frightened, distrustful, often hostile.  At certain points they revolted (1921).
            As for the immense reinforcement hoped for and for which the horizon was daily scanned--the World Revolution--there were certainly no signs of it.  What was the international proletariat doing?  It occasionally stirred a little, but without any real result, or else it was being defeated, like that of Hungary, thrust back, it is true, into the age-old regime by Allied bayonets; and like the one upon which most reliance was placed, the German proletariat, shot down by machine gunfire by Clemenceau.
Barbusse, Henri. Stalin. New York: The Macmillan company, 1935, p. 120
 
TROTSKY TRIES TO MILITARIZE THE TRADE UNIONS
 
            When Stalin requisitioned the grain of the south to feed the hungry population of the north, he had regard neither for the open market of capitalism nor for the principle of the future exchange of goods in communist society.  He was doing what any State power would have had to do if it intended to survive, whether that State were a slave, feudal, capitalist, or socialist.  The economics of War Communism were the economics of survival, and that they took on extreme forms of centralization of authority, applied measures of confiscation right and left, requisitioned without regard for the economic niceties of the market, is incidental.
            At this period Stalin and Trotsky again found themselves in opposite camps.  Flushed with enthusiasm for the growing discipline of the Red Army, Trotsky initiated the transformation of its regiments into military Labor Battalions.  Again showing his characteristic lack of confidence in the workers, he proposed to militarize labor in industry and make the Trade Unions into governmental institutions which would effect the necessary discipline.  He opposed the election of trade union officials and favored their appointment by the Government....
            Lenin and Stalin together fought Trotsky's proposal.  They insisted that the Trade Unions be voluntary and democratic, elect their officials, adopt methods of comradely persuasion and eschew the dictatorial practices of the military-minded.
Murphy, John Thomas. Stalin, London, John Lane, 1945, p. 140
 
            This instance [causing a huge eventual loss by refusing to sign the Brest-Litovsk Treaty] is enough to show the Trotsky had no comprehension of political realities.  This was made clear again on later occasions.  To quote only one instance, after the end of the Civil War Trotsky hit upon the idea of assisting the needed economic reconstruction by not demobilizing the Red Army but converting it into a labor force.  He wanted to organize forced labor under military discipline on an altogether unprecedented scale.  And this in a country already full of revolutionary anarchy!  In his articles he declared that it was a bourgeois prejudice that regarded forced labor as economically inferior to free labor.  If Trotsky's idea had been carried out, in all probability the Bolshevik regime would have been brought down....
Basseches, Nikolaus. Stalin. London, New York: Staples Press, 1952, p. 125
 
            Stalin's position on this question of labor armies is of importance in a study of his character because it destroys the popular conception of him as a ruthless Dictator and demonstrates that, provided such a course is not detrimental to the well-being of the Soviet state, he is always prepared to deal with a problem from a humanitarian standpoint.
Cole, David M.  Josef Stalin; Man of Steel. London, New York: Rich & Cowan, 1942, p. 53
 
            In 1920 a controversy on the trade union question arose in the party.  It arose because Trotsky and his followers had proposed that the policy of the period of War Communism be continued in every sphere of economic and Party work, and that the "screw be put on tighter."
Yaroslavsky, Emelian. Landmarks in the Life of Stalin. Moscow: FLPH, 1940, p. 115
 
 
KRONSTADT AND RETREAT TO NEP
 
Although the government crushed the revolt at Kronstadt, it had to do more than just answer the protest with the gun.  It had to retreat from "war communism" to what became known as the "new economic policy."
Murphy, John Thomas. Stalin, London, John Lane, 1945, p. 142
 
 
DESCRIPTION OF HOW BAD WHITE CONTROLLED AREAS WERE
 
            In all the regions that had been overrun by the armies, the richest food-growing regions of Russia, the marching forces of each side had requisitioned the reserves of the peasants, and the peasants had almost ceased producing.  Thousands of draft animals had perished.  Hospital and medical supplies were gone.  There was a universal shortage of consumer goods.  The paper roubles were almost valueless.  The cities and the towns were in a hopeless state of despair.  Nothing could be more drab and colourless than Petrograd as I saw it in 1920.  Shop windows were boarded up.  Streets were dangerous for vehicles because of their battered condition.  Buildings grimly recorded the bespattering of their walls by machine-gun fire.  Railways were cluttered with shattered rolling-stock.  Not more than a tenth of the locomotives available at the outbreak of the Great War were running.  Bridges by the thousand had been destroyed.  Coal production was down to 7,000,000 tons per annum.  There was a dearth of everything.  Hunger stalked town and village alike, and brigandage was rife throughout the countryside.  Money payments gave way to payments in kind.  Industrial labour had shrunk to half pre-war figures and output was down to 18 per cent of the level of 1913.  Ten million peasants were using wooden ploughs.
Murphy, John Thomas. Stalin, London, John Lane, 1945, p. 142
 
 
WHAT IS NEP
 
This strategy governing the in NEP consisted of maintaining the "dictatorship of the proletariat" by the state retaining its hold on key positions such as the banks, Railway's, telegraphs, Postal Services, large industrial enterprises, and foreign trade, and re-establishing private ownership in small-scale industry, with free market conditions for the exchange of commodities, industrial and agricultural.  The peasants were released from requisitioning raids, and were free to sell any surplus production over an above the tax in kind which they had to deliver to the state.
            The NEP therefore consisted of a mixture of socialist and capitalist economy.  It has been described as "the return to capitalism" and as "state capitalism."  Neither description is wholly true.
            But while the surging movement of Revolution indeed swept across Europe, nowhere, except for a short period in Hungary, had it reached its November 7.
Murphy, John Thomas. Stalin, London, John Lane, 1945, p. 143
 
 
Stalin regarded the NEP as a "breathing space" in which the Revolution retreated to "prepared positions" in order to regroup the Bolshevik divisions before storming new heights.
Murphy, John Thomas. Stalin, London, John Lane, 1945, p. 156
 
 
Lenin called for national unity to meet the "incredible difficulties" of reorganizing economic and social life.  He announced the New Economic Policy abolishing the rigid so-called "War Communism" and restoring a measure of private trade and capitalism in Russia and opening the way for the beginning of reconstruction.  "We take one step backward," said Lenin, "in order at a later date to take two steps forward!"
            When Lenin announced the "temporary retreat" of the New Economic Policy, Trotsky exclaimed: "the cuckoo has cuckooed the end of the Soviet government!"
Sayers and Kahn. The Great Conspiracy.  Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1946, p. 194
 
The rest of the New Economic Policy--restoration of money wages with different rates according to capacity and performance; extra pay for overtime, and, in some branches, the re-appearance of the piece work system; revival of payments for rent, railroad, and street car travel, and the replacement of the food requisitions by a graduated tax in kind--consisted of little more than normal measures of peace time reconstruction.
Duranty, Walter.  Duranty Reports Russia. New York: The Viking Press, 1934, p. 8
 
October 22, 1921--"The real meaning of the New Economic Policy is that we have met a great defeat in our plans and that we're now making a strategic retreat," said Lenin in one of the frankest admissions of the failure of his policies ever made by leader of a great nation.
"We were wrong, and so we have begun to retreat.  Before we are utterly smashed, let us retrace our steps and begin to build on a new foundation."
Duranty, Walter.  Duranty Reports Russia. New York: The Viking Press, 1934, p. 82
 
Lenin thus admits that his change of economic front is due to recognition of the fact that communism is at present inadequate to supply the peasants on the one hand with manufactured goods and the urban workers on the other with food.
Duranty, Walter.  Duranty Reports Russia. New York: The Viking Press, 1934, p. 83
 
To Lenin the New Economic Policy was a delicate adjustment between the forces of communism and individualism, adopted, perhaps like the Brest-Litovsk peace three years before, unwillingly, but as "the breathing space" he knew was necessary for existence.
Duranty, Walter.  Duranty Reports Russia. New York: The Viking Press, 1934, p. 152
 
In regard to the peasants, socialism allows them to profit by their own individual effort as long as the preparation and sale of their products do not involve the hired labor, or, as Russians call it, the exploitation, of others.
Duranty, Walter.  Duranty Reports Russia. New York: The Viking Press, 1934, p. 227
 
            Lenin, ever clear-sighted, scorned to escape from an error by cloaking it with another greater one and bluntly told the Central Committee: "We have made the mistake of thinking we could pass straight to Socialism [Read Communism] without transition."  Looking round him, Stalin also insisted that the situation was so serious that no amount of surface adjustment could make any difference, something entirely new must be evolved, and soon.
            The situation which forced the Bolsheviks to the NEP is easier to understand in its present perspective than it was to those earnest defenders of theory who so hotly opposed it in 1921.
Cole, David M.  Josef Stalin; Man of Steel. London, New York: Rich & Cowan, 1942, p. 57
 
            Though it was forced temporarily to descend to the elementary capitalism of the early 19th-century, Bolshevism survived and gained a much needed respite during which a start could be made to rehabilitate the shattered economic structure of Russia.
Cole, David M.  Josef Stalin; Man of Steel. London, New York: Rich & Cowan, 1942, p. 56
 
            The very visible and noisy revival of private trade which characterized the first years of the new economic policy and which caused some hasty and superficial observers to announce that Russia was returning to capitalism has proved hollow and illusory.  Freedom of private trade still exists theoretically in Russia; but this freedom is of rather an academic character when the private trader can obtain neither an adequate supply of goods, which are practically all manufactured in state factories, nor store buildings, which are leased first of all to co-operatives, nor transportation facilities.
            It is pretty obvious from these facts and figures that, far from returning to private capitalism, the Soviet Government is steadily and rapidly socializing the field where private capital apparently had gained something of a foothold after the introduction of the New Economic Policy.
Chamberlin, William Henry. Soviet Russia. Boston: Little, Brown, 1930, p. 140-141
 
In a series of speeches he said we must either follow this course or perish....  We either pass to the NEP or perish.  That is how he put the question.
Chuev, Feliks. Molotov Remembers. Chicago: I. R. Dee, 1993, p. 125
 
            And so it went.  Courageously and wonderfully!  Or take the NEP, for example.  After all, it was the Mensheviks who demanded freedom of trade, to allow opportunities to sell, and so forth.  So in 1921 Lenin took this Menshevik program and started implementing it, but under control of the workers' state.  It was a measure forced on us by circumstances, but a necessary one.
Chuev, Feliks. Molotov Remembers. Chicago: I. R. Dee, 1993, p. 150
 
            Further.  The Mensheviks were continually talking about the kinds of trading relations we ought to have.  Lenin criticized them: "You are counter-revolutionaries, scum, enemies of the working class."  But then he introduced the NEP in 1921.  This time he had "stolen" from the Mensheviks.
Chuev, Feliks. Molotov Remembers. Chicago: I. R. Dee, 1993, p. 151
 
            Had we not concluded the Brest peace at that point, the Soviet government would have collapsed....  But as regards NEP, according to Lenin, it was our strategic retreat from socialism....  the NEP saved us from ruin....  At the 11th Congress Lenin summed up the results of the new policy and said that if we had not abandoned our earlier policies and had not restored public confidence, Soviet power would not have survived.  That was essentially his analysis of the NEP one year after it was launched.
Chuev, Feliks. Molotov Remembers. Chicago: I. R. Dee, 1993, p. 247
 
            ...State enterprises were placed upon a commercial footing.  Salaries were graded according to qualifications and the kind of work done.  And, as the State found that it had more enterprises on its hands than it could manage itself (since it had seized them all), it hired a certain number of them out to private individuals.
Barbusse, Henri. Stalin. New York: The Macmillan company, 1935, p. 122
 
            Private capital began to make its appearance and developed in the home trade.  It represented 30 percent of the whole amount in circulation in the home trade.  Foreign trade, which remained a State monopoly, represented, in comparison with pre-war figures, 1/4 as regards imports and one-twentieth as regards exports.
 
            American technicians, engineers, and administrators Lenin particularly held in high esteem.  He wanted 5000 of them, he wanted them at once, and was ready to pay them the highest salaries.  He was constantly assailed for having a peculiar leaning toward America.  Indeed, his enemies cynically referred to him as "the agent of the Wall Street bankers," and in the heat of debate the extreme Left hurled this charge in his face.
            As a matter of fact, American capitalism was to him not less evil than the capitalism of any other country.  But America was so far away.  It did not offer a direct threat to the life of Soviet Russia.  And it did offer the goods and experts that Soviet Russia needed.  "Why is it not then to the mutual interest of the two countries to make a special agreement?"  asked Lenin.
            But is it possible for a communistic state to deal with a capitalistic state?  Can the two forms live side-by-side?  These questions were put to Lenin by Naudeau.
            "Why not?" said Lenin.  "We want technicians, scientists and the various products of industry, and it is clear that we by ourselves are incapable of developing the immense resources of this country.  Under the circumstances, though it may be unpleasant for us, we must admit that our principles, which hold in Russia, must, beyond our frontiers, give place to political agreements.  We very sincerely propose to pay interest on our foreign loans, and in default of cash we will pay them in grain, oil, and all sorts of all materials in which we are rich.
            "We have decided to grant concessions of forests and mines to citizens of the Entente powers, always on the condition that the essential principles of the Russian Soviets are to be respected.  Furthermore, we will even consent--not cheerfully, it is true, but with resignation--to the cession of some territory of the old Empire of Russia to certain Entente powers.  We know that the English, Japanese, and American capitalists very much desire such concessions.
            "We have granted to an international association the construction of the Veliky Severny Put, The Great Northern Line.  Have you heard of it?  It is about 3000 versts of railroad, starting at Soroka, near the Gulf of Onega, and running by way of Kotlas across the Ural mountains to the Obi River.  Immense virgin forests with 8 million hectares of land and all kinds of unexplored mines will fall within the domain of the constructing company.
            "This state property is ceded for a certain time, probably 80 years, and with the right of redemption.  We exact nothing drastic of the association.  We ask only the observance of the laws passed by the Soviet, like the eight-hour day and the control of the workers organizations.  It is true that this is far from Communism.  It does not at all correspond to our ideal, and we must say that this question has raised some very lively controversies in Soviet journals.  But we have decided to accept that which the epoch of transition renders necessary."
Williams, Albert R.  Through the Russian Revolution. Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1967, p. 48
 
            The system of War Communism was scrapped and replaced by the so-called New Economic Policy.  The NEP, as that policy came to be known, established a mixed economy.  Large-scale industry and transport remained state-owned.  Private enterprise was allowed in small and medium-sized industry and in trade.  Foreign concerns were invited to restart business in Russia, even in large-scale industry.  The requisitioning of food in the country-side was stopped; it was replaced by ordinary agricultural taxation, first in kind and then in money.  Later on, the ruble was stabilized.  The prime purpose of these sweeping reforms was to re-equip industry almost from scratch, to renew the exchange of manufactures for food and raw materials, in a word, to re-establish a functioning economy with the help of private capital.  The state reserved for itself, apart from the ownership of large-scale industry, the over-all economic control.
Deutscher, Isaac. Stalin; A Political Biography. New York: Oxford Univ. Press, 1967, p. 221
 
            Of all the ironies and contradictions of this time (1921-28) the most striking was as follows.  Under the Tsars, the peasants of Great Russia had lived for centuries under communal land tenure.  At last, following the example of Western Europe, they had awakened to its many deficiencies--such as the division of the village holdings into innumerable separate strips--and following the lead given by the legislation of Stolypin they had been dividing up the holding into compact individual farms.  Now they were doing this again in place after place of themselves, and all that they asked of the government was to confirm what they had done: the Communist Government was asked for a title deed.  And in 1922 the Communist Government, in shaping its new land law, did indeed base it in the main on individual farming!
            ... More than this, as the peasants were listened to in this period, they had an actual opportunity of putting forward their own program, and it was in every way the reverse of Communism: a free market, no tax on thrift, restoration of the ballot, abolition of the practice of sending down from the Communist Party a list of the persons to be elected, and lastly the equalization of the individual peasant's vote with that of the town worker: at present, in the government of the State, it only counted for 1/5.
Pares, Bernard. Russia. Washington, New York: Infantry Journal, Penguin books, 1944, p. 132
 
            First Lenin introduced the "New Economic Policy" which legalized money again and allowed shops to open, invited foreign capital, made possible commercial concessions to foreign companies.  Making war on Capitalism they invited the co-operation of capitalists.
Graham, Stephen. Stalin. Port Washington, New York: Kennikat Press, 1970, p. 68
 
            The New Economic Policy was a complete reversal of the course of the dictatorship....  The government retained its hold upon the basic resources and industries, the transport system, and monopoly of foreign trade.  The socialist agricultural sector was restricted to the cooperative system and the moribund state and collective farms.
Levine, Isaac Don.  Stalin.  New York: Cosmopolitan Book Corporation, c1931, p. 363
 
STALIN IS NOT DICTORIAL BUT IS OPEN-MINDED
 
            His handling of the Commissariat of Nationalities confirms these observations.  Pestovsky, the Pole who became his first secretary in this department, writes "there were Lettish, Polish, Lithuanian, Estonian and other elements in the council of his secretariat.  They were afflicted with the ideas of left bolshevism.  I am almost certain that Trotsky, who accuses Stalin of "dictating," would in three days have dispersed the oppositional council and surrounded himself with his own followers.  But Stalin acted differently.  He decided to educate us by slow and persistent efforts, and displayed much discipline and self-control.  He had his conflicts with individual members of the council, but was loyal to the body as a whole, submitted to its decisions even when he disagreed, with the exception of such cases where there was a violation of party discipline.
Murphy, John Thomas. Stalin, London, John Lane, 1945, p. 145
 
            It was said later that Stalin got all his opponents out of the way and then carried out their programs.  That is not so.  At that time there was unanimity between all groups on certain questions of Soviet policy.  All agreed that Russia must be industrialized.  All agreed that the famous 'scissors' (the term was first used by Trotsky)--the abnormal gap between the prices for industrial goods and those for agricultural produce--must be closed....  This was agreed; what was at issue was the timing, and tempo.  When should industrialization begin?  When should a start be made with the closing of the scissors?  And then, at what rate?  What should be the pace of industrialization?
Basseches, Nikolaus. Stalin. London, New York: Staples Press, 1952, p. 132
 
 
            Stalin was always receptive to what he called constructive criticism and discussion of alternatives.  He was willing to consider various approaches to military, industrial, and foreign policies.
Sudoplatov, Pavel. Special Tasks. Boston: Little, Brown, c1993, p. 90
 
            During the war a small top leadership group was needed.  With this group, however, as Zhukov noted, Stalin worked collectively.  "Today, after Stalin's death," he writes, apparently answering Khrushchev, "the idea is current that he never heeded anybody's advice and decided questions of military policy all by himself.  I can't agree with it.  When the person reporting knew what he was talking about he would listen and I know of cases when he reconsidered his own opinions and decisions.  This was the case with many operations."  "As a rule the General Headquarters worked in an orderly, business-like manner.  Everyone had a chance to state his opinion....  He [Stalin] listened attentively to anybody speaking to the point."
Cameron, Kenneth Neill. Stalin, Man of Contradiction. Toronto: NC Press, c1987, p. 125
 
            Stalin was equally stern to everybody and rather formal.  He listened attentively to anyone speaking to the point.
            Incidentally, I know from my war experience that one could safely bring up matters unlikely to please Stalin, argue them out, and firmly carry the point.  Those who assert it was not so are wrong.
Cameron, Kenneth Neill. Stalin, Man of Contradiction. Toronto: NC Press, c1987, APPENDIX 1
Portrait of Stalin by Zhukov, p. 140
 
            A detailed study of the ideological and political struggle that took place in the Bolshevik leadership from 1922 to 1934 refutes many well-ingrained lies and prejudices.  It is patently false that Stalin did not allow other leaders to express themselves freely and that he ruled like a `tyrant' over the Party.  Debates and struggles took place openly and over an extended period of time.  Fundamentally different ideas confronted each other violently, and socialism's very future was at stake.  Both in theory and in practice, the leadership around Stalin showed that it followed a Leninist line and the different opportunist factions expressed the interests of the old and new bourgeoisies.  Stalin was not only careful and patient in the struggle, he even allowed opponents who claimed that they had understood their errors to return to the leadership.  Stalin really believed in the honesty of the self-criticisms presented by his former opponents.
Martens, Ludo.  Another View of Stalin. Antwerp, Belgium: EPO, Lange Pastoorstraat 25-27  2600, p. 136-137 [p. 118 on the NET]
 
            According to Zhukov and Vasilevsky, Stalin was always prepared to listen to views contrary to his own, provided they were based on facts and presented lucidly.
Grey, Ian. Stalin, Man of History.  London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1979, p. 367
 
            The State Committee for Defense, whose sittings took place at any time of day or night in the Kremlin or at Stalin's country house, discussed and decided upon the crucial issues....
            Often sharp arguments arose at the Committee sittings.  Views were expressed in definite and sharp terms.  Stalin would usually walk up and down the room past the table, carefully listening to those who argued.  He himself was short-spoken and would often stop others with remarks like "come to the point," "make yourself clear."  He opened the sittings without any preliminaries and spoke in a quiet voice and freely, and only on the main points.  He was laconic and precise.
Zhukov, Georgi. Memoirs of Marshal Zhukov. London: Cape, 1971, p. 267
 
            As a rule, the General Headquarters worked in an orderly, business-like manner.  Everyone had a chance to state his opinion.
            Stalin was equally stern to everybody and rather formal.  He listened attentively to anybody speaking to the point.
            Incidentally, I know from my war experience that one could safely bring up matters unlikely to please Stalin, argue them out and firmly carry the point.  Those who assert it was not so are wrong.
Zhukov, Georgii. Memoirs of Marshal Zhukov. London: Cape, 1971, p. 281
 
            Though the troops of the Voronezh and Steppe Fronts reached the FEBA of the enemy defenses on July 23, 1943, they were not able to undertake a counter-attack at once as the Supreme Commander-in-Chief [Stalin] demanded.  They had to replenish stocks--fuel, ammunition, and other material, arrange for cooperation of all arms and thorough reconnaissance, and do some re-grouping, particularly of artillery and tanks.  This required at least 8 days according to the most rigid calculations.
            After heated debates, Stalin grudgingly endorsed our decision, there being no other alternative.
            Stalin was pushing us with the operation.  It cost Vasilevsky and myself great pains to convince Stalin that there should be no haste and that the operation should be started only when everything was absolutely ready.  The Supreme Commander-in-Chief had to agree with our arguments.
            Today, after Stalin's death, the idea is current that he never heeded anybody's advice and decided questions of military policy all by himself.  I can't agree with it.  When he realized that the person reporting knew what he was talking about he would listen and I know of cases when he reconsidered his own opinions and decisions.
            This was the case with many operations.
Zhukov, Georgii. Memoirs of Marshal Zhukov. London: Cape, 1971, p. 464
 
            Stalin insisted on being informed about the decisions made by the staff.  In the mornings he telephoned the chief of operations for a detailed survey of the front, whose intricacies he knew perfectly; in the evening around 11 o'clock the chief of staff, or his deputy, would come to the Kremlin to make a detailed report, which could last well into the night.  The difference lay in Stalin's attitude.  He seldom interrupted the reports.  He allowed the staff to suggest operations; he came to insist that front commanders should be consulted for their views first.  The soldiers slowly overcame their natural caution and began to argue openly with Stalin.  It was discovered that Stalin could tolerate dissent, if forcibly and sensibly expressed.  He liked to be told the truth, however unpalatable.  He took advice and bowed to others' judgment.
Overy, R. J. Russia's War: Blood Upon the Snow. New York: TV Books, c1997, p. 231
 
            I realized during the war that Stalin was not the kind of man who objected to sharp questions or to anyone arguing with him.  If someone says the reverse, he is a liar.
Zhukov, Georgi. Reminiscences and Reflections Vol. 1. Moscow: Progress Pub., c1985, p. 364
 
            I remember a conversation between Zhukov and Stalin which I witnessed.  Stalin had instructed Zhukov to carry out some minor operation, in the area of the railway station Mga, if I remember correctly, in order to help the Leningraders a bit.  Zhukov insisted that a large-scale operation was necessary if the objective was to be achieved.
            "That is all very well, Comrade Zhukov," Stalin replied, "but we lack the means, and this must be taken into account."
            Zhukov stuck to his guns.  "Nothing will come out of it otherwise," he declared.  "Wishful thinking is not enough."
            Stalin did not conceal his irritation, but Zhukov stood his ground.  Finally Stalin said, "Think it over, Comrade Zhukov.  You may go for the time being."
            I admired Zhukov's straightforwardness, but when we left the room I remarked that I didn't think he should have spoken so sharply to the Supreme Commander.
            "It's nothing to what goes on here sometimes," Zhukov replied.
Rokossovsky, K., Ed. by Bob Daglish A Soldier's Duty. Moscow: Progress Pub., 1985, p. 85
 
            I realized that I should have to work hard to be able to cope with this new command and justify the trust of the Party and the Government.  The details are hard to describe, but one episode impressed itself on my memory.  Shortly before the Voronezh operation I came again to Moscow to report to the Supreme Commander.  When I had finished and was about to leave, Stalin said,
            "Don't go yet."
            He phoned Poskrebyshev and asked him to call in a general just removed from the command of a Front.  The following dialogue took place:
            "You say that we have punished you wrongly?"
            "Yes, because the GHQ Representative kept getting in my way."
            "How?"
            "He interfered with my orders, held conferences when it was necessary to act, gave contradictory instructions....  And generally tried to override the commander."
            "So he got in your way.  But you were in command of the Front?"
            "Yes."
            "The Party and the Government entrusted the Front to you....  Did you have a telephone?"
            "Yes."
            "Then why didn't you report that he was getting in your way?"
            "I didn't dare complain about your representative."
            "Well, that is what we have punished you for: not daring to pick up the receiver and phone up, as a result of which you failed to carry out the operation."
            I walked out of the Supreme Commander's office with the thought that, as a new-fledged Front Commander, I had just been taught an object lesson.  Believe me, I made the most of it.
Rokossovsky, K., Ed. by Bob Daglish A Soldier's Duty. Moscow: Progress Pub., 1985, p. 118
 
            By mid-May that planning for 'Bagration' had been completed.  From 22 to 24 May the draft plans were discussed in detail at a conference of the GHQ Supreme Command attended by Stalin and the commanders of the respective Fronts.  On the first day of the conference an argument broke out between Stalin and Rokossovsky that became known throughout the Army....
            The tall, highly popular army commander wanted to envelop the German armies in a powerful pincer movement.  Stalin and some of his General Staff officers demanded a single offensive thrust.  A number of generals including Rokossovsky himself have described the incident....
            When Rokossovsky would not agree with him, Stalin ordered the marshal to go to the next room and think over Stavka's [General Headquarters] proposal.  After 20 minutes he came back.  He said there was nothing for him to think over and he stuck to his view.  Again Stalin sent him back to the next room to 'think' for 20 minutes.  During the second interval (Rokossovsky calls it 'confinement'.  Foreign Minister Molotov and Stalin's right-hand man, Malenkov joined him, saying that they disapproved of his quarrel with the Supreme Commander and suggested that he accept the Stavka proposal.  But Rokossovsky replied that he was convinced of the correctness of his view and that if Stavka ordered him to mount an offensive according to its own plan, he would ask to be relieved of his Front command.  He returned to the conference room, but again failed to convince Stalin and his advisers.  So for a third time Stalin asked him to 'think it over.'  In the next room, alone.  But when he returned this time with his mind unchanged, Stalin went along with him.  In acceding to Rokossovsky, Stalin said: 'When a commander is so determined he probably knows what is best.'
Axell, Albert. Stalin's War: Through the Eyes of His Commanders. London, Arms and Armour Press. 1997, p. 99
 
TESTAMENT DOES NOT DENOUNCE STALIN ON IDEOLOGY
 
It was at this period, however, that Lenin drafted his famous "Testament," which undoubtedly reflects his forebodings with regard to Stalin's brusqueness but says not one word in criticism of his policy....  Nor did Stalin challenge him on his return to activity in the latter part of the year.  On the contrary, it appeared they were in complete accord....
Murphy, John Thomas. Stalin, London, John Lane, 1945, p. 146
 
There is no criticism in a [A OR THE] document--Lenin's testament--of Stalin's policy, but only this delineation of personal qualities,
            That Stalin deeply felt Lenin's personal criticism is certain.  For more than 20 years Lenin had been his teacher and he a faithful disciple.  But he could "take it."  He has many of the qualities of the master.  He is no yes-man.  He has deep convictions, tremendous will-power and determination, and--could Lenin have lived long enough to see it--a patience which at times seems inexhaustible.
Murphy, John Thomas. Stalin, London, John Lane, 1945, p. 151
 
...although subsequent events proved that he [Lenin] had over-estimated Trotsky and underestimated his "wonderful Georgian."
            When he [Stalin] read it [Lenin’s Testament] to the 13th Congress of the Party and commented, "Yes, I [Stalin] am rude to those who would destroy Lenin's party, etc..," he shifted the issue from one of good manners to the larger battle -- ground of the principles, aims and role of the Party as the leader of the Revolution.
Murphy, John Thomas. Stalin, London, John Lane, 1945, p. 154
 
There began already at that time, though not openly, the struggle between Trotsky and Zinoviev for the succession to Lenin.  But there was discussion also as to what was going on at Lenin’s house at Gorky, in other words about Stalin.  Thus it was almost a sensation when Kamenev brought the news that Lenin had broken with Stalin, and had written to Stalin dismissing him.  Before long, however, the sensation shrank to its true proportions.  It turned out that the actual personal difference had nothing to do with politics: Lenin had charged Stalin with rudeness and tactlessness toward his wife Krupskaya.  It is easy to imagine that.  It appears that Stalin never had any great opinion of Lenin’s wife.
Basseches, Nikolaus. Stalin. London, New York: Staples Press, 1952, p. 106
 
            Lenin's "testament" is, of course, favorable for the most part to Stalin; compared with the assessments given the others, the one of Stalin was the most positive....  But Lenin had for the entire preceding period given many descriptions of Trotsky, and they were entirely negative....
            Stalin was, of course, distinguished by rudeness.  He was a very blunt person.  But if not for his harshness I don't know how much good would have been accomplished.  I think harshness was necessary, otherwise there would have been even greater vacillation and irresolution.
Chuev, Feliks. Molotov Remembers. Chicago: I. R. Dee, 1993, p. 213
 
 
This addendum to Lenin's testament was read after his death to a plenary meeting of the Central Committee.
Basseches, Nikolaus. Stalin. London, New York: Staples Press, 1952, p. 108
 
            Khrushchev's treatment of the relations between Stalin and Lenin concentrates on Lenin's growing apprehension of Stalin's bureaucratic methods in 1923.  He omits Lenin's earlier admiration for Stalin and his forwarding of Stalin's career in the Party dating back at least to 1912.  Nor does he note that Lenin's later attacks on Stalin were made when Lenin was ill and cut off from Party activity, and that even then, in his "testament," he considered Stalin to be one of the outstanding Party leaders, his faults not those of "non-Bolshevism"--as with Trotsky--but of an over-bureaucratic method of work and personal "rudeness."  The fact that people who had "worked with Lenin" were executed means little unless we know who the people were and why they were executed.  The fact that people worked with Lenin does not mean they were pro-socialist, as witness Kamenev & Zinoviev, both of whom Lenin condemned in his "testament."
Cameron, Kenneth Neill. Stalin, Man of Contradiction. Toronto: NC Press, c1987, p. 124
 
            [In the Testament] neither his [Stalin] orthodoxy as a party man nor his loyalty to Lenin were called to question.
Graham, Stephen. Stalin. Port Washington, New York: Kennikat Press, 1970, p. 90
 
            Another strange thing: of all those mentioned in the letter Stalin appears in the most favorable light.  He is the one Lenin accuses of rudeness and intolerance, but that was never regarded as a fault in the proletarian party.
Radzinsky, Edvard.  Stalin. New York: Doubleday, c1996, p. 208
++146 1