INTRODUCTION

Unions in Central and Eastern Europe played a key role in the changes during the period 1986 to 2000. These changes were called "the collapse of the Soviet Union" to some, and to others "the processes of democratisation". Perspectives on these changes vary greatly. To the people who experienced these changes first hand, however, the reality of what has happened has been very different from expectations. People in Ukraine and Russia have had to cope with the uncharted waters of new nationhood, transforming to a market economy, new constitutions, accelerated European integration, more direct exposure to global neo-liberalism; pressure from the International Monetary Fund, and serious threats to the rule of law and justice. The major challenges have been and continue to be:

• Struggle for acceptance of unions as genuine social partners;
• Non-payment of wages and pensions;
• Enforcement of rights;
• Unemployment and pauperisation, with growing gap between rich and poor;
• Resultant growth of informal sector, grey economy, and corruption;
• Privatisation gone wild;
• Breakdown in education, health and social security systems;
• Making legislative equality into reality.

Part two examines the contemporary situation of unions in Ukraine, in particular teachers' unions. There are challenges which all unions face, and there are those which are specific to teachers' unions. The economic and legislative context, problems of curruption, issues of union democracy, and financial problems are all addressed. There is also a focus on the internal dynamic of the union and relations between members and the union leadership. These are crucial considerations in understanding the potential of any union-coordinated projects. The main purpose of part three is to analyse the role and to suggest a potential future role of unions in the larger context of the changes that are occuring and the goals which Ukainian workers might adopt. Part four outlines the specific conclusions which follow from this analysis and translates these into practical project ideas. This study should be seen in the context of other comparable studies done by myself in advance of international solidarity projects in Poland and Russia. These can be read here:

1.2 THE HISTORICAL PAST AND PRESENT DAY UKRAINE: NOSTALGIA OR REJECTION?

I addressed such questions to those over 40 years old. With respect to "good things", opinions varied according to socio-linguistic background. Most, especially Russian-speakers, felt that there were more "good things" during the Brezhnev period. Recognition of problems but nevertheless an optimism about the current period was highest amonst Ukrainian-speakers. This split of attitudes seems to be the most common response to current everyday problems. Very few in this age group, and these were almost all Ukrainian-speakers, considered the period of national independence (since 1991) as having brought more "good things". This can also be explained by nostalgia for the past "zastoi" times. This nostalgia was especially true for Russian-speakers. Due to the obvious and considerable decline in the standard of living, Ukrainians of both groups seem to have lost much of their initial hope, if they had any, that independence would bring rapid social and economic benefits. Russian-speakers had little such hope to begin with.

Having said this, there is also a minority which assessed the Khrushchev period in a positive light. This was a period when Stalinism was being purged and attempts were made to develop a more democratic system and reform the economy. Many people spoke highly of Khrushchev's personality and his political actions. Such attitudes are more common amongst Russian-speakers.

With respect to "bad things" as well, opinions also varied according to socio-linguistic background. Russian-speakers tend to view the recent independence period as having more "bad things" introduced. Optimism about the current period was higher amonst Ukrainian-speakers.

There were even some older people who expressed a positive attitude towards the Stalin era. These people considered themselves "Communists" and stressed the context of Soviet losses during the war and competition from Western capitalism. These people tended to support the idea that only unpopular repressive command-administrative methods can change the situation in Ukraine for the better. But these people are few in number and only, in my experience, in the Russian-speaking population.

At the other end of the political spectrum, there are also a small number of people who sympathize with totalitarianism. The relatively small numbers of supporters of totalitarianism of the right or revolutionary dictatorship of the left indicates that Ukrainian society is managing to achieve a balance between conflicting political forces that are on the fringes of socio-political life. That most Ukrainians have a positive opinion towards the "thaw" of the Khrushchev period and the Gorbachev period of perestroika indicates a certain level of democratic consciousness as well as the inclination towards democratic change and a society based on democratic principles.

Most Ukrainians associate the past with a strong single-party system, the main body of which was the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU). While many Russian-speaking Ukrainians see this in a possitive light, most Ukrainian-speakers see this history in a negative light. Nevertheless, it is logical that, in addition to other factors, all Ukrainians' attitudes towards the political parties of today depend on what elements of historical consciousness and memory are reflected in the parties' program and its political orientation.

With the new political multi-party system, the citizens of Ukraine found themselves faced with a difficult problem, the problem of choice. This political system requires that every citizen define his or her own attitudes toward the ongoing changes. It demands a strong sense of individualitya, the ability to make resolute decisions, and to translate all of this into support for particular political movements. For many Ukrainians this was new, as this type of personality could not develop under the earlier one-party system.

Although there is no apparent "generation conflict" in Ukraine, it should be taken noted that there are a substantial number of older people in society who were brought up under the one-party political system. Through hard work, these people were assured certain social guarantees. They have their own vision of the country as an economically developed world power, which accounts for their extreme dissatisfaction with the current situation in Ukraine.

Briefly, the political situation in Ukraine can be characterized as being in transition from the Soviet planned economy (refered to by me as "State Capitalism") to a modern Western-style state based on a market economy. Like most CIS countries, Ukraine is experiencing a slow and painful process of launching a market economy while searching for the most effective administrative mechanism to minimize transition "losses" to society. The development of such mechanisms is no less important than market reforms, especially during the formation of the Ukrainian state. The problem is aggravated by the previous practice of governing during the Soviet period wherein political institutions sought to control people's private lives entirely. Although the desire to do so is strong at times, the experience of other CIS societies shows that it is impossible to change the long standing administrative system all at once.

Although much time has passed since Ukraine proclaimed (so-called) "democratic reforms", many people do not feel than any radical changes have taken place. It is understandable that after all of the "storms and shocks of perestroika" and the dramatic events associated with independence, most of the population of Ukraine rejects the idea of rapid revolutionary change. While everyone I spoke to felt that there was a need for change, few people I spoke to supported radical change by revolutionary means. The majority believe that Ukrainian society should be improved by gradual reformation, i.e. evolutionary change. Unions present organizational opportunities for such changes.

This century has shown that to a large extent, the success of "democratic" reforms depends on the level of people's support. "Democracy" as an abstract ideal or concept is very attractive to Ukrainians. Adherence to democratic principles both in every day life and at the social level seems to be a key aspect of Ukrainian public mentality.

This can probably explain the fact that despite all of the difficulties of the transition period and the economic decline often associated with political change, most citizens of Ukraine prefer to live in a democratic, civil state. Most of them imagine this type of state as one in which there are free elections to the most important bodies of power, all citizens having equal rights, political and civil rights being guaranteed, citizens being respected, and citizens' human dignity being protected.

Most seemed to consider respect for citizens as an important sign of democracy. This may be a response to the way wars, famines, and Stalinism affected life in Ukraine. The long history of suffering and totalitarianism in Ukraine has produced the desire for the protection of social rights and respect for citizens. Thus, such democratic characteristics as equal rights, protection of society and its citizens from illegal actions, and bringing up people in the spirit of human dignity were mentioned most often as being important. These characteristics are regarded as the first and most important signs of democracy and were considered either "very important" or "important" for most of the people I spoke with.

At this same time, such classical indicators as free elections and political rights (which are perceived as very important in the West) appeared to be less important for many people. This distribution of priorities can probably be explained by disappointment in the efficacy of free elections as a means of forming political bodies which are accountable to society. Political rights without economic or administrative support are often perceived as something abstract. In fact, political rights have been negated by the abuse of economic and administrative mechanisms to manipulate political choice rather than support it. This seems to be a result of the gross political and electoral corruption seen in Ukraine recently. Few people I spoke with have any trust in political parties or politicians. As a result, few now have any respect for the political process itself, and some even consider free elections as unimportant for the development of real democracy. There may be more opportunities to build on workers trust in their unions than in trust in any political party.

The current political regime in Ukraine, led by President L. Kuchma, can be described as a transitional one, combining the main components of the old Soviet planned and the new "free market" political systems. Any evolution towards social health and real democracy will depend on the degree to which economic and political reforms meet people's expectations of life in a democratic society.

The problem of global political choices persists even though there is still a clear preference expressed in Ukraine for the democratic model. The idea of democracy in the context of equal civil rights, providing legal protection for minorities and effective measures against state tyranny, is widely accepted. Most Ukrainians would prefer to live in a society where civil rights are not violated and the state guarantees that they are upheld. Most that I spoke with feel that the state must respect the rights of ethnic and religious minorities that reside in Ukraine.

At the same time, attitudes towards the economic and political basis and strategies for change toward democracy and social health differ considerably. For example, I often asked about the need for state intervention into various spheres of social life, particularly the economy. Is Ukrainian society ready to live under conditions whereby the economy is regulated by the market? Most felt that it is not. Many said they preferred to live in a country where there is regulation of the economy and the establishment of stable prices and salaries. Few expressed a preferece for a model where the economy is regulated by the market and the state does not interfere.

But Ukrainians mistrust the government to provide this regulation. This attitude, might suggest an important role for unions as a foil to the power of governments. And so, of course, I also often asked about possibilities of changes through union action. Unfortunately, there seems to be the same lack of confidence amongst Ukrainians' in changes accomplished through union action.

Of course, economic difficulties and a rapid decrease in material status is in part responsible for Ukrainians' disillusionment with the possibility of improving their situation through market reform, government regulations, or union action. This is why there is a feeling amongst many that they would like to simply return to the times when economic relations were regulated by those in power and the population had minimal but stable social guarantees and confidence in the future. It is also an explanation for why many Ukrainians accept democratic political values, but do not support the material basis for free market capitalism.

This is also revealed in Ukrainians' attitudes towards the state's role in providing social protection. Although most stated that they were ready to live in a society in which one's material status depends on personal ability and work, they are not opposed to the state being responsible for a "normal life." Most prefer to live in a country where the state provides absolutely everyone with a certain standard of living.

Thus there is still a strong desire for the state, rather than unions, to interfere with the economy by fixing prices and salaries and for the state to provide a certain standard of living. While those of us on the left see this as a legitimate socio-political choice, those on the right see this choice as a hang-over from the old system or even a symptom of a socialist consciousness. From both perspectives, these attitudes can be a considerable obstacle to further radical reform either towards free market capitalism or a strengthening of unions since the population is not sufficiently ready to speed up reforms in either of these directions. The attitudes include a fear of risk, a lack of personal initiative, and a lack of responsibility for one's own material status and family well being. This can be seen in the low participation rate in entrepreneurial businesses and unions.

This situation makes it difficult to predict how the present political regime will evolve. The evolution will be conditioned first of all by internal factors such as the current authority's ability to:

• stop declining production;
• to stabilize the financial system;
• to improve the standard of living for the majority of the population;
• to solve the most acute problems in the economic and political spheres;
• to achieve positive changes in the social and economic spheres.
• and to do all of this in accordance with the will of the people.

In the absence of such improvements, it seems that the idea of the civil market model will not be accepted by Ukrainians. If this were to become apparant, then certainly the alternative of abandoning the current path would be increasingly considered. What this would mean, and how this would be labelled, depends on one's political perspective. Some would call it a return to socialims, others would call it a return to totalitarianism. In both scenarios, continued reforms toward market capitalism or a return to a planned economy, the role of strong and democratic unions is extremely important.

How likely is a change in direction? Even now, a signifant part of the population thinks that abandoning reforms and returning to earlier conditions is desirable, although some of these expressed an opinion that it is impossible considering the current hegemony of market capitalism.

In the West, we tend to believe that the clear division of executive, legislative and judicial power is one of the most important indications of democracy. Ukrainians seem to accept the idea of such a division and would like to live in a state in which the functions and responsibilities of each branch of power are legally defined. Unfortunately there is a significant confrontation among the different branches of power, a rapidly declining prestige of local legal bodies, and an obvious weakness of the public prosecutor system, police and other power structures. The recent Gondadeze case is illustrative. There is a strong possibility that if the confrontation between the executive and legislative branches continues, the willingness to accept some kind of totalitarian regime will grow. Many feel that Kutchma is already assuming this role. The recent changes in the constitution, brought about by a highly questionable referendum, seem to support this view that the office of the President is increasingly powerful.

Therefore, individual political self-identification may provide interesting perspectives in addtion to considerations of election results and party membership information. In my experience, most of the people I spoke with were either apolitical or centrist. However, there was a significant minority, especially in Donetsk, which seemed to me be on the left. However, I was mostly in the Russian-speaking East. The same is not true in the Ukrainian-speaking West of Ukraine, which is more political, more anti-union, and there is even a significant rightist minority. It seems that the proportion of adherents to leftist political ideas in the central, southern or northeastern regions is about equal to the proportion of those with rightist views in Western Ukraine. But this is only in terms of proportion, because the West has a much smaller population than these other leftist regions of Ukraine.

Older people especially seemed to be disproportionaltely more on the left. Younger people tend to reject both the left and unionism. These older and Russian-speaking people in the East, who tend to be on the political left, tend to be more concerned than other Ukrainians when it comes to social issues. They oppose Ukrainian society's widening gaps between rich and poor, general price increases and declines in wages. They also advocate close ties with Russia.

Younger and Ukrainian-speaking people in the West, who tend to be on the political right, are most worried about a possible communist revival and state interferance in the economy. They oppose Ukrainian membership in the CIS and advocate for closer ties with Europe and the West rather than with Russia.

Comparing the politcial attitudes of Ukrainian men and women, it is the men who seem to be more interested in political life and are more willing to share their opinions. However, this difference seemed to be reversed with respect to unionism. It was the women who seemed to be more interested in unions as a socio-economic force in society.

Perhaps the most common characteristic shared by the majority of both East and West, Russian-speaking and Ukrainian-speaking, young and old, male and female, is a difficulty in identifying their political self-definition in terms of "left" or "right". Some, especially in Kiev, Yalta, and Lugansk had difficulty identifying their political views. Most who could define themselves, considered themselves "centrists". There is also a general sense of disillusionment with contemporary politics, including such self-identification.

Surveys of confidence ratings reflect that neither political parties, rich people, the police, the army, the national government, regional governments, local governments, unions, businesses (such as banks and private enterprises), nor other institutions enjoy much public trust.

Only religious organizations, where there seems to be little self-interested corruption, enjoy much public trust.

It is, therefore, important to examine the peculiarities of the current political situation and the genesis of political attitudes which form the core of Ukrainian mass political consciousness. Here it is important to remember that the fact that key elements of the old Soviet bureaucratic system remain untouched considerably hampers both economic reform and political transformation. These elements include an abnormally large state sector within the economy and the continued functioning of the Communist Party within politics. A common aspect of the historical consciousness of some citizens is that they still think that communist-socialist forces can solve their problems. This can be seen in such statements as, "it was no worse then than it is now", "at least you could get a free education", or "we didn't have this much crime", etc. Those who sympathize with right radical organizations such as the SNPU, UNA-UNSO, OUN, KUN, VPO or DSU believe that only this type of organization (assuming they come to power) can provide prosperity and rid society of the remnants of (what they would call) "Communist totalitarianism".

It is questionable, though, whether those in power actually regard their political parties and blocs as links between the state and the people --considering that so few Ukrainians acctually support or even express trust in these organizations.

It seems that the attitute developing is that Ukrainians' interest in political parties, movements, and specific political events depends more and more on how these things affect everyday life. There is an increasing tendency for people to stop thinking that social and political structures, especially political parties, can improve their lives.

This has caused a rift in the mass political consciousness. Although the majority of people believe that political organizations should exist, they refuse to personally participate in the political process. They do not see the political as personal, as most do in the West.

One reason for this political indifference is the inability of political parties and movements to move beyond the old propaganda approaches. It is commonly believed that politicians say one thing and then do another. It is important, for the future that political organizations express solutions to problems based on a new set of public priorities, and then act on these solutions according to these priorities.

Of the small proportion of Ukrainians who do express support and connect thier hopes with a political party, these parties predominantly are the communists and socialists --than with any other political group. This raises the question as to whether the lack of new political parties and the lack of social influence of the old parties explains the waning support for political parties in general in addition to the increasing indifference toward political life.

Interestingly, in explaining why they support a given party, the majority of Ukrainians I spoke to could not say anything about the other political parties or blocs.

1.7 ATTITUDES TOWARDS THE DIFFERENT BRANCHES OF POWER

In any country, the president appears as the legitimate policy maker reflecting national and state unity and protecting state interests. It is therefore important to explore attitudes towards the "First Person" of the state and determine people's regard for this office and their expectations of this person.

Confidence in the president has declined significantly during the last few years --especially after the release of tapes which appeared to link L. Kuchma to the death of journalist Gondadeze. Kuchma now enjoys only a very low level of public trust, amonst the Ukrainians I spoke with.

Of the leaders of the different branches of power (L. Kuchma, O. Moroz and Prime Minister E. Marchuk), Kuchma's actions elicited the strongest opinions.

Ukrainians seem willing to accept further economic reforms but not those instituted by Kuchma's team. At the same time, there are strong expressions that the president's ordinances do not really have any effect as they are simply not fulfilled. Such views were especially strong in Lugansk, Yalta, and Donetsk.

Most people I spoke with expressed a lack of confidence not only in the Office of the President, but also in the Cabinet of Ministers, regional authorities and local authorities as well. This indicates that Ukrainians should be more concerned with the effectiveness of the various levels of the executive body, and less concerned with the distribution of power.

There also seemed to be support for the strengthening of the executive system at the local level. Many expressed a belief that the situation in Ukraine will be improved only when the local Soviets have more executive and legislative power in the country.

Of course, support for President Kuchma varies from region to region, with more support in the West and less in the other regions.

Attitudes towards the Supreme Soviet of Ukraine are also worth examining. Few that I spoke with expressed trust for the Supreme Soviet, and most expressed significant distrust.

There seems to be little hope that the newly elected Supreme Soviet (elections were in November 1999) can improve the situation. Most seem to think that a new parliament will work the same way as did the old one.

The level of confidence in the Cabinet of Ministers is also quite low and many expressed a belief that the cabinet should be reformed.

The communists had proposed submitting the following issues for a national referendum:

• social protection;
• the conservation of social gains;
• the expediency of the presidency;
• national symbols;
• language status;
• membership in the "voluntary union of independent nations";

The issues that did get on to the referendum, however, were very different. These were:

• 1.
• 2.
• 3.
• 4.
• 5.

There are also questions of citizenship and ethnic background. The vast majority of Ukrainians want these to be solved in a peaceful civilized way. There is a general acceptance that individuals with Ukrainian citizenship should all be equal regardless of their nationality, religion, or political views. The feeling is that a Ukrainian is first and foremost a citizen of Ukraine, not a person of a certain nationality.

The most important point, however, is that the idea of Ukrainian self rule can not be confined to state symbols including the constitution, but must include the appropriate socio-economic base. M. Grushevskiy stated that the Ukrainian national idea was not destroyed by Bolshevik bayonets, but by the inability of the state Duma to institute socio-economic policies that would satisfy the masses.

Today, the future of the idea of Ukrainian self-determination, and in fact the state itself, depends primarily on economic reforms, people's attitudes towards them, and people's material well-being. Ukraine is following a peculiar but civilized path from the administrative model to a bureaucratic society. This path differs in many respects from the path chosen by neighboring countries.

I was particularly interested in whether Ukrainians were concerned about possible dependence on Western credits. This seems not to be of great concern.

This is also an issue which worries older people more than the youth.

It seems that perceptions about Russian TV correlate to how people perceive this issue. Russian TV seems to be trusted and relied upon (more than Ukrainian TV) by those advocating for close ties with Russia.

• to what degree are the ideas of radical reform popular among different social groups?
• what kind of market model do people expect?
• how do Ukrainians feel about privatization?
• does the present economic reality meet these expectations?

Such contradictions in views can be explained by people's understanding of the market economy and how it is formed. Most Ukrainians feel that market reforms should be accompanied by various social protection measures. They are not as clear on what these measures should be and how they fit into a market economic model. Most Ukrainians seem to want the government to have at least some control over prices and establish minimum salaries. Many express this by saying they want the state to guarantee a "normal life" to everyone through such means.

Ukrainian society seems to continue to have strong paternalistic attitudes towards the state despite mistrust of the government and support for a market economy and reforms in principle. These attitudes are also expressed when discussing Ukrainians' attitudes towards social justice.

Most Ukrainians believe that the division between rich and poor is unjust while very few express the belief that it is natural for society.

People's attitudes towards social justice issues seems to be correlated with their material level. The Ukrainians of higher income, tend to be the less likely to support equality.

After the declines of the period 1988 to 1995, Ukraine achieved a certain leverl of macroeconomic stabilization between 1995 and 1998. This had a positive influence on living standards. Since the crash of August 1998, however, living standards have declined significantly.

Material self-perception largely seems to depend on such factors as gender, age, education, and social status. Women are usually more critical of their social status than are men. The youth are less critical than the old concerning their social status, but the material situation of young people seems to depend largely on their parents' well-being. Pensioners, especially those who are 60 years and older, are in the most difficult situation.

Employment does not appear to affect perceptions of poverty. Most of the employed, especially teachers, perceived their material level as low or lower than average. This included workers and technical specialists with university education.

Impressions of the poor are difficult to interpret. The unemployed should not be seen as members of unprotected social groups. A large number of the unemployed are highly qualified workers who in most industrial countries comprise the working class. The Ukrainian poor are mainly people who had average incomes up until the end of the 1980s.

In Ukraine, poverty is accompanied by a general decline is social conditions. This has led to increasing concern about acute social problems, in addition to one's own standard of living. Most of the people I spoke to were worried about problems associated with getting an education, and most expressed concern about the problematic drinking of a member of their family.

The most acute problems seem to be:

• low income;
• health problems;
• poor living conditions.

It seems that all socio-demographic groups are characterized by a general dissatisfaction with their lives.

Many people cited several factors that worried them, including:

• "the slow degradation of our society";
• "high rent";
• "no chance to educate my children";
• "increasing alcoholism and drug use";
• "bad attitude towards pensioners and veterans of the Great Patriot War" (which how they refer in Eastern Europe to the Second World War);
• "loss of contact with relatives living in other CIS countries";
• "the desperate situation among old people";
• "increasing prices for public services";
• "irregular salaries".

The current state of society is characterized by the prevalence of pessimistic attitudes towards life's prospects. Many stated that they expected life to get worse in the future while the others either did not have any opinion or did not expect any changes at all.

Some rhetorical questions were commonly heard --such as, "How can I raise my grandchildren in the spirit of respect for honest work if my 35 years of service does not give me a normal pension?" or "How can you bring your kids up in the spirit of human dignity if only drug pushers and prostitutes live well?"